by the Mekong Belt Desk

This week, Southeast Asia faces mounting economic pressures, humanitarian challenges, and regional security concerns. Laos struggles with rising electricity costs and domestic power shortages despite its growing energy exports, while ASEAN renews efforts to address Myanmar’s ongoing crisis through humanitarian assistance and the Five-Point Consensus. In Cambodia, the government’s response to stranded cruise passengers draws international attention, highlighting how humanitarian gestures can shape a country’s global image. Meanwhile, renewed clashes along the Myanmar–Thailand border threaten civilian safety, disrupt cross-border trade, and underscore the broader regional consequences of Myanmar’s continuing conflict.

Myanmar 🇲🇲

ASEAN’s Myanmar Dilemma: Humanitarian Assistance and the Five-Point Consensus

by Moe Thiri Myat

Philippine Foreign Secretary Ma. Theresa Lazaro, serving as the ASEAN Chair’s Special Envoy on Myanmar, visited the country on 28–29 October to oversee humanitarian assistance and discuss the implementation of ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus (5PC). During the visit, she met Myanmar’s military-backed Foreign Minister Tin Maung Swe in Naypyidaw on 29 October, where both sides discussed humanitarian access, regional cooperation and Myanmar’s participation in ASEAN. The visit came ahead of the 49th ASEAN Summit in Manila in November, where leaders are expected to review progress on the bloc’s peace plan for Myanmar.

On 28 October, Lazaro travelled to Taunggyi in southern Shan State, accompanied by the ASEAN Monitoring Team and representatives from the AHA Centre. During the visit, she observed the distribution of rice, family kits and hygiene supplies to displaced communities, with support from the Myanmar Red Cross Society. The mission also marked the beginning of a month-long humanitarian operation expected to reach more than 11,000 households across Kayin and Shan states, including communities that had previously been difficult for the AHA Centre to reach.

The visit also included humanitarian activities in Naypyidaw, where Lazaro attended the handover ceremony of a reconstructed monastery in Pyinmana Township and distributed school supplies to children at a newly built school. These projects were supported by the Philippines through the AHA Centre as part of recovery efforts following the devastating March 2025 earthquake. According to the Philippine Foreign Ministry, the mission aimed to expand humanitarian assistance to conflict-affected communities and improve access to areas with limited aid delivery.

Beyond humanitarian assistance, discussions in Naypyidaw also covered the implementation of the Five-Point Consensus. According to Myanmar’s Foreign Ministry, Tin Maung Swe emphasised that Myanmar would continue cooperating with ASEAN while safeguarding its national interests and sovereignty. The two sides also discussed restoring Myanmar’s original role and rights within ASEAN, strengthening bilateral cooperation and preparations for the upcoming ASEAN Summit.

Adopted in April 2021 following the military coup, the Five-Point Consensus calls for an immediate cessation of violence, inclusive political dialogue, mediation through an ASEAN special envoy and humanitarian assistance. However, progress has remained limited. In its October 2025 review, ASEAN leaders expressed concern over the lack of substantive progress and maintained restrictions on Myanmar’s political representation at ASEAN summits and foreign ministers’ meetings until meaningful progress is achieved.

Another unresolved issue was Lazaro’s possible meeting with detained former leader Aung San Suu Kyi. The Philippines had previously sought access to her as part of its diplomatic engagement, but the visit concluded without any publicly reported meeting. Philippine officials had earlier stated that no details were available regarding such an arrangement.

The visit took place as the Philippines prepared to host the 49th ASEAN Summit in November, where Myanmar’s situation and the implementation of the 5PC are expected to remain on the agenda. Philippine Foreign Affairs Undersecretary Leo Herrera-Lim described Lazaro’s humanitarian mission as part of ASEAN’s continued commitment to the consensus, particularly its provision on humanitarian assistance. Lazaro’s observations from the visit are also expected to be reported at the summit, as ASEAN considers its next steps on Myanmar’s humanitarian and political crisis.


Moe Thiri Myat is a senior at Parami University. Majoring in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics (PPE). Interested in analyzing emerging sociopolitical situations and developments, through her work as a Myanmar correspondent at The ASEAN Frontier she aims to explore how sociopolitical developments across Southeast Asia shape and are shaped by the situation in Myanmar.

Thailand 🇹🇭

Fighting Erupts between along Thailand’s Border

by Natamon Aumphin, in Bangkok

On 29 October 2026, an ongoing clash between the military junta and Karen forces along the border of Thailand in Mae Sot district, Tak province, caused two spillover casualties on Thai territory. Heavy artillery was exchanged between the two while nearby villages were bombed by drones, spotted since the early morning. Although there were no deaths on the Thai side, household damages can be seen, and 1 was hospitalized. Ratchamanu Task Force Headquarters (RTFH) has prepared armed forces along the border ensuring security and aid in case of escalation. Aside from deploying forces, border trade at Mae Sot will be halted for a week until 5 November or until ceasefire.

Although the dispute happened on Myanmar territory, it has important implications for Thailand. Firstly, the clash could spillover to Thai territory, causing damaged civilians and casualties. If the dispute escalates, it could destabilize the region and disrupt people’s livelihoods along the border as they need to be evacuated. Secondly, it affects the border economy if the border trade has to be temporarily paused. In fact, the border trade at Mae Sot has contributed over 40% of the total trade between Thailand and Myanmar even though most of the products are related to electronics, which could be linked to scam operations in Shewe Kok Ko. Lastly, the clash could worsen human rights allegations and decrease human development in the long run as trading routes are harder to reach to civilians and so does aid. This has been among the concerns of human rights groups as more and more ASEAN countries showed benign relations toward the Myanmese government.


Natamon has served as a rapporteur at the Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS Thailand). She has also worked as a research assistant on diplomatic issues in Southeast Asia. Her work focuses on how domestic politics shape foreign policy in the region. She holds a degree in international relations and has experience in policy analysis, event reporting, and regional research.

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Cambodia 🇰🇭

Cambodia Demonstrates Compassion by Welcoming Villa Vie Cruise

by Chandara Samban, in Kandal

In late October, the suspension of operations by the cruise ship Villa Vie Odyssey attracted global attention, receiving coverage from major international media outlets. The vessel was carrying passengers facing an unexpected predicament, particularly the prospect of being forced to disembark against their will. However, Cambodia, the final destination of this “World Endless” voyage, extended a warm welcome to the passengers. Cambodian authorities and the government stepped in to provide assistance, generating positive public sentiment and potentially helping restore the country’s international reputation, which has previously been tarnished by its association with online scam operations. Experts have viewed Cambodia’s decision to welcome the passengers and facilitate the vessel’s arrival as a commendable and appropriate course of action.

On the morning of October 28, 2026, the Villa Vie Odyssey, a luxury cruise ship measuring more than 200 meters in length, originating from Florida, United States, and carrying over 200 passengers announced that passengers would have to disembark upon its arrival at the port of Sihanoukville, Cambodia. The sudden announcement, which passengers subsequently shared with major international media outlets, caused considerable public attention. The decision was attributed to a financial crisis, particularly a sharp increase in fuel costs driven by the conflict in the Middle East, which reportedly forced the company to terminate the voyage in Cambodia. This effectively brought an end to the dream of an indefinite, round-the-world journey that had begun in October 2024.

Some passengers reported having sold their homes and other assets to spend their retirement years living aboard the ship. They described the company’s decision as irresponsible, while the company maintained that it could no longer afford to continue providing the service. The situation prompted intervention from Cambodian authorities. Notably, Minister of Tourism Hout Hak traveled to meet directly with the cruise ship’s management team and passengers to assist with visa arrangements and ensure the safety and well-being of those who had not yet arranged their return flights.

This development sparked debate within Cambodian society, with some questioning why the government had intervened in a matter involving a private company. The government, however, maintained that its response was a humanitarian gesture, reflecting its commitment to assisting all travelers arriving in Cambodia without discrimination. Conversely, some members of the public criticized the intervention, arguing that the passengers were relatively affluent individuals from major global powers who did not necessarily require such government assistance.

Others, including Cambodian social media influencers, viewed the intervention as an opportunity for the country to improve its international reputation and showcase the kindness and compassion of the Cambodian people. They saw it as a way to counter negative narratives, often encapsulated in the derogatory nickname “Scambodia,” and promote a more positive image of the country as “Carebodia.”

This perspective also draws parallels with 2020, when Cambodia allowed the cruise ship MS Westerdam, carrying more than 2,000 passengers and crew members, to dock after several other countries had turned it away due to concerns over COVID-19. That decision demonstrated Cambodia’s willingness to extend humanitarian assistance and ensure that those stranded at sea were not left behind.

Speaking to The ASEAN Frontier (TAF), Pen Bona, spokesperson for the Cambodian government, said the government’s intervention concerning the cruise ship was purely humanitarian and reflected Cambodia’s goodwill. He emphasized that the action was not intended to rehabilitate the country’s international image in relation to online scam operations, a subject frequently highlighted by major international media outlets, sometimes even in contexts where it is entirely unrelated. He further clarified that Cambodia had no connection to the cruise company’s financial crisis and that the vessel’s arrival was merely coincidental.

Meanwhile, Ou Virak, a political analyst and human rights activist at Future Forum, expressed support for the government’s decision to welcome and assist the cruise ship’s passengers. He viewed the move as a positive development for Cambodia, despite the government incurring some public expenditure, as it projected a favorable image of the country on the international stage. He added that the gesture reflected the goodwill of the Cambodian people and could serve as a form of “soft power” in the long term.

Regarding the continued association of Cambodia with online scam operations in major international media coverage, Ou Virak noted that such narratives were not easy to change and would take considerable time to overcome, as they were deeply rooted in social perceptions and psychology. He added that Cambodia’s positive actions toward the international community could provide a favorable foundation for rebuilding the country’s international reputation.

Villa Vie Odyssey cruise ship offers various tourism and residential accommodation packages. According to the vessel’s official website, the cost of permanent residence aboard the ship ranges from approximately $120,000 to $440,000, while monthly accommodation packages can cost around $3,500. In 2025, the cruise line also introduced a “lifetime residency” package, allowing passengers to live aboard the vessel for the remainder of their lives.


Chandara is a freelance journalist with a focus on foreign affairs, security issues, and ASEAN affairs. He also serves as a Junior Counterterrorism Intelligence Analyst.

Lao PDR 🇱🇦

Laos Sells Its Power Abroad While Bills Rise at Home

by Thongsavanh Souvannasane, in Vientiane

Laos, often called the “Battery of Southeast Asia,” sells most of the electricity it makes to neighboring countries, yet its own families pay more for power and face blackouts, as the state power company, Électricité du Laos (EDL), tries to repair its finances.

In 2024, Laos exported enough electricity to power Paris for a year and a half, according to official data cited by AFP. GlobalData said exports rose again in 2025. A former EDL expert estimated that about 80 percent of the power Laos produces is sold abroad.

Most of Laos’s power comes from dams, about 72 percent in 2025, GlobalData said, so supply drops in the dry season from March to August. A World Bank report said Laos has at times been unable to meet both home demand and export contracts, and has bought power from abroad at high cost.

Blackouts also hit hospitals.

Mekong Eye reported that Lao Friends Hospital for Children near Luang Prabang lost power several times a week during heat above 40 degrees Celsius.

Household electricity prices have risen sharply. In July 2025, a household using up to 25 units of electricity a month paid LAK 679 (USD 0.03) per unit, nearly double the LAK 355 (USD 0.01) in January, the Laotian Times reported. Prices keep rising under a 2025-2029 plan to help EDL’s finances.

Prices for housing, water, electricity and gas combined rose 29.6 percent compared with a year earlier, according to the latest Lao Statistics Bureau figures. That group covers several household costs, not just electricity. The research body AMRO estimated

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in 2025 that the electricity price changes could add about 2.4 points to Laos’s inflation rate in 2026.

Exporting power does not necessarily mean EDL earns enough to cover its costs at home.

In 2025, EDL paid an average of about 6.2 US cents for each unit of power but sold it to households for about 3 cents. EDL says it built up large debts by extending power lines to remote villages, where service does not make a profit.

At its annual review in February, EDL said it will adjust prices to better reflect its costs while protecting low-income families, renegotiate what it pays power producers, and restructure its debts with lenders.

The State Inspection Authority told the National Assembly on 8 October that it will keep checking how EDL uses a USD 237.6 million government loan fund. Lawmakers are also considering exempting subsidized household electricity for low-income users from value-added tax, but authorities have not said when.

New Prime Minister Saleumxay Kommasith listed tax collection and a stable currency among his first priorities.

Laos is still building for export. The USD 5 billion Luang Prabang dam on the Mekong River is more than 72 percent built and should start producing power in 2030, mostly for Thailand. Laos and Myanmar have also agreed to study another dam on their shared part of the Mekong.


Thongsavanh is a journalist from Laos with a background in English-language media. He graduated from the Lao-American Institute with a Diploma of the Arts in English and contributes to independent news platforms. His reporting focuses on environmental issues, socio-economic development, and geopolitics.

Editorial Deadline 31/10/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Karen Ysabelle David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk

This week, the Pacific Corridor is a frenzied hub of activity: Singapore is pushing to decarbonize its manufacturing sector; Vietnam is sprinting to realize its double-digit growth ambitions as the end of the year looms; and the Philippines is straining against the limits of migrant protection as the 15-year saga of the Mary Jane Veloso case comes to a close.

There are challenges aplenty. Are millions of Singaporean dollars in funding enough to kickstart decarbonization, all while keeping jobs and investments plentiful? Can Hanoi meet its own fast-approaching deadline without conflating a high disbursement rate with actual productivity and growth? Will Manila learn from the case of Mary Jane Veloso — arrested in Indonesia in 2010 and only recently released — and move to better protect its millions of overseas workers worldwide?

With such a dynamic region, is it any wonder that all three countries are in such frantic motion?

Singapore 🇸🇬

Singapore’s Push to Decarbonize Its Manufacturing Sector

by Jennifer Hui En Tan, in Singapore

As manufacturers face increasing pressure to reduce emissions, developing cleaner industrial technologies is becoming not just an environmental priority, but also a question of investment, productivity, and long-term economic resilience. On 23 October 2026, Singapore announced a SGD143 million Industry Decarbonization Funding Initiative to accelerate the development and commercialization of low-carbon technologies. The initiative aims to help industries reduce their environmental impact while maintaining Singapore’s position as a competitive destination for manufacturing and investment.

Manufacturing contributes around 20% of Singapore’s GDP and employs approximately one-eighth of its workforce. However, industries account for around 65% of the country’s emissions, including those associated with electricity consumption. Reducing these emissions is therefore essential to achieving Singapore’s target of net-zero emissions by 2050.

The challenge is to decarbonize without undermining jobs, investment, and economic growth. Singapore’s limited land and renewable energy resources, alongside the complex energy requirements of its industries, constrain the options available. Technologies developed elsewhere may also require adaptation to local operating conditions.

To address these challenges, up to SGD100 million of the initiative will support the Decarbonization Research for Industry, Ventures, and Enterprise (DRIVE) program. Companies can identify their own decarbonization challenges and collaborate with public research institutions to develop solutions. This approach allows research to be guided by practical industrial needs rather than technological innovation alone.

However, developing promising technologies is only the first step. Five existing low-carbon energy research projects will receive further support under a SGD65 million grant call to scale up their technologies and test them in industrial settings. This funding is intended to help researchers move beyond laboratory experiments toward solutions that can be applied in real-world industrial environments.

Singapore is also developing a Low-Carbon Technology Translational Testbed on Jurong Island, supported by SGD62 million in funding. The facility will allow companies to test emerging technologies under industrial conditions without having to build their own costly pilot facilities. Potential applications include converting carbon dioxide into sustainable aviation fuel and producing hydrogen from ammonia, both of which could help reduce emissions in energy-intensive sectors.

These investments could help Singapore remain attractive to manufacturers and investors as businesses face growing pressure to lower their emissions. Yet funding alone will not guarantee success. Technologies must demonstrate that they can operate reliably at scale and reduce emissions at commercially viable costs. Singapore must also maintain reliable energy supplies and competitive operating costs, particularly for energy-intensive industries.

The implications extend beyond Singapore. Its research institutions, financing ecosystem, and industrial test facilities could help connect technology developers, investors, and manufacturers across Southeast Asia. Manufacturing-intensive economies such as Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, and Indonesia may benefit from regional partnerships, although their differing energy mixes, infrastructure, and financial capabilities mean that solutions will need to be adapted to local conditions.

Ultimately, Singapore’s decarbonization efforts will be measured not by the amount of funding committed, but by whether research translates into technologies that industries can adopt at scale. If successful, the initiative could strengthen Singapore’s manufacturing competitiveness while contributing to Southeast Asia’s wider transition toward a lower-carbon economy.


Jennifer is a final-year International Relations student at the Singapore Institute of Management, where she focuses on political engagement, diplomacy, and community governance. She is an active volunteer in her constituency, working closely with residents to understand local concerns, facilitate dialogue, and support community initiatives.

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Vietnam 🇻🇳

The Last Sprint Beyond a Numerical Rate

by Thao-My Mai Vu, in Ho Chi Minh City

As 2026 draws to a close, Vietnam is racing against the clock to realize its double-digit growth ambitions. Recent momentum seems promising: GDP growth accelerated to 9.95% for Q3, bringing its nine-month growth to 9.01%. Yet, closing the remaining gap now hinges on public investment — one of the most feasible levers that the government can pull within weeks without a heavy reliance on market conditions, consumer spending, or external factors. While disbursement has reached a record high (roughly 64.6% of the plan assigned by the Prime Minister for 2026), the strain is most acute regarding the remaining VND360.9 trillion that must be deployed within the last two months. 1,131 stalled projects, worth around VND779 trillion, remain unresolved amid deficiencies in planning, land access, site clearance, and materials supply.

In this context, mounting pressure may yield tangible benefits. It incentivizes authorities to resolve regulatory bottlenecks and unblock delayed works, which in turn drives a nationwide surge in infrastructure building, particularly in key transport projects. In fact, funds are being reallocated from slow-moving projects to projects with good disbursement rates, which may improve efficiency.

At the same time, this strategy warrants great caution, since a high disbursement rate does not necessarily facilitate productive growth, especially under time pressure. Much of the fastest-disbursing expenditure in the first nine months, such as in Vietnam’s two mega-cities — Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City — was attributed to land clearance, compensation, resettlement, and infrastructure relocation. Year-end figures may thus swell without a substantial increase in finished work. This shortcoming has been acknowledged, yet the new official scoring system still adopts a performance measure based on the disbursement rate.

Such a ‘disbursement race’ may, without rigorous oversight, prioritize low-value projects that are easier to fund over those offering longer-term economic returns. Moreover, it can also lead officials to overlook the voices of affected residents: Ho Chi Minh City, for instance, has urged people to hand over land early to keep projects on schedule, risking the marginalization of their grievances.

The central question for Vietnam at the moment, therefore, should no longer be about the feasibility of a double-digit target, but more about the rate of productivity and tangibility induced from this growth in the longer term.


Thao-My is a young researcher focusing on small-power statecraft, Vietnam-Cambodia relations, and the politics of water infrastructure in the Greater Mekong Subregion. As Vietnam’s Student Delegate to the Raisina Dialogue in New Delhi, she contributed to global dialogues on multilateral reforms and bridging the North-South divide from a Southeast Asian perspective. She also has professional experience in policy advocacy and government affairs.

The Philippines 🇵🇭

Mary Jane Veloso and the Strained Limits of Migrant Protection

by Glenn Vincent N. Boquilon, in Makati City

Mary Jane Veloso’s release in September 2026 marked the end of a long legal ordeal that began with her arrest in Indonesia in 2010. After spending nearly 15 years in detention, she returned to the Philippines in December 2024 to serve the remainder of her sentence. President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. granted her an absolute pardon on 25 September, allowing her to walk free.

Her case is more than a story of individual freedom. It highlights the difficult relationship between overseas employment, human trafficking, and the responsibility of governments to protect their citizens abroad.

Veloso was arrested after Indonesian authorities found heroin in her luggage. She maintained that she had been deceived by recruiters and did not know she was carrying illegal drugs. Her case drew international attention in 2015, when she received a last-minute reprieve from execution following diplomatic appeals by the Philippine government.

Her eventual return also demonstrated the importance of bilateral diplomacy. An agreement reached between Manila and Jakarta in 2024 allowed her to serve her sentence in the Philippines. The pardon brought another resolution, a case shaped by two countries’ legal systems and years of negotiations.

For the Philippines, the case carries implications beyond diplomacy. Millions of Filipinos seek employment overseas while often relying on recruiters and intermediaries to access opportunities abroad. When these arrangements involve deception or exploitation, workers can face serious legal and personal consequences in countries where they may have limited support networks.

This makes migrant protection a governance issue. Assistance cannot begin only after a worker is arrested or placed in danger. Recruitment oversight, access to legal assistance, and coordination between Philippine diplomatic missions and host governments are equally important.

The case also has wider relevance for Southeast Asia, where workers regularly cross borders for employment. Regional cooperation on ethical recruitment and human trafficking investigations could help address risks that no single government can manage alone.

Ultimately, the measure of migrant protection is not only whether governments can bring citizens home. It is whether they can prevent exploitation, secure fair treatment abroad, and ensure that workers are not left to navigate complex legal systems alone.

Mary Jane Veloso is free. The bigger challenge is ensuring that fewer migrant workers find themselves in similar circumstances.


Glenn holds a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from the University of Santo Tomas. His experience spans governance programs, policy development, and political research, having worked with the Ateneo School of Government and WR Numero Research on projects focused on electoral reform, public opinion, and regional development. He also helped coordinate the drafting of the Bangsamoro Local Government Code and supported the Academy of Multiparty Democracy.

Editorial Deadline 27/10/2025 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

By Siu Tzyy Wei, Lead Editor - Maritime Crescent Desk

This week, we look at what gets put on record, and what must still be accounted for.

Malaysia’s deaths in custody raise urgent questions about police accountability and the institutions responsible for protecting the public. Meanwhile, Brunei’s relationship with the European Union presents opportunities to turn diplomatic engagement into more substantive cooperation. In the meantime, as Indonesia moves into its second year with the Prabowo administration, colours that once resembled rivalry unite the people of Yogyakarta in memory and in honour of their struggles as a society.

Whether through the commitments governments make or the cases they must answer for, the record matters. So does what happens after it is written.

Malaysia 🇲🇾

To “Kill” A Jailbird

by Sydney Gan, in Kuala Lumpur

On September 9th, Noorizwan Zulkefly was brought into the Cheras police headquarters on suspicion of drug possession, housebreaking, and theft. Eleven days later, he was found dead in detention. His autopsy revealed no harm to his internal organs, but found multiple external bodily injuries. The final cause of death remains uncertified. Since then, Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, in a rare acknowledgement of custodial deaths, has ordered the Inspector-General of Police to conduct a transparent probe into Noorizwan’s case.

Alleged police brutality is unfortunately one that Malaysians know all too well. Last year, a staggering total of 42 deaths in custody were recorded - a 2021 study found that victims of custodial deaths were mostly males with a mean and median age of 37 years. More than half were found to be of Malay/Bumiputera descent, but Indian Malaysians are known to be over-represented in police custody deaths. For many custodial cases, inquests often attributed deaths to natural causes (most, like asthma, jaundice, and tuberculosis, treatable with medical intervention), suicide, and drug overdoses, but none truly align with the miscarriage of justice experienced behind closed doors.

Interventions and investigation protocols in place, namely referrals to the Independent Policy Conduct Commission (IPCC), are lacklustre and toothless mechanisms that serve as a bureaucratic buffer against true accountability - a lazy stopgap to pacify dissenters and human rights groups. Since the IPCC’s inception under the Independent Police Conduct Commission Act 2022, civil society organizations have criticized the Commission for its lack of independent oversight, as its membership charter allows police officers to be part of the investigation processes.

The Bar Council also highlighted the Commission’s lack of meaningful investigative and disciplinary powers, which, more often than not, results in a deference to the Police Force Commission, completely undermining the purpose of a third-party investigative body. It is also important to note that where the IPCC successfully makes a case for police misconduct, any recommendations issued are not legally obliged to be acted upon. It is therefore no surprise that most police officers found responsibility easily sidestep prosecution; this reflects a larger systemic failing, one that policymakers seem to be disinterested in addressing meaningfully.

Legislative reform must come in the shape of dedicated regulation shaped around custodial rights and welfare. Malaysia currently does not have sufficient legal safeguards in place to report the infringement of such rights, much less proactively prevent them. As such, the nation must look towards a non-negotiable statutory duty of investigation, held independently from the police, and to consider the appointment of an impartial, third-party human rights watchdog who has the power to enforce accountability on the currently ungovernable authorities.

Noorizwan’s unjustifiable death sparked a nationwide conversation on custodial deaths that has empowered more families of other victims to demand answers from the police. As policy discussions regarding police authority and accountability continue to develop, this is a key opportunity for Anwar’s Unity Government to make good on reform promises and deliver tangible changes to the corrupt norm of the police system.


Sydney holds a Bachelor of Laws from King’s College London, where she focused on Human Rights Law, Criminology, and Public & Administrative Law. She is an Analyst at Asia Group Advisors, providing policy analysis and strategic guidance across the tech, sustainability, and gaming sectors in Southeast Asia. Prior to joining AGA, she worked in the social development sector in London, contributing to the Ukraine Judicial Training Programme through research on war crimes adjudication and the development of a legal training curriculum with high court magistrates.

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Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳

Can Brunei Turn Europe’s Interest into Opportunity?

by Syimah Johari, in Bandar Seri Begawan

In September 2026, The European Union (EU) and the Philippines reached a substantial agreement, reflecting bilateral efforts to diversify their economic relationships amid growing global trade uncertainty. The agreement aims to strengthen trade and investment ties while building more resilient supply chains. As global trade becomes less predictable, the EU is also looking to deepen its economic engagement with Southeast Asia.

For Brunei Darussalam, this presents a question: how can it turn Europe’s growing interest in the region into opportunities for its own economic diversification?

Brunei has already taken steps to strengthen its relationship with the EU. In April 2026, the country hosted the 25th ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting, which emphasised the need to deepen trade and investment cooperation between the regions. Both sides identified areas such as digital trade, green technologies and supply-chain resilience as priorities for further cooperation. These discussions provide a starting point for Brunei to explore how closer ties with Europe could support its economic development.

Closer relations with the EU could support Brunei’s efforts to reduce its reliance on oil and gas. European businesses could bring investment, technology and expertise that help Brunei develop other industries. For example, Brunei could explore opportunities to work with European partners in renewable energy, or by developing more products from its existing resources, as it looks to develop new areas of economic activity.

Digital development offers another opportunity. Cooperation with European businesses and institutions could strengthen Brunei’s digital capabilities and develop the skills needed to support technology-related services. This would help local businesses adapt to a changing economy and allow Brunei to build on opportunities beyond its traditional energy sector.

However, closer diplomatic relations do not necessarily guarantee that European businesses will invest in Brunei. Businesses will need to see clear benefits in operating here, including good infrastructure, a suitable business environment and access to skilled workers. Brunei therefore needs to consider what it can offer European partners and how it can make investing in the country worthwhile.

The EU’s growing interest in Southeast Asia could create opportunities for Brunei, but the latter will need to take steps to benefit from it. Closer relations are a good starting point, but what matters is whether Brunei can turn these ties into tangible investments, new industries, and jobs. By focusing on areas where it has potential to grow, Brunei can use its relationship with the EU to support its efforts to diversify the economy.

Ultimately, the EU’s growing engagement with the region offers Brunei an opportunity to strengthen its economic partnerships and support its diversification ambitions. The challenge is turning diplomatic goodwill into tangible outcomes. By targeting sectors that complement its existing strengths while developing new capabilities, Brunei can make closer relations with Europe a more practical part of its long-term economic strategy.


Syimah is a graduate of King’s College London with a BA in International Relations. With a strong focus on diplomacy, regional cooperation, and development policy, she is passionate about contributing to meaningful change through public service. Currently, she is involved in poverty alleviation work through a local NGO.

Indonesia 🇮🇩

Colours Speak

by Amallia Utami

October 28 marks Hari Sumpah Pemuda (Youth Pledge Day). This year, the date coincides with the second year of President Prabowo Subianto and Vice President Gibran Rakabuming’s administration, and a demonstration is scheduled to take place in Yogyakarta. Ahead of the event, the colours green, blue, and red have appeared as symbols associated with the demonstration.

Under normal circumstances, these colours represent the three football clubs in Yogyakarta: blue for PSIM, green for PSS Sleman, and red for Persiba Bantul. Although the clubs themselves have not issued official statements, the colours appearing together have been interpreted as a sign of unity among their supporters in expressing concerns shared by the wider public.

These colours have long represented rivalry between the clubs’ supporters. However, following the Kanjuruhan tragedy, which killed 135 people at Kanjuruhan Stadium in Malang, East Java, they have also become associated with solidarity. Colours have appeared in other protests in Indonesia, including “hero green” and “brave pink,” which gained attention in early September 2025 alongside calls for the government to meet 17 short-term and eight long-term demands.

“Brave pink” was inspired by a woman in a pink hijab who stood at the front of a protest on August 28, 2025, and became associated with courage and empathy. “Hero green” takes its name from the jacket worn by motorcycle taxi driver Affan Kurniawan, who was killed when a tactical vehicle operated by the Indonesian National Police’s Mobile Brigade Corps (Brimob) ran over him on August 28, 2025. Since then, this leaf-like green has become a symbol of solidarity and the struggles of precariats. Black has an even longer history in Aksi Kamisan, where it has been used since 2007 to express mourning for victims of serious human rights violations in Indonesia, including journalists, students, and activists.

People may take part in demonstrations for different reasons, including their connection with fellow supporters or their concern about public issues. These reasons can bring them together around a shared understanding of the problems they face and the values they want to defend. Participants do not need to express their concerns in exactly the same way, and a shared symbol, like colours, can help them find common ground even when their reasons for joining differ.

These examples show how colours can become a form of expression in activism (and digital activism) that is easy to recognize and share. Their meanings develop through events, experiences, and struggles that people remember together.


Amallia is a media and culture graduate from the University of Glasgow with experience in journalism and creative writing. Her interests lie in democracy, media and communication, particularly how contemporary media environments shape self-censorship, misinformation, and disinformation.

Editorial Deadline 24/10/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk

Every government holds a few cards it would rather not play, and this week three of them reached for theirs, each for a different reason. In Myanmar, the junta played its most loaded one: after five years of silence, it let Kim Aris speak to his mother, Aung San Suu Kyi, for 20 minutes, a call critics read as a last-resort bid for legitimacy, with a clock on the table to remind everyone who controls the time. Thailand did the opposite, pulling a card back before it landed. Its proposed departure tax, meant to raise 12 billion baht a year, was shelved within weeks once tourism groups warned of 1.5 million fewer visitors, a reminder that a card played at the wrong moment can cost more than it earns. Cambodia, meanwhile, put its whole hand down, unveiling a 2026-2030 strategy for the small businesses that make up over 99% of its economy, though critics are already eyeing a $4,000 export licence and a 31-member steering committee as the cards that could beat it.

Myanmar 🇲🇲

Isolated Junta Finally Plays Suu Kyi Card: Desperate for Recognition?

by Ley Hlaing

The Myanmar regime has eventually taken out the Suu Kyi card in the game, as an attempt to reassure diplomatic survival. Despite the fact that the move is sort of replaying to the old playbook like in the 2000s, this time, the Myanmar generals seem to be out of any other card and at the same time, very desperate for the legitimacy and recognition of the international community, though analysts would argue there might be other external driving forces of this ploy.

On October 22, 2026, the younger son of Aung San Suu Kyi, Kim Aris who has been trying to contact and speaking out as “proof of life’ for his mother for so long, announced that he got to have a 20-minute call at the Burmese Embassy in London with his mother on his facebook, which has been a significant news over the week in Myanmar. For the first time in five years, the mother-son reunion for 20 minutes spread out around the world. She has been unlawfully detained since the first day of the coup in February 2021 and also has been severely isolated with the rest of the world by the Myanmar military. While this news is such a relief for her son and the people of Myanmar whose hearts that she won for years, this is, however, a strategic playcard for the military and the self proclaimed president Min Aung Hlaing whom the regime itself finally allowed this to happen with political machination and malicious intent behind it. The reason is very simple; because the Myanmar military and its new regime has been encountering serious suffocations politically, economically and diplomatically, taking out Suu Kyi play card must have been the last choice of theirs and eventually became a reality as a “political calculation”.

Actually, there have been a couple of times that the regime tried to spot Suu Kyi back on the light within only 2026, which obviously only for the sake of their interest and political profit over the move, starting from moving to the house arrest in April; allowing meeting with the representative of the Red Cross releasing press photos in August; and to recently, three days before letting her speak with her son, the spokeswoman of the regime issued a statement that they have delivered two books and two letters sent by the King Charles of England to Aung San Suu Kyi.

The incidents reveal a magnificent truth that Aung San Suu Kyi remains being the most important person in Myanmar’s political landscape, her role and existence is still significant as always and the uniformed generals are still in fear of the lady who dresses the Longgyi. Furthermore, having played out as the last card, there also emerged a serious jealousy and hatred over the 81-year-old lady by the Myanmar military community, especially Min Aung Hlaing and his allies. This can be evident with two points; first, in the released photos of Aung San Suu Kyi talking with her son, there is a clock in the table which underscores that her communication is rigidly limited, monitored, and entirely at the mercy of the military authorities.

Secondly, in the issued statement about King Charles’ gifts and letters to Suu Kyi, the regime spokeswoman, Khaing Khaing Soe, used the specific words like “အထူးအကျဉ်းသူ ဒေါ်စုကြည်” (“Special Prisoner Daw Suu Kyi”- directly translated in Burmese/English) which frustrated a significant number of Myanmar public.

Suu Kyi’s son’s efforts have finally paid off and on the phone call with his mother, he also noted she is facing some health challenges. On his facebook post, he mentioned that it is still important to see his mother totally free and a few minutes of speaking is not enough. Arguably, external factors, most notably shifting diplomatic positions from neighboring China, might heavily drive this sudden pivot. Subsequently, in April 2026, Chinese spokesperson, who rarely talked about her over the years, publicly referred to Suu Kyi as an “old friend of China,” signaling Beijing’s desire for a mediated stabilization of the country’s civil conflict, where the military continues to lose territory to ethnic armed groups.

Ironically, this is not the first time happening like this, the uniformed generals, former regime leaders like Than Shwe and the civilian transformed president Thein Sein have done the same as the last attempt after serious diplomatic isolation and loss of control. Those previous attempts have worked out for them with releasing sanctions. This is not a pity by the regime but a strategic attempt to gain profit by the military, serving as a desperate act of hostage diplomacy that the international community must firmly reject rather than reward with undeserved legitimacy.

Ley Hlaing is a former Political Science student from the University of Yangon, Myanmar. Currently, he is pursuing his BA at Parami University with a major in Philosophy, Politics and Economics. His academic and professional interests span community development, literature, minority issues, and social impact research. Having held roles as Research Assistant, Student Mentor, and Facilitator for local initiatives, he has constantly supported project management in literature and education programs in Myanmar.

Thailand 🇹🇭

Thailand Defers Planned Tourism Tax to Ease Peak-Season Concerns

by Pathom Sangwongwanich, in Bangkok

Thai Finance Minister Ekniti Nitithanprapas announced Thailand will defer the introduction of a proposed departure tax imposed on international outbound travelers to maintain tourism recovery momentum in this year’s final quarter, a move that follows citizens’ outcry and vehement pushback from tourism bodies.

“We have discussed this with the Revenue Department and decided that we probably will not proceed with it for now because we want tourism to continue moving forward,” Ekniti said. “We want to build on the positive response to the World Bank and IMF meetings. People around the world want to return, so we want to maintain this positive atmosphere.”

The Ministry of Finance previously spearheaded a proposed departure tax, also known as exit fee, to bolster long-term fiscal space and credit ratings, with a goal of generating roughly 12 billion baht annually. Under the draft law, travelers would be required to pay the tax every time they depart Thailand at a rate which would be set by a ministerial regulation, capped at 5,000 baht per trip. The initial rate was reported to be 1,000 baht for air travel, while departures by land and sea would initially be exempt. The Revenue Department, an entity under the Ministry of Finance, opened the public consultation on September 30, with comments accepted until October 29 via a government website.

The move was met with waves of pushback and criticisms from tourism bodies and local citizens, with the former warning how the tax would have potential hurdles for Thailand’s aviation and tourism hub ambitions. The proposed exit fee tax could increase the cost for tourists by 10%, potentially resulting in a 5.4% decrease in foreign tourist arrivals, or a loss of 1.5 million people, which would eventually result in a potential loss of around 75 billion baht in tourism revenue, according to the Association of Thai Travel Agents.

The Ministry of Finance’s proposed tax policy underscores the government’s urgent search for new fiscal buffers to safeguard public finances. Driven by multi-decade budget deficits and the rising costs of healthcare and social security for an aging population, new revenue streams have become essential. In June, Ekniti told parliament that the fiscal 2027 budget (October 2026 – September 2027) would reach 3.79 trillion baht. He noted that another deficit is necessary to stimulate the economy, even as opposition lawmakers expressed concern that increased borrowing and lagging revenues could push public debt beyond the 70% ceiling.

At the same time, the friction between revenue collection and tourism competitiveness highlights a delicate balancing act. Since tourism is a critical pillar of Thailand’s economy, any policy that risks dampening visitor demand warrants careful scrutiny — especially with peak travel season underway. Ultimately, the tax policy presents a difficult trade-off: higher travel costs could lead foreign tourists to choose alternative destinations or delay their trips, while the policy itself threatens to undermine broader ambitions to establish Thailand as a regional tourism and aviation hub.

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Cambodia 🇰🇭

What Is Cambodia’s National Strategy on MSME Development 2026-2030 About?

by Sokna Thea, in Phnom Penh

Cambodia launched its National Strategy on Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise (MSME) Development 2026-2030 on Oct. 22, 2026. The plan aims to strengthen local businesses, support Cambodia’s graduation from Least Developed Country (LDC) status in 2029, and help the country become a high-income economy by 2050. Its four strategic pillars aim to make Cambodia’s 753,670 economic establishments, more than 99% of which are MSMEs employing 2,980,569 workers, more competitive and better positioned to drive local growth and regional trade.

Across ASEAN, MSMEs account for 97.2% to 99.9% of all businesses and contribute 44.8% of regional production. In Cambodia, they contribute approximately 63% of non-agricultural GDP and employ more than 70% of the non-agricultural workforce. Yet only 0.76% of domestic SMEs export directly, generating $2.955 billion in registered export revenue, or 16.53% of national exports. To close this gap, the strategy requires foreign-invested manufacturing companies to source at least 25% of their inputs locally. It also aims to connect at least 50 domestic MSMEs directly with export-oriented foreign-invested firms as suppliers and expand MSME exports to at least 50 product categories annually by 2030.

The strategy also encourages businesses to register formally, addressing an informal economy that employs nearly 6.2 million people across 86.6% of unregistered businesses. The government is simplifying registration through the Cambodia Data Exchange (CamDX) platform and a unified Single Portal system. Registered MSMEs can access tax deductions in six priority sectors, including agro-industry, food processing, consumer goods, tourism, and IT, as well as import duty exemptions for production machinery and raw materials. By 2030, local MSMEs are also expected to supply at least 50% of domestic demand for 15 strategic products. National branding standards, including “Made in Cambodia” and “Product of Cambodia,” support efforts to replace imports with locally made goods.

To improve access to funding, the strategy brings together financial institutions and government agencies. Women account for 1,841,362 of the 2,980,569 MSME workers, or approximately 61.8%. Support measures include low-interest loans, matching grants, and provincial Women’s Development Centers. Key institutions include the SME Bank of Cambodia, the Agricultural and Rural Development Bank (ARDB), the Credit Guarantee Corporation of Cambodia (CGCC), and Khmer Enterprise (KE). The plan also promotes digital adoption through the CamInvoice electronic invoicing system and enables high-growth businesses to raise capital through listings on the SME Board of the Cambodia Securities Exchange (CSX).

However, the strategy faces practical challenges. In an August 2026 Cambodianess commentary, social enterprise owner Kurt Harrison said his business was quoted around $4,000 for an export licence, making an overseas order unprofitable. The case highlights how high export costs can block small businesses from international markets. Separately, Kiripost reported analyst Chey Tech’s warning that a 31-member steering committee involving more than 10 ministries could complicate decisions and delay reforms. These concerns raise questions about whether Cambodia can reduce export costs and bureaucratic barriers to help MSMEs grow.

Sokna has a background in International Affairs and Business & Commercial Law. He’s currently a Senior Project Coordinator at the Ministry of Economy and Finance of Cambodia, working on the Financial Management Information System (FMIS) Project. His professional focus is driven by entrepreneurship, business development, and financial technology, with a particular interest in how private-sector innovation drives Cambodia’s economic growth.

Lao PDR 🇱🇦

What Laos’ 2025 Census Means for the Region

by Souriya Bounpaseuth, in Vientiane

Laos has just released the results of its 2025 Population and Housing Census, the country’s fifth and the first collected digitally. Announced on 20 October, it estimates 7.24 million residents, after a follow-up survey added about 497,000 people to the 6.74 million initially counted.

Annual growth fell to 1.1 percent, less than half the 2.5 percent peak of 1985–1995. Births dropped from 28 to 18.1 per 1,000 people in a decade, and median age rose from 18.5 in 2005 to 27. The working-age share is now 65.0 percent, and the dependency ratio has fallen from 76.4 to 53.8. The growth is uneven. Attapeu and Xekong are expanding at close to 3 percent a year, while Champasak and Savannakhet show little growth.

UNFPA’s representative in Laos said these shifts can create economic opportunities, but that planning must estimate the investment needed in education, health, skills, employment and social protection. Census materials add that the gains depend partly on whether people find stable, adequately paid work.

Demographic change is reshaping the whole region. An ASEAN–UNFPA forum in November 2025 described rapid fertility declines, longer lives, urbanisation and rising mobility across Southeast Asia, with age structures shifting at different speeds. The ASEAN Secretary-General stressed coordinated demographic planning across the Community.

Labour mobility is where Laos’ numbers meet the region. Ministry figures show 708,751 Lao workers took jobs abroad between 2016 and 2026, 672,936 of them in Thailand. In July, Thailand’s cabinet extended work permits for about 770,000 migrant workers from Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam to ensure an adequate workforce for manufacturing and services. Lao migrant workers sent home an estimated USD 500 million in the first seven months of 2026, up 36.6 percent from a year earlier, according to the Lao Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare.

Laos’ growing working-age share is in demand both abroad and at home. In Laos, National Assembly members have raised concerns about workers leaving, citing high living costs, a weakening kip and wages that do not match expenses, and a ministry working group is assessing labour needs.

The census gives Laos a demographic opening. According to documents shared by the Lao Statistics Bureau and UNFPA, the benefits depend partly on whether people can find stable jobs and earn enough to support their families.

Editorial Deadline 24/10/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Karen Ysabelle David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk

Diplomacy has often been likened to a dance: careful, choreographed, and when done well, graceful. But a single misstep, a single missed beat, and the entire dance becomes a disaster. This week in the Pacific Corridor, Manila and Hanoi find themselves dancing to two very different tunes with two very different partners.

For the Philippines, its dance partner is an unyielding China, and the music is discordant indeed: the Chinese ambassador’s recent threatening remarks have resulted in a diplomatic debacle and again stoked tensions over the two countries’ maritime dispute in the South China Sea. In contrast, Vietnam is dancing gracefully in time with Denmark, as General Secretary and President To Lam’s state visit to Copenhagen signals deeper bilateral cooperation in green energy and security.

Singapore’s concerns this week are closer to home: the city-state must deal with an ongoing disability employment retention gap. Policies are already in place, but full inclusion still has a long way to go as realities on the ground wait to catch up.

The Philippines 🇵🇭

China’s Strategic Ratcheting of the Philippines

by Arianne De Guzman, in Bulacan

On 19 October 2026, the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) Secretary Ma. Theresa Lazaro summoned Chinese Ambassador Jing Quan following his remarks on 15 October that China could “easily win” a confrontation with the Philippines, but that they preferred peace. President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. condemned the statement as “undiplomatic,” with Chinese Ambassador Jing responding that China could retaliate by declaring them as persona non grata.

Beyond the diplomatic fallout amidst the tensions over competing maritime claims in the area of the South China Sea that the Philippines calls the West Philippine Sea, the Philippines wrestles with the pressure exerted by China to defend its sovereign rights, even without the former’s initiation of outright military conflict.

According to Haroro Ingram, a Senior Associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, China’s tactics illustrate a pattern called “strategic ratcheting,” whereby China uses different forms of pressure to limit the Philippines’ choices. The approach does not necessitate force to achieve China’s objectives; instead, they deploy their coast guard and strengthen their military presence and diplomatic message to make resistance more challenging or costly for the Philippines. Chinese Ambassador Jing’s recent remarks is military intimidation, which is instrumental to shaping political calculations even if force is not used.

While the 2016 arbitral ruling reinforced the Philippines’ legal position, China’s aggressive rejection of the ruling implies that legal victories alone cannot ensure compliance nor dictate behavior. In the past few years, China’s campaign of unlawful and maritime coercion in the Philippines has intensified. The Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative has tracked high levels of maritime activities, such as the deployment of floating objects, including buoys and floating barriers; the installation of temporary structures; and the increased presence of the China Coast Guard.

China has engaged in a multifaceted effort to employ deceptive and coercive activities, such as cyber-operations on Philippine government networks and China-linked intelligence operations to recruit government officials. Though below the threshold of armed conflict, both additional tactics are also designed to exploit identified vulnerabilities and collective private information, aiding them in altering behavior and norms in the Philippines.

The threat is not only to peace and security, but also to shared values and trust. For the Philippines, the challenge is to ensure that repeated coercion does not gradually redefine what it can defend, where it can operate, and how firmly it can assert its rights.

International legal recognition must be translated into stronger maritime enforcement, strengthened safeguards against foreign interference, and coordination with ASEAN member states to make it clear that coercive actions have diplomatic consequences.


Arianne has experience in policy research at De La Salle University’s Jesse M. Robredo Institute of Governance, where she contributed to projects on systemic reform. She earned a degree in Political Science from Colegio de San Juan de Letran. Currently, she works in government relations, specializing in advocacy strategy, legislative monitoring, and stakeholder engagement.

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Vietnam 🇻🇳

Vietnam’s Nordic Overture

by Hang Nguyen, in Ho Chi Minh City

As relations between larger powers grow harder to predict, smaller states such as Vietnam have an evident interest in broadening their pool of partners, a posture consistent with the multilateralism General Secretary and President To Lam emphasized in Copenhagen. His 19 to 21 October state visit to Denmark fits this diplomatic agenda. Vietnam’s ambassador in Copenhagen noted that it is the first state visit to Denmark by a Vietnamese Party General Secretary and the only state visit the kingdom will host in 2026, which places the trip above routine courtesy.

The ceremonial elements carried considerable symbolic weight given the two countries’ shared history. On 19 October, King Frederik X conferred the Order of the Elephant on Mr. Lam, a high-ranking honor reserved for royals and foreign heads of state, to mark 55 years of diplomatic relations. Denmark was among the first Western European countries to establish diplomatic relations with Hanoi in 1971, while the Vietnam War was still under way, and Mr. Lam drew on that record in a speech at the University of Copenhagen to argue for a more ambitious relationship going forward.

The concrete proposal was to upgrade the Green Strategic Partnership, established in 2023, into a framework he described as more comprehensive and strategic. As of 2023, Denmark had signed such partnerships with only five countries, Vietnam among them. The economic rationale rests on complementary strengths: the Danish Energy Agency has estimated Vietnam’s technical offshore wind potential at 160 gigawatts, while Denmark leads in the technology itself. Mr. Lam also invited the University of Copenhagen to open a campus in Vietnam and proposed Danish involvement in planning the ASEAN Power Grid. The Vietnam News Agency reported that roughly 150 Danish companies already operate in the country, making Denmark its third-largest European investor.

A more subtle security dimension runs underneath the cooperation proposal. Mr. Lam expressed hope that Denmark would support freedom of navigation under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), a phrase commonly read as a reference to the South China Sea territorial disputes, and described each country as the other’s gateway to ASEAN and the European Union (EU). For Hanoi, a partner such as Denmark, which has no stake in the dispute, may offer diplomatic backing for rules-based maritime norms at limited risk of provoking either larger power, while Copenhagen gains a foothold in a fast-growing ASEAN economy.

However, several limits apply. Denmark’s capacity to influence the South China Sea balance is modest, and as of 20 October, the coverage reviewed does not indicate that a formal upgrade has been announced. Much of the available reporting originates from Vietnamese state media, leaving Copenhagen’s own priorities only partially visible. The delegation proceeds to the EU and Belgium, which suggests Denmark may function as a template for Hanoi’s broader European approach.

In that sense, the visit’s significance may rest on the signal it sends more than on what Denmark can deliver directly. A green, technology-oriented partnership with a respected small state adds stability to Hanoi’s foreign policy portfolio, though whether the ceremony translates into binding commitments remains to be seen.


Hang is a young researcher with academic experience in Vietnam and the United States. She has previously worked in public relations at the U.S. Consulate General in Ho Chi Minh City and the YSEALI Academy. Her research focuses on ASEAN centrality in the evolving Asia-Pacific landscape, with particular attention to Vietnam’s approach to trade, regional cooperation, and political economy in the face of external power dynamics and global volatility.

Singapore 🇸🇬

Hiring Is Only Half the Job: Singapore’s Disability Employment Retention Gap

by Ryan

Singapore has made hiring people with disabilities a settled policy priority, but a statistic released for the first time in July suggests that getting a job and keeping one are separate problems. According to Ministry of Manpower data cited by The Straits Times, only about one in four employed residents with disabilities worked for the same employer for at least a year as of 2025. The Singapore National Employers Federation, by contrast, puts the share of local employees who stay that long at between 85% and 89%. SG Enable, the national disability agency, conceded the figure sits below the overall workforce and means few such workers stay long enough to build a sustainable career.

The gap sits awkwardly beside real progress on participation. The employment rate of people with disabilities rose from 28.2% in 2018/2019 to 34.7% in 2024/2025, according to Malay Mail, and the Enabling Masterplan 2030 targets 40% by the end of the decade. The Straits Times reporting shows what such aggregates can hide. Muhammad Nafiz Sulaiman, a 19-year-old with autism, completed a horticulture course, worked with a job coach, and interned for three months at a hydroponic farm, yet was not offered a full-time role because his employer felt he lacked initiative, which his mother attributed to difficulties with communication. Workplace dynamics and missing accommodations, rather than competence at the task, appear to be the fault line.

The task force report released on 4 October seems to recognize this. The Taskforce on Assurance for Families with Persons with Disabilities proposes an Employment Support Office offering longer-term career support, and beginning in 2028, job support for workers with higher support needs will run beyond the current one year. Three existing employer schemes will merge into a single Enabling Employment Grant, expected in the first half of 2027, after employers said they struggled to identify the right grant and file multiple applications. SG Enable will also extend its Sector Train-and-Place program from hospitality into five more sectors, with a goal of 800 placements between 2026 and 2030.

Measurement remains the weaker link. The Straits Times notes that Japan breaks retention down by intellectual, physical, mental, and developmental disabilities, a granularity Singapore lacks. The Disabled People’s Association has urged that employment retention and under-employment be added to the Masterplan’s indicators alongside the 40% target. A Singapore Management University survey, Engage.Me, similarly found goodwill toward workers with disabilities to be high but the supporting systems weak, with many workers and employers unaware of existing grants. A headline employment rate rewards entry; it cannot say whether a worker is still there next year.

Singapore’s question is also the region’s. The United Nations Development Programme reports that labor force participation among persons with disabilities across ASEAN is two to six times lower than for those without disabilities, even as Thailand’s quota system, Philippine tax incentives, and Malaysia’s 1% public sector target have opened doors. Malaysia’s human resources minister told Parliament that 68,191 persons with disabilities were placed in private sector jobs between 2023 and May 2026, yet a Nippon Foundation survey of seven ASEAN countries found that some workers are given limited responsibilities once hired.

Quotas can compel a hiring decision and grants can subsidize it, but the supervisor who explains the next task, the colleague who waits for a reply, and the manager who redesigns a shift decide whether anyone stays. Across ASEAN, inclusion will be settled less in ministries than at the workstation.


Ryan is a final-year finance student at the Singapore University of Social Sciences (SUSS) with experience across venture capital, venture debt, and business development. He also holds a diploma in Law and Management from Temasek Polytechnic. His interests lie in how emerging technologies and economic trends shape business ecosystems and regional development in Asia.

Editorial Deadline 20/10/2025 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Siu Tzyy Wei, Lead Editor - Maritime Crescent Desk

This week, the Maritime Crescent feels just a little too similar to The Hunger Games.

On one side, a porch: Brunei and Singapore mark fifty years of diplomatic relations, like two rocking chairs that have creaked in rhythm for decades. Behind them, a forest fire audaciously blazes on, a perfect imagery of Indonesia entering its second year with Prabowo in lead. As the result of the ongoing haze crisis, Malaysia, on the other side, struggles between diplomacy and sovereignty.

Fifty years of calm takes steady upkeep, and it is worth noticing who has kept up theirs. The smoke, like the Games, doesn’t wait for volunteers.

Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳

Brunei and Singapore at Fifty: A Lasting Defence Partnership

by Wira Gregory Ejau, in Bandar Seri Begawan

On 10 October, His Majesty Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah and Prime Minister Lawrence Wong attended a joint parade at the Muara Naval Base. This marked fifty years of defence relations, featuring 256 personnel and assets from both countries’ armed forces. The anniversary commemorates a peacetime partnership forged through cooperation and resilience, and reinforced by a shared commitment to regional stability amid successive shifts in Southeast Asia’s strategic landscape.​‌

The Royal Brunei Armed Forces (RBAF) and the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) began their formal defence relations in 1976, eight years before Brunei would resume full independence. For Brunei and Singapore, military links were always an important precursor to the diplomatic relations of the two countries. Singapore’s first Chief of Defence Force, Winston Choo, trained at the Federation Military College in Port Dickson alongside the officers who would become the RBAF’s first commander and Brunei’s first Deputy Minister of Defence.

The relationship of the two countries is sustained through its material foundations and subsequent durability. Temburong provides training space that Singapore requires, while both armed forces continue to face constraints, highlighted about a decade ago from today, when Singapore’s then Defence Minister, Ng Eng Hen, justified a new defence technology memorandum by pointing to manpower limits for both armed forces. For two of ASEAN’s smallest states, geography and demography are not problems that can be solved once and forgotten.

This year, two critical infrastructure milestones were launched: the renewal of the Sungai Buaya Bridge at Binturan, Penanjong Garrison by the respective land forces, and the inauguration of a new Underwater Demolition Range at Pantai Binturan to support the Royal Brunei Navy’s naval diving capabilities. Both air forces also launched Exercise Vanguard as a new bilateral exercise framework, adding helicopter and drone training. Together, these initiatives reflect a relationship that has expanded beyond individual services into a broader framework of interoperability. The maritime dimension is particularly significant, as naval diving capabilities that support the clearance of submerged obstacles and unexploded ordnance ensure the continued use of critical waterways. For Singapore and Brunei, maritime access is an economic necessity for both. Singapore’s fundamental dependence on open sea lanes to connect a small domestic market to the global economy mirrors Brunei’s need for reliable export of energy resources and maintenance of links beyond its narrow coastline.

Maritime access is only one expression of a broader reality. As small and highly open economies, Singapore and Brunei are both exposed to disruptions affecting energy and food security. Part of Prime Minister Wong’s visit to Brunei included the delivery of four Singapore-developed Light Fire Attack Vehicles to the Brunei Fire and Rescue Department, tailored to Brunei’s requirements. In July, both governments also undertook to explore cooperation on energy and supply-chain resilience.

As the Currency Interchangeability Agreement turns sixty in 2027, Brunei and Singapore’s defence relationship stands among some of the most developed in Southeast Asia, resting on trust built through five decades of training, exchanges and high-level engagement.


Wira holds an MSc in Strategic Studies from the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), with specialised certificates in Terrorism Studies and U.S. Foreign Policy. He works as a freelance writer specialising in history, security and international relations theory, with experience in academia, investigative journalism, and voluntary uniformed service. He currently provides research analysis and consultation on Southeast Asian geopolitics for the Security Observer.

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Indonesia 🇮🇩

It Really Is That Bad

by Rayhan Prabu Kusumo, in Jakarta

For the past year, nearly every one of Maritime Crescent’s briefs about Indonesia has carried bad news. Some weeks it was the stock market falling again, or the rupiah sliding to another low. Other weeks it was a natural disaster, and then the long, slow wait for a recovery that never seemed to arrive. In between came the steady decay of public life. More officials named in corruption cases, more of politicians fighting each other, sometimes using the law enforcement as their proxies. There have now been a great many bad weeks. This month, as Prabowo Subianto marks two years in office, several of them arrived at once.

On October 15, MSCI proposed stripping Indonesia of its Emerging Market status; a day later, the Jakarta Composite fell to 11 per cent. The announcement landed on an economy that was already weak. Even before it, the Jakarta Composite had lost about 30 per cent this year, and for much of 2026 it has been the worst-performing major stock index in the world. The rupiah has repeatedly touched 18,000 to the dollar and has touched it once again. Tens of thousands people lost their jobs this year, and the president’s own labour adviser says the real number is far higher. About one in six Indonesians aged 15 to 24 who want work cannot find any, even as the headline unemployment rate sits at its lowest in three decades.

This column has written about the fires before, and the main news is that they are still burning. Smoke from Kalimantan and Sumatra has hung over Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore for weeks. Over Central Kalimantan, the air pollution index passed 4,000, more than thirteen times the hazardous level. The fuel shortage, meanwhile, has moved from the edges of the country towards its centre. It began in places far from the capital’s attention, then reached Bali, the country’s showcase to the world and the front door for much of its foreign tourism. This week it reached East Java, out of the periphery and onto the same island as the capital.

The power grid has not fared much better. On October 12, Batam and Bintan lost electricity for more than 15 hours. The state utility’s best explanation so far is that an animal may have gotten into a substation. The region has spent years selling itself as the obvious overflow site for the data centres and electronics plants that Singapore has no room for. Investors weighing that pitch now have a blackout to set against it.

The government has not produced a concrete plan for any of it. The president’s response to most problems has been to create new posts and appoint his associates to fill it. Then the problems stay where they were, if not become worse. For most of the year, Indonesians asked whether things were really that bad. Most have stopped asking. The only people who still seem unsure are the ones in charge.


Rayhan has a background in government affairs and public policy, with experience across government institutions and advisory firms. His work focuses on the intersection of geopolitics, policy, and risk, with expertise in advocacy, regulatory analysis, and stakeholder engagement. He holds a degree in Government from Universitas Padjadjaran, and has completed an exchange at Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Spain, focusing on global politics and sustainability.

Malaysia 🇲🇾

Choking on Consensus

by Muhammad Aiman Bin Roszaimi, in Cyberjaya

Every haze crisis in Southeast Asia produces a familiar diplomatic ritual. Neighboring countries express concern, offer assistance, and call for regional cooperation. Yet in 2026, the same question persists. After more than two decades of regional cooperation, why does ASEAN still struggle to respond effectively to a crisis that crosses its borders?

Malaysia has not been inactive. Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim contacted Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto on October 8, while Kuala Lumpur offered firefighting aircraft, helicopters and personnel. Malaysia has also proposed a stronger ASEAN mechanism for addressing the crisis. However, Indonesia subsequently put offers of foreign assistance on hold, citing its capacity to manage the fires domestically. Foreign Minister Mohamad Hasan also ruled out legal action or a formal diplomatic note for now, preferring dialogue and regional cooperation.

Meanwhile, Indonesia has deployed substantial resources, yet Reuters reported that its cumulative burned area reached approximately 1.92 million hectares by the end of September. Emergency assistance alone cannot address the scale or underlying causes of the disaster. It shows that operational challenges are real.

The more fundamental obstacle is sovereignty. Indonesia controls access to its territory and determines how foreign assistance is deployed. This is a legitimate principle of international relations, but it exposes the limitations of ASEAN’s approach to shared environmental threats.

The ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution, signed in 2002, established a framework for prevention, monitoring and emergency cooperation. However, it does not grant neighboring countries an automatic right to intervene or provide ASEAN with a mechanism to compel a government to accept assistance. Non-interference helps preserve regional relationships, but it can also leave collective action dependent on national consent precisely when urgent cooperation is needed.

Therefore, Malaysia must examine its own approach. Avoiding confrontation may protect bilateral relations, but diplomacy should be measured by results, not merely by the absence of tension. If repeated engagement fails to improve access, prevention or accountability, Kuala Lumpur needs to consider what additional options are available. These may include stronger domestic measures against Malaysian-linked companies credibly implicated in overseas burning, as well as improved regional fire monitoring and information sharing.

The answer is not necessarily to threaten Indonesia with litigation or abandon ASEAN. Legal action faces evidentiary and jurisdictional obstacles, while confrontation could complicate cooperation. Instead, Malaysia should press for clearer procedures for accepting assistance, transparent reporting on fires and land concessions, joint investigations and measurable commitments to prevention.

ASEAN has spent decades building a language of regional solidarity, but the haze exposes the distance between that language and the ability to deliver collective action.

For Malaysia, the challenge is not simply to offer help. It is to ensure that diplomacy produces tangible results. When goodwill cannot clear the air, regional cooperation must become more than a promise.


Aiman is a PhD candidate in Security and Strategic Analysis at the National University of Malaysia. His research focuses on Malaysia’s space policy, ASEAN regional security, and the strategic implications of emerging technologies. His work explores how Malaysia’s defense policy and strategic culture shape its approach to outer space.

Editorial Deadline 17/10/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk

Some plans work exactly as intended right up until they don't. In Myanmar, junta leader Min Aung Hlaing sat for his first Western interview since the 2021 coup hoping to project a rebuilt image to the world, only for TIME's "dictator" headline to trigger a public ban on the outlet and drag back into view the war and economic collapse the interview was meant to distract from. In Thailand, Bangkok's declarations of climate resilience at the UN ran headlong into a very different reality at home, as monsoon flooding across all 50 districts forced the postponement of a national election and exposed how far the city's infrastructure lagged behind its pledges. And in Laos, months of quiet containment measures against African Swine Fever weren't enough to keep the disease from reaching Vientiane's dinner tables, pushing pork prices up 50% and closing off even the informal cross-border workarounds families relied on.

Lao PDR 🇱🇦

Saleumxay Becomes Laos’ 10th Prime Minister Ahead of LDC Graduation

by Thongsavanh Souvannasane, in Vientiane

Laos’ National Assembly (NA) elected veteran diplomat Saleumxay Kommasith as prime minister on 5 October, with all 158 lawmakers present voting for him, state media reported.

Saleumxay became the 10th prime minister of the Lao PDR.

He succeeded Sonexay Siphandone, whom lawmakers elected NA president the same day. Sonexay replaces Xaysomphone Phomvihane, who died on 8 August at age 69.

Saleumxay turns 58 on 31 October and comes from Houaphan Province. He studied in Moscow and at Australia’s Monash University, and he speaks English, Russian, and French. He worked at the Lao Mission to the United Nations in New York, became foreign minister in 2016, and became deputy prime minister in 2022.

Outside observers describe him as an international-minded leader.

The Associated Press called his Western-oriented career unusual for Laos. A 2024 US-ASEAN Business Council article named him a strong contender for prime minister and credited him with managing the ASEAN Summit that Laos chaired that year.

In his first speech, he promised quick attention to food production, rebuilding infrastructure, managing minerals, major investments, tourism, tax collection, and a stable currency.

Hard numbers will test those promises. The government expects the economy to grow 5.1 percent this year, but the Asian Development Bank expects 4.0 percent and the World Bank 3.8 percent.

Inflation averaged 7.9 percent in the first nine months of 2026, Bank of the Lao PDR (BOL) Governor Bounkham Vorachit told the NA’s 2nd Ordinary Session of the 10th Legislature, which runs from 5 to 21 October. The central bank expects the full-year average to stay at 7.9 percent, above the NA’s 5 percent target.

Higher electricity prices pushed inflation up most, followed by fuel costs and exchange-rate movements.

Public debt reached about USD 14.31 billion in 2025, or 84 percent of GDP, according to BOL. The government wants to cut that to 70 percent by 2030, and it faces average foreign debt payments of USD 1.45 billion a year from 2026 to 2030. For families, higher prices mean money buys less.

Shortly after the appointment, Vietnam’s prime minister visited Vientiane on 8 October, and the two governments signed 11 cooperation documents. They agreed to speed up a highway, a seaport, an oil pipeline, and a railway. The railway would link Vientiane to Vung Ang port in Vietnam and cost about USD 6.6 billion. The Lao section stretches 452 kilometers, and construction is expected to start this year. Vietnam plans to begin its 119-kilometer section in 2027, with the line operating by 2030.

The railway would give landlocked Laos a direct rail link to a sea trade route.

Separately, Foreign Minister Thongsavanh Phomvihane, Xaysomphone’s brother, has joined the 13-member Politburo of the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party.

Laos also plans to leave the UN’s Least Developed Country list on 24 November, according to the UN, after first targeting 2020 and then 2024. That milestone could test the new government as LDC-specific support measures phase out.

Thongsavanh is a journalist from Laos with a background in English-language media. He graduated from the Lao-American Institute with a Diploma of the Arts in English and contributes to independent news platforms. His reporting focuses on environmental issues, socio-economic development, and geopolitics.

Thailand 🇹🇭

Thailand’s Non-Traditional Diplomatic Expansion Across North Africa

by Paranut Juntree, in Bangkok

On October 15-16, 2026, Thailand hosted the 3rd Thailand-Egypt Joint Commission in Bangkok, marking the first ministerial committee meeting between the two nations in 20 years and the first visit by an Egyptian Foreign Minister to Thailand in three decades. While framed as a bilateral milestone to double trade toward USD2.4 billion, the engagement underscores a broader strategic pivot for Thailand as it systematically expands commercial footprints across non-traditional markets in North Africa and the wider Middle East.

The primary reason for this diplomatic acceleration is Thailand’s drive to hedge against volatile demand across traditional Western and East Asian commercial corridors. Decades of structural dependence on conventional export markets have left Southeast Asia economies exposed to global economic shifts and trade fragmentation. This realignment is rooted in the Thailand-Africa Initiative, originally established in 2013, significantly revamped in December 2025 and reaffirming driven through August 2026 by Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Sihasak Phuangketkeow to build a modern, results-oriented framework for South-South cooperation. Thailand’s recent high-level talks with Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty operationalize this strategy. By executing a Joint Plan of Action (2027-2029) alongside agreements on triangular development cooperation, Thailand is converting diplomatic ties into operational economic access points across the Global South.

This bilateral momentum directly intersects with strategic regional gateways for Thailand, creating high-value synergies for Thai manufacturing, agri-tech, and logistics. Egypt’s position as a gateway to the Suez Canal Economic Zone and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) offers Thai exporters of canned food, rubber and industrial components a resilient transshipment hub into African and European markets. In return, Thailand provides Egyptian industrial inputs, such as iron and steel, a direct anchor into Southeast Asia. Establishing proposed logistics centers for Thai products in Egypt illustrates how bilateral economic frameworks can bypass traditional maritime bottlenecks to secure essential supply chains.

These bilateral breakthroughs in Bangkok stand in direct alignment with wider regional dynamics across Southeast Asia, particularly as ASEAN members push to deepen institutional ties with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). While major powers gathered inside the Queen Sirikit National Convention Center for the Annual Meetings of the IMF and World Bank Group, Thailand’s strategic engagement on the sidelines highlights an execution model centered on practical economic diplomacy. Although multilateral dialogue remains crucial, domestic economic security increasingly relies on functional trade corridors across emerging markets.

To solidify these commercial gains, Thai policymakers and private sector leadership should establish concrete operational frameworks that translate high-level memoranda into sustained market integration. Securing strategic trade pathways and deepening institutional links across North Africa and the Middle East would ensure Thailand’s economic growth remains resilient without over-relying on single-region demand networks.


Paranut has a background in advocacy, with experience in policy research, communications, and civic engagement across both the NGO and government sectors. As Thailand’s Youth Delegate to the United Nations, he represented Thai youth in global dialogues on migration, education, and human rights, championing inclusive policymaking. He holds a degree in political science with a specialization in international relations.

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Myanmar 🇲🇲

Rare Western Interview Brings Myanmar Junta Back Into Spotlight

by Myat Moe Kywe

A rare interview granted by Myanmar’s military juntas to a major Western outlet has ignited a sharp domestic backlash this week, even as it exposes the junta’s broader campaign to rebuild credibility with both its regional neighbors and the West.

TIME magazine published the piece, titled “Myanmar’s Dictator Wants to Rebuild Ties With the West,” on September 23, based on an interview conducted at the President’s Office in Naypyidaw on August 28 between Min Aung Hlaing and TIME’s Editor-at-Large, Charlie Campbell. It marked Min Aung Hlaing’s first interview with Western media since he seized power in the 2021 coup, and came months after Campbell first pitched the interview towards Myanmar’s regime in late April under the working title “The Future of Myanmar,” framed around regime efforts toward peace and stability.

The final product was far from what Naypyidaw anticipated. TIME’s headline flatly labeled Min Aung Hlaing a “dictator,” and the article repeatedly referred to him as a military leader who “calls himself President,” language that appears to have particularly made the regime publish a condemnation statement against TIME and Campbell. The regime responded by blacklisting Campbell, demanding the story’s removal, and banning TIME in Myanmar, accusing the outlet of failing to accurately reflect the answers given and of including “non-constructive writing, interviews with other individuals and unfounded commentaries.”

Inside the story, Min Aung Hlaing used the platform to press for sanctions relief, framing renewed engagement as mutually beneficial for Myanmar and the international community. On the long-stalled Rohingya repatriation agreement, he tied progress to the rollback of legal challenges against the state, warning that without movement the matter becomes unresolvable. He was noncommittal on a possible amnesty for Aung San Suu Kyi, saying it depends on her, while leaving room for reconsideration on the military’s part.

The interview did not occur in isolation. It follows a deliberate pattern of outreach by Min Aung Hlaing toward fellow ASEAN states since his inauguration as president, including bi-lateral state visits to Laos, Thailand, Vietnam, and Cambodia — trips regional and international media have cast as a “diplomatic comeback tour” as reported on Straits Time. Combined with the TIME sit-down, observers read the moves as a coordinated push to normalize the regime’s standing on two fronts simultaneously: consolidating legitimacy within ASEAN while testing the waters for a reset with the West.

Yet the article’s broader reporting undercut that narrative. It documented a military stretched by a civil war showing no sign of ending, a failing economy that has contracted sharply since the coup alongside a weakened Myanmar Kyats and collapsing foreign investment, and a regime increasingly reliant on Beijing and Moscow for military and diplomatic support.

This week’s development has put Myanmar back into the international spotlight through a rare interview with its military leader. What was intended as an opportunity for the regime to present its case to the West instead produced a storyline to reignite the story of what is happening in Myanmar, with its subsequent backlash from the regime against TIME drawing further attention to the story and the wider realities it sought to present.


Myat is a B.A. graduate in Politics, Philosophy, and Economics. She has interned at The Asia Foundation in Washington, D.C., and she has also worked as a summer research assistant at the Centre for Policy and Innovation (CRPI), gaining experience in research and analysis. Her work focuses on civic engagement, gender, youth leadership, and community development.

Cambodia 🇰🇭

Cambodia Stock Index Soars to 4-Year High in August Trading Boom

by Malai Yatt, in Phnom Penh

Strong company fundamentals and resilient economic sentiment sparked a massive market rally on the Cambodia Securities Exchange in August, boosting daily trading volumes by roughly 300 percent over early 2026 averages as both local and institutional investors flooded the market.

In August, 2026, the market condition on the Cambodia Securities Exchange (CSX) gained

strong interest and active participation, with trading activity, trading volume, and share price surging sharply even as the annual dividend payout season has come to an end.

According to CSX’s official report, in August, the CSX Index closed at 541.02, an increase of 18 percent during the month and up nearly 28 percent over the first eight months of the year. Exceptionally, on August 26th, the index soared to 560.09, marking its highest level in the last four years (since March, 2022).

Furthermore, the average daily trading value in August reached KHR 3,175 million (almost $800,000), increasing approximately 300% compared to the daily figure across the first seven months of 2026.

“This positive momentum was driven by several key factors such as share prices remained

appealing relative to corporate potential and business fundamentals, historical dividend yields were strong, and listed companies reported positive financial performance and healthy growth in Q2, 2026”

CSX reported that 2,006 new trading accounts were opened in August alone, reflecting widespread public awareness and growing interest in the opportunity of generating additional income through equity investments. Alongside rising liquidity, investor participation also remarkably set a new record.

The actual figures testify to the resilient growth potential of Cambodia’s capital market. The

expansion of investor participation serves as a vital catalyst for the CSX to further broaden its services, develop new financial products, and modernize its technology infrastructure to serve a broader range of the interests of investors, the report added.

On September 10, Hong Sokhour, Royal Government Delegate in charge as CEO of the CSX confirmed that “CSX has a total of 28 listed companies, comprising 12 equity-listed companies and 16 corporate bond-listed companies. Collectively, these 28 companies have successfully raised approximately $720 million from the securities market.

Regarding the market performance, the average daily trading volume for the first eight months of 2026 increased by nearly 150 percent compared to 2025, with average daily trading value rising to $290,000, he added.

Overall, the CSX is experiencing sustained, resilient growth, driven by strong corporate performance, attractive dividend yields, and solid business fundamentals. This broadening public interest and institutional backing are providing a strong participation to expand its financial products.

Editorial Deadline 26/09/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Karen David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk

El Niño: a weather phenomenon characterized by unusually warm waters in the Pacific. Occurring every few years, this year’s iteration is projected to be a record-setting ‘super’ El Niño like no other. The Philippines is no stranger to the scorching heat and ruinous droughts brought by this phenomenon, but with dire forecasts aplenty, is the country truly ready and braced for impact?

Meanwhile, Vietnam is focused on the recent state visit of the President of Panama to Hanoi and the ensuing implications for Vietnam–Panama bilateral relations. Against the backdrop of today’s fragmented and unstable global system, Vietnam’s famed bamboo diplomacy is building bridges all the way to the other side of the world in Central America.

And this week, Singapore is abuzz with news of the increase in ministerial salaries. Implemented as a way to entice Singaporeans into public service, the move has nevertheless generated much controversy — after all, the city-state’s ministers are already the highest paid in the world.

The Philippines 🇵🇭

Is the Philippines Ready for Super El Niño?

by Eduardo G. Fajermo Jr., in Angeles City

The forecast is severe. El Niño continues to strengthen, with a more than 83% chance of strong-to-very strong conditions through January–March 2027, while international projections warn it could rank among the strongest events since 1950.

The Philippine outlook is just as stark: drought could spread to 17 areas by December, 45 by January, 78 by February, and 84 by March. The numbers give the government a timetable, not an excuse to be surprised.

University of the Philippines climate scientist Dr. Rafaela Jane Delfino called the developing event “literally off the charts.” She urged rainwater harvesting in rain-fed areas, drought-tolerant crops, early dam planning, and household conservation, while warning that destructive rain can still occur during El Niño.

The government has started moving. The El Niño task force has been reactivated, the National Food Authority was ordered to buy more palay (unmilled rice grain) and expand rice reserves, and the agriculture department is assessing major irrigation systems, updating climate-risk maps, and prepositioning seeds, fertilizer, and irrigation support.

Some measures are already visible outside Manila. In Cagayan Valley, irrigation officials are installing shallow wells and mobile solar pumps, clearing canals, rotating water deliveries, and promoting water-saving practices such as Alternate Wetting and Drying to stretch available supplies.

Regional irrigation manager Raymundo Apil also advised farmers to shift toward crops suited to the water available. These are practical steps, but the real test is whether they reach every high-risk farming area before fields dry out.

International climate health researchers also recommend early-warning systems, stronger health services, and constant review of heat, disease, and malnutrition risks. Those needs remain less visible in current national announcements.

The economic stakes are already high. A strong event could cut palay output by 700,000 metric tons, while the previous El Niño caused PHP 57.78 billion in agricultural losses.

September inflation reached 7.2%, food inflation hit 6.8%, and rice prices rose 20.3% from a year earlier. Bangko Sentral Deputy Governor Zeno Ronald Abenoja described El Niño as a slow burn shock, meaning damage can build through harvests, markets, and household budgets before becoming a declared emergency.

Climate Change Commission Executive Director Robert Borje said forecasts must become “timely decisions and concrete actions.” That requires public local dashboards showing reservoir levels, irrigation repairs, seed deliveries, insured farmers, emergency funds, heat plans, and the official responsible for each deadline.

Experts are not saying the Philippines is helpless; they are saying early warning creates responsibility. If shortages and crop failures come because interventions remained in press releases, the damage will not be natural alone: El Niño is the hazard, but unpreparedness is the disaster.


Eduardo is a Political Science graduate and MA Political Science candidate at the University of Santo Tomas, researching democracy, disaster governance, and inclusive policy in the Global South. He is a former faculty member at Holy Angel University, where he taught Philippine history and contemporary global issues. He also worked with a senator in the Guam Legislature, contributing to policy research and legislative analysis.

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Vietnam 🇻🇳

Bamboo over the Canal

by Tri Vo, in Ho Chi Minh City

Vietnam’s manufacturing sector continues to generate record-breaking export volumes through late 2026, allowing Hanoi to aggressively conduct a multi-faceted economic diplomacy strategy aimed at going beyond the traditional Asian and North American markets. From October, Panamanian President José Raúl Mulino arrived in Hanoi for an official state visit — which itself is not just about the pomp and circumstance, but also a transformation in the making, especially in terms of commercial logistics between Southeast Asia and Central America.

During high-level summit talks, General Secretary and President To Lam and President Mulino agreed to elevate diplomatic and economic ties in substantial ways. The cornerstone of the summit was materialized when bilateral delegations exchanged nine foundational cooperation agreements. These pacts span a wide range of matters in critical economic and security sectors, including maritime transport, transnational crime prevention, agricultural development, customs administration, and civil aviation.

The geoeconomic justifications that drive this interregional alignment is ideal for both parties involved. Speaking to the press, President Mulino explicitly highlighted Vietnam’s industrial and export capabilities, placing Panama squarely as the gateway through which Vietnam will enter the Latin American and the Caribbean markets that remain largely untapped for Vietnamese firms. In response, Vietnamese leadership also framed Panama as an indispensable logistical node. By pairing Vietnam’s high-tech manufacturing output with Panama’s world-class maritime infrastructure (specifically the Panama Canal), its regional aviation hubs, and free trade zones, both countries are establishing what could be described as an uninterrupted economic corridor connecting Southeast Asia with the Western Hemisphere, increasing commercial exchanges amidst a milieu inimical to such activities. In doing so, it allows not just two countries but also East Asia and the Western Hemisphere a chance to prosper and thrive together.

More crucially, the partnership extends far beyond the transactional aspect of any economic engagements. During bilateral exchanges, the two governments also pledged to deepen joint research in agricultural innovation, infrastructure connectivity, and maritime shipping logistics. Furthermore, both delegations reaffirmed their commitment to maintain close coordination in combating transnational criminal activities.

With 2026 soon to fade into the past, this bilateral relationship provides a vital strategic hedge against a world rendered in increasing fragmentations. The synchronization between Hanoi’s export engine and Panama’s maritime strength creates a highly competitive commercial axis that could provide a bulwark for companies seeking safe havens in a world increasingly wont to protectionism. For trade strategists within ASEAN, the improving Vietnam–Panama relationship could serve as a viable lesson on how diplomatic diversification is no mere decoration, but a means by which a bet is hedged, a deck is reshuffled, and an economy is protected against the rising ties of instability.


Tri has experience in management consulting and strategy, having worked with institutions such as the UNDP, The Asia Group, and ARC Group. He has provided strategic, legal, and operational insights to clients in sectors including manufacturing, energy, and technology. He holds both academic and professional experience related to Southeast and East Asia, with a focus on regional development and policy.

Singapore 🇸🇬

Singapore Increases Ministerial Salaries

by Nurul Aini, in Singapore

On 15 October 2026, the allowances of Member of Parliaments (MPs), the leader of the opposition, and the non-constituency member of parliaments (NCMP) will be increased. For MPs, in particular, their monthly salary will increase from SGD13,750 to SGD18,500. For other part-time posts such as the Speaker of Parliament, the annual salary will increase to SGD900,000. Pegged to 15% of the Speaker’s salary, deputy speakers will now receive SGD135,000 annually.

The revised framework raises the annual reference salary for an entry-level MR4 minister from SGD1.1 million to SGD1.8 million, bringing the Prime Minister’s reference salary from SGD2.2 million to SGD3.6 million. Yet the government has limited the immediate adjustment for serving political officeholders to up to 9%. PM Lawrence Wong has also pledged to donate his salary increase to charity.

During parliamentary debates, this increase is discussed both as a practical consideration for those intending to serve, and as a somewhat more competitive edge against the salaries of high-earners in the private sector. Workers’ Party Pritam Singh supports the increase in MP allowance, but disagrees with the formula used to benchmark ministerial salaries. He argues for ministerial salaries to be pegged to a multiple of an MP’s salary, which is in turn derived from a public sector appointee’s salary. Currently, the allowances are based on the median annual income of the top 1,000 earners in Singapore, with a 40% discount to reflect the ethos of public service.

PM Wong highlighted that the increase aims to remove financial obstacles for those who are eager to serve. In highlighting the necessity of the salary increase, PM Wong noted that ministerial salaries have fallen behind both private sector and civil service salaries for the past 11 years. The Minister for Defense, Chan Chun Sing, argued that the increase in ministerial salary was to account for inflation.

If economic conditions were a concern in 2017 and 2023, it brings forth the question of what is different in today’s climate.

Minister Chan Chun Sing also warned that individuals whose sole drive of joining politics is money are not the candidates that the government wishes to field. The logic in this seemingly contradictory statement has gained traction among the public in online debates. Commenters in platforms such as Facebook have raised questions about personal commitments of ministers that require an increase in salary.

Meanwhile, some commenters note that the work of a minister goes beyond a 9–5 structure and involves attending to situations at odd hours, weekends engagements, and international and regional engagements. When it comes to pegging the salary to the private sector, some question whether commercial success translates or equates to exceptional political success, which includes political judgment, integrity, and intelligence.


Aini is currently pursuing a master’s degree in English literature at Nanyang Technological University. She has experience working in youth groups, contributing to the planning and management of outreach activities.

Editorial Deadline 12/10/2025 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Siu Tzyy Wei, Lead Editor - Maritime Crescent Desk

From diplomacy to public spending and football, national priorities are rarely defined by words alone. They are revealed in the partnerships countries cultivate, the resources they allocate, and the people they choose to back.

This week, we look at Brunei and Singapore’s diplomatic ties, Malaysia’s 2027 national budget, and Indonesia’s debate over the preference for Europe-trained footballers over locally developed talent. Across these different arenas, each story offers a glimpse into how Southeast Asian countries navigate competing interests, make strategic choices, and decide where their bets lie.

Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳

Small States, Big Security

by Syimah Johari, in Bandar Seri Begawan

Over the weekend, Brunei and Singapore celebrated 50 years of bilateral relations. Marked by Singapore Prime Minister Lawrence Wong’s visit to Brunei, their longstanding partnership offers a glimpse into how small states can strengthen their security through cooperation. While they may have limited military resources compared with larger powers, small states can build relationships, share expertise and work together on common security concerns. In this sense, their influence is not determined by size alone, but also through the partnerships they cultivate.

Brunei and Singapore’s defence relationship has developed through regular training exchanges and close professional and personal ties between their armed forces and defence leadership. These longstanding connections have helped sustain cooperation over the years, supported by bilateral exercises, policy discussions and leadership engagements. More recently, the launch of Exercise Vanguard reflects the continued development of their military cooperation.

For small states like Brunei and Singapore, defence partnerships with each other and other countries provide opportunities to access training, develop capabilities and exchange views and best practices. This is particularly important as smaller states may have fewer personnel and financial resources available for defence than larger powers. Cooperation can therefore provide access to expertise and resources that might be otherwise difficult or costly to develop independently. However, defence partnerships alone cannot replace the need for states to maintain and develop their own military capabilities. Rather, such partnerships should complement national defence efforts and strengthen, rather than substitute for, domestic preparedness.

Multilateral platforms are also important to the security of smaller states. Through ASEAN, small states can participate in regional discussions, raise shared concerns and pursue their national interests alongside larger powers. Acting through a regional platform can give smaller states a collective voice and greater opportunities to shape regional discussions than they might have individually. However, ASEAN’s ability to act collectively depends on its members reaching a consensus, which can be challenging when their national interests differ. This highlights both the value and limitations of multilateral cooperation for smaller states.

Brunei and Singapore’s 50 years of defence relations demonstrate how sustained partnerships can contribute to the security of smaller states. Through bilateral cooperation and multilateral platforms such as ASEAN, small states can strengthen their capabilities, exchange expertise and pursue their interests within the wider regional security environment. While these partnerships cannot replace the need for strong national defence capabilities, they remain an important part of how smaller states navigate an increasingly complex security landscape.


Syimah is a graduate of King’s College London with a BA in International Relations. With a strong focus on diplomacy, regional cooperation, and development policy, she is passionate about contributing to meaningful change through public service. Currently, she is involved in poverty alleviation work through a local NGO.

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Malaysia 🇲🇾

Reaching for the Skies

by Edrina Lisa Ozaidi, in WP Kuala Lumpur

Malaysia recently tabled the 2027 budget under the theme “Reaching For the Skies, White Anchored On Our Values”. Marked as the fifth MADANI Budget and the second under the 13th MP, how is this budget expected to perform, and what is the simple breakdown of the budget stacked up against Budget 2026?

Although the previous budget originally tabled RM419.2 billion, it was ultimately revised to R441.1 billion during implementation, with a projected fiscal deficit of 3.6% of GDP, expending total federal spending to a record RM459.8 billion - RM376.8 billion projected for operating expenditures and RM83 billion for development expenditure.

Despite the higher headline figure, the fiscal deficit is projected to narrow further to 3.3% of GDP, sending a strong signal to international credit rating agencies: the Ringgit remains stable, national debt is controlled, and giving the public hope that arbitrary currency devaluation will be prevented.

According to a review by PwC analysts, the budget reflects a careful balance between supporting the economy and maintaining fiscal responsibility, highlighting that higher revenue collections boosted by subsidy rationalisation and stronger economic momentum allowed the government to return disposable income to households without loosening fiscal targets.

While the previous budget was not as friendly for the M40’s income group, the 2027 budget adjusted the personal income tax framework by raising the basic tax relief from RM9,000 to RM12,000 and trimming tax rates for middle-income earners (RM70,0000–RM150,000 range). This directly increases liquid take-home pay for roughly 5 million middle-class (M40) taxpayers by up to RM1,600 annually. Although this is a big appeal to the M40’s as the previous budget disqualified them from cash welfare (like STR), they bear the brunt of inflation and subsidy cuts.

Small businesses face two major policy updates: a lower income tax rate (cut from 15% to 14% on the first RM150,000 chargeable income and a delay/exemption from mandatory RM2,000 minimum wage floors for smaller firms. Here, BDO Malaysia experts noted that the lowered MSME tax rates and higher small-value asset capital allowance thresholds offer immediate liquidity relief to over 300,000 small businesses facing elevated operational costs.

Meanwhile, healthcare receives RM47.7 billion, a 1.2 billion increase compared to last year, to help reduce hidden charges at medical facilities and hire 9,000 permanent medical staff to address public hospital overcrowding. For housing, the government maintained its support by allocating RM20 billion for SJKP housing guarantees, aiming to help 80,000 first-time homebuyers each year. Budget 2027, however, introduces better tranches for affordable homes and newly expanded renovation financing caps.

While Budget 2026 served as the heavy-lifting phase for structural fiscal reforms (implementing e-invoicing and paring down blanket subsidies), Budget 2027 functions as a redistributive plan. That being said, the success of Budget 2027 will depend on its execution, MSMEs ability to adjust accordingly. It also depends if the private domestic investments can sustain the projected 4.2% - 5.2% GDP growth trajectory in 2027.


Edrina is a communications professional with a background in international relations. She holds a degree from the University of Nottingham Malaysia and has worked across public relations and social media for organizations in the development, education, and corporate sectors. Her work focuses on crafting narratives around regional affairs and strengthening media engagement across Southeast Asia.

Indonesia 🇮🇩

New Beginnings

by Gemala Asyura, in Pekanbaru

On October 5, Gelora Bung Karno turned red. Indonesia beat Thailand 4-2 on penalties after a 2-2 draw to win the FIFA ASEAN Cup. Since 2000, Indonesia had reached six ASEAN Cup (also known as AFF Championship) finals, but lost them all. Fans even joked that the team was the king of the runners-up. Now, the wait for a regional trophy is over. The AFF Championship is scheduled outside FIFA’s international calendar, so clubs aren’t obliged to release players and promised stronger squads.

ASEAN had their own Cup since 1996, so why did FIFA finally decide to make another ASEAN Cup now? Is it to gain votes for the upcoming re-election of the FIFA President? Infantino now faces his biggest crisis since 2016, after backlash over a withdrawn plan to sell stakes in FIFA’s commercial rights. After Norway’s federation demanded FIFA’s committees to examine his conduct, and new reports allege undisclosed pay, he faces re-election on 18 March 2027. So far, critics’ suggested the tournament’s real impact may be the votes that fuels requests for scrutiny, but not conclusions that rules were broken.

Echoing Indonesia’s colonial history, many of Indonesia’s players grew up in Europe, mostly the Netherlands. Most athletes qualify through a parent or grandparent, a route relied on by Indonesia and the Philippines. However, critics say the naturalisation push has come at the expense of homegrown development, which they describe as under-resourced. The Jakarta Post argued that Indonesia’s win almost certainly would not have happened without overseas-born recruits, and that only a handful of homegrown players were left on the bench. Simultaneously, the Football Association of Indonesia (PSSI) binsists the approach is a long-term programme and that domestic development continues alongside it. Reflecting on the U-19 team’s 2024 AFF title, the open question is also whether youth programmes can produce players at a competitive caliber. Fans have mixed feelings about this - some celebrate a stronger team, while others worry that local players lose opportunities. Both reactions are understandable.

The harder question is whether Indonesia can build a system that develops its own players for the global stage. Japan launched the J.League in 1993 and invested heavily in youth academies and coach education. South Korea built a pipeline that produced Son Heung-min, who sharpened his game in a German academy. Neither country relied on imports. For Indonesia, heritage players are a bridge. They raise standards and bring habits from elite European academies. The goal is a pipeline where homegrown talent plays beside them, not behind them.


Gemala holds a degree in International Relations, with a focus on contemporary global issues. In addition to her years of undergraduate study, she has hands-on experience in early childhood education, having worked in both teaching and teaching assistant roles. She now pursues journalism as a practical extension of her academic background, with a focus and scope centered on ASEAN regional dynamics and social issues.

Editorial Deadline 10/10/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk

Red carpets are getting easier to roll out and much harder to roll back in Southeast Asia, and this week three capitals across the region put real effort into ceremony, each betting that the pageantry would help deliver what policy alone hasn’t yet. In Myanmar, Min Aung Hlaing added Malaysia to his growing collection, receiving a red carpet and guard of honour in Putrajaya. Anwar Ibrahim pledged to do “whatever possible” to help reintegrate Myanmar while insisting that engagement isn’t recognition, even as migrant workers protested in Kuala Lumpur and Washington opened its own direct talks with Naypyidaw the same day. In Thailand, Bangkok is rolling out a carpet of its own: the IMF-World Bank Annual Meetings will bring some 15,000 attendees from 191 countries, a chance for an economy that has averaged just 2.34% growth to prove it deserves investors’ trust ahead of its 2028 ASEAN chairmanship. In Cambodia, Vietnam’s new prime minister arrived to a royal audience, meetings with Hun Sen and Hun Manet, six new agreements, and a US$20 billion trade ambition as the two countries approach 60 years of diplomatic ties.

Myanmar 🇲🇲

Red Carpet in Malaysia

by Moe Thiri Myat

For more than five years, ASEAN has tried to maintain a distinction between Myanmar as a member of the regional bloc and the military leadership governing it. That distinction became more difficult to sustain this week when Myanmar President Min Aung Hlaing arrived in Malaysia for a two-day official visit. On 8 October, he received a formal welcome in Putrajaya, including a red carpet and guard of honour, before meeting Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim. It was Min Aung Hlaing’s first visit to Malaysia since the 2021 coup and one of the clearest signs yet of his return to leader-level diplomacy within Southeast Asia.

The symbolism matters because ASEAN has not formally abandoned its post-coup position. Its 2025 decision maintained non-political representation for Myanmar at ASEAN summits and foreign ministers’ meetings until meaningful progress was made on the Five-Point Consensus, and ASEAN foreign ministers reiterated in January that the consensus remained the bloc’s primary reference for dealing with Myanmar. Yet following his meeting with Min Aung Hlaing, Anwar said Malaysia would do “whatever possible” to help Myanmar become fully reintegrated into the regional community. He also stressed that engagement should not automatically be read as recognition.

That distinction of engagement without recognition is therefore becoming increasingly important. Malaysia has an immediate reason to engage Naypyidaw: repatriation. Anwar said around 10,000 Myanmar nationals had already been returned since January, while Malaysia is seeking cooperation to send back thousands more. The issue is particularly sensitive because Malaysia hosts one of the region’s largest Rohingya populations. Before the visit, Anwar told parliament that no Rohingya had yet been included in the returns and said repatriations should take place with the consent of those involved.

The issue has attracted particular concern because Malaysia hosts a large population of Rohingya refugees. Before the visit, Anwar told parliament that Rohingya had not been included in the returns and said repatriations should take place with the consent of those involved. However, the United Nations and human rights organisations have raised concerns about returning Myanmar nationals amid ongoing armed conflict, persecution risks and possible forced military conscription. The discussions did not establish whether Rohingya refugees would be included in future arrangements. The official reception also drew opposition from Myanmar communities in Malaysia. On 8 October, migrant workers and activists gathered in Kuala Lumpur to protest Min Aung Hlaing’s visit. The Myanmar Affairs Alliance urged the Malaysian government to reject his leadership and “respect the people’s will.” Myanmar resistance groups also criticised the visit amid continuing conflict inside the country.

The visit comes as Min Aung Hlaing continues to expand diplomatic contacts following his assumption of the presidency in April. While ASEAN’s restrictions on political representation remain in place, individual member states have increasingly pursued bilateral engagement with Naypyidaw. Beyond the region, On 8th October, the United States had also initiated direct high-level talks with Myanmar’s military-backed government, focusing on detained Americans, online scam operations and potential economic cooperation. These developments come as questions over Myanmar’s participation in ASEAN, the implementation of the Five-Point Consensus and the country’s continuing humanitarian crisis remain unresolved.


Moe Thiri Myat is a senior at Parami University. Majoring in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics (PPE). Interested in analyzing emerging sociopolitical situations and developments, through her work as a Myanmar correspondent at The ASEAN Frontier she aims to explore how sociopolitical developments across Southeast Asia shape and are shaped by the situation in Myanmar.

Thailand 🇹🇭

IMF-World Bank Group Annual Meeting 2026 to be Held in Bangkok

by Natamon Aumphin, in Bangkok

IMF-World Bank Group (WBG) Annual Meeting 20206, Thailand’s biggest event of the year, is to be held in Bangkok from 12 to 18 October 2026. This is the second time Thailand has hosted the meeting since 1991, signifying Thailand’s presence in the global arena. This year, Thailand aims to utilize its strategic role to bring sustainable, high-value, and long-term investment from abroad. Although interest in investment in Thailand has existed prior to the meeting, the event serves as an opportunity for Thailand to show its potential and prove its credibility to prospective investors. It is expected that at least 15,000 attendees from 191 member countries will be present in this annual meeting.

The IMF-WBG Annual Meeting is the biggest global gathering of financial-related sectors, an equivalent of the Olympics in the financial realm. The convention gathers influential figures and institutions from finance, business, government, and civil society to address economic and development challenges.

For over half a decade, the second-largest economy of Southeast Asia has had an average growth of 2.34%, significantly lagging behind its peers such as Singapore, Vietnam, and Malaysia. As Thailand is experiencing stagnant growth, ‌it is crucial for Thailand to leverage this opportunity and bridge connections between relevant stakeholders to develop sustainable economic approaches. The key highlight from the forum is business matching and connecting bridges between technology and the private sector, which is foreseen to increase high-value foreign direct investment to the nation.

Aside from business affairs, this year’s meeting also gives importance to public participation by expanding opportunities for individuals to attend the meeting via the World Bank Live website. Reflected in the session “Civil Society Townhall”, the meeting aims to be inclusive by opening a panel led by Ajay Banga, the president of the World Bank Group, to answer questions and address public concerns, allowing public participation from on-site and online channels.

Therefore, for Thailand, the IMF-WBG Annual Meeting 2026 is not only an opportunity to increase its reputation in economic progress but also a stage to prove its leadership readiness, preparing the nation for an upcoming ASEAN Chair rotation in 2028. Amid the global uncertainty and shocks, the crucial key is to be “trusted trading partner of every country,” said Jirayut Srupsrisopa, founder and Group CEO of BitKub.


Natamon has served as a rapporteur at the Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS Thailand). She has also worked as a research assistant on diplomatic issues in Southeast Asia. Her work focuses on how domestic politics shape foreign policy in the region. She holds a degree in international relations and has experience in policy analysis, event reporting, and regional research.

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Cambodia 🇰🇭

Vietnam’s New Prime Minister Visits Cambodia

by Chandara Samban, in Kandal

New Vietnamese Prime Minister Le Minh Hung, who assumed office just over six months ago, is paying an official two-day visit to Cambodia following a trip to Laos, aiming to strengthen ties with neighboring countries across the former Indochina region. During his stay, he is meeting with Cambodia’s top leaders, the Vietnamese community in the country, and representatives from the Cambodian and Vietnamese private sectors. These engagements aim to explore opportunities to deepen cooperation and advance agreements across various fields as the two countries approach the 60th anniversary of their diplomatic relations. During his visit to Cambodia from October 9 to 10, the Vietnamese Prime Minister paid a royal audience to King Norodom Sihamoni, held discussions with Senate President and ruling party leader Hun Sen, met with National Assembly President Khuon Sudary, and held talks with Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet.

The prime ministers of Cambodia and Vietnam welcomed positive developments in bilateral relations, particularly cooperation in energy, trade, investment, security, education, tourism, and healthcare. They also highlighted the close ties between the two governments, characterized by frequent exchanges of visits and regular communication. The two countries agreed to work toward increasing bilateral trade to US$20 billion in the coming years by accelerating transport infrastructure initiatives and upgrading border crossings for freight, particularly through the Phnom Penh–Bavet and Ho Chi Minh City–Moc Bai expressways.

Furthermore, both sides agreed to strengthen cooperation across various sectors through six agreements covering 1) combating illicit drugs; 2) government-level educational cooperation for the 2026–2030 period; 3) the preservation and promotion of friendship monuments in both Cambodia and Vietnam; 4) security cooperation between the two countries’ information technology centers; 5) the establishment of a joint trade committee between the two governments; and 6) coordination to boost bilateral trade. In addition, the Vietnamese Prime Minister visited Vietnamese-invested facilities, including the AngkorMilk plant in Phnom Penh, operated by Vietnam Dairy Products Joint Stock Company (Vinamilk). He described the facility as a successful Vietnamese investment project in Cambodia, noting that it was projected to generate total revenue of US$104 million by 2025.

Le Minh Hung also with the Vietnamese community in Cambodia. During the meeting, he called on the Cambodian government to facilitate the lives of Vietnamese citizens in the country, particularly by expanding educational opportunities for Vietnamese children at both school and higher education levels through increased scholarship opportunities. He also called for a stronger role for the Cambodia–Vietnam Association in supporting the Vietnamese community and further strengthening relations between the two countries.

Geopolitical analyst Ro Vannak believes that strengthening ties with Cambodia is essential for Vietnam to maintain border security and safeguard its strategic interests along the Mekong River. For Cambodia, he argued, the objective is to build mutual trust and strengthen reciprocal security cooperation to mitigate risks and prevent hostility. This is particularly important given that Cambodia shares a border with Vietnam and is also currently involved in a border dispute with another neighboring country, Thailand. Ro Vannak noted that Vietnam has left both positive and negative impressions on the Cambodian public consciousness. Although the two countries have historically been adversaries, Vietnam also acted as an ally in the more recent past by helping to overthrow the Khmer Rouge, a historical legacy that continues to shape relations between the two nations. Nevertheless, he argued that, from a strategic perspective, foreign policy should prioritize shared interests and long-term national interests, particularly the well-being of the people in both countries.

Meanwhile, geopolitical analyst Seng Vanly views the Vietnamese Prime Minister’s visit as an opportunity to reaffirm existing agreements, particularly those concerning trade, investment, and security, rather than introduce significant changes to bilateral relations. In his view, signing agreements at the leadership level is not enough; both governments must evaluate the actual scope and effectiveness of their cooperation while placing the interests of their people and nations at the forefront, especially in matters of security. He emphasized that frequent exchanges of visits between the leaders of the two countries demonstrate the close ties between their governments. He added that Vietnam seeks to maintain its influence in Cambodia, while Cambodia seeks economic, trade, and political cooperation with Vietnam.


Chandara is a freelance journalist with a focus on foreign affairs, security issues, and ASEAN affairs. He also serves as a Junior Counterterrorism Intelligence Analyst.

Lao PDR 🇱🇦

Floods in Laos Highlight Climate Risks

by Phonethida Sitthixay, in Vientiane

Since July 2026, heavy rains unleashed severe flooding across Laos, displacing thousands of families and underscoring the growing threat climate change poses to the country’s development.

In the north, Luang Namtha Province was declared a disaster zone after flash floods swept through Boten near the Laos–China border. More than 30 villages were inundated, farmland and schools destroyed, and even the local airport forced to close. Water levels on the Tha River surged to 6.58 meters, well above the flood warning threshold.

In the south, Savannakhet Province saw the Xe Champhone River rise above danger level, flooding thousands of hectares of rice fields and affecting over 2,000 households. The floods cut off eight villages, with recovery efforts underway. Meanwhile, Champasack Province reported the Mekong River rising beyond alert levels.

The worst hit was Khammouane Province, where flooding affected over 60,000 people across all 10 districts, damaging 206 villages and nearly 9,500 households. More than 15,000 hectares of rice fields were destroyed, with losses estimated at LAK 100 billion (USD 4.4 million).

Nationwide, authorities estimate 654 villages across 42 districts have been hit, leaving 95,200 people impacted and at least four dead. Prime Minister Sonexay Siphandone has ordered immediate recovery measures, including road repairs, relief supplies, and stricter monitoring of dam safety and reservoir levels.

Officials admit floods are becoming more frequent and destructive. Between 2021 and 2025, Laos recorded 376 natural disasters affecting more than one million people, according to a government review. This year’s floods have already surpassed last year’s impact, with northern provinces like Luang Namtha and Phongsaly suffering damage rarely seen before.

Experts point to climate change as a key driver. Stronger monsoons and typhoons, combined with deforestation and poor land management, are intensifying floods. Typhoon Maysak and heavy rains dumped up to 140 mm in 24 hours this month, overwhelming rivers and reservoirs.

As Laos prepares to graduate from Least Developed Country (LDC) status by the end of 2026, the floods are a stark reminder that economic growth must be matched with climate resilience.


Phonethida Sitthixay holds a Bachelor of Arts in International Relations from the National University of Laos. She is currently a Senior Project Coordinator at AIF Group, where she works on government-led initiatives to modernize financial integration across public sector systems in Laos. She has experience in sustainable development policy, diplomacy, and economic reporting, having worked with the Global Green Growth Institute and The Laotian Times. Her interests focus on Laos’s diplomacy, regional integration, and its evolving role beyond ASEAN.

Editorial Deadline 10/10/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Karen Ysabelle David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk

All around the world, the changing climate has put dozens of cities at risk of disappearing underwater. In the Pacific Corridor, Vietnam’s Ho Chi Minh City is one such sinking example. Our newest correspondent, Thao-My Mai Vu, talks about how the city’s rapid urbanization is now taking its toll: with frequent flooding battering Saigon and urbanization showing no signs of stopping, low-income and working-class residents may well be the first to pay the costs of a city sinking around them.

Meanwhile, stories from the rest of the region: in the Philippines, a rash of fatal school shootings — previously a rarity in the country and in the region at large — has left officials searching for answers, almost four months since the first incident in Tacloban. In Singapore, the opening of the long-awaited Johor Bahru–Singapore Rapid Transit System Link has been postponed, but ties between Singapore and Malaysia remain as strong as ever. And for Timor-Leste, we take another look at how closer ties with the rest of Southeast Asia can generate opportunities for Timorese students.

Vietnam 🇻🇳

Built to Flood

by Thao-My Mai Vu, in Ho Chi Minh City

During the evening rush hour on 29 September, a sudden deluge paralyzed traffic on at least 12 roads in Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC). Thousands of commuters pushed their motorcycles home through severe gridlock, and some waited in their offices until midnight to wait for the floodwaters to recede. This scene is the epitome of the frequent floods that have plagued the city since late September 2026, as it enters the peak rainy season and a period of rising tides. However, a more-than-one-meter level of flood after just 79.2mm of rain in 45 minutes implies a deeper layer of the ‘climate change vulnerability’ discourse.

This metropolis of 14 million sits atop soft, compressible sediments, and is sinking twice as fast as the sea is rising, at 2 to 8 centimeters per year. Decades of costly government efforts have made little progress in halting this. On 2 October, after the deluge, the HCMC People’s Committee issued Plan No. 537 to address the issue of flooding for 2026 to 2030. This plan has reflected a necessary shift in mindset: from solely gray to more green and blue infrastructure, and from ‘anti-flooding’ to ‘flood management.’ However, it barely touches upon one of the main contributors — the city’s urban planning strategy.

In the whirl of its rapid urban sprawl and concretization, more than 90% of wetlands in HCMC have been converted to impervious built-in areas since 1990, which significantly undermined its rainwater retention, groundwater filtration, and flood mitigation capacity. This expansion is currently accelerating, with an apartment construction boom in 2026 in the southern and southeastern parts of the city — the fastest-sinking and most subsidence-prone areas. High-density, high-rise apartments — branded as ‘eco-metropolis’ or ‘green paradise,’ mostly aimed at upper-middle-income buyers — are mushrooming in Nha Be, Thanh Da - Binh Quoi Peninsula, and Can Gio commune, adding load on soft delta soil.

The pressure on the city’s resilience is also set to amplify. Recently, authorities requested approval to convert 4.57 hectares of protective mangrove forest in Can Gio, long vital to the city’s flood mitigation, for a US$3.9 billion metro line project. This land conversion, if approved, could adversely encroach upon the wetlands and cause significant canopy loss and vegetation stress. The cost is likely to fall not upon buyers of green-branded towers, but more on the city’s low-income and working-class residents, who remain the most vulnerable amid climate change crises.

The implications of one deluge in HCMC can extend to ASEAN as a whole, particularly for urban planning strategy as climate vulnerability raises the stakes. Megacities need to develop subsidence maps and give them greater weight as a basis for issuing construction permits. They should also decelerate land-driven growth in low-lying and flood-prone areas, so that these areas can remain as water-retention zones and flood corridors for the whole city.


Thao-My is a young researcher focusing on small-power statecraft, Vietnam-Cambodia relations, and the politics of water infrastructure in the Greater Mekong Subregion. As Vietnam’s Student Delegate to the Raisina Dialogue in New Delhi, she contributed to global dialogues on multilateral reforms and bridging the North-South divide from a Southeast Asian perspective. She also has professional experience in policy advocacy and government affairs.

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The Philippines 🇵🇭

When School Shootings Reach Southeast Asia

by Glenn Vincent N. Boquilon, in Makati City

School shootings have long been associated with the United States and other Western countries. However, recent incidents in the Philippines are challenging the idea that this is not a distant problem.

Three fatal school shootings have occurred in the Philippines within just the last three months. In June, a shooting at San Jose National High School in Tacloban City killed three students and injured several others. In August, a student in Zamboanga City killed a classmate before taking his own life. In September, another shooting at Banga National High School in South Cotabato left two students and the gunman dead, with several others injured.

The incidents are concerning partly because school shootings remain relatively uncommon in the Philippines. Their emergence raises questions that go beyond school security. How are minors gaining access to firearms? How are violent ideas reaching them? And can schools identify risks before they escalate?

The South Cotabato shooting has also drawn attention to online spaces. Authorities are investigating alleged online interactions that may have influenced the student. Officials have raised concerns about online communities that glorify school shootings and exposed these kids to violent content.

This makes the issue more complicated than simply increasing security at school entrances. Firearm access, online platforms, and student support systems all form part of the environment surrounding the youth.

The Philippines is also not alone in this challenge. In August, a 14-year-old student in Thailand carried out a shooting at a school outside Bangkok. The attack killed several people and injured more than 20. These cases have prompted renewed attention to access to firearms and school security.

The parallel is significant for Southeast Asia. The region does not experience school shootings at the same frequency as the United States. In this regard, the recent cases show how violence can increasingly intersect with schools and digital spaces.

This presents a new challenge for education systems across Southeast Asia. School safety can no longer focus only on physical security, but must also consider child protection and early intervention. Consequently, schools should remain places where students can learn without fear, but the recent experience of the Philippines shows that the security environment around them is changing. The question now is whether Southeast Asian education systems can adapt before school shootings become a more familiar regional concern.


Glenn holds a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from the University of Santo Tomas. His experience spans governance programs, policy development, and political research, having worked with the Ateneo School of Government and WR Numero Research on projects focused on electoral reform, public opinion, and regional development. He also helped coordinate the drafting of the Bangsamoro Local Government Code and supported the Academy of Multiparty Democracy.

Timor-Leste 🇹🇱

ASEAN Membership: What’s In It for Timorese Students?

by Lucreicha Jane

Note: This article was first published in Issue 52 of the Pacific Corridor newsletter on 12 June 2026.

Timor-Leste just joined ASEAN. For Timorese students, this is more than just a political achievement; it could mean new opportunities that were not readily accessible before.

When Timor became part of ASEAN, it also became part of a much bigger regional space with many countries in Southeast Asia. This raises a simple question: “What does this actually change for students in real life?”

One of the main possible changes is access to educational opportunities. Being part of ASEAN could open more chances and scholarships, exchange programs, and study abroad opportunities across Southeast Asian countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore. Some of these opportunities already exist, but ASEAN membership may make them more structured and easier to access.

With regard to student exchange programs, instead of being rare or limited, exchanges between universities in ASEAN countries could become a more regular occurrence. This means students might have more chances to study abroad for short periods of time, join training programs, or experience different education systems in the region. There are also youth and skills development programs within ASEAN. These programs often focus on leadership, entrepreneurship, climate issues, and digital skills. Timorese students could now take part in more of these regional activities, which may help them prepare for future employment.

Beyond education, ASEAN membership also means connection. Students in Timor-Leste are now part of a wider student network across Southeast Asia. This could help in building friendship, academic cooperation, and even career opportunities. But even with all of these possibilities, one important question remains: “Will students actually take these opportunities?” Having access is one thing, but being ready and informed is another.

In the end, ASEAN membership is not just about politics or government decisions. For students, it could shape their education, skills, and future paths, but only if they are willing and ready to seize those opportunities.


Lucreicha Jane is an International Relations undergraduate at the Universidade Nacional Timor Lorosa'e (UNTL), with interests in international law, governance, and youth leadership. She previously served as General Secretary of the JCI Timor-Leste Local Chapter Dili Women Entrepreneurs (2024–2025) and as Executive Vice President of the Student Council at UNTL's Faculty of Social Sciences and Politics.

Singapore 🇸🇬

Singapore-Johor RTS Delayed to 2027: What the Setback Means for Cross-Border Connectivity

by Jennifer Hui En Tan, in Singapore

The Johor Bahru–Singapore Rapid Transit System (RTS) Link, a long-awaited cross-border rail project intended to ease congestion between Singapore and Johor Bahru, has been delayed from its original target of December 2026 to February 2027. While the delay postpones the project’s anticipated benefits by several months, the RTS Link remains a significant piece of infrastructure in strengthening connectivity between Singapore and Malaysia.

The project was conceived in response to persistent congestion at the Causeway, one of the world’s busiest land crossings. By providing a dedicated rail connection between Singapore’s Woodlands North and Johor Bahru’s Bukit Chagar, the RTS Link is expected to offer a faster and more reliable alternative for daily cross-border travel. The RTS Link is designed to carry up to 10,000 passengers per hour in each direction, with the journey between the two stations expected to take around six minutes. Its capacity could significantly reduce pressure on existing road and rail connections, which currently handle large volumes of commuters, tourists, and goods traveling between the two countries.

The RTS Link therefore represents more than a new transport option. By shortening travel times and improving the predictability of cross-border journeys, it could make it easier for people to live, work, and conduct business across both sides of the border. Although the delay may be frustrating for commuters anticipating a faster journey across the border, completing these stages thoroughly is important for ensuring that the RTS Link can operate safely and consistently once passenger services begin.

The significance of the RTS Link extends beyond transportation. It is being developed alongside an economic relationship between Singapore and Johor that is already deeply established. Johor offers Singapore-linked businesses access to land and industrial space, relatively lower operating costs, logistics and manufacturing capabilities, a large labor pool, and proximity to Singapore. Singapore, meanwhile, contributes capital, financial and advanced business services, technology, infrastructure, international connectivity, and access to global investors.

For businesses, improved connectivity could make it more practical to distribute operations across the border while maintaining close links between headquarters, workers, suppliers, and customers. The RTS Link is also part of a much broader relationship between Singapore and Malaysia. The two countries are closely connected through trade, investment, tourism, employment, commuting, and shared infrastructure. Easier movement between Singapore and Johor could further improve connectivity and support tourism, employment, and family connections, all while making everyday interaction across the border more accessible.

The delay of the RTS Link to February 2027 may postpone the project’s immediate benefits, but it does not diminish its broader significance. The rail connection is being developed at a time when Singapore and Malaysia are seeking to deepen economic integration and strengthen the Johor–Singapore corridor.

Once operational, the RTS Link could help alleviate congestion while supporting the movement of workers, visitors and businesses between the two countries. Together with the Johor-Singapore Special Economic Zone and other forms of bilateral cooperation, it reflects a relationship in which transport connectivity, economic integration, and people-to-people ties are increasingly interconnected.

Ultimately, the RTS Link is not simply a six-minute train journey between Singapore and Johor Bahru. It is part of a broader effort to make the border less of a barrier and the two economies more closely connected.


Jennifer is a final-year International Relations student at the Singapore Institute of Management, where she focuses on political engagement, diplomacy, and community governance. She is an active volunteer in her constituency, working closely with residents to understand local concerns, facilitate dialogue, and support community initiatives.

Editorial Deadline 06/10/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

By Siu Tzyy Wei, Lead Editor - Maritime Crescent Desk

Influence is not always about who holds the microphone. Sometimes, it is about who controls the stage. This week, Malaysia witnessed Formula 1’s transformation into a global platform for soft power. For Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, the spectacle also raises the question of whether international visibility can be converted into political confidence at home. Across the world, where Brunei’s new Foreign Minister made his debut on the world stage at the UN General Assembly, visibility has become its own form of currency. In Indonesia, visibility takes a different stage, as the revised Broadcasting Bill brings user-generated content on digital platforms into greater regulatory scrutiny. The debate is therefore not only about regulating harmful content, but also about who gets to define the boundaries of acceptable public expression online.

Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳

The New Voice for Brunei

by Maryam Zulaidi

The 81st UN General Assembly (UNGA) marked a significant moment for Brunei’s diplomacy, as HRH Prince Mateen made his debut at the High-Level Meeting as Minister of Foreign Affairs following his appointment earlier this year. As Brunei’s international spokesperson, he addressed a clear yet critical message regarding international order on the UN podium. The core message hints at overcoming double-standards between UN members, or trust among nations will erode. He presented the current state of Palestine as the defining example, stating that there can be no lasting peace without justice for the people of Palestine and that the conflict has become a test to the Organisation’s own credibility. Through this example, he argued that the decades of suffering of innocent Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank, including UN staff, journalists and medics killed while carrying out their duties is precisely why the UN Charter and international law must be enforced without exception. To strengthen accountability for crimes against peacekeepers, he emphasised that Brunei co-sponsored UN Security Council Resolution 2823 and therefore warned the spread of conflict and violence into neighbouring Lebanon, where UN peacekeepers have also been unjustifiably killed. Taken together, Brunei views that trust in the UN can only be restored through unprejudiced multilateral efforts by the UN, first starting with the conflict and oppression existing in Palestine.

This message carries weight for a tiny nation such as Brunei. Although Brunei has long supported the Palestinian cause at the UN, this was the second consecutive year in which Palestine stood at the centre of its national statement, following last year’s address by Dato Seri Setia Erywan Yusof, the Second Minister of Foreign Affairs. Though, its continued relevance can be understood through Brunei’s own interests. As a small state, Brunei relies on international law and the UN Charter to safeguard its sovereignty. Arguably, by insisting that these rules be upheld in Palestine, Brunei is also reinforcing the very principles that protect smaller nations from being overlooked. In this sense, defending the rules of Palestine is also indirectly defending them for Brunei.

Compared with last year’s statement, this year is much more direct and sharp in terms of tone. In 2025, the emphasis on Palestine and supporting its full UN membership is an inherent right. This year, it moved further toward accountability, UN’s credibility and the protection of peacekeepers. This shift reflects a changed context, in which ongoing suffering has made the question of enforcement, rather than solely recognition, increasingly urgent. It also implies that under HRH Price Mateen, Brunei intends to remain a consistent and principled voice on Palestine within the multilateral system.

During his stay in New York, Prince Mateen also attended a series of bilateral meetings on the sidelines of UNGA. This includes, discussions with his counterparts from Vietnam, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar, each focused on deepening economic and diplomatic ties. Together, these meetings reflect Brunei’s strong approach to foreign policy of building cooperation for mutual benefit with partners across Asia.


Maryam is a first-year International Relations and Politics student at the University of Sheffield, with an academic focus on Southeast Asia—particularly Maritime Southeast Asia—and the Middle East. She aspires to a career in diplomacy and academia and is committed to fostering international dialogue and advancing scholarly engagement with global issues. Beyond her academic work, she pursues creative interests and voluntary initiatives that broaden her perspectives on public service.

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Indonesia 🇮🇩

When Rules Silence

by Amallia Utami

Indonesia’s proposed revision of the Broadcasting Bill has raised concerns about the future of public expression on digital platforms. On 31 August 2026, the House of Representatives’ Legislative Body approved the harmonised bill for consideration. As the ongoing legislative processes continue, there are concerns over how the proposed regulations could affect the public’s participation on social media.

The proposed scope includes user-generated content (UGC) on digital platforms, such as TikTok, Instagram, and YouTube. This raises questions as decisions on what to publish are spread across many creators. Platforms still control distribution and moderation, but they do not exercise the same editorial control over every upload as broadcasters do over their programmes.

Remotivi researcher Muhammad Heychael warned that the threat of sanctions could encourage platforms to remove content whose status remains unclear. With broad restrictions, companies may find it safer to take a post down than to risk being penalised. This leaves users dependent on how platforms interpret the rules, including when their posts do not clearly violate them. The concern is that pressure to comply could lead platforms to remove lawful content simply because keeping it online carries an uncertain risk.

This could affect how people participate in raising issues online. A video about poor public services, for example, allows an individual experience to become a shared concern. Others may respond with similar experiences or demand an explanation from the institution involved. If such content is removed under unclear standards, the opportunities of building democratic space may be reduced. The concern extends beyond the person whose post disappears, since other people also lose opportunities to learn about problems and discuss them openly.

Another possible consequence is self-censorship among users. When the boundaries are unclear, users may hesitate to post criticism even when there is nothing unlawful about it. Some may soften their language or avoid certain subjects because they do not want to deal with the possible consequences. Discussions may continue, but without those who decide to withdraw. Their absence matters because experiences that could help others understand an issue may never be shared, leaving the discussion to those who feel able to keep speaking.

Addressing harmful content is a reasonable responsibility for digital platforms. However, the proposed rules should account for the way users produce content and the decisions platforms make about it. Clear limits and a workable process for challenging removals are needed, particularly when a post is taken down despite no clear violation. The revision therefore needs closer scrutiny over how it would operate in practice. Protecting users should include ensuring that they can raise concerns without feeling that silence is safer.


Amallia is a media and culture graduate from the University of Glasgow with experience in journalism and creative writing. Her interests lie in democracy, media and communication, particularly how contemporary media environments shape self-censorship, misinformation, and disinformation.

Malaysia 🇲🇾

Malaysia’s Need for Speed

by Sydney Gan, in Kuala Lumpur

Over the weekend, Malaysia was at the center of sporting action as the host of the 2026 Formula One (F1) Bahrain Grand Prix, welcoming more than 261,000 spectators. This opportunity - initially a one-off lucky break for Malaysia - has now introduced its potential permanent return to F1 as part of the circuit roster. Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim is effectively immortalized as the leader who brought back the sport into an entertainment-starved Malaysia. How will this affect, if at all, his prospects as the 16th General Election looms?

It all comes back to soft power: the successful organization of a large-scale sporting event lends Malaysia a subtle appeal and perceived legitimacy, thus positioning Malaysia favorably amongst its more powerful Western and Middle Eastern counterparts. This F1 competition alone brought together the support of the King of Malaysia with Bahrain’s King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa, and continued collaboration will no doubt open doors to closer diplomatic and trade relations with powerful international players.

The concept of spotlighting Malaysia on a global scale is not exactly new to Anwar. In 2025, he had an exemplary showing as the ASEAN Chair, notably brokering the KL Peace Accords to cease further disputes in the Cambodian-Thai border (a success that prompted murmurs about a potential Nobel Peace Prize nomination). Anwar’s ASEAN stint, though short-lived, effectively highlighted Malaysia’s full potential as a viable regional competitor, inspiring confidence within Malaysians and providing him great assurance for a second term - that is, before the house of cards that is the Unity Government threatened to dismantle at his very feet.

Now, with the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) pledging to contest independently from Anwar’s Unity Government in the upcoming General Election, Anwar is visibly struggling to uphold the power he once held fast. Internationally, his optics have never been better, but at home, he is forced to face his growing competition, as well as the slow erosion of his own coalition, where members are dropping out one-by-one to join rival Rafizi’s party Bersama. It is apparent that Anwar is increasingly banking on Malaysian goodwill and populist opinion to tide him over for the next national polls - in the upcoming 2027 Budget, Anwar is predicted to lead with indulgent allocations for increased subsidies and cash handouts, in order to appeal to the masses. The name of the game is to rebuild trust among voters, never mind that this eleventh-hour hurrah feels more like a last-ditch scramble rather than a sincere effort.

The soft power of sports is endearing and entertaining, but when it comes to real political prospects, it does little more than put a band-aid on a bullet wound. Anwar still has to confront the reality that his loss of followers can only be attributed to his lack of rigor in follow-through on his initial reform agenda. As the glamor of international sports pageantry dispels, a fierce and cut-throat political brawl remains to be played out, with the potential to hurtle Malaysia into further political uncertainty.


Sydney holds a Bachelor of Laws from King’s College London, where she focused on Human Rights Law, Criminology, and Public & Administrative Law. She is an Analyst at Asia Group Advisors, providing policy analysis and strategic guidance across the tech, sustainability, and gaming sectors in Southeast Asia. Prior to joining AGA, she worked in the social development sector in London, contributing to the Ukraine Judicial Training Programme through research on war crimes adjudication and the development of a legal training curriculum with high court magistrates.

Editorial Deadline 5/10/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk

Some things only look solid until they touch the ground. In Thailand, Bangkok's worst flooding in years left 10,000 pieces of luggage stranded at Suvarnabhumi, forced more than 70 flight cancellations, and ended with Thai Airways' CEO ousted by his own board, a reminder that a tourism recovery depends on what works when conditions turn bad. In Myanmar, a wave of foreign YouTubers is telling a different story from the safe distance of Yangon and Mandalay, with titles like "24 Hours Eating Noodles in War-Torn Myanmar." Locals and critics say these videos help the junta project a stability that young people living under forced conscription and night-time curfews don't recognize, and that a country's safety can't be judged from its best-protected streets. In Cambodia, the military service law that sat unenforced since 2006 is now real: about 3,000 young people signed up in the first days, with prison penalties for evasion and rights groups warning that the burden will fall hardest on those with the fewest means. And in Laos, the countdown to LDC graduation on November 24 is less a finish line than a landing, with officials themselves cautioning that the real risks begin once trade preferences start to phase out.

Thailand 🇹🇭

Bangkok’s Floods Uncovers a New Crack for Thailand’s Tourism Recovery

by Pathom Sangwongwanich, in Bangkok

Bangkok’s worst flooding in years has shifted from a public-infrastructure crisis into an aviation and tourism problem, which ultimately leads to the ousting of Thai Airways International Chief Executive Officer Chai Eamsiri. The move, mandated by the company’s board of directors with immediate effect on October 2, follows a week-long debacle as the national flag carrier canceled several flights and cut Bangkok departures because flood-related staff shortages crippled its aviation and ground service operations at Suvarnabhumi International Airport, leaving around 10,000 luggage stranded on terminal floors.

Chai’s dismissal is mainly rooted in failure to address crisis management, tarnishing the airline’s reputation and causing considerable losses to aviation operations, and a previous corruption allegation linked to wine procurement for in-flight service. The Ministry of Finance discovered that the purchase involved manipulation by the airline’s procurement department, which bought 860,000 wine bottles at a price of over 1,000 baht per bottle from a single supplier.

Chai, who joined the airline in 1985 and rose through the ranks to become chief financial officer before being appointed CEO in 2023, said the board of directors “didn’t give a reason” for his dismissal. Meanwhile, the flag carrier said in an exchange filing that the board of directors will conduct a fact-finding investigation of the crisis and Chai is suspended as CEO during the course of investigation.

Sumrid Sumneing, a board member of Thai Airways International, has been appointed as acting CEO in an attempt to manage the operational turmoil. Previously, the airline had announced the cancellation of more than 45 flights for October 1 and October 2 to address a backlog of more than 10,000 pieces of luggage and cargo, with plans to resume full-scale operations by October 3. Thai Airways International recently canceled 37 flights bound for domestic and international routes on September 29 and 30 and the cumulative tally was poised to reach over 70 flights as more cancellations for flights between October 1 and October 3 had been announced.

The disruption has raised questions beyond the immediate inconvenience to passengers. Tourism Minister Surasak Phancharoenworakul sharply criticized Thai Airways’ management prior to Chai’s dismissal, saying the episode risks undermining traveler confidence and damaging Thailand’s image as a tourism hub. “If you think your term is almost over and you are not going to do anything, I don’t think that’s acceptable. Resign, or consider stepping down quickly so that someone who wants to work can come in and help,” Surasak said.

That criticism comes at a sensitive time for Thailand’s tourism industry. Tourism is a key driver of Thailand’s economy, which has lagged regional peers since the pandemic, as it contributes to about 12% of GDP. Year-to-date foreign tourist arrivals were registered at 22.7 million, down 3.7% year-on-year, as of September 26, according to data from the Ministry of Tourism and Sports.

For international travelers, flooding that affects roads and neighborhoods may be an expected seasonal disruption. However, flooding that leaves luggage stranded at the country’s main international gateway is different. It can turn a weather event into a direct test of the country’s ability to keep its tourism infrastructure functioning.

The episode also highlights a broader challenge for Thailand because tourism recovery is not simply about bringing more visitors through the airport. It depends on whether the country can deliver a reliable experience once they arrive — from transportation and airports to hotels, attractions, and basic infrastructure.

Myanmar 🇲🇲

Foreign Travel Bloggers and Youtubers Claim Normalcy in Myanmar

by Ley Hlaing

Over the past two to three years, a couple of foreign influencers and youtubers have been claiming that Myanmar is a fun, safe country to travel and spend time on vacation, little do they know or they are intentionally ignoring the sufferings of people of Myanmar with their misleading thumbnails while joyfully immersing themselves in the junta’s mechanism of normalizing the turmoil with the use of tourism.

A few assertions by the youtubers and travel bloggers that Myanmar is going back to normal and safe to visit starting from 2022, have now become quite frequent especially after the former junta leader, Mig Aung Hlaing became president in 2026. A few critical questions should be asked: who are those people? And why do they come to Myanmar and claim the country is okay to visit now? Seeking answers to these questions will explain a broader part of the story. Their content titles are like “I Spend 72 Hours In A Country At War 🇲🇲,” “24 Hours Eating Noodles in War-Torn Myanmar 🇲🇲” portraying themselves as real great adventurers and culturalists, eating outside the local cuisine in Yangon and some major cities.

Recently, some local frustration came up with those foreign YouTubers using misleading and AI-generated thumbnails and praising a “fun, safe country” just only visiting the urban places like Yangon and Mandalay. Local residents note these creators enjoy strict “tourist privileges” in highly protected bubbles while remaining completely undermining to everyday local threats like forced conscription, sudden raids, and arbitrary detention which are not the primary targets applying on them. While these hypocrites foreign bloggers can easily ride on a taxi and go out at nights for exploratory fun to the Chinatown, a local youth would hardly go outside after 7PM MMT due to the forced conscription and scared of night crime in their own town and country. The local youth might ask if that is not hypocrisy, what else would be. Their ignorance is very inhumane and a complete total inconsideration.

In fact, they are within the junta’s mechanism of manufacturing stability. A comprehensive report in The Diplomat outlines how the military’s Ministry of Information actively manufactures narratives of stability. This includes state-backed media infrastructure designed to mask the ongoing crisis and push structural propaganda. Some people commented that these content creators are “junta’s unofficial assets” suspecting for doing contents like these, they might even have gotten a free visa or an invitation. The debate over whether visiting the country helps or hurts its citizens is long-standing. Analysis on New Mandala and historical features by The Diplomat explore how the state uses tourism and the reopening of travel to project normalcy and secure state revenue, even as resistance groups urge boycotts to block funds from reaching military-affiliated businesses.

Despite the fact that their own governments are declaring that Myanmar is a red zone and unsafe to travel, these bloggers are actively involving in spreading junta’s pleasure and narratives. Looking at those bloggers and their fame, many frustrated locals remark that these so-called bloggers are kind of trash, they cannot make those contents in their own soil, which triggers a brutal truth that it is a win-win situation for both the junta and these creators; the former manufacturing stability and reviving tourism and the latter, the fake and misleading popularity. It is their responsibility to what extent they express about a country they are shooting a content. However, it is way more dangerous and a misleading conclusion to say everything is sound and safe only after visiting cities like Yangon and Mandalay. On the other hand, those who work on the travel agencies and business, they see this is a great opportunity to showcase that some places in the country can be traveled and become renowned which is good for the country. All in all, safety is first for travel and thus if these content creators are truly adventurous, they should also go to the battling places and draw a conclusion. These bloggers should know that they can do better and it should always be questionable about the correct safety of a country one is travelling to and the true popularity will only be achieved when they do not paint false narratives on the lives of the people of Myanmar.

Ley Hlaing is a former Political Science student from the University of Yangon, Myanmar. Currently, he is pursuing his BA at Parami University with a major in Philosophy, Politics and Economics. His academic and professional interests span community development, literature, minority issues, and social impact research. Having held roles as Research Assistant, Student Mentor, and Facilitator for local initiatives, he has constantly supported project management in literature and education programs in Myanmar.

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Cambodia 🇰🇭

Cambodia Begins Enforcing Military Service Law as About 3,000 Apply in First Week

by Sokna Thea, in Phnom Penh

Cambodia has begun enforcing its new military service law, with about 3,000 young people signing up in the first day, Prime Minister Hun Manet said on Friday last week. The government has yet to release a detailed breakdown of the applicants, and the figure could rise as registration continues.

The law took effect in May 2026, replacing a 2006 statute that was never put into practice. Under the new rules, male citizens aged 18 to 25 can be required to serve for 24 months, up from 18 months under the old law. Women can also apply voluntarily.

Recruits will be chosen through a mix of voluntary enlistment and a draft lottery. The Ministry of National Defence will set an annual quota based on the armed forces’ needs. Officials have indicated a target of roughly 8,500 new recruits for 2026, but no official cap has been published.

Defense Minister Tea Seiha said registration forms are being handed out from October 1 to October 9, with completed forms accepted between October 10 and October 15. Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet called 2026 a “historic year” for the law and said future intakes would happen gradually each year.

Those selected will serve for 24 months. The first three months will be basic training, followed by practical postings. Hun Manet said training would cover not only combat skills but also radio communications, electronics repair, and aircraft maintenance. He added that recruits would learn about drones and artificial intelligence, describing the program as an investment in both national defense and young people’s skills.

The law includes penalties for avoiding service. In peacetime, evasion can lead to six months to two years in prison and fines of up to $1,000. During war or foreign attack, the penalty can rise to five years in prison and higher fines. Exemptions are granted to Buddhist monks, other religious clergy, and people with disabilities. Some citizens can request a deferral, including for up to one year in certain cases.

The move to enforce conscription comes after renewed security concerns along the Cambodia-Thailand border. Deadly clashes in 2025 left soldiers and civilians dead and displaced families. Hun Manet announced plans to start enforcing the law in mid-2025, shortly after those incidents.

Civil society groups say national service can be legitimate, but they urge strong safeguards. Am Sam Ath of the rights group LICADHO said the government must ensure adequate allowances and clear legal protections so recruits can return to their studies and jobs without harm. Ny Sokha of ADHOC warned that penalties may hit poorer citizens hardest and expressed concern over provisions that could be used against government critics. Observers are calling for transparent, corruption-free lottery and selection processes.

Sokna has a background in International Affairs and Business & Commercial Law. He’s currently a Senior Project Coordinator at the Ministry of Economy and Finance of Cambodia, working on the Financial Management Information System (FMIS) Project. His professional focus is driven by entrepreneurship, business development, and financial technology, with a particular interest in how private-sector innovation drives Cambodia’s economic growth.

Lao PDR 🇱🇦

Countdown to November 24 as Lao PDR prepares to Leave the LDC List

by Souriya Bounpaseuth, in Vientiane

On 24 November 2026, Laos is scheduled to graduate from the UN’s Least Developed Country (LDC) category, according to the UN’s LDC Portal. With the date weeks away, the government has restated its position publicly. On 25 September, on the sidelines of the 81st UN General Assembly in New York, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Thongsavan Phomvihane told the UN High Representative for the LDCs that Laos was fully prepared to graduate this year. He also asked for international support to strengthen the economy beyond graduation.

The case for graduation rests on measurable progress. Laos reached a Gross National Income (GNI) per capita of 2,503 USD in the 2024 UN review, well above the 1,306 USD graduation threshold, and has met all three criteria since 2021. Human development has been central. Officials note that progress in human assets contributed to Laos qualifying, and that further gains in health, education and nutrition will remain important after it leaves the category. The road has not been short, though. Laos first targeted 2020, then 2024, before settling on 2026.

Graduation does not mean support ends overnight. Laos’ Smooth Transition Strategy sets three goals: a smooth, quality and sustainable graduation. The strategy is part of a wider plan, since graduation preparations are embedded in the 10th National Socio-Economic Development Plan for 2026–2030. A transition period is reported to run until 2029, giving exporters, ministries and development partners time to adjust as LDC-specific measures phase out.

The effects will not be felt equally across the economy. A joint UN study listed on the LDC Portal found that textiles and clothing in five Asian LDCs, Laos among them, make heavy use of LDC trade preferences and are among the sectors most likely to be affected. The ILO has also stressed that responsible business conduct will be essential for maintaining market access and competitiveness, pointing to standards, skills and compliance as the next test for Lao enterprises.

Lao officials have been open about the risks ahead. At a UN meeting, Laos’ Permanent Representative to the UN, Thongphan Savanphet, cautioned that the period after graduation could be fragile if support measures were withdrawn too quickly, with shifts in climate, trade and digital technology bringing both opportunities and new risks. He also pointed to digital transformation, green growth and regional integration as possible routes to trade and investment and a more resilient economy.

The date on the calendar will mark a milestone, but the real measure of success will come afterwards whether growth holds, whether households benefit, and whether the economy becomes more resilient.

Editorial Deadline 03/10/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Karen Ysabelle David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk

In this week’s Pacific Corridor newsletter, we talk about one of life’s great inevitabilities: taxes.

In the Philippines, a proposed 15% global minimum tax on large multinational enterprises (MNEs) continues to make progress. But for investors, this begs the question: what happens when tax incentives result in an MNE’s effective tax rate falling below the 15% threshold? Meanwhile, Singapore’s small and medium enterprises are joining in on the AI adoption race that is fast becoming a trend in the region. But with the city-state’s larger firms still far ahead, can government initiatives such as tax deductions for AI spending do the trick in closing the gap?

Vietnam this week is focused on bigger problems as it tries to maintain its balance between two opposing giants, following Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to the United States in late September. With every move, the US and China can send shockwaves throughout the world, forcing smaller countries like Vietnam to be on constant alert.

The Philippines 🇵🇭

New Philippine Bill Proposes 15% Global Minimum Tax (GMT), But What Happens to Tax Incentives?

by Arianne De Guzman, in Bulacan

The Philippines has made progress toward imposing a 15% global minimum tax (GMT) on large multinational enterprises (MNEs), with the introduction of measures on how they would be supported during the transition and how tax incentives under the CREATE MORE and other special laws would be treated.

On 3 September 2026, Congressman Adrian Salceda filed House Bill (HB) 11114, a bill that would implement the Qualified Minimum Top-Up Tax (QDMTT) Tax based on the GMT. The bill is currently pending before the House Committee on Ways and Means. Under the proposed framework, in-scope MNEs would be mandated to pay a top-up tax in the Philippines when their effective tax rate (ETR) falls below 15%.

The policy issue for investors is what happens when tax incentives result in an MNE’s ETR falling below the given 15% threshold.

According to the latest technical guide by the Fiscal Incentives Review Board (FIRB), the adoption of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Global Anti-Base Erosion (GloBE) Rules (Pillar 2) would not automatically strip covered MNEs of their registered status or entitlement to tax incentives.

However, the FIRB made it clear that income tax-based incentives can lower an MNE’s tax liability and can translate into a lower ETR, which could, in turn, lead to potential QDMTT exposure, effectively attenuating the savings gained. These benefits include tax holidays, the 5% special corporate income tax rate, and reduced corporate tax brackets.

To maintain the Philippines’ investment competitiveness while complying with the GloBE Rules, the government is actively exploring non-income tax mechanisms and plans to expand the enhanced deductions regime. Those measures would shift the conversation toward expenditure- and production-based incentives, making tax incentives linked to investment rather than profits.

HB 11114 addresses the treatment of qualifying incentives through a Substance-based Tax Incentive Safe Harbor. As an option for an in-scope MNE, qualifying tax incentives under the Global Anti-Base Erosion (GloBE) Rules may be treated as Covered Taxes when determining the jurisdictional ETR, subject to a substance-based limitation. In practice, the safe harbor does not mean that the incentives stop reducing the taxes counted in the ETR calculation. Rather, qualifying incentives may be added to Covered Taxes when calculating the GloBE ETR, subject to the applicable limitation.

It is important to note that this distinction matters because the treatment of an incentive under the GloBE Rules can affect whether it contributes to a top-up tax liability. MNEs planning to invest in the Philippines must also look into their investment’s value after taxes.

Beyond tax incentives, HB 11114 also provides non-fiscal support for qualifying investments, such as research and development, workforce training, high-technology production, and enabling infrastructure. The FIRB would be required to conduct a quantified cost-benefit analysis and determine that the support is necessary to secure the investment and limited to the minimum amount necessary.

If enacted, the bill would shift the investment conversation from simply offering tax relief to determining which incentives remain effective under a 15% global tax floor and what other forms of support can be used alongside them under the proposed framework.


Arianne has experience in policy research at De La Salle University’s Jesse M. Robredo Institute of Governance, where she contributed to projects on systemic reform. She earned a degree in Political Science from Colegio de San Juan de Letran. Currently, she works in government relations, specializing in advocacy strategy, legislative monitoring, and stakeholder engagement. Beyond her professional work, she is actively involved in youth development and grassroots initiatives through the Rotaract Club of Santa Maria.

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Singapore 🇸🇬

Singapore's AI Adoption and the Gap It Still Has to Close

by Ryan

When a hotel chef phoned Alan Tan in March 2025 to ask about a missing order of 2,000 pieces of kueh (bite-sized snack), the third-generation owner of Peranakan heritage brand HarriAnns Nonya Table did not have a supply problem. He had a paperwork problem. Several pages of the hotel’s purchase order had failed to print, so the missing items never made it into the manual tally that administrative staff compiled each day for the central kitchen. “I told my kitchen staff: ‘I don’t care, you have to make the order right now,’” Tan recalled to The Straits Times. That scramble pushed a business built on three generations of handmade recipes toward an AI-enabled ordering and billing system, developed for under SGD 50,000 with half the cost underwritten by Enterprise Singapore’s Enterprise Development Grant, which now catches the tally errors that once threatened HarriAnns’ contracts with five-star hotels, which includes the Shangri-La and the Fullerton.

Across town, the beachside Italian restaurant Fico had a different kind of problem: it was leaving revenue on the table. Operator The Lo & Behold Group had long refused to overbook Fico’s East Coast Park capacity for fear of long waits, until a project team built a tool on Anthropic’s Claude Code that analyzed historical reservations, dining durations, and guest habits to identify windows when the restaurant could safely accept more bookings than its seating allowed. Within a month of its June rollout, the tool lifted weekend revenue by 2%, Chief Operating Officer Rifeng Gao told The Straits Times, noting that the underlying pattern was too granular for staff to track by hand.

Neither story involves a dramatic robotic overhaul, and that, increasingly, is the point of Singapore’s AI push. The Infocomm Media Development Authority (IMDA) reported in October that AI adoption among small and medium enterprises tripled in a single year, from 4.2% in 2023 to 14.5% in 2024, even as adoption among larger firms climbed from 44% to 62.5%. That gap matters as much as either figure: AI is fast becoming standard practice for big firms while remaining a minority pursuit among the smaller enterprises that dominate Singapore’s economy. Closing that gap is the explicit goal of the city-state’s policy architecture. The Productivity Solutions Grant and Enterprise Development Grant have underwritten AI purchases for years, and Budget 2026 layered on a 400% tax deduction for qualifying AI spending, capped at SGD 50,000 a year, alongside a new “Champions of AI” program run jointly by Enterprise Singapore and Digital Industry Singapore. A newer National AI Impact Program targets 10,000 firms and 100,000 workers by 2029.

That difference travels well past Singapore’s borders. A Lazada and Kantar survey of online sellers across ASEAN found Indonesian and Vietnamese merchants already using AI across 42% of business functions, with Singaporean and Thai sellers close behind and Malaysian sellers trailing at 26%, even as every government in the bloc claims a national AI strategy. What grants and targets cannot buy is the moment of decision that actually moves a small business from strategy to shop floor. That moment belongs to people like Alan Tan, insisting his kitchen make the order right now instead of writing off the loss, and Rifeng Gao, betting a single restaurant’s weekend on a tool nobody had tested before June. Ten thousand subsidized firms become ten thousand transformed ones only when enough owners, from Tiong Bahru to Ho Chi Minh City, make that same unglamorous choice: trusting the machine with the one problem that has quietly cost them money for years.


Ryan is a final-year finance student at the Singapore University of Social Sciences (SUSS) with experience across venture capital, venture debt, and business development. He also holds a diploma in Law and Management from Temasek Polytechnic. His interests lie in how emerging technologies and economic trends shape business ecosystems and regional development in Asia.

Vietnam 🇻🇳

Two Giants vs. Vietnam’s Strategic Balancing

by Hang Nguyen, in Ho Chi Minh City

Looking back on past decades, any political or diplomatic moment by the United States and China caused ripples in the trajectory of global affairs. The world has arguably been operating in a prolonged state of U.S.–China hegemonic competition, evident through prevalent themes and popularized International Relations terminology dedicated to navigating great power rivalry, including “BANI” (Brittle, Anxious, Nonlinear, Incomprehensible), “resilience”, and “hedging.”

Subsequent to President Trump’s state visit to Beijing in May, from 23 to 25 September, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and President Xi Jinping made his first official state visit to Washington D.C. in more than a decade. The delegation was welcomed by the Trump administration as a two-day high-level dialogue covering issues as varied as trade, Taiwan, Iran, AI, and fentanyl. Many thought pieces focused on analyzing the changes, symbolic or substantive, to U.S.–China relations. However, this article directs anticipation toward the implications on Vietnam.

Skeptic discourse with regard to Vietnam’s capacity to strategically balance cooperation with the United States and China already exists, only becoming more amplified with different possible developments.

In the scenario of U.S.–China’s mutual concession on regional issues, Vietnam may become vulnerable in its maritime disputes in the South China Sea, as Washington’s priority on a stable bilateral relationship could come at the expense of smaller claimants. Hanoi has long relied on the American naval presence and diplomatic support for the 2016 arbitral ruling to complicate Beijing’s calculations. Should détente lead Washington to quietly downplay these signals, China would face fewer external constraints in pressuring Vietnamese fishing and energy activities. The concern, therefore, is less a dramatic abandonment than a gradual erosion, in which the costs of resistance rise while American attention falls.

Economically, Vietnam has thrived on supply chain diversification away from China. A trade thaw could weaken firms’ incentive to relocate, while renewed scrutiny of transshipment could expose Vietnamese exporters to penalties from both sides. Yet the opposite scenario carries its own risks. Should the summit’s goodwill prove short-lived, Vietnam would again face pressure to choose sides through technology restrictions, security partnerships, or investment screening. Its “bamboo diplomacy” depends on both giants tolerating ambiguity, and confrontation narrows that space.

A subtler implication concerns leverage. Vietnam’s value to Washington has rested on being both a counterweight and a manufacturing alternative, and warmer U.S.–China ties may dilute both roles, making its hedging less rewarded. Beijing, meanwhile, may read a softer American posture as the green light to push bilateral negotiations over the South China Sea, where the asymmetry between the two claimants is at its starkest.

Doubts over Washington’s commitments could also strain ASEAN cohesion, weakening the collective voice Vietnam needs on maritime issues, while visible concessions at sea would test the domestic legitimacy Hanoi draws from both economic growth and the defense of sovereignty.

Ultimately, both outcomes of the summit carry costs for Vietnam. Détente risks making Hanoi less relevant, while rivalry risks making its choices harder. In an era of “BANI” dynamics, stability between giants is not necessarily stability for those beside them, further forcing countries like Ha Noi to be highly adaptive.


Hang is a young researcher with academic experience in Vietnam and the United States. She has previously worked in public relations at the U.S. Consulate General in Ho Chi Minh City and the YSEALI Academy. Her research focuses on ASEAN centrality in the evolving Asia-Pacific landscape, with particular attention to Vietnam’s approach to trade, regional cooperation, and political economy in the face of external power dynamics and global volatility.

Editorial Deadline 29/09/2025 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Siu Tzyy Wei, Lead Editor - Maritime Crescent Desk

This week, the ship that travels across the Maritime Crescent begins to adjust its sails.

In Indonesia, the people watch their coal industry as an indigenous tycoon rises and an old Chinese-Indonesian dynasty retreating knowing very well that the presidency, more than the market, now decides who rises and who gets squeezed. As Brunei advances on its maritime engagements with its Southeast Asian partners through multilateral cooperation and information sharing, Malaysia navigates new waves of opportunities and concerns with its recent rise in the global passport rankings.

Where the sails turn, the stories continue.

Indonesia 🇮🇩

Here Be Dragons

by Rayhan Prabu Kusumo, in Jakarta

In September, one of Indonesia’s largest coal producers began to change hands at a startling price. Haji Isam, a Kalimantan tycoon and President Prabowo’s most generous backer, agreed to buy into Bayan Resources after an opening offer roughly eighty per cent below market value. Bayan, a company owned by a Chinese-Indonesian tycoon Low Tuck Kwong, had just been hobbled by the government’s own coal quota, which capped how much it could sell. In the same weeks, the Hartono family, the country’s richest and long known for keeping its money at home, was moving more than a billion dollars abroad.

The obvious reading is a changing of the guard — an indigenous tycoon rising and an old Chinese-Indonesian dynasty retreating. Jakarta commentators call it the Nine Haji displacing the Nine Dragons. The evidence is clear. When Danantara, the state’s new investment fund, needed capital, much of it came from the Chinese-Indonesian conglomerates it was supposedly superseding, which lined up to buy its Patriot Bonds. The families at the top are the ones that have been there for decades. What has changed is what it costs them to stay.

The new cost is subordination. Haji Isam buys where the state permits and runs the projects it hands him, including its flagship food estate in Merauke. The Hartonos move money offshore as insurance and still buy the Patriot Bond to stay in favour. Both are responding to the same fact: the presidency, more than the market, now decides who rises and who gets squeezed. The instruments are discretionary, things like a coal quota granted or withheld, a tax inquiry that ends with someone stopped at the airport, a presidential speech denouncing robber barons. This is what explains the Bayan price. The state’s quota made the company cheap, and the state’s favourite was positioned to buy it.

Governments have done this before. A leader who distrusts a wealthy class seldom abolishes it; he brings it to heel. After Khodorkovsky was jailed in 2003, Russia’s remaining oligarchs understood that their fortunes existed at the Kremlin’s pleasure. Those who complied kept their money, and those who resisted lost it or took it to London. Indonesia’s version is gentler, applied through tax probes and travel bans as opposed to prison sentences, but the principle is the same. Private wealth is tolerated while it is useful to the centre.

There is a real case for what Prabowo is doing. The tycoons built their fortunes on political protection and cheap access to resources, wealth is extremely concentrated and skewed along ethnic lines, and making them pay more into the common account is a defensible aim. The problem is the method. Disciplining capital through discretion merely renegotiates wealth and power, with fewer names on the list and one office choosing them. The tycoons understand this, which is why some are buying and some are leaving. Everyone else gets an investment climate in which the most valuable asset is proximity to the president.


Rayhan has a background in government affairs and public policy, with experience across government institutions and advisory firms. His work focuses on the intersection of geopolitics, policy, and risk, with expertise in advocacy, regulatory analysis, and stakeholder engagement. He holds a degree in Government from Universitas Padjadjaran, and has completed an exchange at Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Spain, focusing on global politics and sustainability.

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Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳

Multilateral Maritime Engagement: Brunei Hosts ReCAAP Cluster Meeting

by Wira Gregory Ejau, in Bandar Seri Begawan

From September 21 to 24, the Royal Brunei Police Force and the National Maritime Coordination Centre co-hosted the ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre Cluster Meeting 2026 in Bandar Seri Begawan, bringing together senior officials from Brunei, Cambodia, China, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam to exchange threat assessments and coordinate responses to maritime crime across the sub-region.

Alongside the Royal Brunei Police Force, Royal Brunei Armed Forces, and the Maritime and Port Authority, the meeting included representatives from Brunei Gas Carriers, Brunei Shell Petroleum, and Brunei LNG. The presence of these energy sector stakeholders at the maritime security forum highlights the growing importance of evolving maritime security threats for an LNG-exporting economy based in a largely peaceful country. Brunei’s hydrocarbon revenues depend on the uninterrupted movement of vessels, which the ReCAAP framework exists to secure, as maritime insecurity is a direct threat to the infrastructure underpinning national income.

The Assistant Commissioner of Police Haji Hamri Aslan, who also serves as ReCAAP ISC Governor for Brunei, framed the forum’s purpose beyond piracy in the following statement: “ReCAAP Focal Points in Southeast Asia face common security challenges such as armed robbery against ships, contraband smuggling, IUU fishing and irregular human migration.” While addressing piracy in the conventional sense has remained of utmost importance, the cluster meeting also reflects a threat environment that has broadened considerably into grey-zone issues that encompass fishing violations, smuggling networks, and migration pressures that engage coastguard, police, military, and civilian agencies simultaneously.

ReCAAP’s Half Year Report for January to June 2026 of this year recorded 35 incidents of armed robbery against ships in Asia, which was a 64% decrease from 96 incidents in the same period in 2025, and the lowest figure for any first half-year since 2019. The Straits of Malacca and Singapore (SOMS) have historically been one of the region’s most active hotspots, and accounted for 60% of total incidents, but did see a 74% year-on-year reduction. This was attributed explicitly to coordinated law enforcement action by the littoral states and visible countermeasures by the shipping industry, with Philippine ports and anchorages being the notable counter-trend, rising from zero to ten incidents in the same period.

The SOMS improvement is directly attributable to Indonesian enforcement arrests in 2025, which followed intelligence coordination through the information-sharing infrastructure that ReCAAP exists to provide. In part, the cluster meeting provided an opportunity to examine that model of cause and effect, along with what actionable information sharing was produced and how it could be replicated elsewhere in the network.

Brunei’s hosting role follows the SOCTPF co-chairmanship in June, PACIFIC ANGEL in August, and anticipates the 6th SOCTPF in 2027. The consistent thread is a state-building institutional presence across multiple security architectures simultaneously through convening capacity, information exchange, and multilateral hosting. In a regional security environment where the most persistent threats are transnational rather than interstate, that is a credible and sustainable form of contribution.


Wira holds an MSc in Strategic Studies from the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), with specialised certificates in Terrorism Studies and U.S. Foreign Policy. He works as a freelance writer specialising in history, security and international relations theory, with experience in academia, investigative journalism, and voluntary uniformed service. He currently provides research analysis and consultation on Southeast Asian geopolitics for the Security Observer.

Malaysia 🇲🇾

Power to Move

by Muhammad Aiman Bin Roszaimi, in Cyberjaya

Malaysia’s passport has climbed to second place in the 2026 Passport Index Global Ranking, sharing the position with Singapore and behind the United Arab Emirates. Malaysian passport holders now have access to 175 destinations, including 129 visa-free destinations and 46 offering visa-on-arrival access.

The achievement is certainly worth noting. The more interesting question is not how many countries Malaysians can visit without a visa, but why so many countries are willing to let Malaysians enter with relatively few barriers in the first place? Passport strength is, in part, a product of diplomacy.

Visa-free access does not emerge simply because a country has a strong economy. It is negotiated through bilateral relations, assessments of migration and security risks, reciprocity and perceptions of political stability. The passport can be understood as one small, everyday manifestation of that diplomatic network.

Yet there is an important caveat before celebrating the number too much. “Passport power” is not the same as national power.

The ranking measures mobility and access. It does not measure military capability, economic size, technological capacity, diplomatic influence or the ability to shape international institutions. Nevertheless, the passport ranking captures international openness; in an increasingly fragmented world where states are tightening borders, screening travellers more closely and introducing new immigration restrictions, the ability of Malaysian citizens to move relatively freely across borders represents a form of accumulated diplomatic capital.

For a trading country seeking foreign investment, tourism, international education, professional mobility and deeper economic integration, economic mobility also matters. Although Malaysia seeks to position itself as a middle power, the country still depends partly on connectivity by maintaining multilateral relationships and remaining sufficiently open to engage with diverse partners.

But there is also a lesson here for Malaysian diplomacy. Maintaining passport strength requires more than celebrating rankings. But it does suggest that Malaysian citizens inhabit a country whose diplomatic doors remain unusually open to the world. And in an era when more countries are building walls, that openness is itself a form of strategic capital.


Aiman is a PhD candidate in Security and Strategic Analysis at the National University of Malaysia. His research focuses on Malaysia’s space policy, ASEAN regional security, and the strategic implications of emerging technologies. His work explores how Malaysia’s defense policy and strategic culture shape its approach to outer space.

Editorial Deadline 26/09/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk

Some plans work exactly as intended right up until they don't. In Myanmar, junta leader Min Aung Hlaing sat for his first Western interview since the 2021 coup hoping to project a rebuilt image to the world, only for TIME's "dictator" headline to trigger a public ban on the outlet and drag back into view the war and economic collapse the interview was meant to distract from. In Thailand, Bangkok's declarations of climate resilience at the UN ran headlong into a very different reality at home, as monsoon flooding across all 50 districts forced the postponement of a national election and exposed how far the city's infrastructure lagged behind its pledges. And in Laos, months of quiet containment measures against African Swine Fever weren't enough to keep the disease from reaching Vientiane's dinner tables, pushing pork prices up 50% and closing off even the informal cross-border workarounds families relied on.

Myanmar 🇲🇲

Rare Western Interview Brings Myanmar Junta Back Into Spotlight

by Myat Moe Kywe

A rare interview granted by Myanmar’s military juntas to a major Western outlet has ignited a sharp domestic backlash this week, even as it exposes the junta’s broader campaign to rebuild credibility with both its regional neighbors and the West.

TIME magazine published the piece, titled “Myanmar’s Dictator Wants to Rebuild Ties With the West,” on September 23, based on an interview conducted at the President’s Office in Naypyidaw on August 28 between Min Aung Hlaing and TIME’s Editor-at-Large, Charlie Campbell. It marked Min Aung Hlaing’s first interview with Western media since he seized power in the 2021 coup, and came months after Campbell first pitched the interview towards Myanmar’s regime in late April under the working title “The Future of Myanmar,” framed around regime efforts toward peace and stability.

The final product was far from what Naypyidaw anticipated. TIME’s headline flatly labeled Min Aung Hlaing a “dictator,” and the article repeatedly referred to him as a military leader who “calls himself President,” language that appears to have particularly made the regime publish a condemnation statement against TIME and Campbell. The regime responded by blacklisting Campbell, demanding the story’s removal, and banning TIME in Myanmar, accusing the outlet of failing to accurately reflect the answers given and of including “non-constructive writing, interviews with other individuals and unfounded commentaries.”

Inside the story, Min Aung Hlaing used the platform to press for sanctions relief, framing renewed engagement as mutually beneficial for Myanmar and the international community. On the long-stalled Rohingya repatriation agreement, he tied progress to the rollback of legal challenges against the state, warning that without movement the matter becomes unresolvable. He was noncommittal on a possible amnesty for Aung San Suu Kyi, saying it depends on her, while leaving room for reconsideration on the military’s part.

The interview did not occur in isolation. It follows a deliberate pattern of outreach by Min Aung Hlaing toward fellow ASEAN states since his inauguration as president, including bi-lateral state visits to Laos, Thailand, Vietnam, and Cambodia — trips regional and international media have cast as a “diplomatic comeback tour” as reported on Straits Time. Combined with the TIME sit-down, observers read the moves as a coordinated push to normalize the regime’s standing on two fronts simultaneously: consolidating legitimacy within ASEAN while testing the waters for a reset with the West.

Yet the article’s broader reporting undercut that narrative. It documented a military stretched by a civil war showing no sign of ending, a failing economy that has contracted sharply since the coup alongside a weakened Myanmar Kyats and collapsing foreign investment, and a regime increasingly reliant on Beijing and Moscow for military and diplomatic support.

This week’s development has put Myanmar back into the international spotlight through a rare interview with its military leader. What was intended as an opportunity for the regime to present its case to the West instead produced a storyline to reignite the story of what is happening in Myanmar, with its subsequent backlash from the regime against TIME drawing further attention to the story and the wider realities it sought to present.


Myat is a B.A. graduate in Politics, Philosophy, and Economics. She has interned at The Asia Foundation in Washington, D.C., and she has also worked as a summer research assistant at the Centre for Policy and Innovation (CRPI), gaining experience in research and analysis. Her work focuses on civic engagement, gender, youth leadership, and community development.

Thailand 🇹🇭

How Heavy Rain and Structural Vulnerabilities Deepen Crisis Across Bangkok

by Paranut Juntree, in Bangkok

On September 26, 2026, the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA) expanded its emergency disaster declaration across all 50 districts of the capital. While framed as an immediate administrative step to unlock emergency relief funds and mobilize citywide support, the decision underscores a profound structural vulnerability for millions of residents and working-class communities struggling to navigate an inundated urban landscape.

The primary trigger for the acute flooding was a series of intense monsoon downpours exceeding 300 mm of accumulated rainfall over a short span. However, the severity of the flooding exposes deeper, systemic failures rooted in Bangkok’s unsustainable urban planning. Decades of uncoordinated development, concrete coverage, and the loss of natural water retention zones have left the low-lying metropolis severely constrained. Compounded by ongoing land subsidence, Bangkok’s aging canal network and pumping systems quickly reach capacity during severe downpours. Water trapped in secondary streets and residential sub-districts cannot discharge efficiently into the Chao Phraya River, creating protracted urban pools. To assist displaced citizens and vulnerable groups, the BMA had to open temporary shelter centers inside municipal schools, distributing sandbag barriers and mobilizing utility vehicles for stranded commuters.

This physical paralysis immediately spilled over into civic life, creating unexpected friction around democratic participation. A notable casualty of this emergency was the nationwide Social Security Board election. Originally scheduled for late September to choose employer and employee representatives, the election ran into severe logistical obstacles as major transit routes, polling venues, and administrative centers across Bangkok and nearby provinces became inundated. Recognizing that flooded roads and disrupted public transit would systematically disenfranchise millions of insured workers unable to reach polling booths, the Social Security Office (SSO) ultimately issued an emergency postponement. The delay illustrates how fragile infrastructure can compromise fundamental institutional and democratic processes.

The ongoing inundation on the ground stands in stark contrast to Thailand’s high-level diplomatic engagement at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). While Thai representatives at UNG highlight national commitments to climate adaption, carbon neutrality, and the Sustainable Development Goals, the paralysis across the country’s capital highlights an execution gap between international policy pledges and local resilience. While multilateral advocacy for loss-and-damage support remains essential, the domestic crisis demonstrates that global diplomacy must be grounded in immediate, functional urban adaptation at home.

To uphold the country’s commitments to public safety and long-term climate resilience, the Thai government and municipal leaders should establish clear operational frameworks to safeguard urban communities from recurring climate disasters. Guaranteeing climate-resilient infrastructure and institutional adaption would ensure domestic governance aligns with international standards without compromising democratic participation and public safety.


Paranut has a background in advocacy, with experience in policy research, communications, and civic engagement across both the NGO and government sectors. As Thailand’s Youth Delegate to the United Nations, he represented Thai youth in global dialogues on migration, education, and human rights, championing inclusive policymaking. He holds a degree in political science with a specialization in international relations.

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Lao PDR 🇱🇦

Swine Fever Outbreak Widens Across Laos

by Thongsavanh Souvannasane, in Vientiane

Pork has all but vanished from some markets in Vientiane Capital, and the Lao-style barbecue buffets that Lao people love for their sliced pork belly are quietly swapping in beef and buffalo to keep the grills running.

The cause lies hundreds kilometers away, where African Swine Fever (ASF) has torn through 15 districts across seven provinces, killing or forcing the culling of nearly 13,000 pigs nationwide.

As of 17 September, 9,066 pigs died from the disease and a further 3,688 culled to break the chain of transmission.

The outbreak traces back to Namtuan village, Xayabouly district, in mid-June, when it had reached only two provinces. Within weeks, it swept through 38 villages across six districts of Xayabouly and 17 villages in Bountai district, Phongsaly Province.

ASF is a highly contagious viral disease affecting domestic and wild pigs, with a mortality rate close to 100 percent in infected animals, according to the World Organisation for Animal Health. It does not infect humans, though people can spread it between pigs through contaminated clothing, equipment, or food. Its economic toll is severe nonetheless, wiping out herds and disrupting pork supply chains from farm to kitchen.

This is not Laos’ first brush with the virus, which struck first in March 2019 in Toumlan district, Salavanh Province, in the south, before spreading nationwide and subsiding within a year, aided by COVID-19 border closures that limited the movement that spread it. This time, the disease has taken root far to the north, beginning in Xayabouly Province.

Officials blame illegal smuggling, unregulated pork trading, and farmers secretly selling meat from dead pigs at cut-rate prices, a practice that only accelerates the spread.

The government has moved to contain it.

The Prime Minister’s Office issued a notice on 10 September banning pork imports from abroad and tightening monitoring of pig movement between provinces. Xayabouly has gone further, banning the purchase, sale, and transport of pigs outright and setting up 19 checkpoints at border crossings and district and provincial boundaries.

Response teams have buried and disinfected infected livestock and distributed disinfectant, dewormer, and insecticide to affected farms.

Back in the capital, the squeeze is showing up in wallets.

Pork prices have jumped from a typical LAK 60,000 to 70,000 (USD 2.7 to 3.1) per kg to as high as LAK 90,000 (USD 4), even though authorities have not confirmed an outbreak in Vientiane Capital itself. Beef has followed, rising from around LAK 160,000 (USD 7.1) to between LAK 170,000 and 200,000 (USD 7.6 and 8.9) as shoppers switch over.

Residents who once crossed the Mekong bridges into Thailand for cheaper meat can no longer carry it back across the border, closing off one of the last workarounds left.

For now, with the outbreak still active and no end in sight, shoppers, restaurateurs, and farmers alike, in Vientiane and beyond, are left to adjust.

Thongsavanh is a journalist from Laos with a background in English-language media. He graduated from the Lao-American Institute with a Diploma of the Arts in English and contributes to independent news platforms. His reporting focuses on environmental issues, socio-economic development, and geopolitics.

Cambodia 🇰🇭

Cambodia Stock Index Soars to 4-Year High in August Trading Boom

by Malai Yatt, in Phnom Penh

Strong company fundamentals and resilient economic sentiment sparked a massive market rally on the Cambodia Securities Exchange in August, boosting daily trading volumes by roughly 300 percent over early 2026 averages as both local and institutional investors flooded the market.

In August, 2026, the market condition on the Cambodia Securities Exchange (CSX) gained

strong interest and active participation, with trading activity, trading volume, and share price surging sharply even as the annual dividend payout season has come to an end.

According to CSX’s official report, in August, the CSX Index closed at 541.02, an increase of 18 percent during the month and up nearly 28 percent over the first eight months of the year. Exceptionally, on August 26th, the index soared to 560.09, marking its highest level in the last four years (since March, 2022).

Furthermore, the average daily trading value in August reached KHR 3,175 million (almost $800,000), increasing approximately 300% compared to the daily figure across the first seven months of 2026.

“This positive momentum was driven by several key factors such as share prices remained

appealing relative to corporate potential and business fundamentals, historical dividend yields were strong, and listed companies reported positive financial performance and healthy growth in Q2, 2026”

CSX reported that 2,006 new trading accounts were opened in August alone, reflecting widespread public awareness and growing interest in the opportunity of generating additional income through equity investments. Alongside rising liquidity, investor participation also remarkably set a new record.

The actual figures testify to the resilient growth potential of Cambodia’s capital market. The

expansion of investor participation serves as a vital catalyst for the CSX to further broaden its services, develop new financial products, and modernize its technology infrastructure to serve a broader range of the interests of investors, the report added.

On September 10, Hong Sokhour, Royal Government Delegate in charge as CEO of the CSX confirmed that “CSX has a total of 28 listed companies, comprising 12 equity-listed companies and 16 corporate bond-listed companies. Collectively, these 28 companies have successfully raised approximately $720 million from the securities market.

Regarding the market performance, the average daily trading volume for the first eight months of 2026 increased by nearly 150 percent compared to 2025, with average daily trading value rising to $290,000, he added.

Overall, the CSX is experiencing sustained, resilient growth, driven by strong corporate performance, attractive dividend yields, and solid business fundamentals. This broadening public interest and institutional backing are providing a strong participation to expand its financial products.

Editorial Deadline 26/09/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Karen David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk

This week in the Pacific Corridor, we roll out the red carpet as we take a look at two of the region’s most high-profile and powerful families. In Vietnam, Thailand’s royal family makes a rare State Visit to Hanoi. But just beneath the pomp and circumstance of this royal affair, there lies the nitty-gritty goal of strengthening the economic ties between Vietnam and Thailand.

In the Philippines, the September 21 anniversary of the declaration of Martial Law has stirred not-so-distant memories of the Marcos political dynasty. With another Marcos as President, debates and discussions abound on the all-too-familiar topic of corruption. Can the current Marcos live up to his aspiration as an anti-corruption reformer, or is he all talk?

Away from the spotlight, in Timor-Leste, a growing wave of scam call center operations has brought growing concern — especially when the mastermind has yet to be found. Singapore is facing much the same conundrum: we take a look back to the start of the year, with the city-state confronting its own rise in scams.

Vietnam 🇻🇳

Beyond the Pageantry

by Tri Vo, in Ho Chi Minh City

Amidst the intensifying geopolitical contention within and without Southeast Asia, regional integration on a country-to-country basis is rapidly emerging as an effective countermeasure against the undulating waves of instability. Such a geopolitical chess move is being made under the spectacle of normal diplomatic engagements, under all the pomp and circumstance of international relations.

From 14 to 16 September, Thailand’s King Maha Vajiralongkorn and Queen Suthida embarked on a historic State Visit to Hanoi, marking the first such royal visit since the two nations established relations 50 years ago in 1976. While the ceremonial aspects of the trip heavily highlighted the diplomatic banality of deepening political trust and cultural affinity, the in-depth agenda, one that was out of sight and out of mind of the media as a whole, was firmly grounded in structural economic alignment. Indeed, beyond the outward pageantry, the visit was meant to accelerate the upgrade of Thailand–Vietnam bilateral relations into the tier of Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, thus binding the ties between the two nations ever more tightly.

The primary economic mandate of this partnership is the rapid and sustainable expansion of bilateral trade. In 2025, bilateral trade reached a mark of nearly US$22.1 billion. With such powerful momentum at their backs, policymakers from both Bangkok and Hanoi have eyed an aggressive immediate goal of US$25 billion. Yet, the sky has proved to be the limit even with so lofty a figure. Even as commercial relations are running red hot, diplomats and trade officials are actively laying the groundwork to push this figure toward an even more ambitious ballpark of US$50 billion in the longer term.

To achieve these massive trade volumes, Hanoi and Bangkok are rapidly implementing the “Three Connects” strategy. This framework targets the physical and institutional integration of supply chains, the alignment of grassroots business operations, and synchronized sustainable development strategies. Crucially, such a strategy is moving far beyond just trade. Recent high-level commercial exchanges have explicitly propounded bilateral cooperation in emerging fields such as artificial intelligence, semiconductor manufacturing, and biotechnology. Thailand has also offered to share its advanced capabilities in space technology and satellite utilization, further strengthening the economic ties between the two nations, not just on a superficial surface of ever-rising trade figures, but also on an even more meaningful level of engagement between the best and the brightest of both.

Ultimately, the Thai Royal Visit is not merely a commemoration of a fruitful 50-year relationship; it is a signal of two countries moving together, tying their bonds ever tighter under a more adverse milieu. As the world becomes more unstable, both nations are building mutual trust to the highest possible level, so that barriers may come undone, doubts may be unmade, and a new framework of partnership may emerge anew so that what will be is a Southeast Asia more interconnected and well-prepared to head off the challenges of the time. Such is the promise of deeper Vietnamese–Thai ties that it can serve as a stark reminder of the staying salience of bilateral relations within the larger bloc of ASEAN to act as a bedrock for group-wise solidarity.


Tri has experience in management consulting and strategy, having worked with institutions such as the UNDP, The Asia Group, and ARC Group. He has provided strategic, legal, and operational insights to clients in sectors including manufacturing, energy, and technology. He holds both academic and professional experience related to Southeast and East Asia, with a focus on regional development and policy.

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The Philippines 🇵🇭

The Dynasty That Outlived the Dictatorship

by Eduardo G. Fajermo Jr., in Angeles City

The Philippines did not celebrate Martial Law on 21 September 2026. It commemorated its victims by confronting its unfinished reckoning with power. Marches in Manila and Iloilo City tied the dictatorship’s legacy to alleged corruption in flood control projects and to the dynastic system protesters say protects impunity.

The symbolism was unavoidable: Ferdinand Marcos Jr., son of the former dictator, was the president receiving those demands. His father’s formal military rule lasted from 1972 to 1981, and the Philippine government later recognized 11,103 victims eligible for reparations for killings, disappearances, torture, and arbitrary detention.

The immediate grievance was the continuing controversy over failed or allegedly nonexistent flood control projects, which had already triggered major demonstrations in 2025. Progressive organization Sanlakas said protesters refused to forget both the horrors of Martial Law and the “impunity of corruption” exposed by the scandal.

In Iloilo, remembrance became a direct challenge to inherited political power. Former legislator Raoul Manuel argued that replacing individual officials would not repair a system that passes public office between relatives, while Jaro Archbishop Midyphil Billones urged Filipinos not merely to move on, but to “move forward” carrying history’s lessons.

Days earlier, the Supreme Court unanimously held that Congress has a constitutional duty to enact an anti-political dynasty law. Although the 1987 Constitution has mandated such a prohibition for nearly four decades and the House of Representatives approved a bill in June, no completed law had reached the president by the anniversary.

Political kinship is not proof of corruption, and a family name is not evidence of guilt. Yet when the same clans influence nominations, budgets, contractors, and succession, political competition narrows, oversight becomes personal, and citizens face formidable barriers to entering public life.

The historical connection between abuse and plunder is already written into Philippine law. The 2013 reparations statute allocated PHP10 billion, plus interest, from Swiss deposits adjudged by the Supreme Court to be ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses — using recovered assets to compensate victims of the same regime.

Corruption is therefore not simply money missing from a ledger. A ghost or substandard flood control project becomes a flooded home, a closed business, a missed wage, and a disrupted supply chain when the next typhoon arrives.

For ASEAN governments, investors and development partners, this is more than a Philippine political dispute. Corruption in one of the world’s most disaster-exposed states turns climate risk into preventable economic loss, weakens confidence in infrastructure spending, and undermines ASEAN’s aspiration to be a rules-based, people-centred community.

Marcos Jr. has attempted to place himself on the side of accountability. In July, he told Congress he was “not the president of my family,” while promising to pursue cases even when they touched allies or relatives. His cousin, former House Speaker Martin Romualdez, has denied the allegations.

The Palace has also said Marcos respects peaceful protest and that investigations will continue regardless of political ties. Political scientist Jean Encinas-Franco supplied the appropriate standard: “Rhetoric is fine, but actions are better.”

The son is not legally responsible for the father’s crimes, but the president is politically responsible for whether today’s government makes power less hereditary, procurement more transparent, and accountability non-negotiable. That requires independent investigations, open contracts, protected whistleblowers, public tracking of infrastructure projects, and an anti-dynasty law capable of preventing both simultaneous family control and choreographed succession.

A democracy that remembers torture but tolerates plunder has learned only half the lesson. In 2026, “Never Again” must also mean never again allowing public office, public money, and public memory to be captured by the few.


Eduardo is a faculty member at Holy Angel University, where he teaches courses on Philippine history and contemporary global issues. He is currently pursuing a Master’s degree in Political Science at the University of Santo Tomas, with a research focus on disaster governance, environmental politics, and the urban poor in the Philippines.

Timor-Leste 🇹🇱

Who is Behind the Scam Call Center Operations in Timor-Leste?

by Amandina Maria Helena da Silva, in Dili

The growing wave of scam call centers emerging across Timor-Leste is not merely a serious public concern — it is creating a deep political dilemma for the government, fueling growing speculation that some powerful figures within the ruling establishment may be protecting or supporting those behind these operations.

In July 2026 until now, Timor-Leste’s Scientific Criminal Investigation Police (PCIC), together with the National Strategic Intelligence Service, identified scam call center operations around the city of Dili, including in other municipalities like Oecusse and Liquiçá. Nearly 600 people were arrested during a police crackdown in Dili that was reported by ABC Australia — but not the mastermind.

In response to this case, the Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão directly accompanied the PCIC’ operations to dismantle and arrest the operator of these scam call centers. Through this operation, the Prime Minister also affirmed and declared that there is zero tolerance for the practice of illegal activities in Timor-Leste.

The discovery of scam call center operations in several parts of Timor-Leste has sparked growing public concern, with many people taking to social media and news sites to voice their views and raise questions. According to the director of human rights organization AJAR-TL, José Luis Oliveira, the growing invasion of online scam networks poses a serious threat to Timor-Leste’s future, including to the integrity and effectiveness of the country’s judicial system. Besides that, FRETILIN Secretary General Mari Alkatiri affirmed in Timor Post News that PM Xanana Gusmão should identify who facilitates foreign nationals to operate scam call centers in Timor-Leste — not just target operators who may themselves be victims.

Alongside the scam and mafia online operations flourishing in Timor-Leste, CNRT members in the National Parliament (PN) confirmed that they would sign a letter of political affirmation to ask PM Xanana Gusmão, as well as the CNRT Party President, to dismiss the President of the Council of Ministers, Agio Pereira Alves, because the CNRT regrets that some political figures have been linked to the operation of scam call centers in the country.

The above situations have attracted the attention of everyone including civil society. As said by Luta Hamutuk in Journal Independent, this shows that CNRT wants to promote the Mafia to hold power. However, Rafa News reported that PM Xanana Gusmão confirmed that he will not dismiss Agio Pereira from his role as Presidency of the Council of Ministers.

This dynamic creates controversy and contradictions. At the same time, the defendants in online fraud cases totaling 141 allegedly fled the territory of Timor-Leste — but the Executive Director of the Migration Service Assistant Commissioner of Police Jorge Monteiro said that he has not received official information about these individuals.

This leaves people asking: how did the accused manage to leave without Immigration knowing? And who helped them escape? This is not just about a weak border system — it is about accountability. People deserve to know how this happened, who was responsible, and whether anyone will be held accountable. If not, we will sacrifice our sovereignty for the mafia to control.


Amandina is a human rights advocate working with Asia Justice and Rights Timor-Leste on the Interim Reparation to Women Survivors project. She previously worked with UNDP Timor-Leste’s Accelerator Lab and has contributed to human rights and health initiatives through several youth and civil society organisations. Her interests lie in justice, youth empowerment, and community-based social change in Timor-Leste.

Singapore 🇸🇬

Navigating Truth in the Modern Digital Age

by Jennifer Hui En Tan, in Singapore

Note: This article was first published in Issue 30 of the Pacific Corridor on 9 January 2026.

Global connectivity through technological devices has grown rapidly throughout the last few decades. However, so have scam cases and online misinformation through the rapid development of artificial intelligence (AI) and deepfake software, making media literacy more important than ever. In the first half of 2025 alone, Singaporeans reportedly lost SGD 456 million to scams; measures such as the Protection from Online Falsehood and Manipulation Act (POFMA) are thus put in place to protect Singaporeans against misinformation. Media literacy is essential to Singapore’s societal wellbeing and national security, ensuring that citizens are equipped to recognize and navigate digital threats.

The ability to perceive deception and false information online has proven to be more critical now more than ever. Scam cases have cost Singapore SGD 3.4 billion since 2019 and SGD 1.1 billion in 2024 alone. The overall rise and accessibility to AI has shifted the dynamic and forced individuals to be more attentive with the content they see, with three quarters of Singaporeans concerned with the rise of deepfakes used in scams. Beyond scams, the overall rise in AI and deepfakes have also caused a rise in the spread of misinformation. During the 2025 General Elections, experts cautioned Singaporeans against misinformation through foreign interference.

Singapore has identified and is working to target such concerns by encouraging media literacy and preventing cyber threats through a multitude of angles. The Media Literacy Council, supported by the Singapore Infocomm Media Development Authority, develops and supports initiatives under the Digital for Life Movement, a project aiming to expand digital skills and encourage informed digital use. Besides education, Singapore has pushed against scams by implementing stricter laws against scammers. Since 30 December 2025, Singapore has implemented mandatory caning for scammers and given authorities the power to freeze accounts related to such activities. The POFMA, which was passed in 2019, empowers authorities to issue correction directions, remove harmful content, and limit the spread of misleading information that could undermine public trust or social stability. These efforts reflect Singapore’s approach to fostering a safer digital environment for the state.

The rapid rise in misinformation and scams are highly relevant to ASEAN, as misinformation has become a regional challenge, which threatens political stability and social trust. For instance, in the Philippines, AI-generated disinformation has intensified political tensions, exemplified by the 15 July 2025 incident where a woman discovered fabricated videos of her deceased brother being circulated to discredit her and advance political agendas. Malaysia faces similar vulnerabilities, with political actors commonly weaponizing disinformation to damage opponents’ reputations. The persistent use of false information for political gain highlights Malaysia’s ongoing struggle with digital manipulation and underscores the broader regional need for stronger media literacy and cross-border cooperation against misinformation.

In sum, the rapid rise of misinformation and scams underscores the urgent need for stronger media literacy efforts in Singapore and across ASEAN. Singapore’s approach illustrates how states can strengthen societal resilience. Yet cases from the Philippines and Malaysia demonstrate that misinformation remains a shared regional challenge, capable of influencing politics, eroding trust, and destabilizing communities. As ASEAN becomes more digitally interconnected, cultivating a well-informed and discerning citizenry is essential to safeguarding national security, preserving social cohesion, and ensuring a safer digital future for the region.


Jennifer is a final-year International Relations student at the Singapore Institute of Management, where she focuses on political engagement, diplomacy, and community governance. She is an active volunteer in her constituency, working closely with residents to understand local concerns, facilitate dialogue, and support community initiatives.

Editorial Deadline 21/09/2025 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Siu Tzyy Wei, Lead Editor - Maritime Crescent Desk

Across the Maritime Crescent, governance has always been recorded - on palm leaves, in policy briefs, in ministerial mandates. The lontar manuscripts of the Malay Archipelago were never meant to be permanent - they were inscribed on material that requires tending, reading and renewal to survive.

This week, the stories ask of the aforementioned three qualities of sustainability. Brunei, a small state continues to deliberate where it fits within its relationship with BRICS. Malaysia’s haze response, still underwhelming, pleads for a framework that has yet to be held to account. In Indonesia, a ministerial exit raises questions on how power moves in the archipelago.

The walls stand. The question is how long before delayed maintenance becomes too late.

Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳

As BRICS Expands, Where Does Brunei Fit?

by Syimah Johari, in Bandar Seri Begawan

Following the recent BRICS summit in New Delhi where leaders discussed reform of global governance, trade, development, energy, technology and the broader role of the Global South, the grouping continues to expand its engagement beyond its membership. With several Southeast Asian countries now participating as members or partners, geopolitical and economic dynamics in the region are evolving. Where, then, does a small ASEAN state fit within an increasingly diversified diplomatic landscape?

Several ASEAN countries are already engaging with BRICS in different capacities. Indonesia is a member, while Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam are among the grouping partner’s countries. Their participation provides additional channels for engagement with BRICS members and broader discussions on issues affecting the Global South. For Brunei, this creates both opportunities and deliberations. Although Brunei may not need to join BRICS to benefit from its expanding networks, it will need to monitor how the grouping affects ASEAN cohesion, regional economic competition and the balance of relations among China, Russia, India and other major powers.

The implications are particularly relevant to Brunei’s trade and energy interests. BRICS gather large markets and major economies, including energy producers. For Brunei, greater engagement among neighbouring ASEAN economies with BRICS could create avenues to diversify exports, attract investment and develop cooperation in energy, food security, technology and infrastructure. At the same time, closer economic ties with individual BRICS members would require careful management to avoid excessive dependence on any one market or partner.

Diplomatically, Brunei’s existing relationships with China and India, alongside its wider ties with other BRICS members, can give the sultanate room to engage through bilateral relationships and ASEAN-led platforms. For a small state, this flexibility can be valuable. Brunei can continue to engage in areas such as development, maritime cooperation and global governance while keeping ASEAN at the centre of its regional diplomacy. Rather than viewing BRICS as a choice between alignment and distance, Brunei could approach its growing presence in Southeast Asia as another avenue for dialogue and cooperation.

As BRICS cultivates a stronger presence in Southeast Asia, it is becoming part of the diplomatic and economic landscape surrounding Brunei. For Brunei, the question may not be whether to align itself closer to BRICS, but more about how to do so while keeping ASEAN at the centre of its regional outlook. For a small state like Brunei, maintaining that flexibility could allow it to build new economic and diplomatic partnerships without narrowing the relationships it already has.


Syimah is a graduate of King’s College London with a BA in International Relations. With a strong focus on diplomacy, regional cooperation, and development policy, she is passionate about contributing to meaningful change through public service. Currently, she is involved in poverty alleviation work through a local NGO.

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Malaysia 🇲🇾

Time’s Ticking

by Edrina Lisa Ozaidi, in WP Kuala Lumpur

Malaysia’s air quality continues to worsen, pushing Air Pollutant Index (API) readings into alarming rates. Yet again, the country finds itself stuck in a frustrating cycle. Fueled by El Niño, the current haze emergency has laid bare deep institutional fatigue.

As public health warnings continue to roll out, a hard look at the current administrative responses reveals a troubled reality; the state mechanisms are sluggish, reactive and disconnected from the much needed proactive agility. Is the current administration doing enough for the haze emergency compared to the past?

Currently, Malaysia’s tactics against the seasonal haze rely on both domestic containment strategies and regional diplomacy. The Department of Environment (DOE) constantly tracks real-time data through the Air Pollutant Index Management System (APIMS), which local authorities and state disaster committees use to coordinate emergency actions when the readings spike and, of course, provide open-source data for the public.

State governments have deployed targeted solutions like localised cloud-seeding operations to induce rainfall over heavily polluted pockets, alongside clamping down on domestic open burning permits. Healthwise, the Ministry of Health (MOH) issued continuous advisories and public messaging through various media networks. However, despite decades of experience with transboundary haze, the crisis continues to recur with punishing intensity.

Malaysia remains structurally hamstrung by its reliance on regional frameworks like the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution. Because enforcement depends on neighbouring political will and complex corporate concessions, diplomatic protocols lag in stopping fires at the sources, thus creating a transboundary deadlock.

The Human Rights Commission of Malaysia (SUHAKAM) has repeatedly pointed out that Malaysia lacks a dedicated Clean Air Act. Without a solid legal framework, domestic standards and broader public-interest litigation rights, environmental enforcement often defaults to fragmented local bylaws rather than a national mandate.

Public frustration also continues to build on the Ministry of Health (MOH) and the Ministry of Education (MOE). During past episodes, state distribution of genuine N95 masks to vulnerable communities were with far greater urgency. In contrast, recent policy responses have been lackluster, seen in the sharp incline of asthma and upper respiratory tract infections (URTI). For low-income families, advocating to wear appropriate masks without subsidised distribution amounts to an empty mandate.

Under standard guidelines, school closure are triggered only when the API threshold crosses critical limits, leaving students and teachers to endure the bad air condition long before administrative takeover. The pivot to home-based learning only arrived after public outcry and even then, initiatives or help for working parents were not established. Despite experience, better policies for working parents during school closure are an afterthought.

The recurring haze is no longer a surprise weather anomaly. Malaysia needs to move past its slow reactions and expedite the process of delivering a solid framework that holds its stakeholders rightfully and fully accountable.


Edrina is a communications professional with a background in international relations. She holds a degree from the University of Nottingham Malaysia and has worked across public relations and social media for organizations in the development, education, and corporate sectors. Her work focuses on crafting narratives around regional affairs and strengthening media engagement across Southeast Asia.

Indonesia 🇮🇩

No Surprise Here

by Gemala Asyura, in Pekanbaru

One would usually postpone answering a phone call during an important meeting, but Purbaya was told to pick up his phone right away. He stepped away to answer it, only to find out that he had been effectively and immediately terminated from his role. He never returned to the meeting. Within hours, the position was handed over to his deputy, Suahasil Nazara. Purbaya’s removal also followed the abrupt resignation of Bank Indonesia Governor Perry Warjiyo weeks earlier, intensifying scrutiny of Indonesia’s economic leadership.

President Prabowo Subianto appointed Purbaya Yudhi Sadewa as finance minister in September last year, replacing Sri Mulyani Indrawati amid the 2025 protests. Two top officials leaving so close together suggests something more - perhaps real instability at the top of Indonesia’s economic leadership. So what actually triggered it? All signs point to one thing, a reshuffle of officials at Customs and Tax, just four days before he was fired. Purbaya himself said the firing was “partly” about an internal staff reshuffle at the ministry. He insists he didn’t disagree with Prabowo on policy, just with some other officials.

On September 10, Purbaya rotated around 350 to 400 officials across the Finance Ministry. Most of them worked at two agencies, The Directorate General of Taxes and the Directorate General of Customs and Excise (Bea Cukai). While Purbaya has been shaking up Bea Cukai in recent months, investors like Fitch and Moody’s have cut Indonesia’s credit outlook. Moreover, the rupiah hit historic lows under Purbaya. So the firing may have been about both internal friction and market pressure at the same time.

In early 2026, Prabowo wanted to disband Bea Cukai entirely and outsource its functions to the Swiss surveillance firm Société Générale de Surveillance (SGS), a system Indonesia had used decades earlier during the New Order era. So why did Purbaya’s September reshuffle draw the President’s attention quickly?

One possible explanation is that it touched people closer to Prabowo himself. Customs Director General Djaka Budhi Utama wasn’t just any official. According to The Star, citing Reuters, he got handpicked directly by Prabowo, and was a former member of Prabowo’s special forces team. When Purbaya rotated officials under Djaka without his agreement, it may have read less as routine institutional cleanup and more as a move affecting figures within the President’s own network.

In hindsight, Purbaya is the eighth minister replaced across six separate waves of reshuffles within Prabowo’s Kabinet Merah Putih (Red and White Cabinet) in just 23 months. That’s an average of one reshuffle wave roughly every four months since Prabowo took office, making cabinet turnover a defining feature of his presidency rather than a rare event.

This also raises the question of whether Prabowo is relying too heavily on his power to reshuffle the cabinet. The President has the prerogative right, but using it eight times in under two years without clear proof of improvement makes it fair to ask whether this power is being used to fix real problems, or just to keep control over people close to him.


Gemala holds a degree in International Relations, with a focus on contemporary global issues. In addition to her years of undergraduate study, she has hands-on experience in early childhood education, having worked in both teaching and teaching assistant roles. She now pursues journalism as a practical extension of her academic background, with a focus and scope centered on ASEAN regional dynamics and social issues.

Editorial Deadline 19/09/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk

This week's headlines run from floodwaters to backroom diplomacy, but the thread connecting them is who gets left to clean up the mess. In Thailand, Bangkok Climate Action Week puts youth advocates at the center of the city's green agenda, though funding and educational support still lag the enthusiasm. Meanwhile, Cambodia hosts its first international conference on combating online scams even as U.S. lawmakers and rights groups question whether the crackdown reaches the officials allegedly protecting the scammers.

As for Myanmar and Laos, this week our coverage follows up on previous stories, looking at Vietnam's foreign minister makes the first bilateral visit to Myanmar since the 2021 coup and at the toll of Laos’ recent floodings.

Thailand 🇹🇭

From Climate Citizens to Bangkok Climate Action Week 2026

by Natamon Aumphin, in Bangkok

Bangkok Climate Action Week 2026 (BKKCAW) is just around the corner, from 3-11 October, 2026, led by Just Transition Incubator (JUTI) in collaboration with the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA) and partners. The event reflects the core Bangkok mission under the current Bangkok Governor Chadchart Sittipunt: to make Bangkok liveable socially and economically. The event encompasses diverse stakeholders, ranging from governmental entities to civil societies, and expands the scope so it is relevant to everyone.

Leo Horn-Phathanothai, founder of JUTI and co-chair of BKKCAW steering committee, highlighted that climate is similar to economy. It is a reflection of policy decisions and political will, which needs people’s participation and consent. This way BKKCAW 2026 is not merely just another climate event, but is rather a third space for the public to gather, track progress, and be active in the green agenda, which align with broader ASEAN goals and could enable regional cooperation. To effectively forward the agenda, everyone has to be involved including youth.

Benyapa Achariyakaroon, founder of Green Youth, a youth-led environmental organization aiming to create accessible climate education, said that being able to participate in BKKCAW 2026 means more opportunities to raise awareness about climate change to a wider audience. By expanding how climate change can affect job security as a whole, she hopes that the public will find climate education more relevant in their daily lives and gain new understanding of the topic through career workshops and panel talks.

As a youth working in environmental advocacy for over four years, Benyapa applauded Bangkok for having youth participation in green spaces. Nonetheless, she voiced her concerns about building the next generations of environmental advocates due to the lack of educational support, funding, and public understanding in climate advocacy. Although she sees more effort, space for youth participation in the climate agenda is still limited, which undermines the goal to achieve green agendas of the city, country, and ASEAN because of the lack of bottom-up efforts.

She highlighted that, to make environmental advocacy sustainable, it is imperative to have educational structure to prepare youth to be long-term agents of change, guiding support to raise funds for projects, as well as public endorsement through policy. Because people cannot escape from the impact of climate change, she urges the public to think more about building a liveable planet and have faith in change. Before ending the interview, she stressed the importance of people’s pressure and community-centered approach, saying that these are the two key points to enable change from a small unit which could have an impact to the broader society.


Natamon has served as a rapporteur at the Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS Thailand). She has also worked as a research assistant on diplomatic issues in Southeast Asia. Her work focuses on how domestic politics shape foreign policy in the region. She holds a degree in international relations and has experience in policy analysis, event reporting, and regional research.

Cambodia 🇰🇭

Cambodia to Host First International Conference on Combating Online Scams

by Chandara Samban, in Kandal

Cambodia is set to host its first international conference on combating online scams from September 23 to 24, 2026. Experts and representatives from approximately 20 countries are expected to attend, alongside the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and INTERPOL, which are collaborating on the event.

The conference aims to achieve three key objectives: first, to develop a deeper understanding of the complex evolution of the online scam ecosystem; second, to strengthen international cooperation in law enforcement; and third, to facilitate the exchange of experiences and best practices in combating this modern form of crime.

The Cambodian government has presented the hosting of the conference as a positive development, particularly in anticipation of the potential adoption of significant documents outlining joint international efforts to tackle technology-facilitated crimes.

However, as Cambodia prepares to host this major international conference, the government under Prime Minister Hun Manet has implemented a series of rigorous measures against online scam operations. These include large-scale nationwide crackdowns, the arrest of alleged key ringleaders such as Chen Zhi and his associates, and a months-long campaign that has resulted in the deportation of tens of thousands of foreign nationals.

The government has also cited its October ban on online casino gambling as another positive outcome of its enforcement efforts. Between July 2025 and August 2026, authorities reportedly investigated 830 suspected locations and conducted raids on 663 sites, dismantling 86 large-scale online scam operations and expelling more than 20,000 foreign suspects.

Nevertheless, concerns over the effectiveness of these efforts persist, as reflected in recent reports, calls for further investigations and sanctions against individuals allegedly involved, and indications that online scam activities continue to emerge.

Notably, in mid-September, U.S. Representatives Brian Mast, Chair of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee, and John Moolenaar, Chair of the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party, wrote to the U.S. government requesting a 180-day investigation into several influential Cambodian figures, including Hun To, a nephew of former Prime Minister Hun Sen; Sar Sokha, Minister of Interior; Dy Vichea, Deputy National Police Chief; and Neth Savoeun, National Police Chief, among other senior officials.

The lawmakers alleged that these individuals may be facilitating or enabling criminal organizations to conduct online scam operations through corruption or complicity. They argued that sanctions against individuals involved, particularly influential figures, are necessary to make anti-scam efforts more effective. They also claimed that scam activities have continued despite previous Cambodian government crackdowns, which they characterized as ineffective and associated with human rights concerns.

Another report, released in mid-September by the U.S.-based National Democratic Institute (NDI), highlighted gaps in Cambodia’s crackdown efforts, particularly in relation to accountability, political factors, and financial networks, which the report said are hindering further progress.

This comes despite previous Cambodian enforcement actions and the freezing of more than $300 million in assets. The NDI report also pointed to allegations that certain influential Cambodian figures are implicated in, or allegedly provide protection for, online scam operations.

Cambodian Minister of Information Neth Pheaktra described the hosting of the international conference as a reflection of Cambodia’s political will to crack down on and prevent online scams. He called for unified international cooperation, emphasizing that the issue is a global challenge rather than one facing Cambodia alone. He also noted that Cambodia itself has been a victim of online scams and has previously worked with various countries to address the problem.

However, attention will now turn to the outcomes of the international conference and the measures that follow. These could provide an opportunity for Cambodia, a small Southeast Asian nation to strengthen its capacity to combat online scams and other technology-related crimes, particularly as it continues to face criticism from parts of the international community over the limited results of previous crackdowns.


Chandara is a freelance journalist with a focus on foreign affairs, security issues, and ASEAN affairs. He also serves as a Junior Counterterrorism Intelligence Analyst.

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Myanmar 🇲🇲

Vietnam Expands Bilateral Cooperation with Myanmar

by Moe Thiri Myat

Vietnamese Foreign Minister Lê Hoài Trung visited Nay Pyi Taw on 26 August, marking the first bilateral visit by a Vietnamese foreign minister to Myanmar since the 2021 military coup. During the visit, Trung and Myanmar Foreign Minister Tin Maung Swe co-chaired the 10th Vietnam–Myanmar Joint Committee for Bilateral Cooperation, reviving a mechanism that had not met since March 2019. The meeting followed the exchange of new ambassadors in July and reviewed cooperation across government, parliament, local authorities and people-to-people ties.

The visit also broadened cooperation in defence, security and technology. The two sides agreed to expand delegation exchanges, military training and young-officer exchanges, alongside cooperation in search and rescue, disaster response, bomb and mine clearance, humanitarian assistance and military medicine. Discussions also covered telecommunications, digital government and the digital economy, extending bilateral cooperation beyond traditional diplomatic and economic ties.

Economic cooperation formed another major part of the discussions. Vietnam and Myanmar agreed to work toward raising bilateral trade to US$1 billion and to convene the 11th Joint Trade Sub-Committee to address barriers including import licensing, quarantine requirements, standards and customs procedures. The two countries also discussed expanding investment and improving conditions for Vietnamese businesses operating in Myanmar. Bilateral trade stood at around US$590 million in 2025, while Vietnam had 107 valid investment projects in Myanmar with registered capital of about US$1.4 billion as of the end of June 2026. Mytel, the telecommunications joint venture involving Vietnam’s military-linked Viettel group, remains one of the most prominent examples of bilateral commercial cooperation.

The visit also carried a political dimension. During a separate meeting with Lower House Speaker and Union Solidarity and Development Party chairman Khin Yi, Trung congratulated Myanmar on what Vietnam described as the successful organisation of the general election earlier in 2026 and acknowledged the new government’s initial period in office. Trung also formally invited Min Aung Hlaing to make a goodwill visit to Vietnam. The two countries discussed supporting one another in regional and international forums, including ASEAN and the United Nations.

The visit comes while ASEAN continues to manage its relationship with Myanmar through the Five-Point Consensus. The bloc has maintained restrictions on Myanmar’s political representation at ASEAN summits and foreign ministers’ meetings, while continuing to call for progress on ending violence, facilitating humanitarian assistance and promoting inclusive dialogue. ASEAN’s latest formal review of the Five-Point Consensus reaffirmed it as the principal framework for addressing the political crisis in Myanmar.

Vietnam’s visit adds to a series of recent contacts between Myanmar and individual ASEAN members. Min Aung Hlaing has travelled to Laos and Thailand this year, while Cambodia is preparing to receive him in September. Vietnam’s invitation could create another opportunity for high-level engagement within Southeast Asia. At the same time, the agreements reached in Nay Pyi Taw extend into defence, trade, telecommunications, digital infrastructure and coordination in regional forums, giving the visit significance beyond a routine diplomatic exchange and placing it within the wider evolution of Myanmar’s relations with its ASEAN neighbours.


Moe Thiri Myat is a senior at Parami University. Majoring in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics (PPE). Interested in analyzing emerging sociopolitical situations and developments, through her work as a Myanmar correspondent at The ASEAN Frontier she aims to explore how sociopolitical developments across Southeast Asia shape and are shaped by the situation in Myanmar.

Lao PDR 🇱🇦

Floods in Laos Highlight Climate Risks

by Phonethida Sitthixay, in Vientiane

Since July 2026, heavy rains unleashed severe flooding across Laos, displacing thousands of families and underscoring the growing threat climate change poses to the country’s development.

In the north, Luang Namtha Province was declared a disaster zone after flash floods swept through Boten near the Laos–China border. More than 30 villages were inundated, farmland and schools destroyed, and even the local airport forced to close. Water levels on the Tha River surged to 6.58 meters, well above the flood warning threshold.

In the south, Savannakhet Province saw the Xe Champhone River rise above danger level, flooding thousands of hectares of rice fields and affecting over 2,000 households. The floods cut off eight villages, with recovery efforts underway. Meanwhile, Champasack Province reported the Mekong River rising beyond alert levels.

The worst hit was Khammouane Province, where flooding affected over 60,000 people across all 10 districts, damaging 206 villages and nearly 9,500 households. More than 15,000 hectares of rice fields were destroyed, with losses estimated at LAK 100 billion (USD 4.4 million).

Nationwide, authorities estimate 654 villages across 42 districts have been hit, leaving 95,200 people impacted and at least four dead. Prime Minister Sonexay Siphandone has ordered immediate recovery measures, including road repairs, relief supplies, and stricter monitoring of dam safety and reservoir levels.

Officials admit floods are becoming more frequent and destructive. Between 2021 and 2025, Laos recorded 376 natural disasters affecting more than one million people, according to a government review. This year’s floods have already surpassed last year’s impact, with northern provinces like Luang Namtha and Phongsaly suffering damage rarely seen before.

Experts point to climate change as a key driver. Stronger monsoons and typhoons, combined with deforestation and poor land management, are intensifying floods. Typhoon Maysak and heavy rains dumped up to 140 mm in 24 hours this month, overwhelming rivers and reservoirs.

As Laos prepares to graduate from Least Developed Country (LDC) status by the end of 2026, the floods are a stark reminder that economic growth must be matched with climate resilience.


Phonethida Sitthixay holds a Bachelor of Arts in International Relations from the National University of Laos. She is currently a Senior Project Coordinator at AIF Group, where she works on government-led initiatives to modernize financial integration across public sector systems in Laos. She has experience in sustainable development policy, diplomacy, and economic reporting, having worked with the Global Green Growth Institute and The Laotian Times. Her interests focus on Laos’s diplomacy, regional integration, and its evolving role beyond ASEAN.

Editorial Deadline 19/09/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Karen Ysabelle R. David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk

In early September, parts of the Pacific Corridor woke up to dark skies overhead: it was transboundary haze, long the bane of ASEAN environmental cooperation. This year, as it faced deteriorating air quality, it was again Singapore’s turn to grapple with the question: why is this particular regional problem so difficult to solve?

The haze has become a recurring issue. And as the climate emergency becomes ever more urgent, more and more extreme weather phenomena will keep crossing national borders. Almost a year since the article was first published, we take a look back at the typhoons that deluged parts of Vietnam in September and October 2025 — how much has really changed since then?

But for the Philippines, there may be clear skies ahead: in a historic milestone, the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao held its first-ever parliamentary elections. This is only just the latest step in the region’s decades-long peace process, but for now, the forecast is of cautious optimism.

Singapore 🇸🇬

Singapore Haze Returns: Why Does a Regional Problem Remain so Difficult to Solve?

by Jennifer Hui En Tan, in Singapore

Singapore has experienced a deterioration in air quality since early September, with haze affecting parts of the island. On 4 September, the 24-hour Pollutant Standards Index (PSI) reached 101 in the central region, entering the “Unhealthy” range for the first time since 8 October 2023. The National Environment Agency (NEA) has linked the current haze conditions to moderate to dense smoke plumes from fires in Southern and Central Sumatra and parts of Kalimantan. With prevailing winds blowing from the southeast and south, smoke has drifted toward Singapore and neighboring states.

The immediate source of the current haze is smoke from land and forest fires in Indonesia. During periods of dry weather, fires in parts of Sumatra and Kalimantan can produce significant amounts of smoke. The geography of the region means that this smoke does not necessarily remain within the area where the fire occurs. This makes haze a regional environmental issue, rather than one that can be managed entirely within the borders of a single country.

Singapore works with the ASEAN Specialized Meteorological Center, which monitors hotspots, smoke plumes, weather conditions, and regional haze, providing information that helps countries assess the development and movement of fires and smoke across Southeast Asia. The current episode illustrates the difficulty of addressing environmental problems when the causes and effects cross national boundaries.

ASEAN has established a regional legal and institutional framework for addressing transboundary haze. The ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution (AATHP) was signed in 2002 and provides cooperation on monitoring, prevention, preparedness, national and joint emergency response, and scientific research. ASEAN has also established procedures for countries to share information and coordinate emergency responses when fires become severe enough to cause transboundary haze. However, individual countries remain responsible for preventing and controlling their own territories. This means that while ASEAN provides mechanisms for monitoring and regional coordination, effective prevention and response still depend largely on national action.

For Singapore, this means that managing haze involves more than responding when air quality deteriorates. Regional monitoring, early warning, prevention, and cooperation between ASEAN member states remain important in reducing the likelihood and severity of future haze episodes.

Singapore’s latest haze episode highlights the progress and limitation of ASEAN regional response. While mechanisms provide a framework for monitoring and emergency coordination, preventing transboundary haze ultimately depends on action within individual countries. As weather conditions become increasingly challenging, sustained regional cooperation and stronger prevention efforts will remain essential to reducing the impact of haze on Singapore and its neighbors.


Jennifer is a final-year International Relations student at the Singapore Institute of Management, where she focuses on political engagement, diplomacy, and community governance. She is an active volunteer in her constituency, working closely with residents to understand local concerns, facilitate dialogue, and support community initiatives.

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Vietnam 🇻🇳

The Climate Emergency in Vietnam

by Hang Nguyen, in Ho Chi Minh City

Note: This article was first published in Issue 19 of the Pacific Corridor newsletter on 17 October 2025.

Late September and early October saw Vietnam battered by a rapid succession of flash floods, landslides, vigorous rainstorms, and violent winds delivered by Typhoon Bualoi (Typhoon No. 10) and Typhoon Matmo (Typhoon No. 11). Extreme weather events hit the northern and central provinces annually; however, local residents and businesses still continue to be inundated with damages to their livelihoods and infrastructure. The lack of efficient climate change resilience further exacerbates civilian distress, signaling a call for urgency for the national government and regional institutions to ramp up natural disaster capacity-building and mitigation initiatives.

As of 11 October, preliminary statistics have reported catastrophic losses: 238 dead or missing, 367 injured, 258,000 private residences severely damaged, 500,000 hectares of agricultural rice fields destroyed, and automobile damages racking up to VND 76 million (US$3 million). Roads, schools, banks, health services, and other public infrastructure have suspended operations. The total economic loss is currently estimated to be tens of trillions VND (several billion US$), a burden to be placed on the Vietnamese government, taxpayers, and businesses.

Viewed from a more humanitarian perspective, the aftermath of flooding has devastated civilian normalcy in the afflicted regions. People have reported losing their entire life savings, properties, and important paperwork such as the “Pink Book” (Certificate of Land Use Rights) in the current calamities; livestock displaced; inability to contact family; no running water or electricity; and left to hopelessly wait for rescue forces. This is particularly the case in the agriculture-predominant regions of the Mekong Delta and of the central coasts, leaving the agricultural backbone of the nation critically incapacitated. Videos have surfaced on online platforms, portraying the cruelty of these historic typhoons and the despair of affected families.

In a swift response to the crisis, the government has mobilized military and security forces for emergency relief within hours after the incident. Notably, Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh issued Decision No. 2221/QD-TTg to allocate aid from the 2025 central budget contingency fund worth VND 140 billion (US$5.6 million) for recovery and rebuilding in four northern provinces. Agencies and individuals have also participated in disaster relief efforts by donating and volunteering. While these expeditious short-term responses are well-coordinated and demonstrate solidarity amongst the Vietnamese people, the reliance on reactive measures rather than sustainable preventive frameworks will persist to disrupt civilian life on a frequent basis.

Vietnam’s recent calamities reflect the broader pattern of climate vulnerability across Southeast Asia, exposing the need for more extensive regional disaster mitigation and response mechanisms. Given that neighboring countries such as the Philippines also recently contended with the tropical cyclone Matmo, this presents an incentive to conduct data sharing and cross-border collaboration. The similar extreme weather phenomena that occurred across Southeast Asia reveals the shared exposure and susceptibility to environmental degradation. Ultimately, as climate risks transcend national borders, the coordination of ASEAN’s approach would facilitate more efficient capacity-building and would be indispensable to safeguarding livelihoods across the region.


Hang is a young researcher with academic experience in Vietnam and the United States. She has previously worked in public relations at the U.S. Consulate General in Ho Chi Minh City and the YSEALI Academy. Her research focuses on ASEAN centrality in the evolving Asia-Pacific landscape, with particular attention to Vietnam’s approach to trade, regional cooperation, and political economy in the face of external power dynamics and global volatility.

The Philippines 🇵🇭

From Peace Agreement to Political Institution

by Glenn Vincent N. Boquilon, in Angeles City

On 14 September 2026, the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) held its first-ever regular parliamentary elections. Over 2.4 million registered voters took part, choosing the people who will sit in the region’s first elected parliament.

This vote matters for more than just picking new leaders. It marks the region’s move away from an appointed, transitional government and toward one that is chosen directly by the people. Since the BARMM was created, the Bangsamoro Transition Authority has run things on an interim basis. In this situation, the parliament will answer to voters instead of being appointed.

The election is also a milestone in Mindanao’s decades-long peace process. BARMM exists because of the 2014 peace deal between the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, which aims to end armed conflict and give the Bangsamoro people real self-governance. Voters in the region later approved the Bangsamoro Organic Law in a 2019 plebiscite, paving the way for the region as it exists today.

What makes this election unique is BARMM’s system of government. Unlike the rest of the country, which follows a presidential system, BARMM uses a parliamentary one. It is the only region in the country to do so. Its 80-member parliament is made up of party representatives, district representatives, and sectoral representatives. Parliament members will then choose the region’s chief minister from among themselves.

This setup encourages political parties and coalitions to cooperate to form a working government. How well they collaborate after the election may matter just as much as who actually won seats.

Turnout was strong, with Commission on Elections reporting that over 80% of registered voters cast ballots, higher than expected. Most polling went smoothly, although there were some reports of election-related violence in a few areas. The high turnout is a good sign of public engagement, but the security incidents are a reminder that challenges remain.

Beyond the Philippines, BARMM’s experience offers a case study for other parts of Southeast Asia dealing with questions of autonomy and regional representation. It showcases how a peace agreement can eventually evolve into a functioning electoral system.

Ultimately, this election is not the endpoint for Bangsamoro’s peace process. This is just the next phase of it. In this regard, the real test now is whether the newly elected parliament can build trust, stay stable, and actually deliver results for the people it represents.


Glenn holds a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from the University of Santo Tomas. His experience spans governance programs, policy development, and political research, having worked with the Ateneo School of Government and WR Numero Research on projects focused on electoral reform, public opinion, and regional development. He also helped coordinate the drafting of the Bangsamoro Local Government Code and supported the Academy of Multiparty Democracy.

Editorial Deadline 15/09/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)