by Karen Ysabelle R. David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk

In a world where natural disasters grow ever more frequent and ever more worse due to climate change, the disaster-prone countries of Southeast Asia are racing to find a way to slow the threat. This week in the Pacific Corridor, the Philippines and Vietnam are heeding the green light to go green.

For the Philippines, digital transformation and the green transition go hand-in-hand. But can the former really bring about the latter when the country’s electricity system and the hundreds of thousands of tons of electronic waste that it generates are not exactly shining examples of sustainability? Vietnam is navigating a similar paradox, as its accelerating policy push for a circular economy outpaces the reality on the ground. Hanoi must move beyond promises and policies if it hopes to make any difference at all.

But for the young people of Singapore this week, climate anxieties are a distant worry when compared to the frustrating reality of a confusing entry-level job market. In the absence of government policy, Singaporean youth are addressing the issue of youth unemployment by taking matters into their own hands.

Singapore 🇸🇬

When Students Build What Institutions Won’t: Singapore’s Youth-Led Job Intelligence Movement

by Ryan

In Singapore’s increasingly opaque entry-level job market, a small but growing cohort of students and recent graduates has taken matters into their own hands. One of the most notable results is didtheyghost.me, an open-source, community-driven platform that allows applicants to track internship applications, log interview timelines, and flag companies that never respond. Built by job applicants for job applicants, the platform describes itself not as a job scraper or another job board, but as something closer to an archive of the application experience itself, helping users to answer burning questions like how long it typically takes to hear back from a given company. A parallel community-maintained GitHub repository for Singapore’s Summer 2026 tech internships has already logged 439 commits from contributors adding and verifying listings, a quiet but telling display of collective self-organization.

These tools did not emerge in a vacuum. Just 74.4% of 2025 university graduates in the labor force secured a full-time job, down sharply from 87.5% of their 2022 counterparts, while the proportion unemployed and actively searching rose to 10.5% from 3.6% in 2022, and the median gross monthly salary has held flat at SGD4,500 for two consecutive years. Layered atop these cyclical pressures is a structural one: artificial intelligence (AI). The anxiety in Singapore is measurable: almost 30% of respondents in NTUC’s 2026 economic sentiments survey felt anxious that AI would replace their job, prompting the union to launch its AI-Ready SG initiative in February 2026, offering 50% subsidies for AI tools and training alongside structured learning pathways.

Singaporean students are not waiting passively for conditions to improve. Faced with a hiring market that increasingly values demonstrated experience over academic credentials, many are pursuing multiple internships before graduation. Most NUS, NTU, and SMU undergraduate programs already include at least one formal internship, with SMU requiring ten weeks as a graduation requirement, but for competitive students the curricular minimum has become a floor rather than a ceiling. The perceived value of internships among graduates rose to 38% in 2025 from 28% the year before, while only 23% now view academic results as an important factor in the job market. Students are simultaneously building portfolios of independent projects and pursuing AI certifications, with 59% of Singapore graduates believing AI skills provide a competitive edge, well above the global average of 40%. The graduating class of 2026 is also screening out roles that do not disclose compensation at a significantly higher rate than previous cohorts, signaling that this generation approaches the job search with a level of market intelligence that earlier cohorts lacked.

The challenge is not unique to Singapore. In Indonesia, unemployment among those aged 15 to 24 stands at 16.26%, the highest of any age group, and despite a national internship program, structural gaps persist. The Philippines recorded youth unemployment of 12.2%, prompting a new ten-year National Education and Workforce Development Plan. Vietnam’s youth unemployment rate among those aged 15 to 24 sits at 9.0%, four times the national average. Malaysia fares better, with graduate unemployment at 3.2% and overall unemployment falling to 2.9% by late 2025, the lowest since 2014, though skills mismatches remain a persistent concern across the region. Across all these markets, it is young people themselves who have most clearly diagnosed the problem and moved fastest to address it, whether by coding platforms to track hiring transparency, stacking internships to build real-world credibility, or upskilling into AI at a pace that institutions have struggled to match. In an environment where the rules of entry-level employment are being rewritten faster than policy can respond, that resourcefulness may prove to be the most transferable skill of all.


Ryan is a final-year finance student at the Singapore University of Social Sciences (SUSS) with experience across venture capital, venture debt, and business development. He also holds a diploma in Law and Management from Temasek Polytechnic. His interests lie in how emerging technologies and economic trends shape business ecosystems and regional development in Asia.

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The Philippines 🇵🇭

Why the Philippines needs a Green Foundation for Digital Transformation

by Arianne De Guzman, in Bulacan

Digital transformation and the green transition are considered as mutually reinforcing goals. While the former emphasizes economic growth and innovation, the latter prioritizes sustainability and climate resilience.

On 2 June 2026, Philippine Department of Trade (DTI) Secretary Ma. Cristina A. Roque stated that the recently signed ASEAN Digital Economy Framework Agreement (DEFA) is anticipated to boost investments to strengthen digital transformation and participation in the Philippine digital economy. The DEFA projects that the value of ASEAN’s digital economy will double in value to US$2 trillion by 2030, as it will accelerate cross-border digital trade, electronic commerce, digital payments, cybersecurity, and data governance.

“For the Philippines, the DEFA is set to bring real benefits to everyday Filipinos,” DTI Secretary Roque said. The agreement is expected to strengthen digital participation in the country and empower micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMES) by creating job opportunities.

While the economic benefits of digital transformation are becoming clearer, the green transition also becomes another major policy objective.

At first glance, digital transformation can help advance environmental goals, as it can reduce paper consumption, streamline transactions, and build efficient systems. In actuality, each online payment, AI-generated response, or cloud-based service relies on data centers, a facility where data is stored, processed, and transmitted.

As the Philippines positions itself as a data center hub in Southeast Asia, power demand is expected to increase substantially. Data centers require a significant amount of electricity and water through power grids and cooling systems, and generate volumes of electronic waste, contributing to carbon emissions and environmental pollution.

This creates a central policy dilemma: digital transformation depends on electricity, but its sustainability depends on how that electricity is produced. The Philippines’ electricity system is still heavily reliant on fossil fuels, with coal supplying about 60% and natural gas 18%, indicating that over three-quarters of power comes from non-renewable sources. In contrast, renewable energy adoption remains uneven, with greater reliance on geothermal and hydropower, while solar and wind still account for only a small share.

The same tension appears in electronic waste. In 2022, the Philippines generated around 537,000 metric tons of Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE), the highest volume in Southeast Asia. According to the 2024 Global E-waste Monitor published by the United Nations, the country remains the region’s largest producer of e-waste. This also provides another reflection about technological advancement — it reinforces the culture of rapid replacement, where electronic devices are continuously produced and discarded even when they remain functional. Green transition, in this sense, cannot rely on recycling alone. It also requires revisiting how technology is valued, designed, consumed.

Tools such as energy monitoring, Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) reporting systems, and access to green finance platforms are now digital by default. Businesses and institutions with digital capacity should be better able to comply with sustainability requirements and access climate-linked investment.

Digital transformation is not the core problem; the question is whether the Philippines is capable of adequately addressing its ecological implications. The Philippines thus finds itself navigating a dual transition: balancing the pursuit of digital advancements, all while keeping in mind ecological well-being.

This dual transition is contingent upon whether digital transformation is matched by balanced investments in digital infrastructure and clean energy and stronger environmental governance. Without this alignment, digital transformation risks undermining the very sustainability benefits it seeks to achieve.


Arianne has experience in policy research at De La Salle University’s Jesse M. Robredo Institute of Governance, where she contributed to projects on systemic reform. She earned a degree in Political Science from Colegio de San Juan de Letran. Currently, she works in government relations, specializing in advocacy strategy, legislative monitoring, and stakeholder engagement. Beyond her professional work, she is actively involved in youth development and grassroots initiatives through the Rotaract Club of Santa Maria.

Vietnam 🇻🇳

Vietnam’s Circular Ambition, Linear Reality

by Hang Nguyen, in Ho Chi Minh City

Vietnam’s accelerating policy ambitions for the post-2025 period have placed the circular economy alongside the digital and green economies as a core engine of the country’s new growth model. The 14th National Party Congress Resolution explicitly mandates that Vietnam “develop the digital economy, green economy, circular economy” and pursue “green conversion, energy transition, and structural transformation” as interlinked national priorities. Yet, as with the twin tensions between green and digital transitions explored previously, the circular economy presents its own paradox: an increasingly robust legal scaffolding that has, so far, failed to translate into meaningful behavioral change on the ground.

The policy trajectory has been swift. The term “circular economy” did not appear in any official Vietnamese document before 2016. By 2021, it had entered Party political discourse for the first time through the 13th Party Congress Resolution. The Law on Environmental Protection (2020) provided the first statutory definition — framing the circular economy as an economic model aimed at reducing raw material use, extending product lifecycles, and minimizing waste — and introduced Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) obligations for producers of plastics, electronics, batteries, and tires. Decision No. 687/QD-TTg followed in 2022 with ambitious quantitative targets: a 15% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions per GDP and recycling of 85% of plastic waste by 2030. Most recently, Decision No. 222/QD-TTg (January 2025) established a National Action Plan for Circular Economy by 2035, while Decree 110/2026/NĐ-CP and Decree 29/2026/NĐ-CP have refined EPR obligations and introduced a domestic carbon trading system, respectively.

The breadth of this regulatory output is considerable. The challenge, however, lies not in the absence of legislative ambition, but in the gap between policy intent and operational reality — a pattern that should be familiar to observers of Vietnam’s broader development strategy. The circular economy’s legal definition, enshrined in the 2020 law, remains narrowly environmental in orientation, focusing on emissions and waste reduction, all while overlooking the model’s deeper economic logic: optimizing resource flows across sectors, linking production chains, improving labor productivity, and generating new economic value. This framing limits policy instruments to environmental tools and fails to engage the business community on genuinely economic terms.

Compounding this is the fragmentation of relevant regulations across multiple laws — environmental protection, natural resources tax, forestry, and consumer rights — without a unifying framework or dedicated coordinating agency. Empirical research on circular agriculture in Vietnam’s Central Highlands found that national government mandates had a statistically insignificant influence on actual farm-level adoption of circular practices, underscoring the disconnect between top-down directives and ground-level behavior. The EPR system, while codified, is still embedding itself in producer compliance routines, and recycling infrastructure outside major urban centers remains severely underdeveloped.

For the circular economy to move beyond its current status as a well-documented aspiration, Vietnam must treat institutional architecture as the central reform priority. This means designating a coordinating body with cross-ministerial authority; synchronizing incentive structures across tax, finance, and procurement policy; and building the decentralized implementation capacity that local governments currently lack. Without this shift, Vietnam risks repeating the same pattern it faces in its green and digital transitions: coherent strategy, fragmented execution.


Hang is a young researcher with academic experience in Vietnam and the United States. She has previously worked in public relations at the U.S. Consulate General in Ho Chi Minh City and the YSEALI Academy. Her research focuses on ASEAN centrality in the evolving Asia-Pacific landscape, with particular attention to Vietnam’s approach to trade, regional cooperation, and political economy in the face of external power dynamics and global volatility.

Editorial Deadline 16/06/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Siu Tzyy Wei, Lead Editor - Maritime Crescent Desk

This week, the cauldron of Southeast Asia simmers - the heat coming more from just the weather.

In Indonesia, the streets and markets reveal what happens when fiscal fuel runs low and public trust, once again, boils over. In Brunei, talks of an upcoming visit to Kazan shows how small states must balance carefully amidst larger flames of great power rivalry. In Malaysia, the return of El Niño reminds us that climate itself is a change that tests resilience across food, water and health.

Together, these stories capture a region living at the boil. Diplomacy, economics and climate each add their own heat to the cauldron, and survival depends on how long the pot can be kept from spilling over.

Indonesia 🇮🇩

Running the Country on Empty?

by Rayhan Prabu Kusumo, in Jakarta

On June 12, after Friday prayers, around 1,500 students marched toward Bundaran HI behind a line of six thousand police. Their demands read like a list: bring fuel prices down, stop wasting the budget, roll back the costly flagship programs, pull the military back out of civilian institutions, and have the President acknowledge that his government has been making mistakes. It is tempting to treat these as five complaints, but they are closer to five symptoms of one thing.

The protest landed at the end of a bruising few months for the economy. The rupiah had been weakening since early in the year. Global oil prices were part of it, but the heavier pressure was sustained capital flight. Foreign investors had pulled a cumulative $3.36 billion from the Jakarta stock exchange by mid-year, and the Jakarta Composite Index was down more than 30% from its historical peak, the worst-performing equity index in the world for 2026. In the government securities market, foreigners booked net sales of Rp 15.43 trillion between the end of 2025 and May 2026, against net purchases of Rp 49.62 trillion in the same months a year earlier. The money was leaving on a judgment about where the budget was headed.

Against that, Pertamina raised non-subsidised Pertamax by more than 32%, announced in the middle of the night with no prior public warning, and the cost fell on the middle class that relies on it. A government with little room left moves in large steps like this one, because the room had been spent before the shock arrived.

The pressure in the markets traces back to a way of spending. Free meals, the Red-and-White village cooperatives, and the other flagships were each launched fast and large, ahead of the institutions meant to run them. Whatever the programs deliver, the commitment is fixed and the bill returns every year. That is the line foreign investors have been reading. Pulling their money out of Jakarta was a judgment on a government that keeps adding permanent costs faster than it builds the capacity to carry them.

The same spending pattern is what brings people into the street. The demonstrations have recurred since Prabowo took office in late 2024, against VAT increases, education cuts, parliamentary housing allowances, and the military’s creep into civilian institutions. What connects them is a steady loss of trust as the people no longer believe the government is working in their interest.

The rupiah has recovered from its all time low and the street has quieted, which is a real if narrow opening. It is not worth much spent on patching a single program, because the problem is the habit of committing to large, permanent programs before the capacity to run them exists. Investors across the region are reading the fiscal line, and the public stopped believing the press releases some time ago.


Rayhan has a background in government affairs and public policy, with experience across government institutions and advisory firms. His work focuses on the intersection of geopolitics, policy, and risk, with expertise in advocacy, regulatory analysis, and stakeholder engagement. He holds a degree in Government from Universitas Padjadjaran, and has completed an exchange at Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Spain, focusing on global politics and sustainability.

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Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳

The Road to Kazan

by Wira Gregory Ejau, in Bandar Seri Begawan

Between June 17-18, ASEAN leaders will travel to Kazan for the bloc’s first in-person summit with Russia since Sochi in 2016. Only a week ago, the Russian Embassy in Bandar Seri Begawan held its annual Russia Day reception on the 7th of June, a modest diplomatic occasion that, perhaps, precedes something considerably larger. Brunei will be among the ASEAN leaders invited by Vladimir Putin to attend the ASEAN-Russia Commemorative Summit in Kazan, marking 35 years of dialogue relations.

The visit to Kazan is an expression of ASEAN’s longstanding practice of maintaining dialogue with all major powers, independent of their conduct in other theatres. Brunei, as the current ASEAN-EU Dialogue Relations Coordinator for the 2024-2027 term, has spent the past several months at the institutional centre of Europe’s deepening engagement with Southeast Asia, such as hosting the 25th ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting in April, facilitating Germany’s bid for ASEAN Sectoral Dialogue Partnership, and stewarding a relationship that both sides are building toward its 50th anniversary in 2027.

During the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian war in 2024, Brunei maintained a steadfast adherence to the doctrine of constructive neutrality. Notwithstanding the complexities of the current international legal landscape, Brunei expressed concern over the escalation of tensions and military actions in Ukraine without naming Russia explicitly. Maintaining this position while sending a head of state to meet Putin in person, on Russian soil, three years into that war, exemplifies engagement without endorsement, access without alignment.

What makes Kazan substantively interesting is the agenda Russia has brought to it: a successor Comprehensive Plan of Action for 2026-2030, a 10-year Strategic Program on Trade and Investment, and frameworks for alternative financial infrastructure designed in part to route around Western sanctions. These reflect Russia’s active courtship of the Global South as a structural response to Western economic pressure, and ASEAN’s collective presence at Kazan, Brunei’s included, lends that courtship a degree of multilateral legitimacy that Moscow has few other means of securing.

Whether Brunei translates summit attendance into deeper bilateral economic engagement with Russia is a separate question, and the existing bilateral relationship offers little basis for projecting significant expansion. What the Kazan visit does confirm is that Brunei’s diplomatic posture remains as multi-faceted as ever, as a practised reality that holds even when the vectors point in conspicuously different directions.


Gregory is an MSc candidate in Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He works as a freelance writer specializing in international history, conflict, and counterterrorism, with experience in academia, investigative journalism, and voluntary uniformed service. He currently provides research assistance with the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) under their Southeast Asian Security and Defence Internship Programme and conducts investigations on regional security and transnational crime for a confidential company.

Malaysia 🇲🇾

The Return of El Niño

by Muhammad Aiman Bin Roszaimi, in Cyberjaya

For Malaysia, El Niño is often associated with hotter days and water shortages. Yet the return of El Niño in 2026 represents a far more significant challenge. It is not merely a weather phenomenon but a national stress test that could expose vulnerabilities across Malaysia’s food security, water management, public health and economic resilience.

According to forecasts by the Malaysian Meteorological Department (MetMalaysia), El Niño conditions are expected to develop from mid-2026 and could persist until early 2027. Government agencies have warned that several states may experience rainfall reductions of between 40 and 60 per cent, accompanied by prolonged periods of hot and dry weather.

The most immediate concern is water security. Malaysia has experienced water disruptions during previous El Niño episodes, particularly when reservoir levels declined due to prolonged dry spells. Reduced rainfall can place pressure on dams, rivers and groundwater supplies, especially in urban areas with high demand and regions already facing infrastructure constraints. Recognising these risks, the government has begun preparations, including cloud-seeding operations, monitoring reservoir levels and identifying alternative groundwater sources.

Agriculture is likely to face even greater challenges. The Economy Ministry has warned that crop yields could decline by between 8 and 10 per cent as higher temperatures and reduced rainfall affect farming activities. Rice cultivation, fruits, vegetables and commodity crops such as palm oil could all experience productivity losses. Such disruptions would not only affect farmers’ incomes but could also contribute to higher food prices, adding pressure to households already coping with rising living costs.

The economic implications extend beyond agriculture. Reduced water availability can affect industrial production, while higher temperatures increase electricity demand as households and businesses rely more heavily on cooling systems. The government has already noted that El Niño could exacerbate existing economic pressures linked to global energy market uncertainties. In a worst-case scenario, simultaneous disruptions to food, water, and energy systems could create inflationary pressures that ripple across the broader economy.

Public health is another area of concern. El Niño can contribute to heat-related illnesses, haze events, and school closures. From 2015 to 2016, temperatures exceeding 37°C led to the closure of hundreds of schools in Northern Peninsular Malaysia. As climate change amplifies the intensity of extreme weather events, future heatwaves may become even more disruptive.

Malaysia’s response should not be limited to emergency measures, as the larger challenge lies in building long-term climate resilience. This includes investing in water infrastructure, improving agricultural adaptation through drought-resistant crops, strengthening early warning systems, and integrating climate risks into national economic planning. The government’s current whole-of-government approach involving NADMA, MetMalaysia, the Health Ministry and state authorities is a positive step, but sustained coordination will be crucial.

Ultimately, El Niño is a jarring reminder that climate-related risks are becoming increasingly intertwined with national security, economic stability, and societal well-being. The question is no longer whether Malaysia will experience the effects of El Niño, but whether it can transform recurring climate shocks into an opportunity to strengthen its resilience for the future.


Aiman is a PhD candidate in Security and Strategic Analysis at the National University of Malaysia. His research focuses on Malaysia’s space policy, ASEAN regional security, and the strategic implications of emerging technologies. His work explores how Malaysia’s defense policy and strategic culture shape its approach to outer space.

Editorial Deadline 13/06/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk

This week’s issue of the Mekong Belt shows that return is rarely as simple as the journey back. In Laos, five men crawled out of a flooded cave in Xaysomboun Province after ten days without food or water, but two of their companions remain unaccounted for underground. All while the rescue mission is suspended, and their families still waiting at the entrance with no answers. In Cambodia, nearly a million migrant workers were forced back across the Thai border in a crisis-driven reversal that left households stripped of income and buried in debt — and with 78% already planning to return to Thailand, the question is less whether they came home than whether home was ever a real option.
Meanwhile, the mysterious detention of Myanmar scholar Min Zin in Kunming raises unsettling questions about the cost of crossing into China for academic work. Finally, in Bangkok, Thailand’s “Thai Help Thai Plus 60/40” co-payment scheme offers 43 million citizens a brief cushion against inflation, though critics warn it is a fiscal shot that delays, rather than treats, the underlying ailment.

Lao PDR 🇱🇦

The Cave Keeps Two, For Now

by Thongsavanh Souvannasane, in Vientiane

Five men walked out of a flooded cave in Laos’ remote Xaysomboun Province on 30 May having survived more than ten days underground without food or water.

The world celebrated. But for two of their companions, still unaccounted for inside the same cave system, the story has no such ending, and may never.

The group entered the cave on 20 May.

When monsoon rains flooded the entrance and trapped them, one man escaped early and alerted authorities, triggering a multinational rescue operation that drew cave diving experts from Australia, Finland, Malaysia, Thailand, and beyond. Finnish cave diving expert Mikko Paasi, a veteran of the 2018 Tham Luang rescue in Thailand, was among those who responded, describing conditions inside as unlike anything in more than three decades of diving.

He wrote on Facebook that never in over 30 years of diving had he experienced such a claustrophobic and hostile environment.

Rescuers located five survivors deep inside on 27 May, more than 250 meters from the entrance, down a steep 45-degree subterranean slope. The passages narrowed in places to little more than 60 centimeters, roughly the width of a refrigerator, and filled with opaque, silty water.

One survivor, identified only as Meud, said in a video shared by a rescue group that the two missing men had entered the cave several days before the others and had descended much further.

Pumping water from the mine was the preferred strategy, but as the miners’ health began to decline rapidly and pumping showed little progress, the team attempted a hazardous underwater extraction. One man was successfully guided through a narrow 25-meter restriction on 29 May.

The risks were deemed too great to repeat, so pumping intensified instead, eventually lowering water levels enough for the remaining four to crawl out on their own the following day, to the astonishment of divers who were suiting up to go back in.

The two missing men were not among them.

Rescuers suspected they may be sheltering in an elevated rocky chamber deeper in the cave system. On 1 June, Thai chief rescuer Kengkard Bongkawong reported hearing knocking sounds from approximately 70 meters down a newly discovered vertical shaft, sounds he said did not appear to be echoes.

The news briefly raised hopes. But Australian diver Josh Richards later clarified in an interview with NBC’s show that the knocking had come from him as he attempted to signal the missing men, and that he heard nothing back.

Conditions steadily worsened.

Sections of the cave began to collapse, air quality deteriorated, and monsoon rains continued to flood the system faster than pumps could manage. On 6 June, the multinational mission was suspended.

Paasi wrote on Facebook that despite giving everything over two weeks, “you can’t fight nature.”

As international rescue teams packed up and headed home, the wives, children, parents, siblings, and friends of the two missing men remained at the cave site, still waiting, with no answers and no end in sight.

Rescuers have said they intend to return if weather conditions improve and the cave system becomes stable enough to resume operations.

Thongsavanh is a journalist from Laos with a background in English-language media. He graduated from the Lao-American Institute with a Diploma of the Arts in English and contributes to independent news platforms. His reporting focuses on environmental issues, socio-economic development, and geopolitics.

Cambodia 🇰🇭

Cambodia’s Migrants Caught Between Debt and the Thai Border

by Malai Yatt, in Phnom Penh

After border tensions with Thailand, the number of Cambodians in the overseas workforce has increased by 70%. Intensive government job-matching efforts have already helped 620,000 of the 973,000 returnees secure new employment at home

According to the recent report by the World Bank, “Cambodia’s overseas migrant workforce contracted sharply by 70%, falling to just 434,000 by December 2025. This collapse was precipitated by border tensions with Thailand in mid 2025, driving a sudden influx of nearly a million returnees and placing severe strain on domestic labor markets.”

State-led reintegration initiatives have become increasingly popular despite this pressure. Beginning in June 2025, authorities quickly implemented a thorough border response, simplifying paperwork and offering emergency food, transit registration, and family communication support, the report said.

According to a CENTRAL-based survey between August and October 2025, 85 percent of returnees are unable to make their payments, and 71 percent of them have debt. Their average monthly payback was $220, and their debt ranged from $30.80 to $35,000. It added that over 50 percent of respondents have planned to immigrate, whereas 78 percent of respondents stated they aim to return to Thailand.

According to the World Bank, the Cambodian government implemented competency-based tests to codify foreign talents and offered direct recommendations to companies and Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) institutions, backed by a dedicated job-matching hotline (1297), in order to assist labor market re-entry.

“These proactive measures yielded notable results: of the 973,000 total returnees in 2025, 98.5 percent from Thailand and 43.3 percent female, official data indicate that 620,000 successfully secured employment. This labor absorption was split evenly, with 310,000 returnees entering the formal sector and an equal number absorbed by the informal economy.”, the World Bank added.

It should be noted that Sun Mesa, the spokesperson for Cambodian Labour and Vocational and Training, confirmed that MLVT is committed to helping any returning workers find employment.

“No matter whether they have or don’t have an identity card, they can still apply for a job. We work to assist them, even with the document process,” he stressed.

Meanwhile, Khun Tharo, Programme Manager for the Centre for Alliance of Labour and Human Rights (CENTRAL), said that one of the most abrupt migration reversals since COVID-19, he continued, was the widespread return of Cambodian migrant laborers from Thailand during the border disputes in 2025.

He said the return was not a “managed reintegration process but a crisis-driven disruption,” leaving many households without access to help, income, or food security.

In conclusion, the sudden 70 percent drop in overseas employment ultimately failed to keep workers home, as severe debt is already driving the vast majority back toward the Thai border.

Malai is a reporter at Kiripost, where she has worked for more than three years, driven by a strong commitment to amplifying the voices of underserved communities. Her reporting focuses on economic and foreign affairs.

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Myanmar 🇲🇲

Questions Loom Around China’s Detention of Myanmar Scholar

by Myat Moe Kywe

The arrest of Myanmar scholar Min Zin by Chinese authorities on espionage allegations has sparked concern among academics and observers both at home and abroad, who view the case as highly unusual and politically significant.

China’s Foreign Ministry confirmed on June 12 that Min Zin, a dual U.S.-Myanmar citizen and executive director of the Institute for Strategy and Policy Myanmar (ISP-Myanmar), was placed under criminal detention on suspicion of “engaging in espionage activities that endanger China’s national security.” Chinese authorities have not publicly provided details of the allegations.

According to reports, Min Zin disappeared on June 3 after arriving in Kunming, Yunnan Province, to attend an academic meeting. Chinese officials later confirmed his detention and notified U.S. consular authorities. The U.S. State Department stated that it was aware of the case and was providing consular assistance.

What makes the case noteworthy is that China rarely detains foreign scholars, particularly those engaged in academic research rather than political activism. While Beijing has tightened controls on domestic academics, journalists, and civil society organizations in recent years, arrests of international researchers remain uncommon. Several reports noted that Min Zin had visited China numerous times before without incident.

The timing has therefore prompted questions; Why Now? The arrest comes only weeks after U.S. President Donald Trump visited Beijing for talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping aimed at stabilizing relations between the two countries and before Min Aung Hlaing pays a state visit to China between June 15 and 19. Some observers are asking whether the detention reflects broader geopolitical tensions or an increasingly expansive interpretation of national security by Chinese authorities.

Min Zin is a prominent researcher whose work focuses on Myanmar’s political transition, conflict dynamics, and China’s role in Myanmar. ISP-Myanmar has published research on issues including border trade, Chinese investment, rare-earth exports, and the strategic relationship between Beijing and Myanmar’s military authorities. These topics have become increasingly sensitive as China’s interests in Myanmar have expanded amid the country’s ongoing civil conflict in the post-coup

For Myanmar’s academic community, the central question remains unanswered: if Min Zin has long engaged with Chinese institutions and traveled to China repeatedly, why was he detained now? Until Chinese authorities provide more information, the case is likely to deepen concerns among scholars conducting research on China, Myanmar, and other politically sensitive regional issues.


Myat is a B.A. graduate in Politics, Philosophy, and Economics. She has interned at The Asia Foundation in Washington, D.C., and she has also worked as a summer research assistant at the Centre for Policy and Innovation (CRPI), gaining experience in research and analysis. Her work focuses on civic engagement, gender, youth leadership, and community development.

Thailand 🇹🇭

Thai Help Thai Plus 60/40: Immediate Economic Lifeline or Populist Procrastination?

by Paranut Juntree, in Bangkok

Thailand’s domestic economy is caught in a difficult squeeze. Against a 2.9% inflationary surge and escalating energy costs due to the conflict in the Middle East, the Ministry of Finance launched on June 1st the “Thai Help Thai Plus 60/40” co-payment program to cushion the blow for 43 million citizens. The program expands direct aid to 13.2 million state welfare cardholders while offering a 60% state subsidy on daily purchases for up to 30 million consumers via the “Pao Tang” application. By artificial-starting consumer spending, the government aims to prevent a severe contraction in public purchasing power and shield local businesses from collapse.

From a short-term perspective, the co-payment scheme yields undeniable, immediate benefits for the grassroots economy. By excluding major corporate franchises and limiting use to independent vendors and community stores, the scheme forces capital down to small retail levels. This targeting provides breathing space to a traditional retail ecosystem lacking the profit margins to survive the prolonged operating costs. For the population suffering from eroded disposable income, a maximum subsidy of THB 1,000 per month for 4 months operates as an effective cost-of-living shield.

However, the rapid rollout has triggered strong structural critique from policy analysts, trade organisations, and macroeconomists. The Thai Retailers Association has petitioned for expansion, noting that rigid non-corporate boundaries exclude vital supply chain segments in the economy, muting the multiplier effect. More critically, funding the co-payment program through an emergency borrowing decree or “Por Ror Kor” raises serious fiscal discipline flags. Borrowing extensive capital to subsidize daily consumption amounts to consuming future wealth without expanding the country’s underlying productive capacity. The Policy Watch also noted that the current co-payment scheme needed to take lessons from its predecessor, “Half-Half” co-payment program during the Covid-19. The “Half-Half” approach made sense during the Covid-19 pandemic, when massive emergency spending was justified because global interest rates were low and financial markets tolerated high deficits. Today, however, the situation has changed. Thailand’s fiscal situation has drastically deteriorated, having much less fiscal space and spiked public debt and rising interest burdens eating up the annual budget. With the current ultra-aging society demanding long-term healthcare and elderly welfare expenditures, the country is wasting its few remaining “fiscal bullets” on short-term populist measures instead of utilizing evidence-based targeting to maximize value.

This friction highlights a classic populist paradox. Consumption subsidies generate high public satisfaction, but their economic shelf-life is brief. Once the four-month window closes and state funding vanishes, consumer demand faces an immediate cliff because of root structural causes, such as low wages, high household debt, and low technological competitiveness. These aspects of the Thai economy remain unaddressed. The money invested in the co-payment scheme may have delivered far superior, compounding value if directed toward sustainable social safety nets or structural investments like logistic upgrades, green energy transitions, or extensive workforce retraining.

Ultimately, “Thai Help Thai Plus 60/40” serves as a vivid case study of a government trapped in reactive crisis management. Supporting small merchants during inflationary shock is an important policy necessity. Yet, substituting structural reform with continuous rounds of co-payment injections is unsustainable. For Thailand to break this cycle of stagnation, policymakers must transition from temporary cash injections toward high-return capital investments, transforming state interventions from an expensive, fleeting safety net into an enduring foundation for economic growth.


Paranut has a background in advocacy, with experience in policy research, communications, and civic engagement across both the NGO and government sectors. As Thailand’s Youth Delegate to the United Nations, he represented Thai youth in global dialogues on migration, education, and human rights, championing inclusive policymaking. He holds a degree in political science with a specialization in international relations.

Editorial Deadline 13/05/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Karen Ysabelle R. David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk

For many countries, a trade deficit is something almost like anathema. But for Vietnam, Tri Vo writes that the country’s recent US$13.8 billion deficit may just be the cost of double-digit growth ambitions and dreams of an economic boom. Rather than a sign of economic weakness, Hanoi may just end up surprising the world with what may actually be a show of strength.

Meanwhile, updates from the other countries of the Pacific Corridor: in the Philippines, Eduardo G. Fajermo Jr. reports that the country’s domestic political chaos intersected with diplomatic disappointment last week, after Manila lost its United Nations Security Council bid against Kyrgyzstan, a first in the history of its foreign affairs. In Timor-Leste, ASEAN membership could mean a more interconnected Southeast Asia and more educational opportunities for Timorese students, according to correspondent Lucreicha Jane in her first-ever article for The ASEAN Frontier. And from Singapore, Nurul Aini reports on the racial and religious tensions still brewing beyond rhetoric and underneath the surface of the city-state’s seemingly model society.

Vietnam 🇻🇳

The Deficit Momentum

by Tri Vo, in Ho Chi Minh City

When the National Statistics Office (NSO) released its macroeconomic data for the first five months of 2026, the headline figures presented quite a stark dichotomy. On the one hand, the domestic manufacturing engine is clearly overheating in a positive direction. The Index of Industrial Production in May increased by an impressive 8.8% compared to the same period last year, and overall exports surged by a massive 19.5% to US$215.66 billion, nearly half of Vietnam’s GDP. Yet, such unvarnished achievements have been somewhat besmirched by a staggering US$13.8 billion trade deficit, a sharp, albeit uncharacteristic, reversal from the US$5.1 billion surplus recorded during the exact same period in 2025.

At first glance, such a huge account deficit might raise some eyebrows, as it typically signals a loss of export competitiveness or a collapse in global demand, and thus other entailing economic problems down the road. However, a more granular analysis belies a phenomenon known as the deficit of expansion. In other words, this massive outflow of cash is not being driven by a surge in consumer imports (which remains modest) or a weakening export sector; rather, it can be a leading indicator showing that factories are proactively and aggressively stockpiling inputs.

Indeed, according to the latest trade breakdowns, imports of production materials accounted for 94.1% of total imports. Machinery, equipment, spare parts, electronics components, and base raw materials overwhelmingly dominate the import ledger, while finished consumer goods account for a paltry 5.9% of the total. Essentially, what this means is that manufacturers/constructors, both FDI and domestic, are importing billions of dollars in input today to fulfill the massive export orders scheduled for the third and fourth quarters. On another note, this move could be a hedge against supply volatility due to global instability.

Furthermore, such an aggressive procurement cycle directly aligns with top-down government growth targets. This is because, for Vietnam’s highly ambitious double-digit growth aspiration to be realized, a surge in input imports is a definite necessity, not merely a systemic glitch.

However, there remain some less salubrious aspects in this seemingly positive development, the most glaring of which is the immediate challenge for monetary policy. As importers demand more U.S. dollars to purchase overseas inputs, there is a real risk that this will reduce the country’s foreign reserves and weaken the Vietnamese Dong at a time when such reserves are already under high stress. Yet, what the next step should be will not be straightforward.

If the central bank tightens liquidity too aggressively to defend the domestic currency, it risks constricting the very firms Vietnam relies on to drive its ambitious economic target by raising their borrowing costs. Inversely, if the bank allows the Dong to continue its slide, inflation — already exacerbated by the global energy crisis — could depress purchasing power and reduce the standard of living.

Ultimately, Vietnam’s US$13.8 billion trade deficit is a necessary risk. It is the upfront cost for initiating and sustaining an economic boom in an increasingly inimical geopolitical landscape. The example of Vietnam, meanwhile, can serve as a powerful reminder for its ASEAN peers — many of whom are also incurring large trade surpluses — about the necessity of sacrificing such a seemingly ironclad mark of economic strength for future progress.


Tri has experience in management consulting and strategy, having worked with institutions such as the UNDP, The Asia Group, and ARC Group. He has provided strategic, legal, and operational insights to clients in sectors including manufacturing, energy, and technology. He holds both academic and professional experience related to Southeast and East Asia, with a focus on regional development and policy.

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The Philippines 🇵🇭

Seat Lost, Space Gained? The Philippines’ UNSC Bid and a Window for Domestic Repair

by Eduardo G. Fajermo Jr., in Angeles City

The Philippines’ bid for a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) ended on 3 June with a result that was decisive and not at all ambiguous. Kyrgyzstan secured the Asia-Pacific seat for the 2027–2028 term on the fourth ballot with 142 votes to the Philippines’ 49, clearing the two-thirds threshold of 128 and widening its lead round after round. It was the first time Manila failed to win after four successful runs since 1957.

Could we have seen this coming?

In pure vote math, perhaps not. But in the political logic of 2026, the loss was legible. Manila was campaigning for a seat that demands confidence in institutional steadiness, at precisely the exact moment that the Philippine state was staging a public stress test.

In other words, Manila was asking the world to trust it with a seat at the UN’s crisis table, all while its own upper chamber was struggling to keep order at home. Even if that did not “cause” the loss, it shaped the optics of reliability — an unspoken currency in New York that is difficult to quantify but easy to feel.

That credibility question has shadowed the Marcos government’s international ambitions before. In 2024, UN expert Irene Khan acknowledged the steps taken by the administration but stressed that more was needed, particularly in accountability for rights abuses and in addressing red-tagging practices. Those concerns are not unique to the Philippines, but they matter more when a country seeks a seat on a body that routinely debates atrocity prevention, humanitarian protection, and sanctions.

So is the loss a blessing in disguise?

It depends on what Manila does with the bandwidth it now has. A UNSC seat is not a ceremonial victory lap; it is two years of constant expectation, daily diplomacy, and a permanent spotlight on every contradiction a rival can amplify. In 2026, the Philippines is already headed into an unusually dense cycle of internal governance stress: Senate instability, an impeachment drama in the background, and International Criminal Court-linked political shocks that keep resurfacing through personalities rather than policy.

Avoiding the UNSC seat may therefore reduce the risk of what diplomats privately dread: being forced to defend domestic disorder while negotiating international crises. The UN Philippines office’s own retrospective emphasizes that past Filipino UNSC leaders navigated complex disputes and peacekeeping deployments, including the Council’s presidency and Haiti peacekeeping deliberations in the mid-2000s — precisely the kind of high-stakes engagement that demands a confident, disciplined state apparatus.

But there is also a cost. Losing the seat narrows Manila’s ability to shape agenda-setting from inside the chamber on issues that directly affect Southeast Asia–maritime tensions, humanitarian norms, and international legal discourse. It also complicates the Philippines’ claim to regional leadership just as it is expected to carry ASEAN’s chairmanship responsibilities, where credibility at multilateral forums can translate into leverage in quiet negotiations.

The UNSC loss is not a reprieve; it is a reckoning. It exposes that global influence cannot be willed into existence through campaign slogans alone. Influence requires institutional trust, and institutional trust is earned through domestic coherence — the boring work of rules, discipline, and credibility that holds even when politics gets hot.

If Manila wants to run again, and its history suggests it will, it will need to treat this defeat not as humiliation but as instruction. The world did not just cast ballots; it sent a message about what it rewards. And the Philippines now has time, perhaps its most valuable resource, to prove it can govern itself before asking to help govern the world.


Eduardo is a Political Science graduate and MA Political Science candidate at the University of Santo Tomas, researching democracy, disaster governance, and inclusive policy in the Global South. He is a former faculty member at Holy Angel University, where he taught Philippine history and contemporary global issues. He also worked with a senator in the Guam Legislature, contributing to policy research and legislative analysis.

Timor-Leste 🇹🇱

ASEAN Membership: What’s In It for Timorese Students?

by Lucreicha Jane

Timor-Leste just joined ASEAN. For Timorese students, this is more than just a political achievement; it could mean new opportunities that were not readily accessible before.

When Timor became part of ASEAN, it also became part of a much bigger regional space with many countries in Southeast Asia. This raises a simple question: “What does this actually change for students in real life?”

One of the main possible changes is access to educational opportunities. Being part of ASEAN could open more chances and scholarships, exchange programs, and study abroad opportunities across Southeast Asian countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore. Some of these opportunities already exist, but ASEAN membership may make them more structured and easier to access.

With regard to student exchange programs, instead of being rare or limited, exchanges between universities in ASEAN countries could become a more regular occurrence. This means students might have more chances to study abroad for short periods of time, join training programs, or experience different education systems in the region. There are also youth and skills development programs within ASEAN. These programs often focus on leadership, entrepreneurship, climate issues, and digital skills. Timorese students could now take part in more of these regional activities, which may help them prepare for future employment.

Beyond education, ASEAN membership also means connection. Students in Timor-Leste are now part of a wider student network across Southeast Asia. This could help in building friendship, academic cooperation, and even career opportunities. But even with all of these possibilities, one important question remains: “Will students actually take these opportunities?” Having access is one thing, but being ready and informed is another.

In the end, ASEAN membership is not just about politics or government decisions. For students, it could shape their education, skills, and future paths, but only if they are willing and ready to seize those opportunities.


Lucreicha Jane is an International Relations undergraduate at the Universidade Nacional Timor Lorosa'e (UNTL), with interests in international law, governance, and youth leadership. She previously served as General Secretary of the JCI Timor-Leste Local Chapter Dili Women Entrepreneurs (2024–2025) and as Executive Vice President of the Student Council at UNTL's Faculty of Social Sciences and Politics.

Singapore 🇸🇬

Racial and Religious Peace Beyond Mere Rhetoric

by Nurul Aini, in Singapore

At the back of the Singaporean collective consciousness is the constant reminder of the 1964 racial riots, where a misunderstanding between the Chinese and Malay communities resulted in violent and bloody clashes. Hence, every year on 21 July, we commemorate Racial Harmony Day, with celebrations done more widely in schools. During this time we are reminded of how important it is for each community to carry out the responsibility of holding together the social fabric through mutual understanding and cooperation so as to not allow history to repeat itself. However, from time to time, issues of race and religion emerge and society once again confronts the reality that racial harmony should not be confined merely to yearly rhetoric, but something that should be practiced.

Recently, a local digital creator (@olliechinny) posted her reflection on being a Chinese person in Switzerland. Documenting some of her experiences, she noted that due to the language barrier between herself and the Swiss community, she felt excluded during certain interactions. She acknowledges that, in Singapore, she had been brought up in a comfortably homogenous environment where she attends “Chinese Schools. Chinese Church.” She then writes, “[t]his was probably also how my Malay and Indian colleagues might have felt back home.” There were mixed reactions to this post — some saw it as a necessary part of her journey to realizing the minority experience in Singapore. Others took a jab at her opinion, even using the same format and wording of her post to satirize the seemingly out-of-touch nature of the original post, while also pointing out both the casual and outward racism faced by brown people in Singapore. In other words, it would have been unfortunately easy for her to sympathize with the minority community, if she had only attempted to communicate beyond her circle. Opinions have also emerged characterizing Singapore’s approach to race as frozen in time and paradoxical, where mechanisms in place to unite the different races also mean that race is more emphasized than ever. Yet, spontaneous discourse about it also remains limited.

A few weeks later, a report was launched against a video of the Islamic call to prayer (azan) during a heritage tour in Pulau Ubin. NParks has since then dismissed the report, citing that the azan during the tour is part of a respectful heritage demonstration. Wan, the tour guide who is also a descendant of the Ubin Orang Pulau, defended this by saying that this was part of an immersive soundscape experience that aimed to allow participants to imagine how the sound might have traveled through the space from the now-demolished mosque to the ears of those living around the area. There has been an outpouring of support for him, with Member of Parliament Alvin Tan reiterating the purpose of the azan and emphasizing the mutual respect and understanding that the community should practice. Unrelated to the issue but relevant to the topic is Professor Syed Farid Alatas’ opinion that Singapore and Malaysia’s racial relations is based more on tolerance than it is on deep mutual understanding. It thus becomes essential to cast aside any hatred and preconceived notions and seek ways to deepen knowledge on other races and religion and find common grounds.

The encouragement towards building understanding should begin with the fundamental question aptly posed in an article by Rice Media: When faced with the unfamiliar, why is the first instinct to silence it?


Aini is currently pursuing a master’s degree in English literature at Nanyang Technological University. She has experience working in youth groups, contributing to the planning and management of outreach activities.

Editorial Deadline 09/06/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Muhammad Aufa Eizdihar

Executive Summary

The global shift to electric vehicles is already underway, from science fiction into reality. The world is changing gears, and so is the industry; with new resources, locations, and emerging leaders. In ASEAN, Thailand, Indonesia and Vietnam have each chosen clear strategies: assembly, minerals and a national champion. Malaysia has yet to make a firm decision, and this delay is resulting in missed opportunities in technology adoption. To avoid falling behind, this essay suggests that Malaysia should not copy its neighbours. Instead, Malaysia’s strengths in semiconductors, engineering, Islamic finance, and government-linked companies support a different approach—focusing on high-value areas like components, software, battery services, and infrastructure. The following five recommendations are intended for implementation within three to five years.

I. Introduction

Every year, tens of billions of Malaysian Ringgit flow from the treasury to keep petrol and diesel within reach for ordinary citizens. It swells with every spike in global oil prices, outpacing the budgets for schools, hospitals, and the broadband lines that could connect rural Sabah (a state in the northern part of Borneo island) to the world. We tell ourselves this is the cost of mobility; but in truth, it is the silent siphon that drains the resources we need to build Malaysia.

Now, imagine the opposite. Every barrel of oil we do not burn at home is a barrel we can sell to the world. Malaysia still exports more petroleum than it uses, but that gap is shrinking, year by year. If we shift meaningfully to electric vehicles, the equation changes: subsidies shrink; export earnings grow. Even before we talk about industry or innovation, the numbers alone make electrification a question of national survival.

But this is not just about numbers on a page. Step outside Kuala Lumpur, Johor Bahru, or Penang, and the air itself tells a story. Our cars and trucks are among the biggest contributors to the haze that hangs over our cities, and to the greenhouse gases that shape our future. Electrification is not a cure-all, but it is a chance for Malaysians to breathe easier—literally. And in a world where supply chains falter and oil prices swing like a pendulum, breaking our dependence on fossil fuels is how we breathe easier in every sense: less vulnerable and less beholden to a resource that will one day run out.

This is not some distant, abstract transition. Electric vehicles—powered by lithium batteries, not petrol, are already changing how we move. The countries that see this moment for what it is—a turning point—will shape the next generation. Those who wait for certainty will discover that certainty only arrives when someone else has already taken the lead.

Electric vehicles (EVs) use electric motors powered by rechargeable batteries instead of internal combustion engines that run on petrol or diesel. This is a fundamental change and not just a gradual improvement. Battery electric vehicles (BEVs) rely on lithium ion batteries and electric motors, made possible by advances in semiconductors, materials science and software, rather than traditional car engineering. The rise of EVs affects more than just the car manufacturing. It also changes the need for charging stations, electric grids, battery supply chains, software for managing fleets and specialised maintenance. McKinsey & Company describes this as a platform shift, meaning it is a new industrial model that will impact the energy, technology, finance and labor markets.

Within Southeast Asia, the race to capture a significant share of the global EV value chain has already begun. Thailand has moved with haste: its government unveiled an ambitious 30@30 policy that targets 30 percent of domestic vehicles produced to be electric by 2030, supported by substantial investment and incentives that attracted Chinese manufacturers such as BYD, SAIC and Great Wall Motors. Chinese imports accounted for approximately 85% of electric car sales in Thailand in 2024. As the IEA notes, this dynamic is shifting as the EV 3.5 Program (Thai government’s flagship project to establish the country as the premier manufacturer of EV in the ASEAN region) phases out import duty exemptions by end of 2025, compelling OEMs (Original Equipment Manufacturer) to commit to domestic production of at least two BEV models by end of 2026 for every imported unit sold. Indonesia, endowed with the world’s largest nickel reserves, has pursued a resource nationalism strategy, restricting raw nickel exports to compel downstream battery investment within its borders, which tripled electric car sales in 2024 and captured over 7 percent of the market, aided by the government’s reduction of VAT on EVs from 11 percent to 1 percent. Vietnam, meanwhile, has nurtured the rapid ascent of VinFast, a domestically owned EV brand backed by significant state investment and a vertically integrated manufacturing strategy. The convergence of these strategies signals that ASEAN is becoming a critical theatre in the global EV competition, one where early-bird advantages in manufacturing, supply chains, and foreign direct investment are being secured.

Malaysia occupies a position of great potential within this emerging regional landscape, although its current foothold remains incomplete. The automotive sector has historically been anchored by Proton and Perodua, integrated into broader Japanese and European supply chains. The government has begun articulating a more deliberate EV strategy through the National Energy Policy 2021 to 2035, the Low Carbon Mobility Blueprint, and the National Energy Transition Roadmap, which targets 80 percent EV adoption and 90 percent local EV manufacturing by 2050. Annual EV sales reached 44,813 units in 2025, a significant increase from just 3,127 in 2022. MIDA (Malaysian Investment Development Authority) has approved over 30 billion RM (Ringgit Malaysia) in EV-related investments since 2018, including battery plants by EVE Energy and Samsung SDI. Public charging networks have expanded to 5,624 points by the end of 2025, but this still falls 44 percent short of the government’s 10,000-point target.

Malaysia’s story is still being written. Where others have chosen their lanes, we stand at a fork in the road, free to choose. We do not need to follow Thailand’s assembly lines or Indonesia’s resource playbook. Our strengths—semiconductors, electronics, battery services, smart charging, and innovative finance invite us to build something different. Our opportunity is not to assemble the vehicles, but to design the systems, the software, and the financial engines that make electrification real.

II. The Global EV Market and the Economics of Electrification

The global electric vehicle market has undergone a structural transformation at a remarkable speed. In 2024, global EV sales surpassed 17 million units, representing more than 20 percent of total new car sales, and the first quarter of 2025 alone recorded over 4 million units sold, a 35 percent increase year-on-year. The IEA predicts that one in four cars sold in Southeast Asia by 2030 will be electric, with two- and three-wheelers electrifying faster still. Behind these volumes is a cost story that is now decisive. Lithium-ion battery packs have declined in price by more than 93 percent since 2010, falling to USD 108 per kilowatt-hour in 2025, with battery electric vehicle packs averaging USD 99 per kilowatt-hour, below the USD 100 threshold for the second consecutive year. At the current learning rate of approximately 19 percent per doubling of cumulative output, packs could approach USD 60 per kilowatt-hour before 2030, the threshold at which most new EVs become cheaper than their ICE (Internal Combustion Engine) equivalents even without subsidies.

This capital mobilisation is reshaping the geography of industrial production: the EV transition is redistributing competitive advantage toward nations that control critical battery minerals, as they can offer low-cost renewable electricity, possess advanced semiconductor manufacturing, or have governments willing to offer compelling investment incentives. The EV transition is what economists term a general-purpose technology shift, restructuring productivity dynamics, labour demand and capital allocation across multiple sectors simultaneously. For middle-income economies such as Malaysia, aligning industrial policy with the direction of this transition may allow them to leapfrog traditional development pathways. Those who fail to adapt risk find their existing industrial assets stranded.

III. The ASEAN EV Landscape.

The competitive dynamics within ASEAN’s EV ecosystem reflect the wider principles of industrial policy theory—governments are dynamically shaping comparative advantage rather than passively waiting for market forces to determine industrial location. Three regional strategies are now visible, each exploiting a different structural endowment and each carrying its own strategic risk.

Thailand’s Assembly focused Strategy

Thailand’s strategy is an aggressive,incentive-based approach. Through its Board of Investment, Thailand has offered tax holidays of up to eight years, import duty exemptions on machinery and raw materials, and subsidies for EV purchasers, explicitly targeting the displacement of its established ICE manufacturing base with EV production. Its partnership with Chinese automakers, who bring lower-cost platforms and supply chain relationships, has positioned Thailand to maintain its role as ASEAN’s premier automotive export hub even as the technology beneath it shifts. Chinese OEM investment commitments in Thailand exceeded USD 1.4 billion between 2022 and 2024.

The strategic risk is the domination by a handful of Chinese OEMs , where fortunes are increasingly tied to Beijing’s industrial policy.

Indonesia’s Resource Management

Indonesia’s strategy is rooted in its natural resource endowments. The country holds approximately 42 percent of global nickel reserves—a mineral essential for nickel-rich cathode chemistries used in high-energy-density EV batteries. Jakarta’s 2020 ban on unprocessed nickel ore exports was a calculated act of resource nationalism designed to capture downstream value addition and attract investment from LG Energy Solution, CATL, and several South Korean battery component manufacturers. The World Bank cautions that resource nationalism can fail if global battery chemistry shifts away from nickel-dependent formulations and towards lithium iron phosphate alternatives, a trend already observable in Chinese domestic markets.

Vietnam’s Statebacked Companies

Vietnam’s approach has centred on the development of state-backed domestic champions. VinFast, the EV subsidiary of the Vingroup conglomerate, has received substantial government support, including preferential land allocation, tax concessions, and state financing to build a vertically integrated EV manufacturing operation. While VinFast’s foray into North American and European markets has faced significant commercial challenges, the model demonstrates the potential for state-directed industrial policy to rapidly develop indigenous EV capacity. The strategic question is patience, not the initial design. The same model was produced by Hyundai for over thirty years and by DeLorean for over three.

For Malaysia, the lessons from these neighbours are instructive in the negative. Each strategy exploits a structural endowment Malaysia does not share: Thailand’s scale advantage in ICE assembly, Indonesia’s nickel reserves, and Vietnam’s political tolerance for concentrated state-directed capital. None is replicable in Kuala Lumpur. Success in the ASEAN EV race will require not policy ambition but coherent, well-resourced implementation aligned with genuine Malaysian industrial endowments.

IV. Malaysia’s Advantages in the Evolving Ecosystem

A careful look at Malaysia’s situation shows it has several real competitive advantages, but these need active government policies to be fully used. Among these, four key strengths stand out.

The first is semiconductor manufacturing. Malaysia ranks among the world’s top five exporters of semiconductors, with a well-developed ecosystem of test and assembly operations in Penang, Kuala Lumpur, and several industrial corridors. Given that EVs require two to three times more semiconductor content than equivalent ICE vehicles, encompassing power electronics, battery management systems, ADAS (Advanced Driver Assistance System) sensors, and in-vehicle computing modules, Malaysia’s existing chip ecosystem represents a natural bridge into the EV component supply chain. The presence of global industry leaders such as Infineon Technologies, NXP Semiconductors, and ON Semiconductor creates both supply chain anchors and potential technology spillover pathways for domestic firms. This is a comparative advantage that Thailand cannot manufacture into existence on a reasonable timeline, and for which Indonesia’s nickel cannot substitute.

The second is human capital. Malaysia produces a substantial annual cohort of engineering graduates, with particular strengths in electrical, electronic, and mechatronic disciplines, the exact competencies required to staff EV-related manufacturing and services operations. The pipeline is reinforced by a network of technical and vocational institutions that, with targeted curriculum reform, could supply skilled technicians for EV maintenance and charging operations. The weakness here is not supply but retention. Malaysian engineering graduates frequently move to Singapore within five years of entering the workforce, drawn by a wage differential that domestic policy has so far failed to close. An EV strategy that does not address this leakage trains engineers for somebody else’s industrial base.

The third is financial and corporate infrastructure. Bursa Malaysia and the expanding Islamic finance ecosystem provide capital market instruments well-suited to funding infrastructure-heavy, long-horizon EV projects. Sustainable sukuk (Malaysian financial certificates complying with Sharia Law) and green bond issuances have already demonstrated Malaysia’s capacity to mobilise Islamic capital for environmental infrastructure. Malaysia is the world’s largest issuer of sukuk; combining that status with a green-mobility mandate would create a financial product, the green sukuk for EV infrastructure, that no ASEAN competitor can match. Alongside this sits the government-linked corporations: Tenaga Nasional Berhad, Petronas, and Khazanah Nasional, which possess the capital depth and institutional relationships to anchor large-scale EV infrastructure projects. Petronas, in particular, holds a strategically ambiguous position—a petroleum major that must, on current trajectories, eventually preside over the managed decline of its core business. Whether it develops as a leader in the energy transition or becomes a victim of it depends on whether the government gives it a clear mandate to redirect capital into charging infrastructure, grid services and battery logistics.

It is worth acknowledging two further assets that feature in broader discussions of Malaysia’s EV potential. Proton and Perodua carry decades of automotive manufacturing experience, though Proton’s majority ownership by Geely means that a “national EV champion” strategy would, in practice, run substantially through a Chinese corporate parent, a reality that complicates the narrative without negating the industrial capability. Separately, Malaysia’s existing rare earth processing operations, anchored by Lynas’s facility in Pahang, offer a niche mid-stream position in the permanent magnet supply chain that feeds EV motors, distinct from the upstream extraction strategy this essay argues against. Neither constitutes the centrepiece of a Malaysian EV strategy, but both deserve recognition as supporting elements within a broader ecosystem.

The National Car Question: Why Proton and Perodua Cannot Carry Us Forward

To write about Malaysia’s automotive future without addressing Proton and Perodua is to avoid the central question. For forty years, these names have carried a weight that goes beyond market share. Proton’s founding in 1983 was an act of industrial ambition—a declaration that Malaysia could manufacture something of significance, not merely assemble it for others. Perodua arrived a decade later and became the car of the majority. Together, they represent the most sustained and self-conscious

industrial project this country has undertaken. Any serious treatment of Malaysia’s future electric vehicles must address them directly.

This section does that. And the argument it makes is not one of dismissal, but of honest reckoning.

On the domestic question, there is no ambiguity. Proton and Perodua must electrify, and the early signs suggest they know it. Proton has begun developing hybrid and EV variants through its partnership with Geely. Perodua has signalled its own electrification timeline. This is the right direction. Malaysia cannot meaningfully transition away from internal combustion engines if its most accessible and widely-owned car brands remain anchored to petrol. In this respect, Proton and Perodua are not supporting actors in the domestic transition. They are the primary mechanism through which most Malaysians will eventually drive electrically.

But the domestic transition argument and the regional export argument are distinct, and treating them as interchangeable is where the national car logic begins to unravel.

The global EV export market operates on a scale and cost structure that no Malaysian policy intervention can bridge in the near term. BYD sold over 1.76 million battery electric vehicles in 2024. Its entry-level Seagull model retails below USD 10,000. SAIC, Chery, and Geely—Proton’s own majority shareholder—are competing simultaneously across Southeast Asia with platforms backed by decades of Chinese state investment in battery manufacturing, supply chain integration, and automotive engineering. These are structural advantages accumulated over a generation. The manufacturing cost differential is not a gap that additional government support in Shah Alam can close on a timeline that matters strategically.

Proton is majority-owned by Geely, a strategy that positions Proton as the centerpiece of Malaysia’s EV export. In material terms, a strategy that directs public resources and national policy energy toward a company whose technology platform and ultimate profit flows belong to a Chinese corporate parent. This does not disqualify Proton from its domestic role. But it does mean that national champion argument is considerably more complicated than it first appears.

Malaysia’s genuine export advantage in the electric vehicle economy lies not in the car itself, but in what the car requires. Every EV carries two to three times the semiconductor content of an equivalent internal combustion vehicle. It requires power electronics, battery management systems, motor controllers, and an expanding suite of software platforms. These are the areas where Malaysian industry, built across decades of electronics manufacturing in Penang and the wider Klang Valley, already holds a credible and recognised position in global supply chains. The strategic question is not whether Malaysia can compete with BYD Auto Company on vehicles. The question is whether Malaysia can ensure that the components powering the next generation of Asian EVs — regardless of whose name is on the badge — are designed, tested, or assembled here.

Proton and Perodua matter. They carry our industrial history, employ our engineers, and will serve as the most accessible pathway for Malaysians to enter the electric age. But a regional EV strategy built on their export potential is a strategy aimed at the wrong target, against competitors we are structurally ill-equipped to out-price or out-scale. The more defensible path—and the one this essay argues for — is to build the components, services, and expertise that every EV manufacturer in the region, Geely included, will require. That is where Malaysia’s leverage lies.

V. Economic Opportunities: Where Malaysia Should Compete In

The electric vehicle ecosystem is sprawling, reaching from mines to microchips to digital platforms. But focus is its own kind of discipline. Instead of trying to do everything, we must choose where we can matter most. Here are four areas where Malaysia’s resources and talent can make a real difference.

Firstly, EV charging infrastructure represents the most immediate and domestically addressable opportunity. A well-designed national fast-charging network would directly stimulate domestic demand for EVs, reduce range anxiety, and generate employment across installation, operations, and maintenance. According to McKinsey, each public charging station supports between two and four direct full-time employment equivalents and generates indirect activity across electricity retailing, property management, and telecommunications. Malaysia’s relatively concentrated urban population, with approximately 78 percent of residents living in urban areas, makes phased deployment economically viable even before national EV penetration rates are high.

Secondly, battery ecosystem services, encompassing battery testing, second-life repurposing, and end-of-life recycling, represent a high-value niche aligned with Malaysia’s environmental commitments and industrial chemistry capabilities. As the global EV fleet expands, the volume of spent lithium-ion battery packs requiring repurposing or material recovery will grow exponentially. BloombergNEF reports that stationary storage battery pack prices fell to USD 70 per kilowatt-hour in 2025, a 45 percent drop from 2024, making repurposed EV batteries cost-competitive for grid-scale storage. Industry estimates suggest the global EV battery recycling market could exceed USD 40 billion annually by 2030. Malaysia’s industrial chemicals sector, regulatory capacity for hazardous materials, as well as proximity to large EV fleets in neighbouring countries position it favourably to develop battery recycling and second life facilities serving a regional market . A country that can’t mine nickel can still be the country that recycles it.

Thirdly, software integration and smart grid development offer high-value, knowledge-intensive opportunities consistent with Malaysia’s digital economy aspiration. EV integration into electricity grids introduces complex optimisation challenges, managing charging loads, enabling vehicle-to-grid energy flows, and balancing variable renewable supply, all of which require sophisticated software platforms and data infrastructure. Malaysia’s growing technology sector, particularly in Cyberjaya and the Multimedia Super Corridor, provides a nascent but credible base for developing EV-related digital services, fleet management software, and smart grid technologies. The IMF notes that digital services exports represent one of the highest-value-added economic activities available to middle-income economies.

Finally, EV maintenance and training services will constitute a growing domestic market as adoption accelerates, with opportunities for vocational institutions, independent service networks, and specialised diagnostics firms. This is the least glamorous segment of the four, and probably the most underestimated. It generates employment that cannot be exported, concentrated among mid-skilled technical workers outside the major urban centres, whose stagnant real wages are a structural concern for the Malaysian government.

VI. Strategic Constraints and Risk Factors

No strategy is complete without confronting its obstacles head-on. Three challenges, in particular, could slow Malaysia’s progress if left unaddressed.

The first is fiscal. Deploying a national fast-charging network requires capital investment on a scale that market forces alone cannot meet in the near term, particularly because charging station revenues remain modest when utilisation rates are low during early adoption. Public subsidy or mandated utility investment will be required, creating fiscal pressure at a time when Malaysia’s government finances face competing demands among subsidies, healthcare, and a rising debt-servicing burden. Poorly designed subsidies, risk misallocating public resources. The instructive contrast is Norway, which used a consumption-tax structure rather than rebates: EVs were exempt from VAT and registration fees, so the fiscal cost fell only when someone actually bought an EV, rather than being paid upfront to manufacturers.

The second is supply-chain dependency. For Malaysia to develop a meaningful battery ecosystem, it will require either deep integration with these supply chains, accepting the geopolitical concentration risk that entails, or a concerted effort to diversify sourcing, which requires long-horizon investment that may exceed current domestic capacity. The US Inflation Reduction Act creates explicit incentives for battery and EV manufacturers to locate in countries with US free trade agreements, a club Malaysia is not part of. Software, finance, and recycling are less exposed to the IRA’s local-content logic than vehicle assembly is. The geopolitics, in this sense, reinforces the strategic recommendation.

The third is policy coordination. Malaysia’s EV ecosystem strategy spans multiple ministries, including the Ministry of Investment, Trade and Industry; the Ministry of Energy Transition and Water Transformation; the Ministry of Transport; and Suruhanjaya Tenaga, whose mandates do not always align . Fragmented policy delivery has historically been a limitation of Malaysian industrial strategy, with well-designed national blueprints losing coherence during implementation. Compounding this is competitive pressure from Thailand and Indonesia, both of which have moved earlier and with greater resource-commitment. Industrial policy has a cruel temporal structure: the cost of being a year late is not one year of lost output, but the compounding advantage that the first movers accumulate over the following decade.

VII. Conclusion and Recommendations

The evidence points to a clear conclusion: Malaysia’s strengths—semiconductors, engineering talent, Islamic finance, and the reach of government-linked companies—are not just assets, but launchpads for leadership in the ASEAN EV ecosystem. The global shift to electric vehicles is not a distant horizon; it is happening now, and the window for Malaysia to claim its place is closing fast. Our best path is not to lower our sights, but to focus them—on high-value, knowledge-driven niches like semiconductor integration, battery services, smart grid platforms, and charging infrastructure. The goal is not to do everything, but to do what we are uniquely equipped for, and to do it exceptionally well.

Based on this analysis, five strategic policy recommendations are proposed.

First, deploy a nationally coordinated EV fast-charging network, prioritising high-traffic corridors, urban centres, and inter-city expressways. The deployment should be structured as a public-private partnership with regulated returns, drawing on Tenaga Nasional Berhad’s grid infrastructure and capital base, and designed to be commercially scalable as adoption increases. A mandatory minimum charging standard for new commercial developments and highway service areas would create structural demand anchors without excessive fiscal outlay. The target should be 15,000 operational points by the end of 2028, revising the Low Carbon Mobility Blueprint’s 10,000 upward to reflect the gap between plan and execution.

Second, reposition Malaysia’s semiconductor ecosystem as the regional supplier of EV power electronics and components to ASEAN and beyond. The existing multinational cluster in Penang and Kulim, home to Infineon, NXP, ON Semiconductor and dozens of local firms in test and assembly, is not simply a domestic asset; it is an export platform. As every EV on the road requires two to three times the semiconductor content of an equivalent combustion vehicle, and as ASEAN’s EV fleet scales toward millions of units, the demand for power modules, battery management ICs and sensor packages will grow correspondingly. Malaysia’s Industrial Master Plan and MIDA’s investment promotion priorities should be explicitly aligned to capture this demand, with enhanced capital allowances for EV-related semiconductor R&D, fast-tracked approvals for EV component manufacturing facilities, and co-investment by Khazanah Nasional in strategic EV technology ventures. The goal is not to service the domestic market; it is to ensure that when a BYD rolls off the line in Thailand or an EV battery is assembled in Indonesia, the power electronics inside it were tested, packaged or designed in Penang. The Penang cluster is not an asset to be protected. It is a platform to be extended across the region.

Third, develop a dedicated Battery Economy Policy Framework to position Malaysia as a regional hub for battery testing, second-life repurposing, and end-of-life recycling. This should include a national battery data registry, regulatory standards for second-life deployment in stationary storage, and industrial land allocation for battery economy zones, potentially co-located with existing semiconductor and chemical clusters in Penang or Selangor. A bilateral battery-flow agreement with Indonesia, under which Malaysia handles end-of-life processing for batteries produced using Indonesian nickel, would turn a structural disadvantage into a regional partnership.

Fourth, invest in EV-related human capital using targeted curriculum reform in public universities and vocational institutions, introducing specialised programmes in EV powertrain engineering, battery system management, smart grid operations and EV software development. Industry partnerships should be encouraged through matching grant programmes and placement requirements. Retention incentives, whether via housing allowances, tax deferrals or wage supplements for engineers in designated EV priority sectors are not a luxury. They are the difference between training a workforce and training a workforce that remains.

Fifth, leverage Malaysia’s ASEAN Chairmanship periods and bilateral diplomatic pathways to advocate for regional harmonisation of the EV supply chain, including mutual recognition of EV standards, coordinated cross-border charging infrastructure with Thailand and Singapore, and joint investment promotion within ASEAN’s emerging EV corridor. Regional integration would allow Malaysia to benefit from economies of scale that no single ASEAN market can achieve on its own. It would also position Malaysia as the coordinator of the regional EV market. This role is diplomatically available, economically valuable, and no other member of ASEAN is better placed for it.

The world is not waiting. The shift to electric vehicles is picking up speed, and those who hesitate will find themselves left behind. Malaysia has reinvented itself before—from rubber and palm oil fields to the precision of electronics. Now, we face another crossroad. The choices we make in the next three to five years will decide whether we lead in the clean energy future or watch from the sidelines. This is not about luck. It is about vision, and the courage to act.

Edited by Nishiha Jasper David, Frontier Analysis Editor

by Siu Tzyy Wei, Lead Editor - Maritime Crescent Desk

As the world becomes harder to read and harder to insulate against, the Maritime Crescent looks at three neighbours who navigate uncertainty in different ways.

In Brunei, a new national committee signals that the sultanate is building its formal structures to watch, assess and prepare before the next shock hits. In Malaysia, the Unity Government is discovering that the coalition which survived a hung parliament may not survive its own ambitions, as state-level rivalries begin to unravel what federal necessity stitched together. In Indonesia, we revisit Jakarta’s defence modernisation drive to ask whether the fiscal and currency pressures beneath that ambition are beginning to test the real cost of strategic autonomy.

In their own ways, this week’s stories are about preparation and survival - one building for it, one hoping it’s enough, and one asking what it costs to remain ready.

Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳

The Sultanate on Lookout

by Syimah Johari, in Bandar Seri Begawan

On 4th June 2026, Brunei established The National Committee on Addressing the Impact of the Middle East Conflict, a pre-emptive coordination mechanism to assess risks, manage potential disruptions, and safeguard national interests. While the conflict is unfolding far from Southeast Asia, the establishment of the committee highlights how distant geopolitical crises increasingly require local responses. It also reflects a broader shift in how security is being understood across ASEAN.

The government of Brunei has been closely monitoring developments in the Middle East and their potential implications for the global economy. Although geographically distant, the conflict has put energy markets, shipping routes and international supply chains under immense pressure. At a point where the world is barely adjusting to the rising costs from the COVID-19 pandemic, the conflict has triggered even higher costs for imported goods and increased economic uncertainty. For Brunei, this means bracing the current blows to its economy via the national stockpile policy, management of strategic supplies, but also the concurrent assessment of medium and long term implications of the conflict to national energy, food, healthcare and development sectors that are deeply dependent on international supply chains.

This reflects a broader regional trend. Traditionally, security has been associated with defence measures, borders and diplomacy. However, in an interconnected world where money, power and defence intertwine, security is redefined to include economic resilience, supply chain stability and access to essential goods. Today, economic resilience is just as important as national security - without it, a nation bears the costs not only to the disruptions of supply chains and growing competition for resources, but the changing nature of geopolitical relations and its overall sovereignty.

For Brunei, these concerns are the mold to the Committee. The country’s economy, while still dependent on oil and gas, is relatively small and highly open, with a strong reliance on imports for essential goods. In other words, the sultanate is highly dependent on the relations it has to its international counterparts and the global supply chain for food, manufactured goods and services to keep its people well fed and safe, thus making it extremely sensitive to the external price fluctuations and disruptions in global markets, As such, the creation of a Committee to manage Brunei’s survival amidst the Middle East conflict reflects a vital whole-of-government strategy to adapt and survive amidst turbulent and volatile realities it observes and experiences.

While the national committee was established to specifically address the impact of the Middle East conflict on the country, its significance extends beyond a single crisis. The committee reflects a broader shift in how Brunei is approaching geopolitical exposure - institutionalising its awareness that international disruptions can rapidly translate into domestic economic disruption, and that resilience is no longer an aspiration but an active policy priority.


Syimah is a graduate of King’s College London with a BA in International Relations. With a strong focus on diplomacy, regional cooperation, and development policy, she is passionate about contributing to meaningful change through public service. Currently, she is involved in poverty alleviation work through a local NGO.

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Malaysia 🇲🇾

United, For Now

by Edrina Lisa Ozaidi, in WP Kuala Lumpur

In November 2022, Malaysia’s general election resulted in a “hung parliament” where no single coalition had enough seats to form a government. To break the deadlock, the King intervened and proposed a “Unity Government”.

This forced long-time rival coalitions to work together — Pakatan Harapan (PH), led by the current prime minister, Anwar Ibrahim, a reformist coalition that had spent decades fighting against the establishment and Barisan Nasional (BN), which is the traditional establishment party that had governed Malaysia for over 60 years until its historic 2018 defeat.

For nearly four years, this “coalition of rivals” has maintained stability at the federal stage but remained bitter competitors at the local and grassroots level. Both sides are now preparing to compete against each other in the upcoming state election.

The current tension stems from a fundamental misalignment between the federal-level cooperation and state-level survival. In Johor, UMNO has moved to assert dominance, signalling its intention to contest all 56 state seats rather than maintaining a seat-sharing pact with its federal partner, Pakatan Harapan (PH). BN’s Chairman, Ahmad Zahid Hamidi, reminded its role as a “unity government enabler” in the fragile governing coalition to its federal partner.

In a tit-for-tat response, the PH-led administration in Negeri Sembilan dissolved its assembly, effectively ending the uneasy truce and pushing both state elections towards a high-stakes, three-cornered fight. Alternatively, Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s administration always prioritises political stability over the systemic reforms promised to the electorate. This has left the government more vulnerable to these localised revolts.

The structural flaws of the current administration are getting more difficult to ignore. Analysts point out that the Unity Government operates through the consensus, thus sacrificing long-term policy to avoid immediate collapse. As state election looms — infrastructure projects and reform agendas such as the “Maju Johor 2030” plan — are being weaponised as campaign tools, stalling long-term governance for short-term electoral optics.

The result is a “wait-and-see” culture among investors and civil servants. With growing speculation of an early general election (GE16) by late 2026, the bureaucracy has become increasingly cautious, delaying regulatory approval and fiscal measures.

When a government spends more time managing internal fissures than executing policy, it is the public that ultimately pays the price through stagnating development and policy inconsistency. Malaysia now stands at a crossroads. The Prime Minister has hinted that snap polls could be called if coalition cracks continue to widen. However, calling for national elections during a period of high economic sensitivity may only deepen the divide.

For the Unity Government to survive its remaining term, it must transition from a reactive state of “crisis management” to being proactive in genuine reforms. If the coalition continues to cannibalise itself in the states while clinging to power at the federal level, it risks losing not just the next election, but the core legitimacy of its power that was brought in 2022. Only time will tell if the Unity Government can survive its own internal contradiction.


Edrina is a communications professional with a background in international relations. She holds a degree from the University of Nottingham Malaysia and has worked across public relations and social media for organizations in the development, education, and corporate sectors. Her work focuses on crafting narratives around regional affairs and strengthening media engagement across Southeast Asia.

Indonesia 🇮🇩

What the Budget Numbers Don’t Show

by Hree Putri Samudra, in Jakarta

Defense modernization is one of the easier things to sell in Jakarta. The announcements are familiar by now: Rafales from France, J-10s from China, PT PAL talking about unmanned submarines, another parliamentary hearing where the budget edges upward and officials speak of momentum. The ambition is real enough. What gets less attention is the part that starts after the cameras are gone. Procurement contracts do not end at signing. They arrive later as maintenance obligations, spare-parts orders, software updates, fuel bills, and invoices priced against a rupiah sitting closer to Rp17,500 than the Rp16,500 the budget was built around.

On paper, Rp187.1 trillion suggests a government still serious about defense modernization. The exchange rate complicates that story. Rafale contracts, T-50i sustainment, and billions in foreign financing behind the J-10 acquisitions are tied to currencies Indonesia does not control. The budget approved in Jakarta remains numerically intact as the rupiah weakens. At current rates, the difference runs into hundreds of millions of dollars, enough to turn maintenance, ammunition, and training from routine planning questions into budgeting problems.

This is usually where the public conversation loses track of how defense budgets actually work. When conversations revolve only on capital, what gets squeezed are the less visible elements that keep a military running. Refitting schedules stretch. Spare-parts procurement slows. Exercises get reduced because fuel and operating costs no longer match the assumptions made months earlier. Nobody announces lower sortie rates or delayed maintenance cycles. It is here that currency pressure leaves its mark - not in procurement headlines but in the quieter erosion of readiness.

Indonesia has been bearing this defence budgeting imbalance for years. Procurement and personnel absorb attention and money more easily than sustainment ever does. Maintenance, readiness, and lifecycle costs tend to sit further down the priority list until the exchange rate forces them back into view. When the rupiah is relatively stable, the system muddles through. Under sustained depreciation, the distance between what Indonesia formally owns and what the TNI can reliably operate becomes harder to ignore.

Defense is competing inside a tighter budget than the headline numbers suggest. Oil assumptions have shifted, debt servicing is heavier, and Makan Bergizi Gratis now carries Rp335 trillion, almost double the military allocation. Prabowo has defended the program and understandably so. But when some spending lines are politically difficult to touch, adjustment rarely disappears. It tends to move elsewhere, often into maintenance, training, and delayed upgrades.

The foreign policy effects are harder to measure but still worth noticing. Governments under fiscal pressure negotiate differently, especially when procurement financing narrows and economic assumptions become harder to defend. Jakarta’s commitment to large-scale US energy purchases was presented as partnership, and while there is no reason to dismiss that outright, tighter budgets usually leave less room to bargain comfortably.

Bebas dan aktif - free and active - was always a doctrine with a material premise: that Indonesia would be substantial enough, stable enough, and solvent enough that genuine independence was possible. That premise hasn’t collapsed. But it isn’t free, rather, it is getting more costly to sustain.


Hree is a Policy Fellow at the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network (APLN) where she leads research and policy interventions on Indo-Pacific nuclear security and AI governance. She previously served as a Research Fellow at the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) and has managed multi-country security portfolios across all 10 ASEAN member states. Her work examines the intersection of emerging technologies, strategic stability, and the evolution of regional security architectures. She specializes in institutional risk assessment and the application of open-source intelligence (OSINT) for strategic monitoring. Her current research focuses on how technological shifts such as AI and advanced verification tools reshape escalation dynamics and multilateral cooperation in a multipolar world.

Editorial Deadline 16/05/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk

Across the Mekong Belt this week, big projects are being built. Just don't ask who they're built for. In fact, across the four countries, the pattern is the same: the deals get made, the tracks get laid, and dissent gets paved over.

In Myanmar, Min Aung Hlaing flew to New Delhi to use handshakes to reframe its junta as a diplomatic partner, with India's infrastructure and security interests quietly lending the regime a legitimacy it has never earned. In Laos, a USD 20 billion trade roadmap and a railway extension to the South China Sea deepen Vientiane's integration into China's regional supply chain, but that connectivity seams to arrive faster than the regulatory frameworks meant to govern it.

Meanwhile, in Thailand, a trillion-dollar Land Bridge moves forward under cabinet protection, quietly bypassing the parliament and the southern fishing communities who will bear the cost. And in Cambodia, Hun Manet is headed to Kazan to meet Putin — a trip that says less about Russia and more about Phnom Penh’s determination to keep its options open, whoever is watching.

Myanmar 🇲🇲

What Min Aung Hlaing’s India Visit Really Means

by Moe Thiri Myat

This week’s update starts with Myanmar junta chief Senior Min Aung Hlaing’s first visit to India and meeting with India Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Many believe the visit represents more than just a routine diplomatic engagement. Publicly framed around economic cooperation, regional connectivity, and strategic development projects such as the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project, the diplomatic side of the visit revolved on border cooperation and bilateral ties. Yet, the visit reveals a tendency beyond infrastructural development or trading purposes, raising questions regarding Myanmar’s democratic trajectory when regional powers begin treating the Junta as a normal government.

This visit comes at a moment when Myanmar’s military regime seeks international legitimacy after the elections, as the junta continues to face intense resistance from ethnic armed organisations and pro-democracy forces across the country. Despite persistent conflict, humanitarian deterioration, and international criticism, Min Aung Hlaing’s appearance in India signals that parts of the region are increasingly willing to engage the regime as a political reality rather than as an isolated military government. India’s discussion for high-level meetings and trade cooperation gives the regimes a significant victory. For a junta that has faced international condemnation since the 2021 coup, such engagement helps restore an image of diplomatic acceptance.

New Delhi has long viewed Myanmar through the lenses of border security, Northeast India’s stability, counterinsurgency cooperation, connectivity, and competition with China. Projects such as the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project are central to India’s regional strategy, linking India’s eastern seaboard to its Northeast through Myanmar. From this perspective, engagement with whoever controls Naypyidaw may appear pragmatic. However, this pragmatism has democratic costs. When economic corridors, infrastructure projects, and security cooperation proceed without serious attention to political legitimacy, they risk strengthening the very institutions responsible for Myanmar’s democratic breakdown. Development projects are never politically neutral in a conflict setting. They can shape territorial control, revenue flows, and the regime’s ability to claim administrative authority.

Beyond Myanmar, it mirrors a growing tension within ASEAN and the broader Indo-Pacific region regarding the balance between democratic values and regional management problems. The implications extend beyond Southeast Asia. India, often positioned internationally as the world’s largest democracy, now faces increasing scrutiny over whether its Myanmar policy aligns with its democratic identity or primarily reflects geopolitical calculations linked to China, border security, and regional influence.

Ultimately, Min Aung Hlaing’s India visit should not be read only as an economic or diplomatic event. It is part of a wider regional normalisation process. The critical question is whether India’s engagement will encourage a political pathway that supports Myanmar’s democratic future, or whether it will further entrench the junta by giving it external recognition, economic opportunity, and diplomatic breathing space.


Moe Thiri Myat is a senior at Parami University. Majoring in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics (PPE). Interested in analyzing emerging sociopolitical situations and developments, through her work as a Myanmar correspondent at The ASEAN Frontier she aims to explore how sociopolitical developments across Southeast Asia shape and are shaped by the situation in Myanmar.

Lao PDR 🇱🇦

Trade Ambitions and Railway Expansion Reshape ASEAN

by Phonethida Sitthixay, in Vientiane

As Laos and China marked 65 years of diplomatic ties, officials of both nations unveiled a bold new plan: a USD 20 billion trade target and a railway expansion that could reshape ASEAN’s economic map.

In the weeks leading up to the anniversary, Lao Minister of Industry and Commerce Malaythong Kommasith met with Chinese Minister of Commerce Wang Wentao on May 21, with both sides ending up agreeing on four strategic pillars to reach the 2030 target: agriculture, industrial cooperation, digital trade, and green energy. In recent years, China has already stood as Laos’ largest trading partner and investor, but the roadmap signals a shift toward diversified growth, positioning Laos as more than a recipient of infrastructure projects.

At the meeting, both sides pledged to upgrade the 1998 Laos–China Trade Agreement, focusing on market access, e‑commerce, trade facilitation, and payment settlement mechanisms. Moreover, China agreed to promote Laos’ energy security by increasing fuel supplies after the Middle East crisis, while also enhancing cooperation in renewable energy and electric vehicles. In agriculture, the two sides plan to establish local fertilizer production by combining Laos’ potash reserves with Chinese imports of phosphorus and nitrogen.

Connectivity is also central to the vision. The China–Laos Railway (LCR), which has already transported millions of tons of goods across ASEAN markets, began its first major capacity expansion this week. To further streamline the target, the Lao National Assembly approved a multi‑billion‑dollar extension from Thakhek to Vietnam’s Vung Ang seaport, this helps to open a direct corridor to the South China Sea.

Complementing these moves, the Lao government also launched a new smart customs system on June 1 at the Thanaleng Dry Port, streamlining clearance at a hub that links Laos to Thailand and serves as a gateway to Vietnam, Myanmar, and China.

As Laos and China celebrate 65 years of ties, the focus now shifts to achieving the ambitious USD 20 billion trade target by 2030. Railway expansion and customs modernization are expected to boost regional connectivity and logistics, positioning Laos as a vital bridge within ASEAN supply chains. However, a report warns that the pace of integration will depend on how effectively Laos manages regulatory reforms and balances its reliance on Chinese investment with broader regional partnerships.


Phonethida holds a Bachelor of Arts in International Relations from the National University of Laos. She previously worked at The Laotian Times, where she developed her skills in news writing and reporting, and served as a Political-Economic Fellow at the U.S. Embassy in Vientiane. As TAF's Laos correspondent, she brings a focus on governance, sustainable development, and Laos' evolving role in the regional order.

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Thailand 🇹🇭

A Trillion Dollar Mega-Project without Public Participation?

by Natamon Aumphin, in Bangkok

On May 29, Thailand’s lower house voted to allow new studies of the Land Bridge to be under the cabinet rather than the parliament, undermining parliament’s check-and-balance mechanisms.

Conventionally, it is a practice for the parliament to establish subcommittees to review the feasibility of mega projects, particularly the controversial ones that face public criticism. These committees invite diverse stakeholders to consult the project, ensuring comprehensive confrontation, as reflected in the past studies. Although some of the existing studies raise doubt about its research design, the latest one is even more skeptical. In fact, the proposal is not in the policy submitted to the Office of Election of Thailand and the attempt to push the project forward is rather rapid and publicly opaque. Therefore, it raises questions about public participation, particularly from civil society, and potential corruption.

Even though the Land Bridge, by principle, favors industrial sectors domestically and internationally, the impact mostly lies on the local Southern people, who rely mainly on the ocean for sustenance. Nonetheless, building this mega project is estimated to have massive environmental impact, for example, on the seabed with an abundance of sea life, coral reefs, and water quality. Similar projects, such as the Eastern Economic Corridor, have proven to be inefficient, said Natthaphong Ruengpanyawut, the opposition from the People’s Party. Despite GDP growth, the EEC decreases the security and welfare of the people in the area due to pollution, contamination, and concentrated benefits.

Therefore, reflecting back on the Land Bridge, if the government continues to neglect public participation, the livelihood of the local people and the local economy will erode as they benefit little from the trillion-dollar transport corridor while needing to face the impact. In fact, as the majority of the people rely on the Andaman and Gulf of Thailand sea, the project will likely hurt rather than benefit them. The only groups that will gain advantage are large industrialists and foreign nations such as China that have always criticized the dominant role of the Malacca Strait managed by Singapore, the key US ally in Southeast Asia.

Natamon has served as a rapporteur at the Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS Thailand). She has also worked as a research assistant on diplomatic issues in Southeast Asia. Her work focuses on how domestic politics shape foreign policy in the region. She holds a degree in international relations and has experience in policy analysis, event reporting, and regional research.

Cambodia 🇰🇭

The Kazan Gambit

by Chandara Samban, in Kandal

Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet is set to travel to Kazan, Russia, for an ASEAN-Russia summit where he is expected to meet President Vladimir Putin — a move observers see as Phnom Penh’s effort to balance ties with major powers while under close Western scrutiny.

Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet is set to attend the ASEAN-Russia Summit marking the 35th anniversary of ASEAN-Russia relations in Kazan, Russia. The summit, which will be held from June 17 to 18, 2026, will be the first time Russia has hosted the event and aims to strengthen the strategic partnership between the two sides. This information was provided by the RT Moscow office and confirmed by Cambodia’s Permanent Secretary of State at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Eat Sophea, to TAF on June 7, 2026.

According to Cambodia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the summit, which will be attended by the leaders of ASEAN member states, will focus on four key areas. First, trade, technology, renewable energy, AI, smart cities, political-security cooperation, and cybersecurity. Second, expanding cooperation in renewable energy, artificial intelligence, and smart city technologies. Third, preparing an action plan for 2026–2030 to deepen political, security, and socio-cultural cooperation. And fourth, promoting dialogue on cybersecurity, transnational crime, food security, and energy security.

Cambodia also plans to hold a bilateral meeting between Hun Manet and Putin, alongside meetings with other ASEAN leaders. Amid ongoing tensions with Thailand over land and maritime borders, Eat Sophea said Phnom Penh will reaffirm its commitment to resolving the dispute through international principles.

Thong Mengdavid, Deputy Director of the China-ASEAN Studies Centre, said the visit reflects Cambodia’s neutral foreign policy and creates opportunities for cooperation with Russia in security, energy, technology, and education. On ASEAN-Russia ties, he described the relationship as one of “strategic pragmatism,” where Russia needs ASEAN as a gateway beyond China, while ASEAN values Russia for supporting ASEAN Centrality through diversified partnerships. He also urged Cambodia to raise the Thailand border dispute at the summit and seek regional support for a peaceful resolution.

Geopolitical analyst Seng Vanly said the visit demonstrates Hun Manet’s commitment to balanced, independent diplomacy. “In the regional context, ASEAN and Russia maintain a strategic partnership that is cautious but necessary,” he said, noting shared interests in Asia-Pacific stability and multilateralism. On the border dispute with Thailand, however, Vanly cautioned against raising it at the summit to avoid ASEAN friction, and instead urged Cambodia to pursue legal mechanisms such as UNCLOS.

From the Russian perspective, Dr. Bulat Akhmetkarimov, an international relations scholar based in Phnom Penh, said the summit offers both sides a valuable platform for dialogue amid growing global fragmentation. He noted ASEAN’s growing importance in Russia’s “Turn to the East” policy and suggested Russia could offer an additional avenue for the Cambodia-Thailand dispute. On that issue, Akhmetkarimov noted Russia must balance its historically close ties with Cambodia against its significant economic interests with Thailand, which is set to chair ASEAN in 2027.


Chandara is a freelance journalist with a focus on foreign affairs, security issues, and ASEAN affairs. He also serves as a Junior Counterterrorism Intelligence Analyst.

Editorial Deadline 06/06/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

By Anthony Pramualratana, Deputy Executive Director of the ASEAN Centre for Sustainable Development Studies and Dialogue

My uncle, a quiet and self-assured village headman, was a true local innovator whose confidence stemmed from hands-on experience. He was well-known in our community for his ingenuity. For example, he devised a clever system to dry harvested rice by constructing a makeshift tunnel from corrugated metal sheets and using a large fan to improve drying efficiency—this innovation helped the village secure better prices at the rice mill. He was also reportedly among the first to modify the iconic long-tail boat by attaching a propeller-equipped long branch to a two-stroke motor, a practical adaptation that became widely adopted.

My uncle had a remarkable ability to listen attentively and absorb new agricultural techniques shared by district government experts. Yet, rather than adopting these methods immediately, he would quietly test them on his own, often alone. I vividly remember him pointing out a subtle difference in water levels across a rice field, saying, “The water level here is a few millimeters too deep compared to over there... My dream is to plough this one-acre field so that the water level is exactly the same.”

This meticulous attention to detail and commitment to hands-on experimentation exemplified his approach to cultivating local wisdom. During a demonstration on pesticide use, agricultural advisers distributed gas masks for farmers to wear while spraying. However, many farmers fainted afterward due to the heat. Observing this, my uncle suggested a more practical approach: spraying only on very still-days, always spraying downwind, and working in pairs for safety. His advice reflected a grounded understanding of local conditions and a focus on practical, sustainable solutions. He’d share observations with a matter-of-fact tone, like his knowing remark that “sub-contractors regularly use only 8 truckloads of stone rather than 10 as required for road construction as that’s how they make their money.” He reminded me of Jed Clampett from The Beverly Hillbillies, someone who knew most everything but rarely flaunted it.

This profound local wisdom, honed through quiet, practical approaches and a keen awareness of external challenges—whether beneficial, like expert advice, or detrimental, like local corruption may seem quite common to the Asian reader, was deeply rooted in local traditions and concepts of reciprocity, prudence, self-sufficiency, and risk aversion. These intrinsic values and the nuanced, lived experience they represent are often overlooked in the relentless pursuit of short- term, externally driven development initiatives that ultimately prove unsustainable. The focus shifts to quick fixes and measurable outputs, inadvertently sidelining the invaluable, culturally embedded innovations and resilient practices that truly sustain communities. This disconnect means that genuine, long-term progress may be sacrificed for fleeting, superficial gains, undermining the very communities they aim to help.

These instances, though seemingly minor, illuminate a critical disconnect: the insufficient integration of rich cultural values, traditions, and indigenous knowledge into the very fabric of sustainable development in villages across the Southeast Asian region. This article argues that without a deep understanding of “where we came from”—the inherent values that have shaped Southeast Asian societies—we risk undermining the sustainability and effectiveness of our efforts to chart a truly sustainable “where we are going.”

The dialogue surrounding sustainable development and the circular economy in The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), as an example, has gained significant momentum, driven by a growing awareness of environmental degradation and resource scarcity. However, a prevailing challenge lies in the frequent dominance of external frameworks and approaches, often overlooking the profound resonance of these concepts within existing ASEAN cultural values.

For instance, the Indonesian and Malaysian concept of Gotong Royong, emphasizing mutual cooperation and shared responsibility, directly aligns with the collective action vital for a successful circular economy. Similarly, the Filipino Diskarte, a spirit of ingenuity and resourcefulness in maximizing utility, inherently embodies the principles of waste reduction and extended product lifecycles. Thailand’s “Sufficiency Economy“ philosophy, advocating moderation and prudence, provides a powerful indigenous framework for mindful consumption—a cornerstone of circularity. The Vietnamese value of Tích trữ, or saving and extending the life of goods, further underscores a natural inclination towards durability and reuse. Maybe a lot of our sustainable development efforts have not adequately involved the disciplines that value these cultural underpinnings such as anthropology, history and linguistics but rather attempting to directly implement policy development and regulations within a specific and short time frame.

The imperative for sustainable development and the transition towards a circular economy in ASEAN has never been more pressing. The region, a global biodiversity hotspot and home to over 680 million people, faces escalating environmental challenges—from rampant plastic pollution choking its seas and waterways to accelerating deforestation, biodiversity loss, and the ever-present specter of climate change impacts. For instance, the EU-ASEAN High-Level Dialogue on Environment and Climate Change has specifically addressed “conservation of natural resources, water and biodiversity, waste management, plastics and marine litter,” and highlighted the findings of a regional gap analysis on the state of the circular economy for plastics in ASEAN Member States. Consequently, there has been an increasing focus, both internally and through partnerships with dialogue partners, on adopting green growth strategies, promoting renewable energy, enhancing disaster resilience, and fostering resource efficiency. The concept of a circular economy is increasingly recognized as a vital pathway for ASEAN’s future economic prosperity and environmental stewardship.

Yet, despite this growing recognition and the influx of technological solutions and policy frameworks, a fundamental challenge persists. This article posits that the current trajectory of sustainable development and circular economy initiatives in ASEAN, often heavily influenced by global North paradigms, risks undermining their long-term efficacy and local ownership due to an insufficient integration of the region’s unique cultural ethos. Our central argument is clear: genuine, impactful, and enduring sustainability in Southeast Asia can only be achieved when policies and projects are not merely adapted, but are deeply rooted in, and organically grow from, the indigenous values, traditions, and knowledge systems that have long governed communal life and human-nature interactions across the diverse ASEAN member states. We contend that understanding “where we came from”—the shared historical and cultural values that have shaped Southeast Asian societies—is not merely an academic exercise, but an essential, foundational prerequisite to effectively charting a truly sustainable “where we are going.” Pretty (2003) explains one practical outcome of this as social capital and the collective management of resources.

The Tapestry of ASEAN Values: Common Threads

ASEAN is celebrated globally for its extraordinary diversity, a vibrant mosaic of languages, religions, historical narratives, and socio-political systems. Yet, beneath this compelling surface of variety lies a remarkable coherence: a profound set of underlying values, traditions, and indigenous knowledge systems that, though expressed uniquely across member states, resonate with remarkable commonality. These shared cultural threads often predate modern national boundaries and hold profound implications for understanding and fostering sustainable development and circular economy principles within the region.

The Spirit of Interconnectedness and Community

At the very heart of many Southeast Asian societies lies an intrinsic understanding of interconnectedness and a profound emphasis on communal harmony. This is not merely a social preference but a foundational worldview that sees individuals as inextricably linked to their families, communities, and even the broader natural world.

One of the most widely recognized manifestations of this is Gotong Royong in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. More than just an act of mutual assistance, Gotong Royong embodies a philosophy of collective responsibility, shared burden, and reciprocal altruism.

Historically, this communal spirit was the backbone of village life, where tasks too large for individuals—such as constructing a house, preparing land for planting, or organizing a harvest were undertaken collectively. A similar practice can also be seen in kān longkhaēk in Thailand. Villagers would voluntarily offer their labor, knowing that similar support would be extended to them in their time of need. This traditional practice ensured social cohesion, reinforced bonds of solidarity, and effectively managed resources and labor for the collective good. In the context of a circular economy, “Gotong Royong“ offers a powerful indigenous framework for fostering collaborative consumption models, community-led repair initiatives, and shared resource management systems. This communal ethos intrinsically encourages a collective ownership of environmental challenges and solutions, where the success of a circular system relies on the active participation and shared benefits among all members. Similarly, in the Philippines, the concepts of Kapwa and Bayanihan encapsulate this deep-seated sense of shared identity and communal unity. Kapwa literally translates to “together with the person,” but its deeper meaning signifies a shared inner self, a recognition of humanity in others, and a profound sense of interconnectedness with all beings. This worldview fosters empathy, compassion, and a natural inclination towards collective well-being over individual gain.

Bayanihan, derived from bayan (community or town), refers to the spirit of communal unity, work, and cooperation to achieve a particular goal, most famously depicted by neighbors literally moving a house together. It is a tradition of reciprocal help, where individuals volunteer their time and effort to support community endeavors, often without expectation of direct personal reward beyond the intrinsic satisfaction of contributing to the common good [8]. These concepts resonate powerfully with the principles of a circular economy, where the entire system—from design to consumption to recovery—is interconnected, and the success of resource loops depends on collective action and shared responsibility among producers, consumers, and communities.

Embracing Kapwa and Bayanihan can foster a culture where shared resources (e.g., community tool libraries, shared mobility services), collaborative repair workshops, and collective waste reduction initiatives are not just economic models but are seen as extensions of existing, cherished social practices. They encourage a shift from individualistic consumption to shared access and communal stewardship of resources.

The common thread running through Gotong Royong, Kapwa, and Bayanihan is the understanding that societal well-being is intrinsically linked to collective action. In a circular economy, where materials are kept in use, waste is minimized, and natural systems are regenerated, everything is interconnected. A single product’s lifecycle touches multiple stakeholders, from designers and manufacturers to consumers and recyclers. These ASEAN values provide a cultural bedrock for fostering the collective responsibility and collaborative spirit essential for closing material loops and transitioning away from linear production and consumption patterns. They highlight that the journey towards circularity is not just a technical or economic one, but fundamentally a social and communal endeavor.

Respect for Nature and Resourcefulness

Beyond human interconnections, many ASEAN cultures exhibit a profound, often spiritual, respect for the natural world, coupled with an inherent resourcefulness born from historical necessity and a deep understanding of local ecosystems.

In Vietnam, the concept of Trân trọng thiên nhiên—the profound respect for nature—is deeply embedded in cultural practices, folklore, and traditional livelihoods. Traditional Vietnamese agriculture, particularly rice cultivation, has historically operated in harmony with natural cycles, demonstrating an innate understanding of ecological balance and the need to steward natural resources responsibly. This translates into practices that minimize waste, utilize natural processes, and value the inherent life force within the environment. This reverence for nature provides a powerful cultural impetus for conservation, biodiversity protection, and sustainable resource management, aligning directly with the circular economy’s goal of regenerating natural systems and decoupling economic growth from virgin resource extraction. It fosters a mindset where the environment is not merely a source of raw materials but a living entity deserving of care and protection, whose health is intrinsically linked to human well-being.

The Filipino value of Diskarte exemplifies a pragmatic ingenuity in maximizing resource use and minimizing waste. Diskarte is often translated as “resourcefulness” or “strategy,” but it encompasses a broader philosophy of adaptability, creativity, and problem-solving, particularly in the face of scarcity or limitations.

It’s about making do with what you have, finding alternative uses for discarded items, improvising solutions, and extending the life of products through ingenious repairs. This can be seen in the ubiquitous jeepneys—former US military jeeps creatively repurposed and adorned to become iconic public transport, or in the widespread practice of repairing electronics, clothing, and household items rather than simply replacing them. Diskarte fosters a culture of repair, reuse, and upcycling, where materials are valued for their potential utility rather than their immediate form or perceived obsolescence. This directly aligns with the core tenets of sustainable resource management and waste reduction in the circular economy, emphasizing product longevity, material recovery, and the creative transformation of ‘waste’ into valuable resources. It offers a locally ingrained cultural trait that naturally gravitates towards circular principles, viewing perceived waste as an opportunity for innovative transformation.

These values, Trân trọng thiên nhiên and Diskarte, together underscore a dual approach to resource management: a deep respect for the natural world that minimizes initial impact, combined with a pragmatic ingenuity that ensures maximum utility from resources once they are extracted or manufactured. This cultural DNA provides a compelling foundation for circular economy initiatives that aim to design out waste, keep products and materials in use, and regenerate natural systems.

Principles of Balance and Moderation

Another pervasive thread across ASEAN cultures is the emphasis on balance, harmony, and moderation, often rooted in philosophical or spiritual traditions. This outlook directly counters the pervasive consumerist culture that drives linear economies.

Thailand’s Sethakit Poh Piang or Sufficiency Economy Philosophy (SEP) stands as a pre-eminent example of this. Articulated by the late King Bhumibol Adulyadej, SEP is not an economic theory in the conventional sense but a holistic philosophy applicable to individuals, families, communities, and the nation. Its core principles revolve around moderation, prudence, and resilience. Moderation or Poh Piang advocates for living within one’s means, avoiding extravagance, and consuming only what is necessary, while prudence Mee Hetuphol encourages careful planning, rational decision-making, and understanding potential risks. Resilience Poom Kumkan“ emphasizes building strong foundations to withstand internal and external shocks.

Critically, SEP encourages a balanced approach to development, recognizing the interconnectedness of economic, social, environmental, and cultural dimensions. It champions self-immunity against external pressures and highlights the importance of knowledge and morality in decision-making. This ‘philosophy’ offers a profound alignment with the circular economy’s imperative to reduce overconsumption and promote mindful resource use.

SEP inherently challenges the growth-at-all-costs paradigm, advocating instead for sustainable living and production that respects ecological limits. It encourages durability in products, efficient use of resources, and localized, resilient economic systems. Rather than solely focusing on material throughput, SEP inspires a focus on well-being and long-term sustainability, providing a powerful ethical and philosophical framework for transitioning towards a circular economy where consumption is mindful, resources are valued, and waste is minimized by design. It shifts the focus from accumulating more to living better with less, fostering a culture of mindful resource stewardship.

Complementing these indigenous philosophical frameworks is the contemporary Malaysian concept of Madani. Madani (Championed by Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim) is a vision for a civil and prosperous nation rooted in core values that resonate strongly with sustainable development. While comprehensive in its scope, encompassing governance, trust, and well- being, its pillars of Sustainability (Kelestarian), Prosperity (Kemakmuran), and Respect (Ihsan) are particularly pertinent to the dialogue on circularity.

Madani emphasizes the importance of building a just and equitable society that lives within environmental limits, fostering economic prosperity that does not come at the expense of ecological integrity, and nurturing a deep respect for all forms of life and the natural world. This concept implicitly calls for moderation, prudent resource management, and a sense of collective responsibility for the environment, echoing the principles found in Thailand’s SEP and the community-oriented values like Gotong Royong. It provides a modern policy lens through which traditional values supporting environmental stewardship and balanced growth can be reinvigorated and applied to contemporary challenges, serving as a guiding principle for Malaysia’s approach to the circular economy and broader sustainable development goals.

The Madani framework thus reinforces the idea that the pursuit of a circular economy is not merely an economic strategy but a societal transformation grounded in ethics and values inherent to the region.

Thrift and Longevity

Closely intertwined with moderation is the enduring value of thrift and the cultural inclination to extend the lifecycle of goods, rather than embracing planned obsolescence. This often stems from historical realities of scarcity, coupled with an intrinsic respect for labor and resources.

In Vietnam, practices like tích trữ (saving or stockpiling) coexist with a broader cultural emphasis on frugality and resourcefulness, where people often repair, reuse, and extend the lifespan of goods. This is evident in traditional households where clothing is mended until threadbare, furniture is meticulously repaired and passed down through generations, and leftover food is creatively repurposed. It’s a mindset that prioritizes long-term utility over short-term gratification, seeing inherent value in products beyond their initial purchase. This deep-seated value encourages a culture of meticulous care for possessions, fostering habits of repair, maintenance, and prudent consumption.

This culture fosters a consumer behavior that demands durable goods, appreciates repair services, and actively participates in secondary markets for reuse and sharing. This stands in stark contrast to the throwaway culture often associated with linear economies, demonstrating an innate cultural predisposition towards the core tenets of a circular economy. The act of tích trữ transforms perceived waste into a resource, fostering a mindset of resource preservation and utility maximization.

The Missing Dialogue: A Disconnect in Policy and Implementation

Despite the compelling alignment between ASEAN’s foundational cultural values and the principles of sustainable development and the circular economy, a persistent and critical disconnect often emerges in the actual policy formulation and project implementation within the region. While efforts to promote sustainability are laudable and increasingly urgent, their effectiveness is frequently hampered by a fundamental flaw: a missing dialogue, a failure to deeply integrate the very cultural roots that could ensure their lasting success.

The Dominance of External Frameworks

A significant characteristic of the sustainable development and circular economy landscape in ASEAN is the pervasive influence of external frameworks. Initiatives, strategies, and even specific technical solutions are frequently conceptualized, funded, and driven by External Partners and various international organizations. These external actors often bring considerable technical expertise, financial resources, and established conceptual models derived from their own experiences and priorities. The foundational values of these experiences are rarely discussed with ASEAN partners. For instance, circular economy roadmaps and programmes are frequently modeled on external directives and strategies, while sustainability reporting standards may adhere to global frameworks developed in Western contexts. While these external inputs are undoubtedly valuable—providing access to advanced technologies, best practices, and crucial funding—they often come with unexplained assumptions and a transplanting of activities within a rigid time frame. The focus tends to be on measurable KPIs, technological fixes, and formal governance structures, which, while important, can overshadow the equally vital socio-cultural dimensions unique to the ASEAN context.

Insufficient Local Contextualization

Therefore, the core problem is not the external engagement itself, but the insufficient depth of local contextualization. While consultations with local stakeholders do occur, they often remain at a superficial level, failing to genuinely integrate ASEAN’s indigenous knowledge, values, and traditions into the fundamental design and implementation of policies and projects. There is a tendency to “localize” by translating documents or adding a few local case studies, rather than by truly co-creating solutions from the ground up, drawing on the wellspring of regional wisdom.

This oversight perpetuates a top-down approach where external models are imposed or adapted rather than allowing culturally resonant and locally owned solutions to organically emerge. The consequence is that valuable local insights, which could drastically enhance project effectiveness and long-term sustainability, are often marginalized or entirely missed.

Examples of Potential Mismatches

This lack of deep understanding and integration of local values can lead to a series of significant mismatches, undermining the very goals they aim to achieve:

• Low Community Buy-in: A classic example is the introduction of highly centralized, formal waste management systems in communities where informal recycling networks and traditional practices of diskarte (resourcefulness) or tích trữ (thrift) are already deeply ingrained. If these systems fail to acknowledge and integrate the existing informal sector, or if they clash with communal sharing traditions, they often face resistance, lack of participation, and ultimately, low community buy-in, leading to their eventual failure. Communities might not see themselves reflected in the solution, feeling that external experts are dictating rather than collaborating.

• Culturally Inappropriate Solutions: Consider sustainable agriculture initiatives that advocate for specific high-yield monoculture crops or advanced machinery, overlooking traditional intercropping systems, organic fertilization methods, and water management techniques passed down through generations. These indigenous practices, often optimized for local climate and soil conditions and rooted in a trân trọng thiên nhiên (respect for nature) philosophy, might be more resilient and sustainable in the long run than externally prescribed alternatives that demand significant capital investment and new technical knowledge.

• Unsustainable Practices in the Long Run: Policies that promote the rapid adoption of new materials or technologies without considering the region’s strong culture of repair and longevity can inadvertently foster a linear throwaway mentality. For instance, if readily available, cheaper but less durable goods replace traditionally robust and repairable items, new waste streams are generated that local infrastructure is ill-equipped to handle, leading to long-term environmental burdens.

• Ineffective Awareness Campaigns: Environmental awareness campaigns often rely on Western-centric messaging about individual responsibility and carbon footprints. While important, these may not resonate as deeply in cultures where community collective action (Gotong Royong, Bayanihan) and spiritual reverence for nature are more potent motivators. However, a generic public service announcement will likely be less effective than campaigns crafted by local creative industries who possess an innate understanding of cultural nuances, humor, and community aspirations. Local advertising agencies have a proven track record of creating campaigns that profoundly connect with the local populace, turning abstract concepts into relatable, actionable narratives that tap into core values.

The Consequence: Unsustainable Outcomes

The ultimate consequence of this missing dialogue is the creation of initiatives that are not truly embraced, owned, or sustained by local communities, and subsequently, government authorities. Projects, however well-funded and technically sound, can become transient interventions rather than deeply embedded and self-perpetuating solutions. They often cease to function effectively once external funding or oversight concludes, leaving behind expensive infrastructure but little lasting change in behavior or mindset.

Reconnecting with Our Roots: A Path Forward

The analysis in the previous section highlighted a critical gap: the tendency for externally driven sustainable development and circular economy initiatives in ASEAN to overlook or insufficiently integrate the region’s rich tapestry of cultural values and indigenous knowledge. To transcend these limitations and foster truly sustainable, resilient, and locally-owned outcomes, a fundamental paradigm shift is required. This path forward demands a conscious and concerted effort to reconnect with ASEAN’s roots, recognizing that cultural relevance is not a peripheral consideration but the very bedrock of effective change.

The Imperative of Genuine Local Dialogue

The first and arguably most crucial step is to foster genuine, inclusive, and sustained dialogue at all levels of policymaking, project design, and community engagement. This is more than a superficial consultation process; it is about establishing a true partnership where local voices, including those of indigenous communities, traditional leaders, women’s groups, and informal sectors, are not just heard but are empowered to shape the agenda ². Such dialogue must prioritize and elevate ASEAN’s values, indigenous knowledge systems, and historical experiences. This means creating platforms for co-creation, where solutions are collaboratively developed from the ground up, blending scientific expertise with traditional wisdom. For instance, in waste management, instead of merely informing communities about new regulations, dialogue should involve understanding existing informal recycling practices, communal sharing norms, and traditional resourcefulness (Diskarte) to design integrated systems that build upon, rather than dismantle, these local efficiencies and social structures ³. This iterative process of listening, learning, and co-design ensures that solutions are culturally appropriate, economically viable for local populations, and socially acceptable, fostering deep-seated buy-in and ownership.

Integrating Values into Policy Frameworks

Beyond dialogue, the next critical step is to explicitly integrate these foundational values into national and regional policy frameworks for sustainable development and the circular economy. This means moving beyond generic policy statements to articulating how concepts like Gotong Royong, Sufficiency Economy, Madani, or Trân trọng thiên nhiên can serve as guiding principles for specific policy instruments.

For example, waste management policies could be designed to explicitly promote community cooperation and collective responsibility, building upon the spirit of Gotong Royong or Bayanihan rather than solely relying on individualistic incentives or penalties. This could manifest in policies that support community-managed waste banks, local composting initiatives, or repair cafes where shared effort is the driving force. Similarly, sustainable agriculture policies could valorize and incentivize traditional farming practices that embody Trân trọng thiên nhiên – such as integrated pest management, organic fertilization, and seed saving – providing official recognition and support for practices that have proven ecologically sound over centuries, rather than solely promoting industrial farming methods.

Furthermore, national development plans could explicitly consider Sufficiency Economy Philosophy or the Madani concept as guiding principles for economic growth, promoting moderation, prudence, and resilience in consumption and production patterns, and thus inherently fostering circularity and sustainability at a systemic level. This integration ensures that policies are not just technically sound but are also culturally resonant and aligned with the aspirations and worldview of the populace. The infusion of these concepts along with an on-the-ground study method that involves qualitative research with an action research design involving intensive, systematic, and semi-structured experiential learning focusing on problem identification, prioritization, analysis, and linkage with available sustainable resources for sustainable solutions with community members as discussed by Mulasari et. al. (2024) in the study of Community-driven Waste Management: Insights from an Action Research Trial in Yogyakarta are essential in our discussions.

Culturally Sensitive Project Implementation

A paradigm shift is also imperative in the actual implementation of sustainable development and circular economy projects. Project design documents must move beyond a “consultation” checkbox to genuinely embed local knowledge and traditions as integral components of the process. This involves more than just selecting beneficiaries; it means ensuring that project teams include local cultural experts, ethnographers, and community facilitators who can bridge communication gaps and ensure solutions are contextually appropriate. For instance, promoting energy efficiency might involve leveraging traditional architectural designs that naturally cool homes, rather than solely pushing for energy-intensive air conditioning. Similarly, promoting sustainable tourism could focus on fostering deeper cultural immersion and supporting local artisan economies, drawing on the tích trữ value of craftsmanship and longevity, rather than mass tourism models that often lead to resource depletion and cultural commodification. The shift is towards enabling communities to lead their own development pathways, with external support serving as a catalyst rather than a directive force, leading to more effective, sustainable, and truly owned outcomes.

Empowering Education and Awareness

To foster genuine understanding and lasting behavioral change, educational programs and public awareness campaigns must be meticulously designed to resonate with local cultural contexts and values. Generic global messaging often falls flat. Instead, campaigns should leverage traditional storytelling, local proverbs, religious teachings, and community leaders to communicate sustainability concepts in a language and framework that is intrinsically understood and valued. Instead of abstract discussions about carbon footprints, campaigns could frame waste reduction as an extension of Diskarte or tích trữ, or communal clean-ups as an expression of Gotong Royong. UNESCO’s work on culturally relevant education provides a valuable blueprint, demonstrating how integrating local heritage, languages, and traditional knowledge into curricula can foster a deeper appreciation for cultural values and their intrinsic link to environmental stewardship. This approach ensures that education is not perceived as an external imposition but as an empowerment that connects new knowledge with existing wisdom, fostering genuine behavioral change.

The Role of Dialogue Partners

Finally, External Partners have a crucial supportive role to play. Their contribution must evolve from primarily transferring models and technology to actively seeking to understand and integrate ASEAN’s inherent values into their collaborative projects. This means investing in cultural competency training for their own staff, funding research that maps ASEAN’s indigenous knowledge systems, and co-designing projects with local experts from the outset. Rather than suggesting external blueprints, External Partners should act as facilitators, providing technical assistance and financial support that empower ASEAN countries to develop their own culturally appropriate circular economy roadmaps and sustainable development pathways. This collaborative approach, rooted in mutual respect and a genuine appreciation for diverse knowledge systems, will lead to more robust, resilient, and enduring partnerships that truly serve the long-term sustainability goals of the ASEAN region. By doing so, External Partners can help catalyze a sustainability transformation that is authentically “rooted” in the diverse yet unified spirit of Southeast Asia.

Common Heritage, Shared Future: Leveraging Commonalities

The detailed exploration of ASEAN’s rich cultural values—from the spirit of Gotong Royong and Kapwa to the profound respect for nature embodied in Trân trọng thiên nhiên, the prudence of Sufficiency Economy and Madani, and the inherent thrift of Tích trữ—reveals a powerful and often underutilized asset. These are not merely isolated cultural artifacts, but living traditions that provide a strong, indigenous foundation for the principles of sustainable development and the circular economy. Recognizing these deep-seated commonalities across the diverse ASEAN member states is crucial, not just for individual national progress, but for forging a more cohesive and impactful regional trajectory towards a sustainable future.

Building on Shared Wisdom for Cohesive Regional Strategies

By explicitly acknowledging and actively leveraging these shared values, ASEAN member states can transcend the limitations of purely economic or technical approaches to sustainability. This common heritage offers an unparalleled opportunity to develop more cohesive, culturally resonant, and therefore more effective regional strategies and initiatives. Imagine a regional circular economy framework that is not merely an adaptation of external models, but one that actively synthesizes these indigenous values into its core principles, perhaps emphasizing a “Community-Led Circularity” model where local solutions born from Gotong Royong are scaled across the region. Collaborative research initiatives could explore traditional ecological knowledge across member states to inform regional biodiversity conservation and sustainable resource management policies. Shared cultural narratives about human-nature relationships could form the basis of region-wide environmental education campaigns, fostering a collective sense of stewardship. This approach moves beyond political cooperation that delves into a deeper cultural synergy, fostering a shared identity in the pursuit of sustainability that resonates with ordinary citizens across the region.

A Unified ASEAN Voice in International Dialogues

A strong emphasis on shared values can significantly bolster ASEAN’s collective voice and position in international dialogues on sustainable development. In a global arena often dominated by Western development paradigms, ASEAN has a unique opportunity to present a distinct, culturally informed perspective on how to achieve environmental sustainability and economic prosperity. By articulating a vision of a circular economy rooted in “sufficiency,” “balance,” and “community,” ASEAN can advocate for models of development that are not only economically viable but also socially equitable and culturally appropriate for developing regions. This unified voice, grounded in a common heritage, can strengthen ASEAN’s negotiating power in global forums, influencing international norms and standards to be more inclusive of diverse socio- cultural contexts. It allows ASEAN to contribute a valuable perspective to global environmental governance, showcasing that a sustainable future can be forged through diverse pathways, including those deeply rooted in traditional wisdom and shared cultural values. This collective assertion of cultural identity in the face of global challenges can position ASEAN as a leader in defining a more equitable and culturally relevant path to planetary well-being.

Final Thoughts

The journey towards sustainable development and a robust circular economy in Southeast Asia is undeniably complex, fraught with both opportunities and challenges. As this article has argued, the prevailing tendency to frame and implement sustainability initiatives primarily through externally derived frameworks often overlooks a crucial, yet powerful, asset: the rich tapestry of ASEAN’s own deeply ingrained cultural values and indigenous knowledge systems. The “missing dialogue”—the insufficient integration of these profound cultural undercurrents into policy and project design— has demonstrably led to mismatches, low community buy-in, culturally inappropriate solutions, and ultimately, unsustainable outcomes.

By reconnecting with its roots, leveraging its common heritage, and empowering its shared wisdom, ASEAN has the unique opportunity to forge a distinctive and powerful identity in the global sustainability landscape. This is not merely about adopting global best practices; it is about defining a new, culturally rich model of development that prioritizes balance, community, and respect for nature. Such a model promises not just environmental protection and economic prosperity, but a future that is truly rooted, resilient, and reflective of the diverse yet unified spirit of Southeast Asia. It’s time for ASEAN’s values to not just inform its future, but to actively drive it.

Dr. Anthony Pramualratana is the Deputy Executive Director of the ASEAN Centre for Sustainable Development Studies and Dialogue (ACSDSD). He also leads the ASEAN Circular Economy Stakeholder Platform, supporting member states in advancing sustainable consumption and production through a circular economy approach. Dr Pramualratana oversees the Centre’s research and studies, driving evidence-based strategies to address regional sustainability challenges. He was also a lecturer at Mahidol University’s Institute for Population and Social Research and holds a master’s degree in Sociology from the East-West Center, University of Hawaii, and a PhD in Demography from the Australian National University.

Edited by Marios T. Afrataios, TAF Co-Founder

by Karen Ysabelle R. David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk

As the month of May drew to a close, we saw the movers and shakers of the world’s defense community flock to Singapore for the annual Shangri-La Dialogue, Asia’s premier security summit. Set against a backdrop of heightened geopolitical tensions and complex security risks, the summit nevertheless provides a neutral venue for connection and discussions. For host Singapore, the summit was also a chance to reinforce its enviable role as a trusted convener for Asia and the rest of the world.

For Vietnam, whose own President To Lam gave the opening keynote address at the Dialogue, it was an opportunity to see and be seen as one of the region’s rising middle powers. At the same time, the Vietnamese leader highlighted in his speech the multiple crises facing the world today and the fragmented security environment that middle powers must learn to navigate.

But for the Philippines, foreign affairs takes a backseat amid the Vice President’s upcoming impeachment trial and a chaotic Senate. In the midst of head-spinning developments, a coalition of concerned citizens have launched Bantay Senado in an effort to keep the public informed and aware during a time of unprecedented political uproar.

Singapore 🇸🇬

Asia at a Crossroads: What the Shangri-La Dialogue 2026 Reveals About the Region’s Security Future

by Jennifer Hui En Tan, in Singapore

The yearly Shangri-La Dialogue was held from 29 May to 31 May 2026, hosting more than 550 defense ministers, military chiefs, diplomats, and security analysts at Asia’s most closely watched security forum. This year’s dialogue opens against the backdrop of Middle East tensions, energy price volatility, and global supply chain uncertainty. Launched in 2002 by the International Institute for Strategic Studies with the support of the Singapore government, the Shangri-La Dialogue has grown into Asia’s premier defense summit, enabling decision makers from across Asia Pacific, North America, Europe, and the Middle East to share policy response to common threats.

Throughout the years, the Shangri-La Dialogue has established itself as the region’s most important platform for strategic and defense diplomacy. The forum allows governments to explain their security policies, exchange perspectives on emerging threats, and engage directly with counterparts to manage tension and build confidence. In an era where geopolitical rivalries increasingly shape regional affairs, such opportunities for dialogue have become more valuable than ever.

This year’s dialogue shifted focus on a multitude of issues, such as the United States’ strategy in the Indo-Pacific, the strategic competition between the United States and China, and China’s evolving role in the Asia Pacific region. Furthermore, the dialogue focuses on the Middle East conflict and tensions involving Iran.

China’s level of participation has been increasingly viewed as a barometer of its broader relationship with Western powers and its willingness to engage in regional security discussions. As tensions between Beijing and Washington persist over issues ranging from Taiwan to trade and technology, China’s intentions and policy positions are closely monitored and are of interest.

Despite the significance of the Shangri-La Dialogue, it often remains a forum for discussion rather than decision-making. The summit does not produce binding agreements but is rather a platform for signaling intentions, communicating positions, and publicly airing disagreements. This limitation, however, does not diminish its importance. The dialogue’s value lies in its ability to provide a space where competing powers can engage directly despite heightened tensions. This helps reduce the risk of misunderstanding and miscalculations.

Singapore’s role as host carries significance: the state’s position as a neutral convener shows that the dialogue serves as a function that goes beyond formal agenda, but rather serves as a signal of the region’s continued relevance to the global security order. The summit reflects the broader balancing act faced by many Southeast Asian nations. ASEAN members continue to navigate the complex relationship between the United States and China to maintain productive ties with both, all while avoiding being drawn into great power rivalry.

As geopolitical tensions intensify and security challenges become increasingly interconnected, the Shangri-La Dialogue remains vital for fostering communication and strategic engagement. Though the summit does not produce binding agreements, its significance lies in bringing together key decision-makers to exchange views and manage tensions. The summit also reinforces Singapore’s role as a trusted and neutral convener in a fragmented international environment. As Asia navigates an increasingly uncertain strategic landscape, the Shangri-La Dialogue serves as an important reminder that dialogue, diplomacy, and cooperation remain essential to preserving regional stability.


Jennifer is a final-year International Relations student at the Singapore Institute of Management, where she focuses on political engagement, diplomacy, and community governance. She is an active volunteer in her constituency, working closely with residents to understand local concerns, facilitate dialogue, and support community initiatives.

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Vietnam 🇻🇳

Vietnam at the Shangri-La Dialogue

by Sean Huy Vu

The Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD), Asia’s premier security summit, was held in Singapore during the last weekend of May. The event is hosted annually by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), a British think tank, and brings together diplomats, military officials, scholars, journalists, and key sectors of the private sector.

This event was the first time Vietnam, represented by President To Lam, made the opening keynote address at the forum. The Dialogue occurs just one month after President To’s election by the National Assembly, and during his first tours of Thailand and Singapore since reassuming office.

The SLD occurs amid a world of turmoil: the war in Iran, the conflict between Thailand and Cambodia, concerns over freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, and concerns about the autonomy of Taiwan. In its 2026 Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment, the IISS warned of the growing risks of nuclear conflict — particularly in the Korean peninsula — and the vulnerability of the Malacca Strait as a maritime chokepoint. It also criticized ASEAN’s rotating Special Envoy chair mechanism for preventing long-term stakeholder engagement over resolving the civil war in Myanmar.

These were some of the issues President To Lam indirectly touched on in his address. “While all nations continue to speak of peace, stability, and cooperation,” he remarked, “the strategic environment is marked by growing lack of trust, fragmentation, and unchecked competition.”

President To identified three “crises” occurring in the world: a crisis in the international order; a crisis in development models; and a crisis in strategic trust. In the first crisis, “commitments are repeatedly affirmed yet undermined in practice… [and] laws are interpreted selectively.” In the second crisis, economic development pathways are disrupted and can “evolve into social and political instability.” The final crisis, the decline of trust between states, can lead to a security dilemma. “Managing differences within a rules-based framework,” To Lam stated, ensures that “competition remains bounded, responsible and predictable.” He stressed the need for “rapid communication channels… transparency, dialogue, substantive information-sharing… clear codes of conduct… [and] robust technological norms” so that humans, rather than AI, are responsible for their own security.

Vietnam’s aspirations for maintaining a rules-based order contrast sharply with the United States. Rather than returning to the “utopian” status quo of the past 30 years, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth communicated the Trump administration’s ambitions to assert a more hegemonic foreign policy based on “realism.”

To Lam’s speech echoes Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s speech at the World Economic Forum earlier this year. It captures the hopes and fears of middle powers in proactively shaping the international order for peaceful, stable development amid great power rivalry. Vietnam is arguably the archetypal middle power, having hosted summits with all members of the United Nations Security Council in less than a year between 2024 and 2025. Not only does the country’s participation at the IISS summit elevate its status internationally as a rising power on the global stage, it enhances its political legitimacy at home.


Sean is a scholar of East Asian history, culture, and international relations, with current research at Georgetown University examining working-class labor and human trafficking in the region. His broader interests include the social psychology of religion and identity politics. Sean previously taught modern Korean history at the University of California, Irvine, where he completed his B.A. in History, and later taught English in Ho Chi Minh City while studying Vietnamese language and culture. His writing has been published by UC Irvine, Johns Hopkins University, and Foreign Analysis.

The Philippines 🇵🇭

Why Citizen Coalitions Matter for Democracy

by Glenn Vincent N. Boquilon, in Angeles City

In democracies, power has always been rooted in the people. Citizen movements have long played a crucial role in ensuring that democratic institutions and practices are held intact. In the Philippines, the launch of Bantay Senado reflects this continuing tradition. Composed of students, academics, professionals, and ordinary citizens, the coalition seeks to monitor the upcoming impeachment trial of Philippine Vice President Sara Duterte. The network also aims to provide a comprehensive and inclusive understanding of the proceedings for the ordinary Filipino.

Formally launched at De La Salle University last 3 June, Bantay Senado’s call to action highlights the need to be cautiously aware (mapagmatyag), openly informed (magpaliwanag), and show necessary clamorous defiance (mangalampag) throughout the impeachment trial. The network reiterates the Senate’s obligation and constitutional duty to conduct a fair and unbiased trial. The coalition spokesperson and convener, Prof. Cleve Arguelles, said that the network is non-partisan, and that regardless if the Vice President is convicted or found innocent, the trial is being held for the sake of the Filipinos and the mandate of the 1987 Constitution.

Public oversight is an often overlooked aspect of democracy. Coalitions like Bantay Senado show how organized citizen movement can encourage public participation in governance across groups. They take on the vital role of aiding checks and balances and ensuring that no abuse of power nor political ambition takes precedence over national interests. At present, the Senate of the Philippines has been riddled with controversies spanning from an incumbent senator evading an arrest warrant from the International Criminal Court to involvement in the infamous flood control scandal. These further reinforce the need for a watchdog like Bantay Senado, as all of these are intertwined in the country’s current political climate.

As of their launch, Bantay Senado has recorded over 300 volunteers across the Philippines. One of the main initiatives of the network is to organize town hall meetings and bring the dialogue to the masses. These conversations will be done in everyday language, ensuring that complex terms and jargon are broken down and made easily digestible for ordinary citizens. Information materials posted on different social media platforms shall also be translated into major Philippine languages to reach a wider audience. Through these efforts, the coalition hopes to encourage greater public participation and help citizens better understand a process that could have significant implications for the country’s democratic institutions.

A huge front in monitoring the impeachment trials entails fighting off disinformation and misinformation campaigns. Carlo Flores, Executive Director of Team Pinas emphasized that this is the first impeachment trial in the country where social media and artificial intelligence can greatly influence public narratives. Therefore, Bantay Senado also has a responsibility to provide accurate and accessible information about the proceedings. The network aims to do this by offering fact-based explanations and regular updates. This will help the public separate verified information from misleading claims and ensure that discussions surrounding the trial remain grounded in evidence rather than speculation.

As the impeachment trial moves forward, it is imperative that the public continues to demand accountability and transparency from the Senate. While that narrative writes itself, another important story is unfolding alongside it: a new tale of citizens coming together to consolidate democratic practices and institutions. The Bantay Senado network serves as a reminder that power truly belongs to the people. Time and time again, it has been proven that democracy works best when people are willing to engage and be informed.


Glenn holds a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from the University of Santo Tomas. His experience spans governance programs, policy development, and political research, having worked with the Ateneo School of Government and WR Numero Research on projects focused on electoral reform, public opinion, and regional development. He also helped coordinate the drafting of the Bangsamoro Local Government Code and supported the Academy of Multiparty Democracy.

Editorial Deadline 02/06/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by the Maritime Crescent Desk

This week, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei faced different challenges related to leadership, public services, and social responsibility. In Indonesia, President Prabowo's proposal to introduce French language education after his visit to France sparked criticism, with observers questioning the lack of a clear implementation plan and broader foreign policy direction. In Malaysia, an LRT derailment highlighted long-standing problems with public transport infrastructure and concerns about the country's heavy reliance on private vehicles. In Brunei, growing online hostility toward local content creators revealed tensions within the #SapotLokal movement, raising questions about the difference between constructive criticism and online hate.

Malaysia 🇲🇾

Malaysia’s Mobility Infrastructure Problem

by Sydney Gan, in Kuala Lumpur

On the 28th of May, a Light Rail Transit (LRT) passenger train was derailed in Chan Sow Lin Station due to a track switch fai­lure. All 25 passengers were evacuated safely with no injuries reported, but the incident has sparked significant backlash against the Ministry of Transport, the breaking point in consecutive public transport failures over the years.

Since then, the MADANI government has ordered the Land Public Transport Agency (Apad) to take maximum punitive action against Prasarana Malaysia Bhd and to set up an independent task force to spearhead the investigation. The Ministry of Transport is also concurrently mulling a comprehensive internal audit of Prasarana’s rail transit systems beyond LRT services, to preemptively address future risks of infrastructure-related incidents.

Experts from the Malaysian Chinese Association noted that such measures must be backed by political will to implement post-audit policy recommendations, stating that the risk of recurrence remains unsustainably high if they are not. Other transport experts cast doubt on the government’s capability to conduct an audit at all, highlighting the lack of technical talent to sufficiently uphold institutional accountability. Ultimately, the Ministry’s measures are taken to be merely stopgap measures, with the government often taking a reactive rather than a long-term, proactive approach to transport governance reform.

This case exposes a deeper, systemic failing in Malaysia’s mobility infrastructure network, which must be seen together with Malaysia’s disregard for first- and last-mile connectivity. In peri-urban and even central urban areas, Malaysians struggle with significant station-level gaps, often forced to depend on driving to access public transport. As walkability in Malaysia is limited - due to highways and major roads surrounding neighborhoods, the lack of pedestrian-friendly infrastructure, and personal safety risks - non-drivers are completely alienated from accessing rail and bus transit in the first place. From this, a unique demand for e-hailing emerges as a Malaysian necessity, rather than a luxury, to which there are few to no alternatives.

The crippling over-reliance on car travel is especially acute against the backdrop of Malaysia’s fuel crisis. With nearly 40% of the country’s crude oil requirements transiting through the Strait of Hormuz, the MADANI government is struggling to maintain fuel prices and subsidies across the nation, which directly impacts drivers on the ground. With this weak existing infrastructure, is Malaysia at all equipped to shoulder the burden of a suddenly incapacitated, automobile-dependent population?

The rakyat’s sensitivity towards fuel pricing is being blatantly leveraged by the government to form populist policies, in order to curry favor towards targeted voter bases. This risks diluting the issue into mere political rhetoric - one must venture to examine with a critical lens why such an over-reliance on fuel exists in the first place, and why the Malaysian government has allowed the infrastructure weaknesses to persist all this while, until we are left straining under the weight of the geopolitical crisis. This incident should serve as a wake-up call to the government to take swift, strategic, forward-looking action, lest Malaysia risk significantly lagging behind in the future of mobility in Southeast Asia.


Sydney holds a Bachelor of Laws from King’s College London, where she focused on Human Rights Law, Criminology, and Public & Administrative Law. She is an Analyst at Asia Group Advisors, providing policy analysis and strategic guidance across the tech, sustainability, and gaming sectors in Southeast Asia. Prior to joining AGA, she worked in the social development sector in London, contributing to the Ukraine Judicial Training Programme through research on war crimes adjudication and the development of a legal training curriculum with high court magistrates.

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Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳

The Selective Solidarity of #SapotLokal

by Maryam Zulaidi

Lately, there has been a noticeable surge of hate across multiple social media platforms towards Bruneian ‘online personalities’. Oddly enough, the waves of hate derive from the locals themselves. is a movement across the Malay nations i.e Brunei and Malaysia in support of empowering independent local enterprises. Despite that, this slogan is narrowly interpreted as many still fail to acknowledge content creation as a genuine form of work. Thus, with the exclusion of gig workers, their solidarity is rather contradictory. There remains a reluctance among a minority of Bruneians to recognise them as influencers. Anonymous users have justified their standing by stating that these media personalities do not bring any positive impacts to the world and are constantly feeding into controversies. Most comments are evidently malicious whilst the rest are disguised under “constructive criticism”. What must be understood here is that there is a fine line between constructive criticism and hate speech.

According to the UN, hate speech is “any kind of communication in speech, writing or behaviour, that attacks or uses pejorative or discriminatory language with reference to a person or a group on the basis of who they are, in other words, based on their religion, ethnicity, nationality, race, colour, descent, gender or other identity factor.” Applying our context into the definition, it is mainly the prejudiced writing and/or speech that is used against Bruneian media personalities. In contrast, constructive criticism is a helpful remark that points out something wrong whilst giving suggestion(s) of improvement. For instance, if a Tiktok personality posts culturally insensitive content, a viewer flags the harm their content may bring and recommends that the creator delete the video and educate themselves regarding the matter. The intent of constructive criticism is therefore, not to demean but to encourage others to improve. While the two words are seemingly distinguishable on paper, they are often conflated in practice.

That said, the blame is not entirely one-sided. One should not blindly accuse the anonymous accounts, because a few of these media personalities may also struggle to understand the criticism and confuse them for hate. Consequently, they too, unintentionally fuel the provocation. Regardless of them choosing a public life, it does not give us the right to strip them of their autonomy. This choice does not justify for creators to endure personal attacks and constant ridicule. Most importantly, this act of bullying contradicts the basis of the nation’s ideology of nilai-nilai murni; good values and ethics that all Bruneians should practice.

Anonymity plays a central role in this all. When people hide behind screens, they feel protected from their accountability. This phenomenon, coined by John Suler, is called the ‘online disinhibition effect’. In a nation where mental health is still a cultural taboo, the consequences of pervasive digital aggression transcends the screen. Discreetly accumulating into a crisis that Brunei has yet to openly confront.


Maryam is a first-year International Relations and Politics student at the University of Sheffield, with an academic focus on Southeast Asia—particularly Maritime Southeast Asia—and the Middle East. She aspires to a career in diplomacy and academia and is committed to fostering international dialogue and advancing scholarly engagement with global issues. Beyond her academic work, she pursues creative interests and voluntary initiatives that broaden her perspectives on public service.

Indonesia 🇮🇩

Prabowo’s Lip Service Language-Diplomacy

by Muhammad Rayhansyah Jasin

Skipping annual prayer congregations, buying qurban animals with the state budget, this year’s Ied Adha celebrations has been marked with a slurry of controversies by President Prabowo Subianto who also decided to spend the religious festivities abroad in France. Visiting for the third time between January - May 2026, Prabowo’s May trip, postponed since April, was meant to lay the groundwork for a future strategic partnership with France and convening the first high-level Indonesia-France business council. The visit also saw a commercial agreement worth US$3.5 billion centered on energy resilience, trade, and defense cooperation. As a show of diplomatic gesture in front of President Emanuel Macron in the Elysee Palace, Prabowo instructed French language education to be introduced for all school levels in Indonesia. Another agreement also explored possible French language training programs to include police forces.

Prabowo’s education instructions are not without precedence. During Brazil’s President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva’s visit to Indonesia in late October 2025, Prabowo also stated that the government has mandated the education ministry to start teaching Portuguese. Prabowo’s haphazard vision of language diplomacy rests on global demand for more versatile skilled workers. Yet, six months on, there has not been any national guidelines or framework conceived regarding that announcement with no clear implementation from the education ministry. Observers have lamented Prabowo’s last week instruction to be no different with the Portuguese debacle, signifying the former general’s flip-flopped and unplanned foreign policy.

Both Portuguese and French have been added as priority languages alongside Spanish, Russian, English, Arabic, Japanese, Korean, and Mandarin to be taught in universities. Still, the move is seen to be based on Prabowo’s quick judgement instead of a bottom-up recommendation from academia and business leaders alike. Legislators also commented that the government must restrain from drafting education policies without considering the preparedness of education infrastructure, adequate teachers, and students’ basic needs.

Prabowo’s language diplomacy reflects a broader tendency in his foreign policy to prioritise impromptu initiatives over a coherent long-term diplomatic roadmap. This approach has attracted criticism, particularly regarding the frequency and cost of his overseas trips. Following his visit to Paris on May 28, reports from Flightradar24 indicated that a planned stop in Rome was cancelled at the last minute in favour of a direct return to Jakarta. Rumours also circulated that proposed visits to Hungary and Austria failed to materialise because no heads of state were available to welcome his entourage.

Criticism has extended beyond scheduling concerns. Former Deputy Foreign Minister Dino Pati Djalal urged Prabowo to reduce his overseas travel, noting that he has spent roughly one out of every six days abroad over the past eighteen months, with some trips reportedly costing hundreds of billions of rupiah. While Cabinet Secretary Teddy Indra Wijaya defended these expenses by claiming that any budget overruns were personally covered by Prabowo, concerns remain about fiscal discipline and policy consistency.

Deepening ties with the European Union, particularly France, is important for Indonesia’s strategic position. However, these efforts should complement, rather than overshadow, Jakarta’s leadership role within Southeast Asia. Without close coordination with neighbouring states, Indonesia risks weakening its influence within ASEAN while pursuing broader global ambitions.


Rayhan is pursuing an Erasmus Mundus Joint Master’s Degree in Public Policy at Central European University and the Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals. He holds a Bachelor of Social Sciences in International Relations and Political Economy from Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University. His current research focuses on the socio-economic impacts of Indonesia’s nickel mining industry on local communities and national development.

Editorial Deadline 01/06/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk

This issue of the Mekong Belt analyzes how governments across the region are managing the stories they tell, uncovering where the plot diverges from reality. In Myanmar, Min Aung Hlaing has rebranded a coup as a "National Resurgence," complete with a 100-Day Plan that reads more like a press release than a policy: big words, big promises, but no recovery plan for the economy. In Cambodia, Hun Sen signed a royal pardon with one hand and kept every political shackle in place with the other: Kem Sokha walks free, but he can't run, vote, or even leave the country, which raises the question of what exactly was pardoned.

Meanwhile, in Laos, the government actually decided not to tell a story, saying nothing for three days while seven men suffocated underground. It was their families, posting frantically on Facebook, who broke the story the state refused to tell. And in Thailand, record FDI numbers make for dazzling headlines, but when the raw materials are all imported and the knowledge stays with the multinationals, a boom that doesn't root locally is just a story about someone else's growth.

Myanmar 🇲🇲

Myanmar Regime’s 100-Day Plan

by Ley Hlaing

The newly transformed regime under self-proclaimed president Min Aung Hlaing has launched a 100-Day Plan following the formation of its cabinet. The plan prioritizes the rebranding of the regime and the normalization of military rule, but its stated goals sharply contradict the realities on the ground.

Shortly after forming a cabinet of 31 key ministries, Min Aung Hlaing announced the blueprint at the first cabinet meeting on April 20, 2026, setting a deadline of July 21, 2026. State-owned media and regime mouthpieces have since largely portrayed the plan as a National Resurgence. Comprising two main parts — ministry-specific projects and a peace process — the plan reflects severely limited administrative capacity and relies on a broad, generalized scope. The ministry-specific component covers only five of the 31 ministries: Finance and Revenue; Education; Health; Cooperatives and Transport; and Digital Development and Communications. Critics have pointed out that the plan lacks any meaningful measures for economic recovery and is limited in its implementation coverage.

The second component — the peace process — is heavily emphasized, calling on ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) to join peace talks within 100 days and urging heartland People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) to surrender. This mirrors a long-standing tactic of successive military governments: using negotiations to fracture anti-junta resistance. While the invitation is extended to both signatory and non-signatory members of the National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), it makes no mention of the parallel government, the National Unity Government (NUG). Former NCA signatories have been actively resisting the junta since the coup, and most resistance leaders and spokespeople have expressed no interest in or trust toward the invitation, stating that the regime is reviving the NCA simply because “they need it.” That perceived need points to possible hidden agendas behind this outsized peace overture toward groups the regime once labeled terrorists — among them: normalizing the regime within the 2008 Constitutional framework, resuming Chinese-backed projects under pressure from Beijing, and seeking reintegration into the international community.

While the plan’s goals are prominently declared, the realities are strikingly different. Driven in part by the global energy crisis, reports indicate that average prices of basic food items in Myanmar have risen by 19 percent since late February 2026, deepening hunger among a population already struggling to meet basic needs. The security situation is equally alarming: forced conscription has effectively transformed into human trafficking. Young men, including underage boys, are no longer safe after dark, with forcible recruitment now occurring in major cities such as Yangon and Mandalay — a grim escalation that directly contradicts the regime’s calls for peace. Meanwhile, additional ministries have since joined the 100-Day Plan: Electricity and Energy has pledged to ensure national energy sufficiency and support long-term economic development, while Immigration and Population has moved to implement the La Min project, which involves issuing Citizenship Scrutiny Cards and Unique IDs.

Min Aung Hlaing’s 100-Day Plan is ultimately a survival strategy for a closed regime, not a viable blueprint for recovery. Its “National Resurgence” branding obscures a collapsing economy, a sham peace process designed to splinter resistance, and an intensifying forced conscription campaign fueling a regional human trafficking crisis and accelerating the erosion of Myanmar’s middle class. The international community should recognize these peace overtures for what they are — and respond by rejecting them outright and cutting the economic and political lifelines sustaining the junta’s continued warfare.

Ley Hlaing is a former Political Science student from the University of Yangon, Myanmar. Currently, he is pursuing his BA at Parami University with a major in Philosophy, Politics and Economics. His academic and professional interests span community development, literature, minority issues, and social impact research. Having held roles as Research Assistant, Student Mentor, and Facilitator for local initiatives, he has constantly supported project management in literature and education programs in Myanmar.

Cambodia 🇰🇭

Kem Sokha Pardoned in Cambodia, but Political Ban Remains

by Sokna Thea, in Phnom Penh

Cambodia’s acting head of state Hun Sen signed a royal decree on 25 May 2026 that pardons opposition figure Kem Sokha from a 27-year prison term for treason. The pardon frees him from his sentence only. A lifetime ban on politics and a five-year ban on leaving the country both stay in place, so he walks free but cannot run for office, vote, or travel abroad.

Hun Sen, now Senate president, signed the decree for King Norodom Sihamoni, who is in Beijing for prostate cancer treatment. Under the constitution, the Senate president acts as head of state when the king is abroad. Prime Minister Hun Manet, Hun Sen’s son, requested the pardon and called it a step toward national unity.

Police arrested Sokha in September 2017 and charged him with conspiring with a foreign power, mainly over a 2013 video of a speech about democracy work. A court convicted him in March 2023 after a trial that UN experts said was politically motivated. He spent more than eight years in jail and house arrest. The Phnom Penh Court of Appeal upheld the verdict on 30 April 2026 and added the travel ban, just 25 days before the pardon.

The case removed the main electoral challenger to the ruling party. Weeks after the arrest, the Supreme Court dissolved Sokha’s Cambodia National Rescue Party in November 2017. With no rival, Hun Sen’s party won every seat in the 2018 election and has held full control since.

Analysts read the timing as image management. The exiled Khmer Movement for Democracy, led by Mu Sochua, called it a political chess move that only shifts Sokha from house arrest to political confinement. Pressure on Cambodia has grown. The US sanctioned ruling-party senator and Hun Sen ally Kok An in April 2026 over scam compounds, while the European Union still withholds full trade access over rights concerns. Washington, meanwhile, cut a threatened 49 percent tariff on Cambodian goods to 19 percent in a 2025 trade deal. Phnom Penh also hosts the Francophonie Summit in November 2026.

The move signals Hun Sen retains decisive influence after handing the premiership to his son in 2023. It also fits a wider pattern in Southeast Asia, where Thailand’s Constitutional Court dissolved the election-winning Move Forward Party in 2024. Rights groups warn that dozens of other government critics remain jailed. Human Rights Watch welcomed the release but said it was deplorable that Sokha remains barred from politics and from leaving the country. Sokha, now 72, said he will not seek revenge and plans to enter the monkhood to honor his gravely ill mother.


Sokna has a background in International Affairs and Business & Commercial Law. He’s currently a Senior Project Coordinator at the Ministry of Economy and Finance of Cambodia, working on the Financial Management Information System (FMIS) Project. His professional focus is driven by entrepreneurship, business development, and financial technology, with a particular interest in how private-sector innovation drives Cambodia’s economic growth.

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Lao PDR 🇱🇦

Seven Men Trapped in Flooded Laos Cave

by Thongsavanh Souvannasane, in Vientiane

Eight days on, and seven men are still trapped underground in northern Laos, and no one has heard from them since the cave sealed shut.

The men, aged in their twenties and thirties, entered a cave in Longcheng district, Xaysomboun Province, on 20 May. Heavy rain triggered flash flooding and a landslide that blocked the entrance, trapping them inside a subterranean gold mine. Authorities were alerted by a member of the group who managed to escape before the exit was blocked.

The story did not break immediately.

For nearly three days, no official announcement came. It was the trapped men’s siblings and family members who raised the alarm, posting desperate appeals on Facebook, tagging rescue organizations, and sharing information in Lao-language community groups. That grassroots surge pulled the story into public view across Laos and the region.

Why the men entered the cave remains disputed.

Initial reports say around eight villagers were hired by a Chinese mining company to search for gold, earning about LAK 100,000 (USD 4.58) a day, and one escaped before the tunnel flooded. Other accounts suggest they went in independently. There has been no official confirmation, though rescuers say the cave was frequented by locals looking for gold despite repeated safety warnings.

On May 23, Lao authorities formally wrote to Thai rescue teams requesting their assistance, citing Thailand’s specialist diving expertise and the rescuers’ depth of experience in flooded cave operations. The request brought a 26-member Thailand-based team to Xaysomboun within days.

About 100 people from Laos and Thailand are now at the site.

To reach the trapped men, rescuers must navigate a 340-meter flooded tunnel, with some passages just 60 centimeters wide. Teams pump water around the clock and thread fresh air through a pipe deep into the system. On 26 May, they broke through 15 meters of sand and gravel in a single day, closing in on the chamber where the men are believed to be sheltering on an elevated ledge with natural airflow.

Then, on the night of 26 May, operations halted. Two rescuers suffered dizziness inside the cave, forcing teams to suspend overnight diving and clear all personnel from the tunnels. The setback, however, came with one piece of encouraging news: water levels inside the cave had dropped nearly two meters, a sign that the round-the-clock pumping is working, and that conditions may be more favorable when teams resume at dawn.

On 25 May, Thailand-based diver Norrased Palasing and Finnish specialist Mikko Paasi, both Tham Luang veterans whose experience navigating submerged, narrow cave systems puts them at the front of this rescue, arrived to join contingent leader Kengkard Bongkawong, who coordinated the 2018 Tham Luang rescue in Chiang Rai Province. Thai instructor Parasu Komaradat provides remote guidance as authorities continue pumping water and preparing diving operations to ensure the safety of all involved.

There has been no contact with the trapped men since they went in. As of 27 May, the rescue operation remains ongoing.


Thongsavanh is a journalist from Laos with a background in English-language media. He graduated from the Lao-American Institute with a Diploma of the Arts in English and contributes to independent news platforms. His reporting focuses on environmental issues, socio-economic development, and geopolitics.

Thailand 🇹🇭

Thailand’s FDI Boom Masks Weak Local Benefits

by Satid Sootipunya, in Bangkok

Thailand’s Board of Investment (BOI) attracted record Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs) of over USD 27 billion (1 trillion baht) to the Kingdom in the first quarter this year, driven by electronic-related industries amid the Artificial Intelligence (AI) boom.

Secretary General of BOI Narit Therdsteerasukdi said in a statement that Thailand’s investment environment has been buoyed by the diverted flow of foreign investment caused by geopolitical shifts and the relocation of manufacturing bases.

In the three months ended March 2026, investment promotion applications were submitted for 24 projects worth 1.016 trillion baht, 2.4 times higher than the same period last year.

Accelerated by geopolitical tensions and the China-plus-one policy, several multinational data center and cloud service companies are eyeing Thailand as their new regional hub, including TikTok Systems, Skyline Data Center and Cloud Services, Global Switch, and Evolution Data Centres.

Former Thailand’s Finance Minister Dr. Somkid Jatusripitak supported this development, saying that the Thai government should attract quality FDIs instead of focusing only on volume. The administration should utilize incoming foreign investment to support Thailand’s future development.

“We must act as architects — designing what kind of future we want for the country,” said Dr. Somkid. This includes addressing rural poverty and improving the livelihoods of farmers.

Despite the surge in FDI applications, the Bank of Thailand (BOT) reported that the use of locally sourced raw materials has declined, with the majority of production inputs being imported.

The report also mentioned that Thailand’s FDI value has increased 1.8 times over the past five years compared with the pre-COVID-19 period, fueled by data centers and cloud services. However, Thailand’s new industrial structure remains concentrated mainly in the midstream and downstream segments.

The big question is whether Thailand will experience another major takeoff from the current flow of FDIs given the changing global investment landscape.

The answer may be no if the government focuses only on the quantity of FDIs instead of quality: requiring multinational companies to transfer knowledge to Thai workers and increasing the use of local content.


Satid is a multimedia economic journalist and news anchor who covers macroeconomic trends, Thailand’s fiscal policy, and key regional developments for Bangkok Biz. A Journalism graduate from Thammasat University, he has reported on major issues such as the US–China trade tensions, the Myanmar crisis, and global corporate stories, drawing on prior newsroom experience at The Momentum, the Bangkok Post, AFP, and Varasarn Press. His work blends economic analysis, foreign affairs, and digital storytelling, with a strong focus on making complex financial and political topics accessible to Thai audiences.

Editorial Deadline 30/05/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Karen Ysabelle R. David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk

Singapore: a country internationally renowned for its wealth, economic development, and high standard of living. For its human rights situation? Not so much. Its recent Universal Periodic Review before the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council only shone the spotlight on the shortcomings and blind spots of a country that has otherwise been held as an exemplar for the rest of Southeast Asia.

In the Philippines, spectacle and scandal continue to rock the Senate for the nth week in a row. With a parliamentary power struggle, a senator on the run, and a looming impeachment trial, the actual hard work of democracy and governance has been left by the wayside.

And Vietnam this week grapples with the paradox and the delicate balancing act of simultaneous environmental and digital transformation. For the sake of its grand targets and promises, Hanoi must learn the difficult task of reconciling the two.

Singapore 🇸🇬

Singapore at the UN Human Rights Review: What Was Raised and What Comes Next

by Jennifer Hui En Tan, in Singapore

On 12 May 2026, representatives from 142 countries converged in Geneva to deliver recommendations to member states and to Singapore as part of its fourth Universal Periodic Review (UPR) before the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council. The review marks a significant moment in Singapore’s ongoing engagement with the international human rights framework, one that the country has participated in since the UPR’s establishment in 2006. The recommendations put forward during the session span a range of issues, and Singapore has indicated that it will examine them before providing its formal response to the Human Rights Council.

The UPR is a peer review mechanism through which every UN member state has the opportunity to assess the human rights situation in other member states roughly once every five years. The UPR universally applies non-binding recommendations to all 193 UN member states. Notably, Singapore ranks 13th on the UN Human Development Index and first in the Asia Pacific for Gender Equality on the UN Gender Inequality Index. These rankings reflect the achievements of Singapore’s human rights standing globally. However, they are not the main focus of the fourth UPR, which centered on areas where international recommendations diverged from Singapore’s current domestic practices.

During the UPR review, issues on the table included the death penalty, migrant workers, and LGBTQ+ rights. The most heavily contested issue was Singapore’s use of capital punishment: 41 countries made recommendations relating to the death penalty, reflecting the growing international consensus against its use. Notably, Singapore has long defended its position on capital punishment, explaining this measurement as a cornerstone of the state’s low-crime, high-order social compact.

Several countries recommended extending anti-discrimination protections to LGBTQ+ individuals and called for the establishment of a national human rights institution. Singapore repealed Section 377A of the Penal Code in 2022, though the UPR suggested further steps on legal equality and institutional oversight as areas for continued development.

Singapore’s UPR does not exist in a regional vacuum, and through an ASEAN lens adds important texture to the debate. With regard to the death penalty, Singapore is not an outlier within Southeast Asia. Several ASEAN member states continue to use capital punishment, situating Singapore within a regional norm even as that norm diverges from global abolitionist trends. This context does not blunt the international criticism, but it does complicate the picture of isolation that critics paint.

Singapore’s fourth UPR ultimately reflects the complexity of evaluating a state that excels by many conventional measures yet continues to draw sustained international attention on a distinct set of rights issues. What the process does provide, however, is a structured moment of international accountability, one that places Singapore’s domestic policy choices in conversation with evolving global norms. As Singapore considers its formal response to the 142 recommendations received, the outcome will signal not only its immediate policy intentions but also how it sees its role in shaping the human rights standards that the international community is collectively building.


Jennifer is a final-year International Relations student at the Singapore Institute of Management, where she focuses on political engagement, diplomacy, and community governance. She is an active volunteer in her constituency, working closely with residents to understand local concerns, facilitate dialogue, and support community initiatives.

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The Philippines 🇵🇭

The Philippine Senate’s Wag the Dog Politics

by Arianne De Guzman, in Bulacan

In the 1997 political satire Wag the Dog, a Hollywood producer and a presidential spin doctor fabricated a fictional war in Albania to distract the American public from a sex scandal involving the U.S. President seeking reelection. Through staged footage and patriotic music, the film shows how politicians can manipulate public perception by turning politics into spectacle and entertainment to distract the public from critical issues.

This May, the Philippine Senate reflected a similar pattern. Instead of holding an orderly deliberation on proposed legislative measures and cases, national attention repeatedly shifted toward dramatic spectacles of controversy and confrontation. These performances captured more media attention than the bills and resolutions that should have been tackled, as well as the issues that required government oversight.

On 11 May, Senator Ronald “Bato” dela Rosa reappeared in the Senate after six months of absence, following Ombudsman Jesus Crispin Remulla’s announcement that the International Criminal Court (ICC) had a warrant of arrest against him for his alleged role in former President Rodrigo Duterte’s war on drugs campaign. Thereafter, a Senate leadership coup occurred to remove Senator Vicente “Tito” Sotto, with Senator dela Rosa’s vote helping install Senator Alan Peter Cayetano as Senate President.

The timing of these political spectacles mattered, as they unfolded ahead of Vice President Sara Duterte’s impeachment trial, where the Senate will serve as the impeachment court.

Following the transmittal of impeachment articles from the House of the Representatives to the Senate, another spectacle emerged. On 13 May, a shooting incident and lockdown inside the Senate happened, where Senator dela Rosa sought protective custody. Senate President Alan Peter Cayetano claimed that National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) agents attacked the Senate to serve the warrant. However, the Department of the Interior and Local Government and the police later concluded, based on CCTV footage, that there had been no attack, and that all the shots heard came from inside the building.

Public reports and social media attention shifted away from impeachment evidence, focusing instead on the closure of Senate gates, tensions between Senators Robin Padilla and Kiko Pangilinan, alleged gunshots, dramatic Facebook live broadcasts, and videos of Senator dela Rosa evading authorities.

The Senate, as one of the country’s accountable mechanisms, becomes secondary to spectacle because dramatic performances generate more engagement compared to complex deliberations. Filipino citizens, instead of being treated as rational political actors, are reduced to consumers of politics as entertainment.

The Wag the Dog politics is not simply about distraction — it is the transformation of democratic institutions into spaces governed by media logic. Unlike the film, the war on drugs campaign and the ICC case against former President Duterte are not fabricated. Investigations, legal proceedings, and political polarization are real. However, the way these events are staged, amplified, and consumed redirects public attention away from the national concerns.

The Philippine Senate ended the month of May by demonstrating how political spectacle shapes democratic life, where visibility and performance often matter as much as governance itself.


Arianne has experience in policy research at De La Salle University’s Jesse M. Robredo Institute of Governance, where she contributed to projects on systemic reform. She earned a degree in Political Science from Colegio de San Juan de Letran. Currently, she works in government relations, specializing in advocacy strategy, legislative monitoring, and stakeholder engagement. Beyond her professional work, she is actively involved in youth development and grassroots initiatives through the Rotaract Club of Santa Maria.

Vietnam 🇻🇳

The Paradox of Green and Digital Economies

by Hang Nguyen, in Ho Chi Minh City

As Vietnam identifies grandiose targets for epochal economic development for 2030, the constant reiteration of the key words “digital economy,” “sustainable development,” “high-tech innovation,” and “green finance” in published resolutions and papers demonstrate a clear vision for growth. In the 14th National Party Congress Resolution, digital transition and digital transformation were, for the first time, comprehensively embedded as cross-cutting structural drivers. These two strategies, while sharing similar strategic importance, have distinctive and conflicting applications.

Vietnam’s 14th National Party Congress Resolution entails forward-looking stats: an average GDP per capita of around US$8,500 by 2030; manufacturing and processing account for approximately 28% of GDP; total wealth accumulation reaches around 35–36% of GDP; and final consumption rate reaches around 61–62%. Vietnam remains apprehensive of falling into the middle-income trap as recent geopolitical risks and turbulence have shaken previous beliefs on secure growth, encouraging the state to bolster domestic industries with long-term sustainable practices. Following the trajectory of global trends, Vietnam has increasingly directed its attention toward the development of green and digital economies. However, the question of whether these transitions are compatible concurrently has not been answered.

Both environmental and digital transformation are restructuring the work force by creating more job opportunities but also increasing the requirements for skilled labor and creating employment gaps in Vietnam. Furthermore, the increased incorporation of digital tools in energy-intensive sectors will increase the efficiency and sustainability of many economic and social activities. While European political discourse has already initiated research and forums surrounding the synergetic or conflicting dynamic of these two tracks of developmental transformation, this topic is only just gaining momentum in the Vietnamese media in recent months.

As much as these “twin” transitions are driving a new direction of policy-making and sustainable growth, many conflicting aspects might challenge this dual-track approach. Digital technologies may simultaneously offset some of the environmental gains they bring. Achieving environmental targets may mean pulling back on certain technologies, which could slow digital advancement in specific industries, while sustainability efforts might also put a brake on economic expansion. By the same token, tackling wealth inequality could draw resources away from ecological initiatives and vice versa, while digital technologies may increase energy demands associated with ICT production and use. Additionally, trade partners have tightened import requirements as a result, such as Europe’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) and England’s Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD).

In order to properly deal with the contradictions that arise due to the need for both green and digital transformations, Vietnam must ensure that technological advancement aligns with sustainability. Instead of focusing on fast-paced digitalization without considering its impact on environmental goals, Vietnam needs to focus on digitalization powered by renewable sources, smart manufacturing processes, and skills development in both green and digital sectors. Within the region, the various ASEAN agreements including ASEAN Digital Economy Framework Agreement (DEFA), ASEAN Smart Cities Network, and ASEAN Power Grid provide important opportunities for cooperation in the areas of renewable energy, digital trade, and sustainable finance.


Hang is a young researcher with academic experience in Vietnam and the United States. She has previously worked in public relations at the U.S. Consulate General in Ho Chi Minh City and the YSEALI Academy. Her research focuses on ASEAN centrality in the evolving Asia-Pacific landscape, with particular attention to Vietnam’s approach to trade, regional cooperation, and political economy in the face of external power dynamics and global volatility.

Editorial Deadline 26/05/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

In 2019, a video allegedly depicting Malaysian minister Azmin Ali in a same-sex encounter circulated online. The incident escalated into a national scandal that intersected with factional contestation, moral politics and coalition stability. Digital forensics specialists were called upon to analyse the footage, yet their assessments did little to settle the political debate. Crucially, the political story was not only the content of the footage, but whether it could be trusted at all. Azmin Ali addressed this directly through public denial and media appearances that were themselves recorded and circulated online. In doing so, his rebuttals became part of a digital archive that could later serve as raw material for manipulation or synthetic media.

As synthetic media becomes increasingly sophisticated, political conflict increasingly shifts from disagreement over interpretation to disagreement over reality itself. Even prior to the popularisation of deepfake technology, the Azmin case demonstrated that once digital manipulation becomes socially plausible, disputes over authenticity do not remain technical matters left to forensic experts. Instead, they become political resources that actors mobilise to defend reputations, undermine opponents, or cloud the public sphere with uncertainty, particularly in Malaysia, where sexual scandals have historically shaped moral contestation and political legitimacy.

That uncertainty has intensified with the rise of generative AI, as Malaysia increasingly confronts cases where synthetic media is operationalised as coercion. In September 2025, Malaysian MPs and senators were blackmailed with threats to release AI-generated sexual deepfakes unless US$100,000 was paid, exposing significant legal gaps and concerns about broader institutional trust.

Simultaneously, Malaysia’s political communication ecosystem has become dependent on platform logics, particularly among younger citizens whose political exposure is disproportionately algorithmic, short-form and creator-mediated. Analysts of GE15 described the election as one fought through TikTok strategies and platform culture, while acknowledging that algorithmic reinforcement tends to amplify predispositions rather than invent them organically. In other words, deepfakes are transcending into an environment that is already structurally reliant on mediated authenticity and recognising credibility through cues produced within attention economies.

These developments illustrate an important analytical point that is easy to miss if deepfakes are framed simply as “misinformation”. Reputational harm can arise from circulation, especially in digital environments where screenshots, re-uploads, and archival systems create durable traces that persist beyond verification. Even when synthetic media is later debunked or removed from the original platform, it can still continue circulating through reposts, wayback archives, or private channels that preserve material long after its initial publication. In some cases, controversial content may even be deliberately preserved to keep allegations in circulation. Once suspicion enters the public sphere, corrections or forensic clarification may do little to reverse reputational harm, particularly in polarised environments where uncertainty itself can become politically useful. The asymmetry between the speed of virality and the slower pace of verification means that harm may persist even after authenticity disputes are addressed.

In Malaysia, these effects intersect with an already polarised information environment and a political culture in which reputational narratives, moral framing, and factional contestation shape offline perceptions of legitimacy. Malaysia is consequently entering a condition of synthetic legitimacy, in which political authority remains dependent on visual and audio cues even as the capacity to fabricate them becomes more accessible. Deepfakes should therefore be understood as a crisis in which the credibility of audio-visual evidence itself is in doubt, forcing political systems to operate under structural uncertainty.

What counts as a deepfake, and why does legitimate use matter?

The term deepfake is often used as shorthand for political deception, but refers to a broader family of AI-generated or AI-manipulated media produced through machine learning techniques that synthesise faces, voices, and scenes with increasing realism. Deepfakes may involve manipulated speeches, face-swaps, or synthetic pornography, but the same technical pipeline also supports legitimate applications such as life-like avatars and AI-enhanced creative content. The political risks, therefore, arise from deceptive deployment in contexts where credibility and legitimacy depend on evidentiary media.

Acknowledging the legitimate uses of AI-generated media is, therefore, necessary because synthetic media is not inherently malicious. Generative systems support lawful applications in entertainment, education, and accessibility, making blanket bans difficult to implement given their dual-use nature. As a result, governance challenges stem less from the existence of the technology itself than from how synthetic media is deployed within political and informational environments. Overly broad regulation may therefore produce unintended effects by discouraging legitimate forms of expression, such as satire and parody, while creating uncertainty around acceptable political speech.

This is particularly important in Malaysia, where broader debates surrounding media regulation and online speech governance have already highlighted tensions between addressing harmful content and safeguarding legitimate political expression and public discourse. In such an environment, vague or expansive deepfake regulation could create significant enforcement discretion and uncertainty for journalists, activists and political actors. Existing laws on communications, fraud, and obscenity can already be applied to harmful uses of synthetic media, even as newer initiatives such as the Online Safety Act 2025 remain in transition. The broader challenge is not simply regulating the technology itself, but responding to the political and informational conditions that shape how synthetic media is used, interpreted, and contested.

From social media election to algorithmic contestation

Malaysia’s experience with platform politics did not begin with deepfakes, and this historical trajectory matters because it shows that political legitimacy had already begun migrating toward visibility-based signals long before synthetic media entered the picture. Malaysia is among the most digitally connected societies in Southeast Asia, with internet penetration reaching 97.4 percent and social media usage at 83.1 percent of the population. Under such conditions, much of the country’s political conversation unfolds within digitally networked environments rather than through discrete campaign events or traditional media cycles.

This shift became particularly visible during the 2013 general election. GE13 has been widely described as Malaysia’s first “social media election”, an expression that captured the growing strategic role of online communication even at a time when Facebook, not TikTok, dominated the digital landscape. Since then, social media has reshaped Malaysia’s election landscape by enabling alternative narratives, facilitating networked mobilisation, and weakening the monopoly power of traditional media, even as digital spaces also created new vulnerabilities to polarisation and coordinated manipulation. Over time, platforms became more than mere communication tools, as political actors began adapting their strategies and legitimacy performances to the forms of visibility and engagement that digital platforms reward.

By GE15 in 2022, TikTok was described as a central political arena for youth outreach, with parties deploying short-form video strategies to generate relatability and cultural fluency among younger voters who were newly electorally consequential under UNDI18. This reflected recognition that contemporary campaigning had become intertwined with platform culture. The objective was to appear authentic within the aesthetic norms of the platform, often at the expense of substantive policy communication.

Yet the political influence of TikTok should not be understood as a mechanism that converts online popularity into entirely new electoral constituencies. Rather, social media platforms function primarily as amplification systems that make pre-existing political sentiment more salient within public discourse. Algorithmic recommendation systems reinforce ideological predispositions by repeatedly exposing users to content that aligns with their existing interests and engagement patterns. Repeated exposure also normalises particular narratives and interpretations of political reality. The political significance therefore, lies in selective visibility, or the gradual process through which particular framings become recognisable as credible or authoritative through sustained presence within users’ feeds.

Youth politics in the deepfake era

Deepfake risk is often framed through a deficit model that assumes young voters are inherently gullible. A more accurate framing is that vulnerability is structural. Youth political exposure in Malaysia increasingly unfolds within algorithmically curated feeds. As a result, political information circulates less through structured debate and more through short-form videos, memes, and creator-driven interpretations that blur the boundaries between entertainment and political communication. In this context, deepfakes do not need to convert voters ideologically; they can instead sharpen affect, intensify cynicism, or reinforce distrust by making the information feel unreliable.

When cues used to establish authenticity can be cheaply manufactured, trust declines. This particularly affects younger voters who rely heavily on platforms to distinguish between authentic and synthetic media, requiring forms of scrutiny that political participation was not designed to accommodate.

Over time, this instability can produce two corrosive outcomes. Faced with persistent uncertainty, some users may adopt generalised scepticism in which all political information is treated as potentially fabricated. Others may retreat into partisan information environments where credibility is determined primarily by group affiliation rather than evidence. In both cases, the result is a weakening of the shared informational foundations upon which democratic deliberation depends.

Hybrid media systems, political influencers, and the re-signalling of authority

These visibility dynamics are reinforced by hybrid media systems in which communication circulates across interconnected networks of journalists, political actors, influencers, and digital creators. Within such environments, authority is no longer conveyed solely through institutional position or traditional media visibility but is mediated by actors who interpret political developments for audiences through platform-native formats. As a result, the boundaries between journalism, commentary, activism, and campaigning have become blurred, producing environments in which political meaning is constructed through interactions between institutional actors and digitally mediated intermediaries.

Research on hybrid media environments shows how influencers operate within these networks and reshape who gets to frame political reality. Within the Malaysian context, policy research has similarly examined the growing prominence of political influencers as intermediaries for audiences that consume political information through creators and micro-media rather than traditional news institutions. Rather than simply relaying political messages, these actors contextualise and personalise developments in ways that can make complex issues more accessible.

The implication is that political legitimacy within platform environments depends on signals of authenticity, such as perceived sincerity. It is within this environment that deepfakes become destabilising. By replicating the cues used to signal authenticity, synthetic media weakens the public’s ability to treat those cues as reliable evidence, eroding the foundations that sustain platform-mediated legitimacy.

When evidence becomes contestable

Malaysia’s emerging condition as one of “synthetic legitimacy” recognises that the deepfake problem cannot be reduced to misinformation or cybercrime alone. What is destabilised is the system through which political authority is recognised. In platform politics, legitimacy increasingly depends on visibility and recognisable forms of authenticity, as political actors adapt to platform-native formats and short-form media. While this can make politics more accessible, it also shifts legitimacy toward performative cues that are more vulnerable to manipulation.

In such an environment, synthetic media attacks distort information and undermine the credibility through which political authority is recognised. Authority can be attacked through fabricated scandal, but it can also be defended through plausible denial, as actors dismiss authentic evidence as manipulated. Known as the “liar’s dividend”, the mere possibility of manipulation allows genuine evidence to be contested or dismissed as fake, leaving audiences less able to treat any media source as credible proof. Institutions that normally adjudicate authenticity, such as courts, law enforcement, or digital forensics, often operate too slowly or remain politically contested to resolve disputes before public narratives have already solidified.

The implications extend beyond reputational harm. Legitimacy in democratic systems depends not only on electoral outcomes but also on public confidence that political speech can be reliably attributed to identifiable actors, that scandals are grounded in verifiable evidence, not fabricated content, and that citizens share a common informational foundation. This means that there would be a shared set of facts, sources, and standards of verification that allow political disagreement to take place within a recognised reality rather than collapse into disputes over whether events occurred at all. When audio and video recordings, which have traditionally functioned as key forms of political evidence, can be convincingly manipulated through synthetic media, establishing that attribution becomes significantly more difficult. Under such conditions, citizens may no longer be able to rely on familiar cues to determine whether a statement or recording is genuine, weakening the shared basis on which political claims are assessed. As these foundations erode, the credibility of the political system itself becomes more fragile.

Governing when authenticity is programmable

If the challenge posed by deepfakes is structural, responses must address the informational conditions under which political legitimacy is constructed rather than focusing solely on individual instances of harm. This requires a combination of legal clarity, platform responsibility, and public capacity.

Governance cannot rely exclusively on reactive response. The central challenge is ensuring that manipulated media can be identified, contextualised and addressed quickly enough to prevent the erosion of public trust. Thus, platforms play a particularly important role because the speed of virality often far exceeds the pace of institutional response. Mechanisms such as rapid takedown pathways, transparency requirements for political content, and clear labelling of synthetic media may become essential tools for limiting harm while preserving legitimate creative uses of generative technologies.

Equally important is developing citizen and institutional capacity to verify political information through trusted sources and transparent authentication mechanisms. This requires moving beyond general media literacy toward practical toolkits that help users assess credibility in real time. This may include clearer provenance signals for digital media, such as watermarking or content origin indicators, as well as accessible verification channels through official institutions and independent fact-checking bodies.

Strengthening the evidence-based environment requires reinforcing the visibility and reliability of authoritative sources. This may involve standardising verification markers for official communications, improving the discoverability of primary sources, and ensuring that corrections or clarifications are disseminated with comparable reach to the original content. Without such measures, the issue is not simply that false content circulates, but that the line between credible and non-credible claims becomes increasingly blurred.

Malaysia’s experience illustrates a challenge that will likely confront many political systems across Southeast Asia. As generative AI tools become more accessible and synthetic media becomes more convincing, the problem will not simply be identifying individual deepfakes but maintaining the informational foundations upon which democratic legitimacy depends. When authenticity becomes programmable, the resilience of political institutions may ultimately depend on whether societies can build systems of trust that are harder to fake. In an era of synthetic media, political authority may increasingly hinge on who can most convincingly “fake it until they make it”.

by Siu Tzyy Wei, Lead Editor - Maritime Crescent Desk

This week, fragile lines run through the Maritime Crescent’s strategic landscape, shaping both trade and defence.

In Indonesia, every shipment of palm oil, coal, and nickel braces for an incoming change in its tradeflow, a bottleneck that risks turning commercial routes into chokepoints of control. In Malaysia, the cancellation of a missile deal exposes fragile lines of trust in the global arms market, where neutrality no longer guarantees access to advanced technology. Meanwhile in Brunei, new ties with Germany sketches fresh lines of interdependence, marking the sultanate’s first steps into a wider transregional architecture.

These fragile lines are not abstractions — they are the seams where power, confidence, and control can fray, and where the region’s future will be tested.

Indonesia 🇮🇩

A Bottleneck Republic

by Rayhan Prabu Kusumo, in Jakarta

By 2027, every shipment of palm oil, coal, nickel and other strategic commodities leaving Indonesia will have to pass through one state owned enterprise (SOE). PT Danantara Sumberdaya Indonesia sits inside the country’s sovereign wealth super-fund. Producers will keep producing, but the state will handle paperwork, foreign buyer contracts, and logistics. Jakarta says the policy will plug the billions lost each year to under-invoicing and offshore profit parking, and build a national champion comparable to Saudi Arabia’s Aramco or Malaysia’s Petronas. The question for the region is whether the design can actually deliver on either goal.

The case for action is genuine. Indonesian exporters have long self-reported volumes and prices to customs, affiliates have routinely traded with affiliates at questionable pricing, and proceeds have been parked offshore for years, so the revenue gap that the government wants to close is not imagined. This is also not an insular move, because the past year has seen the administration create other state companies under Danantara to absorb seized palm oil estates and mining concessions.

The design raises serious questions. First, the aspiration to emulate those national champions will prove difficult, because they are themselves the producers, while the new SOE owns nothing and sits as a marketing layer above producers it does not control. Indonesia exports hundreds of grades of palm, coal and nickel, and how one entity prices all of them fairly remains unresolved. Secondly, long-term supply contracts have also not been addressed. The closest historical precedent is the BPPC clove monopoly of 1990 to 1998, which was sold with the same language about stabilising prices and capturing leaking rents, and which ended with collapsed farm-gate prices and a decade of damage to the clove industry.

Beyond the bilateral disruption, foreign buyers lose counterparty certainty when a state body is inserted late in a supply chain, which makes trade finance harder. Indonesian producers, in turn, hand decades of buyer relationships and pricing intelligence to an intermediary that has neither. The implications also travel across ASEAN, since Indonesia is the bloc’s largest commodity exporter, so a Jakarta bottleneck will reach Malaysian refiners, Singaporean traders and regional shipping schedules while signalling to regional investors that resource nationalism in Southeast Asia’s biggest economy is hardening. Closer to home, Indonesia itself faces a challenge: a single discretionary chokepoint may produce new forms of leakage through plethora of risks that historically have often exceeded the leakages such systems were designed to fix.

On balance, few would dispute the reasonable goal of recovering rent lost abroad, but whether this design can deliver it is a separate question. A marketing layer placed above producers it does not own, holding discretion over thousands of pricing decisions and answering only to one centre of authority, will produce outcomes shaped by its incentive structure regardless of policy intent. Through 2027, the real test of PT Danantara Sumberdaya Indonesia’s survival are whether export volumes hold up, whether Indonesian prices stay anchored to world benchmarks, and whether long-term foreign buyers continue signing contracts.


Rayhan has a background in government affairs and public policy, with experience across government institutions and advisory firms. His work focuses on the intersection of geopolitics, policy, and risk, with expertise in advocacy, regulatory analysis, and stakeholder engagement. He holds a degree in Government from Universitas Padjadjaran, and has completed an exchange at Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Spain, focusing on global politics and sustainability.

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Malaysia 🇲🇾

Trust on the Line

by Muhammad Aiman Bin Roszaimi, in Cyberjaya

Malaysia’s dispute with Norway over the cancellation of the Naval Strike Missile (NSM) deal is more than a procurement controversy. It has evolved into a broader strategic lesson about the risks of defence dependency, political conditionality and the fragility of trust in the global arms market.

The issue emerged after Norway revoked export approvals for the NSM system intended for Malaysia Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) programme, despite Kuala Lumpur having reportedly fulfilled almost all contractual obligations since the agreement was signed in 2018. Malaysia had already paid approximately 95 per cent of the contract value before the cancellation took effect.

For Malaysia, the implications are significant. The NSM was not merely an optional add-on, but a core anti-ship capability intended to arm the Royal Malaysian Navy’s delayed Maharaja Lela-class LCS fleet. Without the missile system, the broader logic behind the LCS modernisation programme becomes strategically weakened.

Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim described Norway’s move as “unilateral and unacceptable”, warning that such actions could undermine confidence in European defence suppliers. Malaysia has since pursued compensation claims reportedly exceeding RM1 billion, including both direct payments and indirect integration costs.

However, the incident reveals something deeper than a contractual dispute. It highlights how defence procurement today is increasingly shaped not only by commercial agreements, but also by geopolitical alignment and export control politics. Norway defended its decision by stating that some of its “most sensitive” defence technologies would now be restricted to allies and close strategic partners amid a changing global security environment.

This rationale carries uncomfortable implications for middle powers like Malaysia. Traditionally, Southeast Asian states have pursued diversified defence relations to avoid excessive dependence on any single bloc or great power. Malaysia itself has long practised a hedging strategy which maintains defence cooperation with Western, Asian, and regional partners simultaneously. Yet the NSM episode suggests that neutrality alone may no longer guarantee reliable access to advanced military technology.

In many ways, this reflects a broader transformation in the international defence industry. Arms transfers are increasingly becoming instruments of strategic trust rather than purely market-based transactions. Export controls, technology access and interoperability are now closely tied to alliance structures and geopolitical positioning. The result is a more fragmented defence ecosystem where political alignment matters as much as purchasing power.

Domestically, the controversy also places additional pressure on Malaysia already troubled LCS programme, which has faced years of delays, cost overruns and scrutiny over governance failures. The missile cancellation further complicates efforts to restore public confidence in Malaysia naval modernisation agenda. Even if compensation is eventually secured, replacing the NSM system would likely require new integration processes and further delays.

At the regional level, the incident may encourage Southeast Asian states to reconsider how they assess defence suppliers. Reliability, political predictability and long-term strategic assurance may become increasingly important alongside capability and price. Malaysia’s warning that the episode could affect regional confidence in Norwegian or even broader European defence partnerships reflects this growing concern.


Aiman is a PhD candidate in Security and Strategic Analysis at the National University of Malaysia. His research focuses on Malaysia’s space policy, ASEAN regional security, and the strategic implications of emerging technologies. His work explores how Malaysia’s defense policy and strategic culture shape its approach to outer space.

Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳

A Milestone in ASEAN-EU Relations

by Wira Gregory Ejau, in Bandar Seri Begawan

During his visit to Berlin from 18 to 19 May 2026, Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah met with Federal President Frank-Walter Steinmeier for bilateral discussions on defense technology, industrial cooperation, and the future of ASEAN-EU relations. These talks carry significant weight, occurring at a pivotal moment in the institutional trajectory of the ASEAN-EU partnership.

Three weeks prior, Brunei hosted the 25th ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting in Bandar Seri Begawan, which was co-chaired by EU High Representative Kaja Kallas and Brunei’s own Foreign Affairs Minister. The Berlin visit was its direct diplomatic sequel for Brunei, conducted at the head-of-state level. Brunei currently serves as Country Coordinator for ASEAN-EU Dialogue Relations for the duration of the 2024-2027 term, and 2027 marks the 50th anniversary of EU-ASEAN dialogue relations, which is a milestone that both sides are actively building toward. The Sultan’s visit to Berlin comes at a time when European strategic interest in Southeast Asia is running at a historically significant level.

The most analytically consequential specific outcome of the visit is when Brunei, in its capacity as Country Coordinator, is currently positively considering Germany’s request to become an ASEAN Sectoral Dialogue Partner, a status currently held by Pakistan, Norway, Switzerland, and Turkey, amongst others, a move that would give Germany a structured bilateral channel with ASEAN that is distinct from the EU-level relationship. In the recent years, Germany has been deepening its Indo-Pacific engagement - publishing its Indo-Pacific Guidelines in 2020 and accelerating that orientation after 2022. A Sectoral Dialogue Partnership would formalise that engagement institutionally and mark a qualitative step beyond what any other EU member state has individually secured with the bloc.

The bilateral visit provides the material texture of the relationship, which includes ongoing cooperation through the Muara Maritime Services joint venture, Lufthansa Technik’s involvement in Brunei’s aviation sector, and the Brunei Fertiliser plant. All projects cover maritime, aviation, and industrial domains, with discussions touching on prospects for expanded defence technology cooperation and collaboration in the nano sector. Laying foundations on security-industrial cooperation marks a notable beginning to Brunei-Germany relations - unorthodox even - a move that extends past Brunei’s traditional energy-focused external partnerships.

Finally, both leaders also acknowledged the structural linkage between Southeast Asian and European security amid rising global tensions. This framing reflects a broader shift in diplomatic discourse, in which regional security orders that once operated largely independently are increasingly understood as interdependent. Ultimately, the development of Brunei-Germany relations amidst the former’s role as the ASEAN-EU Coordinator displays an intelligent use of timely opportunity in positioning itself as a notable partner in the transregional architecture.


Gregory is an MSc candidate in Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He works as a freelance writer specializing in international history, conflict, and counterterrorism, with experience in academia, investigative journalism, and voluntary uniformed service. He currently provides research assistance with the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) under their Southeast Asian Security and Defence Internship Programme and conducts investigations on regional security and transnational crime for a confidential company.

Editorial Deadline 23/05/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk

This week's issue of the Mekong Belt features four articles that each, in their own way, ask who bears the cost of a state's unfinished business. In Laos, farmers and rural communities continue to live with the literal remnants of a war fought over fifty years ago, as UXO contamination and deforestation trap the country's most vulnerable in a cycle of poverty. Meanwhile, Myanmar inches back toward ASEAN's table through a cautious virtual meeting, raising the question of whether diplomatic re-engagement can — or should — outpace accountability. Across the border, Thailand's private sector is sounding the alarm on a demographic time bomb, as a shrinking workforce and a creaking immigration system threaten to undermine decades of industrial growth. And in Cambodia, 790 juvenile offenders have been transferred to border centres to perform military engineering support — a government initiative that blurs the line between rehabilitation and conscription, drawing scrutiny from international humanitarian law.

Lao PDR 🇱🇦

Land, Lives, and Laos

by Thipphavanh Virakhom, in Vientiane

Laos is a country still shaped by a war it never declared. Between 1964 and 1973, almost 3 million tonnes of bombs were dropped on its territory, this was the most heavily bombed country in history based on its population. Out of 270 million small bombs dropped, nearly a third failed to explode and are still dangerous today.

Fifty years on, this is not history. It is the daily reality for millions of people. Roughly 25% of Laos’s villages remain contaminated with unexploded ordnance (UXO). Over 22,000 people have been killed or injured since the war ended. The number of victims has dropped to about 300 a year. That shows things are improving, but it still means 300 people are hurt or killed every single year.

The people most at risk are not statistics, They are farmers who cannot safely work their land, children growing up in communities where the soil still holds danger, women and girls in remote villages far from healthcare and support when accidents happen. Poverty and UXO contamination feed each other. Unsafe land means less income which means less capacity to move away or recover.

Laos is facing a major forest crisis alongside its bomb problem. The country used to be 70% forest, but illegal logging dragged that down to 40% by 2010. Even though more than half of the population relies on the forest to make a living, losing these trees costs the country nearly a fifth of its economy every year. While a new plan to plant 10 million trees will help, the loss of these forests hurts the poorest rural communities the most, the very same people who are already trapped living on land filled with hidden wartime bombs.

Policies and frameworks exist. Laos has integrated UXO clearance into its national development plan. It was among the first countries to ratify the Convention on Cluster Munitions and will chair the treaty’s Third Review Conference in Vientiane this coming September. But frameworks alone are not enough. What is still needed is consistent, long-term funding reaches the village level. Community-based clearance and reforestation programmes that actively included women, ethnic minorities, and the rural poor, not just as beneficiaries but as decision-makers. Stronger regional accountability within ASEAN, where only two of eleven member states have fully joined the cluster munitions treaty. And honest recognition that recovery takes generations, not project cycles.

Sustainable development in ASEAN cannot be complete while one of its members is still clearing bombs from its farmland and watching its forest disappear. This is calling for partnership. The kind that shows up in budgets, in technical support, and in political will that outlasts any single conference commitment cycle. The bomb and the trees are not separate issues. They are one. The question of whether the most vulnerable people in Southeast Asia Nations can finally live safely, on land that nourishes rather than threatens them. That question deserves a serious and sustained answer including from Laos, from ASEAN, and from the wider international community.


Thipphavanh holds a bachelor’s degree in international affairs. She is a governance and development professional specialising in rule of law, access to justice, and gender equality in Lao PDR. Her work focuses on strengthening justice sector institutions, advancing people-centred governance, and promoting gender-responsive systems. With extensive experience in project coordination, monitoring and evaluation, stakeholder engagement, and strategic communications, she has collaborated closely with national institutions and international partners to support inclusive and sustainable development.

Myanmar 🇲🇲

ASEAN Agrees to Virtual Talks With Myanmar's Foreign Minister

by Myat Moe Kywe

ASEAN has agreed to hold a virtual meeting with Myanmar’s foreign minister, the bloc’s secretary-general said Thursday. This signals a cautious shift toward re-engaging with Myanmar’s military government, which ASEAN has largely distanced itself from since the 2021 coup.

ASEAN Secretary-General Kao Kim Hourn confirmed the development on the sidelines of the bloc’s summit in the Philippines. “It’s very clear that today the ASEAN foreign ministers agree that there will be an engagement with Myanmar, with the foreign minister of Myanmar, that they will have a virtual meeting coming up in the very near future,” he told Reuters.

Myanmar’s leadership has been barred from top ASEAN meetings since the military’s 2021 coup unleashed a lethal crackdown on dissent and spiralled into civil war. The decision to hold a virtual ministerial-level meeting — rather than a physical seat at the summit table — reflects the bloc’s attempt to thread a difficult needle: resuming dialogue while avoiding the optics of full rehabilitation of a regime still prosecuting a brutal conflict against its own people.

Kao Kim Hourn said Myanmar had indicated it wanted to normalise ties with the 11-member grouping, but that its neighbours want to see concrete progress on de-escalation, dialogue and humanitarian aid access before any broader re-engagement, according to Free Malaysia Today.

The announcement did not emerge in a vacuum. The decision to hold talks with Myanmar’s top diplomat came after Thailand’s foreign minister told Reuters he would propose the idea, with the aim of building consensus within ASEAN for greater engagement.

Bangkok has been among the most active in pushing for Myanmar’s return to regional forums. Thailand reportedly sent a congratulatory message to junta chief Min Aung Hlaing after he assumed the presidency under the military’s rebranded regime.

On May 18, the Philippines and Myanmar held their fifth round of Foreign Policy Consultations in Manila — co-chaired by Myanmar’s Deputy Foreign Minister U Ko Ko Kyaw and Philippine Undersecretary Leo M. Herrera-Lim — covering trade, investment, energy and transnational crime. The Philippines’ decision to invite only a deputy minister, rather than a senior political figure, appeared calibrated to signal engagement without full endorsement.

The pattern points to a bloc under quiet strain. While ASEAN has collectively reaffirmed Myanmar’s exclusion from high-level political summits, a position reiterated in Cebu during 48th ASEAN Summit, individual member states have also engaged functional ties with Naypyidaw on their own terms, creating a growing gap between the bloc’s stated position and the diplomatic reality on the ground.

Now, with the bloc’s agreement on holding the virtual meeting, it is likely to shift the bloc’s stance on Myanmar. Once scheduled, it, will be the most formal contact between ASEAN’s foreign ministers and the junta’s top diplomat since Myanmar’s exclusion began. Critics are likely to argue it rewards a regime that has shown little genuine movement on the bloc’s Five-Point Consensus — its own roadmap for resolving the crisis — which remains largely unimplemented more than four years after it was agreed upon.

Kao Kim Hourn also said the possibility of creating a special envoy for Myanmar with a remit beyond one year was part of ongoing discussion, with some unspecified issues still to be resolved.

The virtual meeting is being presented as a cautious way to keep communication open without formally recognizing the junta. However, it raises a deeper question: beyond ASEAN’s diplomatic calculations and gradual re-engagement, will this kind of engagement actually reflect or address the realities and concerns of people in Myanmar?


Myat is a senior undergraduate student majoring in Politics, Philosophy, and Economics. She has interned at The Asia Foundation in Washington, D.C., and she has also worked as a summer research assistant at the Centre for Policy and Innovation (CRPI), gaining experience in research and analysis. Her work focuses on civic engagement, gender, youth leadership, and community development.

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Thailand 🇹🇭

Thailand’s Demographic Time Bomb

by Paranut Juntree, in Bangkok

Thailand is sprinting toward a demographic cliff. Long celebrated as the primary industrial engine of Southeast Asia, the Kingdom’s domestic labor pool is drying up at a globally unprecedented rate.

Thailand has already become an aged society where more than 20% of its population is 60 or older, combined with a shrinking birth rate and unprepared effects of the current Iran-US conflict and the hikes in energy and production costs. This workforce crisis reached a critical flashpoint on May 20, 2026, when the Joint Standing Committee on Commerce, Industry and Banking (JSCCIB) slashed its national GDP growth forecasts. Led by the newly appointed chairwoman of the Federation of Thai Industries (FTI), Pimjai Leeissaranukul, the private sector issued a definitive ultimatum that vital industries like manufacturing, construction, agriculture, and hospitality are starving for personnel, risking total collapse without an immediate, massive influx of foreign labor.

However, welcoming migrant workers requires Thailand to confront an uneasy paradox. While the private sector demands the immediate relaxation of immigration barriers to maintain national competitiveness, the physical infrastructure governing these workers is fundamentally insufficient. A key friction point is the Ministry of Labour’s e-Work Permit system. Due to technical bottlenecks and unintegrated databases, the digital framework frequently leaves renewals in administrative limbo. The JSCCIB notes that these bureaucratic delays have inadvertently stripped thousands of legally documented, tax-paying migrants of their status, pushing them into illegal undocumented vulnerability due to systemic state shortcomings.

This legal gray zone also highlights ethical and human rights risks. When official channels become impossibly slow, desperate employers may turn to unregulated brokers. This immediately subjects vulnerable individuals to transnational trafficking, excessive recruitment debts, and possibly forced labor. This danger is magnified by the ongoing crisis in a neighboring country like Myanmar, where displaced populations are constantly crossing the border fleeing conflict rather than purely pursuing economic migration.

Furthermore, the government must actively manage public perception on migrant labor. For decades, domestic policy has treated migrant communities as transient national security threats rather than permanent pillars of economic integration. A clear example of this is the restricted right of migrant workers to unionize and protect their interests. While public sentiment often resists the influx of foreign labor due to concerns over domestic job competition, the business sector faces a starkly different reality. For employers, there is a critical shortage of domestic workers willing to fill ‘3D’ jobs (dirty, dangerous, and difficult). To neutralize domestic anxieties that migrants are exhausting public resources, policy must frame structured, low-cost health insurance schemes and worker protections as an investment that makes foreign labor budget-neutral and beneficial for provincial infrastructure.

While the private sector is already pushing to expand G2G (government-to-government) agreements to bring in new demographics from South Asai, money and quotas alone cannot fix flawed institutional logic. Easing borders is merely a temporary solution if the domestic framework remains hostile. As Thailand grapples with an aging society, treating migrant workers with basic human dignity, streamlining legal registration, and ensuring fair wages is no longer just a human rights protection gesture but an economic survival mechanism of the country.


Paranut has a background in advocacy, with experience in policy research, communications, and civic engagement across both the NGO and government sectors. As Thailand’s Youth Delegate to the United Nations, he represented Thai youth in global dialogues on migration, education, and human rights, championing inclusive policymaking. He holds a degree in political science with a specialization in international relations.

Cambodia 🇰🇭

Cambodia Transfers 790 Juvenile Offenders to Support Military Engineering and Frontlines

by Malai Yatt, in Phnom Penh

Following Prime Minister Hun Manet’s directive, nearly 800 juvenile offenders were moved to specialised centers to perform national service, focusing on vocational rehabilitation and engineering support for frontline military operations

According to the official announcement, after Manet has ordered the supportive measures for gangsters who engage in harmful practices and order insecurity in society, the government bodies have been working to transfer juveniles to the border.

It should be noted that on April 20, PM was instructed to carefully organise and transfer juvenile offenders to perform work assisting frontline operations in printing and other appropriate tasks, in order to support both the frontline military and the engineering corps.

“As a result, on May 21, the General Department of Prisons arranged the transfer of a total of 790 male juvenile offenders from educational and correctional centres and capital-province prisons to continue their sentences at two target educational and correctional centres.

It added that there are listed as the 4th Correctional Education Center (in Pursat Province), totaling 651 individuals, and the Preah Vihear Provincial Prison, totaling 139 individuals.

The transfer of these juvenile offenders was intended to enhance correctional education and rehabilitation through participation in vocational training programs, to build personal skills, and to engage in activities beneficial to the local community, according to Manet’s Facebook post.

Comparing the new initiative to one convention, it’s similar to the Third Geneva Convention, which protects prisoners of war. It lays out specific guidelines for their care and release, as well as defining their rights. Other individuals who are robbed of their freedom due to armed conflict are likewise protected by international humanitarian law.

In a previous announcement, the PM has suggested that sending gang members and young offenders to perform military duty at the border could benefit the country and shorten prison sentences.

“Currently, we arrest and imprison them, but what we lose is rice. Some change their lives after release, but others return to gang activity,” the Prime Minister said, adding that they would not serve on the frontline but take on support roles.

“[We’re] not handing them a gun; they should build trenches, it helps the engineering division,” Manet said, citing an example, he added.

In short, Cambodia has transferred 790 juvenile offenders to border centers, shifting from standard imprisonment to military engineering support and vocational rehabilitation to improve national security and discipline.

Malai is a reporter at Kiripost, where she has worked for over two years, driven by a strong commitment to amplifying the voices of underserved communities. Her reporting focuses on economic and foreign affairs.

Editorial Deadline 23/05/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

The ASEAN Five-Point Consensus (5PC) was established on April 24, 2021, during the ASEAN Leaders’ Meeting convened at the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta, Republic of Indonesia. The 5PC is the primary peace plan to address the post-coup crisis in Myanmar, focusing on halting violence, promoting dialogue, and providing access to humanitarian aid.

On the situation in Myanmar, the leaders reached consensus on the following:

• First, there shall be an immediate cessation of violence in Myanmar and all parties shall exercise utmost restraint.

• Second, constructive dialogue among all parties concerned shall commence to seek a peaceful solution in the interests of the people.

• Third, a special envoy of the ASEAN Chair shall facilitate mediation of the dialogue process, with the assistance of the Secretary-General of ASEAN.

• Fourth, ASEAN shall provide humanitarian assistance through the AHA Centre.

• Fifth, the special envoy and delegation shall visit Myanmar to meet with all parties concerned.

It has been five years since the military coup in Myanmar and no significant progress has been made, with the implementation of the 5PC effectively stalled throughout the period.

On May 8th, during the Press Conference at the 48th ASEAN Summit in Cebu, President Marcos highlighted the limitations associated with the implementation of the Five-Point Consensus and noted the growing frustrations among member states over the lack of measurable progress. The President reaffirmed that ASEAN remains committed to working harder to resolve the situation in Myanmar. Despite the commitment, the actual plan remains unclear.

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With the Philippines’ chairmanship of the 48th ASEAN Summit this year, observers’ attention turned to how ASEAN aims to tackle the protracted Myanmar crisis, which remains a top concern for the regional bloc. During the Press Conference, our media representation from the ASEAN Frontier observed that President Marcos framed Myanmar not only as a regional security concern but as a humanitarian and familial responsibility within ASEAN. “Myanmar is not merely a trade partner or a friend. Myanmar is part of the ASEAN family, and it is a tragedy when a family member is left out of the family for whatever reason,” he stated, framing the crisis as a shared regional responsibility. This framing suggests an attempt to sustain political cohesion within the bloc, even as practical outcomes remain limited. He further highlighted that ASEAN needs to do more and find other ways “to move the process forward.”

President Marcos asserted that the Philippines, along with all member states, would like to see more progress, but not at the cost of ASEAN’s core principles such as the rule of law and respect for human rights.

The President also highlighted a recurring challenge within ASEAN’s response to the Myanmar crisis; a gap between adoption and implementation under the Five-Point Consensus (5PC).

While ASEAN has publicly expressed frustration over the lack of progress on the 5PC, the strategy on how to move forward remains unclear.

Rhetorical commitment contrasts with the absence of enforcement tools or alternative diplomatic pathways. While ASEAN leaders continue to express dissatisfaction with the status quo, the institutional architecture of the organization offers few mechanisms to move beyond consultation and symbolic pressure.

From a policy perspective, the persistence of this deadlock reflects ASEAN’s broader institutional constraints. The bloc’s consensus-based decision-making and long-standing principle of non-interference limit its ability to enforce compliance, particularly in internal political crises involving member states. As a result, the 5PC has functioned more as a normative framework than an operational mechanism.

The Myanmar issue increasingly functions as a test case for ASEAN’s credibility as a rules-based regional institution. The current trajectory suggests a continued reliance on declaratory diplomacy, with limited capacity to alter ground realities—underscoring a persistent tension between ASEAN’s stated principles and its operational effectiveness.

Myat is a senior undergraduate student majoring in Politics, Philosophy, and Economics. She has interned at The Asia Foundation in Washington, D.C., and she has also worked as a summer research assistant at the Centre for Policy and Innovation (CRPI), gaining experience in research and analysis. Her work focuses on civic engagement, gender, youth leadership, and community development.

Edited by: Marios T. Afrataios

by Karen Ysabelle R. David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk

There’s rarely a dull moment in Philippine politics. But the dramatic events that unfolded last week — shots fired in the Senate building, with senators and journalists scrambling for cover, and ending with a fugitive senator fleeing in the dark of the night — seemed straight out of a Hollywood plot. With fingers pointing and smoke and mirrors galore, the Senate has captured the country’s attention, but for all the wrong reasons.

Away from the excitement in Manila, Vietnam presents a sobering counterpoint: the country’s impressive trade surplus has also drawn the wrong kind of attention. Hanoi must now fight to preserve its own economy against a protectionist and suspicious United States, all while hoping to offer a playbook for the rest of the ASEAN members.

Meanwhile, Singapore’s famously strict drug rehabilitation framework is undergoing a change as it softens its approach on first-time drug abusers. But with combating drug abuse still a priority for ASEAN, it would be a mistake to think that the city-state remains anything but as hardline as ever in its broader drug stance.

The Philippines 🇵🇭

Philippine Senate Under Attack: Gunshots, a Fugitive Senator, and the Cracks in Democratic Restraint

by Eduardo G. Fajermo Jr., in Angeles City

If the Philippine Senate is meant to embody institutional restraint, this week delivered the opposite: a senator sought by the International Criminal Court (ICC) used the chamber as a temporary refuge, gunfire was reported inside the Senate complex, and the political blame game erupted almost as quickly as the security lapse itself. In a country already operating under coalition fracture and impeachment pressure, the Senate became the week’s pressure point.

Sen. Ronald “Bato” dela Rosa, a Duterte ally and former police chief, briefly surfaced from hiding and took refuge in the Senate as authorities moved to enforce the ICC-linked arrest request. The confrontation that followed ended with gunshots heard inside the Senate compound and dela Rosa slipping back into hiding, an image that punctured the Senate’s claim to control its own premises and procedures.

Authorities have since zeroed in on the Senate’s own security leadership. Senate officials acknowledged a warning shot was fired; separate reports said the first shot came from within Senate security, and probes are underway into how firearms were used and who gave the orders.

What followed was as politically revealing as the gunfire. Minority senators say they were being blamed or insinuated as complicit because they “went home early,” implying they supposedly knew something would happen. Sen. Panfilo Lacson rejected that claim as “unfair” and “malicious,” saying none of them had advance knowledge of the shooting incident.

The implication matters because it shows how Senate fractures quickly become weaponized. Instead of a unified institutional response to a security breakdown, the chamber slipped into factional storytelling. Lacson warned that insinuations against the minority were irresponsible and that the Senate should recover dignity through restraint and maturity.

Besides the pointing fingers about the shooting, the minority bloc was also removed from chairmanship of key committees after voting against Sen. Alan Peter Cayetano. These assignments are not simply administrative perks in the Philippines; they are power instruments that determine which investigations proceed, which hearings get oxygen, and which narratives become institutional records.

The Senate is also juggling the constitutional weight of an impeachment track against Vice President Sara Duterte. That backdrop makes every security and leadership decision politically charged, because senators are simultaneously thinking about legal duty, coalition survival, and the next election cycle.

The most telling detail is not the gunfire itself, but what came after: a senator slipping away despite state declarations of enforcement, and lawmakers trading insinuations instead of locking down a common institutional story. When a Senate cannot prevent its own premises from becoming a sanctuary, and cannot prevent a security incident from becoming a blame war, it exposes the fragile seam between law and loyalty.

Democratic institutions do not only weaken when they are attacked from the outside. They weaken when the people entrusted to uphold procedure treat law as negotiable and crisis as a political weapon. This week, the Philippine Senate did not merely face a legal confrontation, it revealed how quickly rules can collapse into factions, and how easily a chamber meant to restrain power can be pulled into protecting it. If this remains unresolved, the precedent will outlive the gunshots: not that the Senate was attacked, but that it blinked.


Eduardo is a faculty member at Holy Angel University, where he teaches courses on Philippine history and contemporary global issues. He is currently pursuing a Master’s degree in Political Science at the University of Santo Tomas, with a research focus on disaster governance, environmental politics, and the urban poor in the Philippines.

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Vietnam 🇻🇳

To Trade Under Strain

by Tri Vo, in Ho Chi Minh City

For the past year, Vietnam’s export machine has fired on all cylinders, weathering the undulating waves of global commercial instability. The numbers are indeed impressive: according to the U.S. Trade Representative, the goods trade deficit with Vietnam hit US$178.2 billion in 2025, driven by products such as electronics, machinery, apparel, and food. Such an at-first-glance victory is nothing but gild that has increasingly become a lightning rod of unwanted attention for Ha Noi. Indeed, as 2026 unfolds, the U.S. Department of Commerce (DoC) has sharply intensified its scrutiny of such trade imbalance, starting with anti-dumping duties on Vietnamese seafood exports. Yet, stress is also being felt across a wide range of vital sectors.

The most immediate pressure points are emerging in renewable energy. During the week of the 11^th of May, a coalition of American solar panel manufacturers, including industry majors like First Solar and DYCM Power, filed a formal request with the DoC to start a new anti-circumvention inquiry. The complaint asserts that foreign enterprises are exploiting third-party nations by using Chinese-origin wafers to produce solar cells, whereas they are then assembled into finished modules in Vietnam and Ethiopia before being exported to the U.S. market. Such complaints, especially given that it hews close to recently leveled U.S. accusations that Vietnam is a transshipment hub for Chinese goods wanting to skirt higher tariffs, can then be utilized as evidence of widespread commercial malpractice on the part of Ha Noi, thus opening the floodgates for more punitive measures.

In addition, looming over these probes is the broader, structural disadvantage of Vietnam’s legal trade standing in the view of the U.S. government. Despite a massive lobbying effort involving dozens of American business associations, the DoC officially denied Vietnam’s request for the designation of a “market economy” in August 2024. Such a trivial label is more critical than it meets the eye, as without it, Vietnam remains classified as a non-market economy. Under such a label, regulators routinely disregard the actual, on-the-ground production costs of Vietnamese companies during anti-dumping investigations, instead relying on surrogate values from third-party nations. This rigid mathematical framework almost invariably presents a far-from-realistic picture of Vietnam as a major export dumper, resulting in quite unfair import duties.

To defend its hard-won trade surplus, Vietnam’s Ministry of Industry and Trade is proactively working to forestall potential further punitive measures. As such, Vietnamese manufacturers are being forced to dramatically increase their supply chain transparency, especially regarding product origin rules. Exporters must now rigorously document the traceability of their inputs, not just the final assembly, thereby proving to skeptical U.S. trade officials that the raw materials and components used in those Vietnamese goods are indeed locally sourced, rather than merely a veneer for imported goods from China.

As global trade continues to fracture along geopolitical fault lines, Ha Noi’s very ability to navigate such a minefield will dictate its ability to fulfill the ambitious double-digit growth rate of this year and those to come. More than that, Vietnam’s response playbook can prove applicable beyond its borders, as ASEAN peers are also mired in trade disputes with a much more protectionist America and in need of policy lessons from peer nations to preserve their own economies.


Tri has experience in management consulting and strategy, having worked with institutions such as the UNDP, The Asia Group, and ARC Group. He has provided strategic, legal, and operational insights to clients in sectors including manufacturing, energy, and technology. He holds both academic and professional experience related to Southeast and East Asia, with a focus on regional development and policy.

Singapore 🇸🇬

Singapore Extends a Hand Without Loosening Its Grip

by Ryan

A quiet but meaningful shift in Singapore’s drug rehabilitation framework signals the city-state’s evolving approach to first-time offenders, even as it doubles down on enforcement and regional solidarity.

Singapore’s approach to drug policy has long been characterized by its uncompromising firmness, but a policy change announced on 15 May at the country’s third annual Drug Victims Remembrance Day marks a deliberate evolution in how the city-state treats those at the earliest stage of dependency. Law Minister and Second Minister for Home Affairs Edwin Tong announced that, effective from 16 May 2026, all first-time drug abusers who voluntarily surrender to the Central Narcotics Bureau (CNB) will no longer be sent to a Drug Rehabilitation Center (DRC). Instead, they will be placed directly on community-based drug supervision with compulsory case management, a shift that keeps rehabilitation out of an institutional setting while maintaining close state oversight.

The change is not a softening of Singapore’s broader drug stance but rather a calibrated expansion of a pathway that already existed in a narrower form. Under the Enhanced Direct Supervision Order introduced in 2019, first-time abusers assessed as low-risk could already avoid the DRC in favor of community supervision managed by the Singapore Anti-Narcotics Association. The updated policy extends this to all first-time surrenderers, provided they have not surrendered more than twice and are not currently wanted by the authorities or under active investigation. Those who come forward will continue to undergo regular counseling sessions employing psychology-based methods such as goal-setting and family engagement, alongside hair or urine testing conducted by the CNB.

The practical reach of this change, at least initially, is modest. According to CNB data, only around 30 first-time abusers surrendered themselves in the entire period from 2020 to March 2026. But the policy’s significance lies less in its immediate scale than in what it signals about the direction of Singapore’s rehabilitation philosophy. By removing the DRC as the automatic first response to voluntary self-disclosure, the government is reinforcing the incentive structure for early help-seeking, treating the act of surrender as an intervention point worth rewarding with a less disruptive response.

That incentive matters against a troubling statistical backdrop. Singapore recorded 68 drug-related deaths in 2025, a 15% increase from the year before. The number of new abusers aged below 20 increased by 22% from 2024 to 2025, with over half of all new abusers arrested in the past three years being under 30, and the youngest arrested in 2025 just 12 years old. Cannabis remains a particular concern, with seven in ten cannabis abusers arrested in 2025 being new users, of whom 63% were below 30. Despite this, the CNB has reported encouraging rehabilitation outcomes elsewhere: the two-year recidivism rate for the 2023 DRC release cohort fell by 4.7% to 26.1% compared with the previous cohort.

This announcement arrived alongside a broader regional framing. Tong emphasized that ASEAN member states share a strong consensus on tackling drug abuse, and confirmed that an annual ASEAN Drug Victims Remembrance Day will be observed on 26 June beginning this year, with member states invited to share stories of drug victims from their own countries. The initiative builds on Singapore’s chairmanship of the 46th ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting on Drug Matters in August 2025.

For ASEAN, where member states face rising youth drug use and the persistent challenge of balancing public health outcomes with rule-of-law commitments, Singapore’s incremental but deliberate policy recalibration offers a template worth watching closely.


Ryan is a final-year finance student at the Singapore University of Social Sciences (SUSS) with experience across venture capital, venture debt, and business development. He also holds a diploma in Law and Management from Temasek Polytechnic. His interests lie in how emerging technologies and economic trends shape business ecosystems and regional development in Asia.

Editorial Deadline 19/05/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Siu Tzyy Wei, Lead Editor - Maritime Crescent Desk

Progress, it turns out, always comes with fine print.

This week, we look beneath the surface of stories that ask the same question: what is the true cost of development, and who is left to foot the bill when announcement fades and minutiae takes hold?

In Indonesia, Hree P. Samudra pulls back the curtain on Jakarta’s modernisation ambitions to trace what the headline budget figures conceal: currency depreciation, deferred maintenance and slow erosion of military readiness that often go unnoticed. In Brunei, Syimah Johari examines the proposed Brunei-Miri Bus Link - a welcome step towards the region’s most active cross-border corridors, but one whose promise hinges on questions of infrastructure, border capacity and whether a new but slower route can compete with long-existing commuting habits. In Malaysia, Edrina Ozaidi turns to the wards where young doctors are stretched thin by a system that asks them to bear the human cost of a healthcare structure long overdue for reform.

Together, this week’s correspondents remind us that progress rarely arrives without hidden tolls. The costs that matter seldom break the surface, but are the ones that emerge quietly, long after the cameras stop rolling.

Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳

Between Speed and Access

by Syimah Johari, in Bandar Seri Begawan

Bruneians have long travelled to Miri for short getaways, affordable shopping, and access to a wider range of services and attractions. Despite the frequency of cross-border movement, travelling to and from Miri can be inconvenient due to border procedures, transport logistics, and reliance on private vehicles. This ongoing mobility has prompted discussions surrounding the proposed Brunei-Miri Bus Link, an initiative aimed at improving cross-border connectivity by formalising an already active travel corridor. The proposed weekly airport-to-airport route is estimated to take around three hours, notably longer than travelling by private vehicle, raising questions over why a slower public transport alternative is being introduced when faster private travel options already exist.

At present, cross-border movement between Brunei and Miri is already frequent, with many travelling between the two locations on a regular basis. However, movement remains heavily reliant on private vehicles due to flexibility and convenience, making travel largely informal and demand-driven. Much of this movement is also socially and economically motivated, including travel for shopping, work, education, and leisure. With this in mind, the proposed Brunei-Miri Bus Link was introduced by Malaysia’s Deputy Tourism, Arts and Culture Minister, Chiew Choon Man, who stated that the initiative could help boost cross-border tourism between the two countries. As the proposal remains in its preliminary stages, further bilateral discussions are expected to take place.

Despite the continued reliance on private vehicles to travel between Brunei and Miri, there are underlying logistical challenges that could make the proposed bus link an attractive alternative. While travelling by car offers greater flexibility and shorter travel times, factors such as fuel costs, parking fees, vehicle security, and border delays can make cross-border travel more costly and demanding for individuals. In this sense, the proposed bus link could provide a more cost-efficient and centralised mode of transport, reducing some of the planning and logistical burdens associated with private travel.

This is particularly relevant for Bruneians who use Miri as a transit point through Miri International Airport as a more affordable international option. A 2025 study focusing primarily on Brunei visitors to Miri found that approximately 56 per cent travelled there for overseas flights. As such, a dedicated bus service could potentially improve accessibility and convenience for such travellers.

However, concerns surrounding efficiency still remain. The proposed bus journey is estimated to take around three hours- longer than travelling by private vehicle due to road limitations and possible delays at immigration checkpoints. During peak travel periods, processing larger groups of passengers places additional pressure on existing border infrastructure, affecting travel flow and waiting times. This raises broader questions about whether supporting infrastructure and border procedures are prepared to accommodate the proposed service effectively.

Ultimately, the proposed Brunei-Miri Bus Link reflects a shift towards formalising an actively evolving pattern of cross-border movement. Its effectiveness will therefore depend on how well it fits into current travel behaviour and whether it can offer a practical and accessible alternative for regular cross-border travellers.


Syimah is a graduate of King’s College London with a BA in International Relations. With a strong focus on diplomacy, regional cooperation, and development policy, she is passionate about contributing to meaningful change through public service. Currently, she is involved in poverty alleviation work through a local NGO.

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Malaysia 🇲🇾

Worn to the Bone

by Edrina Lisa Ozaidi, in WP Kuala Lumpur

We have often heard about the bustling, scary scenario in the emergency department of a hospital. Teleseries or medical dramas have taught us one thing — it takes a lot of staff to run a department smoothly. The Malaysian medical sector, however, faces a major crisis of staff retention, especially among junior doctors who battle against job security and burnout.

To understand the severity of the issue, one must understand the progression of problems. Back in 2016, the lack of permanent vacancies prompted the government to introduce the 5-year contract system, where junior doctors will serve 3 years of housemanship plus 2 years of compulsory placement. For those intending to specialise, 2 more years are needed.

This has caused a two-tier workforce, doctors who are already in placement and contract doctors that face a ceiling. While the placement was meant to address oversupply of talent and budgetary constraints, it further caused disparity, significant job insecurity, and career and specialisation pathways among junior doctors.

The suppressed frustration then caused a movement where doctors staged a nationwide strike during the pandemic. Unfortunately, the solution that was prompted by the government was to open more permanent posts and grant Hadiah Latihan Persekutuan (HLP) eligibility to contract officers to mediate the current tension while the systemic flaws are not yet addressed.

By 2025 and the current year, more systemic failures become more noticeable. The government also introduced a shift system intended to replace 24-hour-on-call shifts with 18-hour shifts. However, this integrated on-call hours into the regular work week, causing doctors to lose weekdays on-call allowances, a move that was criticised by the doctors association as a pay cut in disguise.

Recently, the health director-general issued a landmark circular capping house officer hours at 60-62 hours per week and strictly prohibiting 24-hour shifts. The new mandates also mention the implementation of three flexible work shifts (morning, evening, night), without considering the number of housemen available.

The directive stipulates that in the event of a lack of medical officers, the clinical workload for evening and night shifts must be borne entirely by medical officers and specialists to ensure compliance with house officers’ rest periods.

Private doctors’ associations call out that 60 hours remain burdensome compared to the international 40-hour standard (based in UK), while calling for the government to address the systemic failures. Unlike an official cap on trainee doctors’ work hours in Malaysia’s public service, medical officers often work 33 hours on-call shifts.

Recent statistics also reveal more systemic failure, where out of 5,000 housemanship positions offered, only 529 graduates reported for duty. While fewer graduates enter the public system, the burden on existing staff increases. Despite higher on-call allowances (raised by 40% in Budget 2026) and relocation aids, doctors are leaving for the private sector or overseas for better opportunities and pay, and Malaysia needs to step up in its system to ensure the rate of doctors’ retention improves.


Edrina is a communications professional with a background in international relations. She holds a degree from the University of Nottingham Malaysia and has worked across public relations and social media for organizations in the development, education, and corporate sectors. Her work focuses on crafting narratives around regional affairs and strengthening media engagement across Southeast Asia.

Indonesia 🇮🇩

What the Budget Numbers Don’t Show

by Hree Putri Samudra, in Jakarta

Defense modernization is one of the easier things to sell in Jakarta. The announcements are familiar by now: Rafales from France, J-10s from China, PT PAL talking about unmanned submarines, another parliamentary hearing where the budget edges upward and officials speak of momentum. The ambition is real enough. What gets less attention is the part that starts after the cameras are gone. Procurement contracts do not end at signing. They arrive later as maintenance obligations, spare-parts orders, software updates, fuel bills, and invoices priced against a rupiah sitting closer to Rp17,500 than the Rp16,500 the budget was built around.

On paper, Rp187.1 trillion suggests a government still serious about defense modernization. The exchange rate complicates that story. Rafale contracts, T-50i sustainment, and billions in foreign financing behind the J-10 acquisitions are tied to currencies Indonesia does not control. The budget approved in Jakarta remains numerically intact as the rupiah weakens. At current rates, the difference runs into hundreds of millions of dollars, enough to turn maintenance, ammunition, and training from routine planning questions into budgeting problems.

This is usually where the public conversation loses track of how defense budgets actually work. When conversations revolve only on capital, what gets squeezed are the less visible elements that keep a military running. Refitting schedules stretch. Spare-parts procurement slows. Exercises get reduced because fuel and operating costs no longer match the assumptions made months earlier. Nobody announces lower sortie rates or delayed maintenance cycles. It is here that currency pressure leaves its mark - not in procurement headlines but in the quieter erosion of readiness.

Indonesia has been bearing this defence budgeting imbalance for years. Procurement and personnel absorb attention and money more easily than sustainment ever does. Maintenance, readiness, and lifecycle costs tend to sit further down the priority list until the exchange rate forces them back into view. When the rupiah is relatively stable, the system muddles through. Under sustained depreciation, the distance between what Indonesia formally owns and what the TNI can reliably operate becomes harder to ignore.

Defense is competing inside a tighter budget than the headline numbers suggest. Oil assumptions have shifted, debt servicing is heavier, and Makan Bergizi Gratis now carries Rp335 trillion, almost double the military allocation. Prabowo has defended the program and understandably so. But when some spending lines are politically difficult to touch, adjustment rarely disappears. It tends to move elsewhere, often into maintenance, training, and delayed upgrades.

The foreign policy effects are harder to measure but still worth noticing. Governments under fiscal pressure negotiate differently, especially when procurement financing narrows and economic assumptions become harder to defend. Jakarta’s commitment to large-scale US energy purchases was presented as partnership, and while there is no reason to dismiss that outright, tighter budgets usually leave less room to bargain comfortably.

Bebas dan aktif - free and active - was always a doctrine with a material premise: that Indonesia would be substantial enough, stable enough, and solvent enough that genuine independence was possible. That premise hasn’t collapsed. But it isn’t free, rather, it is getting more costly to sustain.


Hree is a Policy Fellow at the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network (APLN) where she leads research and policy interventions on Indo-Pacific nuclear security and AI governance. She previously served as a Research Fellow at the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) and has managed multi-country security portfolios across all 10 ASEAN member states. Her work examines the intersection of emerging technologies, strategic stability, and the evolution of regional security architectures. She specializes in institutional risk assessment and the application of open-source intelligence (OSINT) for strategic monitoring. Her current research focuses on how technological shifts such as AI and advanced verification tools reshape escalation dynamics and multilateral cooperation in a multipolar world.

Editorial Deadline 16/05/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk

This week's issue of the Mekong Belt looks into the gap between state action and state accountability. From Vientiane to Naypyidaw, passing through Bangkok and Phnom Penh, governments across the region are moving: passing laws, making arrests, convening summits, greenlighting megaprojects. Still, the harder question is always the same: who bears the cost, and who stays protected?

In Laos an enforcement surge has led to the detention of over 1,500 cybercrime suspects in a single month — but the architects of the scam networks remain untouched, and a 99-year lease makes it easy to ask how deep this crackdown can really go. In Myanmar, we sit in on an ASEAN that can’t agree on what to do next. Four years after the coup, Cebu showed a bloc that knows the status quo is broken but can’t commit to anything that would fix it. Meanwhile, in Thailand, the Land Bridge debate is back and with it so is a central question: with a 1.24% return rate, a trillion-baht price tag, and coastal communities on the line, who exactly does this megaproject serve? Finally, Cambodia's new conscription law clears parliament: two years of mandatory service for men aged 18–25, no pay, imprisonment for draft dodgers, and economists warning it could shave 0.5% off GDP annually.

Lao PDR 🇱🇦

Laos’ War on Scams

by Thongsavanh Souvannasane, in Vientiane

More than 1,500 scam suspects are detained in a single month. For a country long accused of looking the other way on cybercrime, the numbers coming out of Laos in May 2026 demand a closer look.

On 12 May, Bokeo provincial authorities dismantled a multinational call center scam gang in Ton Pheung district, detaining 62 suspects and confiscating computers and mobile phones. It was the third major operation in the province in less than two weeks, following 71 arrests in Houayxay on 4 to 5 May and 159 detentions in Ton Pheung on 11 May. Later on 7 May, authorities separately transferred 605 suspects from alleged fraud operations in Savannakhet Province to Vientiane for investigation, involving nationals from eight countries.

Combined with an early April sweep that detained 742 suspects, the total number of individuals detained in connection with cybercrime across Laos in the first half of May alone exceeded 1,500.

This is not incremental enforcement. It is a surge.

At the April cabinet meeting, Prime Minister Sonexay Siphandone ordered agencies to make cybercrime enforcement a top national priority, warning that officials found involved face disciplinary action. On 30 April, Minister of Public Security Vanthong Kongmany visited the Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone (GTSEZ) in Bokeo to reinforce enforcement on the ground, a rare show of ministerial presence in the zone.

Since 2023, nearly 2,800 suspects from 27 nationalities have been arrested in the GTSEZ alone.

The urgency is not purely domestic. In February 2026, UN Human Rights Chief Volker Türk named Laos as a key location hosting large-scale scam operations targeting victims worldwide. With US enforcement actions escalating across the region and Laos now on the international record, Vientiane can no longer afford to be seen as passive. There is also a subtler risk: as crackdowns disrupt operations elsewhere in the Mekong, criminal networks have consistently relocated across borders.

Laos must act, or risk becoming the region’s last safe harbour.

Yet the enforcement record raises hard questions. A December 2025 inspection of 475 buildings inside the GTSEZ found full compliance and no illegal activity, a finding difficult to reconcile with thousands of arrests in the same zone in the same year. The most plausible explanation is one the government has not offered: that operators received advance warning.

More fundamentally, the vast majority of those arrested are low-level workers, many of them trafficking victims themselves. The financiers and organizers who built the system have not appeared in any arrest announcement.

The structural obstacle is still harder. The Lao state granted its operator a 99-year lease, an inherent conflict of interest that sets a ceiling on how far this crackdown can go. Tax revenue in the zone dropped 49% in 2025 as 551 businesses shut down. Operations are being disrupted. But disruption is not dismantlement. Laos’ war on scams is real, whether it reaches the people who built the system is the question that matters.


Thongsavanh is a journalist from Laos with a background in English-language media. He graduated from the Lao-American Institute with a Diploma of the Arts in English and contributes to independent news platforms. His reporting focuses on environmental issues, socio-economic development, and geopolitics.

Myanmar 🇲🇲

The Bloc That Blinks

by Moe Thiri Myat

Breaking news from Myanmar emerged at the 48th ASEAN Summit in Cebu, Philippines, highlighting the Myanmar crisis as one of the region’s most difficult diplomatic challenges. More than four years after the 2021 military coup, the leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states continue to express frustration over the slow progress in Myanmar’s ongoing affairs while remaining divided over the approaches they should collectively take.

Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. criticized the lack of progress under ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus since its initiation in 2021. Many leaders also acknowledged the need for alternative approaches to move the situation forward and restore stability in Myanmar. Moreover, Marcos stated that ASEAN members wanted to “find ways to change the processes that are currently in place.”

Thailand, on the other hand, has increasingly positioned itself as one of the strongest advocates for greater engagement with Naypyidaw. Thailand’s Prime Minister Anutin stated that current political developments in Myanmar — regarding the release of President U Win Myint and reports concerning Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s wellbeing — were positive signs for dialogue. This signals Thailand’s willingness to support more direct communication between ASEAN and Myanmar’s military officials. Moreover, Thailand’s foreign minister even proposed inviting other regional countries to engage with diplomats as part of a “step-by-step process” toward greater engagement.

There are ongoing differences even within ASEAN, as some member states prioritize political accountability and legitimacy while others focus more on practical concerns including border security, trade disruptions, humanitarian access, migration, and regional stability. Regionally, the Myanmar crisis also intensifies these external issues, such as border management, economic development, transnational crime, refugee flows, and regional security.

Myanmar’s military has grown increasingly outspoken under ASEAN pressure. On May 10, Myanmar’s foreign ministry accused some ASEAN countries of discrimination and of violating the ASEAN Charter by restricting Myanmar’s participation in high-level meetings. Naypyidaw also argued that Myanmar has remained a responsible ASEAN member since joining the bloc in 1997 and has continued fulfilling its obligations despite ongoing political tensions.

However, ASEAN leaders still have not recognized Myanmar’s recent election process, and senior junta leaders remain excluded from ASEAN summits; only low-level representatives have been permitted to participate on behalf of the country.

Beyond ASEAN’s internal divisions, China plays a crucial role: its relationships with both Myanmar’s military leadership and several ethnic armed organizations operating near the border reveal that Myanmar’s crisis is embedded in larger power dynamics. This creates an additional challenge for ASEAN. Even though the bloc continues to search for collective solutions through its own diplomatic mechanisms, some of the most powerful actors are still shaping realities beyond ASEAN-led processes. Therefore, ASEAN’s ability to act collectively is complicated not only by disagreements among member states but also by the broader geopolitical environment surrounding Myanmar.

For more than four years since the coup, the Myanmar crisis has continued to test ASEAN’s unity, credibility, and ability to respond collectively to an internal crisis among member states. While ASEAN leaders agree that the current situation cannot remain stagnant, member states still appear divided over what an effective and realistic path forward should look like — particularly as the crisis is increasingly shaped not only by ASEAN itself but also by larger regional powers with competing interests.


Moe Thiri Myat is a senior at Parami University. Majoring in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics (PPE). Interested in analyzing emerging sociopolitical situations and developments, through her work as a Myanmar correspondent at The ASEAN Frontier she aims to explore how sociopolitical developments across Southeast Asia shape and are shaped by the situation in Myanmar.

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Thailand 🇹🇭

Who is Benefiting From Thailand’s Land Bridge?

by Natamon Aumphin, in Bangkok

In recent weeks, debate over developing the Land Bridge project in southern Thailand — connecting the Andaman Sea and the Gulf of Thailand — has surged. The debate has been revived by the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz, which has prompted fresh calls to reduce reliance on the Strait of Malacca and to boost the local economy at the macro level. Nonetheless, despite promises of economic gain, opponents have raised concerns about the project’s damaging impact on the coastal environment and local communities. As the megaproject aims to connect Ranong and Chumphon through the construction of deep-sea ports and industrial railways, topsoil and nearby areas would need to be removed — which could damage marine life, coral reefs, and the livelihoods of southern communities who rely on the sea through fisheries, farming, and tourism.

According to a study from Chulalongkorn University, the economic internal rate of return (EIRR) is very low, at only about 1.24%. While another study conducted by the Office of Transport and Traffic Policy and Planning (OTP) exists, the project study area in Ranong covers only 1 kilometer, within which lie the Ramsar site and national parks. Likewise, the target areas for developing deep-sea ports in Chumphon are situated near wetlands — sites that are vital for natural habitats, support human livelihoods, and absorb natural disasters.

On top of environmental concerns, the development of the Land Bridge would incur approximately 1 trillion baht (USD 30.67 billion ), which would worsen the public debt, which already approaches the 70% of GDP ceiling. To alleviate the financial burden, the government has proposed the public-private partnership (PPP) model. To facilitate this, the government is pushing the Southern Economic Corridor (SEC) draft — a special regulation designed to attract investors. Nonetheless, the draft has been a subject of contention among locals and human rights groups, who see it as benefiting investors too much while neglecting the needs and rights of local people. If the draft is passed, investors could own land, local oversight power would diminish, and resources would be absorbed into the project instead of going to the people.

Therefore, even though the megaproject has an ambitious aim — claiming to generate employment, increase regional and national growth, and benefit the people — the forecasted reality may be different. Evidence suggests that wealth would be concentrated among a few capitalists, further contributing to Thailand’s already high domestic inequality, while people’s lives would be upended: from sustaining themselves through the sea and tradition, to earning a living through construction and logistics that damage their own homes. Many scholars have also agreed on this point and urged the government to redevelop and enhance existing projects before building new ones. Nonetheless, the central question remains: if the project goes ahead, who does the government prioritize? Who does the wealth belong to? And will the livelihoods of local communities and the environment be endangered or compensated?

Natamon has served as a rapporteur at the Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS Thailand). She has also worked as a research assistant on diplomatic issues in Southeast Asia. Her work focuses on how domestic politics shape foreign policy in the region. She holds a degree in international relations and has experience in policy analysis, event reporting, and regional research.

Cambodia 🇰🇭

Cambodian Parliament Adopts Military Conscription Draft Law

by Chandara Samban, in Kandal

The Cambodian National Assembly passed a military conscription law on May 12, 2026, requiring men aged 18 to 25 to serve in the military for two years, while women may join on a voluntary basis. The law aims to strengthen national defense, instill patriotism among young people, and provide them with additional life skills. However, the law remains controversial, particularly due to public concerns over livelihood issues, loss of family income, labor shortages in the private sector, and the possible impact on young people’s education.

The conscription law was previously proposed by the Cambodian government in 2025 but was put on hold following Cambodia’s border crisis with Thailand. By mid-2026, the government resumed discussions on the law with amendments to the earlier version, which had originally been proposed in 2006 but was never implemented. Under the revised law, young men between the ages of 18 and 25 will be required to serve in the military for 24 months and remain reserve soldiers until the age of 45. It is also being considered that registered individuals will have to attend short annual training courses even after completing their two-year service. The law exempts women, who may participate voluntarily, as well as people with disabilities, monks and religious priests , and individuals who play important roles for the nation. In cases of non-compliance or evasion, registered individuals could face imprisonment ranging from six months to five years. In addition, if there are insufficient recruits, a lottery-style “lucky draw” system may be used among registered individuals.

In parliament, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet stressed that the law is important for strengthening Cambodia’s military capacity, particularly in enhancing the nation’s self-reliance and defense capabilities. Responding to concerns and criticism surrounding the law, Hun Manet defended military service describing it as an honor rather than a burden, and called on both young people and their parents to support the initiative.

On this issue, Chheang Vannarith, Chairman of the National Assembly Advisory Council (NAAC), showed support for the law, arguing that Cambodia must be well prepared for war amid growing global uncertainty. He stated that the law would help modernize the national defense sector for a small state like Cambodia, particularly by strengthening military capacity to protect both land and maritime borders. He also said military service would help provide civilians with military education and a better understanding of their roles and defense techniques.

Geopolitical analyst Seng Vanly believes the law is important for recruiting young people into the military, as many active-duty soldiers today are aging and need to be replaced by a younger generation. He added that the government is likely pursuing this law because voluntary recruitment may become increasingly difficult in the future.

Despite support for the law, concerns remain. Many Cambodians expressed worries on social media that the law could be implemented unfairly, disproportionately affecting the poor and powerless. Some fear losing their income and being unable to support their families because military service is unpaid, while businesses are concerned about losing workers needed for production and services. About this, Casey Barnett, former president of the American Chamber of Commerce in Cambodia (AmCham), argued that the Cambodian government could consider alternatives to mandatory military service. He suggested that the state could instead introduce policies encouraging citizens to have children and support childcare in order to build strong and high-quality human capital for the future. He believes that implementing conscription could reduce Cambodia’s economic growth by 0.5% of GDP due to the annual loss of more than 300,000 workers, while also affecting education, career development, and delaying marriage, which could ultimately impact population growth.


Chandara is a freelance journalist with a focus on foreign affairs, security issues, and ASEAN affairs. He also serves as a Junior Counterterrorism Intelligence Analyst.

Editorial Deadline 16/05/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Karen Ysabelle R. David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk

Last week, in sunny Mactan on the island of Cebu in the Philippines, leaders from across Southeast Asia flocked together for the 48th ASEAN Summit. As the ASEAN Chair for 2026, Manila is expected to lead the region in deepening cooperation and integration. But against a backdrop of historic global instability and domestic political chaos, Manila’s stint as Chair may end up becoming more difficult than most.

For Vietnam, the Summit was a reminder of its 50 years of diplomatic relations with the Philippines, and of the growing economic and security cooperation between the two. Yet as Hanoi’s response to the South China Sea issue — a cause near and dear to Manila’s heart — remained muted, it was also a reminder that there is still much left to be desired with regard to intra-ASEAN cooperation.

And in Singapore, a proposed government-run dating platform to help address the city-state’s fertility crisis has caught the attention of the public. But without addressing the root causes of the crisis, can the government playing matchmaker really do much to help?

The Philippines 🇵🇭

ASEAN focuses on stability amid global uncertainty

by Glenn Vincent N. Boquilon, in Angeles City

The 48th ASEAN Summit and Related Meetings were held in Cebu, Philippines, from 6 to 8 May 2026 under the leadership of President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. The convening of ASEAN leaders comes at a time when the region is facing extensive economic and geopolitical pressures. The dialogue this year continues to revolve around cooperation, security, and resilience. However, there is a need to focus on global conflicts, food and energy stability, and strengthening ASEAN unity.

The summit carries the theme “Navigating Our Future, Together.” The tone can be seen as more practical than symbolic. Regional cooperation and integration are expected to be centered in all the discussions. In this regard, leaders are being counted on to present clear and feasible agreements rather than broad statements that highlight a change in approach, thus putting more weight on concrete steps and actionable plans that can help manage the challenges the region is facing.

Due to recent escalations in the Middle East, energy has become one of the most urgent concerns internationally. Like the Philippines, many Southeast Asian countries rely on imported fuel to help operate multiple industries. Accordingly, the current bottleneck poses a great challenge for different sectors regionally. Consequently, there is pressure to look beyond short-term solutions and think about long-term energy security. ASEAN’s goal must be to reduce vulnerability and build more stable systems.

Food security is also a part of this year’s discussions. Supply disruptions and rising costs have made it harder for many countries to maintain stable food systems. This is not only an economic issue but also a social one, with many communities susceptible to food insecurity. The Secretary-General of ASEAN, Kao Kim Hourn, said that there is also a need for more effective management of regional food reserves. When steady access to food is ensured, national and regional stability may also follow.

Undoubtedly, disaster resilience remains a priority. The region continues to face frequent natural disasters, from strong typhoons to flooding, rising sea levels, and earthquakes. These calamities disrupt and destroy infrastructure, economies, livelihoods, and communities. Dave Gomez, Presidential Communications Secretary, announced that ASEAN member states have pushed for collaborative frameworks that would enhance early warning systems for different communities and faster humanitarian response for affected areas.

Energy security, food stability, and climate resilience are closely interlinked. A disruption in one field can quickly trickle down and affect others, therefore reinforcing the need for ASEAN leaders to integrate their responses and improve knowledge-sharing capabilities. A coordinated approach would be most effective rather than treating each problem on its own.

The summit also highlights ASEAN’s challenge of balancing regional cooperation with national interests. While member states share common concerns, each country still has its own priorities.

The Philippines’ chairmanship positions it at a strategic vantage point to open discussions close to it, particularly on challenges revolving around maritime security, energy stability, disaster resilience, and regional cooperation. These, too, continue to shape regional priorities. This places it in a strong position to push for solutions that are both national and regional in nature.

Ultimately, the real test comes after the summit ends. The actual development that takes place is what people should look out for. In this instance, agreements and plans matter. However, implementation and effective program execution take precedence. As global risks continue to prove their interconnectivity, ASEAN’s ability to act together will define its role in the years to come.


Glenn holds a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from the University of Santo Tomas. His experience spans governance programs, policy development, and political research, having worked with the Ateneo School of Government and WR Numero Research on projects focused on electoral reform, public opinion, and regional development. He also helped coordinate the drafting of the Bangsamoro Local Government Code and supported the Academy of Multiparty Democracy.

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Vietnam 🇻🇳

Vietnam–Philippine Relations and the 48th ASEAN Summit

by Sean Huy Vu

Under the theme “Navigating Our Future, Together,” the 48th ASEAN summit was held from 7 to 8 May in Cebu, Philippines. Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. stressed the importance of the Summit against the backdrop of the war in Iran, rising fuel prices, and inflation. With over 90% of its oil imported from the Middle East, the Philippines used its chairmanship to initiate the creation of an energy sharing mechanism for the region. However, the specific logistics regarding the distribution of the oil — as to whom, when, where, and how — remain unknown.

Prime Minister Lê Minh Hưng attended the event on behalf of Vietnam, making this his first overseas trip. At the event, Lê also advocated for improvements in human security issues, such as food and energy. He also promoted deeper economic integration within the region, in harmony with Manila’s desire for a regional digital economic framework and AI regulation.

The Philippines also expressed aspirations for resolving territorial disputes in the South China Sea. The Philippines has faced challenges in asserting its sovereignty against Chinese vessels in the area, despite a 2016 tribunal ruling in favor of the Philippines that dismisses China’s nine-dash line claim as illegitimate. President Marcos stated ASEAN will have a maritime center based in the Philippines to ensure the region’s freedom of navigation. Traffic in the South China Sea is estimated to be worth over US$3 billion; should any disruption occur in the area, it would be comparable to the current situation in the Strait of Hormuz, according to President Marcos.

By contrast, Vietnam made very few overt remarks on the South China Sea issue, instead cautiously focusing on pragmatic economic issues. Like the Philippines, Vietnam also has several maritime disputes with the People’s Republic of China, specifically over the Paracel and Spratly Islands. It made its grievances international in 2010 when the country was chair of the ASEAN summit, and partly contributed to the Obama administration’s “pivot to Asia” foreign policy.

Vietnam’s decision not to openly stress its maritime disputes with China at the summit suggests tensions between the two are cooling and becoming more manageable at the bilateral level. A few weeks ago, Chinese authorities unilaterally declared part of the East Sea as off-limits for fishing, including in areas Vietnam deems as part of its sovereignty. Vietnam’s foreign ministry criticized China for the declaration.

Besides global and regional issues, Vietnam and the Philippines took the occasion to celebrate 50 years of diplomatic relations. During the Vietnam War, the Philippines served as a critical military hub for the US. The US used its naval and aerial bases there to repair and re-fuel its ships and planes as well as provide ammunition, food, and medical services to its personnel. Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Sr. — the father of the current President — was an ardent anti-communist and only recognized South Vietnam as the legitimate government. He was ousted in a coup in 1986.

Despite historical differences, Vietnam and the Philippines are growing closer in the realms of economic and security cooperation. Trade between both countries is approaching US$10 billion annually, and they have jointly strengthened maritime law enforcement via search and rescue operations with the US. With this said, since Manila is a treaty ally of Washington, one can expect Hanoi to maintain some distance in the relationship, in order to remain neutral in the strategic competition between the US and China.


Sean is a scholar of East Asian history, culture, and international relations, with current research at Georgetown University examining working-class labor and human trafficking in the region. His broader interests include the social psychology of religion and identity politics. Sean previously taught modern Korean history at the University of California, Irvine, where he completed his B.A. in History, and later taught English in Ho Chi Minh City while studying Vietnamese language and culture. His writing has been published by UC Irvine, Johns Hopkins University, and Foreign Analysis.

Singapore 🇸🇬

Are free dates what young Singaporeans really need?

by Jennifer Hui En Tan, in Singapore

Singapore’s resident total fertility rate (TFR) fell to 0.87 in 2025, the lowest on record and among the lowest globally. In response, the Government Technology Agency (GovTech) has been exploring “Firstdate,” a proposed government-run dating platform for singles aged 35 and below. The idea came to public attention after surveys were circulated on CrowdTask, a government feedback platform, seeking opinions on the service’s design. GovTech has since clarified that the proposal is in a “very early, exploratory stage” and that most such ideas do not proceed beyond the concept or research phase. Nonetheless, the proposal raises an important question of whether the government truly understands what young Singaporeans need and whether a dating platform reflects that understanding.

The central limitation of a dating platform as a demographic policy tool is that it addresses access to potential partners, not the conditions that shape decisions about marriage and parenthood. A 2024 YouGov survey found that 36% of Gen Z and 42% of millennials in Singapore already use dating apps. The barrier faced by many young Singaporeans is not meeting people, but the affordability and stability required to commit to long-term partnership and family life. The more pressing constraints are structural, such as housing costs, work-life balance, the financial burden of raising children, and limited caregiving support. These factors affect not just whether couples form, but whether they choose to have children at all. Getting people on more first dates does not resolve these underlying pressures, and there is limited evidence that increasing match rates translates directly into higher birth rates.

The debate around Firstdate reflects a wider tension in Singapore’s approach to its demographic challenge. The government has acknowledged the severity of the crisis, with the National Population and Talent Division announcing a new workgroup in April 2026 and findings expected by early 2027, but proposed interventions have at times felt misaligned with the concerns young Singaporeans express most often.

Other ASEAN governments have attempted similar interventions with limited success. Thailand, which recorded a TFR of 1.1 in 2023, has introduced cash incentives for newborns and extended parental leave, yet its birth rate has continued to decline. Vietnam, once considered a demographic outlier in the region, has seen its TFR drop below replacement level in urban centers despite active government campaigns encouraging larger families. The evidence across the region suggests that even well-resourced, sustained policy efforts struggle to reverse the trend once it takes hold.

A government dating platform may offer genuine utility for some users, and should not be dismissed outright. However, it is more appropriately understood as a supplementary measure than a substantive response to falling birth rates. For the numbers to shift meaningfully, the conversation will need to turn toward the structural conditions that shape whether starting a family feels feasible at all.


Jennifer is a final-year International Relations student at the Singapore Institute of Management, where she focuses on political engagement, diplomacy, and community governance. She is an active volunteer in her constituency, working closely with residents to understand local concerns, facilitate dialogue, and support community initiatives.

Editorial Deadline 12/05/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)