by Siu Tzyy Wei, Lead Editor - Maritime Crescent Desk

This week’s stories call us to look into the hidden toll of systems, especially when our lives depend on them. In Indonesia, a commuter tragedy in Bekasi pushed correspondent Rayhan Prabu to expose how infrastructure upgrades more often than not, only follow disaster, leaving workers to navigate unsafe commutes and stagnant wages. Meanwhile, Muhammad Aiman highlights the delicate balance between fiscal reform and household survival vis-a-vis Malaysia’s current subsidy rationalisation. Brunei’s Wira Gregory shines light on the deliberate construction of a bilateral economic architecture with China that has grown beyond petrochemicals into digital and agri-food supply chains.

Together, our correspondents remind us that the costs of living are borne by everyday workers, households and small states. Here, perhaps it is worth evaluating the measure of how governments choose to act, or delay, when structural pressures demand more than another workaround.

Indonesia 🇮🇩

End of the Line

by Rayhan Prabu Kusumo, in Jakarta

On April 27, a long-distance express train plowed into the rear of a stopped commuter train at Bekasi Timur Station, east of Jakarta. The car it hit was the women-only carriage. All sixteen casualties were women. Ninety-six others were taken to hospital.

Bekasi is Greater Jakarta’s industrial and residential belt - dense with factories and housing complexes, it houses 2.6 million people - largely because housing in Jakarta is out of reach and the commuter line makes the distance workable. Most of the women in that carriage were workers — heading home or to a shift.

Women-only cars are a fixture on Indonesian commuter lines, unremarkable to anyone who rides them regularly. On that night, it was that car that absorbed the full force of the collision.

Swiftly, President Prabowo pledged roughly Rp4 trillion (USD230 million) to upgrade level crossings across Java - a risk long visible and unaddressed. Monetary compensation only comes after a disaster forces it to. Infrastructure that millions depend on daily is treated as an afterthought until it stops being one in the worst possible way.

Commuting is not the only social issue treated that way. Wages have grown minimally, leaving Indonesian workers among the lower-paid in the region despite productivity gains that should have translated into better take-home pay. Informality is widespread and rising: a large share of the workforce has no contracts, no benefits, and no real recourse. And the geography of work — the reason Bekasi exists as it does, the reason those women were on that train at that hour — reflects a country that has built its economy around cheap, mobile labor.

The current administration has shown it can move resources and political will when it chooses to. But the programs defining its identity speak to a different set of priorities. For workers, the question has never really been whether the government cares. It is what the government considers worth caring about first.

Moving Indonesian manufacturing up the value chain requires an industrial environment that successive governments have gestured toward without actually building, without which workers have nowhere to go but down. Indonesia’s minimum wage is set through a formula that consistently underestimates what it actually costs to live. A wage policy that tracks productivity and real living costs rather than those assumptions would start to correct that. Moreover, a city that builds affordable housing near employment centers, would mean fewer workers making the long commute that cost those women their lives.

Unsurprisingly, the most structurally doable yet most consistently neglected, is enforcement. Laws exist, what often doesn’t is the will to make them stick. And that requires no new policy, just commitment to follow through on the ones already written.

Women-only cars were a practical solution to a problem that should not exist. They did not keep their passengers safe. Indonesia’s workers have been riding practical solutions for a long time — workarounds for wages that don’t stretch, protections that don’t hold, cities that weren’t built with them in mind. At some point, the answer cannot keep being another workaround.


Rayhan has a background in government affairs and public policy, with experience across government institutions and advisory firms. His work focuses on the intersection of geopolitics, policy, and risk, with expertise in advocacy, regulatory analysis, and stakeholder engagement. He holds a degree in Government from Universitas Padjadjaran, and has completed an exchange at Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Spain, focusing on global politics and sustainability.

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Malaysia 🇲🇾

Rationalising Subsidies

by Muhammad Aiman Bin Roszaimi, in Cyberjaya

Malaysia subsidy rationalisation represents a strategic shift from a blanket to a targeted fiscal framework, necessitated by the escalating cost of subsidies which recently strained the national budget. The primary objective is to consolidate public finances while curbing leakages, specifically the cross-border smuggling of diesel and the consumption of subsidised goods by high-income earners and non-citizens.

A major milestone in this transition occurred with the rationalisation of diesel subsidies in Peninsular Malaysia, where the retail price was allowed to float to market rates. To mitigate the immediate economic shock, the government introduced the BUDI MADANI program, which provides monthly cash transfers to eligible logistics providers and individual diesel vehicle owners.

This model serves as a precursor for the planned adjustments to RON95 petrol, where the top tier of earners will eventually pay market prices while the vast majority of the population remains protected. Similar tiered approaches have already been applied to electricity tariffs, where high-volume domestic users and industrial sectors face higher rates while the majority of households are insulated through rebates.

However, the impact of subsidy rationalisation in the current environment is complex and uneven. On the positive side, economists recognise that rationalisation can significantly improve Malaysia’s fiscal position and create policy space for development spending or social protection. It also aligns with broader structural reforms, including efforts to rebalance revenue constraints and enhance spending efficiency, rather than relying on subsidies as a blunt redistributive tool.

At the same time, the policy carries immediate socio-economic risks. The removal or reduction of subsidies, particularly fuel subsidies, can translate into higher living costs, either directly through price increases or indirectly via transportation and supply chain effects. Evidence suggests that such measures may compress household disposable income, especially among middle-income urban groups who are more exposed to market-priced fuel. More critically, vulnerable populations may experience disproportionate hardship if compensatory mechanisms are insufficient or poorly timed.

Beyond material effects, the political economy dimension of subsidy reform is equally significant. Public resistance to subsidy removal is well documented, with support often contingent on how reforms are framed and communicated. Studies show that acceptance increases when reforms are presented as redistributive and equitable, rather than purely fiscal measures. In Malaysia’s current context, policymakers have explicitly acknowledged this challenge, emphasising the need for clear communication to prevent misinformation and maintain public trust. Economists similarly warn that poorly communicated reforms risk triggering public backlash, particularly at a time when cost-of-living pressures remain acute.

Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim has emphasized that the success of these reforms hinges on clear public communication and the efficiency of the civil service in explaining the necessity of the shift. This is crucial to curb misinformation and ensure that the transition from traditional income classifications to a more nuanced one. Ultimately, Malaysia is navigating a complex policy evolution where the long-term goal of market efficiency must be carefully managed against the immediate realities of the cost of living.


Aiman is a PhD candidate in Security and Strategic Analysis at the National University of Malaysia. His research focuses on Malaysia’s space policy, ASEAN regional security, and the strategic implications of emerging technologies. His work explores how Malaysia’s defense policy and strategic culture shape its approach to outer space.

Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳

COMTIEC 6 and Continuing Brunei-China Relations

by Wira Gregory Ejau, in Bandar Seri Begawan

On April 23 in Bandar Seri Begawan, senior officials from Brunei and China convened the sixth iteration of the Consultation Meeting on Trade, Investment and Economic Cooperation ( COMTIEC), reaffirming commitments across the Belt and Road Initiative, digital economy, agriculture, and logistics cooperation.

The six iterations of COMTIEC have represented the institutionalisation of a relationship that both sides have invested in sustaining across shifting geopolitical conditions that operate beneath the threshold of political visibility. The scaffolding has long since been built on a deep relationship of notable intentionality that has long existed since China’s BRI alignment with Brunei’s Wawasan 2035 development framework, the establishment of the Brunei-Guangxi Economic Corridor, the Hengyi petrochemical complex, and the designation of Pulau Muara Besar as an industrial zone with Chinese investment. This has arguably produced a unique, bilateral architecture that is considerably more layered than most comparable small-state partnerships, with COMTIEC 6 extending it further into the maintenance of digital economy, innovation, and agri-food supply chains.

The language employed on the subject of regional and international issues, particularly the joint reaffirmation of “open markets, regional integration, and a rules-based, transparent and non-discriminatory multilateral trading system, with the World Trade Organisation at its core” is notable at a moment when US tariff escalations have placed the assumptions underlying the multilateral trading order under a degree of pressure. The inscription of WTO-centrism into a bilateral communiqué, therefore, locates both parties within an increasingly contested institutional landscape and does so in an outward-facing record.

China’s commitment at COMTIEC 6 to building economic corridors that position Brunei as a regional logistics hub is worth disaggregating, as the Pulau Muara Besar zone sits on deep-water access. The extension of COMTIEC cooperation into agri-food supply chains and digital economy infrastructure suggests the relationship is consciously broadening its sectoral base, which is a development consistent with both Wawasan 2035’s diversification logic and China’s wider interest in anchoring regional digital and food supply architectures.

The original axis of the relationship was heavily concentrated in petrochemicals and downstream energy, with the Hengyi refinery and the PMB zone being its most visible expressions. COMTIEC 6 extends the agenda explicitly, and adds a dimension specifically directed at micro, small and medium enterprise integration through Chinese trade platforms and expos. This element is distinct from the mega-infrastructure logic that has characterised earlier phases of the relationship. MSME market access through the China ASEAN Expo and the China International Import Expo represents a commercialisation pathway that operates at a different scale and involves Brunei’s private sector in ways that capital-intensive infrastructure projects structurally might not cover. If commitments follow through, the cumulative effect is a relationship that is broader-based and therefore more resilient to any single sectoral disruption, playing into the economic diversification strategy required of its external partnerships.

What COMTIEC 6 ultimately illustrates is the difference between a bilateral relationship and a bilateral architecture. The former depends on political will; the latter accumulates its own institutional gravity across sectors, mechanisms, and iterations.


Gregory is an MSc candidate in Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He works as a freelance writer specializing in international history, conflict, and counterterrorism, with experience in academia, investigative journalism, and voluntary uniformed service. He currently provides research assistance with the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) under their Southeast Asian Security and Defence Internship Programme and conducts investigations on regional security and transnational crime for a confidential company.

Editorial Deadline 02/05/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk

Some people disappear suddenly. Others are made invisible slowly, by systems, states, and silences that find it convenient to look away. This week’s issue of the Mekong Belt is about the latter.

In Laos, young women and girls from poor ethnic minority communities are vanishing into trafficking networks that stretch across borders — while a state that identified only 85 victims in all of 2024 and prosecuted none of the traffickers behind them looks the other way. In Myanmar, a single photograph surfaces after four years of silence: Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, seated on a wooden bench. With no timestamp, no video, no independent verification, this can hardly be considered a proof of life, and only deepens the uncertainty surrounding her fate.

Meanwhile, in Thailand, the EU has stepped in with EUR 15 million to make the landmark right-to-work policy for Myanmar displaced persons actually function, but bureaucracy, geography, and implementation gaps keep doubts looming. Finally, in Cambodia, the crisis is buried in balance sheets: NPLs at a ten-year high, growth projections revised down, and a graduation from Least Developed Country status that risks arriving before the country is ready for it.

Lao PDR 🇱🇦

Sold, Trapped, and Silenced: The Exploitation of Lao Women and Girls

by Thongsavanh Souvannasane, in Vientiane

Young Lao women and girls, many from poor ethnic minority communities, are disappearing into trafficking networks that stretch far beyond their villages and borders.

What they were promised was opportunity. What they found was exploitation.

The roots of the crisis trace back to around 2013, when rapid foreign economic investment accelerated a large influx of nationals into the country. The 2021 opening of the Laos-China Railway further eased access. As enforcement tightened elsewhere in the region, traffickers and sex offenders increasingly redirected operations to Laos, where oversight remained weak and penalties lenient.

Traffickers lure Lao women abroad through fraudulent marriage schemes.

China’s severe gender imbalance, a legacy of the one-child policy that left 30 million more men than women, continues to generate demand for foreign brides.

Between 2008 and 2018, an estimated 3,000 Lao women were deceived and sold into such arrangements, with bride prices reaching USD 22,500. Only 600 are known to have returned home. Forced surrogacy networks have also reportedly re-emerged in northern Laos as recently as 2025.

The exploitation of children has drawn particular international alarm.

Official data shows one-third of girls in Laos marry before age 18, the highest rate in ASEAN, a vulnerability traffickers exploit systematically. The US State Department identifies nationals from multiple countries across Asia, Europe, and the Pacific among those traveling to Laos specifically to abuse children, operating through hotels, restaurants, and online platforms, openly advertising services involving minors.

The pattern of offending is often serial.

In June 2025, immigration police at Wattay International Airport intercepted a 21-year-old woman from Savannakhet Province about to be trafficked abroad through a fraudulent marriage scheme. Eight suspects were detained, four of them foreign nationals.

Later that year, a Japanese national was arrested in Luang Prabang with three girls aged 12 to 16. He had been arrested in Laos just months earlier, fined, and released, and had faced similar charges in the Philippines in 2017. Lao authorities have since reclassified such offences as rape and human trafficking, carrying significantly harsher sentences.

Both Japan and South Korea have been forced into rare public responses.

Japan’s Embassy in Laos issued an explicit warning in June 2025, after a Japanese resident in Vientiane petitioned the government over social media posts where men openly boasted about child sex tourism. South Korea’s Embassy followed in September 2025, warning nationals that offences carry criminal penalties under both Lao and Korean law.

Despite both warnings, arrests have continued into 2026.

The US State Department’s 2025 Trafficking in Persons Report downgraded Laos to Tier 3, its lowest ranking, citing endemic corruption and zero prosecutions of traffickers connected to its Golden Triangle Special Economic Zones. The government identified only 85 trafficking victims in all of 2024, down from 168 the year before.

Until prosecutions match the scale of the crime, Laos will remain defined by the impunity it offers to those who prey on its most vulnerable.


Thongsavanh is a journalist from Laos with a background in English-language media. He graduated from the Lao-American Institute with a Diploma of the Arts in English and contributes to independent news platforms. His reporting focuses on environmental issues, socio-economic development, and geopolitics.

Myanmar 🇲🇲

Proof of Life Campaign Intensifies After Military Releases Photo of Aung San Suu Kyi

by Myat Moe Kywe

Myanmar’s military junta has released the first public image of ousted leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in years, alongside a partial reduction of her prison sentence as part of a religious amnesty marking the Full Moon Day of Kason.

The photograph, broadcast by state media on April 30, shows the 80-year-old Nobel Laureate seated on a wooden bench, flanked by two uniformed personnel. It marks the first official visual confirmation of her condition since May 2021, shortly after the military coup that removed her elected government from power. Since then, she has remained in strict isolation, with no public appearance, video, or independent access granted. The military has repeatedly denied requests from international actors and family members alike.

In late 2022, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was sentenced to more than 30 years in prison on charges including corruption, election fraud, incitement, and violations of Myanmar’s Official Secrets Act — charges widely condemned as politically motivated. Her sentence was subsequently reduced to 27 years. On April 30, authorities announced a further reduction of one-sixth as part of a broader amnesty covering 1,519 prisoners, including 11 foreigners, granted, according to state media, “for the sake of public peace and humanitarian reasons.”

The image arrives amid a global proof-of-life campaign led by the All in One Piece Movement, an advocacy group established by her son, Kim Aris. The movement has spent months mobilizing international governments and civil society to demand transparency regarding her health and whereabouts. While the photograph offered some reassurance, it also raised new concerns: there was no timestamp, no accompanying video, and no independent verification. “As a son, I have no information,” Kim Aris said. “My request is to verify that my mom is alive, to be able to communicate with her, and to see her free.” Rather than ending public concern, the image has intensified calls for stronger proof.

The timing has drawn attention. The release came shortly after Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to Myanmar, prompting speculation that regional diplomacy may have influenced the junta’s decision. Although official Chinese statements on the visit made no mention of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian later told foreign media that “Aung San Suu Kyi is a long-standing friend of China” and that Beijing has consistently monitored developments regarding her situation. He added that China supports Myanmar in pursuing a development path suited to its national conditions and supports all parties in achieving lasting peace and reconciliation. Whether Wang Yi’s visit quietly contributed to the release of the photograph remains unclear.

For many people from Myanmar, at home and abroad, the message remains unchanged: one photo is not proof of life. The demand for transparency, dignity, freedom for Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the release of all political prisoners, and justice for Myanmar continues.


Myat is a senior undergraduate student majoring in Politics, Philosophy, and Economics. She has interned at The Asia Foundation in Washington, D.C., and she has also worked as a summer research assistant at the Centre for Policy and Innovation (CRPI), gaining experience in research and analysis. Her work focuses on civic engagement, gender, youth leadership, and community development.

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Thailand 🇹🇭

Can Europe’s Treasury Bridge Thailand’s Refugee Work Permit Gap?

by Paranut Juntree, in Bangkok

When Thailand launched its “Right to Work” policy for displaced persons fleeing Myanmar in October 2025, the policy was hailed as a landmark humanitarian blueprint for self-reliance in response to the US aid cuts. However, the rollout quickly collided with reality. Hampered by bureaucratic friction and a “learning-as-we-go” approach, the policy’s effectiveness has been tested by administrative complexity. Now, a new cornerstone has arrived. On April 20, 2026, the European Union launched a EUR 15 million (570 million baht) sustainable solutions program, titled “Supporting Thailand’s Transition to Self-Reliance & Inclusion: Preparing Myanmar Displaced Persons for Inclusive Future.”

While Thailand provided the legal blueprint, the EU is now providing the operation engine. This strategic investment would test whether international capital can dissolve bureaucratic deadlocks and transform over 80,000 Myanmar displaced persons from temporary shelters from aid-dependent residents into active economic contributors.

A major hurdle with the Right to Work policy has been the geographic isolation of temporary shelters, many of which are distant from active labor markets. The EU’s allocation of EUR 10.5 million to an International Rescue Committee (IRC)-led consortium targets this directly. By funding vocational training and importantly, employment matching, the EU is effectively subsidizing the Thai Ministry of Labour’s workload. This prepares refugees for the market, transforming them into desirable employees rather than administrative challenges in the policy.

One of the primary barriers to inclusion has been the public fear that refugees would exhaust Thai public resources, particularly in terms of health. To counter this, the EU is investing EUR 2 million via Expertise France and the M-Fund, a non-profit health insurance scheme for migrant workers in Thailand. This “health de-risking” strategy strengthens local health systems to absorb the 40,000 working-age displaced persons. By utilizing low-cost, non-profit insurance models, the program demonstrates that a refugee workforce can be budget-neutral, or even a net positive for provincial infrastructure.

Furthermore, EUR 2.5 million is dedicated to UNHCR-led child protection and inclusion in national frameworks. By ensuring that women, children, and people with disabilities are integrated into essential services, the investment addresses the human dignity at the heart of the “aid to agency” shift in refugee management.

The EU’s funding provides a stable three-year horizon for 2026 until 2028, offering a necessary buffer against recent shocking US aid cuts. However, money only fixes the cost as it cannot fix the logic. The infrastructure for the Right to Work is still in its maturing stages. If issues regarding labor movement, protection, and health services are not managed with clear, consistent policy, the framework may remain vulnerable to implementation gaps.

As Thailand grapples with a labor shortage, an aging population, and a refugee humanitarian crisis, this EUR 15 million represents not only a relief but an invitation to humanitarian excellence. While the EU is helping to construct the bridge, the responsibility now lies with the Thai government to ensure the path is clear for refugees in temporary shelters to cross it.


Paranut has a background in advocacy, with experience in policy research, communications, and civic engagement across both the NGO and government sectors. As Thailand’s Youth Delegate to the United Nations, he represented Thai youth in global dialogues on migration, education, and human rights, championing inclusive policymaking. He holds a degree in political science with a specialization in international relations.

Cambodia 🇰🇭

Cambodia’s 2026 Economic Outlook Amid Recent Shocks

by Malai Yatt, in Phnom Penh

Cambodia faces an uncertain 2026 outlook as rising banking risks and global geopolitical tensions test its export-driven economic resilience.

According to the ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO), external pressures are compounded by domestic banking vulnerabilities, including rising non-performing loans (NPLs), and persistent uncertainty surrounding the border dispute with Thailand. The country’s upcoming graduation from Least Developed Country status by 2029 adds another layer of risk, potentially undermining export competitiveness and increasing financing costs if the transition is not carefully managed.

Local media reports that Cambodia’s NPL ratio for the entire banking sector reached a ten-year high of 8.6% in 2025, with projections suggesting it could surpass 10% in 2026 as Middle East-driven fuel inflation weighs on domestic consumption, exports, agriculture, and tourism. Commercial banks saw their NPL ratio rise from 7.2% in 2024 to 8.3% in 2025, while microfinance institutions saw a decline from 15.4% to 14.8%. Financial institutions restructured USD 1.9 billion, or 9% of USD 5.7 billion in outstanding loans — though experts note that without restructuring, the ratio would have been considerably higher.

Despite these pressures, AMRO estimates that Cambodia’s economy grew by 5.3% in 2025, supported by strong garment exports, steady foreign direct investment, and swift policy responses. Growth is expected to slow further to 4.3% in 2026. Lead economist Jinho Choi noted that “proactive and targeted policy support, together with structural reforms, will be important to sustain medium-term growth.”

In response to the fuel price crisis, Prime Minister Hun Manet has ordered relevant stakeholders to introduce measures easing the value-added tax burden on gasoline and diesel. Mines and Energy Minister Keo Rottanak confirmed that the government has continued to lower taxes across fuel products to prevent costs from fully passing through to consumers.

Cambodia must balance targeted policy support and structural reform to maintain resilience against rising NPLs and shifting global trade dynamics — a narrow path, but not an impossible one.

Malai is a reporter at Kiripost, where she has worked for over two years, driven by a strong commitment to amplifying the voices of underserved communities. Her reporting focuses on economic and foreign affairs.

Editorial Deadline 02/05/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Karen Ysabelle R. David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk

Even as the instability in the Middle East continues to capture the world’s attention, the Philippines is facing a brewing crisis all its own, as impeachment proceedings against Vice President Sara Duterte have exposed a drug-stained paper trail that may just tarnish her family’s popularity. With the Duterte patriarch in The Hague, can the family survive this latest debacle?

But for the other countries of the Pacific Corridor this week, the war in the Middle East remains an ever-looming — and the greater — threat. For Timor-Leste, the war has raised questions about the country’s long-term energy strategy and security. In Vietnam, dreams of double-digit GDP growth are clashing with the creeping reality of war-induced inflation. And Singapore, for all that it dreams of the stars and the sea as it invests in the space and maritime sectors, is just as vulnerable to the earthly concerns caused by regional conflicts.

The Philippines 🇵🇭

Numbers, Narcos, and a War on Drugs: The Duterte Impeachment Enters a New, Sharper Phase

by Eduardo G. Fajermo Jr., in Angeles City

The impeachment proceedings against Vice President Sara Duterte have entered a phase where the political argument is being driven less by rhetoric and more by documents: wealth declarations, bank-flagged transaction summaries, and now a tax-enforcement move that brings another institution into the picture. In late April, the Bureau of Internal Revenue ordered the issuance of letters of authority to audit Duterte and her husband, Manases “Mans” Carpio, after a finding of probable cause to warrant investigation, adding a parallel pressure point as the House inquiry continues.

Besides the assassination plot against the incumbent President, at the center of the impeachment track now are two overlapping allegations: first, that Duterte’s Statements of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALNs) contain inconsistencies or omissions; and second, that the financial activity described in hearing presentations and Anti-Money Laundering Council-related summaries does not square with what appears in those SALNs. Lawmakers flagged the mismatch between Duterte’s declared net worth — rising from PHP 7.2 million (2007) to PHP 71.058 million (2022) and PHP 88.512 million (2024) — and the reported scale of bank transactions referenced in the proceedings, noting that her SALNs from 2019 to 2024 reflected no declared “cash on hand” or “cash in bank.”

The impeachment narrative escalated further after former Senator Antonio Trillanes IV presented a sworn claim during the hearings that members of the Duterte family received or encashed PHP 181.6 million in checks from a person he identified as alleged Davao drug lord Samuel “Sammy” Uy, with a breakdown that included sums Trillanes attributed to Sara Duterte and other family members.

Still, the allegation carries a political weight that goes beyond pesos and paper trails, because it collides directly with the Duterte brand. Rodrigo Duterte built his national presidency around a brutal anti-drug campaign, a “war on drugs” now at the core of an International Criminal Court (ICC) case. In late April 2026, the ICC confirmed charges against the former President and committed him to trial, with the court stating that there were substantial grounds to believe he bore criminal responsibility in connection with killings tied to that campaign.

This creates a dissonance that the impeachment proceedings are now implicitly exploiting: a political legacy framed as a crusade against narcotics is being pursued internationally for alleged crimes against humanity, while at home the family is facing impeachment-linked allegations of receiving funds from an individual branded as a drug figure. Even if those allegations are ultimately contested, the optics are corrosive. The “war on drugs” was sold domestically as moral clarity and hard discipline; allegations of narco-linked money suggest a different — and politically damaging — moral economy: enforcement rhetoric on one hand, suspect financial entanglements on the other.

This Philippine episode reads as a textbook case of how democratic accountability can become multi-institutional: legislature, financial intelligence mechanisms referenced in hearings, and now tax enforcement moving in parallel. But it also shows how accountability disputes in Southeast Asia frequently merge moral narrative with institutional procedure. The Duterte name remains electorally powerful, yet the ICC’s advancement of the elder Duterte’s case demonstrates that reputational shields do not automatically hold in international forums.

The House may count votes, but the public is counting contradictions. The Duterte project rose on a promise that the state would be ruthless against drugs and corruption, yet it now confronts allegations that strike at the very moral authority it claimed. With the patriarch of that legacy headed to trial overseas, the Philippines is forced to confront a brutal question at home: can a movement built on punishment survive scrutiny of its own receipts? Because in politics, the harshest verdict is not defeat, it is exposure.


Eduardo is a faculty member at Holy Angel University, where he teaches courses on Philippine history and contemporary global issues. He is currently pursuing a Master’s degree in Political Science at the University of Santo Tomas, with a research focus on disaster governance, environmental politics, and the urban poor in the Philippines.

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Timor-Leste 🇹🇱

Timor-Leste and the Question of Long-Term Energy Strategy

by Ricardo Valente, in Dili

Timor-Leste is once again spending millions of dollars to secure fuel in a global market it does not control. This raises the same policy question: is the country building energy security through long-term strategy, or relying mainly on emergency fuel purchases when global prices rise?

Earlier this month, the Government approved a direct award (“adjudicação direta”) worth around USD 168.8 million to purchase about 80 million liters of diesel through Esperanca Timor Oan (ETO) — a Timorese-owned energy company founded on specializing in fuel import, storage, and distribution. The Government presented the decision as necessary to secure national fuel supply during a period of rising international prices.

However, the procurement method has also raised public discussion. Diligente reported concerns about transparency, especially because the contract was awarded through direct negotiation instead of an open competitive process. This adds to wider questions about how large energy-related spending decisions are managed.

The urgency of fuel procurement is linked to global energy risks. According to the Lowy Institute, countries that depend heavily on imported fuel are more vulnerable to global oil shocks because they lack strong internal systems that are capable of handling shocks. Even indirect geopolitical tensions, including risks around key shipping routes such as the Strait of Hormuz, can affect global oil prices and quickly pass through to import-dependent economies like Timor-Leste.

This situation highlights a structural challenge. Timor-Leste imports most of its refined fuel, meaning national supply is closely tied to external markets and private suppliers. In practice, this often means making rushed purchases when prices go up, rather than stable long-term planning.

Speaking at a regional energy summit, President Jose Ramos-Horta acknowledged this vulnerability, stating that “our electricity system currently depends almost entirely on imported diesel,” warning that as global prices rise, the impact is directly on fiscal pressure and the cost of living. He also noted that recent Government measures, including large fuel purchases, “buy time, but are emergency measures, not lasting solutions.”

At the center of the system is TIMOR GAP, the state-owned oil and gas company responsible for the country’s petroleum interests. It plays an important strategic role, but in practice its ability to keep fuel supply stable and act as a national safety buffer is still limited, with most fuel import and distribution handled through commercial companies. This difference between its official role and what it can actually do continues to raise questions about how the country’s energy system is governed and structured.

The broader issue is no longer only about fuel procurement, but about the direction of Timor-Leste’s energy strategy. Energy security is not just about buying fuel during shortages, but about reducing exposure to repeated global shocks through better planning, storage systems, and clearer institutional roles.

This also leads to a longer-term question: whether Timor-Leste’s energy strategy will continue to rely mainly on imported fuel, or whether it can gradually diversify towards more stable and locally produced energy sources, including renewable energy, as part of a broader system of resilience. As President Ramos-Horta emphasized, reducing dependence on imported diesel through investment in renewable energy is not only a climate goal, but “an economic and strategic necessity.”

For now, as global energy markets remain unstable, Timor-Leste faces a clear policy challenge. The real test for Timor-Leste’s energy strategy is not whether it can secure fuel in a crisis, but whether it can reduce the need to keep doing so.


Ricardo is a media and communication practitioner and International Relations graduate based in Dili, Timor-Leste. He is the founder of Gen-Z Talk Timor-Leste, a youth-led digital platform dedicated to civic engagement and public dialogue. His work focuses on amplifying young voices, promoting social awareness, and contributing to conversations on society, politics, economy, governance, digital rights, and security.

Vietnam 🇻🇳

Domestic Consumption for Double-Digit Growth

by Tri Vo, in Ho Chi Minh City

As Vietnam approaches Reunification Day (30 April) and International Labor Day (1 May), an important holiday period, the domestic economy faces a critical litmus test. For the first quarter of 2026, the country’s growth narrative has been overwhelmingly dominated by a booming manufacturing export sector. However, to achieve the government’s highly ambitious mandate of double-digit GDP growth for 2026, export momentum alone will be far from sufficient; for so grand a goal, the market of 100 million people must open its wallet.

The most manifest indicators of this domestic spending appetite are currently visible in the aviation and tourism sectors. Indeed, anticipating a massive wave of movement, Vietnam Airlines, the country’s flagship carrier, has aggressively increased capacity at a ballpark of nearly 1.12 million seats across its domestic and international networks, a 15.5% rise compared to the same period last year.

Yet, the will to spend is colliding with the unenviable reality of inflation hitting. Driven by ongoing geopolitical tensions in the Middle East and persistently high jet fuel prices, carriers are actively scaling back less profitable routes while significantly raising fares. For instance, return airfares from Hanoi to popular tourist hubs like Phu Quoc have skyrocketed. Currently, these tickets are priced between VND 5 million and VND 5.5 million on Vietnam Airlines, while even budget carrier Vietjet Air is charging between VND 3.5 million and VND 5 million (50–60% of the country’s average monthly salary).

Consequently, locations easily accessible by car or train are experiencing a boom. Near the capital of Hanoi, Ninh Binh has seen its search volumes nearly triple, while coastal Vung Tau, reachable from the economic center Ho Chi Minh City within 2 to 3 hours, has recorded an increase of over 40% in booking interest. This more prudent approach suggests that while the Vietnamese middle class has accumulated disposable income after 30 years of economic opening, they remain highly vulnerable to the undulatory ripple of inflation.

Recognizing the rising spending hesitance, policymakers have deployed fiscal stimulus to induce more consumption. The most consequential of these measures is the National Assembly’s official resolution to extend the 2% VAT reduction through 31 December 2026. By lowering the standard tax rate from 10% to 8% on a wide array of consumer goods and services, with newly added categories like transportation, logistics, and IT products, the government is attempting to create a positive feedback loop that tackles affordability in both the upstream and downstream of goods, thus overriding consumer anxiety to stimulate purchasing power.

When the General Statistics Office releases its retail sales and services data in early May, how much and how far such stimulus works will be revealed. If the upcoming week does not deliver a substantial pump in domestic consumption, it will put more pressure on the second half of the year to reach the current growth goal. More substantially, however, such an event would serve as a sign that the capital flowing into the economy, either in the form of foreign or public investment, has not yet fully trickled down to ordinary households, thus presenting a profound challenge for policymakers trying to steer the economy toward the lofty growth ambitions not just for 2026 but beyond.


Tri has experience in management consulting and strategy, having worked with institutions such as the UNDP, The Asia Group, and ARC Group. He has provided strategic, legal, and operational insights to clients in sectors including manufacturing, energy, and technology. He holds both academic and professional experience related to Southeast and East Asia, with a focus on regional development and policy.

Singapore 🇸🇬

Ground to Space Ambitions

by Nurul Aini, in Singapore

Singapore is augmenting opportunities in the space and maritime sector. On 1 April 2026, the National Space Agency of Singapore (NSAS) was established under the Ministry of Trade and Industry. According to Dr. Tan See Leng, the Minister-in-Charge of Energy and Science and Technology, the NSAS will serve as a governing body to provide decisive leadership so that Singapore can seize opportunities in the expanding space economy. The NSAS is also a stronger institutional and statutory body than the Office for Space Technology and Industry (OSTIn), expanding its scope to not only promote the sector but also to maintain a sustainable approach to space. As outlined by OSTIn’s guidelines, all space activities should be in line with the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and the International Organization for Standardization.

Singapore’s approach aims to be multidisciplinary, where domains like robotics, engineering, artificial intelligence (AI), and law coalesce even for sectors that may not deem themselves directly involved in the space sector. Challenges remain for the expanding space sector — talents for the workforce still need to be amplified as people on the ground are unfamiliar with the space domain. There are, however, multiple outreach efforts such as one tapping the interest of pre-university students: one example is MANGOSAT, a nanosatellite created by 22 pre-university students, set to be launched into space in 2028 to collect advanced images for environmental and agricultural purposes.

According to Ms Michelle Khoo from Deloitte, the space sector is also predicted to provide an estimated US$100 billion potential cumulative boost to Southeast Asia’s GDP, with increased adoption of earth observation technology being the leading domain in the space sector.

Meanwhile, when it comes to the maritime sector, Singapore will be investing SGD 100 million in maritime research and development over the next five years. This aims to drive research and development efforts in autonomous port operations, alternative fuels, smart ships, and intelligent and integrated port services. According to Acting Transport Minister Jeffrey Siow, the maritime industry faces challenges including cyber threats, the rapid development of AI, and gaps in technology, regulatory frameworks, and bunkering infrastructure for transition to alternative fuels.

Regional and international connectivity remain important for Singapore for both sectors. The NSAS has conducted international partnerships, including hosting the 33rd ASEAN Sub-Committee on Space Technology and Applications (SCOSA). A report by Deloitte also outlines that collaborative models like SCOSA can develop sustainable governance models fit for the emerging international space ecosystem. The recent renewal of the partnership between Singapore’s Maritime and Port Authority with Shanghai Maritime University also drives knowledge exchange and maritime development.

When it comes to issues regarding the blockade, in an interview with CNBC, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vivian Balakrishnan, highlighted that Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore are strategically aligned when it comes to keeping the Strait of Malacca open, without toll charges. While the Indonesian Finance Minister, Purbaya Yudhi Sadewa, had initially floated the idea of a levy on the Strait of Malacca, he afterwards reiterated Indonesian Foreign Minister Sugiono’s stance that there will be no tariffs on the Strait, in alignment with international law. Malaysia’s Foreign Minister Mohamed Hasan later reiterated that decisions regarding the Strait cannot be made unilaterally and must involve all four countries, including Thailand.

Singapore’s investment in the space and maritime sectors is part of the country’s effort at developing resilience through internal coherence and strategic connectivity. Although begun years before, it comes at a time when a blockade at a significant chokepoint like the Strait of Hormuz has been proven to cause a systemic shock with far-reaching repercussions.


Aini is currently pursuing a master’s degree in English literature at Nanyang Technological University. She has experience working in youth groups, contributing to the planning and management of outreach activities.

Editorial Deadline 28/04/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

Ask a young Southeast Asian about the maritime issues shaping the region, and the answer will likely begin with the South China Sea dispute, coast guard confrontations, and flashpoints in contested waters. While these form the most visible part of the story, a wider set of maritime issues also shapes coastal livelihoods, climate exposure, food security, infrastructure resilience, and access to future opportunity across Southeast Asia.

With ten of eleven Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states being coastal states, the sea defines the region’s geography, economies, weather, and food supply. The maritime domain is therefore an integral part of the region’s strategic, political, economic, and social landscape, with direct effects on the peoples of ASEAN, and in particular on its youth.

Youth aged 15 to 34 make up around a third of ASEAN’s combined population, with many of these young people living near the coast or in communities tied closely to fisheries, ports, shipping, marine tourism, and the wider coastal economy. For this generation, maritime issues shape the conditions under which they will live, work, and adapt.

Maritime pressures affecting young lives

A 2021 report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies has described Southeast Asia as being on the front lines of climate change, plastic pollution, and fisheries stress. UNICEF estimated that more than 120 million children in East Asia and the Pacific are highly exposed to coastal flooding, while more than 210 million are highly exposed to cyclones. In the Philippines alone, UNICEF recorded 9.7 million child displacements between 2016 and 2021, with about 60 per cent of the population living by the ocean and sea levels rising at up to four times the global average. The Asian Development Bank has also found that Southeast Asia bears more than 42 per cent of global annual damage from coastal flooding, estimated at over US$26 billion each year.

ASEAN member states accounted for around 20 per cent of global fishery production in 2022, yet surging global and regional demand has left 64 per cent of the region’s fisheries base at medium to high risk. The ASEAN Centre for Biodiversity has warned that, under current practices, viable fish stocks could be exhausted as early as 2048. In fishing and coastal communities, these pressures shape household incomes, if local work remains viable, and whether younger people see a future at home. In Indonesia, climate change has driven fishers to migrate to Jakarta in search of livelihoods, often settling in informal coastal neighbourhoods with limited access to sanitation, housing, and schooling. In the Philippines, a landmark assessment of 44 coastal towns found that 68 per cent of their fisheries were unsustainable, and reclamation projects from Cavite to Cebu have steadily reduced local fish supply and displaced long-established fisherfolk communities. These pressures cut directly into education choices, migration patterns, household security, and community stability.

A November 2024 survey of more than 2,700 Gen Z and millennial respondents across the region also found that employment opportunities rank among the most pressing issues for 76 percent of Gen Z respondents, while 44 percent identified environmental protection as a major concern – both issues sit squarely at the intersection of the maritime domain. Ports, shipping, fisheries, marine services, coastal management, and maritime technology will continue to shape Southeast Asia’s future, yet these sectors may not be front-of-mind when younger people think about work, training, and advancement.

Why the youth angle matters

Ocean-dependent communities, including youth, are disproportionately affected by maritime insecurities and competing pressures linked to the ocean economy, yet they often remain marginal to decision-making and maritime governance. For younger Southeast Asians, that imbalance carries long-term consequences, since they will live longest with coastal climate stress, resource strain, marine pollution, and economies deeply dependent on maritime trade and infrastructure.

However, engagement is more than a matter of fairness. Young people across the region are already generating solutions that formal institutions have been slower to develop. The UNDP-supported ASEAN Blue Innovation Challenge has surfaced youth-led ventures tackling concrete maritime problems: projects such as retrieving discarded fishing gear in Myanmar, turning old fishing nets into tiles in the Philippines, and making biodegradable materials from coconut waste in Indonesia.

Youth networks can also mobilise at a reach that formal regional or national processes may miss out. Bye Bye Plastic Bags, an Indonesian youth-founded initiative, has reached over 50,000 students across more than 20 countries and helped shape Bali’s provincial plastic-bag ban. Save Philippine Seas has mentored more than 600 marine conservation leaders across Southeast Asia and backed 130 youth-led community projects. These ground-up organisations reach audiences, drive behavioural change, and generate citizen-science data that institutional channels may miss.

Young people in coastal communities also hold ground-truth knowledge the sector is short on. Studies of community-based fisheries co-management in Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam have found that when local youths are brought into decisions, resource conflicts drop and food security improves. USAID’s work on small-scale fisheries across the Indo-Pacific has similarly shown that youth and women already do essential, often invisible, work along fisheries value chains, and that formalising this work through training, credit access, and value-added processing is among the most effective ways to keep the sector viable as older generations retire.

What should change

Part of the challenge lies in how maritime issues are usually presented. In much of Southeast Asia, they still appear mainly through disputes, sovereignty, law enforcement, and inter-state coordination. That language remains necessary, but it has become the dominant register of discussion, and it narrows how maritime issues are understood. The ASEAN Maritime Outlook shows how broad the maritime agenda already is, spanning connectivity, fisheries, labour, tourism, transport, and science and technology alongside security. It acknowledges that many maritime challenges directly affect the welfare of the peoples of ASEAN, but that breadth still does not come through clearly enough in wider public discourse.

Closing that gap calls for two reciprocal moves. Regional youth dialogues on resilience, skills, sustainability, and future opportunity should treat maritime pressures as a recurring thread rather than a specialist concern. Maritime discussions, in turn, should routinely draw in younger people working on coastal, fisheries, environmental, infrastructure, and community issues. At present, the two tracks run largely in parallel, touching similar terrain but rarely meeting.

The scope of youth engagement itself also deserves to be widened. Existing ASEAN youth conversations have largely clustered around a familiar set of themes such as employment and entrepreneurship, digital skills, education, climate action, and civic participation. Maritime concerns tend to surface only when a crisis or flashpoint forces them into view. Coastal livelihoods, blue economy careers, fisheries sustainability, marine pollution, and coastal climate adaptation fit naturally alongside the themes already in play, and speak directly to the realities many young Southeast Asians live with.

Framing, though, is only half of the shift. It will need to be matched by the quality of participation once young people are in the room. Three things matter in particular. The first is engagement at the shaping stage of policy, so that young people inform positions as they are being formed rather than respond to positions already set. The second is involvement in delivery, which takes seriously the fact that many maritime policies land in coastal communities where young people are already adapting, organising, and responding on the ground. The third is making adequate space for young Southeast Asians to set their own agenda on maritime affairs, as legitimate interlocutors rather than beneficiaries of programmes designed elsewhere. ASEAN’s existing youth and sectoral processes already offer much of the scaffolding required; the work ahead is to connect them with greater intent.

Towards a wider maritime conversation

Southeast Asia’s maritime issues will continue to involve security, diplomacy, and statecraft. They also involve coastal climate risk, strained livelihoods, vulnerable infrastructure, food security, and uneven access to opportunity. These pressures already shape how many young people across the region live, work, and plan their futures.

Treating the maritime domain as a wider conversation, and treating young Southeast Asians as participants in shaping it, are two sides of the same move. A region whose median age is thirty cannot afford a maritime agenda that speaks past the generation most exposed to its pressures and most invested in its future. Nor can it afford to treat their involvement as symbolic. Much of the practical work, from adapting coastlines and rebuilding fisheries to closing the loop on plastics and staffing the blue economy, will fall to them.

The headlines will continue to focus on the visible flashpoints. The more consequential maritime story is the one unfolding in coastal neighbourhoods, fishing households, and the choices young Southeast Asians are making about whether to stay, leave, or build something new. That story deserves a fuller conversation, and a generation ready to help lead it.

Edited by Thant Thura Zan, Frontier Analysis Editor

by Siu Tzyy Wei, Lead Editor - Maritime Crescent Desk

This week’s spread is not just about food security, it’s about politics, faith and survival. For appetisers, Brunei is working to carve out its place in the agrifood sector, using the stage of the FAO Regional Conference to signal its ambitions for its livelihood beyond oil and gas.

For the entree, Malaysia’s pig farming industry sits on a smoking bed of cultural sensitivities, environmental pressures and recurring disease outbreaks, reminding us how fragile supply chains can be when faith and policy are served simultaneously.

As the last course, ASEAN is working the margins of a system already in decline. With great powers paralysed, the bloc’s value lies in controlling text, shaping safeguards and extracting incremental gains before consensus collapses entirely.

Together, these stories show that Southeast Asia’s future is not guaranteed. Securing a spot at the buffet means navigating crises, balancing tradition with modernization, holding together the systems that keep both supply and stability from unravelling, and ensuring that stomachs are filled not just today, but also tomorrow. There may be no second helpings - except the urgency to get it right from this point forth.

Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳

Brunei’s Agrifood Push

by Syimah Johari, in Bandar Seri Begawan

From 20th to 24th April 2026, Brunei hosted the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)’s 38th Regional Conference for Asia and the Pacific for the first time. As the host, the sultanate sought opportunities to highlight its cultural heritage, local cuisine and progress on the multilateral stage. Beyond its ceremonial significance, the regional conference was also a timely opportunity for the country to position its agrifood sector on that same stage, showcasing not only its active goals and pursuits towards economic diversification, but also proving itself as a capable and reliable regional partner in food security.

Given the country’s ongoing reliance on oil and gas, the agrifood industry has been identified as one of the five key pursuits for its foreseeable economic future - a growing emphasis closely tied to broader concerns around food security. Just like many Southeast Asian countries, Brunei’s food security remains significantly dependent on food imports; however, global disruptions – including pandemics, geopolitical conflicts and supply chain challenges have only exposed the vulnerability of existing systems. For a small state like Brunei, such pressures are immediately and exponentially felt, thus fueling the urgency to secure its agrifood sector as a strategically necessary economic priority. In this context, hosting the FAO Regional Conference for Asia and the Pacific places Brunei represents a significant opportunity to achieve what it has set out to achieve.

Brunei’s agrifood sector is not starting from scratch. A sturdy base of local producers and small and medium-sized enterprises reflects ongoing development, alongside increasing recognition of the sector as a national priority in line with broader diversification efforts. This gradual expansion is also evident in continued cross-border trade, with exports to Sabah and Sarawak reaching BND 0.34 million between 2023 and 2025. While arguably modest, this still reflects a sector that has been steadily taking longer runs to achieve its grand goal of economic growth beyond oil and gas.

With food security highlighted as a growing global priority, the conference facilitated greater cooperation among participating countries and reinforced the importance of strengthening agrifood systems in the face of evolving global challenges. For a country whose survival is notoriously reliant on natural resources that many wish to have, Brunei’s growing focus on agrifood reflects a greater urgency to address its finite reality. In a time where supply chains are struggling to withhold the pressures pushed by post-pandemic socioeconomic stratifications and geopolitical crises like the US-Iran war, hosting the FAO Regional Conference for Asia and the Pacific is not just about being part of the conversation, but a pursuit of securing long-term survival, stability and prosperity. While Brunei has successfully engineered a platform for such conversations to emerge with greater urgency, the next step lies in ensuring that multilateral conversations do not succumb into yet another political echo chamber, and instead transform into physical, workable solutions for a shared future.


Syimah is a graduate of King’s College London with a BA in International Relations. With a strong focus on diplomacy, regional cooperation, and development policy, she is passionate about contributing to meaningful change through public service. Currently, she is involved in poverty alleviation work through a local NGO.

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Malaysia 🇲🇾

Pigs, Pandemics, and Policy

by Edrina Lisa Ozaidi, in WP Kuala Lumpur

In a multicultural Malaysia, the Chinese community have long dominated pig farming to meet domestic pork demand. Today, the industry finds itself intersected between market demands, environmental challenges and deep-rooted cultural sensitivities.

Islam is the official religion practised by the majority Malay-Muslim population, making up around 63.5% of Malaysians. In the Holy Quran, Al-Baqarah 2:173 declares pork haram (forbidden) for Muslims; avoiding pork is thus fundamentally viewed as a submission to divine command.

While non-Muslims retain the right to raise, buy and sell pigs as well as consume pork, the religious taboo has shaped public discourse, policy and zoning decisions in ways that affect the entire sector. Current political discourse maintains that issues around pig farming centre on farm management, biosecurity and environmental compliance rather than faith itself.

Amplified media coverage often isolates the issue.

Media coverage often amplifies the industry’s key problems on the grounds of pollution. Compared to other livestock, pigs produce more liquid-like wastewater, causing pipes to churn out pig waste into muddy slurry pits. In the foreground, concrete housing and defunct oil palm plantations line up the blackish river.

These are inherent critiques of pig farming, yet underlying factors — fragmented land use, urban sprawl encroaching on older farms, and inconsistent zoning — receive less attention.

Historical trauma colours much of the narrative.

From 1998 to 1999, the Nipah virus spread from fruit bats to pigs and then to humans, killing 105 people and led to the culling of nearly 40–50% of the national herd at the time.

The drastic measure contained the zoonotic disease, but severely impacted the billion-ringgit industry as a biosecurity scar.

Today, the sector faces a recurring crisis: African Swine Fever (ASF)

Since 2021, ASF has repeated the culling of tens of thousands of pigs, further eroding the supply chain and driving up pork prices, hitting consumers and small operators hardest.

The industry finds itself in a systemic trap.

Small-scale farms, often lacking secure land titles or capital, struggle to afford the shift to “closed-house systems” with advanced wastewater treatment and biosecurity measures.

Setting up even one modern closed-house building can cost around RM1 million, with full modernisation running RM15,000–30,000 per sow - a price that leaves smaller companies vulnerable to the next outbreak and/or regulatory crackdown.

Because Muslim dominant state governments hold primary authority over land zoning and licensing, some are pushing for farm centralisation or mandatory modernisation, while others grapple with proximity issues as residential areas expanding toward existing operations.

Federal efforts, also dominated by political Islam, include incentives like tax breaks for closed systems, but implementation varies and long-term supply chain planning remains fragmented.

A more integrated overhaul is needed.

Malaysia’s pork industry needs to move beyond cycles of crisis and cull.

From clearer zoning that separates farms from sensitive areas, affordable modernisation support for smaller operators, stronger biosecurity infrastructure, to transparent public communication, this is not merely an agricultural story.

A multicultural country navigating increasing religious influence in public life, the future of pig farming tests how Malaysia balances economic livelihoods, environmental sustainability, food security and social harmony.


Edrina is a communications professional with a background in international relations. She holds a degree from the University of Nottingham Malaysia and has worked across public relations and social media for organizations in the development, education, and corporate sectors. Her work focuses on crafting narratives around regional affairs and strengthening media engagement across Southeast Asia.

Indonesia 🇮🇩

The Quiet Leverage Washington Keeps Underestimating

by Hree Putri Samudra, in Jakarta

When Ambassador Do Hung Viet banged the gavel on 27 April to open the Eleventh NPT Review Conference, he walked into the worst room any chair has inherited in the treaty’s fifty-six years. New START lapsed in February and nobody bothered to replace it. Operation Epic Fury had already turned much of Iran’s nuclear estate into gravel, and a withdrawal bill was making the rounds in the Majlis. Paris, never one to read the room, had pulled eight European capitals under its “dissuasion avancée” umbrella, while Riyadh was reportedly being handed enrichment rights in exchange for staying useful. The Secretary-General opened with funeral diction, telling delegates that “arms control is dying”. In that mess, ASEAN’s leverage is not decorative. It is structural, and Washington keeps refusing to see it.

Most Western capitals are reading Vietnam’s presidency as a polite turn at the rostrum, courtesy of a Non-Aligned Movement nomination, which is exactly the misjudgement that costs final documents. With the P5 in pieces, Moscow and Beijing visibly closing ranks against the P3, and not a single P5 consultation paper on the table for the first time anyone in the secretariat can remember, the Vietnamese chair is the only person in the building still holding a working steering wheel. Hanoi’s drafters know it. They can lift paragraphs from the 2022 Chair’s draft on risk reduction and Article VI benchmarks, the ones Moscow signed off on before the Ukraine carve-out detonated the floor, and slip them back into circulation. That is text control, and text control is how these conferences are actually won.

ASEAN brings three things to that desk it routinely undersells. The SEANWFZ Treaty remains the only nuclear-weapon-free zone whose protocol the P5 has refused to sign, with the same U.S. reservations on transit and continental shelf and the same French squeamishness on negative security assurances sitting on the table since 1995, despite a 2016 P5 communiqué pledging readiness to sign “at the soonest possible time”. More importantly, the bloc delivered early, disciplined support for the TPNW, with Thailand ratifying on opening day in 2017, without tearing itself in half, a trick the New Agenda Coalition has never quite pulled off. And the Philippine ASEAN chairmanship under “Navigating Our Future, Together” gives Vietnam the political cover to operate in New York without looking exposed.

For ASEAN, the internal mess most outsiders write off as paralysis is the actual point. Jakarta still does activist disarmament, Kuala Lumpur owns the humanitarian file, and Singapore guards safeguards and IAEA technical credibility, even as it stays pointedly outside the TPNW because rules-based pragmatism has its limits when alliance partners are watching. Hanoi works the NAM nomination while keeping back channels warm in every P5 capital, Manila quietly squares EDCA basing with its non-proliferation commitments, and Bangkok keeps ASEANTOM’s plumbing from rusting. That spread is what lets the bloc talk to nuclear-armed states and abolitionists in the same breath without sounding ridiculous to either.

Even so, the ceiling deserves to be named. Phnom Penh will not let through anything Beijing finds inconvenient, and Vientiane will quietly back it up, which means coordinated ASEAN language on AUKUS Pillar I or on a Chinese arsenal moving past six hundred warheads is simply not happening. What ASEAN can do is convert that silence into currency and spend it on the SEANWFZ Protocol and on safeguards.

Naval propulsion is where that trade gets serious. The AUKUS Article 14 arrangement has handed Brasília’s PROSUB programme the template it had been waiting for, and Tehran’s delegation is reading every comma. Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur have already aired their unease in the IAEA Board through successive 2024 governors’ interventions without forcing a vote, and that restraint is exactly the raw material Vietnamese drafting can convert into language tightening Article 14 implementation without naming AUKUS, the only formulation Canberra and Beijing both swallow.

In New York, the DPRK punctuated the week by firing its seventh missile test of the year, cluster-warhead Hwasong-11s arcing east while delegates argued procedure, and Pyongyang’s empty seat is precisely why NNWS unity is hardening into something the P5 cannot wave away. ASEAN cannot move that file. It can still move three others, the P5 ratification timetable for the SEANWFZ Protocol, naval propulsion safeguards language that stops the AUKUS template from being copy-pasted, and a chair’s summary that keeps the disarmament pillar breathing if consensus dies on the floor. Two consecutive failed RevCons have already pushed NNWS unity to its highest pitch since 2003. ASEAN is not here to save the treaty, only to bank what it can before the architecture goes.


Hree is a Policy Fellow at the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network (APLN) where she leads research and policy interventions on Indo-Pacific nuclear security and AI governance. She previously served as a Research Fellow at the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) and has managed multi-country security portfolios across all 10 ASEAN member states. Her work examines the intersection of emerging technologies, strategic stability, and the evolution of regional security architectures. She specializes in institutional risk assessment and the application of open-source intelligence (OSINT) for strategic monitoring. Her current research focuses on how technological shifts such as AI and advanced verification tools reshape escalation dynamics and multilateral cooperation in a multipolar world.

Editorial Deadline 25/04/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk

Myanmar takes the stage this week, as the junta stages a pardon designed for international consumption: former President U Win Myint might have been freed, but Aung San Suu Kyi is still missing, and nothing fundamentally changed.

Meanwhile, Beijing’s hand is growing visible across the region. In Laos, a high-level delegation travels to Beijing carrying a personal letter from the president, renewing commitments on railways, energy, and natural resources. The friendship is real and valued, but so is the debt, and so is the classroom that sits half-empty while the budget bends toward repayment. In Cambodia, the strategic embrace is now institutional: a 2+2 dialogue, a 3+3 expansion already agreed, warships arriving at a moment of regional tension. Beijing is not just an investor anymore: it is a security partner, a mediator, and increasingly, a guarantor of the status quo. Thailand alone attempts to chart its own course, announcing a diplomatic vision built on independence and regional leadership. Whether that vision can survive a domestic reality shaped by the same geopolitical currents it hopes to navigate is the question its foreign minister has yet to answer.

Myanmar 🇲🇲

A Pardon Designed to Deceive

by Moe Thiri Myat

The junta made a striking move this week, as one of the country’s imprisoned leaders was released, raising an immediate question: why now? Why him?

U Win Myint was released on April 17 and returned to his family during Thingyan. The same amnesty did not free Daw Aung San Suu Kyi: her sentence was only reduced, her location remains unclear, and the UN’s response was notably restrained. Secretary-General António Guterres reiterated the need to release all those arbitrarily detained and create conditions for a political process.

The release came at a telling moment, after Min Aung Hlaing assumed the presidency through an electoral process widely condemned as unfree and exclusionary. In an effort to soften the regime’s image on the global stage, the junta offered a controlled political gesture while tightening its grip on the power transition. It gives the junta a political asset — a display of mercy at a crucial moment, seeking recognition from regional and international actors.

Why release U Win Myint, but not Daw Aung San Suu Kyi? That contrast may signal a subtle but calculated move, not a genuine political opening. As Suu Kyi’s whereabouts remain uncertain, her son, Kim Aris, is publicly still asking the regime for a “proof of life”. In that light, the release of U Win Myint can be read not as a real opening, but as a lower-risk concession: one that generates goodwill headlines while avoiding the far greater political consequences that Suu Kyi’s release would carry.

The picture becomes clearer when looking at what followed. Reports indicate that U Win Myint’s residence in Naypyidaw remains under strict surveillance, with visitors subjected to identity checks and close monitoring. Concerns also persist around Section 401 and the possibility of re-arrest, pointing to a tightly managed release. The junta appears to be offering visibility without real freedom — enough to project goodwill, but not enough to allow unrestricted political activity.

The situation calls for a strong international response. The Philippines, as ASEAN Chair in 2026, described the move only as a “constructive response,” stressing that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and all remaining political prisoners must still be released to support meaningful dialogue and the Five-Point Consensus. That response suggests regional actors are not accepting the junta’s narrative of reconciliation.

The release of U Win Myint is not a humanitarian gesture. It is a political test — whether one carefully staged pardon can help the junta gain diplomatic space, soften international pressure, and present military rule in a more acceptable form without making deeper concessions.


Moe Thiri Myat is a senior at Parami University. Majoring in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics (PPE). Interested in analyzing emerging sociopolitical situations and developments, through her work as a Myanmar correspondent at The ASEAN Frontier she aims to explore how sociopolitical developments across Southeast Asia shape and are shaped by the situation in Myanmar.

Lao PDR 🇱🇦

What China’s Embrace Really Means for Laos

by Thipphavanh Virakhom, in Vientiane

Last week, a high-level Lao delegation travelled to Beijing, carrying a personal letter from President Thongloun to Chinese President Xi Jinping. China marked 2026 as the “Year of Laos-China Friendship,” renewing commitments on railways, energy, and natural resources. It was a moment that reflected the depth of a relationship built over decades, and a timely reminder that strong partnerships are most powerful when they rest on strong foundations at home.

Laos has made real progress. Government revenues are up, inflation is easing from 24.5% a year ago to 8.5% today, and the country returned to international bond markets last year.

At the same time, debt repayments remain large, leaving limited room in the budget for the things families need most, schools, clinics, and roads. Engaging with international financial frameworks such as those offered by the IMF and the G20 could help Laos find a more sustainable path forward, one that protects essential services while honouring its commitments.

Behind the economic numbers are real children and real families. Education spending has dropped significantly over the past decade, and the effects are visible in classrooms across the country. Today, only about one in five children can read properly by grade three, and nearly 450,000 young people of secondary school age are not in school at all.

Many young people, especially from rural and indigenous communities, are leaving Laos to find work abroad, where wages can be significantly higher. Fulfilling the government’s own commitment to dedicate 18% of the national budget to education, and closing the current USD 250 million education funding gap, would send a clear message that investing in the next generation is a national priority.

Building Trust Through Good Governance. Laos is moving in the right direction. The country’s anti-corruption score has improved meaningfully over the past decade, and Laos is now recognised as one of eight Asia Pacific countries to have made significant progress since 2012. Governance reforms introduced in 2025 are beginning to take effect at the local level, which is encouraging.

Continuing this momentum matters enormously, not just symbolically, but practically. Better governance means more efficient use of every public dollar, stronger investor confidence, and broader opportunities for all Laotians.

A Seven-Month Opportunity. Laos is scheduled to graduate from Least Developed Country status in 2026, a milestone that reflects decades of hard work and development progress. It also comes with new responsibilities, as some forms of special international support will change after graduation. The next seven months are a genuine opportunity: to advance debt discussions, protect investment in education, and build the accountable institutions that people and investors alike are looking for.

The Laos-China friendship is genuine and valued. So is the relationship between the Lao government and its own people. Strengthening both begins with the same commitment , putting people first, in every budget and every plan.


Thipphavanh holds a bachelor’s degree in international affairs. She is a governance and development professional specialising in rule of law, access to justice, and gender equality in Lao PDR. Her work focuses on strengthening justice sector institutions, advancing people-centred governance, and promoting gender-responsive systems. With extensive experience in project coordination, monitoring and evaluation, stakeholder engagement, and strategic communications, she has collaborated closely with national institutions and international partners to support inclusive and sustainable development.

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Thailand 🇹🇭

Thai Diplomacy 2.0: Promise or Performance?

by Natamon Aumphin, in Bangkok

On April 20, 2026, Sihasak Phuangketkeow, the current foreign minister, reflected on the future of Thailand’s foreign policy with international and domestic media, outlining a continuity of proactive diplomatic strategy aimed at bringing Thailand back to the global stage. The plan for proactive diplomacy has been in place since 2023, when he first assumed the leading position at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). Nonetheless, doubts about the proactive role remain, as Thailand faces daily crises — mostly from geopolitical turbulence disrupting day-to-day economic activities.

Thailand was once known and praised for its flexible approach to foreign policy, dubbed bamboo diplomacy, particularly during the Cold War. That reputation shifted after the coup d’état in 2014, which sparked criticism of a loss of direction, a drift from the global agenda, and a broader regression. To revamp Thailand’s global standing and branding, Sihasak and his cabinet have sought to reposition Thailand’s leadership role in ASEAN — as it once held — through strategic proactive diplomacy. The plan was announced during his first term in late 2023. However, due to prolonged political instability, the strategy appeared intermittent. As Prime Minister Anutin consolidated his position in parliament, the MFA was able to press forward with the strategy, now dubbed Thai Diplomacy 2.0.

The new diplomacy strategy is intended as a continuation of Thai Diplomacy 1.0, seeking to balance short-term crisis management with long-term goals by prioritizing the interests of the nation and its people. The latest strategy, however, shifts focus toward regional, economic, and human security, while its predecessor addressed broader issues including the environment, green transition, and digital expansion — in alignment with ASEAN’s long-term roadmap.

Nonetheless, while the new strategy looks promising, further assessment is needed to determine whether it represents a genuine commitment to repositioning Thailand on the global stage or merely a performative one. The MFA has stated its intention to engage with civil society transparently and democratically. The reality on the ground, however, is less encouraging: authorities are tightening enforcement of the lèse-majesté law to sideline the opposition People’s Party and its reform wing; the Clean Air Bill faces the prospect of being dropped; and weakening institutions have left accountability over election transparency in limbo. Coupled with stagnant economic growth and an energy crisis, these domestic realities must be addressed before the government can credibly claim to be reemerging as a regional leader. Without that foundation, the plan risks becoming a paper tiger — ill-equipped to help the nation adapt to a rapidly shifting geopolitical environment.

Natamon has served as a rapporteur at the Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS Thailand). She has also worked as a research assistant on diplomatic issues in Southeast Asia. Her work focuses on how domestic politics shape foreign policy in the region. She holds a degree in international relations and has experience in policy analysis, event reporting, and regional research.

Cambodia 🇰🇭

Cambodia and China Hold First “2+2” Strategic Dialogue Meeting

by Chandara Samban, in Kandal

Cambodia and China have agreed to strengthen cooperation across security and development, following the first round of their new 2+2 strategic dialogue. Experts believe China is seeking to pull Cambodia further into its strategic orbit as part of its broader effort to counter U.S. influence in the region, while both sides frame the engagement as natural bilateral cooperation in line with existing agreements.

On April 22, 2026, the two countries held their inaugural 2+2 strategic dialogue, covering foreign affairs and security. The Chinese side was represented by Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Defense Minister Dong Jun; the Cambodian side by Foreign Minister Prak Sokhonn and Defense Minister Tea Seiha. Both sides welcomed the comprehensive strategic partnership established in 2023, reaffirming mutual trust and unwavering support for each other’s positions. Cambodia expressed full support for China’s Belt and Road Initiative and its four global initiatives on development, security, civilization, and governance. Both countries also agreed to expand the format to a 3+3 dialogue by adding internal security to the agenda.

Wang Yi outlined six points of agreement: mutual support for core interests, including Cambodia’s continued backing of the One-China principle; advancement of economic corridors and the Funan Techo Integrated Water Resources Management Project; deepening political and security ties, including jointly opposing so-called “color revolutions”; cooperation on combating online scams; Chinese assistance in strengthening Cambodia’s military capabilities; and mutual support on the international stage.

Seng Vanly, a Phnom Penh-based geopolitical analyst, sees the dialogue as part of a deliberate Chinese strategy to integrate Cambodia more deeply into its regional network. “From China’s perspective, Cambodia is the most reliable partner in implementing global security in the Chinese style — less concerned with human rights and more focused on maintaining state power,” he said. “This engagement is not purely humanitarian, but aimed at shaping the regional order in line with Beijing’s strategic interests.” He also noted that Wang Yi’s visits to Cambodia, Thailand, and Myanmar signal China’s growing ambition to position itself as a regional mediator on issues — from the Cambodia-Thailand border dispute to Myanmar’s internal crisis — that directly intersect with its own interests.

Regarding China’s influence on Cambodia, a recent CSIS report found that China remains Cambodia’s largest investor, with approximately 75% of Cambodians viewing Chinese influence positively. The report recommends that the United States deepen engagement with the Cambodian people to remain competitive in the region — a sign that Beijing’s political and cultural outreach is widening beyond economics. This suggests that China continues to be a key player in the eyes of some Cambodian officials, business leaders, and citizens who expect continued Chinese investment. At the same time, Beijing is expanding political and cultural cooperation, as seen in initiatives such as this strategic dialogue forum, as well as other efforts like Track II mediation initiatives on the Cambodia–Thailand border dispute.

Overall, Cambodia and China are deepening a relationship that now spans trade, diplomacy, and security. China is not only consolidating economic ties but actively expanding into internal and external security cooperation, with the goal of making the bilateral relationship more durable and strategically cohesive. The recent arrival of Chinese-provided warships in Cambodia, at a moment of heightened tensions with Thailand, underscores how quickly that cooperation is taking on tangible form.


Chandara is a freelance journalist with a focus on foreign affairs, security issues, and ASEAN affairs. He also serves as a Junior Counterterrorism Intelligence Analyst.

Editorial Deadline 25/04/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Karen Ysabelle R. David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk

It’s a dilemma faced by every young country: focus on the bright promises of the future, or look back on the struggles of the past? As Amandina Maria Helena da Silva writes, twenty-three-year-old Timor-Leste is no exception. Even as Dili now steps into the spotlight, the women survivors of the country’s decades-long struggle for independence find themselves relegated to the shadows.

Meanwhile, this week, Vietnam and the Philippines both look uneasily beyond their borders. In Vietnam, Sean Vu reports on what President Tô Lâm’s recent state visit to China reveals about Hanoi’s delicate balancing act between “an assertive Beijing and an unpredictable Washington.” Manila, too, is fretting about its security, as the fast-paced world of today brings with it a whole host of new security risks, as discussed by Glenn Vincent N. Boquilon.

As Timor-Leste grapples with its past and Vietnam and the Philippines focus on a chaotic present, Singapore, as ever, looks toward the future, writes Jennifer Tan. Faced with a slowing job market, the city-state is confronting the problem presented by artificial intelligence head-on by offering its citizens the opportunity to reskill and upskill through a government initiative.

Timor-Leste 🇹🇱

Voices Forgotten in Independence

by Amandina Maria Helena da Silva, in Dili

During the 1975–1999 conflict, in order to control the resistance of Timor-Leste, sexual violence against women and girls was widespread and perpetrated in a systematic manner in multiple locations across the country. At present, many women survivors have reached old age, facing emerging social, economic, and health difficulties, all while feeling as though they have been neglected by the state.

Despite their situation, women survivors continue fighting to gain recognition from the government or state that they are active contributors to the independence of Timor-Leste, and not only the combatants.

As documented by AJAR-TL (Asia Justice and Rights Timor-Leste), survivors continue to experience profound sadness, pain, and anger stemming from past events that have shaped their suffering up to the present, such as living with stigma and discrimination; poverty; no food; no adequate shelter; and living with severe diseases and trauma. Yet these experiences remain unrecognized by the state. For survivors, official recognition is not merely symbolic; it is essential to restoring their dignity and affirming the value of their lives.

In the context of the celebration of the International Day of the Right to Truth and Dignity of Victims, as reported by RTTL Roman ba Nasaun, survivor Rosa Belo expressed feeling unable to overcome the painful experiences of the past and that she continues to live with their enduring impact. Meanwhile, the daughter of survivor Idalina emphasized the importance of protecting and recognizing victims, acknowledging that they also made significant contributions to the struggle for independence.

Furthermore, the Director of AJAR-TL emphasized that this represents an opportunity to call upon both the public and relevant authorities to uphold the dignity of victims and to ensure that their right to adequate reparations is fully recognized and fulfilled.

However, although Timor-Leste has been independent for almost 24 years, the recognition and dignification of survivors’ voices has not been prioritized as a national concern. While survivors live in conditions of poverty, suffering from multiple illnesses, and experiencing painful deaths, the question must be asked: independence for whom?

Besides this, the Centro Nacional Chega-CNC has made an effort to develop a draft law and policy on reparations for victims. The draft is presently undergoing public consultation following its completion, and it will subsequently be submitted to the Council of Ministers for approval.

Amandina is a human rights advocate working with Asia Justice and Rights Timor-Leste on the Interim Reparation to Women Survivors project. She previously worked with UNDP Timor-Leste’s Accelerator Lab and has contributed to human rights and health initiatives through several youth and civil society organisations. Her interests lie in justice, youth empowerment, and community-based social change in Timor-Leste.

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Vietnam 🇻🇳

Is Vietnam Leaning Towards China?

by Sean Huy Vu

After his election by the National Assembly, President Tô Lâm made his first state visit to China from April 14–17. During this trip, both leaders expressed their desire to boost trade and cooperation between their countries. Vietnam hopes to export more machinery and agricultural products, while Beijing intends to increase its investment in Vietnam’s green energy and transportation infrastructure, among other initiatives.

Tô Lâm’s visit comes as Vietnam’s political elite reform the regime to more closely imitate China’s institutions. At the 3+3 strategic dialogue last month, the two countries pledged to increase cooperation in their Ministries of foreign affairs, national defense, and public security. Tô Lâm himself broke with precedent and unified both the roles of State President and Party General Secretary, just like in China.

Even among Vietnam’s domestic populace, there appears to be a shift. Social media posts (especially on TikTok), online searches, and language learning data suggest that Vietnamese attitudes towards China are becoming less hostile, according to Reuters. Nguyen Khac Giang of the Yusof-Ishak Institute explained that, “Young Vietnamese online sound less strident about China than before, but that owes more to the state’s increasingly tightening control of nationalism than to fading resentment.”

But social media algorithms and like counts can distort reality. A recent poll by ISEAS shows that over 59% of Vietnamese elites favor the United States over China in a hypothetical forced choice. In contrast, 52% of respondents across ASEAN chose China. A major source of friction between Beijing and Hanoi is the South China Sea, where Chinese vessels employ gray zone, coercive tactics against Vietnamese fishermen for the sea’s water and airspace, as well as fishing grounds. The territorial disputes resonate with the nationalism of the Vietnamese public, whose ancestors experienced centuries of conflict with China, the most recent being the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War. Another area of competition between China and Vietnam is the latter’s role as a diversified source for production and export in global supply chains, especially for the United States and its allies.

Thus, Vietnam is not aligning closer with China, but is continuing its “struggle and cooperation” approach (đấu tranh và hợp tác). Although Vietnam remains one of the United States’ major supporters, this popular sentiment cannot be easily translated into policy since Vietnam remains deeply integrated with China’s economy and maintains several territorial disputes. Any overt tilt towards Washington could result in consequences for the ruling party in Hanoi. As Gregor Polling of the Center for Strategic and International Studies notes, “In the new world ​of U.S. revisionism, keeping China at arm’s length in favour of U.S. investment or U.S. preferred standards just isn’t seen as viable anymore.”

To balance between an assertive Beijing and an unpredictable Washington, Vietnam has increasingly leveraged several of its Comprehensive Strategic Partnerships (CSP). In the midst of turmoil in the Middle East, “Hanoi has turned to Japan and South Korea for crude oil assistance and is seeking alternative jet fuel suppliers,” after China suspended exporting their refined fuel to neighbors. South Korean President Lee Jae Myung met with his Vietnamese counterpart for a four-day visit in an aim to boost economic and people-to-people ties. South Korea is already Vietnam’s largest source of foreign direct investment (FDI), at 25% of the total, equivalent to approximately US$99 billion, and the relationship is expected to grow. Should Vietnam continue to successfully diversify its relations, the need to lean towards either the United States or China will be unnecessary.


Sean is a scholar of East Asian history, culture, and international relations, with current research at Georgetown University examining working-class labor and human trafficking in the region. His broader interests include the social psychology of religion and identity politics. Sean previously taught modern Korean history at the University of California, Irvine, where he completed his B.A. in History, and later taught English in Ho Chi Minh City while studying Vietnamese language and culture. His writing has been published by UC Irvine, Johns Hopkins University, and Foreign Analysis.

Singapore 🇸🇬

Is Singapore’s Upskilling Push Actually Working?

by Jennifer Hui En Tan, in Singapore

Singapore’s job market has experienced a notable slowdown in recent years, with job postings dropping 17% and companies increasingly preferring contract roles over permanent positions due to economic uncertainty. In response, the government has intensified initiatives for citizens to upskill SkillFuture programs. Since 2024, individuals aged 40 and above received a SGD 4,000 non-expiring credit to top up their skills and pursue new career goals, a move further accelerated by the rapid rise of AI. Despite the push, an important question remains: are these initiatives delivering their intended impact?

Singapore has shown the sharpest drop in job postings in five years since March 2021, with a 4.5% dip in February 2026 and 58% of employers planning to freeze headcount. Despite the current job market having more jobs compared to pre-pandemic times, the concentration in skilled sectors made the level of entry higher for the overall population. This issue is directly linked to the overall rise of AI and digital technologies, as employers plan to utilize and upskill employees to work alongside AI. Furthermore, 30% of respondents in a NTUC survey stated that they felt anxious that AI would or could replace their jobs in the future.

SkillsFuture is an initiative by the Singaporean government to incentivize citizens to reskill and upskill by providing subsidies and credits. So far, 555,000 individuals have enrolled in a SkillsFuture-supported program, and the Career Transition Program under SkillsFuture recorded that 72% of individuals who completed the course secured employment in their new sector within six months of completion. This reflects the program’s effectiveness in lowering barriers to training and encouraging broader participation across age groups.

Steps to maintain high quality and relevant training have been initiated by SkillsFuture. By tightening course approval and renewal, this ensures that training programs are encouraged to actively invest in workforce development. Initiatives to launch a revamped portal with AI powered personalized guidance and curated recommendations for in demand skills to direct users towards pathways that align with their interested industry’s needs and long-term economic priorities.

Within Southeast Asia, similar skill development incentives have been introduced to strengthen workforce competitiveness. Indonesia has introduced the Kartu Prakerja program, a large-scale, government-funded upskilling initiative which has reached 14.3 million beneficiaries across 34 provinces. Indonesia’s program stands out as one of the region’s most extensive and well-documented national upskilling initiatives. Notably, 92% of participants selected training based on their individual needs, while 95% reported a skill improvement upon completion, suggesting a strong alignment between training provision and user-driven demand, as well as positive perceived outcomes.

Overall, while Singapore’s SkillsFuture initiative has significantly improved access to training and shows promising indicators in employability outcomes and skills acquisition, its long-term economic impact remains mixed and still evolving. The program has lowered barriers to lifelong learning and helped many individuals transition into new roles, particularly in a rapidly changing labor market shaped by AI and structural shifts. However, challenges such as uneven employer participation, varying relevance of courses, and uncertainty over measurable wage and productivity gains suggest that SkillsFuture’s effectiveness is not yet fully maximized. Moving forward, its success will depend on strengthening the alignment between training, industry demand, and tangible career outcomes, ensuring that upskilling translates more directly into sustained economic resilience and workforce competitiveness.


Jennifer is a final-year International Relations student at the Singapore Institute of Management, where she focuses on political engagement, diplomacy, and community governance. She is an active volunteer in her constituency, working closely with residents to understand local concerns, facilitate dialogue, and support community initiatives.

The Philippines 🇵🇭

Rethinking Security in a Changing World

by Glenn Vincent N. Boquilon, in Angeles City

Since the Cold War, national security has been defined and understood through military terms. Discussions were centered on armed conflict, protection from external threats, and maintaining state sovereignty. While this is still the case today, the definition has continuously evolved. Security is no longer just about borders and weapons. It now covers a wider range of risks that affect economies, the technological landscape, and other important domains of life.

However, traditional defense still plays an important role. Countries like the Philippines continue to invest in military modernization. The Armed Forces of the Philippines’ (AFP) Re-Horizon 3 is a prime example of this, as the program seeks to shell out around US$35 billion for military upgrades. They also continue to strengthen alliances with various countries that could help protect the country.

Recent escalations in the disputed territory that the Philippines calls the West Philippine Sea, including confrontations during resupply missions, show that upholding sovereignty and territorial defense are still principal concerns. As gray zone tactics are becoming more pervasive in nature, strategic engagements must also follow. At the same time, joint exercises with partners such as the United States Armed Forces under agreements highlight how alliances continue to shape security strategy.

Simultaneously, new security risks are becoming harder to predict. Economies today depend on systems that can be vulnerable to disruption. Power grids, transport networks, communication systems, and digital platforms are all critical infrastructures that can be easily manipulated in an attack. The Philippines is not new to cyber attacks, with several official government websites having been targeted in recent months. Regionally, ransomware threats in Singapore and Indonesia show how these challenges can disrupt services and affect public trust. Thus, digital vulnerability and cybersecurity are other important domains that must be considered when thinking of national security.

Adding to this, energy security is another challenge. The tensions between the United States and Iran have pushed oil prices to an all-time high. Many countries in Southeast Asia, including the Philippines, rely on imported fuel. With limited access to this essential element, disruptions have occurred across multiple industries. As a response, the Philippine government has declared a state of national energy emergency. Time and time again, geopolitical tensions entail a degree of instability across the globe.

There is also a growing focus on the need to safeguard information systems. Protecting sensitive data is pivotal to national security. As technology advances, threats are becoming more sophisticated and complex. Reports of disinformation campaigns and concerns over foreign interference during elections are a prevalent issue in Southeast Asia. These highlight how challenges in security have gone beyond physical borders and spread to digital landscapes. Ultimately, governments must pay closer attention to data protection, digital platforms, and the role of information in shaping public opinion.

Many of these challenges are shared by countries in Southeast Asia, as they work to uphold sovereignty while also dealing with economic pressures and technological risks. Regional efforts through ASEAN include cooperation on cybersecurity, disaster response, and economic resilience. While each country responds differently to threats, there is a growing understanding that security now requires coordination across borders. Knowledge management and information sharing are pivotal to regional security.

In the end, redefining security means adjusting to a more complex and ever-changing world. Defense remains important, but it is no longer enough on its own. Countries must now protect not only their borders, but also their economies, systems, and institutions. For the Philippines and the wider ASEAN region, this extensive approach is becoming ever more essential in navigating today’s security challenges.


Glenn holds a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from the University of Santo Tomas. His experience spans governance programs, policy development, and political research, having worked with the Ateneo School of Government and WR Numero Research on projects focused on electoral reform, public opinion, and regional development. He also helped coordinate the drafting of the Bangsamoro Local Government Code and supported the Academy of Multiparty Democracy.

Editorial Deadline 21/04/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

For decades, Malaysia’s nation-building project has been inward-facing; focussing on managing racial complexity, ensuring stability, and building the foundations of a modern economy. This approach has delivered real progress. But as the global system fractures and reverberations are felt around the Indo-Pacific, it is no longer sufficient. This article argues that Malaysia’s next chapter requires a shift in perspective: from inward management to outward purpose. What the country lacks is not capability, but a unifying idea that defines our role in the world. Existing ambitions such as becoming high-income, moving up the value chain, maintaining non-alignment are important, but they describe outcomes and methods, not purpose and identity.

Malaysia’s geography and history point to a clearer answer. Situated along the Straits of Malacca, one of the world’s most critical trade corridors, and shaped by centuries of historical heritage of movement, Malaysia is not merely a participant in global commerce, but is positioned to become a central node within it.

To realize this, Malaysia must dedicate itself to becoming a modern trading civilization: A country where nations come to trade goods, invest capital, and exchange ideas. Where its people are open, and they explore the world.

Malaysia should build a nation of, and a nation for, explorers.

Where it started

Whether consciously or not, many Malaysians are familiar with this question: What is Malaysia? What defines the country and its people as Malaysians? Are Malaysians characterised by their multicultural, multiracial, and multireligious diversity? Or simpler still - it’s the child-like wonder of, “Who are we?” The common answer may sound familiar: Malaysia is defined by her people.

They carry a rich tapestry of history: from unwilling neighbours ferried to support British colonial trade, to post-independence citizens tied together by Satu Malaysia. A melting pot of food, language, and that unmistakable Malaysian twang. Malaysians are less defined by similarity, and more by their differences.

Yet, sometimes, in the space where a national identity should sit, many have wondered if the harmony is held together less by a coherent idea of unity, and more by a quiet fear of disharmony.

Malaysia celebrates Satu Malaysia, but how many have more multicultural friendships than their parents did? And how do those compare to their parents?

The country continues to be moulded by differences inherited from an older time, and still allows the future to be shaped by the same paradigm. Surely, this must change. A new way of thinking about Malaysia’s future is required, and this article presents a thesis for a way forward.

It’s time to look outwards, not inwards.

The majority of Malaysia’s nation-building literature largely explored the question of Malaysia’s future by looking inwards.

Most start by tracing the curvature of colonialism beneath the smiles of ordinary Malaysians, and find that British racial separation birthed a constitution that embeds our differences as an institutional reality.

Unlike its Southeast Asian neighbours, who chose to suppress racial differences in pursuit of a unified identity, Malaysia chose to embrace them. From there, there was no turning back.

Malaysia was forced, from the onset of its genesis, to start nation-building by looking inwards. Institutions and policies were designed to distribute wealth along racial lines, managing a delicate balance that demanded constant attention. For the consequences of failure snake beneath every Malaysian’s subconscious: Malaysia cannot afford another May 13.

In effect, much of what Malaysia built as a nation was shaped by race. It became a country that understood itself through its internal racial dynamics, rather than its external place in the world.

For the last 70 years, this was not only understandable, but necessary. How can a country look outward if it is not yet stable within?

In the 1970s, Malays controlled only a small share of corporate equity despite forming the majority of the population. Rural states such as Kedah, Kelantan, and Pahang lagged far behind more urbanised regions like Selangor, Johor, and Penang. In East Malaysia, social mobility was limited, and for many, economic advancement remained a distant aspiration.

Since then, Malaysia has made real progress. Poverty has fallen dramatically. Inequality has narrowed. Participation in the modern economy has broadened. The economy has expanded, and human development indicators have improved significantly states data from Sultan Nazrin Shah’s book Striving for Inclusive Development, which traces Malaysia’s economic journey from its colonial roots to the present day.

But progress did not come without cost.

Institutional weaknesses enabled periods of corruption and misgovernance. Race-based policies, while addressing inequality, also created distortions that continue to shape the economy today.

Yet, through these imperfections, something else emerged.

From the cracks of its early struggles grew institutions and infrastructure that defined the Malaysia Boleh (Malaysia can do it) spirit. Malaysia now has strong physical infrastructure, a capable financial system, widespread connectivity, and a population that is increasingly educated and globally aware.

In many ways, Malaysia is ready.

And this is increasingly recognized, not just by observers, but by policymakers themselves. In recent years, there has been a wave of national strategies: the 13th Malaysia Plan, NIMP (industrial), NETR (energy), and the Defence White Paper. Together, they signal a renewed push to re-energize growth and reposition the country.

Perhaps for the first time since Mahathir Mohamad (Malaysian Prime Minister) sparked a frenzy for industrialization that catapulted Malaysia into a middle power, there is a recognition that the country stands at the precipice of something great.

As Liew Chin Tong argues in Second Takeoff, this is Malaysia’s time. As global supply chains shift and geopolitical tensions reshape the world economy, a new wave of industrialization is underway. Countries that position themselves well will capture the next phase of growth.

For 70 years, the country looked inward. Now, it must begin to look outward.

This is not to deny that challenges remain. Malaysia’s internal issues have not disappeared. But the path forward may not lie in continuing to look inward alone. It is through the outward journey of pursuing a Grand Strategy that the country will reshape how it sees itself.

Its diversity, long treated as a source of tension, will begin to find new meaning. Its pockets of economic aspirations will orient themselves to serve a wider purpose.

Like sailors on land who spent decades fixing their vessels, Malaysia’s entire nation-building apparatus will finally set sail towards this true north. And in doing so, the country may finally arrive at an answer to the question it began with: What is Malaysia?

Crafting Malaysia’s Grand Strategy

A grand strategy is the overarching, long-term plan that defines a nation’s core objective and aligns all its resources: economic, political, military, and social, to achieve it amid a contested global order.

At its core, it must answer three questions:

• What is Malaysia trying to become? (state/identity)

• Where does it play? (geography, domains, arenas of competition)

• How does it align everything to get there? (policies, institutions, capabilities)

If these three do not connect, what exists is not a grand strategy, but a collection of initiatives.

The ambition of this article is simple, but demanding. It is not to examine Malaysia through a single lens, but to define what Malaysia should be by holding its geography, history, economy, institutions, and identity together as one system.

Yet even with years spent studying Malaysia’s development, answering a basic question remains difficult: what is Malaysia’s grand strategy?

The answers available today are, at best, incomplete. Consider the familiar description:

“Malaysia is a strategically positioned, multiethnic middle-income nation balancing export-driven economic ambition, state-guided development, and social cohesion while navigating identity, governance, and geopolitical complexity.”

This may sound accurate, but it is not distinctive. Replace “Malaysia” with Indonesia, the Philippines, India, Turkey, or Brazil, and it would still ring true.

At best, Malaysia’s current policy direction suggests that it aims to become a stable, inclusive, high-value economy and a neutral middle power embedded in global supply chains. But this is not a grand strategy. It is a well-coordinated development approach.

It tells how Malaysia grows, but not what it aspires to grow into.

Consider this:

• “High-income nation” is an outcome, not an identity.

• “Move up the value chain” is a method, not a direction.

• “Neutral middle power” is a posture, not a purpose.

Malaysia knows how it wants to grow, but not what it wants to grow into.

It is, in many ways, like a chef with all the right ingredients, but no dish defined. Or a ship in choppy waters, with capable sailors and a sturdy vessel, but no clear destination.

This gap becomes clear when examining national policies.

The 13th Malaysia Plan, for example, outlines a broad set of domestic priorities, with limited articulation of Malaysia’s role on the global stage.

Similarly, Malaysia’s industrial policy (NIMP) identifies the right capabilities such as advanced manufacturing, digitalization, net-zero, and supply chain resilience, but offers little clarity on the unifying purpose behind them.

Why is Malaysia digitalizing? Why is it pursuing net-zero? Why is it revitalizing manufacturing? Beyond responding to global trends, what is the larger role Malaysia is trying to play?

An articulation of a Malaysian grand strategy can be found in the aforementioned book by Liew Chin Tong (The Second Takeoff). In this interpretation, he makes a memorable argument that Malaysia’s direction is to achieve three Ms:

• Middle-Class: To grow rich before growing old.

• Middle-Power: To be a non-aligned middle power that serves as a conduit between the West and East.

• Middle-Ground: To occupy the “middle” in manufacturing (e.g. assembly), leveraging its “middle” position between East and West.

But even this framing does not provide a clear direction for Malaysia.

Having a strong middle class signals a stable economy, and being a non-aligned middle power is an approach. Occupying the middle ground in manufacturing is an industrial strategy. These are important but they do not, in part or in full, define what Malaysia is meant to be.

What emerges, then, is a pattern. For decades, Malaysia’s socioeconomic development has largely been inward-facing, focused on stabilizing the racial-religious balance while pursuing industrial growth. This model has served the country well. But it cannot be the path of a country on the precipice of its next chapter.

This is the moment to ask a different question - not just how Malaysia grows, but what it will grow into.

Any meaningful answer must be clear, practical, and carry a call to action; one that defines what Malaysia must become, and, when examined closely, reveals the foundational core of what makes a Malaysian.

Malaysia as a Trading Civilization

Some countries must struggle to create relevance in the world. Others have relevance thrust upon them by sheer size or by geography that places them at the center of global affairs.

China and India derive relevance from scale. As vast continental powers, their populations provide depth and internal momentum. The same is true of the United States which is shielded by the Pacific and Atlantic, bordered by relatively stable neighbours, and able to grow into a global center of innovation and capitalism.

Others derive relevance from movement. The Gulf states, such as the UAE, have leveraged their position along critical trade and energy routes to become hubs of commerce and connectivity. Similarly, small states like Singapore have capitalized on geography to attract capital and talent. In these cases, relevance is not driven by size, but by proximity to global flows of goods, capital, and people.

Malaysia belongs to this second category.

It does not possess the scale of continental powers, nor the singular continuity of older civilizations. But it sits along one of the most consequential waterways in the history of global commerce - the corridor linking the Indian Ocean and the Pacific.

Malaysia has the Straits of Malacca.

Long before the modern nation-state, the Malay world thrived as a network of maritime trading communities. The Malacca Sultanate became a crossroads of cultures and economies, a resting place where merchants, scholars, and diplomats gathered to exchange goods and ideas.

Trade did not just bring wealth. It shaped a shared identity. The people of the Malay world became defined by movement, exchange, and exploration.

As such, the diversity that defines Malaysia today did not arise in isolation. It is the birthmark of a land shaped by centuries of trade, migration, and exchange. Malaysia’s diversity is not merely a byproduct of colonial history, but the inheritance of a trading civilization that once stood at the center of its world.

Today, the global system is reorganizing once again. The Indo-Pacific has become the central arena of economic dynamism and geopolitical competition. Supply chains are shifting. Trade routes between East Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, and Europe are deepening.

The system before Malaysia is being rebuilt. And parts of it are being rebuilt around it.

The Strait of Malacca remains one of the most vital trade corridors in the world. But geography alone does not guarantee influence. Malaysia’s strategic advantage must be cultivated through institutions, infrastructure, diplomacy, and capability.

Singapore understood this early. It did not merely benefit from its location but organized its entire system around it. By leveraging its maritime position decades ago to become the epicenter of regional trade, it used that advantage to become the financial, military, and intellectual drumbeat of the region.

Does Malaysia not stand at such a moment too?

There are strong instincts in adopting the right developmental policies. Manufacturing growth, export-led industrialization, and integration into global supply chains have transformed the country into a middle-income economy. Its ports are active. Its industries are competitive. Its society is diverse and capable.

Malaysia knows how to grow. But not what it is growing into.

The answer lies in something both old and new: Malaysia must turn its core into a trading nation once again. Not only of goods, but of capital, ideas, and exchange.

And this begins at sea.

Maritime trade is Malaysia’s natural foundation. The country already possesses ports across Penang, Selangor, Johor, and the East Coast. Capturing trade flows begins as a (behemoth) logistical challenge to attract transhipments away from Singapore. But if achieved, the long-run benefit is clear: global flows become anchored to Malaysia.

From there, everything begins to align.

Manufacturing gains purpose when it is positioned close to trade. Supply chains deepen when firms see Malaysia not just as a production base, but as a gateway. The export-led model becomes more powerful when it is tied directly to both Eastern and Western markets.

Maritime trade connects global demand with the supply from Malaysia’s re-industrialization objectives.

Growth then spreads. Industrialization strengthens existing hubs of Penang, Selangor, and Johor, and gradually extends outward as demand increases. States that were once peripheral gain new relevance as part of a larger system of production and exchange.

Even Malaysia’s military and foreign policy begin to align. A stronger role in trade demands a more capable naval and aerial presence to secure its waters. Its non-aligned foreign policy becomes an advantage as a platform of neutrality and trust in an increasingly divided world. Malaysia moves from participating in ASEAN to shaping it through connectivity and integration.

Tourism evolves alongside this as traders, investors, and talent flow through Malaysia. Its diversity becomes an asset on display, not a tension to manage.

And perhaps most importantly, in what started this entire essay, Malaysia inherits a renewed sense of identity.

A country that has long looked inward begins to look outward. Diversity is no longer just something to manage, but something to present. Malaysia becomes defined not just by its differences internally, but by how it showcases its diversity externally.

And if the above sounds far-fetched, the argument here is to the contrary.

This vision does not replace existing ambitions, but gives them meaning. Industrial policy, digital infrastructure, green energy, and innovation all remain essential. But within a trading strategy, they are no longer isolated efforts. They become parts of a coherent Grand Strategy.

Malaysia already possesses the foundations. Its geography places it at the center of key trade routes. Its ports, industries, and workforce are deeply connected to global markets. Its diplomatic posture remains balanced and pragmatic.

What is lacking is not capability, but clarity.

If developed intentionally, Malaysia can become a central, trusted platform for trade, production, and exchange in the Indo-Pacific.

This will not be easy. Institutional fragmentation, governance challenges, and gaps in execution remain real constraints. But they are not new, and they are not insurmountable.

Malaysia’s forefathers have done this before, and it can do so again.

The civilizations that once thrived along these shores succeeded not because they had more resources, but because they understood that success meant organizing themselves around global movements that are bigger than themselves: movements of goods, people, and ideas.

Today, Malaysia faces a similar moment.

Reclaiming History and Aligning Future

The question is not whether Malaysia can participate in the global system. It already does. The question is whether it will define its role within it, or continue without one.

Reclaiming its historical heritage as a trading nation offers that definition. It connects its geography to its future, aligns its capabilities with purpose, and places Malaysia not at the margins of the Indo-Pacific, but at one of its natural centers of gravity.

This should be Malaysia’s Grand Strategy.

This is what Malaysia must grow into.

Edited by Nishiha Jasper David, Frontier Analysis Editor

by Siu Tzyy Wei, Lead Editor - Maritime Crescent Desk

This week, the Maritime Crescent is bearing a weight that is too heavy to carry. In Indonesia, the law faculty of a well known university buckles under the moral burden of a sexual abuse scandal that exposes cracks in the very institution meant to uphold justice. Malaysia, long reliant on brown energy, now finds itself struggling to surmount the weight of political neglect as the search for renewable sources of energy becomes urgent and unavoidable. In Brunei, the small state shoulders the mounting responsibility as it hosts Australia’s Prime Minister Albanese in negotiating food and energy security in a world of tightening supply.

Together, these stories remind us of the weight we are carrying - institutions, systems and states lifting more than they can bear, revealing both the fragility of their foundations and the resilience demanded of them.

Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳

Wading through the Mire

by Maryam Zulaidi

For the past two months, the ongoing conflict between Iran and the United States of America has tempered the flow of vessels to and from the Strait of Hormuz, severely disrupting energy supply chains around the globe and leaving nations in the continents of Asia and Oceania to feel its adverse impacts. This uncertainty has threatened nations such as Australia to expeditiously secure essential commodities from other sovereign states away from the region of conflict as the nation is highly dependent on imported fertilisers where 69% of its urea is sourced from the Middle East.

In Australia’s efforts of shielding itself from a domestic food and energy shortage, the state is currently and actively finding alternative trading nations in place of Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar. Southeast Asia is second to the Middle East in sourcing urea to Australia. Among the incoming 300,000t of urea shipments, only one is from the Gulf while the rest are supplied from Brunei and Indonesia. Though, Indonesia’s urea fertiliser supplies may be under threat, and as a result, it is urgently showing interest in securing food and energy agreements with neighboring nations such as Brunei, Singapore and Malaysia. Brunei represents a safe haven for Australia due to its geographical proximity as well as being the most accessible option. As of recent, the sultanate supplies 11% of Australia’s urea imports.

Last Tuesday, 14th April 2026, marked Australia’s Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s first diplomatic visit to Brunei with the purpose of potentially increasing supply of diesel and urea fertiliser following his visit to the Brunei Fertilizer Industries (BFI). The comprehensive partnership between the nation and Brunei witnessed the signing of a joint statement on energy and food security between the two countries. The statement upholds their commitment to alert each other and stay clear from any unsubstantiated import and export restrictions regarding matters related to the trade of energy and food supplies. Australia, as Brunei’s top trading partner, brings considerable economic gains to the sultanate due to its import reliance even as urea prices remain competitive on raw materials – it is understood that 6,000t of granular urea has been sold by BFI for $710/t fob.

Taken together, the partnership between Australia and Brunei indicates a sharper purpose: broader calibration of global supply chains, mainly energy and food in reaction to the present geopolitical instability. A silver lining amidst thundering grey skies, Brunei finds itself opportunities derived not only from trade, but is also positioning itself as a cornerstone partner in a world increasingly imperiled by resource uncertainty.


Maryam is a first-year International Relations and Politics student at the University of Sheffield, with an academic focus on Southeast Asia—particularly Maritime Southeast Asia—and the Middle East. She aspires to a career in diplomacy and academia and is committed to fostering international dialogue and advancing scholarly engagement with global issues. Beyond her academic work, she pursues creative interests and voluntary initiatives that broaden her perspectives on public service.

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Malaysia 🇲🇾

The Renewable Rush

by Sydney Gan, in Kuala Lumpur

As the conflict in the Middle East rages on, the looming energy crisis in Malaysia exposes an over-reliance on fossil fuels and begs the question: what are Malaysia’s choices when oil inevitably runs out?

Despite the strategic, non-partisan posturing, Malaysia is unable to escape the apparent fact that the Strait of Hormuz’s closure represents a chokehold on Malaysia’s precious oil supply - and that, as it stands, Malaysia is ill-prepared for sufficient alternatives. Malaysia’s energy sector is heavily reliant on fossil fuels, with coal and natural gas comprising over 90% of electricity generation. In an effort to introduce green energy options, the government has introduced key policy frameworks such as the National Energy Transition Roadmap (NETR), which aims at achieving net-zero emissions by 2050. On all accounts, Malaysia has an advantage in advancing the renewable energy agenda: its equatorial location provides abundant solar energy, and it has since evolved into an international hub for solar technology manufacturing. However, government policies in practice demonstrated reluctance and a lack of political will to aggressively push for renewable energy adoption, the inertia of which was successfully blown under the radar for years - until now, when the threat of an energy crisis is swiftly coming to a head.

Presently, Malaysia is considering the large-scale adoption of two renewable energy sources. The first is biofuel, for which Malaysia currently has 19 production plants that process the sludge or by-product of crude palm oil to produce alternative fuel options. Deputy Prime Minister Datuk Seri Dr Ahmad Zahid Hamidi singled out biofuel as the a viable long-term solution to reduce diesel prices, as this renewable energy source has already undergone vehicle testing. A formal proposal has been submitted to the National Economic Action Council (MTEN) to urge the upscaling of further biofuel efforts and further cross-ministerial collaborations to ensure nationwide low production costs through efficient integration.

Concurrently, the MADANI Government is also seriously considering developing nuclear energy programmes. Science, Technology and Innovation Minister YB Chang Lih Kang cautions that this lower-carbon source would be adopted merely complementarily to current existing sources, in order to ensure resilient energy over the long term. Currently, small modular reactors are being studied as part of the government’s feasibility study assessing nuclear power’s role as a stable base-load supply. Unlike its biofuel counterpart, nuclear energy is a relatively unexplored option in Malaysia and lacks well-established infrastructure. Coupled with a generalised hesitation towards adoption due to the threat of nuclear fallout, Malaysia tiptoes around this proposed alternative, caught between its necessity and its high risk of radioactivity

As Malaysia faces uncertain times ahead, renewable energy alternatives emerge not just as a ‘nice-to-have’, but as a need. It would seem that Malaysia has jumped onto the bandwagon a touch too late, but it is the subsequent policy push that will be significant to see Malaysia finally develop towards its green and sustainability goals.


Sydney holds a Bachelor of Laws from King’s College London, where she focused on Human Rights Law, Criminology, and Public & Administrative Law. She is an Analyst at Asia Group Advisors, providing policy analysis and strategic guidance across the tech, sustainability, and gaming sectors in Southeast Asia. Prior to joining AGA, she worked in the social development sector in London, contributing to the Ukraine Judicial Training Programme through research on war crimes adjudication and the development of a legal training curriculum with high court magistrates.

Indonesia 🇮🇩

When Justice Breaks, Again

by Muhammad Rayhansyah Jasin

On April 14, videos of the internal ethics forum at University of Indonesia (UI) went viral when 16 male law students were summoned over their group chat involving lewd discussions of fellow female students, staff, and lecturers. The Faculty of Law’s As the Student Executive Board (BEM) demanded public apologies, immediate expulsions and stronger campus guidelines. The faculty suspended the students’ academic status for 45 days, stipping them of positions in student organisations while internal proceedings continue

Under Indonesia’s 2022 Anti-Sexual Violence Law, non-physical harrassment, including digital abuse, is a crime. Universities in Indonesia were required to establish anti-sexual violence and prevention task Force (Satgas PPKS) in 2023; later extended under Regulation No.55/2024. Yet, the UI case shows how legal frameworks alone cannot prevent misconduct - even when perpetrators are law students aware of the gravity of their actions. Many held leadership roles, even handling past harassment cases, underscoring the hypocrisy and depth of the problem.

This case reflects the normalization of misogyny running rampant around Indonesian campuses. A resurfaced clip from Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB) showed students singing “Erika”, a anthem filled with sexist remarks and obscene lyrics; at Padjadjaran University, a lecturer allegedly coerced an exchange student for explicit images; University of Sultan Ageng Tirtayasa expelled a student caught recording in a women’s restroom. Harassment persists despite regulations, eroding trust in institutions meant to safeguard students.

The scale is alarming. Education watchdog Network for Education Watch Indonesia (JPPI) reported 233 cases of violence in educational institutions in the first 4 months of 2026, nearly half involving sexual harassment. Such figures highlight that safe spaces cannot exist only n paper. The UI case must serve as more than a wake-up call - it is evidence for a moral emergency within higher education.

Regionally, Southeast Asia faces similar challenges. The sexual trafficking industry employs up to 300,000 people working behind the sexual human-trafficking industry, while WHO estimates one in three women in ASEAN states experience violence, higher than the global average. Campuses - supposedly the safest public spaces - have become hotspots of abuse is a jarring indictment of cultural complacency.

Indonesia’s universities now stand at a crossroads. They can continue treating harassment as isolated scandals, or they can confront the entrenched culture that normalises misogyny and undermines private spaces. For policymakers, the lesson is clear: laws and task forces are not enough. Enforcement must be consistent, leadership accountable and campus culture reshaped to prioritise dignity and safety.

The UI case should not fade into another headline - it must mark the reminder of a broader reckoning - one that forces institutions to lift the weight of responsibility they have long avoided, and in proving that higher education can be a space of justice.


Rayhan is pursuing an Erasmus Mundus Joint Master’s Degree in Public Policy at Central European University and the Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals. He holds a Bachelor of Social Sciences in International Relations and Political Economy from Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University. His current research focuses on the socio-economic impacts of Indonesia’s nickel mining industry on local communities and national development.

Editorial Deadline 18/04/2025 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk

When crises arrive from outside, what matters most is what you have built within to defend yourself. This week’s issue finds the Mekong countries caught between external shocks and internal fragilities, and the distance between the two is shorter than governments would like to admit.

Cambodia is absorbing three simultaneous blows: a border conflict that sent hundreds of thousands of workers home, a fuel crisis draining foreign exchange, and a scam economy still corroding investor confidence. Each shock alone would already be tough to manage. Together, they have pushed growth projections to their lowest in years. In Laos, the numbers are looking just as uncomfortable: inflation already above target, debt constraining every policy response, and a fuel shock that hit households before the government had any cushion to soften it.

Meanwhile, In Myanmar, the revolution's closest allies are being peeled away one by one. Not by the junta, but by China's calculated pressure on the very groups that once dealt it its greatest defeats. Finally, Thailand too has been suffering the shockwaves rippling from the Middle East, but its advanced digital infrastructure allows it to do what few others can: get relief to the right people without resorting to costly blanket subsidies.

Cambodia 🇰🇭

Cambodia’s Growth Outlook Falls as Three Crises Hit at Once

by Sokna Thea, in Phnom Penh

Cambodia’s economic outlook for 2026 has been revised down sharply by major institutions. The World Bank now projects 3.9% growth, the ADB 4.5%, while the government still holds to a 5.0% target. The downgrade comes as inflation reached 5.6% in March 2026, tourism weakened, and investment confidence came under further pressure.

The first shock is the Cambodia-Thailand border conflict. The ADB estimates that the border closure alone cut Cambodia’s GDP growth by about 1.4 percentage points. Around 900,000 to 950,000 Cambodian migrant workers in Thailand returned home, and remittances dropped 37%, from USD 2.95 billion to USD 1.86 billion in 2025. Trade was also hit hard. The Poipet-Aranyaprathet crossing, which handles more than 70% of bilateral land cargo, was closed, blocking about USD 460 million per month in trade flows. Tourism suffered as well, with Angkor Wat arrivals down 34% year on year by March 2026.

The second shock is the energy crisis. Cambodia imports virtually all of its refined fuel and has no domestic refining capacity, leaving it highly exposed to global price swings. Since late February 2026, diesel prices surged by as much as 87%, regular gasoline rose 30% to 35%, and LPG increased about 70%. More than 2,000 of Cambodia’s 6,300 petrol stations were initially paralyzed, while fuel imports reached USD 606 million in January and February 2026 alone. The shock is now pushing up production costs across garments, transport, and agriculture.

The third shock is the scam economy, which continues to damage both reputation and investment. Cambodia-based scam operations are estimated at USD 12.5 billion to USD 19 billion a year. The US Treasury sanctioned 146 targets linked to the Prince Group network, and the US Department of Justice seized about USD 15 billion worth of Bitcoin tied to Chen Zhi’s network. Foreign direct investment fell 37% year on year, according to the Council for the Development of Cambodia. The decline reflects a drop from a higher 2024 baseline, though Cambodia still attracted about USD 5.2 billion in 2025, with more than 70% coming from China. An AmCham survey also found that the share of firms expecting profit declines rose from 20% to 34%.

These shocks are interconnected. The border conflict disrupted fuel supply routes, while higher energy costs added pressure across export sectors. Meanwhile, scam-related reputational damage continues to slow tourism recovery and limit investor diversification. Compared with regional peers, Cambodia’s outlook is now clearly weaker. Vietnam is projected at 7.2%, while Indonesia stands at around 5.2%.

The key question is whether this represents only a temporary slowdown or something more structural. The ADB had earlier projected 6.2% growth for 2026 before recent downgrades. The current range, from 3.9% to 4.5%, suggests Cambodia may be moving into a lower growth path if the Middle East conflict remains unstable and border and scam-related risks continue to weigh on the economy.


Sokna has a background in International Affairs and Business & Commercial Law. He’s currently a Senior Project Coordinator at the Ministry of Economy and Finance of Cambodia, working on the Financial Management Information System (FMIS) Project. His professional focus is driven by entrepreneurship, business development, and financial technology, with a particular interest in how private-sector innovation drives Cambodia’s economic growth.

Lao PDR 🇱🇦

Lao New Year Relief as Rising Costs Strain Daily Life in Laos

by Thongsavanh Souvannasane, in Vientiane

Rising living costs continue to affect households nationwide, with the impact most pronounced in the capital Vientiane, where prices of food, transport, and basic services are rising steadily.

Over the past year, inflation has been driven mainly by higher fuel costs, currency pressure, and reliance on imports, steadily reducing purchasing power. For many residents, daily expenses now take up a larger share of income, leaving less room for savings or non-essential spending.

A typical urban daily budget reflects this pressure.

Meals that once cost around 15,000 to 20,000 kip (USD 0.68 to 0.90) now often exceed 35,000-60,000 kip (USD 1.5 to 2.7), while transport costs have risen alongside fuel prices. Higher fuel costs have also pushed up logistics expenses, feeding into broader increases in goods and services.

Recent projections by the Asian Development Bank show that economic growth in Laos is expected to slow to around 4.0% in 2026, down from 4.4% in 2025, before a slight recovery to 4.5% in 2027.

Inflation, after easing to 7.7% in 2025, is projected to rise again to around 9.8% in 2026. In the first quarter of 2026, it already stood at around 7%, remaining above the government’s target of keeping inflation below 6% over the next five-year term.

Fuel prices remain a key driver of rising costs.

Following escalation in the Middle East, diesel prices in Laos surged sharply from around 19,970 kip (USD 0.9) per liter in late February to over 50,000 kip (USD 2.26) by mid-April 2026, an increase of more than 150%. As Laos relies heavily on imported fuel, global price shocks quickly translate into domestic inflation.

At the same time, structural challenges persist.

Public and publicly guaranteed debt is estimated at around 82% of GDP, limiting fiscal space and constraining policy responses. External risks, limited foreign exchange buffers, and banking sector pressures continue to weigh on the economic outlook.

Despite gradual stabilization supported by exports, tourism recovery, and infrastructure development, these gains have yet to fully ease household-level pressures.

As a result, many people are adjusting their spending habits, eating at home more often, reducing non-essential purchases, and prioritizing basic needs.

Compared to neighboring Thailand, where higher wages and more diversified supply chains provide greater resilience, consumers in Laos remain more exposed to external shocks.

Despite these challenges, mid-April brings brief relief as Laos celebrates Lao New Year (Pi Mai Lao) from around 13 to 16 April. The traditional water festival is marked by water splashing, religious ceremonies, and family gatherings.

While it does not change economic realities, it offers a short pause from financial pressures and a moment of collective relief.


Thongsavanh is a journalist from Laos with a background in English-language media. He graduated from the Lao-American Institute with a Diploma of the Arts in English and contributes to independent news platforms. His reporting focuses on environmental issues, socio-economic development, and geopolitics.

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Myanmar 🇲🇲

Myanmar’s Neighbors Prioritize Self-interests Over Morality

by Mozart

Amid international neglect of Myanmar’s political crisis, its neighbors are increasingly prioritizing their own interests by engaging with the junta and supporting its plans to suppress dissent, ignoring the will and suffering of the Myanmar people. In fact, the junta’s actions are largely dictated by the political calculations of neighboring states, particularly China.

On the third day of the Thingyan festival, April 15, 2026, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) issued a statement formally congratulating junta leader Min Aung Hlaing on becoming Myanmar’s president, indicating its hope to collaborate with his leadership on peace negotiations through political means. The statement frustrated many during the Thingyan break, as a group once considered an enemy of the junta appeared poised to become its partner under pressure from a neighboring country.

The TNLA is one of the three members, alongside the Arakan Army and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), of the Brotherhood Alliance, which launched the highly successful Operation 1027 in late 2023, severely weakening the junta by seizing towns, military bases, and key trade routes. However, China-brokered ceasefires had already strained the alliance by early 2026: the MNDAA began handing back control of Lashio to the junta in April 2025, and the TNLA agreed to return Mogok in October 2025. China holds significant influence over both groups, and its facilitated peace process leaves little room for dissent from either party. The episode reveals, with some irony, that durable peace in Myanmar may be impossible without Chinese involvement — and that such involvement comes on Beijing’s terms alone.

These groups had repeatedly pledged solidarity with the people of Myanmar. That position has now reversed — not due to internal conviction, but external pressure. The junta’s heavy reliance on China for surveillance infrastructure, combined with Beijing’s leverage over regional armed forces, illustrates a realist politics that places strategic interest firmly above political morality. China needs Myanmar stable enough to advance its economic agenda, including Belt and Road Initiative projects such as the Kyaukphyu Deep Sea Port and cross-border pipelines. Beyond Shan State, China is also pressing the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) to enter negotiations with the junta to stabilize the broader region.

China is not the only enabler of the regime’s survival — but it is arguably the most significant. Other neighbors have adopted similarly realist stances. Thailand’s dependence on Myanmar’s natural gas, and its desire to limit refugee and migration flows, have led Bangkok to continue engaging with the military leadership, often bypassing ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus. India’s Act East policy and its competition with China have led New Delhi to maintain ties with the junta in order to protect infrastructure projects such as the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project and to manage instability along its border.

Together, these regional dynamics have created what might be called a buffer of indifference — one that shields the junta from full international isolation. While Western sanctions bite, Myanmar’s neighbors provide the economic lifelines and diplomatic cover the regime needs to endure. By facilitating a sham electoral process in late 2025 and early 2026, these states are not seeking a democratic solution, but a manageable one that protects their investments. The Myanmar people find themselves fighting not only a domestic military dictatorship, but a regional geopolitical order that treats their suffering as secondary to trade and security.


Mozart is a research assistant at Mosaic Myanmar and is currently pursuing a Bachelor of Arts in Liberal Arts and Sciences at Parami University. His academic and professional interests span community development, minority issues, and social impact research. He has held roles including service-learning intern, student mentor, and operations coordinator for local initiatives, supporting project management, monitoring and evaluation, and education programs in Myanmar.

Thailand 🇹🇭

Thailand's Digital Edge in an Analog Crisis

by Satid Sootipunya, in Bangkok

The status of the Strait of Hormuz remains uncertain. The Iranian government announced on Friday that it would be ‘completely opened’ during a 10-day ceasefire, signaling relief to countries across the world, including Thailand; however, the waterway was shut once again on Saturday.

The sense of uncertainty directly affects the movement of assets worldwide, including energy prices. Experts said that even though the war ends today, the impact of developments in the Middle East on global energy prices – especially Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) – would still persist due to attacks on energy infrastructure in the region. For example, LNG infrastructure in Qatar’s Ras Laffan Industrial City, a major exporter to many nations including Thailand, has been severely affected.

As such, the world will face persistently elevated energy prices for an extended period since it potentially takes 3-5 years for those infrastructures to resume operation, according to an expert.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF), in its latest Economic Outlook in April 2026, suggested that governments should implement targeted subsidies on energy prices instead of broad-based measures, given limited fiscal space in many countries.

For example, Thailand is experiencing prolonged fiscal deficits of 3–4% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), meaning that allocating public funds to untargeted energy subsidies would further strain its already-stretched public finances.

Krishna Srinivasan, Director of the Asia and Pacific Department (APD) at the IMF, said during the launch of the Asia Pacific Economic Outlook that the Thai economy is highly exposed to developments in the Middle East due to its heavy reliance on oil and LNG imports through the Strait of Hormuz, accounting for 8–10% of GDP. Given Thailand’s relatively high public debt of 65–66% of GDP, targeted subsidies are recommended.

“Thailand’s debt is on the higher side,” Krishna said, adding, “make sure that you use your fiscal resources wisely.”

Ekniti Nitithanprapas, Deputy Prime Minister of Thailand and Minister of Finance, said during the session “Governor Talks: Thailand – Navigating Macroeconomic Stability and Growth in a Turbulent World,” that although the Thai economy is relatively vulnerable in this oil price crisis, one area where Thailand can perform well is in implementing targeted subsidies for vulnerable individuals.

Ekniti said Thailand’s digital infrastructure is among the most advanced in the region, allowing individuals to transfer money instantly between banks without transaction fees through the government-backed PromptPay system, using only telephone or 13-digit identification numbers. Through the registration system in the digital platform, it enables the government to identify vulnerable groups and deliver relief measures directly.

“Currently, we are developing a [digital] oil and Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) wallet to mitigate the impacts of the war on Thai people as well,” said Ekniti, adding that “we need to target only households severely affected by the war. We cannot implement broad-based measures because our fiscal space is limited.”

On 27 March 2026, the Thai administration announced several relief packages for 5 vulnerable groups directly affected by the spike of energy prices, including low-income households, public transportation drivers, farmers in the agricultural sector, fishermen, as well as SMEs and government contractors.


Satid is a multimedia economic journalist and news anchor who covers macroeconomic trends, Thailand’s fiscal policy, and key regional developments for Bangkok Biz. A Journalism graduate from Thammasat University, he has reported on major issues such as the US–China trade tensions, the Myanmar crisis, and global corporate stories, drawing on prior newsroom experience at The Momentum, the Bangkok Post, AFP, and Varasarn Press. His work blends economic analysis, foreign affairs, and digital storytelling, with a strong focus on making complex financial and political topics accessible to Thai audiences.

Editorial Deadline 18/04/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Karen Ysabelle R. David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk

Twenty-three years after gaining independence, all eyes are on Timor-Leste, ASEAN’s newest member state. As the country takes its place on the world stage with its memberships in ASEAN and the World Trade Organization, correspondent Ricardo Valente highlights the challenges, pressures, and risks that inevitably come with a country’s growing pains. Is Dili ready for the spotlight?

Not that the older countries of the Pacific Corridor are safe from their own challenges. In Vietnam, Hang Nguyen reports on the persistent problem of brain drain, as highly skilled Vietnamese professionals are lured away by better prospects abroad. Writing from Singapore, correspondent Ryan writes about the city-state’s increasingly selective graduate job market, meaning that while Singaporean fresh graduates look inward, their prospects may also be far and few in between. And in the Philippines, the national energy emergency resulting from the war in Iran is becoming progressively more intertwined with what Eduardo G. Fajermo Jr. calls “an already volatile political season” in Manila.

Timor-Leste 🇹🇱

Ready for Regional and Global Economic Opportunity — But at What Cost?

by Ricardo Valente, in Dili

As Timor-Leste prepares to deepen its integration into the regional and global economy — including its admission to ASEAN and membership in the World Trade Organization — the country is also entering a new phase of economic opportunity. These milestones are expected to expand trade, attract foreign investment, and position Timor-Leste more firmly within regional markets.

At the national level, this direction has been recently reinforced through engagement between the Government and the CCI-TL (Chamber of Commerce of Timor-Leste), where attracting foreign investment has been identified as a key priority.

However, analysts suggest that integration also brings new pressures.

A Lowy Institute analysis highlighted concerns that Timor-Leste’s entry into ASEAN comes with significant institutional demands, including the ability to participate in complex regional processes and manage a high volume of agreements. For a country with limited administrative capacity, this transition may present practical challenges in implementation and coordination.

At the same time, concerns raised by La’o Hamutuk highlight potential economic risks. The organization has warned that deeper integration, particularly through free trade arrangements, may expose Timor-Leste’s small and underdeveloped economy to stronger regional competition, raising questions about the readiness of local industries to compete.

These broader concerns intersect with recent developments in the country’s investment landscape.

Reporting by The Guardian has drawn attention to a proposed resort project in Timor-Leste linked to individuals allegedly associated with a regional online scam network. While no wrongdoing has been established within the country, the case has raised questions about how foreign investment is assessed and the extent to which risks are scrutinized.

In response, President José Ramos-Horta stated that the allegations remain unverified and reaffirmed Timor-Leste’s openness to foreign investors, noting that action would be taken if credible evidence emerges.

A separate case reflects another dimension of the challenge. The long-delayed Pelican Paradise Resort project, once promoted as a strategic tourism investment, is now being considered for cancellation after years of limited progress.

Taken together, these developments point to a broader issue: as Timor-Leste opens its economy, the question is not only how to attract investment, but how to ensure it is credible, well-managed, and effectively implemented.

ASEAN and WTO integration is likely to reshape expectations around how investment is managed, increasing pressure on accountability, delivery, and sustainability. Deeper integration brings opportunity, but also closer scrutiny.

These challenges are not unique to Timor-Leste, as they are also faced by many emerging economies. However, as the country steps onto a larger economic stage, its ability to manage this balance will be critical.

The promise of investment is clear. The question that remains is whether the systems to support it are ready.


Ricardo is a media and communication practitioner and International Relations graduate based in Dili, Timor-Leste. He is the founder of Gen-Z Talk Timor-Leste, a youth-led digital platform dedicated to civic engagement and public dialogue. His work focuses on amplifying young voices, promoting social awareness, and contributing to conversations on society, politics, economy, governance, digital rights, and security.

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Vietnam 🇻🇳

Vietnam’s Brain Gain

by Hang Nguyen, in Ho Chi Minh City

Vietnam has undergone three major main waves of brain drain: the post-Vietnam War refugee crisis of the 1970s–1980s, the Đổi Mới economic reforms’ transition period, and the twenty-first century surge of self-financed Vietnamese international students studying abroad. Young individuals are attracted by greater earning potential, welfare programs, and infrastructure in Western countries, leaving behind the lower wages, heavy pollution, and lacking social welfare of Vietnam. The whittling number of domestic talents strains national economic growth, especially in innovative industries such as STEM, healthcare and medicine, academia, and finance, among many others.

To circumvent this rising concern, the Vietnamese government has rolled out multiple initiatives over the years. On 3 April, Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh signed Decision No. 530/QD-TTg, approving a national program to attract foreign experts and overseas Vietnamese scholars to Vietnam. This plan targets an increase of 500 academic experts for full-time leadership positions in universities and vocational training institutions, with a further 1,500 headcount in academic, research, or collaborative placements by 2035. Most significantly, at least 30 outstanding foreign experts will be recruited by the government to innovate and lead spearhead projects in education, training, scientific research, and technology transfer. This effort is a strategic developmental agenda aimed to achieve the goals in Vietnam 2035: Towards Prosperity, Creativity, Equity and Democracy.

Future reforms will address previous challenges deterring foreign or foreign-trained talent. Quality-of-life considerations, such as environmental pollution, air quality, limited social welfare systems, and disparities in public services, have heavily influenced the decision-making of experts and overseas Vietnamese skilled workers. Additionally, administrative paperwork and legal procedures — lengthy visa processes, work permit requirements, and tax regulations — can create significant obstacles and discourage potential candidates. The wage gap between Vietnam and developed economies remains substantial, while domestic industries in high-technology and scientific research are still in a developing phase. Self-financed Vietnamese international students and overseas professionals lack the incentive to return to the country, where opportunities and welfare are comparatively less appealing.

Further reforms will focus on financial mechanisms and institutional autonomy, allowing public institutions greater flexibility in resource allocation and performance-based remuneration. Administrative procedures will be streamlined, including work permits, visas, and residency processes. With the further introduction of supportive policies on housing, living conditions, and essential public services, experts and their families will experience a smoother process settling down in Vietnam.

Ultimately, the emigration of highly-skilled professionals is not a phenomenon unique to Vietnam; it is also a problem for Southeast Asian neighbors Malaysia and Indonesia. This shared concern presents an opportunity for regional cooperation in developing policies that both attract global expertise and encourage the return of overseas talent. In order for Southeast Asia’s economic landscape and innovation ecosystems to catch up with the rest of the world, higher education is an utmost priority.


Hang is a young researcher with academic experience in Vietnam and the United States. She has previously worked in public relations at the U.S. Consulate General in Ho Chi Minh City and the YSEALI Academy. Her research focuses on ASEAN centrality in the evolving Asia-Pacific landscape, with particular attention to Vietnam’s approach to trade, regional cooperation, and political economy in the face of external power dynamics and global volatility.

Singapore 🇸🇬

Fresh Graduates, Uneven Prospects

by Ryan

Singapore’s graduate job market is becoming more selective, and the latest data shows that the strain is not being felt evenly. Fresh graduates from private education institutions offering bachelor’s-level external degree programs saw just 46.9% enter full-time permanent work in the 2024/2025 survey, while median monthly pay for those who did remained flat at SGD3,500. Even graduates from Singapore’s six autonomous universities faced softer conditions: 74.4% secured full-time permanent roles in 2025, down from the previous year, although their median monthly salary held at SGD4,500. In other words, the market has cooled for everyone, but the gap between autonomous and private pathways remains wide.

That divide matters because it reflects more than just salary differences. Singapore’s autonomous universities still carry a stronger labor-market signal: they are publicly funded, more selective, and generally more integrated with employers through internships, structured career services, and established alumni networks. In contrast, the private education landscape is more varied. SkillsFuture Singapore’s survey covers 26 private institutions and focuses specifically on full-time external degree programs, which already makes the category more heterogeneous than the autonomous university system. That said, the private track is not uniformly weak. Health sciences graduates from private institutions posted a 76.5% full-time permanent employment rate and a median salary of SGD3,935, showing that outcomes improve when courses are tightly linked to clear industry demand.

The bigger story is that Singapore’s graduate market is not collapsing. It is tightening. The Ministry of Education has said that the post-pandemic hiring surge of 2022 and 2023 was always likely to normalize, and that vacancies have moderated as firms adopt a more cautious stance amid economic and geopolitical uncertainty. That explanation is important. Singapore’s graduates are still entering one of the region’s most formalized labor markets, but in a slower cycle, employers appear to be rewarding brand recognition, job readiness, and course relevance more aggressively. This helps explain why the autonomous–private divide becomes more visible precisely when hiring slows.

Compared with the rest of ASEAN, Singapore’s challenge looks less like a jobs crisis and more like a sorting mechanism. In Malaysia, the graduate unemployment rate fell to 3.2% in 2024, but skill-related underemployment remained substantial, suggesting that many degree holders are still working below their qualifications. In Indonesia, youth unemployment for those aged 15 to 24 stood at 16.9% in August 2025. In the Philippines, official data for December 2025 showed a youth employment rate of 87.8%, implying youth unemployment of about 12.2%. In Vietnam, youth unemployment was 8.2% in the second quarter of 2025. The World Bank has warned that across East Asia and the Pacific, many workers are moving not into high-productivity manufacturing, but into lower-productivity and often informal services, while employers still struggle to find technical and digital skills.

That is what makes Singapore’s data so revealing. The country still offers stronger graduate outcomes than much of Southeast Asia, but its internal hierarchy is becoming harder to ignore. A degree alone is no longer enough. What increasingly matters is where it comes from, how closely it maps to labor market demand, and whether graduates leave school with skills that employers can use immediately. For Singapore, the policy challenge is not only to preserve graduate employment, but to narrow the quality gap between institutions. For ASEAN, the lesson is broader: expanding higher education is the easy part. Building a labor market that can absorb graduates into productive, well-matched jobs is much harder.


Ryan is a final-year finance student at the Singapore University of Social Sciences (SUSS) with experience across venture capital, venture debt, and business development. He also holds a diploma in Law and Management from Temasek Polytechnic. His interests lie in how emerging technologies and economic trends shape business ecosystems and regional development in Asia.

The Philippines 🇵🇭

Oil Shock, Trust Shock: Why the Philippines’ Energy Emergency Is Becoming a Governance Test

by Eduardo G. Fajermo Jr., in Angeles City

A conflict thousands of kilometers away is now shaping daily life in the Philippines in ways that go beyond price boards at gasoline stations. As the Iran war pushes oil markets into a new round of volatility, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has framed the moment as a national energy emergency, while Filipinos brace for higher transport and food costs and ask a harder question: will the government’s response feel competent, fair, and timely?

That question matters because the energy crunch is colliding with a wider crisis of confidence. Pulse Asia noted that corruption sits at the center of how Filipinos assess leadership, with fighting against corruption cited as the leading reason for trusting Marcos among those who trust him, while broader survey context shows impeachment developments and governance controversies shaping the political atmosphere. When a shock hits, trust becomes a multiplier: it can buy time for policy to work, or accelerate public impatience when relief appears uneven.

The Straits Times captured that tension through the story of a 72-year-old jeepney driver who broke down in tears after missing documentation requirements tied to a PHP5,000 fuel subsidy rollout, at a moment when he feared for his livelihood. The narrative resonated because it was not only about hardship. It was about eligibility rules, administrative friction, and whether state assistance reaches the most exposed sectors fast enough to matter.

Economic pain is also visibly forcing a recalibration of how government and schools operate. The Commission on Higher Education allowed higher education institutions to shift, if necessary, to up to 100% online delivery as a temporary arrangement during the national energy emergency, citing energy conservation pressures.

Work arrangements across the bureaucracy are being reshaped too. Malacañang temporarily moved toward a four-day work week for offices under the executive branch and a directive to cut electricity and fuel consumption by 10% to 20%. What might look like a technical adjustment carries political meaning: when the state itself scales back physical operations to conserve fuel, it signals the depth of the disruption, and invites scrutiny over preparedness.

Pulse Asia’s March 2026 media release also situates the energy crunch within an already volatile political season, noting parallel developments such as impeachment proceedings and high-salience governance controversies that heighten polarization and public judgment. In such an environment, an energy crisis is not simply “external.” It becomes domestic the moment citizens experience unequal access to relief, inconsistent enforcement, or unclear communication.

The crisis is also affecting the Philippines’ regional posture. As ASEAN chair this 2026, the country is moving hundreds of preparatory meetings online to cut costs, with Marcos planning to press ASEAN partners to focus on energy and food security at upcoming summits. This is an ASEAN lens worth noting: domestic price shocks can reorder regional agendas, pushing maritime and security flashpoints into the background as governments prioritize the immediate economics of stability.

The energy emergency is becoming a referendum on state capacity and political legitimacy at the same time. If relief feels accessible and rules feel humane, the government may regain space to govern through a turbulent second half of the term. If relief feels exclusionary or slow, the oil shock may harden the public’s broader doubts about leadership, deepening a crisis of trust that cannot be solved by subsidies alone.


Eduardo is a faculty member at Holy Angel University, where he teaches courses on Philippine history and contemporary global issues. He is currently pursuing a Master’s degree in Political Science at the University of Santo Tomas, with a research focus on disaster governance, environmental politics, and the urban poor in the Philippines.

Editorial Deadline 14/04/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Siu Tzyy Wei, Lead Editor - Maritime Crescent Desk

This week at the Maritime Crescent is all about appearances and the politics behind them.

Amidst the ongoing oil crisis, Brunei, Indonesia and Malaysia join hands in launching SEAFA, a trilateral fertiliser alliance designed to shield the region from global supply shocks. With Brunei becoming the host of the secretariat, Wira Gregory looks into the Sultanate’s role as the secretariat host and its evolving identity as a quiet architect of resilience, a role that may move far beyond the stretches of hard power.

As Malaysia sails again with the second Global Sumud Flotilla, Muhammad Aiman explores the weight of moral solidarity that it now carries as a growing stakeholder across contested waters. Beyond humanitarian aid, can the nation-wide support for a flotilla of symbols and intentions truly shift the tides of justice?

In Indonesia, society meets with Koperasi Merah Putih, a state initiative that promises transformation but inevitably returns to old familiarity. Beneath the banners of progress, Rayhan Prabu explores whether the program risks becoming a monument of appearances rather than a vessel for much needed change.

At face value, these stories unravel a tapestry of gestures - alliances built, flotillas launched and cooperation unveiled - revealing how the three nations navigate the delicate balance between image and intent.

Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳

SEAFA and the Sovereignty of Food Security

by Wira Gregory Ejau, in Bandar Seri Begawan

As the Strait of Hormuz remains in limbo following the outbreak of the US-Israeli war on Iran in late February, effectively disrupting approximately one-third of global seaborne fertiliser trade, Brunei, Malaysia and Indonesia have launched the Southeast Asia Fertiliser Association (SEAFA) on 6 April. Established by Pupuk Indonesia, Petronas Chemicals Group, and Brunei Fertiliser Industries, SEAFA presents as one of the more strategically consequential multilateral moves in recent ASEAN memory.

Prior to the crisis in the Middle East, the Strait of Hormuz served as a corridor through which roughly one-third of globally traded fertiliser normally transits. In a period when diplomatic posturing is critical, many governments have kept their cards to themselves, making it difficult to gauge domestic preparedness for shocks. Urea and ammonia have become commodities with volatile availability, with the spring planting season across the Northern Hemisphere having collided with an agricultural input crisis. Urea and ammonia have become commodities of volatile availability, colliding with the Northern Hemisphere’s spring planting season. Unlike oil, fertiliser markets lack internationally coordinated strategic reserves; the machinery for crisis response simply does not exist at the institutional level.

That being said, Brunei, Indonesia and Malaysia occupy a position of rare strategic complementarity. Indonesia and Brunei possess domestic fertiliser production capacity that exceeds national requirements, while Malaysia remains a net importer, exposed precisely where the others are insulated. Together, they span both sides of the energy-fertiliser nexus, which is the chain by which liquefied natural gas (LNG) is converted into nitrogen fertiliser. In turn, this underwrites crop yields across the region. Crucially, both Indonesia and Malaysia are also significant LNG exporters. This carries the capability for all three nations to sit astride the input-output chain that runs from Gulf gas fields to Southeast Asian farms, with potential leverage at both ends.

SEAFA is a hedge against the logic that regional blocs dependent on external chokepoints for agricultural inputs effectively outsource their sovereignty. While it would be premature to assume that an industry association may function as a treaty mechanism, its founding represents the difference between building structural resilience and managing crisis optics after the fact. If SEAFA evolves as intended, with a strong focus on expanding membership, coordinating LNG-linked production inputs, and developing a collective voice in international agri-commodity governance, it could represent the trio’s first serious attempt to convert resource complementarity into collective strategic leverage.

For a small state whose strategic footprint is significantly measured, Brunei’s role as secretariat host for the institutional architecture of a regional body is multilateral statecraft that extends its presence and confers legitimacy at a cost structure that hard power cannot match. The question SEAFA ultimately poses to the region is whether ASEAN is prepared to treat food security as the structural geopolitical issue it has now demonstrably become.


Gregory is an MSc candidate in Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He works as a freelance writer specializing in international history, conflict, and counterterrorism, with experience in academia, investigative journalism, and voluntary uniformed service. He currently provides research assistance with the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) under their Southeast Asian Security and Defence Internship Programme and conducts investigations on regional security and transnational crime for a confidential company.

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Malaysia 🇲🇾

Malaysia’s Flotilla Diplomacy

by Muhammad Aiman Bin Roszaimi, in Cyberjaya

Malaysia’s participation in the Global Sumud Flotilla 2.0 (GSF 2.0) reflects more than a humanitarian gesture, it is a convergence of public sentiment and state-level diplomacy. As the Gaza crisis continues to shape global discourse, Malaysia involvement offers insight into how middle powers navigate moral politics and international constraints.

At its core, the GSF 2.0 is a transnational, civilian-led movement aimed at delivering humanitarian aid to Gaza through maritime routes. Drawing participants from over 70 countries, it aoperates as a non-violent grassroots movement grounded in global solidarity with Palestinians.

At the societal level, Malaysia’s ivil society organisations, humanitarian NGOs and grassroots movements have played a central role in mobilising participation. Malaysian contingents in earlier flotilla missions included doctors, journalists, and activists, the humanitarian nature of the mission more than the political nature of the crisis it serves.

Three key factors drive this mobilisation.

First, there is a strong moral and religious dimension, where solidarity with Palestine is framed within the global Muslim community as a humanitarian obligation transcending borders. Second, the flotilla is a movement that visibly thrives on active participative, encouraging Malaysians to move beyond symbolic protests into direct action. Third, it reflects a broader Global South solidarity narrative, positioning Malaysia alongside other developing nations advocating for justice in international affairs.

That being said, the flotilla remains a political symbol. Its focus on aid delivery ultimately highlights the political blockade of Gaza, a plight perceived by the global audience as systemic injustice.

Malaysian government response has evolved from rhetorical support to more active engagement. On January 2026, Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim confirmed that Malaysia will be directly involved in Global Sumud 2.0, alongside more than 80 countries.

This shift signals an important transition for Malaysia. From being an observer, the nation is now an active stakeholder in the humanitarian crisis. The government frames its involvement as part of a broader “moral struggle” to uphold humanitarian principles and justice irrespective of borders, race, or religion. At the same time, Putrajaya has taken a firm diplomatic stance when previous flotilla missions were intercepted. Malaysia condemned such actions as violations of international law and demanded the immediate release of detained activists, including its own citizens.

However, the government position also reflects a careful balancing act. While supporting GSF 2.0, Malaysia continues to rely on diplomatic channels to engage with international partners in amplifying Palestinian concerns.Ultimately, Malaysia involvement in GSF 2.0 sits at the intersection of normative foreign policy and strategic signalling. Domestically, it reinforces the government’s alignment with public sentiment. Internationally, it positions Malaysia as an advocate for humanitarian justice within the Global South.

Yet, the same concerns echoes. Previous flotilla missions were intercepted before reaching Gaza, underscoring the constraints faced by non-state humanitarian initiatives in contested geopolitical spaces.

In this sense, Malaysia’s participation is less about immediate material impact and more about shaping narratives where it is asserting that even middle powers and civil societies can challenge the status quo, if only symbolically.


Aiman is a PhD candidate in Security and Strategic Analysis at the National University of Malaysia. His research focuses on Malaysia’s space policy, ASEAN regional security, and the strategic implications of emerging technologies. His work explores how Malaysia’s defense policy and strategic culture shape its approach to outer space.

Indonesia 🇮🇩

Red, White, and The Price of Appearances

by Rayhan Prabu Kusumo, in Jakarta

The Indonesian government is now accepting applications for a new batch of Sarjana Penggerak Pembangunan Indonesia—a go-to-scheme designed to accelerate college graduates into leadership roles of the Prabowo’s administration flagship programs. This time, they are being deployed to run village-level cooperatives under Koperasi Merah Putih.

For fresh graduates entering one of Southeast Asia’s tightest job markets, the offer looks tempting: a title, a salary, a sense of national purpose, and perhaps most meaningfully, a formal employment status. Yet behind the promise is a program that is expensive, poorly structured, and in a particularly cruel twist, potentially harmful for the very people it claims to help.

Koperasi Merah Putih was pitched by the Prabowo administration as a grassroots economic intervention to establish cooperatives across Indonesia’s roughly 80,000 villages. Each cooperative would build on what a village already produces or does well—deepening its value chain, connecting it to broader markets, turning a local advantage into something more durable. Done right, it could have been Indonesia’s version of China’s Township and Village Enterprises: state-facilitated, locally rooted, and oriented toward real productive activity.

Instead, most cooperatives have become just a little more than glorified retail cooperatives, selling basic goods in communities already saturated with small traders doing exactly that. In Indonesia, MSMEs account for 99% of businesses and 97% of employment, with retail and trade dominating the sector. By injecting state-backed cooperatives into the same space, the government is competing with the economy ordinary Indonesians already built to survive.

And it is doing so at enormous cost. With each cooperative requiring at least Rp3 billion to stand up, the program’s price tag runs to a minimum of Rp240 trillion (~USD 14.1 billion). Such a figure is likely conservative, given that the program has already drawn on public funds well beyond its designated budget lines. To put that in context, the Free School Meal program—the administration’s premier flagship program and the most expensive social program in Indonesian history at Rp335 trillion a year (~USD 19.7 billion)—is running simultaneously. The economic case for either spending commitment has never been convincingly made, let alone both at once.

The ingredients for genuine transformation were all there—nationwide reach, significant funding, and a structure capable of catalysing industrial development. Instead, the government used all of them to build grocery stores. A program with the scale and state backing to meaningfully move the needle on Indonesia’s long-stalled structural transformation was handed a mandate it was more than capable of fulfilling. What it chose to do with that mandate was to walk down the path of familiarity again.

Indonesia does not need another player in the trade space. It needs industrial development and an economy that can actually absorb the graduates it keeps producing. Koperasi Merah Putih, as it stands, offers none of that, only the appearance of trying. And it is a spectacularly expensive appearance to keep up.


Rayhan has a background in government affairs and public policy, with experience across government institutions and advisory firms. His work focuses on the intersection of geopolitics, policy, and risk, with expertise in advocacy, regulatory analysis, and stakeholder engagement. He holds a degree in Government from Universitas Padjadjaran, and has completed an exchange at Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Spain, focusing on global politics and sustainability.

Editorial Deadline 11/04/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Tony, in Bangkok

A new year begins across mainland Southeast Asia, but familiar challenges persist. Laos faces the annual return of transboundary haze, with regional agricultural burning once again pushing air quality to hazardous levels and highlighting the limits of national solutions to a cross-border crisis. Meanwhile, in Myanmar, a lawsuit against Telenor over alleged data sharing with the military underscores ongoing concerns over corporate accountability and digital rights following the 2021 coup. In Thailand, a fragile US Iran ceasefire offers only temporary relief, as energy insecurity and reactive policies expose deeper structural vulnerabilities during Songkran.

Lao PDR 🇱🇦

Laos and the Mekong Burning Season. Why Does the Air Pollution Problem Keep Coming Back?

by Thipphavanh Virakhom, in Vientiane

Burn bans return each January. The smoke returns each March. And the cycle begins again, not because no one cares, but because the problem runs deeper than any single policy can reach.

These previous weeks, Vientiane’s air crossed into hazardous territory. But the smoke did not start here. Prevailing westerly winds carry haze from burning fields in Myanmar’s uplands into northern Thailand and Laos. Agricultural fires in Vietnam and Yunnan, China add to the drift. What any one community inhales in March is, in large part, the accumulated output of an entire sub-region. Chiang Mai, just across the Thai border, ranked as the most polluted city in the world on the 1st of April, a reminder that this is a regional emergency that happens to land most visibly in national headlines.

If the smoke crosses every border freely, can any single country’s policies realistically solve this alone? ASEAN has had a legally binding agreement on transboundary haze since 2002, ratified by all ten member states. Yet a critical structural gap remains, the agreement contains no sanction clause for countries that fail to meet their obligations. Cooperation exists – Lao, Thailand and Myanmar are now sharing satellite fire-detection data but it remains early and uneven.

When the same burn ban is issued each January and the smoke returns each March, what does that tell us about the distance between regulation and the institutional muscle required for effective implementation? Laos is not without policy. This dry season brought a strengthened nationwide burn ban, expanded provincial monitoring responsibilities, and a World Bank-backed USD 37.85 million pollution management programme running through 2031. Yet PM 2.5 exceeded safe limits across every province this season. The gap between policy on paper and outcomes on the ground often comes down to enforcement capacity – local authorities in many provinces lack the staff, equipment, and budget to act constantly, producing uneven compliance rather than a national response.

If governments are the main actors driving this change, what obligations come with that role and how do we measure whether those obligations are being met for the communities most affected? Upload farming communities practice slash and burn not out of ignorance, but because it works for their conditions, low cost, no need for external inputs, and adapted to steep terrain with poor soils. Research on agricultural transitions in Laos consistently shows that farmers only shift practices when alternatives earn them at least as much per workday, are reliably marketable, and do not leave them food-insecure during the transition period. It requires not just policy but sustained investment in extension services, accessible markets, land security and time – elements that top-down bans alone cannot provide.

The burning season is not a mystery. Its causes are well documented, its geography mapped from satellite, its health consequences measured. What remains unresolved is the harder work such as aligning policy with enforcement capacity, national rules with regional cooperation, and agricultural change with the real conditions of rural life. None of these are quick fixes. But the smoke returning each year proves that the current approach has not yet closed the distance between intention and outcome, pushing us to seek better alternatives.


Thipphavanh holds a bachelor’s degree in international affairs. She is a governance and development professional specialising in rule of law, access to justice, and gender equality in Lao PDR. Her work focuses on strengthening justice sector institutions, advancing people-centred governance, and promoting gender-responsive systems. With extensive experience in project coordination, monitoring and evaluation, stakeholder engagement, and strategic communications, she has collaborated closely with national institutions and international partners to support inclusive and sustainable development.

Myanmar 🇲🇲

Telenor Faces Lawsuit Over Alleged Data Sharing With Myanmar Military

by Myat Moe Kywe

A Norwegian telecommunications giant, Telenor, is facing a lawsuit filed on April 8 over allegations that it shared customer data with Myanmar’s military following the 2021 coup. The case was brought by a Swedish non-profit, Justice and Accountability Initiative, on behalf of Myanmar citizens who claim their personal data was handed over without consent. The lawsuit is supported by the Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations (SOMO) and the Open Society Justice Initiative (OSJI).

Telenor entered Myanmar’s telecom market in 2014 and quickly became one of the country’s leading providers. However, after the military seized power,, the company announced its withdrawal in March 2022, citing an “extraordinary situation” that made continued operations untenable. In May 2022, Telenor completed the sale of its Myanmar business to Lebanese investment firm M1 Group and majority-owner Shwe Bayin Phyu Group, the military-linked local conglomerate with interests in petroleum, one of the military-linked businesses being listed in Open Sanctions announced by the U.S. Department of Treasury.

According to the lawsuit, between the coup and its exit, Telenor allegedly complied with military requests to provide customer data, including location information. Reuters reported that data linked to at least 1,253 phone numbers may have been shared, with Telenor’s headquarters in Norway advising its local team to comply with junta directives. In the news reported by DW, the company did not deny the allegations but said “Telenor Myanmar had no real options. We could not play Russian roulette with the lives of our employees.”

Civil society activist Aung Thu, who was arrested in September 2021, told Reuters that his data was among those shared. Other reports, including from DW News, suggest that such data may have contributed to arrests, imprisonment of activists, and even the 2022 execution of a prominent political figure, Phyo Zeya Thaw.

The lawsuit demands compensation of €9,000 (about $10,500) for each individual whose data was allegedly shared. Legal counsel Beini Ye from OSJI stated that, “if this lawsuit is successful, this case would be the first to hold a telecoms company to account for not sufficiently protesting user data from access by an authoritarian regime.”

The legal action comes amid growing concerns over digital surveillance in Myanmar. Since the coup, the military government has expanded its control over telecommunications and internet use. Most recently, authorities introduced mandatory registration of mobile devices through the International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) system and the Central Equipment Identity Register (CEIR).

Digital rights advocates warn that such measures could further erode privacy. Thit Nyan, a researcher at the Myanmar Internet Project, cautioned that without proper legal safeguards, systems like CEIR could become powerful tools for surveillance and repression.

Since the military coup in 2021, internet and mobile communications in Myanmar have increasingly been subject to monitoring and censorship, raising ongoing concerns about the safety and rights of users in the country. The outcome of the lawsuit is likely to be closely watched both at home and abroad, as scrutiny grows over accountability and the protection of personal data in Myanmar’s telecom sector.


Myat is a senior undergraduate student majoring in Politics, Philosophy, and Economics. She has interned at The Asia Foundation in Washington, D.C., and she has also worked as a summer research assistant at the Centre for Policy and Innovation (CRPI), gaining experience in research and analysis. Her work focuses on civic engagement, gender, youth leadership, and community development.

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Thailand 🇹🇭

The US-Iran Ceasefire: A Fragile Relief for Global Markets, A Permanent ‘War-Tax’ for Thailand

by Paranut Juntree, in Bangkok

To global markets, the April 8 ceasefire between the U.S. and Iran, mediated by Pakistan is a temporary diplomatic and economic victory. However, to the Thai consumer, it is a mirage. While the price of a liter of diesel may eventually tick downward following the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, the price of a plate of Pad Kra Pao and countless other daily essentials may not, and continue to climb.

The damage has already been done. Higher energy and logistics costs are now “baked in” to the economy, as oil serves as the foundation for everything from manufacturing power to product distribution. While the ceasefire has paused the large-scale conflict, it has not halted the permanent upward shift in the cost of living in Thailand, combined with a volatile political climate for an administration already accused of favoring “gray capital” over common citizens.

In Thailand, inflation is projected to rise in Q2 2026, reaching 3.4% as higher costs become a permanent fixture. When oil prices spike, consumer goods also rise. Yet, when a ceasefire may provide a temporary relief, those prices may remain “sticky” as businesses are hesitant to lower costs due to ongoing war-risk surcharges on shipping and the need to recoup losses from the month-long shock.

Furthermore, the ceasefire does nothing to fill the 56.2-billion-baht hole in the Thai Oil Fuel Fund. Even if global crude prices drop, the Thai government must keep domestic prices high to replenish the fund used for previous diesel-price caps. The 6-baht diesel hike implemented on March 26 is not merely a temporary measure, it is a long-term “war-tax” on the Thai public.

The Anutin administration also faces a deepening trust deficit. Early in the conflict, suppliers were suspected of hoarding fuel to wait for price hikes, undermining the 30-baht subsidy. The “missing” 57 million liters of fuel in early April fueled suspicions of middlemen gas-stocking to manipulate the market. This has set in deep-seated outrage, as the public perceives the government as unable or unwilling to control profiteering.

In a move that further fuels a scarcity mindset, the government proposed “wartime rationing,” suggesting petrol stations close from 10 PM to 5 AM. Coming during Songkran, Thailand’s most vital travel season, this policy keeps the public in a state of panic despite the ceasefire news.

The 14-day ceasefire is a fragile relief that fails to address Thailand’s structural vulnerabilities. It is a precarious pause, held together by unagreed terms and shadowed by ongoing regional friction and persistent conflict spillover, which threatens to collapse the truce at any moment. With the ever-present risk of the Strait of Hormuz re-closing, the Thai government must move beyond performative crackdowns on hoarders and develop a robust, transparent energy reserve plan and action steps towards rising inflation. Without a clearer strategy, if the conflict continues, the domestic fallout of the crisis will far outlast its temporary peace.


Paranut has a background in advocacy, with experience in policy research, communications, and civic engagement across both the NGO and government sectors. As Thailand’s Youth Delegate to the United Nations, he represented Thai youth in global dialogues on migration, education, and human rights, championing inclusive policymaking. He holds a degree in political science with a specialization in international relations.

Cambodia 🇰🇭

Cambodia Faces Energy Concerns Amid Middle East War

by Chandara Samban, in Kandal

This week, in our Cambodia coverage, we revisit the March 16 issue by Chandara Samban.

The Middle East conflict, stemming from escalating tensions between Iran and the Israel-US alliance, has entered its third week since late February. The crisis has created widespread instability across the region, with nearly ten countries reportedly targeted by missile and drone attacks. France, Germany, and the United Kingdom have also become involved, further escalating the situation.

Among the most pressing consequences is a growing global energy crisis. The Strait of Hormuz — a critical oil transportation corridor — has been temporarily closed by Iranian forces since the conflict’s opening phase. Countries dependent on oil imports are now facing severe supply disruptions. In Cambodia, citizens have grown increasingly anxious over rising fuel prices, given the country’s limited reserves and uncertain supply outlook.

Oil prices have surged to approximately US$119 per barrel, the highest level since 2022. Cambodians are already feeling the impact, with regular gasoline climbing to around US$1.30 per liter and diesel reaching US$1.54.

Minister of Mines and Energy Keo Rattanak has echoed public concern, warning that Cambodia’s current oil reserves could only last until April without new imports. The ministries of Mines and Energy and Commerce have pledged to coordinate a response in line with the Prime Minister’s directives. As of March 13, around 2,000 gas stations had temporarily closed due to fuel shortages. Authorities have prohibited stations from withholding stock in anticipation of higher prices.

According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), the Strait of Hormuz accounts for nearly 20% of global oil supply — and roughly 90% of oil destined for Asia. Any disruption to this route carries serious consequences for the broader Asian economy, where Cambodia’s dependence on imported fuel leaves it particularly exposed.

In response, some Cambodians have proposed practical alternatives: greater use of public transportation, a shift toward electric vehicles, or simply walking shorter distances where feasible.

Economist Hong Vannak of the Royal Academy of Cambodia told The ASEAN Frontier that while the situation raises legitimate energy security concerns, it is unlikely to trigger a severe economic crisis. “Oil transported through the Strait of Hormuz accounts for around 20% of global supply, which means alternative supply channels may still be available,” he said, adding that OPEC members and other major players would likely seek solutions, with Russian oil a potential option if U.S. sanctions were eased.

Vannak noted that the government has taken steps to monitor and regulate fuel prices, while some private institutions have introduced temporary measures such as remote work policies. He also recommended expanding the use of solar and electric energy — and, looking further ahead, urged the government to attract investors to establish a domestic oil refinery, which would significantly strengthen Cambodia’s long-term energy security.


Chandara is a freelance journalist with a focus on foreign affairs, security issues, and ASEAN affairs. He also serves as a Junior Counterterrorism Intelligence Analyst.

Editorial Deadline 11/04/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Karen Ysabelle R. David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk

More than a month into the war in Iran, the countries of the Pacific Corridor are still grappling with the blowback of a distant conflict. For the small city-state of Singapore, there is little it can do about the closure of the Strait of Hormuz aside from diplomatic overtures. Just like most of the rest of the world, it is locked in a stalemate by a war it did not ask for and one that it has no stakes in.

The repercussions of the war are being felt not just by states. In the Philippines, ordinary Filipinos are buckling under the strain, as round after round of fuel price hikes have led to higher transportation costs that are beginning to spill over to the cost of everything else. In response, the Philippine government has turned to stopgap measures to try and alleviate the problem.

Meanwhile, in Vietnam, a look at the start of a new regulatory era for its property sector. Can new laws put into place succeed in turning a long-languishing sector into an economic driver for the country?

Singapore 🇸🇬

Singapore’s Navigation of the Strait

by Nurul Aini, in Singapore

When a disruption happens someplace far away from the nation, there are two possible responses: 1) to dismiss such events as beyond our domain of concern and relegate it to yet another event in foreign affairs; or 2) to care but only to the extent of their practical implications on our daily lives. The latter is an understandable reaction, especially for many who are trying to survive with the high cost of living while juggling daily responsibilities. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz tests the awareness, principles, and adaptability of a small nation like Singapore to a changing world order.

In a statement made by Prime Minister Lawrence Wong on 19 March 2026 regarding the Middle East conflict, he reiterates that a break in international law, which may be perceived as an abstract issue, could signal grave tangible implications for small states, as countries become more inclined to use force as a means to gain rather than through peaceful engagements.

Additionally, in a doorstop interview in Japan, Wong spoke about navigating through historical sensitivities in the name of diplomacy, as he hopes that Japan can, “clearly articulate its position on these issues and put to rest these outstanding historical issues.” He explained that Singapore-Japan relations are part of maximizing strategic space, all while emphasizing ASEAN centrality with “an open and inclusive regional architecture with ASEAN at the center, while we in ASEAN engage with all the major powers,” thus making for “a stabler and more inclusive architecture that will maximize our chances for peace and shared prosperity.”

Lawrence Anderson, a former Singapore diplomat, foregrounds the importance of recalibration, where increased cooperation with regional and extra-regional partners become significant to “strengthen global commitment to international law and respect for rules,” diversifying such relationships beyond being purely for economic means.

The practicality in Singapore’s approach remains as it closely monitors the situation while providing help to relevant businesses and individuals affected. The U-Save and Service & Conservancy Charges (S&CC) rebate outlined in Budget 2026 is set to be rolled out in April, which will offset expenses for utilities for lower- and middle-income households. The effectiveness of its impact remains to be seen as the closure of the Strait continues. Community Development Council (CDC) voucher handouts, which can be spent in supermarkets and shops involved in the scheme, will be given in June 2026 instead of the original planned disbursement in January 2027. Businesses will receive an increase in Corporate Income Tax rebate to 50%. As of 7 April 2026, government assistance that includes a SGD200 increase in the Cost of Living Payment payout and additional help for eligible platform workers adds another SGD1 billion to what was announced during the recent Budget.

Additionally, according to the chief executive of the Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore (MPA), Mr Ang Wee Keong, the closure of the Strait is an opportunity for Singapore to explore cleaner maritime fuel. Yet, Singapore is not excluded from lingering worries in other domains such as disruptions to food supply chains and fuel reserves. While the war may initially feel distant, the effects on Singapore are gradually felt through daily ‘small’ disruptions, where adjustments to policies and budgets become necessary, inevitably propelling us to be concerned and aware about global politics.


Aini is currently pursuing a master’s degree in English literature at Nanyang Technological University. She has experience working in youth groups, contributing to the planning and management of outreach activities.

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The Philippines 🇵🇭

Fueling Hardship

by Arianne De Guzman, in Bulacan

As the Holy Week concluded, Filipino motorists, commuters, and Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) braced for another round of fuel price hikes, with gasoline, diesel, and kerosene prices rising again last 7 April 2026, marking the 13th consecutive week of price increases for gasoline and the 15th for diesel and kerosene.

The Philippines, the first country to declare a state of national energy emergency and one of the most oil-dependent economies in the Southeast Asia region, is heavily reliant on imported oil, sourcing 98% of its supply from the Persian Gulf. This dependence leaves the country susceptible not only to the ripple effects of the United States (US) and Israel’s war on Iran but also to the challenges caused by its negligible domestic production.

Beyond this broad outlook, risks and issues also became a daily calculation for many Filipinos. In the transportation sector, one of the largest consumers of oil products, jeepney drivers are among the most immediately affected. Mr. Romeo Esmenda, a jeepney driver in Quezon City, shared that prior to the US and Israel’s bombing of Iran, he often spent around PHP3,000 (US$49.91) while still earning PHP1,500 (US$24.96) in profit. Currently, filling his jeepney tank costs PHP6,000 (US$99.83), yet his profit has decreased to just PHP300 (US$4.99).

They are not alone.

Mr. Mike Olea, a Filipino who owns a small, family-owned food shop, also shared that the prices of cooking gas, meat, and other key ingredients have increased sharply in recent weeks, prompting him to rethink his spending and business strategy. He added that his food shop relies on an 11-kilogram cylinder of cooking gas every week; however, the 30% increase has induced significant pressure on his business expenses. Mr. Olea revisited raising menu prices and reducing meat and vegetable servings, as he observed fewer customers visiting due to rising living costs.

Commuters, too, are feeling the impact.

Ms. Emma Almadrones reported higher spending on transportation costs, often taking extra rides or seeking alternative ways to get to work, stating that some jeepney drivers are now making fewer trips than usual or have completely stopped operating. With food prices also increasing, she prefers to bring lunch to work and walk home instead of waiting for a ride.

In response, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. signed an executive order (EO) activating the Unified Package for Livelihoods, Industry, Food, and Transport (UPLIFT), a program focused on providing fuel subsidies, commuter assistance, and expanding public transportation services. Sonny Africa, an economist and Executive Director of IBON Foundation, stated that his policies are contingent on existing government funds, raising doubts whether it will be sufficient if prices continue to rise. President Marcos also signed Republic Act No. 12316, allowing the suspension or reduction of fuel excise taxes, which is expected to take effect this April. Senator Panfilo “Ping” Lacson noted that the Philippine government could lose around PHP200 billion in revenues, with a potential recommendation to suspend the value-added tax (VAT), which could reach over PHP320 billion.

For many Filipinos, the oil crisis illustrated how global economic events intersect with local realities. It also highlights the importance of human-centered policies, not just market stabilization, to sustain livelihoods and strengthen communities. While recent diplomatic efforts alleviate the oil crisis, community resilience and support for vulnerable sectors remain central to how the Philippines weathers the ongoing crisis.


Arianne has experience in policy research at De La Salle University’s Jesse M. Robredo Institute of Governance, where she contributed to projects on systemic reform. She earned a degree in Political Science from Colegio de San Juan de Letran. Currently, she works in government relations, specializing in advocacy strategy, legislative monitoring, and stakeholder engagement. Beyond her professional work, she is actively involved in youth development and grassroots initiatives through the Rotaract Club of Santa Maria.

Vietnam 🇻🇳

The Laws of the Land

by Tri Vo, in Ho Chi Minh City

As the first quarter of 2026 comes to an end, the release of comprehensive market reports by major international consultancies provides the most definitive look yet at Vietnam’s property sector operating under a fully modernized legal framework. The set of regulations — comprising the revised Housing Law, the Real Estate Business Law, and the Land Law 2024 — officially took effect in August 2024, aiming to resolve years of legal ambiguities. Now, more than eighteen months into this new regulatory era, Q1 data reveal that the market has transitioned from a long period of paralysis into a time of relatively sustainable growth. But this time is different. Vietnam’s real estate sector is not experiencing a speculation frenzy; instead, macroeconomic conditions and stringent new compliance standards are reshaping the landscape to favor well-capitalized developers with high legal compliance.

A central catalyst for this structural shift is the overhaul of land valuation. The new Land Law abolished the rigid, state-mandated land price framework, requiring provincial authorities to implement market-aligned land prices starting from 1 January 2026. While this transition increases the financial obligations for developers, it effectively de-risks the sector for foreign institutional investors by establishing a predictable, market-driven mechanism for land acquisition and compensation.

The practical effects of this legislative environment are reflected in regional absorption rates. In Hanoi, apartment prices have continued to rise alongside robust sales volumes, with market activity overwhelmingly dominated by large-scale, integrated mega-projects from established developers. Conversely, Ho Chi Minh City has a slower trajectory, dominated by new supply constraints but steady price appreciation, now driven (in the suburban areas) by resilient owner-occupier demand rather than just speculative flipping.

Beyond the residential segment, the commercial and industrial real estate segments remain the indisputable engines of the market. This resilience is underpinned by Vietnam’s broader macroeconomic stability, highlighted by an impressive inflow of foreign direct investments of over US$38 billion in the previous year. Industrial park owners, in particular, are capitalizing on the new legal provisions that allow for more flexible rental arrangements. Indeed, such regulations allow for easier subleasing to multinational manufacturing tenants seeking to rapidly set up operations in the country.

Ultimately, the Q1 2026 property data signals a maturation of the Vietnamese real estate market. This is done by flushing out less-qualified actors, leaving a consolidated arena of larger players capable of navigating the higher compliance costs. As the government aggressively pursues its ambitious double-digit economic growth mandate for the year, a legally transparent and structurally sound real estate market has transformed from a systemic vulnerability into a stabilized pillar of Vietnam’s long-term economic expansion.


Tri has experience in management consulting and strategy, having worked with institutions such as the UNDP, The Asia Group, and ARC Group. He has provided strategic, legal, and operational insights to clients in sectors including manufacturing, energy, and technology. He holds both academic and professional experience related to Southeast and East Asia, with a focus on regional development and policy.

Editorial Deadline 07/04/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Delowar Sha (Mohammad Arif), Rohingya refugee and human rights advocate

Climate change may at times feel like a distant, abstract global environmental issue. Yet for communities like mine, this is a reality we live with every single day. I am a Rohingya refugee living in a refugee camp in Cox’s Bazar, Bangladesh. When the monsoon clouds gather over the hills, I feel fear before the rain starts. It is a quiet fear felt by everyone around me. People look at the sky with worry because here in Cox’s Bazar refugee camp, rain brings danger to us displaced people.

Our shelters are made of bamboo and tarpaulin, which we refugees built on steep and unstable hills. When heavy rain falls, especially at night, it becomes impossible to sleep. I have spent many nights listening to the sound of rain hitting the plastic roof and wondering if the ground beneath us would give way. In those moments, every sound feels like a warning and reminder of the risks to our life. For many of us, fear is neither abstract, nor distant. I have seen what happens when the soil becomes too soft to hold the shelters in place. Landslides have happened suddenly, and repeatedly, leaving little time to react. I remember seeing a nearby shelter fully collapse into pieces after heavy rain. A family lost everything they had rebuilt after fleeing Myanmar in 2017. It is painful to watch people go through loss again and again in refugee life.

Today, nearly one million Rohingya refugees live in Cox’s Bazar. Most of us arrived after violence erupted in Myanmar in 2017. We came here seeking safety in refugee camps, hoping to escape the fear of violence, crimes against humanity, and religious persecution. We fled our homeland with very few belongings, determined to protect the dignity of our families, our mothers, and our sisters.

While the world sees our situation primarily as a political crisis, another reality shapes our daily lives and receives far less attention. Climate change has become another crisis for us. The camps were built to respond to a humanitarian emergency and save us from hunger and starvation. Large areas of forest were cleared to create space for shelters to house us. I can’t forget how the hills used to be covered with trees. Now, without those roots to hold the soil together, the land has become too unstable to keep our shelters standing through the night.

The moment you enter the camp, you can immediately see how closely people live together in its crowded areas. Narrow pathways wind through crowded shelters. Refugees climb up and down the hills. During dry days, the paths are dusty, making it difficult to move around freely. During monsoons, the paths turn into slippery mud. Moving from one place to another becomes dangerous, especially for children, elderly people, and those with disabilities, who already struggle to live comfortably in such an environment. When heavy rain falls, the situation quickly worsens, and our shelters cannot withstand the elements because they are made of bamboo and tarpaulin. Water flows through the pathways and enters homes. I have seen families trying to lift their belongings onto higher ground, trying to save what little they have left. Sometimes, our shelters are left unsafe and exposed. Clothes, food, and bedding get drenched in rain. The feeling of helplessness, of powerlessness, in those moments is hard to describe.

Many parents fear for their children. I have seen mothers holding them tightly during storms, trying to protect them from the wind and rain. Fathers often stay awake all night, watching for signs of landslides because they feel responsible for protecting their family. There is a quiet strength parents portray, enormous and selfless. There is a constant question in our minds: Will our shelter survive tonight? For elderly people and persons with disabilities, the risks are even greater, including in my own family. I take care of my disabled mother and younger sister, they need medical treatment and constant care. Evacuation is not easy in a crowded camp, especially when paths are flooded and blocked. I have seen people struggling to move quickly when danger comes. These are the moments when our vulnerability becomes most apparent, and when I wish I could get them move to a safer place.

The physical dangers create an emotional fear that many people carry silently. Every monsoon season brings anxiety and fear in Cox’s Bazar refugee camps. When a shelter is damaged and destroyed our families are relocated to another area of the camp. This might seem like a simple solution but it means losing neighbors, routines, and a sense of belonging. It feels like starting over again. Access to clean water and sanitation becomes more difficult during floods. Dirty water spreads quickly and the risk of disease, such as diarrhea and chicken pox, increases. In these conditions, even small health problems can become serious. I experienced this myself in 2025, when I fell ill and my condition became severe enough that the MSF-run Jamtoli hospital in Camp 15 had to transfer me to Kutupalong MSF hospital.

What I have described above is only part of the vulnerability we face. I have also observed how the presence of such a large refugee population affects nearby communities. Resources like firewood, water, and land are in limited supply, affecting our ability to cook food and feed our families. Many refugee families depend on firewood for cooking, which has contributed to deforestation in the area of Cox’s Bazar. At the same time, host communities are also struggling with poverty and environmental changes. This creates a difficult situation where both refugees and local communities are pressured. Climate stress does not affect one group alone, it affects everyone in the region of the refugee camp.

Inside the camps, energy is another daily challenge. Some organizations have introduced alternative fuels like LPG, which helps reduce the need for firewood. However, supply and access is not always consistent. Many families rely on traditional methods because they have no other choice. Expanding renewable energy, especially solar power, could make a meaningful difference in reducing environmental damage and improving daily life. Women and girls face additional challenges during environmental disasters. I have seen how difficult it becomes for them to move safely during floods, especially at night. Access to safe sanitation facilities becomes limited, increasing risks to their safety and dignity. Many women are responsible for collecting water and managing household needs, tasks that become much harder during extreme weather.

When I reflect on all of this, I cannot ignore the issue of justice. The Rohingya people have contributed almost nothing to global carbon emissions. Yet we are among those facing some of the most severe consequences of climate change. This is not just unfortunate, it is unjust. There have been efforts by humanitarian organizations to reduce risks in the camps. I have seen projects to stabilize hills, improve drainage systems, and strengthen shelters. These efforts are important and they do make a difference. But they cannot fully solve the problem, especially when the scale of the population is so large and the environmental pressures are so severe.

We need solutions that look beyond immediate emergencies, solutions that are comprehensive and sustainable. We need approaches that connect climate adaptation with human dignity, supporting both refugees and host communities, and recognizing the long-term nature of this crisis. I believe that one of the most important aspects of the solution lies with young people. Many Rohingya youth, including myself, want to learn and contribute to our communities. But opportunities for education are limited. If we are given access to education, especially programs that include environmental awareness and disaster preparedness, we can become part of the solution.

Education is not only about personal growth. It is about building stronger communities. I continue to experience all the challenges and suffering around me in Camp 15. Yet I also see the awe-inspiring strength of humanity’s will to survive and live in dignity. I have seen families rebuild their shelters after storms, even when they have very little and no source of income. I have seen young people continue studying even in difficult conditions. I have seen community members helping each other during emergencies. For people like me, this is not just a topic of discussion. It is our daily reality. And our future depends on the world’s will to listen to the voices of those living in refugee camps.


Delowar Sha (Mohammed Arif) is a Rohingya refugee, humanitarian worker, and human rights advocate based in the Cox’s Bazar refugee camps in Bangladesh. He is a Human Rights Diploma graduate from the Institution of Human Rights and Democratic Government (IHRDG). He works as a teacher in a BRAC education program supported by UNICEF and is the founder of the Student Advocacy Network for Rights (SANR), promoting youth empowerment, education, and climate awareness in refugee communities.

Edited by Marios T. Afrataios, Co-Founder of The ASEAN Frontier

by Siu Tzyy Wei, Lead Editor - Maritime Crescent Desk

This week, the region finds itself walking down narrow paths - thin lines where choices, truths and vulnerabilities converge, where the weight of uncertainty becomes heavier to bear by the day.

In Indonesia, Hree P. Samudra turns to Lebanon, where conflict clouds the very act of knowing. The fog room of war becomes a space for distortion, raising questions about how humanitarian aid and nuclear governance can function when institutions built to preserve peace struggle to grasp the full picture.

In Malaysia, Edrina Lisa traces the government’s careful steps along the energy tightrope. While oil wealth cushions national revenue, subsidies strain the budget. The balancing act between fiscal responsibility and social protection reveals how volatility abroad is felt at home, forcing Kuala Lumpur to rethink the foundations of resilience.

Over in Brunei, Syimah Johari reflects on the fragile space between prosperity and precarity. In the quiet margins where households navigate vulnerability with little fanfare, socio-economic divides and resilience spreads their roots in silence - consequences that require immediate tending to.

From tightropes to contested truths and fragile divides, this week at the Maritime Crescent reminds us that the region’s story is traced in delicate crossings - where balance is tenuous, where clarity is elusive, and where the future is forged by the quiet endurance of walking narrow paths.

Indonesia 🇮🇩

What Lebanon Tells Us About the Limits of Knowing

by Hree Putri Samudra, in Jakarta

On 29th and 30th March 2026, three Indonesian peacekeepers serving with the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) were killed in southern Lebanon - one by a projectile at a UNIFIL base, two more in a roadside blast. Indonesia condemned the attacks. Israel denied responsibility and blamed Hezbollah. The Security Council held an emergency session. But UNIFIL itself said something nobody wanted repeated: the origin of both explosions was unknown.

Rather than a temporary oversight, the current limitations of the system are arguably a matter of structural design. UNIFIL’s Board of Inquiry lacks subpoena power, operates without intelligence-sharing and defaults to confidentiality, seen in the aftermath of the 2016 Juba attacks. In an attempt to refrain from accusation, UNIFIL’s workflow is designed to deliberately maintain process, momentum and perhaps, even decorum. Yet, reality has moved beyond simple monitoring. After Iran’s Supreme Leader was assassinated on 28 February and March 2 strikes on Hezbollah, southern Lebanon became an active warzone. With 1,300 dead and 1.2 million displaced, the scale of the IDF operations makes attribution impossible. Attribution requires firing logs and surveillance, data controlled by belligerents. In the wider picture, such information gatekept only strengthens a deliberate epistemic wall by the day. Because the parties involved are the ones likely responsible, they have no incentive to share. UNIFIL now has 7,505 remaining peacekeepers, down from 10,500 last year, occupying 50 fixed, and publicised positions. The outcome is predictable patrol routes that endanger its workforce - a risk to tackle before UNIFIL’s mandate expires on 31 December 2026. However, with the IDF pushing for a buffer zone toward the Litani River and Hezbollah fight to stop it, UNIFIL’s is falling further behind from its capacity to serve when and where it matters most.

Indonesia contributes 755 personnel to UNIFIL and plans up to 5,000 troops to Gaza - a clear bid to be seen as a global security actor. But that bid rests on assumptions Lebanon has now exposed. Indonesia’s representative at the Security Council demanded a “direct UN investigation, not merely Israeli excuses.” That investigation would use the same Board of Inquiry whose structural limits have just been described. Indonesia is demanding answers from a system that cannot produce them.

This problem extends beyond peacekeeping. The 11th Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) opens in New York on 27 April. The NPT relies on compliance verified through International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections. But the IAEA, like UNIFIL, operates on consent. In June 2025, after strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, the IAEA withdrew all inspectors from Iran. Three of the last four review conferences failed to reach consensus. The architecture of verification collapses at the moment it is needed most.

From southern Lebanon to nuclear governance, the pattern is identical. International institutions are asked to verify what the parties involved have every incentive to conceal. Indonesia should ask not only who killed its soldiers, but how peacekeepers can be protected in systems built to avoid accountability.


Hree is a Policy Fellow at the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network (APLN) where she leads research and policy interventions on Indo-Pacific nuclear security and AI governance. She previously served as a Research Fellow at the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) and has managed multi-country security portfolios across all 10 ASEAN member states. Her work examines the intersection of emerging technologies, strategic stability, and the evolution of regional security architectures. She specializes in institutional risk assessment and the application of open-source intelligence (OSINT) for strategic monitoring. Her current research focuses on how technological shifts such as AI and advanced verification tools reshape escalation dynamics and multilateral cooperation in a multipolar world.

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Malaysia 🇲🇾

Walking the Energy Tightrope

by Edrina Lisa Ozaidi, in WP Kuala Lumpur

Malaysia is one of the few countries in the region that exports oil, but how is it faring amidst the global crisis?

As the global energy market faces oil-related turbulence driven by geopolitical tensions in the Middle East and Eastern Europe, Malaysia finds itself alongside many other nations at the same crossroads of the energy crisis.

Malaysia’s position as an oil exporter has long been seen as a strength. However, the domestic fiscal burden of maintaining fuel subsidies has forced quite a shift in how it navigates the oil crisis of the mid 2020s.

The fiscal tightrope

High global crude prices are a double-edged sword. They may cushion national revenue through Petronas dividends and petroleum taxes, but they also simultaneously inflate the government subsidy bill.

Previously, Malaysia relied on blanket subsidies to shield consumers, but the Ministry of Finance has identified it as unsustainable on the federal budget for the long term.

To navigate this, the government has transitioned toward targeted subsidy rationalization, most notably through the Budi Madani initiative, which redirects aid to the bottom 40% (B40) and middle 40% (M40) income groups.

Furthermore, the government has also activated the Special Task Force on Energy and Subsidy Management, composed of experts from the financial ministry, economic ministry and the national bank, all working to sustain the nation’s target subsidy rationalisation goals.

Decoupling from the dollar and global shock

Another key part of Malaysia’s navigation strategy involves reducing ‘weaponised interdependence’ in energy trade. By promoting Regional Payment Connectivity, Bank Negara Malaysia is enabling the settlement of energy-related transactions in local currencies. This reduces the exchange rate shock that occurs when the US Dollar spikes alongside oil prices, providing a technical shield for the Ringgit and local businesses.

The Special Task Force has estimated that with the current “targeted” approach, Malaysia’s fiscal buffers are robust enough to sustain global oil prices at $100–$110 per barrel for at least the next 18 to 24 months without requiring a drastic cut to development spending.

This “runway” provides the government with the necessary breathing room to further diversify the economy before a potential long-term global energy shift.

The Transition as a Shield

Thirdly, Malaysia is also navigating the crisis by accelerating its National Energy Transition Roadmap (NETR). Investment through hydrogen, carbon capture, and solar energy helps the state attempt to “future-proof” the economy against the inevitable volatility of fossil fuels.

This strategy treats the current oil crisis not just as a financial hurdle, but as a catalyst to solidify Malaysia’s position as a regional leader in green technology.

But is it enough?

Malaysia’s navigation of the current oil crisis is defined by a shift from passive protectionism to active structural reform.

Backed by a 24-month fiscal safety net and the oversight of a dedicated Task Force, Kuala Lumpur is ensuring that the nation remains resilient even as the global energy landscape remains fractured and unpredictable.

But to answer the question, only time will tell.


Edrina is a communications professional with a background in international relations. She holds a degree from the University of Nottingham Malaysia and has worked across public relations and social media for organizations in the development, education, and corporate sectors. Her work focuses on crafting narratives around regional affairs and strengthening media engagement across Southeast Asia.

Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳

Walking in the Shadows of Prosperity

by Syimah Johari, in Bandar Seri Begawan

On the surface, Brunei is often associated with stability and comfort, need is not always immediately visible. As a country whose image is created based on its generous social welfare and abundance of oil and natural gas, it is easy to assume that the entire population lives with little to no socioeconomic constraints. As such, it is important to break such a facade - although it does not affect most of the population, poverty still exists. At the Legislative Council last year, those classified as poor by the government fall under relative rather than absolute poverty, meaning they are able to meet basic needs but may remain financially vulnerable. As a result, poverty in the sultanate remains a largely translucent issue - present but watered down, a social blind spot.

With a relatively decent image of the state of poverty retained, public awareness of the issue remains limited, even though need is not absent. This narrow perception overlooks a significant group within society: individuals and households who, while not classified as poor, continue to face socio-economic challenges. In line with the Zero Poverty 2035 target, the government has introduced subsidies and support programs to help maintain stability for households in need. However, what further narrows down the public understanding of who are considered “in need” is the eligibility criteria that determines the access to such programs.

Rather than a standardised poverty threshold, eligibility for social support in Brunei is determined using measures like the Minimum Cost of Basic Needs (KMKA), which reflects the typical household expenditure. Individuals who fall below this threshold are considered in need, and may receive assistance through programs like the Monthly Welfare Assistance (BKB), zakat (obligatory, annual religious charity in Islam), or other government, private sector and NGO initiatives.

Yet despite what seems like a whole-of-society effort to alleviate the socioeconomic challenges faced by many of these individuals and households, poverty is a deeper issue than what meets the eye. While NGOs like Society for Community Outreach and Training (SCOT) and Hand4HandBN provide essential support like donation drives and grassroot efforts at creating self-employment opportunities for its beneficiaries, significant gaps remain. These interventions often address immediate material needs, yet they struggle to reach underlying socioeconomic vulnerabilities - such as social stigma, limited upward mobility and rising living pressures - that persist beneath the surface.

Recognising such needs in its quieter forms is essential. Doing so allows for a more complete understanding of society and ensures that support is seen not merely as a welfare mechanism, but as part of a nuanced social landscape. By acknowledging the existence of households that live between stability and struggle, society can develop a deeper appreciation for the diversity of experiences that shape Brunei today.


Syimah is a graduate of King’s College London with a BA in International Relations. With a strong focus on diplomacy, regional cooperation, and development policy, she is passionate about contributing to meaningful change through public service. Currently, she is involved in poverty alleviation work through a local NGO.

Editorial Deadline 04/04/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk

Across the Mekong Belt, the first quarter of 2026 brought a phase of political change that showed how, in Southeast Asia, the faces at the top rarely change — they simply rearrange themselves or find new titles. This week's issue follows that logic across four countries, where power is passed, repackaged, or quietly entrenched by the same hands that have always held it.

In Laos, a cabinet of familiar faces returns with familiar promises, and familiar shortfalls. The numbers — inflation, debt, fuel prices — tell a story the new term's targets quietly ignore: ambition might be restated, but the mechanisms to deliver it are not. In Myanmar, the junta offers its most theatrical shuffle yet: Min Aung Hlaing trades a uniform for a presidential title, handing his gun to a loyalist: the deck stays the same, only the hands have moved.

Meanwhile, in Thailand, a single MP's intervention threatens to sink a Clean Air Bill that citizens fought hard to put on the table — a reminder that reform, even when it reaches parliament, is never safe. Cambodia, alone this week, offers something closer to genuine disruption: a sweeping crackdown on online fraud networks, an arrest of real consequence, and a cyber law with teeth. Whether the ambition outlasts the deadline remains to be seen.

Lao PDR 🇱🇦

Familiar Faces, Unfinished Business: Laos’ Cabinet Returns

by Thongsavanh Souvannasane, in Vientiane

When Prime Minister Sonexay Siphandone was sworn in for a second term to lead the 10th Government Cabinet of Laos on March 31st, there was little surprise in the room.

Most of the 17-member cabinet are returning faces, and Sonexay himself is a known quantity. But continuity in leadership is only a virtue if the previous term is delivered. On several fronts, the record invites scrutiny.

The most immediate pressure arrived with brutal timing.

Just three days before the inauguration, a crisis erupted in the Middle East, triggering a fuel shortage that sent prices spiraling. In barely five weeks, diesel costs leapt from 19,970 kip (USD 0.91) per liter to 51,360 kip (USD 2.33), a 157% increase hitting households and businesses hard.

Yet the crisis exposes a deeper question: why, after years in office, has Laos still not built the reserves or supply chain diversification to cushion exactly this kind of shock? For a landlocked nation with well-documented import vulnerabilities, that absence looks less like bad luck than policy failure.

Inflation tells a similarly uncomfortable story.

The government has pledged to keep price growth below five percent annually over the next five years. Yet the first quarter of 2026 already averaged seven percent, before the fuel shock fully fed through.

Last year’s full-year rate of 7.7% should have sounded the alarm.

That the government enters its new term with the same target but no visible new mechanism to achieve it raises legitimate questions about whether this is genuine commitment or optimistic arithmetic.

At the inaugural session, President Thongloun Sisoulith urged the cabinet to resolve fuel shortages, stabilize the Kip, reform state-owned enterprises, and repair what he himself described as “paralyzed” roads. The list reads less like a forward agenda and more like an acknowledgement of unfinished business from the previous term.

The longer-term numbers offer some relief. Debt has fallen from a COVID-era peak of around 130% of GDP to roughly 90%, with projections pointing toward 65% by 2030.

Growth targets of 6% annually, anchored by hydropower, the Laos-China Railway corridor, and tourism recovery, are ambitious but not implausible. Yet the the International Monetary Fund (IMF) warns that persistent debt and inflation risk undermining inclusive development, and at 90% of GDP, debt servicing continues to crowd out spending on health, education, and rural infrastructure.

Then there is the question.

Sonexay and his sister Viengthong Siphandone, newly appointed Vice President, are children of Khamtai Siphandone, the former President and party patriarch who passed away in April 2025. With two siblings now holding the country’s top executive positions, the Siphandone family’s grip on Lao governance has never been tighter.

Whether that represents continuity of capable leadership or a dynasty consolidating its hold, just months after the patriarch’s passing, is a question Lao political observers will be asking, carefully, for some time.

Laos has a plan for the next five years. The problem is that it had one for the last five years too.


Thongsavanh is a journalist from Laos with a background in English-language media. He graduated from the Lao-American Institute with a Diploma of the Arts in English and contributes to independent news platforms. His reporting focuses on environmental issues, socio-economic development, and geopolitics.

Myanmar 🇲🇲

A New Face at the Top, the Same Fist Below

by Moe Thiri Myat

A significant leadership shift has unfolded in Myanmar this week, signaling changes within the military junta. The junta is not giving up power but just rearranging it. Senior General Min Aung Hlaing resigned his role as a commander-in-chief, instead moving into the presidential process. At the same time, General Ye Win Oo took over the control of the armed forces, ending days of speculation over who would lead the military at this critical moment of the country.

The shift did not occur without warning. Before the 81st Armed Forces Day, Deputy Commander-in-Chief Soe Win publicly signaled that a military leadership reshuffle would follow on Thursday, March 26. In his remarks, he said the military would continue its procedural enforcement regardless of who held senior posts. He also said that “The Tatmataw takes precedence over any individual.”

Attention then turned to who would become the next commander-in-chief. Many believed it would be Soe Win himself to step up as Min Aung Hlaing’s successor. Instead, the role was entrusted to Ye Win Oo, a close loyalist of Min Aung Hlaing and the first former military intelligence chief to become the head of armed forces.

Looking back at Ye Win Oo’s background, he had a close relationship with Min Aung Hlaing for years, rising through the ranks once Min Aung Hlaing assumed the role of commander-in-chief in 2011. He then served as a chief of military intelligence, consolidating his position within the military regime after the 2021 coup. His appointment was announced the very same day Min Aung Hlaing was formally nominated in the process to select Myanmar’s next president. This maneuver thus placed one of Min Aung Hlaing’s closest allies in charge of the military right as the former military leader approaches a transition towards civilian leadership.

This change has drawn reaction beyond Myanmar as well. On April 1st, the ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights, a regional network of lawmakers, warned against recognizing Min Aung Hlaing’s presidency. The group said a new title should not be treated as a break from the system that has ruled the country since the coup, noting that international recognition could normalize the same military order, just under a formal civilian structure.

These changes come at an important moment in Myanmar’s post-coup political landscape. A new president is expected, a new commander-in-chief is already in place, and the military has framed this shift as a part of its planned roadmap. But the leadership changes have also kept attention on how power is being passed, who remains in control, and how the region will respond to the new government structure.


Moe Thiri Myat is a senior at Parami University. Majoring in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics (PPE). Interested in analyzing emerging sociopolitical situations and developments, through her work as a Myanmar correspondent at The ASEAN Frontier she aims to explore how sociopolitical developments across Southeast Asia shape and are shaped by the situation in Myanmar.

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Thailand 🇹🇭

Bhumjaithai Loads Its Gun on the Clean Air Bill

by Natamon Aumphin, in Bangkok

Earlier in April, the public unleashed backlash on social media after Supachai Jaisamut, a Bhumjaithai-list MP, addressed the house over the Clean Air Bill, suggesting that the Senate reject it amid the grave situation of PM2.5 in the Northern region of Thailand.

In the morning of April 2nd, the MP was invited to clarify the situation on channel News Workers’ Off-Screen Chat (กรรมกรข่าว), a news channel led by Sorayut Suthassanachinda, a prominent news presenter. The channel allows invited guests to speak freely, heart-to-heart with him.

In response to the public outrage sparked by his attitude towards the bill, the MP said that he agreed with the majority of the clauses, noting however that there are some confusing parts in the draft that should be revised. According to Jaisamut, the biggest issue is the enforcement power of the bill, as some parts are overlapping with the existing law, including industrial-related legislation that has already been widely implemented in other governmental units. In this context, rejecting the bill, rewriting it and resubmitting it would be the most appropriate and fastest solution compared to establishing a new subcommittee to consider the bill at this stage of revision.

Pattarapong Leelaphat, an MP from the People’s Party, the opposition party behind the bill, responded with worry, questioning why the Bhumjaithai didn’t point out the issue during the committee meeting last year, of which he was also among the attendees. Moreover, the Bhumjaithai was also among the parties that overwhelmingly voted for the bill in the former parliament term last year.

Moving forward, the question is how the parliament will decide the future of the bill and whether other actors, such as the civil society, will be consulted before the decision of this citizen-initiated legislation. These questions will also send signals about the incentives and intention of the current government over the health of citizens as PM2.5 worsens yearly, coupled with grievances from the energy crisis and soaring commodity prices.

Importantly, it might also be difficult in the broader context among ASEAN countries to cooperate to solve this regional pollution in the future if the bill were to be rejected, as there is no guarantee that the house will vote to pass the draft once again.


Natamon has served as a rapporteur at the Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS Thailand). She has also worked as a research assistant on diplomatic issues in Southeast Asia. Her work focuses on how domestic politics shape foreign policy in the region. She holds a degree in international relations and has experience in policy analysis, event reporting, and regional research.

Cambodia 🇰🇭

Cambodia's New Cyber Law Claims Its First Victim

by Chandara Samban, in Kandal

Cambodia has taken bold steps to eliminate online scams by the end of April 2026, passing a new law on cyber and technology-based fraud, launching a nationwide campaign to dismantle scam networks, and pursuing key figures involved. Most recently, authorities arrested the owner of Huione Pay Bank, the close ally of Chen Zhi.

On April 1st, Chinese and Cambodian authorities announced the arrest of Li Xiong, former chairman of the Huione Group, in a joint operation investigating money laundering linked to Huione Pay Bank. The bank reportedly processed an estimated USD 4 billion in money-laundering action between 2021 and 2025, before the National Bank of Cambodia revoked its license in March 2025. The case is also linked to the Prince Group and fraud kingpin Chen Zhi, who was arrested and extradited to China about 2 months ago.

Li Xiong’s arrest has drawn significant international attention, as he is considered a key figure in Southeast Asia’s online fraud networks, which have affected victims globally in recent years. Governments in the US, UK, and Europe have taken targeted actions in response. According to blockchain analytics firm Elliptic, the bank handled approximately USD 8 billion in cryptocurrency transactions and facilitated over USD 300 million in laundering activities linked to the North Korean Government.

Earlier in April, the Cambodian government passed a new Cyber Law specifically targeting online fraud. The Senate approved the law on April 4. Justice Minister Keut Rith stated in a press conference that the law aims to strengthen enforcement against online fraud, particularly by clearly defining and targeting scam operations, which were previously not well addressed under existing legislation.

Under the new cyber law, leaders of online scam networks can face prison sentences ranging from 5 to 20 years, depending on the severity of the offense. Crimes involving human trafficking, coercion, or money laundering may result in harsher penalties, including life imprisonment for masterminds.

Chhay Sinarith, head of the Secretariat of the Commission for Combating Online Scams, emphasized that dismantling online fraud networks is a complex task requiring international cooperation. He noted that Cambodia is working closely with global partners, including the US FBI, INTERPOL, Chinese authorities, and South Korean agencies operating in Cambodia. Many of the criminal networks involve foreign nationals from multiple countries who have established operations within Cambodia.

In the 9 months leading up to early April, Cambodia arrested 750 individuals and repatriated 11,000 foreign nationals. Overall, the broader campaign has resulted in more than 10,000 arrests and the deportation of approximately 80,000 foreigners from 78 nationalities. Common forms of crime include romance scams, investment scams, phishing, and recruitment fraud. The government has pledged to eliminate all online scam operations in the country by the end of April 2026.

In response, LICADHO operations director, Am Sam Ath, who has closely monitored the issue, acknowledged the government’s recent efforts to combat online fraud, which has long harmed Cambodia’s economy and international reputation. However, he expressed concern that the timeline may be too ambitious for a challenge that requires sustained coordination and oversight. He stated, “This crackdown must be strictly enforced, transparent, and applied equally before the law. Corruption must be eliminated without exception. On behalf of civil society, we support and encourage the authorities and the Royal Government to take decisive action against online fraud.” He noted that while the government’s intensified efforts appear promising, their success will ultimately depend on transparency, fairness, and consistent implementation.

The crackdown on online fraud presents a significant test for Cambodia as it seeks to restore its international image and rebuild trust with global partners. While the government has set an ambitious deadline of April 2026, achieving this goal will require advanced technological capabilities and sustained collaboration with international experts, including major global powers.


Chandara is a freelance journalist with a focus on foreign affairs, security issues, and ASEAN affairs. He also serves as a Junior Counterterrorism Intelligence Analyst.

Editorial Deadline 04/04/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Karen Ysabelle R. David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk

This week, we see warning signs and systemic issues with ticking deadlines across the countries of the Pacific Corridor. In Singapore: a looming baby crisis, as the city-state’s total fertility rate plunges to a record low. Despite the government’s best efforts, in a city-state notorious for its high cost of living and fast-paced environment, reversing the trend is set to be an uphill battle.

In the Philippines, the global oil crisis has led to the declaration of a national energy emergency. In a country heavily dependent on imported oil, the crisis has exposed exactly how precarious its situation is, with fears of shortages and price spikes spreading like wildfire through the general populace.

And in Vietnam, the recent National Assembly and People’s Council elections have brought to light the state’s suppression of dissent. With Tô Lâm widely expected to be elected President, there may be no better time than the present to question and push back against the country’s one-party system.

Singapore 🇸🇬

Why are Singaporeans Having Fewer Babies?

by Jennifer Hui En Tan, in Singapore

On 26 February 2026, during Singapore’s 2026 annual budget debate, Deputy Prime Minister Gan Kim Yong raised his concern with Singapore’s total fertility rate (TFR) hitting a record low of 0.87 in 2025. To fight the low birth rate, the government expects to take in between 25,000 to 30,000 new citizens a year over the next five years. Since then, the topic of conversation has been one of the hottest topics in Singapore’s social media scene. So, why are Singaporeans having fewer babies?

Despite Singapore’s incentives for larger families by increasing paid parental leave, child care subsidies, and large family schemes, these fail to tackle the systematic and structural issue behind the country’s falling birth rate. While public sentiment among Singaporeans on social media forums highlights the cost of living, housing, and time as the key deterrent, Singapore’s situation is part of a broader global decline in TFRs. For many citizens, cost remains the most pressing concern, as Singapore is widely regarded as one of the world’s most expensive cities, and housing adds to that pressure. Approximately 77% of Singaporeans live in public housing, and for many young couples, the most realistic route would be to apply for BTO (Build to Order) houses, which come with a typical waiting period of around two to four years, if not longer. Newer BTO flats are frequently criticized for their shrinking sizes, which many feel are not conducive to raising more than one or two children. Time and work cultures further exacerbate the problem. Singapore’s high-pressure work and fast-paced environment leads to many opting out from having children due to the lack of time and flexibility to be meaningfully present in their children’s lives.

A declining fertility rate is not unique to Singapore; rather, it has been an ongoing global issue shaped by broader cultural and mindset shifts. Even with Singapore’s efforts so far, the fact is that children require significant parental time and emotional presence, something that institutional childcare alone is unable to provide. Globally, the TFR has been declining as a result of a combination of socioeconomic, cultural, and technological transformation, which has reshaped family structures and reproductive behavior. As countries develop and the socioeconomic situation gets better overall, higher levels of education lead to greater labor force participation, delayed marriages, and postponed childbearing.

The global decline in TFR has significant implications for ASEAN, as many member states are already experiencing demographic pressure similar to advanced economies. Countries such as Thailand and Malaysia have seen their TFRs fall to 1.22 and 1.55, respectively. Though the TFR rates are not as severe as Singapore, it signals a demographic shift which threatens to reshape the region’s economic landscape.

Singapore’s record low fertility rate ultimately reflects not just local challenges but a broader global demographic shift driven by structural, economic, and cultural changes. While government incentives help, they cannot reverse deeper societal trends such as rising costs, delayed marriages, and shifting lifestyle priorities. As neighboring ASEAN states face similar patterns, the region must prepare for the long-term implications on labor, growth, and social stability. Addressing the fertility crisis will require not only policy adjustments, but also a fundamental rethinking of how societies support families and redefine the balance between work, life, and parenthood.


Jennifer is a final-year International Relations student at the Singapore Institute of Management, where she focuses on political engagement, diplomacy, and community governance. She is an active volunteer in her constituency, working closely with residents to understand local concerns, facilitate dialogue, and support community initiatives.

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The Philippines 🇵🇭

State of Emergency and Its Wider Meaning

by Glenn Vincent N. Boquilon, in Angeles City

On Tuesday evening, 24 March 2026, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. declared a state of national energy emergency, the first country in the world to do so. Beyond a domestic policy move, this can be viewed as a response to the growing crisis outside the Philippines. Tensions between the United States and Iran in the Middle East are beginning to affect countries that rely on imported energy. Additionally, oil companies in the Philippines have implemented a double-digit increase in fuel prices, pushing them to record highs. The government’s decision reflects concerns over fuel supply, rising prices, and the wider impact of global instability.

The Philippines depends heavily on imported oil. When conflict disrupts supply routes or pushes prices higher, the country becomes vulnerable. If left misgoverned, crippling effects can trickle down to various industries and communities. Recent developments in the Middle East have raised fears of shortages and price spikes, pushing the government to act quickly. By declaring a national energy emergency, authorities can respond faster and manage resources more closely.

In this case, the state of emergency allows the government to secure fuel supplies, monitor distribution, and prevent hoarding or price manipulation. Officials have also set up a crisis committee to track the situation and make sure basic needs such as fuel, food, and medicine remain available.

The effects of the Middle East conflict go beyond fuel prices. Geopolitical dynamics like this show how quickly global tensions can shape local decisions. For countries like the Philippines and many across the world, even distant conflicts can create real risks. In this regard, this makes early action and contingency plans important within bodies of government. The declaration of a state of emergency is not just reacting to external circumstances, but preparing for internal challenges that could potentially get worse.

This approach is not unique during times of crisis. In the last couple of years, several countries in Asia have used emergency powers in response to global or external pressures. During the COVID-19 pandemic, governments introduced emergency measures to control the spread of the virus and keep systems running. In other cases, states used similar powers to respond to economic shocks or regional tensions. Each situation is different, but the need for quick action is the same.

Across Southeast Asia, this creates a shared challenge. Governments must respond quickly, but they must also avoid overusing their authority. While emergency powers can help manage crises, they also need to be presented with clear limitations. In any nation, accountability is important to maintain public trust. For observers, this moment highlights how connected the world has become. Consequently, a conflict in one region can affect energy, prices, and policy in another. Governments now have to prepare for risks that come from beyond their borders. In this regard, emergency measures are becoming tools for both response and prevention.

As tensions continue in the Middle East, attention will also remain on how these emergency powers are used in the Philippines. People will watch how long they stay in place and the initiatives that emerge from it. A balance must be found between national security measures and the extended reach of power. In the end, the real test is not just how governments respond to a crisis, but how they return to normal once it passes. In an uncertain and changing global environment, governments must ensure that power is properly regulated, proportionate, and exercised in accordance with the rule of law.


Glenn holds a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from the University of Santo Tomas. His experience spans governance programs, policy development, and political research, having worked with the Ateneo School of Government and WR Numero Research on projects focused on electoral reform, public opinion, and regional development. He also helped coordinate the drafting of the Bangsamoro Local Government Code and supported the Academy of Multiparty Democracy.

Vietnam 🇻🇳

Vietnam Cracks Down on Dissent Amid National Elections

by Sean Huy Vu

On 15 March, over 78 million people in Vietnam voted for candidates to the People’s Committees and National Assembly, an event that happens only once every five years. According to Vietnam Today, 68.6% of the candidates for the National Assembly (612 individuals) are running for the first time, 21.8% (188 candidates) are from ethnic minorities, and 45.4% (392 candidates) are women. Across 34 provinces, voters choose members for a total of 2,554 municipal or provincial seats, and 72,613 commune or ward seats.

A week later, the election results for the National Assembly were revealed, with Lê Minh Hưng winning 99.87% of the vote — higher than any delegate — and Tô Lâm receiving 98.66%. While Lê, a member of the Vietnamese Communist Party’s Central Committee, is speculated by the public and experts to become the next prime minister, Tô is anticipated to be elected president by the forthcoming National Assembly.

The integrity of the elections, however, have been called into question by observers. Although Vietnamese citizens are not legally required to participate in elections, the Party — through its various civil society groups and institutions — strongly encourages voting as a civil obligation. As a Marxist-Leninist state, the Communist Party is the sole legal political party in the country, and although candidates are permitted to run as independents, forming opposition parties is strictly illegal and can invoke grave consequences.

The independence of the national legislature has appeared increasingly dubious to experts. In the past year alone, a record number of Party Central Committee resolutions were institutionalized into law by the National Assembly, with little time for examination or debate around policies. This has led Duke University Political Science Professor Edmund Malesky to conclude, “The separation [of powers] between the executive and the legislature, like in other countries, is not clear [in Vietnam].”

In its pursuit of regime survival, the Vietnamese Party-State has suppressed dissent during the election season. Just two days before the national elections, independent journalist and blogger Lê Anh Hưng was arrested in Hanoi for “making, storing, disseminating or propagating information, documents, and items against the state.” Several individuals have also been fined between US$285 and US$570 for allegedly spreading “off-topic and untrue” information about the elections. In none of these cases did authorities provide specific details regarding the cause for their arrests or penalties. Lê, however, has been imprisoned before for his analysis and outspoken criticism of corruption in Vietnam, garnering himself popularity on social media.

Despite Vietnam’s growing and more empowered middle class, there is little to no opposition to the one-party system. Without critical feedback, the country will face more delays in achieving its development goals, and given the increasing centralization of power under Tô Lâm, political freedoms are unlikely to expand in the near future.


Sean is a scholar of East Asian history, culture, and international relations, with current research at Georgetown University examining working-class labor and human trafficking in the region. His broader interests include the social psychology of religion and identity politics. Sean previously taught modern Korean history at the University of California, Irvine, where he completed his B.A. in History, and later taught English in Ho Chi Minh City while studying Vietnamese language and culture. His writing has been published by UC Irvine, Johns Hopkins University, and Foreign Analysis.

Editorial Deadline 31/03/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Sabrina Nour Touijer, TAF Regional Peacebuilding Analyst

Citizenship can function not only as a marker of political belonging, but as a powerful tool of exclusion and violence. The Rohingya crisis exemplifies how the denial of citizenship can create conditions of extreme vulnerability, legitimising state-sponsored violence and mass displacement (Ullah 2016, p. 291). Shaped in part by lines drawn by colonial powers to serve imperial interests rather than regional political, economic, or cultural realities, the Rohingya population has faced identity-based discrimination and legal exclusion in Myanmar (MacLean 2018, p. 3). Since 2017 alone, more than 700,000 Rohingyas have been forcefully displaced from Myanmar amid systematic violence and persecution (MacLean 2018, p. 3; Kipgen 2019, p.63).

Despite condemnation from international actors, Myanmar denies any wrongdoing, characterising the Rohingya as “illegal Bengalis” who migrated from neighbouring Bangladesh, rather than legitimate members of the national community (Kipgen 2019, p. 63). Bangladesh, however, also refuses to recognise the Rohingya community as citizens, rendering the population as “stateless” (Kipgen 2019, p. 63). Deemed outsiders in a country they have inhabited for countless generations, the Rohingya have been stripped of citizenship and subjected to institutionalized restrictions on marriage, freedom of movement, religious practice, employment, and education, alongside recurring waves of state-sponsored violence (Kipgen 2019, p. 63).

The denial of citizenship thus operates not merely as a legal classification, but as a structural mechanism that creates vulnerability, legitimises violence, and enables mass displacement. This article examines how citizenship denial has functioned as a catalyst for violence and displacement in Myanmar.

Denial of Citizenship

Traditional conceptions of citizenship frame it as a political membership within a nation-state, through which individuals are granted civil, political, and social rights. Displaced populations challenge this conventional understanding, as they do not fit neatly within territorially bounded notions of belonging and political membership (Mehta & Napier-Moore 2010, p. 15). In the absence of citizenship, identity and belonging are thrown into question, while rights typically granted through citizenship such as political participation and the capacity to be heard as a political subject are revoked (Mehta & Napier-Moore 2010, p. 18). This condition of displacement is inherently destabilising, as it reinforces hierarchical distinctions between inclusion and exclusion. Displaced persons are constructed as belonging elsewhere, that have been uprooted from a place in which he/she is expected to return to (Brun, Fabos, & El-Abed 2017, p. 220-221). Displacement thus comes to be perceived as a threat to the ‘national order of things’, reinforcing the assumed alignment between territory, citizenship, and political belonging.

For the Rohingya population, the Myanmar state has reconstituted a historically recognized community into a stateless group through legal and administrative exclusion. Central to this process was the introduction of the 1982 Citizenship Law, which restructured citizenship into three categories: full citizens, defined as descendants of residents present in Burma prior to 1823; associate citizens, defined as people who were given citizenship under the 1948 Union Citizenship Law; and naturalised citizens, defined as people who resided in Burma/Myanmar prior to 1948 but had failed to apply for citizenship under the Union Citizenship act. Within these three categories, citizenship eligibility was limited to those who were of the country’s “national ethnic races” which included Burman, Karen, Chin, Mon, Rakhine, among 135 other recognized “national ethnic races” (MacLean p. 6). However, the Rohingya were excluded from recognition as one of the “national ethnic races” on the grounds that they were classified as “Bengalis” who had migrated from Bangladesh after 1823, rendering them ineligible for citizenship. Rohingya advocates contest this characterisation, arguing that the Rohingya community constitute a distinct cultural and linguistic group rather than a subset of “Bengalis”, and support their claims with historical evidence proving their presence in Burma/Myanmar prior to the 1823 cutoff. State officials, however, reject the validity of these claims, maintaining that such claims are not rooted in empirical facts but instead represent politically motivated narratives.

The 1982 Citizenship Law fundamentally changed the legal and political status of the Rohingyas by formally stripping them of citizenship in Myanmar. This resulted in the Rohingya community facing severe restrictions on access to education and employment, property ownership, freedom of movement, and the ability to marry and form families (OHCHR 2018, p.6). Sectarian violence which began in 2012 until present day has further intensified Rohingya displacement, affecting hundreds of thousands of individuals. On the 25th of August 2017, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) launched coordinated attacks on approximately 30 security outposts in the northern Rakhine State, killing 12 security personnel. The response by Myanmar’s security forces was immediate and disproportionate, involving widespread and systematic atrocities against Rohingya civilians (OHCHR 2018, p. 8). These included extrajudicial killings, the use of force against unarmed populations, mass rape against women, the torture and abuse of detainees, enforced disappearances, arbitrary arrests, and police beatings (OHCHR 2018, p. 8-10). Collectively, these patterns indicate that the denial of citizenship to the Rohingyas in Myanmar has been a deliberate strategy of exclusion, facilitating systematic violence and displacement in a context where international condemnation has been widespread but largely ineffective.

The Politics of Belonging

Citizenship functions not merely as a legal status, but as a foundational marker of political belonging and identity. The systematic denial of citizenship therefore constitutes more than the withdrawal of formal rights; it represents the intentional exclusion of a population from the political, economic, and social community of the state. In the case of the Rohingya, the revocation of citizenship has operated as a strategic mechanism of exclusion, reconstructing identity into a site of governance and repression. Myanmar’s 1982 Citizenship Law institutionalized this exclusion by embedding ethno-national criteria into the legal definition of belonging, effectively rendering the Rohingya community legally invisible. In doing so, the law has expedited sustained violations of international legal norms, including obligations under the Genocide Convention, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Citizenship in Myanmar has provided the legal infrastructure through which discrimination, violence, and displacement have been normalized and justified.

These domestic legal exclusions have been further exacerbated by systemic failures in international enforcement and accountability. Myanmar’s military dominance and persistent refusal to cooperate with international actors and judicial mechanisms have constrained external leverage. Simultaneously, donor fatigue and declining humanitarian funding have weakened protection mechanisms for displaced Rohingya populations, particularly in host states such as Bangladesh. On the geopolitical level, diplomatic protection by Russia and China, most notably through the blocking of United Nations Security Council resolutions has protected Myanmar from consequential ramifications. Regionally, ASEAN’s long-standing principle of non-interference has limited collective regional pressure and undermined the development of a coordinated response to the crisis.

Addressing the Rohingya crisis therefore requires a multi-level strategy that confronts both the legal foundations of exclusion within Myanmar and the structural inadequacy of the international response. At the domestic level, legal reform is necessary. This includes amending the 1982 Citizenship Law to restore nationality to the Rohingya population and formally recognize them as an indigenous ethnic group with historical ties to the Rakhine State. Such reform is essential to dismantle the legal mechanisms that have enabled systemic violence and discrimination. At the regional and global levels, greater cooperation and responsibility are imperative. ASEAN should be urged to move beyond its non-interference doctrine and adopt a coordinated refugee protection framework that strengthens legal safeguards, access to services, and solutions for the displaced Rohingya community. Internationally, accountability mechanisms must be reinforced through targeted sanctions against Myanmar’s military leadership, the expansion of universal jurisdiction cases in national courts, and sustained diplomatic support for proceedings before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Criminal Court (ICC). Collectively, these measures are important, not only for addressing ongoing abuses, but for challenging the normalization of citizenship denial as a tool for exclusion within the international system.

Final Thoughts

The Rohingya crisis signifies how citizenship, apart from being a neutral legal status, can be mobilised as a deliberate institutionalized mechanism of exclusion, violence, and displacement. Through the institutionalisation of ethno-national criteria in Myanmar’s 1982 Citizenship Law, the Rohingyas were reshaped to be a politically expendable population, rather than a historically accepted indigenous community rooted in Burma/Myanmar. This process not only stripped individuals of formal legal rights, but systematically transformed their political identity and protection, creating conditions under which mass violence, discrimination, and forced displacement could be enforced with little accountability.

This case has shown that displacement is not always an unintended consequence of conflict, but the outcome of intentional governance strategies that seek to redefine the boundaries of national membership. The persistence of such an exclusion has been reinforced by international enforcement failures, including geopolitical obstruction from China and Russia, ASEAN’s non-interference doctrine, and declining humanitarian engagement. Addressing the Rohingya crisis requires not only legal reform, but also a more robust international commitment to accountability, protection, and responsibility-sharing.

Ultimately, it reveals how citizenship can be weaponised to exclude and marginalise. Confronting this reality is necessary if the international community is to prevent the normalization of statelessness as a tool of repression and uphold foundational principles of human rights and international law.

Sabrina Nour Touijer is TAF’s Regional Peacebuilding Analyst and a recent graduate with a Master’s degree in Crisis and Security Management, specialising in War and Peace Studies, from Leiden University. Her academic and professional interests focus on conflict, security, and conflict resolution, with a strong commitment to understanding instability and advancing sustainable peace. Through her work, she aims to support more informed and constructive approaches to peacebuilding in volatile environments.

Edited by Nishiha Jasper David, Frontier Analysis Editor

by Siu Tzyy Wei, Lead Editor - Maritime Crescent Desk

This week, flames flicker across the region, sometimes celebratory, sometimes destructive, sometimes provocative, but always revealing a deeper story beneath the embers.

In Brunei, Hari Raya fireworks blaze against the night, as Maryam Zulaidi reflects on the festive season’s power to bring not only families together, but also strengthen diplomatic ties with regional counterparts.

Across Malaysia, fiery words in parliament face the prospect of new restraints, as the government studies proposed guidelines to curb issues surrounding the “3R” - race, religion and royalty among Members of Parliament. Sydney Gan delves into the National Harmony Act, and whether policing parliamentary debate is a solution to preserving unity without hindering accountability.

In Indonesia, the government is straining to shield households from the shock of surging oil prices by pouring trillions into subsidies as the crisis at the Strait of Hormuz threatens to push crude oil costs even higher. Here, Rayhan Jasin examines how Jakarta’s consideration of a nationwide work-from-home mandate could ease fuel demand and fiscal pressure, while also reshaping business practices and exposing new vulnerabilities.

From fireworks to debates, the Maritime Crescent reminds us that flames never burn in isolation. Rather, they leave embers that illuminate deeper significance - showing how celebration, provocation and crisis all glow within the same firelight of the region’s story.

Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳

When Hari Raya Becomes Common Table

by Maryam Zulaidi

Eid-al-fitr is the celebration that marks the end of the holy month of Ramadan and the beginning of the new Islamic month of Syawwal. More popularly known as Hari Raya Aidilfitri, Malay Muslims in Brunei uniquely observe Hari Raya for up to 30 days, a cultural practice which differs from other Muslim communities around the world. During Hari Raya, celebrants visit homes of their relatives and friends and spend quality time together, strengthening and reaffirming familial and communal bonds through traditional food and games. That being said, these practices are not exclusively limited to the Muslim communities of the three nations. Rather, it is a season of celebration that transcends the social construction of cultural boundaries — it is a warm welcome for all to join regardless of background, race, and even faith. In the bigger picture, Hari Raya can be seen as the cushion that supports diplomatic relations between Brunei and its counterparts who share the same cultural practices.

For nearly fourteen years, it has become a routine for a Singaporean minister, accompanied by his/her delegations to pay a friendly visit to Brunei during this joyous event. In the course of this festivity, Singaporean dignitaries are invited to Hari Raya events such as open houses hosted by Bruneian Cabinet ministers and members alike as well as the Singaporean High Commission in Brunei. It is through events like these, informal discussions regarding cooperation between the two states unravel. The exchange of Hari Raya greetings between Brunei and Singaporean state officials goes beyond formality; it depicts and reflects the depth and knitness of bilateral ties between the two countries. Gradually, trust between state officials became established not only at the bilateral level but also through personal and bureaucratic goodwill.

Even the COVID-19 pandemic did not halt this tradition between the two nations. In an era where physical contact and travel was impossible, this custom was not only retained but modified into a goodwill phone call conveyed by then Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong to the Sultan of Brunei.

During the Hari Raya celebrations of 2024, Brunei-Singapore ties were strengthened when both countries celebrated forty years of diplomatic relations, notably commemorated by a courtesy call with His Royal Highness Prince Haji Al-Muhtadee Billah ibni Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah,the Crown Prince and Senior Minister at the Prime Minister’s Office in Brunei. In 2025, Osman at the Singaporean High Commission’s Hari Raya open house expressed that the “relationship between Brunei and Singapore is built on sincerity from all levels of society”.

This year, the bilateral traditions remain steadfast. Singapore’s Acting Minister-in-charge of Muslim Affairs and Senior Minister of State at the Ministry of Home Affairs, Dr Muhammad Faishal Ibrahim and his spouse, who not only stayed in Brunei three days during the festive celebrations, also graced an exchange of souvenirs with Brunei’s Minister of Religious Affairs, Dato Paduka Seri Setia Ustaz Awang Haji Badaruddin.

As Brunei and Singapore have demonstrated, Eid in this corner of the world does more than mark the end of the holy month of Ramadhan. It celebrates the renewal of ties – between families, communities, and states. Beyond celebration, Eid is a home within cultural diplomacy, nowhere more visibly seen than in the ties between the two Southeast Asian nations.


Maryam is a first-year International Relations and Politics student at the University of Sheffield, with an academic focus on Southeast Asia—particularly Maritime Southeast Asia—and the Middle East. She aspires to a career in diplomacy and academia and is committed to fostering international dialogue and advancing scholarly engagement with global issues. Beyond her academic work, she pursues creative interests and voluntary initiatives that broaden her perspectives on public service.

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Malaysia 🇲🇾

Muted Voices, Fragile Balance

by Sydney Gan, in Kuala Lumpur

On 30 March, the National Unity Ministry announced that it is developing guidelines for Members of Parliament (MPs) to restrict discussion of sensitive issues relating to race, religion, and royalty (the ‘3Rs’) during Dewan Rakyat debates. Deputy Minister R. Yuneswaran acknowledged that parliamentarians are protected by immunity in the Dewan, but argued that further safeguards are needed to ensure discussions are conducted “responsibly” without provoking public discord. This apparent move to constrain parliamentary speech raises serious questions about constitutional accountability and the separation of powers, with potential implications for policymaking in Malaysia’s regulatory landscape.

What does it mean when policies are empowered to muzzle their own makers? At its core, this issue goes back to the principle of separation of powers: that the legislative (Parliament), executive (Cabinet), and judicial (courts) branches must remain distinct to prevent the concentration of authority. The Legislature’s role is to scrutinise and challenge the executive, reflecting the democratic will of the people. In Malaysia, however, this balance is already structurally compromised, as the Cabinet is drawn from Parliament itself. Any further limitation - particularly one that restricts MPs from raising or debating contentious issues - risks eroding Parliament’s most fundamental function as a check and balance on executive power.

This concern is closely tied to the rationale behind parliamentary immunity, which was enshrined at the founding of the system. This privilege is not granted on an individualistic level, but to ensure that elected representatives can articulate the interests, concerns, and dissent of their constituents without fear. Yet immunity has also been misused, as seen at least 43 instances recorded in Pusat Komas’s Malaysia Racism Report 2025, thus raising the question of how to balance protection with accountability.

In this context, it is apparent that broad restrictions on debates involving the 3Rs risk undermining the supposed duty of the elected representatives. At the same time, the issue cannot be viewed in isolation from the realities of parliamentary discourse. More than ever, there is a need to highlight the necessary implementation of appropriate safeguards - in the form of training, re-education, and consolidated public pressure in condemning hateful speech. Instead of a blanket ban, this debate also taps into the age-old balancing act between hate speech with the right to expression - the former is the unfortunate but inevitable byproduct of the latter and must be dealt with by systematic procedures in place that does not undermine the freedom of expression.

Presently, Malaysia is on the cusp of introducing the National Harmony Act, first proposed by the Human Rights Commission of Malaysia. The Act envisions the creation of a National Harmony Commission to act as a neutral third-party in managing racial and religious tensions. Its eventual design and implementation could significantly shape how sensitive issues are addressed both within and beyond Parliament, with far-reaching implications for the country’s democracy.


Sydney holds a Bachelor of Laws from King’s College London, where she focused on Human Rights Law, Criminology, and Public & Administrative Law. She is an Analyst at Asia Group Advisors, providing policy analysis and strategic guidance across the tech, sustainability, and gaming sectors in Southeast Asia. Prior to joining AGA, she worked in the social development sector in London, contributing to the Ukraine Judicial Training Programme through research on war crimes adjudication and the development of a legal training curriculum with high court magistrates.

Indonesia 🇮🇩

Mitigating Oil Price Shock to Indonesia’s State Coffers

by Muhammad Rayhansyah Jasin

A month since the US-Israeli joint attack against Iran has brought oil price, measured by the international benchmark of Brent crude, jumped more than 70% to $115. Many market participants have started to internalize the risk of a “higher-for-longer” oil shock that could see crude futures go as high as $200 per barrel. Tehran’s swift response to blockade the Strait of Hormuz by launching missiles against all unauthorized ships is effectively choking off a fifth of oil global supply, equivalent to 20 million barrels, stoking fuel-induced inflationary shocks all around Europe and Southeast Asia.

ASEAN governments have been absorbing the shocks differently, from letting gasoline prices go up such as in Cambodia, Laos, Singapore, and the Philippines, slashing budget subsidies for fuel expenses like in Malaysia and Thailand, or instead relying further to fiscal measurements in keeping stable rates as in Indonesia. To keep gasoline prices unchanged for the past month, the Indonesia government is predicted to add more than Rp 100 Trillions (~$60 Billions) of subsidies if global oil price continues to hover above $80 per barrel, risking increased budget deficits to state coffers. The 2026 State Budget states that for every $1 increase in average global oil price, state income will rise around Rp 3.5 Trillions (~$200 Million) yet it will also incur Rp 10.3 Trillions (~$650 Million) additional spending, thus widening existing deficits. Investor’s trust towards the government’s fiscal handling is also being tested as the national bond market yield is nearing 7%.

In a bid to mitigate further oil surge by reducing overall demand, the government passed a national mandate to allow workers to a one-day work-from-home (WFH) scheme every week starting from April 1. The Minister of Finance, Purbaya Yudhi Sadewa, reasoned that similar policies had been implemented before and not only that WFH could reduce 20% of potential demand, this policy would also help workers reduce commuting cost and direct dispensable income for other needs. Another demand-side restriction of maximum purchase volume of 50 litres/day for every personal vehicle unit is also put in place. Business actors have voiced concerns that such demand-side policies could slow economic activities especially for the transportation sector, notably ride-hailing services and mobility-linked industries, while also reducing potential revenue of Micro, Small and Medium (MSE) enterprises such as food stalls and catering vendors as they rely heavily on high foot traffic surrounding office areas.

Oil shocks can serve as blessing-in-disguise particularly for the electric vehicle (EV) market as it gives reliable alternatives of transportation. Yet, as the Indonesian automotive industry recorded lower sales in 2025 compared to 2024 figures, prolonged oil surge could entice customers to wait out purchasing new cars and damage demand further. Recently, President Prabowo Subianto has touted his grand idea to fasten the EV transition to better insulate consumers from future oil shocks as his administration is preparing to launch up to 55 megawatts of new electricity plants. Yet as this process would take at least years to materialize, perhaps a more immediate solution is for the government to enlarge oil storage capacity so that short-term shortages can be mitigated more than just 20-25 days. Ultimately, this Iranian War-induced oil shock provides yet another lesson for governments everywhere to ground national policies on informed, multiple-scenario-based guesses, instead of looking for easy wayouts based on political hunches and hollow rhetorics.


Rayhan is pursuing an Erasmus Mundus Joint Master’s Degree in Public Policy at Central European University and the Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals. He holds a Bachelor of Social Sciences in International Relations and Political Economy from Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University. His current research focuses on the socio-economic impacts of Indonesia’s nickel mining industry on local communities and national development.

Editorial Deadline 28/03/2025 11:59 PM (UTC +8)