by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk

Everything set in motion — a policy, a permit, a signature, a price shock — eventually arrives somewhere downstream, whether or not anyone's ready to answer for it. This took place quite literally in Laos, where unauthorized iron ore mining forced regulators to suspend operations on the Nam Song River in Vang Vieng. This is the second pollution case in six weeks, and a reminder that most mining permits get approved exactly where monitoring resources are thinnest. Meanwhile, in Myanmar, five years of violence, blocked envoys, and stalled dialogue have flowed directly from the 2021 Five-Point Consensus that junta leader Min Aung Hlaing signed and then broke — and now, with Myanmar barred from ASEAN summits, he's calling the arrival of that bill "discrimination." In Cambodia, a USD 250 million ADB emergency loan aims to shield over a million low-income households from a fuel-price shock tied to the Middle East conflict, even as the borrowing adds to debt Phnom Penh will carry into its 2029 graduation from Least Developed Country status. Finally, in Thailand, the baht is squeezed between a current account deficit widened by that same energy price spike and investors borrowing cheap baht to chase higher yields elsewhere.

Lao PDR 🇱🇦

Mining, Monitoring, and the Rivers Laos Depends On

by Souriya Bounpaseuth, in Vientiane

Six weeks after the Xe Don River made headlines, Laos is facing a second pollution case, this time in a town whose economy depends on its river. On July 24, the Ministry of Industry and Commerce ordered Daochalearn Mineral Processing to suspend iron ore operations after inspections linked the company to pollution in the Nam Song River in Vang Vieng. The company had been mining without official authorisation, a violation of Laos’s Mineral Law.

Vang Vieng’s tourism economy runs on the Nam Song. Roughly 1,500 local households belong to a cooperative built around river-based tourism, including tubing and kayaking, part of the eco-adventure model the town rebuilt itself around after 2012. At its peak the town drew well over 150,000 visitors a year. Unauthorised discharge into that river threatens the income of a community that spent over a decade rebuilding its economy around the river being clean. The stakes are just as direct upstream. Fishing communities along the Xe Don lost a source of food and income when 460 kilograms of dead fish were reported in April, as detailed in earlier reporting on the Xe Don case. Environmental analysis of the region’s mining boom published by Mongabay warns that toxic runoff, particularly arsenic, poses a long-term threat because it bioaccumulates over time, with lasting impacts on fisheries and food security, harm that continues long after the news coverage ends.

A capacity problem, not a case by case failure. Laos’s Law on Minerals, first passed as Law No. 04/NA and revised in 2017 under National Assembly Resolution No. 603/NA, decentralises permitting. Provincial governors approve smaller concessions, while larger ones require central government approval. Of nearly 1,000 mining companies operating nationwide, 671 hold permits issued by provincial authorities, compared with 297 issued centrally, according to figures cited in New Security Beat’s reporting on rare earth mining in Laos. Most approvals happen where monitoring resources are thinnest. A 2026 comparative legal study of Laos’s environmental impact assessment system, which has been in place since the 1999 Environmental Protection Law, found that inadequate enforcement, minimal public participation, and restricted institutional capacity diminish the effectiveness of its EIA system. This points to a structural gap rather than an isolated failure.

What would change the pattern? Independent environmental analysis of the sector points to specific, adoptable standards. These include secondary containment, geomembrane liners, leak detection systems, secure toxic waste storage, and regular monitoring, along with zero-discharge policies and cleaner extraction methods such as bioleaching. These are measurable conditions that any level of government could write into permits and enforce. Just as important is closing the gap between when harm occurs and when affected communities are heard. In both the Xe Don and Vang Vieng cases, it was local reporting from fishers, residents, and tour operators that surfaced the problem before formal inspection did. Empowering and strengthening that role under the system with better accessible and inclusive grievance channels and community-level water testing would help catch problems early and give affected households a stake in the outcome.

With recovery in progress, authorities have ordered Daochalearn to restore affected land and waterways and to work with local officials in Vang Vieng and Longcheang on rehabilitation, with further legal action and penalties possible under instructions from the Prime Minister’s Office if the company continues operating without authorisation. This mirrors the response to the Xe Don case, where water quality returned within national standards at 11 sites by early May under Decree No. 389/PM on EIA. Publishing verified water-testing.

Myanmar 🇲🇲

Myanmar’s Failed President Criticizes ASEAN

by Ley Hlaing

Myanmar’s newly elected president and former junta leader Min Aung Hlaing recently criticized ASEAN’s ongoing approach toward his administration. Analysts could view this sharp remark as a reaction to his government’s continuing diplomatic isolation and severe domestic challenges across multiple sectors.

On the last day of his disappointing 100-Day Plan, the junta president made a speech at the parliament in Nay Pyi Taw, including serious criticism of ASEAN’s decision on Myanmar. He remarked that ASEAN is discriminating against Myanmar, mentioning the Five Point Consensus of ASEAN as being not a “collective” decision on Myanmar’s situation but rather just a statement issued when the ASEAN Chair was held by Brunei. However, Min Aung Hlaing omitted the part where he showed up himself at the meeting on April 24, 2021 and signed the Consensus consisting of these points: 1) immediate cessation of violence in Myanmar, 2) launching constructive dialogue, 3) appointing ASEAN Special Envoy, 4) giving humanitarian assistance, 5) sending delegation to visit.

Looking back at the consensus points, the military government has not only failed to implement the agreement they signed, but also repeatedly violated them. The first point encouraged to uphold the immediate halt of all violence in Myanmar since the three months after the coup. But after ousting the civilian government over five years, the violence in Myanmar has been unprecedented and perpetuated by the state such as bombing the schools, religious buildings, IDP camps and killing thousands of innocent civilians and other escalating situations including political repression, media crackdowns, surveillance, overnight household inspections, forced military recruitment, and restrictions on movement. The second point also did not align with the transformed administration, as dialogue has been rathe selective and peace talks are mainly brokered by China without inclusivity. The junta also failed to respect the last three points, continuing its operations and refusing to let ASEAN special envoys meet with detained political figures like Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. Despite the initial agreements, the situation has evolved to the point that ASEAN currently bars Myanmar’s high-level political leaders from attending subsequent summits, inviting only “non-political” representatives instead.

Immediately after he came back from the summit in Indonesia, military controlled media have subsequently restated that the agreement was made without his consent and they will only consider implementing the provisions after ensuring stability within the country and when the country’s domestic priorities are aligned with them. The consideration has taken for the junta half a decade of period to stabilize their oppressive rule before implementing the provisions.

In mid July, Myanmar’s nominally elected legislature, the Pyidaungsu Hlutta, echoed the same by claiming ASEAN “undermines Myanmar’s equal status within the organization, interferes in the country’s internal affairs, and no longer corresponds to current political realities.” Furthermore, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has issued a statement that upholds this very same view on July 23, 2026. On the day of address in front of 900 representatives and officials, the junta president affirmed their voices as the reaction of their failed administration and 100-Day plan. Analysts note that although Thailand is advocating Myanmar’s representation re-entry back in ASEAN, the Five-Point Consensus remains the bloc’s primary framework for addressing Myanmar’s political crisis. However, there are voices claiming that the Consensus is not strong enough to ensure the accountability of the Myanmar military.

Myanmar’s relationship with ASEAN has come full circle, with the junta facing isolation similar to the challenges preceding its 1997 entry. Despite the regime’s rejection of the Five-Point Consensus and claims of discrimination, ASEAN maintains that re-entry depends on halting violence and honoring the 2021 agreement.

Ley Hlaing is a former Political Science student from the University of Yangon, Myanmar. Currently, he is pursuing his BA at Parami University with a major in Philosophy, Politics and Economics. His academic and professional interests span community development, literature, minority issues, and social impact research. Having held roles as Research Assistant, Student Mentor, and Facilitator for local initiatives, he has constantly supported project management in literature and education programs in Myanmar.

Support Us

Cambodia 🇰🇭

ADB Approves Emergency Loan for Cambodia as Middle East Conflict Drives Fuel Costs

by Sokna Thea, in Phnom Penh

The Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Cambodian government signed a $250 million emergency loan on Friday to cushion the kingdom’s economy against surging global fuel and food prices driven by the Middle East conflict. The financing backs Cambodia’s new Rapid Intervention for Stabilization of the Economy (RISE) Program which is the first initiative executed under the ADB’s revised emergency support policy. Cambodian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economy and Finance Aun Pornmoniroth and ADB Country Director Yasmin Siddiqi formally executed the agreement in Phnom Penh. ADB stated in an official press release that the loan will fund temporary, targeted fiscal measures to protect planned social spending in the 2026 national budget.

Under the RISE initiative, the emergency package targets direct assistance to more than 1 million low-income households registered under the government’s IDPoor system, including at least 350,000 families headed by women. Assistance spans direct cash transfers, temporary debt relief, and subsidies for rural agricultural inputs to help families cope with rising living costs. Beyond immediate relief, the program promotes cleaner energy by offering financial incentives for electric vehicles and green technologies to small transport operators, helping reduce future reliance on imported fuel.

The USD 250 million ADB commitment anchors a broader co-financing coalition, with up to USD 250 million from the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and USD 188 million from the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) remaining under proposal. If fully finalized, total resources for the RISE program would reach USD 688 million. ADB officials noted that the package forms part of a broader USD 450 million regional emergency response across Asia-Pacific, which also includes USD 200 million in policy-based lending to assist Sri Lanka.

Independent analysts and multilateral lenders warn that the fuel-price shock threatens to reverse recent poverty reduction gains. In its latest economic update, the World Bank cautioned that a 60% jump in oil prices could push up to 1.1 million Cambodians below the poverty line as transportation and production costs ripple through the economy. Because Cambodia imports 100% of its refined fuel, domestic pump prices have climbed roughly 30% for gasoline, 87% for diesel, and 70% for LPG since March. Although the government cut fuel import duties to blunt the impact, ADB officials say those steps will only partially offset global price spikes.

Economists caution that while concessional borrowing grants vital fiscal breathing room, it increases Cambodia’s external debt load as Phnom Penh prepares to graduate from Least Developed Country (LDC) status by 2029. LDC graduation will eventually phase out many special trade privileges and highly concessional borrowing terms, tightening future financing conditions. To minimize short-term debt strain, the loan carries a 30-year maturity with a low interest rate of approximately 0.75%, giving the government space to keep vulnerable households afloat while maintaining essential public services.

Sokna has a background in International Affairs and Business & Commercial Law. He’s currently a Senior Project Coordinator at the Ministry of Economy and Finance of Cambodia, working on the Financial Management Information System (FMIS) Project. His professional focus is driven by entrepreneurship, business development, and financial technology, with a particular interest in how private-sector innovation drives Cambodia’s economic growth.

Thailand 🇹🇭

The Baht Under Pressure

by Satid Sootipunya, in Bangkok

The baht is facing pressure from a widening current account deficit and carry trades as investors shift funds to higher-yielding markets, despite an overall strengthening trend.

Thailand’s current account deficit reached USD 17.7 billion in the three months ended June, after a USD 1.4 billion surplus in the first three months of 2026, Bank of Thailand spokesperson Chayawadee Chai-anant said at a press briefing last week.

The quarterly deficit was driven by rising imports of crude oil due to higher energy prices, imports for the electronics sector following the data center investment boom, and surging gold imports, along with a wider deficit in net services, income and transfers due to dividend payments, she added.

The current account deficit is one of the factors weakening the baht as demand for foreign currencies has outpaced demand for the domestic currency. Over the past six months through July 24, the baht has weakened about 8.5%, according to Bloomberg’s Thai baht index.

Besides volatile oil prices, another factor suppressing the baht is the potential for carry trades involving the baht against currencies from other economies, Wachirawat Banchuen, Senior Financial Markets Strategist at Siam Commercial Bank (SCB), said during an interview with local media outlet The Standard Wealth.

The Bank of Thailand (BOT) held its key monetary policy rate at 1% at its latest board meeting, leaving Thailand’s interest rate among the lowest in the world. This encourages investors to borrow baht at low interest rates and invest in higher-yielding markets, such as Latin American and other emerging Asian economies, Wachirawat said.

He added that although Thailand has seen 4 billion baht of capital inflows into the Thai stock market in July, around 2 billion baht has flowed out of the bond market, especially short-term bonds held by foreign investors. This reflects currency speculation during periods of baht weakness.

However, when measuring the baht against its 15 main trading partners via the Nominal Effective Exchange Rate, the baht is projected to appreciate by 1.3%, reaching an index level of 120.8, up from 119.0 last year.

Specifically, the baht is expected to gain against the Japanese yen, Indonesian rupiah, Vietnamese dong, South Korean won, and U.S. dollar, while softening against the Hong Kong dollar, New Taiwan dollar, pound sterling, Singapore dollar, and euro.


Satid is a multimedia economic journalist and news anchor who covers macroeconomic trends, Thailand’s fiscal policy, and key regional developments for Bangkok Biz. A Journalism graduate from Thammasat University, he has reported on major issues such as the US–China trade tensions, the Myanmar crisis, and global corporate stories, drawing on prior newsroom experience at The Momentum, the Bangkok Post, AFP, and Varasarn Press. His work blends economic analysis, foreign affairs, and digital storytelling, with a strong focus on making complex financial and political topics accessible to Thai audiences.

Editorial Deadline 01/08/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Karen Ysabelle R. David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk

Another week, another development in the world of AI. The global data center boom has reached Vietnam, but with a twist: Hanoi hopes its digital infrastructure surge can be powered by green energy, in defiance of the energy-intensive pattern found in the region’s other data center hubs. Can the country’s high-tech high hopes become a success story for Southeast Asia?

In Singapore, a different sort of regional pattern rears its head. As more and more Southeast Asians retreat from marriage, a declining marriage rate couples with a rise in the rate of divorces by mutual agreement in the city-state.

Over in the Philippines, a proposed anti-false information bill just hurdled third and final reading at the House of Representatives. But what sounds good on paper merits taking a closer look: who is this bill actually meant to target?

Vietnam 🇻🇳

Vietnam's Data Center Boom Goes Green

by Hang Nguyen, in Ho Chi Minh City

Vietnam is in the middle of a digital infrastructure surge, and the story unfolding behind the scenes is as much about power and sustainability as it is about servers and cloud contracts.

For years, Vietnam trailed regional data center hubs like Singapore and Malaysia. That is changing fast. Rising cloud adoption, a young and highly connected population, and surging demand for AI computing have turned the country into one of Southeast Asia’s most closely watched digital infrastructure markets. Domestic telecom giants — such as Viettel, VNPT, and FPT — are racing to expand capacity, while international players, including Microsoft and G42, are exploring large-scale projects, with several developments targeted for Ho Chi Minh City through 2027.

New regulation is accelerating the shift. A government initiative issued in late 2025 moved Vietnam’s digital infrastructure strategy from a state-led model toward one driven by private investment, removing caps on foreign ownership for data center service providers. Meanwhile, a personal data protection law taking effect in 2026 requires certain categories of Vietnamese user data to be stored domestically, a rule likely to push more international companies to build or lease local capacity rather than route data through neighboring countries.

All of this growth collides with an old problem: data centers are enormous consumers of electricity, and Vietnam’s grid still relies heavily on coal and hydropower. That tension is precisely what is pushing the “green data center” concept from a marketing term into a genuine engineering priority.

A green data center aims to minimize environmental impact through efficient cooling, renewable power sourcing, smarter workload management, and infrastructure designed to reduce waste heat and water use. Vietnam’s revised national power development plan lays out a path toward carbon neutrality by 2050, targeting renewables making up roughly a third of the energy mix by 2030 and a much larger share by mid-century. New policy frameworks are also beginning to allow direct power-purchase arrangements, letting renewable energy generators sell electricity straight to large users like data center operators rather than only through the state grid.

Viettel’s new high-tech data center complex in Ho Chi Minh City, which broke ground in 2025, illustrates the direction the industry is heading. Positioned as the country’s first hyperscale facility, it has been designed with energy efficiency features intended to support heavy AI workloads without a proportional spike in emissions. Industry analysts expect Vietnam’s green data center market to keep growing at a rapid pace over the next several years, driven by tightening environmental regulation, corporate sustainability commitments, and the sheer cost savings that efficient facilities offer over time.

Challenges remain substantial. Grid capacity in key industrial areas is under strain, land approvals can be slow, and the renewable energy supply needed to make “green” claims credible is still being built out. But the direction is unmistakable: Vietnam is trying to become a regional data center hub without repeating the energy-intensive patterns seen elsewhere. Whether it can scale hyperscale-level computing power while genuinely decarbonizing its grid may become one of the defining infrastructure stories in Southeast Asia over the next decade.


Hang is a young researcher with academic experience in Vietnam and the United States. She has previously worked in public relations at the U.S. Consulate General in Ho Chi Minh City and the YSEALI Academy. Her research focuses on ASEAN centrality in the evolving Asia-Pacific landscape, with particular attention to Vietnam’s approach to trade, regional cooperation, and political economy in the face of external power dynamics and global volatility.

Support Us

Singapore 🇸🇬

Singapore's Marriage Slump Meets a Quieter Kind of Divorce

by Ryan

Singapore recorded 24,688 marriages in 2025, a 6.2% drop from the previous year and the lowest tally since 2016 outside of the pandemic disruption, according to the Department of Statistics’ latest report on marriages and divorces. It is the third consecutive annual decline since weddings peaked at 29,389 in 2022, when couples who had postponed ceremonies during COVID-19 finally caught up. Divorces and annulments also fell slightly, to 7,242, but the more revealing shift is in how couples are ending marriages rather than how many are doing so. Divorce by mutual agreement, introduced as an additional ground for civil divorce in July 2024, accounted for 21.5% of husband-filed and 17.3% of wife-filed cases in 2025, even as “unreasonable behavior” remained the single most cited reason overall.

That shift echoes a sentiment increasingly heard in Singaporean households and reflected in recent Straits Times reporting on couples who describe their split not as a failure, but as a managed, amicable transition. The mutual agreement provision was designed precisely for this cohort. Before the reform, couples without evidence of fault had to either accuse one another of unreasonable behavior, an often adversarial process that family lawyers and the Association of Women for Action and Research had long criticized, or wait out a three-to-four-year separation period. The new pathway lets couples cite shared responsibility, such as differing parenting philosophies, without assigning blame, shortening a process that previously extended emotional and financial strain over years.

Behind the legal change sits a demographic one. Couples are marrying later, at a median age of 31.1 for grooms and 29.6 for brides, and divorcing later too, with median marriage duration at dissolution rising to 11.5 years from 10.0 in 2015. Older, longer-married couples are more likely to have children, shared property, and overlapping social circles, all of which raise the practical cost of an adversarial split and the incentive to manage it civilly. Singapore’s own family ministry has noted that couples married five to nine years remain the single largest group filing for divorce, a stage when children are often young enough that co-parenting considerations dominate. Rising female workforce participation and financial independence have also reduced the economic entanglement that once made fault-based blame the only route to a fair settlement, while broader destigmatization of divorce, visible in more open public discussion of amicable splits, has made couples less anxious about how the process reflects on them.

The demographic backdrop makes the reform more consequential than a procedural tweak. General marriage rates have fallen across nearly every age bracket for men and among those under 35 for women. Singapore’s approach, treating the legal exit from marriage as something that can be humane rather than punitive, is as much social policy as family law.

The pattern is not confined to the city-state. Malaysia recorded roughly 190,000 marriages in 2024, still below its pre-pandemic norm, while Thailand posts one of the region’s higher divorce rates alongside a well-documented decline in weddings among its youth. The OECD’s recent Asia-Pacific social indicators report frames these shifts within a broader regional retreat from marriage tied to rising education, urbanization, and delayed family formation. What distinguishes Singapore is its willingness to legislate for graceful exits rather than treat divorce reform as an afterthought.


Ryan is a final-year finance student at the Singapore University of Social Sciences (SUSS) with experience across venture capital, venture debt, and business development. He also holds a diploma in Law and Management from Temasek Polytechnic. His interests lie in how emerging technologies and economic trends shape business ecosystems and regional development in Asia.

The Philippines 🇵🇭

Fighting Disinformation or Regulating Speech?

by Arianne De Guzman, in Bulacan

On 22 July 2026, the House of Representatives (HoR) approved on third and final reading House Bill No. 9465, also known as the proposed Digital Media Anti-False Information Act, led by House Speaker Faustino “Bojie” G. Dy III.

The measure has a counterpart bill in the Senate, which, as of 25 July 2026, remains pending at the committee level. It is also listed as a priority measure under the Legislative-Executive Development Advisory Council (LEDAC) agenda, and was filed in response to the perils of deliberate disinformation campaigns that are aimed at eroding public trust and weakening democratic institutions.

The measure would mandate the regulation of social media platforms by requiring them to undergo annual independent audits, publicly disclose political advertisements, and work collaboratively with education agencies to institutionalize media literacy. However, there are concerns over how the proposed legislation could threaten freedom of expression and could be weaponized to silence journalists, government critics, and Filipino citizens.

In a joint statement, 55 media organizations and several independent journalists described the bill as a “wrong response to a real problem,” arguing that it places greater emphasis on regulating individual expression and expanding government authority over free speech than on addressing the political economy of influence operations and technological systems that create, amplify, and profit from coordinated information manipulation. Sigla Research Center, a think tank that studies disinformation, echoed these concerns, noting that the measure only targets low-level disinformation-for-hire workers while going easy on those who orchestrate disinformation campaigns, such as financiers, troll farms, political consultancies, and coordinated influence networks.

Sigla also warned that it would give the Philippine executive branch broad powers to order content takedowns and issue accreditations without sufficient court oversight through the Digital Media Integrity Council (DMIC), a body composed largely of government agencies and operating with limited judicial oversight, which could affect legitimate political speech and create a chilling effect on journalism and public discourse.

The 55 media organizations also noted that there are already existing laws in place to address such “harmful acts” associated with deception, particularly remedies for libel, fraud, election offenses, and cybercrime-related offenses. They urged Congress to examine whether these existing laws are effectively implemented.

Taken together, the criticism reveals that the central weakness of the Digital Media Anti-False Information Act lies not in its recognition of disinformation as a public concern, but in who is the target of regulation. Overall, this legislative initiative reflects a content-centered approach that may be easier to enforce but less effective in dismantling the underlying infrastructure of organized disinformation.


Arianne has experience in policy research at De La Salle University’s Jesse M. Robredo Institute of Governance, where she contributed to projects on systemic reform. She earned a degree in Political Science from Colegio de San Juan de Letran. Currently, she works in government relations, specializing in advocacy strategy, legislative monitoring, and stakeholder engagement. Beyond her professional work, she is actively involved in youth development and grassroots initiatives through the Rotaract Club of Santa Maria.

Editorial Deadline 28/07/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Siu Tzyy Wei, Lead Editor - Maritime Crescent Desk

Three stories, moving in different directions and calculations.

In Brunei, a new door opened quietly: formal diplomatic ties with Bhutan, another small kingdom adding a name to its map of friends and allies. In Indonesia, Prabowo swore in the leaders of a new state university, while calling his critics traitors in a colonial-era phrase. In Malaysia, a single deportation case spoke volumes on where the country still stands.

Together, they are all deciding what to open, what to guard and what to protect.

Indonesia 🇮🇩

Loyalty, By Degree

by Rayhan Prabu Kusumo, in Jakarta

Within two days, President Prabowo Subianto made two moves that seemed unrelated. On July 22, he swore in the leaders of a new state university built to groom the country’s future officials. The following evening, on the anniversary of a political party, he told the room that some Indonesians serve foreign masters the way collaborators once served the Dutch, now dressed as reporters, analysts, and NGO workers. Two moments, one project.

The thread between them was a phrase: londo ireng, black Dutchman. In colonial times, it named the native who took the colonizer’s side against his own people, and carrying the full weight of the word traitor. Aimed at journalists and civil-society groups, it recasts criticism as disloyalty and the critic as a foreign asset, a charge Prabowo pressed by asking “who pays for their electricity.” Coming from the highest office, the phrase signals to officials and supporters that surveillance and prosecution of these people are now fair game.

The university is the quieter half of the story. Universitas Republik Indonesia is modelled on France’s old École nationale d’administration, the school that trained the French governing class for decades. It exists to form future civil servants and state-company chiefs, shaping their skills, character and way of thinking. The irony seems lost on its planners: France abandoned that model in 2021 precisely because it produced a narrow, uniform elite, and replaced it with the Institut national du service public, a model that is built to widen the sociopolitical pipeline.

Set side by side, the two moves point the same way: both treat independent thought as a problem to manage. The people Prabowo named have spent his term documenting what this column has tracked - unsustainable expensive programs, a weakening economy, and the creeping militarization. Campuses have been the engine of nearly every protest against the leader, despite being silenced before. The New Order reordered university life to kill student politics, and it held for a generation. The instinct to still the places where dissent forms is not new here. It is being exercised again, more gently, but in broad daylight.

There is a fair case on the other side. Leaders everywhere complain about the press, legitimacy of foreign funding towards advocacy, and whether Indonesia can reasonably want a competent school for its officials. None of that is authoritarian by itself. The danger is in the combination and the source. When the head of state calls critics traitors, and the next elite is trained in an institution built to form loyalty, the room for dissent narrows, regardless of the intent.

By the president’s own definition, the reporter who filed this week’s uncomfortable story is a londo ireng. But so is the economist, the NGO clerk, and whoever wrote this. When the word for critique and traitor collapses into one, a government has long stopped answering its critics and instead, started counting them.


Rayhan has a background in government affairs and public policy, with experience across government institutions and advisory firms. His work focuses on the intersection of geopolitics, policy, and risk, with expertise in advocacy, regulatory analysis, and stakeholder engagement. He holds a degree in Government from Universitas Padjadjaran, and has completed an exchange at Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Spain, focusing on global politics and sustainability.

Support Us

Malaysia 🇲🇾

Standing Strong

by Muhammad Aiman Bin Roszaimi, in Cyberjaya

Malaysia’s recent decision to deport any Israeli citizen found within its borders has once again placed the country at the centre of international attention. After the deportation of a US-Israeli citizen, the US. State Department summoned the Malaysian ambassador for an explanation of its policy.

While the episode appears to be a diplomatic surprise, it has been Malaysia’s long standing foreign policy. Therefore, understanding why Malaysia maintains this position requires examining its historical, diplomatic and domestic foundations.

Malaysia has never established diplomatic relations with Israel since gaining independence. Successive governments have consistently refused to recognise Israel until a just resolution to the Palestinian issue is achieved - a position consistent across four different administrations.

The immediate trigger for the latest controversy was an investigation into the Network School community in Johor, where allegations emerged that Israelis were participating using foreign passports, albeit with valid travel documents. As authorities required the individual to leave the country, Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim declared that any Israeli citizen identified in Malaysia would likewise be deported.

From Kuala Lumpur’s perspective, this is fundamentally an immigration and sovereignty issue. Foreign Minister Mohamad Hasan emphasised that Malaysia immigration policy does not recognise Israel and therefore does not permit Israeli nationals to remain in the country. The government has reiterated that this is not a newly introduced measure but a longwithstanding policy.

Beyond legal and diplomatic considerations, Malaysia’s position is also shaped by its foreign policy identity. The Palestinian cause has become one of the country’s most enduring international commitments, seen across its voting behaviour at the United Nations, humanitarian assistance, and diplomatic statements. For Malaysia and its leaders, support for Palestine is presented as a matter of international law, anti-colonial solidarity and the protection of civilian populations.

Domestic politics further reinforce this stance. Public sympathy for Palestine remains exceptionally strong across Malaysia’s multiethnic society, making any significant shift towards recognising Israel politically difficult. Rather than representing a partisan position, support for Palestine has evolved into a bipartisan consensus that transcends changes in government, giving policymakers considerable domestic legitimacy on international grounds.

However, United States’ criticism has prompted Congress members to call for a review of US-Malaysia bilateral security cooperation and military training programmes, illustrating how regional policies on Israel can increasingly affect broader strategic relationships, particularly as geopolitical competition intensifies. But for Kuala Lumpur, the decision to bar Israeli citizens is about more than immigration enforcement.

Whether this stance will become increasingly costly amid changing geopolitical dynamics remains uncertain. However, Malaysia appears prepared to absorb those diplomatic costs rather than alter one of the most consistent pillars of its foreign policy.


Aiman is a PhD candidate in Security and Strategic Analysis at the National University of Malaysia. His research focuses on Malaysia’s space policy, ASEAN regional security, and the strategic implications of emerging technologies. His work explores how Malaysia’s defense policy and strategic culture shape its approach to outer space.

Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳

Establishment of Brunei-Bhutan Diplomatic Relations

by Wira Gregory Ejau, in Bandar Seri Begawan

On July 13, the governments of Brunei Darussalam and the Kingdom of Bhutan signed a Joint Communiqué establishing formal diplomatic relations through their respective Permanent Representatives to the United Nations in New York.

Bhutan is one of the most diplomatically selective sovereign states in the world. With the establishment of relations with Brunei, it now maintains formal ties with 61 countries and the European Union, which is roughly 30% of UN member states. More notably, it has no diplomatic relations with the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, or China, which are permanent members of the UN Security Council. These constraints are rooted in Bhutan’s longstanding commitment to preserving sovereignty and avoiding entanglement in great-power competition. Within this framework, the decision to formalise relations with a given state carries weight that it would not in a more expansive diplomatic network.

The communiqué itself offers a shared foundation of deep respect for the institution of the Monarchy. Diplomatic instruments rarely invoke constitutional arrangements as common values, and both Brunei and Bhutan are absolute monarchies with governing frameworks centred on royal authority. Whether this constitutes a genuine normative alignment or diplomatic courtesy is a distinction that is worth observing in the long run.

The symmetries between the two states are especially that of size, such as navigating the pressures of substantially larger neighbours, especially as Bhutan attempts to navigate between India and an unresolved border dispute with China with which it has no formal relations. Both have pursued cautious, selective foreign policies that prioritise sovereignty preservation over the accumulation of partnerships, and have, in different ways, used multilateral forums such as ASEAN for Brunei, SAARC and BIMSTEC for Bhutan as the primary architecture of their international engagement rather than bilateral treaty networks.

Bhutan has been accelerating its Southeast Asian diplomatic engagement in recent years, driven in part by the Gelephu Mindfulness City project. It is an ambitious special economic zone designed to attract investment and reposition Bhutan’s economic geography toward Southeast Asia. Singapore has been the most visible partner in this process; formalising relations with Brunei extends that Southeast Asian thread further, and opens a direct diplomatic channel between an ASEAN member and a SAARC and BIMSTEC state that has, until now, engaged Southeast Asia primarily through third-party capitals.


Gregory is an MSc candidate in Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He works as a freelance writer specializing in international history, conflict, and counterterrorism, with experience in academia, investigative journalism, and voluntary uniformed service. He currently provides research assistance with the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) under their Southeast Asian Security and Defence Internship Programme and conducts investigations on regional security and transnational crime for a confidential company.

Editorial Deadline 27/07/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk

This week in the Mekong Belt, stories share a quieter question underneath the headlines: what gets left out when governments announce a win. In Laos, the Luang Prabang Mekong dam has passed 72% completion, but officials still haven't disclosed the UNESCO heritage impact assessment they agreed to conduct, even as 7,000 people are resettled and sediment flows are altered downstream. In Cambodia, a new 10% US tariff over unresolved forced-labor enforcement is being framed by officials as a negotiating win because it undercut competitors' rates, a reading that says little about whether the underlying labor practices have actually changed. Meanwhile, in Thailand, Bangkok's "calibrated re-engagement" with Myanmar's junta is being sold as pragmatic regional leadership, but it leaves an unmanaged displacement crisis at the Thai border largely unaddressed. And in Myanmar, while the regime talks of peace processes and stability, a new report documents 148 political prisoners who died from medical neglect since the 2021 coup, a toll that rarely factors into the official narrative at all.

Lao PDR 🇱🇦

Progress on the Dam, Silence on the Heritage Risk

by Thongsavanh Souvannasane, in Vientiane

Workers have pushed the USD 5 billion Luang Prabang Mekong Hydropower Project past 72% completion, Lao and Thai officials announced after a joint site visit on 18 July.

The milestone raises a question officials have yet to answer: what happens to Luang Prabang’s UNESCO World Heritage status once the dam starts turning its turbines?

Lao Minister of Industry and Commerce Malaithong Kommasith and Thai Minister of Energy Ekaniti Promphan inspected the site straddling Chomphet and Pak Ou districts, 25 kilometers from the historic town.

Officials insisted studies and lessons from the Xayabouly dam, Laos’ first Mekong mainstream dam, had resolved concerns over the project’s impact on the World Heritage site.

Thai companies hold the overwhelming stake: CK Power owns 50 %, Gulf Hydropower 20 %, and CH. Karnchang and TTW Public Company 10 % each, for 90 % Thai ownership. Laos’ PT Sole holds the remaining 10 %, leaving the host country a minority share in a dam it will absorb the resettlement and heritage risks for.

UNESCO tells a more cautious story.

It first raised concerns in March 2020, after Laos notified it of the project, and in March 2023 issued a report urging Laos to protect the town’s heritage sites and regulate nearby tourism development. UNESCO also triggered a Heritage Impact Assessment that Laos agreed to undertake, one whose outcome authorities have not disclosed, leaving the question of whether officials are declaring victory prematurely.

As a run-of-river project, the dam keeps water flowing constantly, but it will also trap sediment that has long nourished riverbank farming and fishing downstream, a cost rarely mentioned alongside turbines and megawatts.

Many villages across Chomphet, Hongsa, and Nga districts in Luang Prabang, Xayabouly, and Oudomxay provinces, home to roughly 7,000 people, are already being resettled for the dam, designed to produce 1,460 megawatts once complete in 2030.

Officials call the resettlement compliant with policy, though how communities assess that trade-off remains unexamined.

The dam fits a larger pattern.

Laos’ electricity capacity grew from 9.4 gigawatts in 2020 to 12.3 gigawatts in 2025, and is expected to nearly triple to 30 gigawatts by 2035, with hydropower still supplying roughly 80% of capacity, an expansion showing little sign of slowing.

The dam also rises as Luang Prabang’s tourism economy booms. Arrivals climbed roughly 52 % year-on-year in 2025, reaching 3.5 million, up from 2.3 million. Authorities credit the surge partly to the Laos-China Railway, which has cut travel time between Vientiane and Luang Prabang and opened a direct route for Chinese tourists from Laos’ northern border, turning an arduous road trip into hours.

That contradiction sits at the project’s heart: Laos markets Luang Prabang’s preserved townscape to record numbers of visitors while building a majority foreign-owned dam upstream that heritage authorities have not confirmed is safe for that townscape.

Whether hydropower earnings and heritage tourism can coexist may depend less on engineering than on how transparently Laos shares an assessment it has yet to make public.

Thongsavanh is a journalist from Laos with a background in English-language media. He graduated from the Lao-American Institute with a Diploma of the Arts in English and contributes to independent news platforms. His reporting focuses on environmental issues, socio-economic development, and geopolitics.

Cambodia 🇰🇭

US Imposes 10% Tariff on Cambodian Goods Over Forced Labor

by Malai Yatt, in Phnom Penh

Following a Section 301 trade investigation, the United States will hit Cambodian exports with a 10% tariff after determining Phnom Penh failed to effectively enforce forced labor import prohibitions.

On July 23, the United States Trade Representative (USTR) declared a new 10% duty on goods imported from Cambodia and 59 other nations, which some Asian nations also included. They include Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and Japan, for their failure to enact and uphold an import ban on forced labor.

USTR confirmed that “Certain products of Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, and more that would encourage these economies to fulfill commitments regarding forced labor import prohibitions or to encourage these economies to enact and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition”

Speaking in a recent interview, Cham Ninul, the Minister of Commerce in Cambodia, confirmed that by taking steps across three ministries to stop forced labor goods from entering the country, Cambodia successfully kept its tariff under 19 %.

“Cambodia is on the negotiating path for a quota system with the US as well, alongside a few other trading partners like Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Malaysia, for specifically sourcing raw materials for garments from the US and to be processed and reimported into the US quota-free and duty-free,” she said.

Based on the latest report by the General Department of Customs and Excise, Cambodia exported more than USD 7 billion worth of goods to the US in the first half of 2026, a 29.8% increase over the previous year.

According to USTR Ambassador Jamieson Greer, President Trump acknowledges that forced labor has persisted in international supply chains despite decades of moral persuasion. It’s long overdue for our trade partners to follow the United States’ strict enforcement of a nearly century-old ban on the importation of forced labor.

“Today’s action will begin to correct what is both a human rights abuse and a distortive trade practice to improve the welfare of workers everywhere. I am encouraged by the trading partners who have moved quickly to adopt forced labor import prohibitions, and look forward to ensuring their effective enforcement.”, he added.

Continuing to the deal, after receiving export tariff pressure, Sun Chanthul, Deputy Prime Minister and First Vice President of the Council for the Development, confirmed, “I would probably range close to the 9% because we want the USTR to have the rate in the same lending zone as our competitors in ASEAN and that is a commitment,” he said

In response to the new tariff evolution, Chanthul said the Cambodia first to zero out all tariffs for imports from the US to Cambodia, as part of a commitment that both countries have agreed on a certain commitment, for instance, on environmental law.

To sum up, despite new 10 % US forced-labor duties, Cambodia aims to protect its growing export trade through strategic quota negotiations.

Malai is a reporter at Kiripost, where she has worked for more than three years, driven by a strong commitment to amplifying the voices of underserved communities. Her reporting focuses on economic and foreign affairs.

Support Us

Thailand 🇹🇭

Decoding Bangkok’s “Calibrated Re-Engagement” with Myanmar

by Paranut Juntree, in Bangkok

Two weeks after Bangkok hosted historic informal consultations, the full diplomatic implications of ASEAN’s “calibrated re-engagement” are coming into focus. Far from a routine press briefing, the high-level meeting co-led by Thai Foreign Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow and Philippine Foreign Secretary Ma. Theresa Lazaro represents a deliberate assertion of the Thai foreign policy agency on ASEAN’s Myanmar issue. For Thailand, managing relations with Myanmar is not an abstract normative exercise, like for many other ASEAN member states, but an urgent frontline security and economic imperative. By steering ASEAN toward a conditional, “two-way street” re-engagement tied to the Five-Point Consensus, Thailand is transforming its geographic vulnerability into proactive leadership, placing its strategic interests at the center of ASEAN’s diplomatic playbook.

Following Myanmar’s February 2021 military coup, ASEAN adopted a policy of institutional distancing, barring non-political junta representatives from high-level summits. Yet Thailand, sharing a 2,400-kilometer border, faced immediate security and economic fallout that rendered complete isolation impossible. While distant member states could afford a principled stance, Thailand wrestled with cross-border shelling, trade stalls, environmental haze, cross-border pollution and rampant scam syndicates operating along the porous frontier. Subsequently, Thailand’s approach evolved through distinct phases: (1) quiet bilateral engagement, hosting informal Track-1.5 (shuffling between diplomatic governmental officials and non-governmental stakeholders), (2) launching a Thai-led humanitarian corridor near Tak-Myawaddy. By 2026, Thailand recognized that maintaining a diplomatic freeze only prolonged deadlock, necessitating an active bridge-building role between Myanmar and ASEAN.

The July 2026 informal gathering in Bangkok, marking the first in-person engagement between ASEAN foreign ministers and Myanmar’s military-appointed foreign minister since the coup, formalized this strategic transition. By pairing Thailand’s frontline necessity with the Philippines’s institutional authority as ASEAN Chair, the initiative seeks to break a five-year stalemate to combat scam networks and revive border trade. However, broader geopolitical realities loom large. Given Myanmar’s deep structural ties with China, a genuine democratic transition remains highly improbable. Beijing views Myanmar as an irreplaceable strategic gateway to the Indian Ocean via the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, preferring a “manageable” government in Napyidaw to safeguard its maritime ambitions and interests. Recognizing this backing, Thailand’s re-engagement acknowledges that isolation cannot force regime change in Myanmar.

Yet, the most critical flaw in “calibrated re-engagement” remains the disconnect between top-down statecraft and ground-level humanitarian realities. As Thailand navigates great-power dynamics, an unmanaged human displacement crisis deepens. Since Naypydaw activated its forced conscription law in 2024, thousands of draft-evaders, youth, and conflict affected civilians, combined with many others since the coup, have crossed into the Thai border. Thailand remains non-signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention, leaving these populations legally precarious and vulnerable to exploitation. If Thailand wishes to claim true regional leadership, its diplomatic pragmatism at the negotiating table must be matched by a humane domestic protection policy. Without addressing post-coup displacement, Thailand risks managing diplomatic symptoms while ignoring the human fallout.


Paranut has a background in advocacy, with experience in policy research, communications, and civic engagement across both the NGO and government sectors. As Thailand’s Youth Delegate to the United Nations, he represented Thai youth in global dialogues on migration, education, and human rights, championing inclusive policymaking. He holds a degree in political science with a specialization in international relations.

Myanmar 🇲🇲

Medical Neglect Behind Bars

by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor

New data from the Political Prisoners Network Myanmar (PPNM), a group that monitors conditions inside the country’s detention system, shows that at least 148 political prisoners have died since the 2021 coup because they simply weren’t given adequate medical care, according to the group’s latest report.

The deaths span 32 facilities across the country, recorded from July 2021 through May 2026. PPNM says the deaths trace back to a familiar set of failures: treatment delayed past the point it could help, chronic shortages of basic medicine, and prison authorities dragging their feet on transferring seriously ill detainees to outside hospitals. The grim irony, per the group, is that many of these deaths were preventable. People came in with conditions doctors could have managed or cured, and died only because they couldn’t get timely access to care.

Two prisons account for nearly half the toll on their own: Insein Prison in Yangon (34.5%) and Obo Prison in Mandalay (12.8%). PPNM’s data shows men make up 86% of the dead, women 13%, with one recorded case involving an LGBT detainee. The victims range from minors to the elderly, though most were working-age men — the demographic most likely to have been swept up in the junta’s mass arrests since 2021.

This 148 figure is actually a subset of a bigger number. In a June 1 anniversary report, PPNM said it has documented 282 total political prisoner deaths in custody over its three years of tracking: the 148 medical-neglect cases, 75 deaths from what it calls unlawful killings by junta personnel and prison staff, and 59 deaths tied to the earthquake that hit Myanmar in March 2026. Laid out that way, medical neglect isn’t a side issue — it’s the single largest driver of death in the system, ahead of both direct violence and a natural disaster.

None of this is new, unfortunately. Rights groups have long documented medical neglect as a leading killer of Myanmar’s political detainees. The case of Zaw Myint Maung, a senior NLD official who died in 2024 after being released only once his leukemia had turned terminal, is the pattern in miniature: care withheld until it’s too late to matter, then a release that functions less as mercy than as damage control for the prison authorities.

The scale of the underlying detention system is worth sitting with. Human rights groups estimate tens of thousands of people have been jailed since the 2021 coup on charges as vague as incitement or defamation, or simply for belonging to a banned organization. The Assistance Association for Political Prisoners puts current detainee numbers in the tens of thousands, though the count shifts as courts keep processing new arrests.

PPNM says the pattern reflects deliberate policy rather than isolated failures, arguing that "time restrictions" imposed on medical referrals function as a de facto denial of care. The group has called for international pressure on prison authorities to allow timely outside treatment, warning that the death toll will continue to climb without independent oversight of conditions inside Myanmar's prison system.


Mattia has a background in international politics with a regional specialization in Asian affairs. He has served as a Junior Analyst for the Asia/Oceania desk at the Istituto Analisi Relazioni Internazionali (IARI), where he focuses on conflict dynamics, maritime security, and strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific. His work reflects a strong interest in security studies and regional geopolitics, with a particular focus on Myanmar’s political crisis, ethnic dynamics, and its implications for regional stability.

Editorial Deadline 25/07/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Karen Ysabelle R. David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk

In the glitzy planned metropolis of New Clark City in the Philippines, a United States-led AI hub is set to rise: this is the controversial and paradoxical Pax Silica. On one hand, there are the grand and heady promises of jobs and investments and progress; on the other, there are the locals’ anxieties about the project’s impact on water, power, and land. Will New Clark City become the next Silicon Valley or will it be branded as government folly?

Meanwhile, updates from the other countries of the Pacific Corridor this week: Singapore reaches out to countries closer to home as its Prime Minister visits Indonesia and Timor-Leste. But the latter’s government is concerned with domestic issues, as a proposal to introduce a criminal defamation law generates controversy among the Timorese public. And in Vietnam, a new decree changes the game for renewable energy industry players in the country.

The Philippines 🇵🇭

Price of Becoming “Silicon Valley”: Pax Silica in the Philippines

by Eduardo G. Fajermo Jr., in Angeles City

The Philippines wants New Clark City to become more than a planned metropolis. Under the United States-led Pax Silica initiative, it is being positioned as a future hub for artificial intelligence (AI), semiconductors, critical minerals, and advanced manufacturing. The promises are significant: jobs, investments, supply-chain security, and a chance for the country to move from being a peripheral participant in global technology to a more active player in the industries shaping the next century.

But the question now being asked in Pampanga and Tarlac is no less significant: at what local cost?

The Bases Conversion and Development Authority has identified a 4,000-acre site in New Clark City for the proposed Pax Silica Coordination Office, which is meant to connect technology firms, research institutions, and government agencies in building an AI and high-value manufacturing ecosystem.

Finance Secretary Frederick Go said joining Pax Silica would help ensure that the country’s mineral resources and strategic location are not merely supporting global industries “from the margins,” but are used to build future industries. US Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs Jacob Helberg described the project as building “manufacturing ecosystems of the next century,” while BCDA President Joshua Bingcang said it could create quality jobs and increase local enterprise participation in the innovation economy.

That is the optimistic version: Pax Silica as a second chance at industrialization. For decades, the Philippines has watched neighbors deepen their manufacturing base while it leaned heavily on services, remittances, and consumption. If New Clark City can host higher-value production linked to AI, semiconductors, and advanced supply chains, the project could help correct an old economic weakness.

Yet the political economy of Pax Silica is not only about ambition. It is also about trust.

Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr. has rejected claims that the project is war-driven, calling it a resilience and industrialization initiative rather than a military imposition. He said Pax Silica is a manufacturing and high-technology endeavor meant to stabilize critical-material supply chains and place the Philippines inside the global manufacturing cycle. That clarification matters because the project is arriving in a region already shaped by US–China competition, South China Sea tensions, and the Philippines’ closer security alignment with Washington.

Still, telling the public that Pax Silica is “not war” does not fully answer the more immediate civilian fear: water, electricity, land, and control. Teodoro has also said the Pax Silica project will not threaten water supply, a concern that has grown as discussions around AI hubs and data centers have entered local public debate. For residents already familiar with water interruptions, heat, power costs, and uneven public utilities, “Silicon Valley” can sound less like national progress and more like another elite development whose burdens are local while its gains are abstract.

The promise of Pax Silica is real. So are the anxieties around it. If managed well, it could help move the Philippines up the technology value chain and give Central Luzon a stronger industrial future. If managed poorly, it could become another symbol of development imposed from above, celebrated in boardrooms, questioned in households, and paid for through local resource strain.

The question, then, is not simply whether New Clark City can become the Philippines’ Silicon Valley. The harder question is whether it can become one without making nearby communities feel like collateral damage. If Pax Silica is truly about resilience, then resilience must begin with the people who will live beside it.


Eduardo is a Political Science graduate and MA Political Science candidate at the University of Santo Tomas, researching democracy, disaster governance, and inclusive policy in the Global South. He is a former faculty member at Holy Angel University, where he taught Philippine history and contemporary global issues. He also worked with a senator in the Guam Legislature, contributing to policy research and legislative analysis.

Support Us

Singapore 🇸🇬

Singapore Deepens Relations with Timor-Leste and Indonesia

by Nurul Aini, in Singapore

As Singapore navigates complex relations with Russia, it is simultaneously deepening its relationship with Timor-Leste. The visit by Singapore’s Prime Minister Lawrence Wong from 2 to 3 July 2026 to Dili is the first of its kind by a Singaporean head of government. As Singapore has been actively supporting Timor-Leste in their ascension toward ASEAN membership, this visit shifts the partnership from pre-ASEAN membership assistance to post-membership partnership by developing bilateral cooperation, especially in areas where both countries are strong. It also explores other possibilities with the aim of reciprocally strengthening each other’s capacity.

The signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on the Establishment of Bilateral Consultations between PM Wong and with Timorese Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão provides a formalized framework for the broadening of this relationship. From the second half of 2027, Timor-Leste will be designated as an approved Non-Traditional Source (NTS) country, which opens up work opportunities in Singapore’s selected sectors, such as the construction, marine, process, manufacturing, and services sectors. Another project that is intended to turn into an agreement is the collaboration between Singapore’s National University Hospital (NUH) and the Ministry of Health of Timor-Leste, which is projected to run for five years beginning in July.

PM Wong also encouraged Singaporeans to explore business and investment opportunities in Timor-Leste, stressing the need for these businesses to see the potential in the country’s “young and youthful population.” This comes as Timor-Leste seeks to diversify beyond its oil and gas industries into tourism, hospitality, infrastructure, and renewable energy. Beyond a simply transactional relationship, PM Wong also emphasized the need for businesses to tap into this emerging market to learn the local cultures and norms of the Timorese people, and to enter the space with humility through acknowledging that Singaporean businesses need to learn from the Timorese as much as Timorese do from Singaporeans.

At its core, this expanding relationship between two countries still emphasizes ASEAN Centrality, as it functions through institutional strengthening, capacity-building, and regional stability. Following the enhanced Singapore–Timor-Leste ASEAN Readiness Support Package (eSTARS), Singapore will provide more ASEAN-related programs that will support officials in Dili to assist the country through its goal of ASEAN Chairmanship in 2029. This includes tailored workshops and attachments by these officials to Singapore’s ASEAN Chairmanship. This bilateral cooperation demonstrates an instance of small-state diplomacy where Singapore positions itself more as a development partner and a bridge to ASEAN rather than as a dominant regional power.

Following the visit to Timor-Leste, PM Wong and his delegation of five ministers then visited Jakarta, Indonesia as part of the second Singapore–Indonesia Leaders’ Retreat at the invitation of President Prabowo Subianto. A few MOUs were signed, spanning carbon credits collaboration, environmental cooperation, digital cooperation, and more. This signifies the continuation of Singapore and Indonesia’s strong relationship. Eventually, Singapore’s continuous outreach to its ASEAN counterpart signifies a shift in emphasis where, as Defense Minister Chan Chun Sing mentioned during the Shangri-La Dialogue, “We are not pro-US or anti-US. We are not pro-China or anti-China. We are pro-ASEAN.”


Aini is currently pursuing a master’s degree in English literature at Nanyang Technological University. She has experience working in youth groups, contributing to the planning and management of outreach activities.

Timor-Leste 🇹🇱

The Return of Criminal Defamation Law: Concealing Structural Problems and Protecting Political Elites

by Amandina Maria Helena da Silva, in Dili

For the second time around, the government of Timor-Leste is proposing the introduction of the criminal defamation law. According to state-run news agency Tatoli, the National Parliament has set an agenda next week to begin discussing in the general phase the draft law on the seventh amendment to the Criminal Code on Criminalizing Defamation and Insult.

The proposal raised concerns among the Timorese public — among them civil society organizations, journalists, activists, and social movements — who believe that the law could affect freedom of expression and media freedom in the country. This includes silencing the people when injustice occurs and when political elites engage in various unjust practices.

According to legal expert Armindo Moniz, this law will only create discrimination in society and protect political elites. He also stressed that this law is unnecessary: it is more important to create laws that combat social problems that society faces, force corrupt officials to account for their acts, combat nepotism, and provide protection for freedom of expression in public space.

This year, the National Parliament is the proponent of this bill, which continues to talk about criminalizing defamation. In response, the non-governmental organization La’o Hamutuk affirmed rejecting the criminalization of all defamation due to the proposal that threatens freedom of expression and justice for vulnerable people. According to the organization, “We need laws that protect the rights of all, not penalize criticism or lack of access to information. Our position is that the remedy must be proportionate, civil, reparative and compatible with freedom of expression, not prison sentences that can create an intimidating effect on journalists, activists, whistleblowers, academics, affected communities and citizens.”

Besides that, the President of the Timor-Leste Journalists Association (AJTL), Zevonia Vieira, stated that this draft law may kill press freedom in Timor-Leste — there is an article that states that journalists who write or cover “suspicious” news may be charged with defamation. Coverage related to the authorities that may be taken as an insult and defamation can result in a journalist going to court, where they may be sentenced to two to three years in prison.

Through the draft law on the seventh amendment to the Criminal Code on Criminalizing Defamation and Insult proposed by parliament, the president of Timor-Leste José Ramos Horta declared that he will use his power to veto this bill to defend freedom of expression, which is an important pillar of democracy.

We can only hope that this is not merely political rhetoric, but a call to continue to promote and protect human rights that are the fundamental rights of the people.


Amandina is a human rights advocate working with Asia Justice and Rights Timor-Leste on the Interim Reparation to Women Survivors project. She previously worked with UNDP Timor-Leste’s Accelerator Lab and has contributed to human rights and health initiatives through several youth and civil society organisations. Her interests lie in justice, youth empowerment, and community-based social change in Timor-Leste.

Vietnam 🇻🇳

Grid to Grind

by Tri Vo, in Ho Chi Minh City

In a massive policy breakthrough for industry players, the Vietnamese government has officially widened the legal pathways for off-grid renewable energy. Beginning in June 2026, Decree 243/2026/ND-CP officially took effect, fundamentally altering the economics of power decentralization. The headline impact of this decree is a massive lift on the sales cap for excess electricity generated by self-produced, self-consumed rooftop solar systems, more than doubling the allowable percentage from 20% to 50% of total power generated.

Before this adjustment, factories installing vast rooftop solar panel systems were heavily curtailed by rigid regulations. If their panels produced more energy than the factory could immediately consume, especially on a Sunday or a holiday, the excess power was lost altogether. By allowing up to 50% of that surplus to be sold, and even waiving the cap entirely throughout 2030, should local power grids have sufficient capacity to absorb such surplus in a safe manner, the government has effectively provided a financial and energy lifeline for many businesses as a result.

This regulatory green light is expected to trigger a flush of corporate power purchase agreement (PPA) signings throughout Q3 and into Q4 of 2026 and even further into the future, with the direct PPA framework (as enacted through Decree 80/2024/ND-CP) now allowing large electricity consumers to bypass the state utility company EVN as the sole intermediary and to purchase electricity from private wire connections of non-state generators. These legal provisions, as a whole, have afforded industrial parks the opportunities to rapidly transform into localized microgrids, cutting down the red tape and power outages inherent in the total reliance on the national grid for many companies within. Businesses can now proactively invest in rooftop solar combined with Battery Energy Storage Systems, safe in the knowledge that excess capacity can be monetized rather than wasted.

From a macroeconomic perspective, decentralizing energy production is an urgent necessity. With the government aggressively pursuing a double-digit GDP growth ambition for the 2026–2030 period with a long-term goal to propel Vietnam into the ranks of high-income nations by 2045, power generation capacity is under extreme pressure as a result. By incentivizing the private sector to build and monetize its own capacity, Vietnam is effectively crowdsourcing the entire grid’s expansion, preserving the integrity of the national energy system from further strain, while reducing the immediate need for massive state investments in new power generation and allowing the government to reroute cash into other capital-intensive infrastructure projects.

Ultimately, lifting the 50% cap is not just an environmental policy but also an industrial retention as well as a financial strategy. The recent solar energy directives prove that Hanoi is willing to step out of the way and let the private market power contribute its fair share to the country’s growth ambition. The successful outcome of the policy will act as a stark reminder for most ASEAN peers about the viability and necessity of moving away from the single-buyer model into something far more sustainable.


Tri has experience in management consulting and strategy, having worked with institutions such as the UNDP, The Asia Group, and ARC Group. He has provided strategic, legal, and operational insights to clients in sectors including manufacturing, energy, and technology. He holds both academic and professional experience related to Southeast and East Asia, with a focus on regional development and policy.

Editorial Deadline 20/07/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

By Thant Thura Zan

Climate negotiations have become remarkably good at producing new ambitions. Every year, governments arrive with fresh initiatives, revised targets and renewed commitments to accelerate climate action. Yet behind the carefully crafted declarations emerging from the UN climate talks lies a more uncomfortable reality: negotiators continue to avoid the two issues that will ultimately determine whether the Paris Agreement succeeds: phasing out fossil fuels and financing the transition.

The negotiations risk is becoming “a masterclass in avoiding the obvious”. This observation captures a growing frustration among developing countries that climate diplomacy remains trapped in procedural debates while implementation continues to lag behind.

This disconnect was evident throughout the 64th sessions of the Subsidiary Bodies (SB64) in Bonn.

One of the most prominent announcements was the incoming COP31 Presidencies’ proposal to increase global electrification from 20 percent to 35 percent by 2035. Electrification has rightly become a central pillar of decarbonisation. Transport, industry and buildings cannot achieve net-zero emissions without replacing fossil fuels with electricity.

But electrification alone is not enough.

Speaking during an SB64 side event, Francesco La Camera, Director-General of the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), reminded delegates that the transition “will not be decided by how much cleaner electricity we generate, but by how much of the economy is electrified.” More importantly, he stressed that electrification must be powered by renewable energy if it is to deliver meaningful emissions reductions. An electric vehicle charged from a coal-fired grid simply shifts emissions rather than eliminating them.

This contradiction lies at the heart of today’s climate politics. Governments celebrate record investments in renewable energy while continuing to approve new oil, gas and coal projects. Clean energy capacity is expanding, yet fossil fuel production continues to rise alongside it. Nearly three decades after the adoption of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the world’s climate negotiations still struggle to confront the principal driver of global warming.

The same tendency to prioritise new initiatives over practical solutions is visible elsewhere. In agriculture, discussions increasingly emphasise artificial intelligence and digital technologies. While innovation undoubtedly has a role to play, farmers confronting droughts, floods and declining harvests are not primarily asking for algorithms. They need access to finance, secure land rights, water, seeds and resilient farming systems. Agroecology has already demonstrated its value in strengthening food security and climate resilience, yet proven approaches often receive less political attention than emerging technologies.

Finance remains the clearest illustration of the gap between ambition and implementation.

Throughout SB64, negotiators devoted considerable time to discussing indicators, methodologies and reporting frameworks under the Global Goal on Adaptation and the Baku Adaptation Roadmap. These technical discussions are important for measuring progress, but they cannot substitute for the resources required to implement adaptation on the ground.

Developing countries repeatedly emphasised that climate finance is not an optional contribution but a legal commitment embedded within the Paris Agreement. Yet negotiations on the Climate Finance Work Programme and Article 2.1(c) continued to expose a familiar divide. While developing countries called for greater public finance and fulfilment of existing obligations, many developed countries focused instead on mobilising private investment and broader financial flows. The consequence is a widening gap between climate ambition and the financial support available to deliver it.

Several discussions at SB64 reinforced this message. Speakers argued that climate finance should be understood not as charity but as a matter of climate justice and historical responsibility. Others called for reforms to the international financial architecture, including stronger multilateral development banks, debt reform and international tax cooperation capable of unlocking the scale of investment needed for a global transition.

For the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries, these debates are far more than diplomatic exchanges taking place in distant negotiating rooms.

Southeast Asia is among the world’s fastest-growing energy markets. Rising populations, expanding industries and rapid urbanisation continue to increase demand for affordable and reliable electricity. At the same time, many ASEAN member states remain heavily dependent on coal, natural gas and imported fossil fuels to sustain economic growth. While regional initiatives such as the ASEAN Power Grid and national renewable energy targets demonstrate growing ambition, achieving these objectives will require financial resources that many developing economies cannot mobilise alone.

The outcome of negotiations on climate finance will thus directly influence ASEAN’s development trajectory. Without predictable grant-based finance, affordable concessional lending and technology transfer, countries across the region risk locking themselves into carbon-intensive infrastructure that could remain operational for decades. Climate ambition cannot be separated from development finance.

One of the more encouraging discussions in Bonn centred on the emerging Just Transition Mechanism. Unlike many negotiation tracks that remain focused on procedures, the mechanism seeks to connect ambition with implementation. For developing countries, a just transition is not simply about replacing fossil fuels with renewable energy. It is equally about creating jobs, expanding energy access, supporting industrialisation and reducing poverty while convincing local politics.

Several ASEAN economies face the dual challenge of reducing emissions while continuing to industrialise and improve living standards. A well-designed Just Transition Mechanism could provide the financial support, consideration of the host country’s energy politics, technology cooperation and capacity building needed to ensure that climate action strengthens.

Ultimately, the challenge confronting climate negotiators is no longer technological. Renewable energy has become increasingly affordable. Solutions for adaptation, industrial decarbonisation and resilient agriculture already exist. The real obstacles are political will and financial commitment.

If climate negotiations continue to prioritise procedural debates over implementation, they risk becoming increasingly disconnected from the realities faced by communities on the front lines of climate change. For ASEAN, where climate vulnerability intersects with rapid economic growth, the costs of delay are particularly high. Every year spent debating frameworks is another year in which the region must navigate rising climate risks with inadequate resources.

As the international community looks towards COP31, success should not be measured by the number of new targets announced or declarations adopted. It should be judged by whether negotiations finally address the issues that developing countries have raised for decades: meaningful climate finance, a credible pathway away from fossil fuels and practical support for a just transition. Only then will climate diplomacy move beyond process and begin delivering the transformation that both ASEAN and the wider Global South urgently need.

Share

by Siu Tzyy Wei, Lead Editor - Maritime Crescent Desk

Every decision to open a door is also a decision to close another.

This week, that balance plays out across Southeast Asia in three very different ways. Brunei looks outward, strengthening diplomatic ties with Singapore. Indonesia turns the key on the long-awaited Masela Block, unlocking new opportunities in its energy sector. Meanwhile, Malaysia makes clear that not all access is welcome, tightening enforcement against illegal e-waste imports and signalling that its ports are no longer open to the world’s toxic leftovers.

Together, these stories reveal a common thread: sovereignty is not only about protecting borders; it is about choosing what, and who, crosses them. Whether through diplomacy, development, or regulation, governments are increasingly exercising that choice with greater intention.

The question, then, is not simply whether access is granted, but on whose terms.

Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳

The Quiet Importance of Diplomacy in Brunei-Singapore Relations

by Syimah Johari, in Bandar Seri Begawan

In conjunction with His Majesty’s 80th birthday, the Senior Minister Lee Hsien Loong of Singapore paid a visit to Brunei alongside Mrs. Lee, and Minister of State for Home Affairs and Social and Family Development, Goh Pei Ming. During this visit, they attended the royal guard of honour parade, the investiture ceremony as well as the royal banquet, as part of official birthday celebrations. They also had the opportunity to meet with members of the royal family and Bruneian ministers. While the visit formed part of the celebrations, it also reflected the longstanding relationship between Brunei and Singapore.

Official visits like this reflect the ceremonial side of diplomacy. While people often associate diplomacy with treaty signings or formal negotiations, relationships between countries are also strengthened through regular high-level engagements. These quieter aspects of diplomacy reinforce mutual trust, provide opportunities for dialogue and help sustain bilateral ties long after agreements have been signed.

This raises the question: why do high-level visits matter? Diplomacy extends beyond formal negotiations, as maintaining relationships between states also requires consistent engagement. Official state visits and attendance at national celebrations demonstrate mutual respect and goodwill between countries. They provide opportunities for leaders to exchange perspectives and discuss bilateral and regional issues. Within ASEAN, where personal relationships and regular engagement among leaders remain an important aspect of diplomacy, such visits continue to play a valuable role in sustaining partnerships.

This is particularly evident in the longstanding relationship between Brunei and Singapore, that is built upon decades of cooperation across multiple areas, including defence, economic ties, education and regional affairs. Defence cooperation remains one of the foundations of the relationship, with both countries maintaining military training and exchanges that reflect the level of trust between them. Economic ties have also remained a key pillar of the relationship, supported by strong trade and investment links, as well as arrangements such as the currency interchangeability agreement that symbolises the close economic connection between both countries. Beyond government-to-government relations, education and capacity-building initiatives, including scholarships and youth exchange programmes, have strengthened people-to-people ties. As active members of ASEAN, Brunei and Singapore also continue to work together on shared regional priorities. Maintaining these areas of cooperation requires consistent dialogue and engagement at the leadership level. High-level visits therefore serve as important platforms for both countries to exchange perspectives on bilateral and regional issues, reinforcing the foundations of their longstanding partnership.

While official visits may appear ceremonial on the surface, they represent a quieter but equally important aspect of diplomacy. The strength of Brunei and Singapore’s relationship has been built not only through formal agreements, but also through continued engagement, mutual respect and the willingness to maintain dialogue over time. As regional challenges continue to evolve, these longstanding partnerships remain important in ensuring cooperation and stability within ASEAN.


Syimah is a graduate of King’s College London with a BA in International Relations. With a strong focus on diplomacy, regional cooperation, and development policy, she is passionate about contributing to meaningful change through public service. Currently, she is involved in poverty alleviation work through a local NGO.

Support Us

Indonesia 🇮🇩

Liquid Gas Blossoms over Abadi Masela Block

by Muhammad Rayhansyah Jasin

One of Indonesia’s largest gas fields finally broke ground on July 16 after President Prabowo Subianto approved the development of a liquid natural gas (LNG) facility in Abadi Masela Block, around 180 kilometers off the coast of the Tanimbar Islands municipality in Maluku Province. The Abadi Masela National Strategic Project is projected to produce up to 9.5 million tons of LNG and 35,000 barrels of condensate per day by 2030 with 60% of its capacity allocated for domestic demand coming from the State Electric Company (PLN), the Pertamina Gas National company (PGN), and the Indonesia Fertilizer Corp. (Pupuk Indonesia). This 21 billion USD investment is expected to generate returns north of 37 billion USD as direct income to its three major share holders, INPEX, Malaysian oil company Petronas, and Indonesia’s Pertamina Hulu Energi Masela holding 65, 20, and 15 percent respectively, while also contributing to state coffers through tax collections of around 6.4 billion USD. An additional 1 billion USD investment is also directed to build Carbon-Capture and Storage (CCS) facilities within the complex. The Minister for Energy and Mineral Resources, Bahlil Lahadalia, also claimed that this project could absorb more than 12,000 construction workers with 800 to 1,000 permanent staff once operation has started running.

The implementation of the Abadi Masela project had been stranded for 28 years, since former President BJ Habibie signed agreements with the Japanese-based INPEX Corporation to be the block’s main operator in 1998, over disputes whether to develop the field through onshore or offshore facilities. The unresolved debates also pushed the legacy Dutch oil company Shell to drop from the project in 2023, citing the government’s shift to prioritize onshore facilities over offshore gas production, with its 35% stake of the project transferred to Petronas and Pertamina. The Prabowo Administration has been spearheading the implementation of this project with the finalization of its Front-End Engineering Design (FEED) in September 2025 and the environmental impact study (AMDAL) in February 2026. Construction is slated to take 3 years with official production demanded to begin before the 2029 General Election in harnessing this 6,97 trillion cube feet gas reserves.

INPEX’s CEO, Takayuki Ueda branded the Abadi Masela Block Project as a symbol of close cooperation between Japan and Indonesia to strengthen the energy supply chain between both countries and usher in a leap in Indonesia’s sustainability commitment. Although pundits have warned that future operations must be scrutinized, the strategic location of the block being close to the tip of Australia’s EEZ–around 400 km north of Darwin–would also bring more attention and tighten security measures around Indonesia’s ocean territory. That said, the Abadi Masela Block Project serves as yet another example of Prabowo’s bombastic infrastructure project in his attempt to reach energy independence. Strict enforcement measures and heightened public scrutiny must be ensured so that all expected returns benefit the state budget with their impacts truly materializing in more affordable and accessible energy and power supply for ordinary Indonesians.


Rayhan is pursuing an Erasmus Mundus Joint Master’s Degree in Public Policy at Central European University and the Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals. He holds a Bachelor of Social Sciences in International Relations and Political Economy from Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University. His current research focuses on the socio-economic impacts of Indonesia’s nickel mining industry on local communities and national development.

Malaysia 🇲🇾

Port of No Return

by Edrina Lisa Ozaidi, in WP Kuala Lumpur

Malaysia’s enforcement in tackling e-waste through a ban was made effective recently.

For years, Malaysia found itself trapped on the receiving end of a dirty global trade, serving as a primary dumping ground for the developed world’s discarded electronics, but recently, the landscape has made a shift.

Following the implementation of an obsolete ban on electrical and electronic waste (e-waste) imports under the Customs (Import Prohibition) Order, the nation has drawn a hard line in the sand—transforming its port into frontline defences against environmental exploitation.

Enforcing a blanket ban against sophisticated smuggling syndicates is an uphill battle. Global e-waste brokers — frequently routing shipments from major ports in the US and Europe—- have long relied on deceptive paperwork, routine misdeclaring hazardous electronics as copper scrap, aluminium flakes or industrial metals.

The ingenuity of these syndicates was vividly laid bare at Port Klang, where a container officially declared as carrying “tin ore” suddenly caught fire.

Subsequent inspection by the Border Control and Protection Agency (AKPS) and the Department of Environment (DOE) revealed that the 17-tonne shipment was 100% prohibited e-waste.

It was a stark reminder of the hidden environmental and safety hazards slipping past conventional surveillance.

To counter these tactics, Malaysia mobilised an aggressive inter-agency response. Under the banner of Op Green Shield, a specialised joint task force comprising the AKPS, Customs, and environmental regulators has ramped up intelligence-led, nearly daily inspections of high-risk cargo.

The result underscores both the scale of the illicit trade and the government’s resolve. Hundreds of containers have been flagged, and thousands of metric tones of illegal e-waste have been systematically intercepted and ordered for re-export back to their countries of origin.

Authorities have also targeted uncooperative shipping liners with stern warnings and temporary license freezes, signalling that complicity in the toxic trade will carry severe commercial costs.

Beyond border security, this hardline stance is reshaping Malaysia’s domestic recycling economy. Local legitimate recyclers and green advocates have welcomed the policy, noting that cutting off the influx of cheap, unregulated foreign waste forces have welcomed the policy noting that cutting off the influx of cheap, unregulated foreign waste forces the industry to turn inward.

Instead of processing mountains of external toxic debris, the focus is shifting toward managing and extracting value from the domestic e-waste stream safely and sustainably.

Malaysia’s message to global brokers is unequivocal: the era of cheap, easy dumping is hopefully over. Through regulatory reform and continuous aggressive enforcement, Malaysia has finally strengthened its move to protect its land, air and communities from becoming the cost-free collateral of the digital age.


Edrina is a communications professional with a background in international relations. She holds a degree from the University of Nottingham Malaysia and has worked across public relations and social media for organizations in the development, education, and corporate sectors. Her work focuses on crafting narratives around regional affairs and strengthening media engagement across Southeast Asia.

Editorial Deadline 18/07/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk

This week across the Mekong Belt, governments and institutions found themselves having to decide — explicitly or implicitly — who belongs in the room, who counts as a partner, and who gets left to deal with the consequences of the side they've chosen. In Myanmar, ASEAN’s special envoy met junta-linked negotiators and ethnic armed groups in Thailand, but left the National Unity Government out of the main talks, undercutting the bloc’s claim to an “inclusive” political dialogue. In Cambodia, Taiwan cut the country from its Guanhong visa facilitation program, citing Phnom Penh’s continued backing of the one-China policy and its silence on Beijing’s reunification rhetoric. Meanwhile, in Thailand, Japan is stepping up cooperation on the arsenic-contaminated Kok River, a crisis linked to Chinese-run mining in Myanmar, filling a gap left by the Chinese Embassy’s largely unanswered calls for accountability. And in Laos, a quieter kind of alignment is underway: the government is expanding its digital tax framework to catch tech giants like Microsoft and Netflix, joining a growing bloc of ASEAN states choosing to bring the digital economy inside the reach of the state.

Myanmar 🇲🇲

An Empty Chair at ASEAN’s “Inclusive” Myanmar Dialogue

by Moe Thiri Myat

ASEAN says it wants an inclusive political dialogue on Myanmar. Yet when its special envoy began meeting the country’s different political and armed actors this week, one of the most important seats was left empty.

On 13 July, ASEAN Special Envoy and Philippine Foreign Secretary Ma. Theresa Lazaro travelled to Thailand with Thai Foreign Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow. Together, they met representatives of several ethnic armed organisations and the military-established National Solidarity and Peacemaking Negotiation Committee. The discussions were presented as an attempt to explore an “inclusive national political dialogue” and revive ASEAN’s stalled response to the Myanmar crisis.

The outreach appeared broad. The military-backed authorities were engaged. Ethnic armed organisations were consulted. ASEAN foreign ministers had also held their first face-to-face meeting since the 2021 coup with Myanmar’s military-backed foreign minister.

But the National Unity Government (NUG) was not invited to the main in-person discussions. That absence immediately exposed the contradiction at the centre of ASEAN’s initiative. The NUG is not a marginal stakeholder waiting to be added later. It remains one of the principal political forces opposing military rule and is connected to resistance structures operating across the country. NUG’s Foreign Minister Zin Mar Aung therefore questioned whether the meetings were intended to advance ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus or support the military-backed government’s separate 100-day peace plan.

The envoy later held a brief online discussion with NUG representatives. According to an NUG official, however, no significant issue was raised. The call allowed ASEAN to say that it had contacted the NUG, but it did not provide the same access given to actors invited into the room.That difference is more than diplomatic protocol. The first participants can frame the problem, influence the agenda and shape what ASEAN later presents as possible dialogue. Those consulted afterwards are left responding to a process they did not help design.

Ethnic opposition groups have also warned that the meetings should not be treated as the beginning of formal negotiations. They argue that dialogue cannot move forward while civilians remain under attack, political prisoners remain detained and humanitarian access remains restricted.

The danger, then, is not simply that the NUG missed one meeting. It is that ASEAN may be constructing an apparently inclusive process around unequal levels of political access. Such engagement could strengthen the legitimacy of military-backed institutions without producing meaningful concessions.

Ultimately, ASEAN’s credibility will not be measured by how many actors appear on its consultation list. It will depend on who is invited early enough to shape the process, whose demands become part of the agenda and whether “inclusive dialogue” means genuine political participation or merely contacting excluded actors after the important conversations have already begun.


Moe Thiri Myat is a senior at Parami University. Majoring in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics (PPE). Interested in analyzing emerging sociopolitical situations and developments, through her work as a Myanmar correspondent at The ASEAN Frontier she aims to explore how sociopolitical developments across Southeast Asia shape and are shaped by the situation in Myanmar.

Cambodia 🇰🇭

Taiwan Drops Cambodia From Visa Facilitation Program Amid Rising Political Friction

by Chandara Samban, in Kandal

Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced on July 17, 2026 that it is removing Cambodia from its Guanhong visa facilitation program, effective mid-July. The program had allowed Cambodian travelers to enter Taiwan without going through the standard visa application process since 2018.

Taiwan said the decision reflects Cambodia’s failure to reciprocate its goodwill, pointing specifically to Phnom Penh’s continued support for the one-China policy, which recognizes Taiwan as part of China. Taipei argues that this stance undermines its sovereignty and autonomy. Concerns over Cambodia’s ties to online scam networks also factored into the decision. While cutting Cambodia from the program, Taiwan expanded visa facilitation for other countries in the region, including Thailand and India.

Cambodia has not issued an official government response. However, Chann Ratana, spokesperson for Cambodia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, told TAF on July 18 that Cambodia respects the one-China policy and considers Taiwan part of China. “Cambodia does not need to sit down and talk with Taiwan,” he said. “Whatever decision Taiwan makes is Taiwan’s own business.”

Tensions between Taipei and Phnom Penh have simmered for years over Cambodia’s stance on Taiwan’s status. In 2024, Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a strongly worded letter to Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet after he expressed support for China’s reunification efforts during a meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi.

Despite the political rift, economic ties between the two remain significant. Bilateral trade reached more than USD 739 million in 2025, an increase of nearly 3% from 2024. Taiwan says it has invested USD 1.255 billion in Cambodia between 1993 and 2025, concentrated in textiles and garments, wood processing, and land development.

Geopolitical analyst Seng Vanly called the move a notable shift in Taipei’s foreign policy and security posture. He said it will complicate travel for Cambodian citizens, including businesspeople, students, investors, and workers, by making the visa process more costly and time-consuming.

“The relationship between Cambodia and Taiwan is becoming increasingly tense and is experiencing growing political friction,” Seng Vanly said. “This rift stems from their different geopolitical positions, with Cambodia maintaining a firm stance on the one-China policy.”

He added that while Cambodia and Taiwan lack formal diplomatic relations, Taiwan remains an important economic partner through its investments in the garment, footwear, and textile sectors since the 1990s. Still, he argued Cambodia should avoid direct negotiations with Taipei to prevent friction with Beijing, suggesting business associations or private-sector channels as an alternative for informal discussions.

Kin Phea, director of the Institute of International Relations at the Royal Academy of Cambodia, said the move is unlikely to affect formal Cambodia-Taiwan relations, since the two sides have never had diplomatic ties. He said the impact will fall mainly on Cambodian citizens traveling to Taiwan for tourism, medical treatment, or business, given that relations have traditionally been people-to-people rather than state-to-state. He encouraged Cambodians planning to travel to Taiwan to comply with the standard visa requirements going forward.


Chandara is a freelance journalist with a focus on foreign affairs, security issues, and ASEAN affairs. He also serves as a Junior Counterterrorism Intelligence Analyst.

Support Us

Thailand 🇹🇭

Japan Takes Initiative to Resolve Toxic Contamination in Kok River

by Natamon Aumphin, in Bangkok

Earlier this month, the Embassy of Japan, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), and representatives from the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) in Thailand met with the Pollution Control Department of Thailand to discuss conserving and monitoring water quality in Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai provinces, as well as building a network to protect the Mekong River, which is the heart of the Northern people. The collaboration, initiated by Japan, comes with a short-term and long-term plan to resolve Mekong contamination.

Although Japan is not directly affected by the contamination in the Mekong River, the nation is stepping in to assist Thailand and neighboring countries, which reflects its willingness to step up to resolve regional issues. The initiatives include technical knowledge exchange and capacity building for local communities and governmental entities to monitor the arsenic levels in the river, installing systems to reduce arsenic to ensure water supply safety, and building Mekong River experts through the Third Country Training Program (TCTP). The tangible efforts were seen earlier this week as the Japanese agencies and the Pollution Control Department conducted a joint site visit to strengthen cooperation.

The collaboration with the Japanese agencies was the latest effort to resolve the contamination issue in the Kok River, where toxins such as arsenic were found last year. The toxins found in the Kok River were suspected to originate from rare earth mining activities in Shan State, Myanmar, linked to Chinese companies, according to an investigation by ThaiPBS. Although there has been ongoing advocacy from civil society to demand accountability and tangible cooperation from the Chinese Embassy in Chiang Mai, no proper response has been observed yet. In fact, the situation between civil society and the Chinese Embassy has worsened due to passive response from the embassy in Chiang Mai.

Moreover, despite peaceful demonstrations to raise awareness and call for tighter regulations for Chinese mining companies in Myanmar, the protesters were faced with police authorities preventing them from entering the Chinese Embassy’s proximity. Two activists were injured, with one being hospitalized. From the public perspective, this action contradicts the Chinese Embassy’s post on its Facebook page stating that consultation and collaboration are welcomed. Therefore, to the public, Japan’s efforts were widely welcomed, reflected in positive sentiments on social media compared to those regarding the Chinese Embassy.

This is not the first attempt at being involved in the Mekong River. Japan has shown consistent commitment to resolving toxic contamination in the Mekong river, in collaboration with Myanmar, Laos, and Thailand. The willingness of Japan in this matter can be seen from two folds. Firstly, Japan experienced mercury toxins in water supplies in the 1950s, resulting in Minamata disease, a dire threat to the livelihood of local residents and aquatic animals in the area. This prompted Japan to build expertise in toxin contamination management. Hence, as Thailand is facing a similar issue, Japan’s willingness to exchange technical knowledge is seen as generous and welcome from the Thai people’s perspective.

Second, on a regional level, this collaboration reflects Japan’s commitment to strengthening its relations with the Mekong River nations. Through mutual benefits, Japan could offer a solution to a complex issue in the region involving many actors, which serves as a way to maintain Japan’s presence in the region after its economic decline. This reflects that Japan is still an active player in Southeast Asia, although in a different role compared to that of the 1950s. As regional competition is on the rise, Japan could be the third player to offer alternatives to Southeast Asian countries when it comes to US-China regional competition.


Natamon has served as a rapporteur at the Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS Thailand). She has also worked as a research assistant on diplomatic issues in Southeast Asia. Her work focuses on how domestic politics shape foreign policy in the region. She holds a degree in international relations and has experience in policy analysis, event reporting, and regional research.

Lao PDR 🇱🇦

Laos Expands Digital Tax Collection as Online Economy Grows

by Phonethida Sitthixay, in Vientiane

As more economic activity moves online, governments are increasingly looking for ways to tax digital services provided across borders. Laos is beginning to see results from its own efforts.

Since registering international digital service providers under its digital taxation framework in late 2024, Laos has collected approximately USD 12 million in tax revenue, according to information presented during the First Extraordinary Session of the 10th National Assembly. The amount was generated through the registration of major technology companies, including Microsoft, Facebook, YouTube, and Netflix.

The collection is part of a broader tax modernization drive led by the Ministry of Finance. At the center of these reforms is the Tax Revenue Information System (TaxRIS), which now covers more than 195,000 businesses. According to the ministry, collections processed through the system have increased by 251% compared with the period before its introduction, representing an average annual increase of more than 20 percent. TaxRIS currently operates in Vientiane Capital and is expected to be expanded nationwide.

In addition, digital tools have also transformed the way the government collects revenue. Today, 95 percent of state revenue is collected through banks and electronic payment channels, while cash collections account for just 5 percent of total revenue.

The rise of digital taxation comes as governments worldwide seek to ensure that online platforms, streaming services, digital advertisers, and other technology firms contribute to public finances in the markets where they generate income.

Laos joins a growing number of ASEAN countries that have introduced taxes on digital and cross-border online services. Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Vietnam, and the Philippines have all adopted various approaches, ranging from VAT and GST mechanisms to broader tax frameworks for foreign digital businesses.

For Laos, the USD 12 million collected is relatively modest, but it highlights a wider effort to modernize tax administration and bring more of the digital economy into the formal tax system. As the government continues expanding digital revenue platforms nationwide, the focus will be on improving compliance, broadening the tax base, and keeping pace with a rapidly changing economy.


Phonethida Sitthixay holds a Bachelor of Arts in International Relations from the National University of Laos. She is currently a Senior Project Coordinator at AIF Group, where she works on government-led initiatives to modernize financial integration across public sector systems in Laos. She has experience in sustainable development policy, diplomacy, and economic reporting, having worked with the Global Green Growth Institute and The Laotian Times. Her interests focus on Laos’s diplomacy, regional integration, and its evolving role beyond ASEAN.

Editorial Deadline 18/07/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Karen Ysabelle R. David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk

The vibrant and busy streets of Dili, the capital of Timor-Leste, can often be dangerous. Road traffic crashes continue to be a public safety hazard in the country, with the problem being particularly acute in the capital city. For Southeast Asia’s youngest state and ASEAN’s newest member, its road safety journey has only just begun as it seeks to transform its driving culture and its young people seek solutions.

Across the rest of the Pacific Corridor, young people are also facing other challenges: in Singapore, they are getting married less, owing to a perfect storm of domestic factors and broader regional demographic challenges. In the Philippines, the rise of AI is opening up a new divide in education, infiltrating schools before regulatory mechanisms can even be put securely into place.

And from Vietnam, an AI-related reminder from the start of the year: Hanoi’s movers and shakers optimistically dubbed AI as the new “core engine” for urban governance. Five months since this article was first published, is there truth behind the optimism?

Timor-Leste 🇹🇱

Timor-Leste’s Road Safety Journey Is Just Beginning

by Lucreicha Jane

Road traffic crashes continue to be one of the most pressing public safety challenges in Timor-Leste. In an exclusive interview with The ASEAN Frontier, the Polícia Nacional Timor-Leste (PNTL), Comando Geral, Direção de Trânsito e Segurança Rodoviária reported that between 1 January and 31 May 2026, 818 road traffic crashes were recorded across the country’s 13 municipalities. These incidents resulted in 46 deaths, 139 serious injuries, and 543 minor injuries. Dili alone accounted for 490 crashes, with 11 fatalities, 57 serious injuries, and 444 minor injuries, making it the municipality with the highest number of recorded traffic crashes during the reporting period. Behind every statistic is a person: a student on the way to school, a parent returning home from work, or a young person riding a motorcycle to meet friends. These figures remind us that road traffic crashes are not merely transportation issues; they are public health, social, and development challenges that affect families and communities across the country. As the number of vehicles continues to grow, particularly motorcycles, Timor-Leste faces increasing pressure to strengthen road safety through better infrastructure, stronger law enforcement, public education, and responsible road user behavior. Preventing road crashes requires more than enforcing traffic laws. It also requires building a culture where wearing helmets properly, respecting speed limits, avoiding distracted driving, and protecting vulnerable road users become everyday habits.

Despite these challenges, 2026 also marks an encouraging milestone for Timor-Leste’s road safety journey. From 1–5 July 2026, Timor-Leste participated for the first time in the Youth United for Road Safety program, organized through the ASEAN Secretariat. Three youth representatives from Timor-Leste joined young leaders from across Southeast Asia in Bangkok to exchange experiences, discuss road safety challenges, and develop practical recommendations for improving road safety in their respective countries. For Timor-Leste, this participation represents more than attendance at an international forum. It reflects the country’s growing commitment to involving young people in shaping road safety solutions. Throughout the program, participants discussed common challenges shared across ASEAN, explored successful initiatives implemented in neighboring countries, and worked together to formulate youth-driven recommendations that can contribute to safer roads throughout the region.

Young people bring valuable perspectives because they are among the most frequent road users. They understand the daily realities of commuting, the influence of social media on driving behavior, and the importance of creating campaigns that resonate with younger generations. Their voices can help bridge the gap between policy discussions and community action. Road safety is a shared responsibility. Government institutions, law enforcement agencies, schools, civil society organizations, families, and communities all have important roles to play. At the same time, every individual decision — whether wearing a helmet correctly, following traffic regulations, or choosing not to speed — can help prevent injuries and save lives. Timor-Leste’s participation in the Youth United for Road Safety program marks an important first step toward stronger regional collaboration. By learning from neighboring ASEAN countries while sharing its own experiences, Timor-Leste is beginning to build a stronger foundation for a safer road environment. The journey toward safer roads will require continued commitment, cooperation, and innovation, but every conversation, every partnership, and every responsible action brings the country one step closer to ensuring that every journey ends safely.


Lucreicha Jane is an International Relations undergraduate at the Universidade Nacional Timor Lorosa'e (UNTL), with interests in international law, governance, and youth leadership. She previously served as General Secretary of the JCI Timor-Leste Local Chapter Dili Women Entrepreneurs (2024–2025) and as Executive Vice President of the Student Council at UNTL's Faculty of Social Sciences and Politics.

Support Us

Singapore 🇸🇬

Why Fewer Singaporeans Are Saying “I Do”

by Jennifer Hui En Tan, in Singapore

Marriage has long been treated as a cornerstone of adulthood in Singapore, embedded within its own bureaucratic architecture with priority housing queues, family benefits, and parenthood incentives. The latest figures from the Ministry of Social and Family Development (MSF) land as more than a statistical footnote. According to MSF’s Family Trends Report 2026, marriages fell for a third consecutive year in 2025, with a 6.2% drop from 2024 and the lowest count in nearly a decade besides 2020.

The decline is often attributed to changing priorities among younger Singaporeans, who now prioritize careers and personal freedom over settling down. Though there is some truth to this, several demographers cited in recent coverage suggested that marriage decisions are shaped by economic and institutional conditions, not preference alone.

Institute of Policy Studies (IPS) Principal Research Fellow Mathew Mathews explains that the decline in marriage continuity depends on whether young Singaporeans see marriage and family formation as both achievable and attractive, noting that many still see marriage as attractive but may not feel ready for it. Furthermore, he noted the long-term social shift, with the younger generation taking more time to search for the right partner, leading to a higher median age at first marriage.

Women’s educational attainment has also reshaped traditional marriage patterns. Greater access to higher education and stronger labor force participation have reduced the economic necessity of early marriage, giving women greater autonomy. At the same time, expectations surrounding dual-income households have risen while caregiving responsibilities remain unevenly distributed, making marriage and parenthood appear more demanding than previous generations experienced.

These shifts carry consequences beyond individual households. As Singapore grapples with an ageing population, the shrinking workforce and rising dependency ratio are now core issues in Singapore’s politics. Demographer Jean Yeung has noted that because the marriage rate is the primary predictor of local birth rates, fewer unions will almost certainly mean fewer children. The shift touches the family support system directly, with the number of seniors living alone more than doubling in the past decade.

Despite policies aimed at encouraging fertility, most existing support only kicks in after marriage rather than making marriage itself more attainable. Broader directions being floated include reducing work-life imbalance, easing housing accessibility for young adults, and even potential matchmaking services. Mathews has flagged the newly convened Marriage and Parenthood Reset Workgroup as timely, aimed at workplace norms, housing transitions, and the pressures young adults associate with marriage.

Singapore’s experience may also foreshadow demographic challenges emerging across Southeast Asia. Thailand officially became a “fully aged society” in 2024, with people aged 60 and above accounting for more than one-fifth of its population, while recording fewer than half a million births for the first time. Thai policymakers have similarly linked delayed marriage and declining fertility to rising living costs and economic uncertainty. Indonesia is witnessing a comparable shift. Its 2025 Intercensal Population survey found that the average age of first marriage for women increased from 23.1 years in 2015 to 25.1 years in 2025, with the most pronounced changes occurring in Jakarta and other highly urbanized regions where female education and workforce participation have expanded rapidly.

These trends reflect a broader ASEAN shift driven by urbanization, higher education, and economic pressures. As demographic challenges grow, governments must find ways to support marriage and family formation without forcing young people to choose between financial security and parenthood.


Jennifer is a final-year International Relations student at the Singapore Institute of Management, where she focuses on political engagement, diplomacy, and community governance. She is an active volunteer in her constituency, working closely with residents to understand local concerns, facilitate dialogue, and support community initiatives.

The Philippines 🇵🇭

The Next Digital Divide Is Access to Artificial Intelligence

by Glenn Vincent N. Boquilon, in Angeles City

For a long time, one of the biggest challenges in education was the digital divide.

In those days, the difference was simple. The divide meant that some schools had access to computers, the internet, and digital tools, while others did not. But as technology continues to evolve rapidly, a new gap may be emerging. This challenge is no longer only about who has internet access. It may soon be about who has access to artificial intelligence (AI).

AI is becoming part of how education systems operate. Around the world, schools are exploring how AI can support teachers, improve decision-making, and better support learners. Despite that, access to these tools remains disparate. Countries that can adopt AI responsibly may gain an advantage, while others risk being left behind.

This challenge is becoming more relevant in Southeast Asia. The region has made some progress in digital transformation, but differences remain between countries and communities. Some education systems have stronger digital infrastructure and research capabilities, while others continue to face challenges in connectivity and resources. As AI becomes more common, these differences could create a new form of inequality.

The Philippines is beginning to explore how AI can address long-standing education challenges. Through the Education Center for AI Research (ECAIR), AI is being developed for practical use in schools. Projects such as SIGLA use AI-assisted screening to identify learners who may need nutrition interventions. SIBOL explores how data and AI can help optimize new library hub investments. Other projects, such as LIGTAS, use technology to support school disaster preparedness and risk assessment.

These initiatives show that AI does not have to replace teachers or existing traditional systems. Alternatively, it can become a tool that helps education administrators make better decisions and respond faster to challenges. The value of AI is not only in the technology itself, but in how it is applied to real-world problems.

Nonetheless, access to AI is not only a question of technology. It is also a question of governance. As more governments adopt AI systems, they must consider how data is collected, how decisions are made, and how people are protected. Without proper safeguards, AI could create new risks, especially when used in areas involving children and public services.

Across Southeast Asia, many countries are starting to develop policies and frameworks to guide responsible AI use. Singapore introduced its Model AI Governance Framework to promote safe and trustworthy AI adoption. Other countries, including Malaysia and Indonesia, have also released national AI strategies focused on innovation and responsible development. At the regional level, ASEAN adopted the ASEAN Guide on AI Governance and Ethics to encourage cooperation among member states.

These initiatives highlight an important reality. The future of AI will not only depend on who develops the most advanced technology. It will also depend on who can use it responsibly. For education systems, this means ensuring that AI further supports teachers, protects learner well-being, and improves access to quality education.

The first digital divide was about access to the internet. The next may be about access to AI. Addressing this gap will require more than technology. It will require strong governance, regional cooperation, and a commitment to ensuring that AI serves learners across Southeast Asia.


Glenn holds a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from the University of Santo Tomas. His experience spans governance programs, policy development, and political research, having worked with the Ateneo School of Government and WR Numero Research on projects focused on electoral reform, public opinion, and regional development. He also helped coordinate the drafting of the Bangsamoro Local Government Code and supported the Academy of Multiparty Democracy.

Vietnam 🇻🇳

From Volume to Value

by Tri Vo, in Ho Chi Minh City

Note: This article was first published in Issue 31 of the Pacific Corridor newsletter.

The end of 2025 also signified the end of the beginning of a period of incredible changes in Vietnam. Under the direction of To Lam, the General Secretary of the Communist Party, Hanoi has articulated a vision for a distinct “Era of Rise,” signaling a departure from the more cautious approach of administrations past and toward a more aggressive expansion agenda. This new spirit was reflected in the recent GDP growth target of at least 10% for 2026 approved by the National Assembly, a figure that far exceeds the forecasts of international financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund.

The preliminary economic data of Vietnam in 2025 confirms that the rationale for this ambitious target is not without foundation. Indeed, the economy was on track to close 2025 with growth exceeding 8%, driven by a manufacturing sector that expanded by 9.5%. Crucially, total export turnover is projected to hit a record US$470 billion, marking a 16% increase year-on-year despite the global trade tumults in 2025, the most notable of which is the major rise in US tariff rates — one of, if not the largest, export markets for Vietnam.

However, the “Era of Rise” sees growth not merely as the expansion in volume but also as a progression in the quality of it. Recent debates have centered on escapingthe processing trap, i.e., the reliance on the low-rung, low-value assembly for foreign direct investment firms as an engine for growth.

The first few signs that signal this shift could be seen in the agricultural and forestry sectors. On 22 December, the Vietnam Administration of Forestry officially launched the “Vietnam Wood” certification mark. As noted by industry leaders at the launch, this is a critical step to standardizing quality and to securing firmer footing in markets that place a high emphasis on quality as well as environmental and social responsibility, like the EU, rather than competing solely on the basis of price competitiveness.

Simultaneously, the technology sector is pivoting from “outsourcing” to “solution generation.” At the Vietnam-Asia Smart City Summit 2025 held in Hanoi on 23 December, the focus shifted entirely to artificial intelligence (AI) as the new “core engine” for urban governance. Policymakers and tech giants discussed deploying AI not just as a supporting tool for efficiency, but to solve critical governmental and operational bottlenecks that threaten to stifle major urban centers, Vietnam’s economic engines, and by extension, the lofty 10% growth target for 2026.

Yet, while the macroeconomic indicators for 2025 are robust, the success of the “Era of Rise” in 2026 and beyond will depend almost entirely on further “institutional breakthroughs” within the Vietnamese state to further accommodate and buttress the ambitious growth target. As such, 2026 will likely see further reforms in the administrative and fiscal fields on a scale similar to those seen in 2025 to cement the momentum gained as of now. Such reforms might engender some initial disruptions, but if the past is prologue, they, like those in 2025, will be the propellant with which Vietnam can move up in a world of increasing disruptions, where what has worked as of now will prove inadequate in the face of upheaval.


Tri has experience in management consulting and strategy, having worked with institutions such as the UNDP, The Asia Group, and ARC Group. He has provided strategic, legal, and operational insights to clients in sectors including manufacturing, energy, and technology. He holds both academic and professional experience related to Southeast and East Asia, with a focus on regional development and policy.

Editorial Deadline 14/07/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

By Ley Hlaing

“Nationalism is power-hunger tempered by self-deception,” says George Orwell. This observation resonates deeply in the context of Myanmar’s ethnic conflicts.
For over a decade, the air in Myanmar has been thick with the rhetoric of “protection.” From the saffron-robed leaders of now-rebranded nationalist movements to the highest ranks of the military council, the rallying cry has remained constant: Amyo, Batha, Thathana—Race, Religion, and the Buddhist Institute’s Teaching of Religion. To these self-proclaimed guardians, the survival of the Myanmar identity is under constant and existential threat. However, a closer look at the geographical focus of their outrage reveals a glaring, hypocritical void. While these groups claim that Myanmar is being “swallowed,” they seem only to care if the throat doing the swallowing belongs to a religious minority. When it comes to the massive, systemic expansion of Chinese influence and the literal loss of territory in Northern Shan State, the “lions” of Myanmar nationalism such as Sitagu and Wiyathu become mere bystanders by staying silent.

This hypocrisy is best encapsulated by the slogan found in almost every immigration office across the country: “မြေမြို၍ လူမျိုး မပြို၊ လူမြိုမှ လူမျိုးပြိုမည်” [Mye-myo-ywe Lu-myo-ma-pyôk Lu-myo-hma Lu-myo-pyôk-mi (translation: Quicksand will not swallow culture and race, outsiders will swallow up the nation into extinction)]. Following the establishment of Myanmar’s Ministry of Immigration and Population as a separate ministry in 1995, this slogan became institutionalized as the ministry’s official motto and was prominently displayed in immigration offices across the country, reinforcing a state-sponsored narrative that framed demographic change as an existential threat to the nation. This motto has been weaponized for years to justify the marginalization of Myanmar’s Muslim population, framing them as a demographic “invader” that threatens to dilute the Bamar-Buddhist bloodline. Yet, as of 2026, the most significant “swallowing” of the Myanmar race and land is not happening through prayer mats or interfaith marriages; it is happening through the rapid “sinicization” of the northern frontier.

Operation 1027, launched by the Three Brotherhood Alliance in October 2023, fundamentally reshaped the territorial landscape of northern Shan State. The Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA’s) capture of key centres, including Lashio and Kokang, followed by China-mediated negotiations and ceasefire arrangements in late 2025, underscored both the erosion of Naypyidaw’s authority and Beijing’s growing influence over the conflict’s trajectory. In areas under its control, MNDAA has replaced local Ta’ang‑language signage with Chinese characters in more than 12 villages and has been incorporating Han Chinese in daily administrations. Furthermore, both the MNDAA and the United Wa State Army (UWSA), which has long maintained close ties with China while also sustaining a pragmatic relationship with successive Myanmar military authorities, have been accused of facilitating Beijing’s expanding strategic influence in northern Myanmar.

In these regions, the political gravity of Beijing is far stronger than that of Naypyidaw, to the point that the Chinese yuan is often the preferred currency, and Chinese infrastructure dictates the economy. Even during fuel shortages in central Myanmar, some border areas reportedly remained supplied through Chinese-linked trade networks, underlining where their economic lifelines now run. If the ultra-nationalists were truly concerned about “the race being swallowed,” they would be campaigning against the unchecked inflow of foreign capital and the de facto administrative control China exerts over Myanmar’s borderlands. Instead, there is a deafening silence.

To understand this selective patriotism, one must look back at the “unholy nexus” formed during the Than Shwe era of the 1990s and 2000s. After the 1988 uprising and the subsequent international isolation, the military regime survived primarily through a “Pauk-Phaw” (blood brother) relationship with Beijing. China provided the billion-dollar weapons pipeline, the infrastructure projects, and the diplomatic shield at the United Nations that kept the junta alive.

During this period, the military and its proxy nationalist monks carefully constructed a narrative of “Buddhist Brotherhood” with China to make this dependency agreeable. They utilized “Relic Diplomacy,” parading the Sacred Tooth Relic from China across Myanmar in 1994, 1996, and 2011. These high-profile religious tours served a dual purpose: they gave the military regime religious legitimacy and framed the Communist superpower not as an atheist threat, but as a “brotherly” Buddhist neighbor. This “brotherhood” effectively immunized China from nationalist critique. In the eyes of the ultra-nationalists, a Chinese person—framed as a cultural and religious cousin—cannot “swallow” the race, even if they control the economy and the land. Only the “Kalar” (a derogatory term used for Muslims) is cast as the alien existential threat.

This brings us to the most cynical aspect of the nationalist agenda: convenience. It is safe, easy, and politically profitable to bully a domestic minority that has no state protector and no army. Rallies against Muslims provide the military with a convenient distraction from its own failures and a way to manufacture a false sense of Bamar unity. Conversely, criticizing China is dangerous. The current military council is more dependent on Beijing today for its survival than at any point in history. Since the ultra-nationalist monks are largely funded by or ideologically aligned with military interests, they cannot bite the hand that feeds their patrons.

The result is a warped version of patriotism where “sovereignty” is only a concern when it involves a mosque, but is ignored when it involves a foreign superpower dictating the terms of a national ceasefire or managing a strategic economic corridor. The “protection” they offer is a myth. They are not protecting the Amyo (race); they are protecting a specific power structure that requires a scapegoat to survive. Their silence suggests that they are either unwilling or unable to defend not only race and religion, but also Myanmar’s language, culture, territory, rivers, and mountains when these are perceived to be compromised through the military’s growing dependence on China. This criticism is frequently linked to projects such as the proposed Myitsone Dam on the Irrawaddy River.

If the nationalists truly believed that a race will be destroyed when it is swallowed by another, they would look north with the same bitterness they direct toward the west and the south. The very land they claimed to cherish is increasingly reshaped through external influence over its language, culture, and everyday governance, as the military leadership deepened its reliance on China to sustain its hold on power.

The silence of the ultra-nationalists in the face of China’s expansion is the ultimate proof of their bias. Their agenda is not about the survival of the Buddhist faith or the Myanmar people; it is a tool of statecraft designed to divide the nation.

True patriotism requires defending the country from all threats—especially the ones that come with a checkbook and a veto at the UN. Until these groups find their voice regarding the northern border, their claim to be “protectors” should be treated as what it is: a hollow excuse for hate.

Subscribe now

by by Siu Tzyy Wei, Lead Editor - Maritime Crescent Desk

Some threads fray quietly long before the fabric gives way.

In Johor, voters tested the seams of Malaysia’s political coalitions ahead of a general election still to come. In Brunei, a wage gap wide enough to send jobseekers into Australia’s fruit fields is pulling at a labour system already stretched thin. In Indonesia, prosecutors, police and now soldiers are yanking at the same thread of corruption enforcement, each pulling to protect their own.

None of these threads have snapped yet, but pull on enough of them, and the pattern starts to come undone.

Malaysia 🇲🇾

The Johor Test

by Sydney Gan, in Kuala Lumpur

Barisan Nasional (BN) has officially won the Johor state election held on 11 July 2026, securing a total of 48 out of 56 seats to form a simple majority state government. This victory boosts BN as a strong contender in the upcoming state and federal elections, while increasing pressure on Pakatan Harapan (PH) to rebuild its urban, non-Malay support, as BN’s Malay-coalition power aggregates.

While BN was naturally expected to win, with Johor deemed its birthplace, the scale of victory is significant. Johor serves as an important litmus test of whether BN could rebuild its political power to what it once was. The results have strengthened BN’s bargaining position within the federal government and provided political momentum for BN ahead of the Negeri Sembilan elections. It also demonstrates the Malay voter base as its traditional stronghold, with high turnout in BN-dominated areas, and a continued confidence in BN’s results-oriented leadership in the state, especially with Onn Hafiz on the helm as Menteri Besar.

Opposition coalition Perikatan Nasional (PN) failed to retain the three seats it won in 2022, with BN reclaiming Bukit Kepong, Maharani and Endau. The result suggests that the fallout between Bersatu and Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) has pushed a significant share of Malay support back towards BN. This was reinforced by PAS’s call for its supporters to back BN in constituencies where PN was not contesting. The outcome strengthens the narrative of Malay-majority consolidation, which poses one of the most significant long-term threats to Anwar Ibrahim’s coalition government. Similar political arrangements between BN and PAS may emerge in future state and federal elections.

Pakatan Harapan (PH) managed to retain several core Chinese strongholds, including Bentayan, Skudai, Penggaram, Mengkibol and Senai. It also retained Malay seat representation through Amanah in Simpang Jeram and PKR in Puteri Wangsa. However, PH has demonstrated weakness in securing mixed constituencies, as non-Malay confidence in parties such as Democratic Action Party (DAP) visibly wanes. This was compounded by lower turnout in minority-heavy seats such as Perling, Tangkak and Bekok, where participation fell below 60%. The result follows PH’s setback in Sabah, where it failed to win any seats despite previously holding six. Although Bersama failed to secure sufficient support and all its candidates lost their deposits, PH has accused the party of splitting the opposition vote in constituencies such as Perling and Bukit Batu. Bersama’s presence may therefore have indirectly strengthened BN by fragmenting anti-BN support – a trend that may be noted across upcoming state pollings as well.

The stability of the federal unity government will depend on the ability of Ahmad Zahid Hamidi and Anwar Ibrahim to separate state-level competition from federal cooperation. Zahid has reaffirmed BN’s commitment to the unity government, but BN’s stronger political position may lead it to demand greater power at the federal level. The Negeri Sembilan election, expected on 1 August, will be the next major test. Unlike Johor, Negeri Sembilan is jointly governed by PH and BN, with PH holding the leading position.


Sydney holds a Bachelor of Laws from King’s College London, where she focused on Human Rights Law, Criminology, and Public & Administrative Law. She is an Analyst at Asia Group Advisors, providing policy analysis and strategic guidance across the tech, sustainability, and gaming sectors in Southeast Asia. Prior to joining AGA, she worked in the social development sector in London, contributing to the Ukraine Judicial Training Programme through research on war crimes adjudication and the development of a legal training curriculum with high court magistrates.

Support Us

Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳

The Fine Print Comes Due

by Maryam Zulaidi

The lack of career advancements, job opportunities and vacancies among Bruneians has left many frustrated especially amid the rising cost of living. Indiscriminately between pursuers of higher education and those without a degree, such a reality has pushed many to migrate overseas in search of opportunities to better their standard of living, and for some, to send back remittances to their families at home. On the surface, this brain drain might seem harmless.

Given Brunei’s relatively high proportion of educated citizens, one may assume these emigrants are taking up professional or tertiary-sector roles abroad. However, that is simply not the case. According to accounts circulating in Bruneian online communities, many are instead opting to do manual labour; fruit picking in Australia being a popular choice. With an estimated earning of approximately AUD1,200 per week, individuals can accumulate a total of AUD5,000 per month - and reportedly untaxed, since the work is undeclared. This contrasts the minimum wage a civil servant earns per month in Brunei, which is BND500 (roughly AUD560), therefore appealing to local jobseekers. It is important to note that these figures are solely anecdotal, sourced to personal testimony rather than official data, but the pattern described is consistent enough across accounts to be worth taking seriously.

The Bruneian passport grants easy, low-friction entry to Australia via the ETA Subclass 601, where a visitor is permitted to stay for no longer than 3 months. Additionally, Brunei also qualifies for the Frequent Traveller stream of the standard visitor visa Subclass 600, which extends up to 10 years of multi-entry access also capped at 3 months per stay. Both visa types strictly mention the prohibition of business visitors to work or offer services to another individual, enterprise or organisation. From the same community thread, this isn’t a one-off overstay pattern but rather, a cycle. An increasing number of people work through the three-month visa window, fly home once it lapses, temporarily stay in Brunei, then return to Australia and then repeat.

Constant violations of the Australian Immigration Laws prompts visas to be cancelled under Section 116 of the Migration Act 1958. Thus, it will only make the visa process for ordinary Bruneian travellers — including students, graduates and families going on holiday — more tedious. If this work is normalised in the Bruneian society, genuine travellers are to bear the costs of a problem they take no part in as well as a possible strain to the bilateral relations. Yet not everyone in these communities is untroubled by the practice, pushback against those who encourage it suggests even Bruneians abroad know the loophole won’t hold.


Maryam is a first-year International Relations and Politics student at the University of Sheffield, with an academic focus on Southeast Asia—particularly Maritime Southeast Asia—and the Middle East. She aspires to a career in diplomacy and academia and is committed to fostering international dialogue and advancing scholarly engagement with global issues. Beyond her academic work, she pursues creative interests and voluntary initiatives that broaden her perspectives on public service.

Indonesia 🇮🇩

Romance of the Three Kingdoms

by Rayhan Prabu Kusumo, in Jakarta

On the night of July 8, soldiers with long rifles took up posts at the gate of a house in Kebayoran Baru, Jakarta belonging to Febrie Adriansyah, the Deputy Attorney General for Special Crimes. Forty kilometres away, at a second house he owns in Bogor, police were pulling seventy-four kilograms of gold and foreign cash worth 476 billion rupiah from a safe behind a wall. A week earlier, his office had named an active police general a suspect in the school-meals graft case.

Indonesia does not run one anti-corruption effort. The police, the prosecutors, and the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) can each pursue graft, and no clear rule decides who handles whom. For years the KPK was the strongest. After its powers were cut back in 2019, the prosecutors’ special-crimes unit became the aggressive arm, taking apart case after case, while the police kept theirs too.

When one of these bodies moves on the other’s people, the other can move back, because nothing above them settles the order. This is not new. A decade ago the KPK and the police fought openly, the small agency against the big one, and the public called it “the gecko against the crocodile.”

When the enforcers fight each other, enforcement itself becomes the weapon, and that is the damage. Every move against corruption can now be read two ways at once, as a genuine case or as a reply to one, and the public has no way to separate them. Most are probably both, which is precisely the problem, because the ambiguity never resolves.

The sequence teaches every official the same lesson, that the way to blunt an investigation is to open one of your own. A corruption case stops turning on evidence and starts turning on which institution moves first, and which has the heavier force behind it. The people who ought to fear these agencies are the corrupt. Instead the agencies fear each other.

For the ordinary citizen, the turf war itself is not the real worry. The state’s instruments of force, the police, the prosecutors, and now the army, no longer stand neutral above the citizen. Each answers to its own interest, and each can aim coercive power at the others. The promise of law is that it falls the same on everyone, enforced by a state that sits outside the quarrel. When the enforcers are themselves the quarrel, that promise thins, because which case is chased and which is buried starts to depend on alliances no outsider can see.

And when soldiers become one of the parties, the line drawn in 1998 - where the military stays out of civilian affairs - is being redrawn quietly. When the next big case disappears, the question will be whether it lacked evidence or protected the wrong people. In the old story, the three kingdoms fought until the country was exhausted, and a fourth power inherited the ruins. Today, the kingdoms here are still fighting, and the ruins would be inherited by ordinary Indonesians.


Rayhan has a background in government affairs and public policy, with experience across government institutions and advisory firms. His work focuses on the intersection of geopolitics, policy, and risk, with expertise in advocacy, regulatory analysis, and stakeholder engagement. He holds a degree in Government from Universitas Padjadjaran, and has completed an exchange at Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Spain, focusing on global politics and sustainability.

Editorial Deadline 11/07/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk

When budgets are tight, what a government chooses to fund says as much as what it cuts. In Myanmar, the junta is bankrolling a USD 1.5 million royal epic amid economic hardship, and critics say the real cost is history rewritten to flatter the military. In Cambodia, a record USD 6 billion microfinance portfolio is masking a debt crisis, one made sharper by displacement from last year's border conflict with Thailand. Laos, meanwhile, has just made poverty reduction its top national priority — a bold pledge from a government the IMF already rates as being in debt distress. And in Thailand, officials are moving to overhaul civil servant healthcare benefits, the latest attempt to rein in a budget where welfare spending now eats up nearly 38% of the total. Four countries, one question running underneath: when the money doesn't stretch far enough, who decides what gets funded — and who pays for what doesn't?

Myanmar 🇲🇲

Behind Myanmar’s Big Budget Konbaung Dynasty Film

by Ley Hlaing

Myanmar’s entertainment world has been currently divided over a massive new film project about the Konbaung Dynasty, which was the country’s last royal family. While the project is being marketed as a source of national pride, many critics believe it is a high-priced propaganda tool designed to serve the military junta’s narrative.

Officially announced during a media launch on 2 June 2026, the production is a five-part series that has been in the planning stages for about two years, although the creators say the dream for the film started fifteen years ago. The production team aims to release the first film in 2027. To support this large project, they are building a permanent 20-acre studio near Mandalay and Pyin Oo Lwin that is designed to look like a historic town where tourists can eventually visit.

The financial data behind this film is staggering for Myanmar’s current economy, with a total budget estimated between 8 and 10 billion kyats, which is roughly 1.5 million US dollars. To show the supposed glory of the old empire, the film will use real gold and genuine jewels for the royal costumes. Producers are also using advanced technology like Computer Generated Imagery and Artificial Intelligence to recreate historical battles and palace scenes on a scale never seen before in local cinema. Surprisingly, the film also features a massive cast, including nearly 100 famous stars and a total of over 600 male actors and more than 30 lead female roles. Well-known actors such as Nine Nine, Nay Toe, and Myint Myat have been cast in major roles as kings and historical heroes.

Beneath the surface of this big-budget project, there are deep concerns about the “propaganda machine” running the film. One of the main companies involved is the Shwe Mann Empire, which is led by Wai Min Maung. He is known to be a close associate of Khin Thiri Thet Mon, who is the daughter of the junta chief Min Aung Hlaing. Because she was a co-founder of a previous film company that is now under international sanctions, many people see this new project as a way to bypass boycotts and move military money into the arts. Critics argue that spending billions of kyats on a state-sponsored film during a time of extreme economic hardship and inflation is a calculated attempt to distract the public with a version of history that favors the military.

The film’s focus on a “Great Burmese Empire” is being called a tool for “Burmanization,” which promotes a history that puts one ethnic group at the center while ignoring or insulting others. A major point of anger is the casting of Nay Toe, a famous actor from the Rakhine ethnic group, as King Bodawpaya. Historically, King Bodawpaya is remembered for his brutal conquest of the Rakhine Kingdom and the theft of the sacred Mahamuni Buddha image and set it in Mandalay. Using a Rakhine actor to play the very king who oppressed his own people is seen by many as a shameless insult to Rakhine culture and a deliberate attempt to mock ethnic history. Ultimately, observers warn that this film is less about historical truth and more about rebranding the military’s image through expensive fiction.

Ley Hlaing is a former Political Science student from the University of Yangon, Myanmar. Currently, he is pursuing his BA at Parami University with a major in Philosophy, Politics and Economics. His academic and professional interests span community development, literature, minority issues, and social impact research. Having held roles as Research Assistant, Student Mentor, and Facilitator for local initiatives, he has constantly supported project management in literature and education programs in Myanmar.

Cambodia 🇰🇭

Cambodia Microfinance Portfolio Surpasses USD 6 Billion Amid Debt Risks and Border Fallout

by Sokna Thea, in Phnom Penh

Cambodia’s microfinance sector reached a historic milestone in 2025, with the total outstanding loan portfolio hitting USD 6 billion, up more than 15 percent from the year before. Deposits at the country’s four licensed Microfinance Deposit-Taking Institutions (MDIs) climbed 17.6 % to USD 2.99 billion. The sector served 1.53 million active borrowers and 2.21 million depositors through 950 offices and 22,531 staff.

Women accounted for 61 % of active borrowers and 63 percent of depositors, underlining the sector’s role in financial inclusion. Riel-denominated loans reached USD 1.4 billion, or 23.3 % of the total portfolio, while riel savings hit USD 393 million, reflecting steady public trust in the national currency.

But the headline growth masks serious household stress. Non-performing loans across Cambodia’s financial system rose to USD 4.7 billion, or 8.1 % of total loans, by June 2025, the highest level in years. A study commissioned by the Cambodia Microfinance Association itself found that 15 % of Cambodian borrowers spend more than 70 % of their monthly income on debt repayments. Cambodia already holds the highest microcredit debt per capita in the world.

These pressures sit inside a weakening economy. The IMF and World Bank both revised Cambodia’s 2025 GDP growth estimate down to 4.8 %, from 6 % in 2024, citing export volatility, slowing remittances, and weaker domestic demand. Average inflation rose to 2.7 %, up from 0.8 % the prior year. The IMF projects a further slowdown to 4.0 % in 2026.

A major shock came from the border conflict with Thailand, which erupted in May 2025, escalated in July and again in December, and displaced more than 500,000 people on both sides. A ceasefire was signed on 27 December 2025 and holds as of mid-2026, though sporadic incidents continue. The conflict disrupted trade and tourism in border provinces, triggered a mass return of Cambodian migrant workers from Thailand, and slashed remittance inflows that many rural households depend on.

The government introduced targeted social assistance for displaced civilians and appointed a working group to restore damaged infrastructure. The Ministry of Economy and Finance ramped up vocational training and job placement for returning workers. The National Bank of Cambodia directed financial institutions to waive fees, penalties, and interest payments for displaced civilians and defer principal repayments in conflict zones. With NPLs already at record highs and households squeezed between debt and lost income, the IMF urged the government to phase out loan forbearance and strengthen oversight of distressed assets before vulnerabilities deepen further.

Sokna has a background in International Affairs and Business & Commercial Law. He’s currently a Senior Project Coordinator at the Ministry of Economy and Finance of Cambodia, working on the Financial Management Information System (FMIS) Project. His professional focus is driven by entrepreneurship, business development, and financial technology, with a particular interest in how private-sector innovation drives Cambodia’s economic growth.

Support Us

Lao PDR 🇱🇦

Poverty Reduction as National Agenda

by Thipphavanh Virakhom, in Vientiane

Laos’ National Assembly adopted a National Agenda on Rural Development and Poverty Reduction for 2027–2030 on 8 July 2026, making poverty reduction the government’s top development priority and targeting 100,000 families lifted out of poverty, with the national rate falling from 14.78 percent to 8 percent. Reading alongside the fiscal and administrative picture around it, the agenda raises questions worth tracking closely over the next four years, not because the goal is unreasonable but because of what achieving it would actually require.

Why does this matter now? Laos adopts the agenda at a moment when its public finances are unusually constrained. The IMF-World Bank Debt Sustainability Analysis released with the 2025 Article IV Consultation assesses Laos as being in external and overall debt distress, with an unsustainable rating reflecting large, protracted breaches of solvency and liquidity thresholds and continued reliance on debt service deferrals. Poverty reduction agendas of this scale typically depend on expanded public spending on health, education, water, and roads; precisely the categories competing against debt service for a limited budget envelope. The agenda’s call for increased domestic and international investment is therefore not a routine planning phrase; it is the central variable that determines whether the 2030 target is reachable at all.

What stage is this at now? The agenda has cleared its highest legislative hurdle, but adoption is a starting point rather than an operational plan. What typically follows in this kind of framework is a set of implementing decrees, budget line allocations tied to specific ministries and provinces, and coordination mechanisms between central agencies and the district and village authorities expected to deliver services locally. None of that machinery has been detailed publicly yet, which means the more meaningful test of the agenda’s seriousness will come in how the 2027 budget cycle actually funds it, not in the target figure itself.

What is beyond the target? Three questions stand out. First, the agenda pairs poverty reduction with “permanent settlement” of rural communities to reduce unplanned migration, while separate labour data shows continuing outmigration to Thailand driven by limited local livelihoods; whether settlement incentives can outweigh that pull is an open empirical question, not a given. Second, the 2025 assessment’s core diagnosis — unstable incomes and dependence on assistance — describes conditions that have persisted across previous planning cycles, so the agenda’s four-year horizon is short relative to the structural nature of the problem it names. Third, an 8 percent poverty rate is only as meaningful as the data system producing it; whether results will be disaggregated by ethnicity, gender, and geography — will determine whether declining averages reflect broad-based improvement or an uneven one.

What would it take? Taken together, these point to what would actually need to happen for the target to be met: a credible medium-term financing strategy that reconciles debt service with new social spending, an operational rollout with clear budget lines by early 2027, and a monitoring system granular enough to show where the remaining 8 percent lives, not just how many families cross the line on paper.


Thipphavanh holds a bachelor’s degree in international affairs. She is a governance and development professional specialising in rule of law, access to justice, and gender equality in Lao PDR. Her work focuses on strengthening justice sector institutions, advancing people-centred governance, and promoting gender-responsive systems. With extensive experience in project coordination, monitoring and evaluation, stakeholder engagement, and strategic communications, she has collaborated closely with national institutions and international partners to support inclusive and sustainable development.

Thailand 🇹🇭

Thailand to Revamp Government Healthcare Perks Amid Stretched Budget

by Satid Sootipunya, in Bangkok

The Thai government is planning to restructure its healthcare benefits for government officials due to the country’s already-stretched public finances.

Deputy Prime Minister Pakorn Nilprapunt last week ordered government stakeholders to urgently study replacing the current direct-reimbursement welfare system for civil servants with a private health insurance one to reduce healthcare-related expenses, following the country’s prolonged budget shortfalls.

For the draft 2027 annual budget, public sector welfare is set to reach 1.4 trillion baht (around USD 42.06 billion), accounting for 37.9% of the total annual budget. Meanwhile, research and development (R&D) spending is set to drop by 72 billion baht (USD 2.16 billion), marking an 8.4% decrease from the previous year.

Besides the standard personnel budget, there are an additional 572.620 billion baht in hidden expenses for civil servants. According to a report from local media outlet Krungthep Turakij, this includes: Healthcare Benefits (94.200 billion baht), Financial Assistance/Welfare (4.670 billion baht), Pensions and Retiring Allowances (389.090 billion baht), Salary Raises and Degree Adjustments (13.000 billion baht), Permanent Wage Earner Contributions (260 million baht), Civil Servant Reserves, Contributions, and Compensations (71.400 billion baht), and Local Government Personnel Expenses (10.2638 billion baht).

For decades, the Thai government has continuously run budget deficits at approx. 3–4% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Roughly 70% of the total government expenditure falls into a hard-to-reduce category, according to research conducted by Thailand’s fiscal policy expert Athiphat Muthitacharoen. A major part of this rigid expenditure is public sector personnel expenses.

Thailand’s Finance Minister Ekniti Nitithanprapas has consistently emphasized the government’s mission since taking office to create responsible state spending and lower the country’s severe fiscal deficits. These deficits have been Thailand’s main economic problem for decades, especially under the relatively low economic growth of the past ten years.

Despite that, S&P Global Ratings recently affirmed Thailand’s sovereign credit rating at BBB+ with a stable economic outlook, noting confidence in the country’s economic fundamentals, reduced external tensions, and clear government policy pathways.


Satid is a multimedia economic journalist and news anchor who covers macroeconomic trends, Thailand’s fiscal policy, and key regional developments for Bangkok Biz. A Journalism graduate from Thammasat University, he has reported on major issues such as the US–China trade tensions, the Myanmar crisis, and global corporate stories, drawing on prior newsroom experience at The Momentum, the Bangkok Post, AFP, and Varasarn Press. His work blends economic analysis, foreign affairs, and digital storytelling, with a strong focus on making complex financial and political topics accessible to Thai audiences.

Editorial Deadline 11/07/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Karen Ysabelle R. David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk

With the world still reeling from the Iran war-induced global energy crisis, few countries have been as affected as the energy insecure Philippines. Fortunately for Manila, it has friends in high places: the World Bank just recently approved a US$1.02-billion loan to support the country’s energy transition. The question now: can it make the most of this windfall?

Meanwhile, Singapore last week just launched its Online Safety Commission to address the frustration of victims of harmful online activity. Once again, the city-state finds itself on the cutting edge of a digital frontier. One can only hope that the rest of Southeast Asia follows suit.

This new development in Singapore’s online landscape leads us to look back on how Vietnam is faring in the global race for digitalization. Just like the former, the latter is dealing with the risks that come with a world that is more digitally connected than ever before, as its e-commerce industry enters a booming new chapter.

The Philippines 🇵🇭

The World Bank’s US$1.02-Billion Bet on Philippine Energy

by Arianne De Guzman, in Bulacan

On 30 June 2026, the World Bank reportedly approved the Second Energy Transition and Climate Resilience Development Policy Loan (DPL), amounting to US$1.02-billion, for the Philippines to support the country’s clean energy deployment, invigorate electricity markets, and improve water management. While this indicates a vote of confidence in the country’s push for affordable electricity and better water services for the Filipinos, is the Philippines prepared to make the most of it?

The timing is significant. The Philippines remains behind in its shift to cleaner energy. According to the Energy Transition Index (ETI) 2026 published by the World Economic Forum, the country ranked 86th out of 120 countries, scoring 52.3 out of 100 — below the global average of 57.3. The report cited challenges in the country’s energy system, sustainability, and the affordability of electricity — issues that continue to burden Filipino households and businesses.

As the Philippines remains dependent on imported fossil fuels and has been exposed to volatile global fuel prices stemming from the geopolitical tensions in the Middle East, President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. has declared a national energy emergency until March 2027. Since the costs of the fuel account for a significant portion of electricity generation, its spikes in global prices are also reflected in Filipinos’ electricity bills.

It is precisely these challenges that the World Bank financing seeks to address. The loan will support key initiatives, including the operationalization of the Renewable Energy Market integration of electric vehicle charging into utility planning, and the launch of the first-ever offshore wind auction, targeting 3.3 gigawatts of contracted capacity by 2030. The World Bank projects that this offshore wind program could mobilize US$7-billion in private investment, which could generate employment opportunities across construction, engineering, and energy services.

However, financing alone cannot guarantee lower electricity prices. Despite the US$20-million being provided as a grant, the US$1-billion comes as a loan that must be repaid. The investment will pay off if the Philippine government can fully implement the planned initiatives on time. Otherwise, delays, possible cost overruns, and weak implementation could increase the country’s debt without even resolving the rising costs of electricity and improving the Philippines’ energy transition readiness.

The urgent need to modernize the country’s energy sector has become evident. The Philippines recently emerged as one of the top spenders on solar panels since the Iran war began. This surge does not stem solely from the rising electricity prices, but also from the country’s enormous renewable energy potential due to its geographic location and archipelagic structure. With abundant solar, wind, and geothermal resources, the Philippines has natural advantages necessary for a more resilient and diversified energy system. Ultimately, the success of the World Bank’s US$1.02-billion financing package will not be measured by the amount provided, but by the reforms it enables.


Arianne has experience in policy research at De La Salle University’s Jesse M. Robredo Institute of Governance, where she contributed to projects on systemic reform. She earned a degree in Political Science from Colegio de San Juan de Letran. Currently, she works in government relations, specializing in advocacy strategy, legislative monitoring, and stakeholder engagement. Beyond her professional work, she is actively involved in youth development and grassroots initiatives through the Rotaract Club of Santa Maria.

Support Us

Singapore 🇸🇬

Singapore's New Online Safety Commission Signals a Shift From Moderation to Enforcement

by Ryan

On 29 June, the Online Safety Commission (OSC) began operations in Singapore, giving the city-state a dedicated statutory agency with the power to compel platforms, group administrators, and individual users to act on harmful online content, rather than merely asking them to. The commission provides victims of online harms in Singapore a dedicated and easily accessible avenue to seek timely redress, and its launch coincided with the coming into force of statutory tort provisions under the Online Safety (Relief and Accountability) Act (OSRAA), which was passed in Parliament on 5 November 2025. The timing matters as much as the substance: Singapore has spent years building a patchwork of online harms legislation, from the Protection from Harassment Act in 2014 to the Online Criminal Harms Act in 2023, but this is the first instance of a regulator built specifically to move faster than the platforms it oversees.

The Commission’s initial mandate is narrow by design. In its first phase of operations, the OSC will support victims affected by five of the most prevalent and severe online harms: online harassment, including online sexual harassment; doxxing; online stalking; intimate image abuse; and image-based child abuse. Eight further categories, including deepfake abuse and online impersonation, are expected to follow at a later stage.

What makes the OSC notable is less the harm that it targets than the accountability structure underneath it. The commission was set up in response to the frustrations of victims of harmful online activity with the slow responses by online platforms, as the OSC has legal authority to compel platforms and group administrators to act quickly. That frustration was not abstract: officials cited platform response times that routinely stretched beyond four days.

The broader significance lies in what this does to the region’s regulatory center of gravity. Singapore’s framework is particularly significant because it demonstrates how Asian jurisdictions are developing independent online governance regimes that may diverge from both the American free speech approach and the European Union’s Digital Services Act model. Elsewhere in ASEAN, the response to platform-driven harm remains fragmented and largely reactive: Malaysia’s own commentators have pointed to Singapore’s Online Criminal Harms Act as a starting point while arguing that a broader, rights-based legal approach would help ASEAN move toward a unified framework for governing AI-enabled abuse. As deepfakes, non-consensual synthetic imagery, and cross-border scam networks increasingly ignore national boundaries, Singapore’s willingness to legislate direct, enforceable duties onto platforms gives the rest of Southeast Asia a live template.

Whether ASEAN member states follow that template individually or attempt something closer to regional coordination will say a great deal about how seriously the bloc intends to treat platform accountability as a shared governance problem. In a region where harmful content moves across borders faster than any single national regulator can chase it, the Commission’s real innovation may not be its enforcement powers at all, but the admission that speed, not scope, is now the measure of a functioning digital state.


Ryan is a final-year finance student at the Singapore University of Social Sciences (SUSS) with experience across venture capital, venture debt, and business development. He also holds a diploma in Law and Management from Temasek Polytechnic. His interests lie in how emerging technologies and economic trends shape business ecosystems and regional development in Asia.

Vietnam 🇻🇳

A New Chapter for E-Commerce

by Hang Nguyen, in Ho Chi Minh City

Due to the global race for digitalization, along with a surge in demand caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, e-commerce industries in Vietnam have experienced expansive growth within the last half decade. Shopee, TikTok Shop, Lazada, and Tiki dominate the country’s e-commercial landscape, with nearly 60% of the population — of various ages, genders, and geographical demographics — accessing these platforms to purchase goods. Vietnam’s e-commerce sector has recorded substantial growth and demonstrated robust performance: market value reached US$25 billion (20% growth) in 2024, ranking third in Southeast Asia, while entering the list of Top 5 economies leading in e-commerce growth in 2022.

The Vietnam E-commerce and Digital Economy Agency (VEDEA), under the Ministry of Industry and Trade (MoIT), recognizes the instrumental role of this industry in national and economic development, but simultaneously acknowledges that the accelerating pace of growth has presented opportunities as well as revealed many complications. E-commercial regulations have been anchored by only two government decrees: Decree No. 52/2013/ND-CP dated 16 May 2013, and the subsequently supplementing Decree No. 85/2021/ND-CP dated 25 September 2021. These documents lacked sufficient legal capacity, whereas Vietnam e-commerce markets were in need of control to ensure stable maturity. On 10 December 2025, the National Assembly voted to pass the Law on E-commerce, consisting of seven chapters and 41 articles to become effective on 1 July 2026.

The law acts as a “shield” in Vietnam’s transition from “rapid growth” toward “quality growth”, circumventing evident issues in Vietnam’s digital environment. Mr. Hoang Quang Phong, Vice Chairman of the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VCCI), highlighted the concerns regarding smuggling, trade fraud, and the online sale of counterfeit, fake and low-quality products. Dishonest e-commercial activities destroy customer trust, harm legitimate businesses, and expose consumers to health risks and meticulous digital scams. In 2025, VEDEA reported banning the operation of 13,700 violating shops on e-commerce platforms for counterfeit, banned, or untraceable products.

The Law on E-commerce introduces transparency into the legal framework, by unprecedentedly classifying four types of platforms with corresponding legal responsibilities: direct business e-commerce platforms; intermediary e-commerce platforms; social networks operating in e-commerce; and joint e-commerce platforms. The law imposes the obligation for e-commerce platforms to disclose ownership, data protection policies, the rights and obligations of parties, and algorithm criteria for product display; all sellers’ identity must be electronically verified. New provisions have also been established to fill the legal gaps existing with livestream sales and affiliate marketing, an emerging and rising domain, such as the prohibition of misleading product information by live streamers. The safety nets enacted by the law promises Vietnam’s economic track towards green, circular, and sustainable development.

However, considerations towards online vendors’ rights should also be discussed. The frequent additions of fees and regulations with shorter implementation deadlines strain sellers’ capacity and spike the competitive market. Mindful market growth must warrant the survivability of e-commercial businesses rather than favoritism towards consumers. Southeast Asia and ASEAN can provide valuable models, markets, and resources for Hanoi to enhance its national model for e-commerce, including the ASEAN Agreement on Electronic Commerce (2019), the ASEAN Digital Integration Framework (DIF), and the ASEAN Coordinating Committee on Electronic Commerce (ACCEC), among others.


Hang is a young researcher with academic experience in Vietnam and the United States. She has previously worked in public relations at the U.S. Consulate General in Ho Chi Minh City and the YSEALI Academy. Her research focuses on ASEAN centrality in the evolving Asia-Pacific landscape, with particular attention to Vietnam’s approach to trade, regional cooperation, and political economy in the face of external power dynamics and global volatility.

Editorial Deadline 07/07/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Siu Tzyy Wei, Lead Editor - Maritime Crescent Desk

This week, the Maritime Crescent finds itself crouched at the starting line of change, ready to accelerate.

In Indonesia, Nadiem Makarim’s sentencing shows what happens when attempts at reform outpaces the laws meant to protect it. Normally seen as the quiet whisper of the region, Brunei recently raised its voice for a regional infrastructure in tackling digital extremism sentiment. In a revisit of Malaysia’s story, new generation of doctors continue running full speed for the lives of their patients amidst a healthcare system long overdue for an upgrade.

This week’s stories move at different speeds but toward the same finish line: a region learning that standing still is no longer an option.

Indonesia 🇮🇩

The Cost of Competence

by Muhammad Rayhansyah Jasin

On June 30, the Jakarta Corruption Criminal Court sentenced Nadiem Anwar Makarim — GoJek founder and Indonesia’s former Minister of Education and Culture (2019–2024) — to 10 years in prison for his alleged corruption in dealing with the Chromebook procurement program for schools that occurred between 2019-2022. The verdict: a fine of Rp1 billion and Rp 809 billions of restitution money, due within a month of the sentencing, or face an additional five years of jail time. The court stated that the Chromebook procurement had been shaped by Google’s influence and ended up profiting Gojek to which Nadiem had claimed no involvement whatsoever. He has vowed to appeal, arguing that the case rests on an investigative error that overlooked how the procurement had actually saved money for the digitalization program. Despite no evidence of money flow towards Nadiem’s personal wealth, the judges reasoned that Nadiem’s decision still resulted in state financial loss and went against the corruption eradication goal. Notably, one of the five presiding judges dissented, stating that Nadiem’s malicious intention was never proven as stated in the public indictment.

Since his September 2025 arrest, Nadiem’s case drew significant public attention; from failed pre-trial appeal to overturn his suspect designation to repeated suspensions of court proceedings, and alleged intimidation tactics after military personnel were dispatched during Nadiem’s indictment session. Two dozen members of academia and anti-corruption NGOs also filed a legal brief by external parties in support of Nadiem, arguing that corruption charges should hinge on proven intent to enrich oneself or associates and not merely on the existence of state losses. Nadiem’s conviction risks criminalizing ordinary policy judgment calls, chilling future bureaucratic reform. Although the court accepted the plea, the verdict’s central reasoning was not that Nadiem made the wrong decision, but rather that the whole decision-making process had violated standard operating procedure and constituted systematic abuse of power.

Foreign investors have watched closely this trial and Nadiem’s verdict could add growing concerns over the fragility of rule-of-law in Southeast Asia’s largest economy. Predictability of doing business in Indonesia has been in limbo as President Prabowo Subianto’s militaristic leadership style chips away at the private sector. As Nadiem’s case became the latest display of prosecution against talented Indonesians that push against bureaucratic traditions, international confidence in Indonesia’s institutional capacity continues to dwindle in the face of authoritarian overreach that seems to conflate unlucky decisions with white collar crime. When that line is blurred, the risk is not just to one former minister or future political appointees, it is to the willingness of any public officials to take real transformative action in reforming bureaucracy. Which standard wins out in a given policy environment may depend less on legal doctrine than political alignments - a new battleground for future decisions.


Rayhan is pursuing an Erasmus Mundus Joint Master’s Degree in Public Policy at Central European University and the Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals. He holds a Bachelor of Social Sciences in International Relations and Political Economy from Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University. His current research focuses on the socio-economic impacts of Indonesia’s nickel mining industry on local communities and national development.

Support Us

Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳

Brunei, the SOCTPF, and CT Cooperation

by Wira Gregory Ejau, in Bandar Seri Begawan

On June 23 in Bangkok, Brunei and Thailand co-chaired the fifth Sub-Regional Counter-Terrorism Policy Forum (SOCTPF), bringing together senior officials from the eight countries - Australia, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand to address terrorism and violent extremism, with a specific focus on the digital domain. Brunei’s delegation was led by Acting Permanent Secretary for Security and Law at the Prime Minister’s Office, Awang Zulhusam bin Haji Abdul Samad.

The SOCTPF sits beneath the Sub-Regional Meeting on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Security at the ministerial level, and has operated since 2021 as the senior officials’ mechanism for translating that ministerial mandate into practical sub-regional cooperation. Notably, its membership includes Australia and New Zealand, both Five Eyes partners, participating alongside six Southeast Asian states in a forum that bridges Indo-Pacific CT cooperation across intelligence-sharing traditions and regional security architectures that do not always operate from common assumptions.

The substantive focus of the meeting was the accelerating use of digital infrastructure. Encrypted applications, gaming platforms, AI-generated content, and deepfakes by extremist networks for radicalisation and recruitment were discussed at length. While these are not novel concerns, the forum’s treatment of them has matured to center on building shared analytical tools for measuring and monitoring the conditions where radicalisation occurs online.

The most significant specific outcome is Brunei’s proposal for a Sub-Regional Sentiment Analysis Framework, which is a mechanism designed to operationalise the forum’s existing Glossary of Extremist Content Online into a common reference standard for tracking extremism sentiment across the sub-region’s digital spaces. The prior generation of sub-regional CT work concentrated on intelligence exchange, legal frameworks, and the movement of individuals. What Brunei is proposing is a shared methodological infrastructure of a mechanism for measuring the environment that produces threats. That is a more sophisticated and arguably more durable instrument, and it positions the SOCTPF’s outputs within a broader evidence-based policy framework at a time when the ASEAN Bali Work Plan on radicalisation and violent extremism is due for renewal.

Brunei has no significant domestic terrorism problem, and does not bring to this forum the operational depth of Indonesia who has dismantled major networks and prosecuted hundreds of terrorism cases, or the intelligence weight of the Five Eyes members at the table. Instead, it provides a level of institutional investment and analytical initiative through the Sentiment Analysis Framework. This contribution may yet prove to be technically ambitious, regionally applicable, and developed by a state whose value in the forum is not derived from the scale of the threat it faces at home.

Brunei will host the 6th SOCTPF in Bandar Seri Begawan in 2027, co-chaired with Malaysia, with the framework as its intended key deliverable. Whether the mechanism achieves the sub-regional uptake required to make it operationally meaningful will depend on how consistently the eight member states can align their definitions, data standards, and monitoring practices, but the 2027 forum will be Brunei’s moment to show whether the proposal survives translation from concept into shared regional practice.


Gregory is an MSc candidate in Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He works as a freelance writer specializing in international history, conflict, and counterterrorism, with experience in academia, investigative journalism, and voluntary uniformed service. He currently provides research assistance with the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) under their Southeast Asian Security and Defence Internship Programme and conducts investigations on regional security and transnational crime for a confidential company.

Malaysia 🇲🇾

Worn to the Bone

by Edrina Lisa Ozaidi, in WP Kuala Lumpur

We have often heard about the bustling, scary scenario in the emergency department of a hospital. Teleseries or medical dramas have taught us one thing — it takes a lot of staff to run a department smoothly. The Malaysian medical sector, however, faces a major crisis of staff retention, especially among junior doctors who battle against job security and burnout.

To understand the severity of the issue, one must understand the progression of problems. Back in 2016, the lack of permanent vacancies prompted the government to introduce the 5-year contract system, where junior doctors will serve 3 years of housemanship plus 2 years of compulsory placement. For those intending to specialise, 2 more years are needed.

This has caused a two-tier workforce, doctors who are already in placement and contract doctors that face a ceiling. While the placement was meant to address oversupply of talent and budgetary constraints, it further caused disparity, significant job insecurity, and career and specialisation pathways among junior doctors.

The suppressed frustration then caused a movement where doctors staged a nationwide strike during the pandemic. Unfortunately, the solution that was prompted by the government was to open more permanent posts and grant Hadiah Latihan Persekutuan (HLP) eligibility to contract officers to mediate the current tension while the systemic flaws are not yet addressed.

By 2025 and the current year, more systemic failures become more noticeable. The government also introduced a shift system intended to replace 24-hour-on-call shifts with 18-hour shifts. However, this integrated on-call hours into the regular work week, causing doctors to lose weekdays on-call allowances, a move that was criticised by the doctors association as a pay cut in disguise.

Recently, the health director-general issued a landmark circular capping house officer hours at 60-62 hours per week and strictly prohibiting 24-hour shifts. The new mandates also mention the implementation of three flexible work shifts (morning, evening, night), without considering the number of housemen available.

The directive stipulates that in the event of a lack of medical officers, the clinical workload for evening and night shifts must be borne entirely by medical officers and specialists to ensure compliance with house officers’ rest periods.

Private doctors’ associations call out that 60 hours remain burdensome compared to the international 40-hour standard (based in UK), while calling for the government to address the systemic failures. Unlike an official cap on trainee doctors’ work hours in Malaysia’s public service, medical officers often work 33 hours on-call shifts.

Recent statistics also reveal more systemic failure, where out of 5,000 housemanship positions offered, only 529 graduates reported for duty. While fewer graduates enter the public system, the burden on existing staff increases. Despite higher on-call allowances (raised by 40% in Budget 2026) and relocation aids, doctors are leaving for the private sector or overseas for better opportunities and pay, and Malaysia needs to step up in its system to ensure the rate of doctors’ retention improves.

Edrina is a communications professional with a background in international relations. She holds a degree from the University of Nottingham Malaysia and has worked across public relations and social media for organizations in the development, education, and corporate sectors. Her work focuses on crafting narratives around regional affairs and strengthening media engagement across Southeast Asia.

Editorial Deadline 04/07/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk

Across the Mekong Belt, the same rivers that sustain Southeast Asia’s economies are now testing its governments — forcing hard choices about water, power, and who gets to control both. Where the Mekong runs dry, Cambodia is racing against El Niño, watching thousands of hectares of rice fields wither before drought turns into disaster. Meanwhile, upstream on the Ayeyarwady, Myanmar’s junta is reviving the long-frozen Myitsone Dam with Beijing’s backing, betting Chinese money can outweigh the fury of 10,000 people facing displacement. Just across the border in Laos, that same regime’s leader was welcomed with ceremony and a fresh Mekong dam deal, proof that legitimacy can be built one handshake at a time. Finally, Thailand shows that it’s not only water moving through the region unchecked, as a flight attendant’s arrest in Melbourne exposed how Golden Triangle heroin is riding first class on trusted uniforms, a reminder that no single country can police a borderless network alone.

Cambodia 🇰🇭

Cambodia Stressed by El Niño As 18,000 Hectares of Rice Fields Face Water Shortage

by Malai Yatt, in Phnom Penh

Cambodia seems to be pressured by the upcoming climate change risk caused by El Niño, with the recent warning made by Prime Minister Hun Manet, who is instructing relevant ministries and institutions to prepare a response to the El Niño natural phenomenon, which Cambodia is currently experiencing.

As stated in the official statement in late June, Manet has told the Ministry of Water Resources and Meteorology, in cooperation with capital and provincial administrations, to continue monitoring developments and to inform citizens about the consequences of this climate change.

At the same time, he also told the National Committee for Disaster Management to cooperate with capital and provincial administrations to prepare necessary means to intervene and rescue citizens in case of emergency.

It should be noted that the Pacific Ocean’s El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO) is listed as the most influential climate driver on Earth.

“Its cycles of warm and cool waters in the central and eastern equatorial Pacific alter where ocean heat is released into the atmosphere, influencing atmospheric circulation, temperatures, precipitation and other weather events that affect agriculture, wildfires and marine fisheries around the globe”, according to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.

Historical El Niño events have triggered crop failures, food insecurity, and market volatility. However, today people possess the ability to pinpoint exactly which farming regions are most vulnerable to severe drought, offering governments and farmers a critical opportunity to prepare.

As reported by the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), “In Asia, the risk extends to critical global markets. El Niño can weaken the summer monsoon across many countries, including Cambodia, putting rainfed crops such as rice and maize under stress during the critical growing season”

Reflecting on Cambodia, as of July 1, a total of 18,362 hectares of rice fields in Ek Phnom and Sangke districts had been affected, 7,769 in Ek Phnom and 10,593 in Sangke, Battambang province, with authorities saying the water shortage might be influenced by the El Niño climate pattern.

Following a stable start to the year, climate models have now converged, signaling the imminent arrival of El Niño with a high degree of certainty. According to Wilfran Moufouma Okia, Chief of Climate Prediction at the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), the weather phenomenon is expected to steadily strengthen in the coming months.

In short, as El Niño strengthens globally, Cambodia’s proactive planning remains crucial to safeguarding local rice production and maintaining national food security.

Malai is a reporter at Kiripost, where she has worked for more than three years, driven by a strong commitment to amplifying the voices of underserved communities. Her reporting focuses on economic and foreign affairs.

Myanmar 🇲🇲

Myanmar Regime Pushes Ahead With Contested Myitsone Dam

by Myat Moe Kywe

Fifteen years after mass protests forced its suspension in 2011 under Thein Sein’s government, Myanmar’s military regime is moving to revive the China-backed Myitsone Dam introduced in 2006 between the military regime under Than Shwe and CCP-controlled China Investment (CPI). The plan is alarming local communities along the Ayeyarwady River, who fear losing their homes and a waterway central to their livelihoods.

The push follows former junta chief Min Aung Hlaing’s June 2026 visit to Beijing. There, he secured his first major diplomatic engagement with China’s leadership since its self-nominated presidency. The visit resulted in 18 MoUs agreed between Beijing and Naypyitaw. The dam’s revival was among the proposals discussed.

Kachin State’s junta-appointed chief minister, Khet Htein Nan, who accompanied him on the trip, has since told Reuters that Myanmar aims to complete the $3.6 billion project within roughly eight years. He says an agreement with China on the timeline has already been reached.

For residents near the confluence of the Mali and N’Mai rivers, the stakes are personal. Independent assessments done in 2013 have found the dam would flood an area roughly the size of Singapore and displace more than 10,000 people. Villages, farmland, and sites central to Kachin identity would be submerged.

Ninety percent of the electricity generated was originally intended for export to China — a term that fueled the 2011 suspension and remains unresolved. ASEAN Frontier could not confirm whether that arrangement has since changed.

Financial pressure looms over the decision either way. Cancelling the contract could trigger compensation claims of roughly $800 million. Continued suspension carries estimated annual “standby” costs of $50 million. Back in 2019, civil society organisations alongside journalist, writers have voiced a one dollar campaign where the citizens will pay one dollar each to compensate for suspension of the dam.

That shows the public dismissal of the dam projects.

However, military officials have framed the dam as a fix for the country’s chronic blackouts. President’s Office spokesperson Khaing Khaing Soe said the project could supply more than half the electricity Myanmar urgently needs, while acknowledging officials are weighing local concerns over flooding and displacement. Min Aung Hlaing has told his cabinet that Myanmar would already have nationwide power coverage had the project not been halted years ago.

Officials say at least 26 public meetings held across Kachin State have shown support for the project. But civil society groups and journalists say the sessions are stage-managed under military rule, where open dissent carries real risk.

Opposition has not gone away. The Kachin Independence Army, which controls much of the area upstream of the dam site, continues to reject the project outright. Analysts also point to a March 2026 earthquake that killed thousands in central Myanmar, warning it has sharpened concerns about building a 152-meter dam in an active seismic zone.

As Naypyidaw courts Beijing for economic support and legitimacy, families along the Ayeyarwady risk being overshadowed by the imperatives of regime survival and regional geopolitics.


Myat is a B.A. graduate in Politics, Philosophy, and Economics. She has interned at The Asia Foundation in Washington, D.C., and she has also worked as a summer research assistant at the Centre for Policy and Innovation (CRPI), gaining experience in research and analysis. Her work focuses on civic engagement, gender, youth leadership, and community development.

Support Us

Lao PDR 🇱🇦

Myanmar’s Leader Makes Laos His First ASEAN Stop

by Thongsavanh Souvannasane, in Vientiane

Myanmar’s junta chief-turned-president Min Aung Hlaing paid a state visit to Laos from 3 to 5 July, his first visit to an ASEAN member state since assuming the country’s civilian presidency.

Lao President Thongloun Sisoulith extended the invitation to mark the 70th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the two nations, established in July 1955.

The visit builds on groundwork laid in June, when Lao Foreign Minister Thongsavanh Phomvihane traveled to Naypyidaw and discussed expanding bilateral cooperation.

Min Aung Hlaing’s trip to Vientiane returned that engagement to the highest level.

He held talks with Thongloun, National Assembly President Xaysomphone Phomvihane, and Prime Minister Sonexay Siphandone, covering trade, tourism, education, health, energy, border development, security, and cooperation against online scams.

The two governments signed the agreements on tourism cooperation and a sister-city partnership between Naypyidaw and Vientiane, and Myanmar donated 640 doses of antivenom medicine to Laos.

The visit’s most substantial outcome came on 4 July, when officials signed a Joint Development Agreement in Vientiane to study a hydropower dam along the Mekong River on the 230-kilometer Laos-Myanmar border. The proposed project would carry an installed capacity of up to 2,790 megawatts, with a feasibility study expected to take 34 months.

On the final day of visit, Min Aung Hlaing also traveled to Luang Prabang, Laos’ UNESCO World Heritage city, where provincial party chief Bounleuam Manivong welcomed him and his delegation with a Baci blessing ceremony, calling the visit a boost to Laos-Myanmar friendship.

The warmth of the reception sits uneasily alongside Myanmar’s record since Min Aung Hlaing seized power in a February 2021 coup that ousted the elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi, the Nobel Peace Prize laureate who has remained detained ever since, save for a recent transfer from prison to house arrest under his personal order.

The United Nations has reported more than 3 million people internally displaced by the conflict that followed, while the independent monitor ACLED estimates total conflict-related deaths above 100,000, making Myanmar’s civil war one of the deadliest active conflicts in Asia. Min Aung Hlaing ruled directly as military chief for five years before taking the civilian presidency in April, following elections that excluded Suu Kyi’s party and were not held in rebel-controlled territory.

That record has left ASEAN divided over how to treat his government, which the bloc largely froze out after the coup.

Laos’ welcome, following recent visits to India and China, raises questions about how far a fellow one-party state is willing to help normalize a leader many in the region and beyond still regard as illegitimate, and whether economic and infrastructure ties, like the new hydropower study, are being allowed to outpace accountability for the toll of the war at home.

Thongsavanh is a journalist from Laos with a background in English-language media. He graduated from the Lao-American Institute with a Diploma of the Arts in English and contributes to independent news platforms. His reporting focuses on environmental issues, socio-economic development, and geopolitics.

Thailand 🇹🇭

Thai Flight Attendant Incident Shows Why ASEAN Needs Urgent Cross-Border Narcotics Prevention

by Paranut Juntree, in Bangkok

The polished, elite image of an international airline crew member represents a category of trusted, low-scrutiny travelers. However, on June 25, 2026, a 26-year-old Thai flight attendant landed at Melbourne Airport on flight TG465 and raised the suspicions of Australian Border Force (ABF) officers. An X-ray examination of her luggage flagged over 1 kilogram of high-grade heroin, stitched deep within the linings of Thai traditional fabric tote bags. The heroin is estimated to have a street value of half a million dollars. The flight attendant was consequently arrested and the incident had launched a joint investigation between Thailand’s Office of the Narcotics Control Board (ONCB) and Australian Federal Police.

This incident exposes a highly calculated strategy by transnational drug cartels targeting open, freelance “carry-for-hire” social media groups. These platforms are heavily populated by flight crews, students, and frequent flyers looking to make money by selling their unused luggage allowance. Investing authorities uncovered digital footprints showing syndicates using anonymous burner accounts to solicit couriers, offering fees to transport what they claim are local textiles or souvenirs for relatives living abroad. This effectively weaponizes the institutional trust granted to airline uniforms, drug syndicates manage to shift 100 percent of the legal risk onto individuals doing side-gigs, while their identities remain safely hidden.

However, this arrest is a symptom of a much larger regional surge in narcotics trafficking. Following systemic instability inside the Golden Triangle, the notorious border region spanning Myanmar, Laos, and Thailand, opium cultivation and heroin processing have spiked dramatically. Since the drug is not produced inside Thailand, the country serves as an indispensable transit bottleneck and repacking hub.

To address this, Thailand immediately enforced a “Zero Trust” policy at its airports. Airline crews and pilots are now stripped of streamlined clearance and must undergo the intensive outbound security screenings as standard passengers. Additionally, Thailand’s Civil Aviation Authority (CAAT) legally banned all air crews from accepting third-party items or freelance “carry-for-hire” gigs.

However, a single country’s response cannot stop borderless networks. ASEAN must urgently strengthen cross-border prevention by shifting from slow diplomatic statements to aggressive operational integration. First, the ASEAN Airport Interdiction Task Force (AAITF) must be re-engineered into a live, automated intelligence-sharing hub to track digital smuggling syndicates before flights depart. Member states must also scale up localized direct “joint strike” operations along Mekong river borders to choke off supply lines at the source. Since transnational cartels operate fluidly across jurisdictions, ASEAN’s enforcement networks must forge robust, real-time intelligence coalitions with primary regional destination markets, most notably Australia, to synchronize inbound and outbound detection strategies.

Ultimately, while Thailand’s operation against transnational drug-trafficking may address its own domestic loopholes, isolated national actions cannot secure a deeply interconnected region, like ASEAN. If ASEAN fails to elevate its collective cross-border narcotics prevention, syndicates will simply pivot to other softer hubs in the region. True aviation and border security demand that all member states scale up unified intelligence operations and treat the entire region as a single, impenetrable defensive line against drug-trafficking and transnational crime.


Paranut has a background in advocacy, with experience in policy research, communications, and civic engagement across both the NGO and government sectors. As Thailand’s Youth Delegate to the United Nations, he represented Thai youth in global dialogues on migration, education, and human rights, championing inclusive policymaking. He holds a degree in political science with a specialization in international relations.

Editorial Deadline 04/07/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Karen Ysabelle R. David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk

War makes for strange bedfellows. In the case of the Iran war, with Prime Minister Lawrence Wong in Kazan for the ASEAN–Russia Commemorative Summit, Singapore has found itself thawing toward the northern giant. Can this fraught early stage — backlit by Russia’s own war with Ukraine — survive the twists and turns that characterize the international system of today, especially as Singapore takes over as ASEAN Chair next year?

Over in Hanoi, just before the end of June, the government broke ground on five urban railway lines spanning hundreds of kilometers. In its bid to chase double-digit GDP growth, will Vietnam’s multi-billion-dollar gamble pay off?

And in the Philippines, even the ongoing political noise unfolding in the highest levels of the government was drowned out by a tragedy last week: a school shooting — a rarity in the Philippines — that claimed the lives of three students. Too little, too late, the incident has led to pointing fingers and a national reckoning.

Singapore 🇸🇬

ASEAN–Russia Enmeshment and Singapore’s Role as an Intermediary

by Nurul Aini, in Singapore

After hosting May’s Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore attended the ASEAN–Russia Commemorative Summit upon the invitation of President Vladimir Putin from 17 to 18 June 2026. While the Dialogue witnessed China’s more indirect approach to the US–China dynamics and the US vocalized a desire for stability with China through high-level diplomatic preservation, the Summit demonstrated ASEAN’s attempt at building security and economic relations, with a third major power that has been characterized as internationally isolated.

There were three deliverables: the Kazan Declaration, the Joint Statement on Cultural Cooperation, and the ASEAN-Russia Comprehensive Plan of Action, which emphasized outcomes like cultural cooperation, energy security, trade and investments, digital economies, artificial intelligence, and more. In the Joint Statement, the ASEAN Community Vision 2045 and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Strategic Plan were both mentioned, alongside the Russian Federation’s Basic Principles of State Cultural Policy, demonstrating that both sides value each other’s cultural sovereignty.

Additionally, Singapore’s attendance highlighted its willingness to navigate complex relations with Russia, considering its targeted sanctions on military exports and financial activities as a result of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. As the oil crisis continues, Singapore emerges as an intermediary, with a London Stock Exchange Group data showing that Russian tankers are increasingly listing Singapore as their destination in January 2026, even though these usually indicate that only ship-to-ship transfers are done at nearby waters. Other countries such as Myanmar have a higher level of dependency on Russia for oil, while Cambodia has seen trade relations decline from 2021 to 2024, with a re-direction to defense industrial cooperation instead.

The differing engagement levels between ASEAN and Russia also means that this emerging relationship cannot simply be captured by unidirectional models or a clean application of the “omni-enmeshment” concept theorized by Shedden Professor of Strategic Policy Studies at the Australian National University, Evelyn Goh. According to Goh, ASEAN’s enmeshment strategy involves engaging major powers in the region’s strategic powers individually, while using ASEAN as a platform, where its objectives differ from “imperative of strategic diversification” to “the desire to boost regional leadership” and “ambitions of transforming great powers behavior,” through building a web of network between major powers while avoiding over-dependency. Goh’s examples revolve more around the emerging security concerns post-Cold War that necessitated the retention of an incumbent hegemon and the socializing of a rising challenger.

It can still be said that ASEAN is extending its omni-enmeshment strategy to a third major power, but now under structural conditions of multipolarity and institutional competition. What makes this relationship interesting is that Russia’s relations with ASEAN are heavily concentrated in sectors such as energy and arms, which has its own set of political complications. Perhaps, within the context where Russia is still constructing its institutional stakes within ASEAN, the relations between the SEA bloc and Russia can be understood more through a push and pull dynamic. Russia has counter-enmeshment strategies in place through its BRICS-EAEU-SCO institutional framework. Analysts like Joanne Lin have highlighted Moscow’s needs for ASEAN markets, characterizing ASEAN-Russia relations as a two-way relationship rather than a one-sided tilt, while considering how ASEAN will navigate through practical cooperations with Russia while avoiding validation of its invasion of Ukraine.

As of now, the emerging relationship between ASEAN and Russia remains at its early stages. As Prime Minister Lawrence Wong emphasized during the Summit, Singapore looks forward to having ASEAN work further with Russia when the country takes over as Chair of ASEAN in 2027.


Aini is currently pursuing a master’s degree in English literature at Nanyang Technological University. She has experience working in youth groups, contributing to the planning and management of outreach activities.

Support Us

Vietnam 🇻🇳

Track, TOD, and Transformation

by Tri Vo, in Ho Chi Minh City

On 22 June 2026, Hanoi officially initiated one of the most ambitious infrastructure initiatives in Vietnamese modern history. In the groundbreaking ceremony attended by the new Prime Minister Le Minh Hung, the capital commenced construction on five urban railway lines spanning more than 300 kilometers. With a preliminary price tag exceeding VND 1.3 quadrillion (roughly US$51 billion or about 10% of Vietnam’s 2025 GDP), such a mega endeavor represents a massive macroeconomic lever for a government aggressively chasing a double-digit GDP growth mandate. Unleashing billions of dollars into the domestic construction sector is, if anything, an economic sailwind for the larger economy.

The sheer scale of such a feat already appears staggering and requires the highest order of capacity. As such, Vietnam’s largest conglomerate, Vingroup — whose Vinhomes–VinSpeed joint venture is appointed as the EPC (engineering, procurement, and construction) general contractor — will be tasked with the delivery of Lines 1, 2, 8, 10, and 14 by 2030. Rather than simply tunneling beneath the existing downtown area, these routes are meant to shift commercial/residential gravity away from the highly congested urban core and toward the peripheries, relieving pressure on the capital’s center and allowing space to give the sometimes-chaotic area a facelift as part of the 100-year planning. For instance, the 81-kilometer Line 1 and 56.5-kilometer Line 2 will create high-speed corridors connecting the city center to Noi Bai International Airport in the suburbs, creating the necessary transportation convenience for families to move to the peripheries.

To finance and generate value from this massive US$51 billion gamble, Hanoi is heavily relying on the Transit-Oriented Development (TOD) model. By making sure that public transport will be followed by localized real estate development, the city plans to capture the land sales value appreciation that follows the construction and completion of rail infrastructure. Under recent policy directives, authorities are expediting land clearance and offering various incentives (like zoning, land-use certification, etc.) for developers to build high-density commercial and residential clusters adjacent to the new lines. This approach is already triggering a profound shift in real estate investment appetite, as institutional investors, such as Vinhomes, aggressively reposition their portfolios toward the suburbs like Ocean Park, anticipating the inevitable value uplift these transit hubs will bring about.

Overall, the short-term economic multiplier effect of this massive project is exactly what Hanoi needs on the economic front going into the second half of the year. Mobilizing capital for 300 kilometers of underground and elevated rail, not to mention facilities such as terminals, will require not just cash but an immense supply of construction materials and engineering labor. This massive domestic demand injection can act as a vital dose of adrenaline for the economy, which is straining under external pressure, including the current Middle Eastern conflict and rising protectionism in the US, a highly important export destination for Vietnam.

Ultimately, Hanoi’s five-line metro expansion is a high-stakes race against time. The city intends to have a fully operational 500-kilometer rail network by 2035, which means that the execution window is quite tight. However, success in this project, along with the entailing movement of people outside of the congested urban core, will present Hanoi’s ASEAN peers with a case in point on how to solve the immense pain of overcrowded urban centers straining services and livability across the region.


Tri has experience in management consulting and strategy, having worked with institutions such as the UNDP, The Asia Group, and ARC Group. He has provided strategic, legal, and operational insights to clients in sectors including manufacturing, energy, and technology. He holds both academic and professional experience related to Southeast and East Asia, with a focus on regional development and policy.

The Philippines 🇵🇭

When Children Carry Guns: Tacloban’s School Shooting and the Philippines’ Safety Reckoning

by Eduardo G. Fajermo Jr., in Angeles City

The Philippines is now confronting a question it has long treated as distant: what happens when the violence that haunts streets, online spaces, and homes enters the classroom? The 22 June school shooting at San Jose National High School in Tacloban City — where two students aged 14 and 15 allegedly opened fire, killed three students, and injured 20 others — has forced the country into a painful reckoning over guns, school security, bullying, online influence, and juvenile justice.

School shootings remain rare in the Philippines, but the Tacloban case showed how quickly rarity can become reality. The suspects used a 9mm Glock pistol and a .38-caliber revolver, with the weapons traced to a police officer relative and a security agency employee. The police recovered more than 40 shell casings, while videos circulating online showed students hiding and crying as the attack unfolded. The details matter because this was not merely a story of two minors committing violence. It was also a story of adult failure: firearms were accessible, school entry points were not secure enough, and warning signs may have gone unaddressed.

Authorities are now rethinking school safety. Civil defense officials said preparedness can no longer be limited to earthquakes and natural disasters, but must include “human-induced” and crime-related incidents. That shift is overdue: Philippine schools regularly drill students for fire and earthquake emergencies, but many are unprepared for armed violence.

The motive remains under investigation, but bullying has emerged as one possible factor. Police and officials have said the suspects may have acted out of retaliation after being bullied, while investigators are also examining online influences. In response, the government temporarily blocked the online game GoreBox, reportedly used by one suspect, while stressing the need to examine online risks to children. Yet the deeper issue is how grievance, isolation, bullying, access to firearms, and violent online spaces can converge around children who are already in distress.

The case has also revived the debate over juvenile sanctions. Under the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act, a child 15 years old or under at the time of the offense is exempt from criminal liability but must undergo an intervention program. Children above 15 but below 18 are also exempt unless they acted with discernment, meaning they understood the wrongfulness and consequences of their act. This legal framework means the 14-year-old suspect is generally handled through welfare intervention, while the legal treatment of the 15-year-old depends on age rules, discernment, and child-protection processes. The law also makes clear that exemption from criminal liability does not erase civil liability.

Public outrage is understandable. Three children are dead. Families are grieving. A community is traumatized. But lowering the age of criminal responsibility should not become a reflexive substitute for fixing the systems that failed before the first shot was fired. The question is not whether children who commit grave violence should be held accountable. They must be. The question is whether accountability stops with the child, or whether it climbs upward to the family, the firearm owner, the school, the platform, and the state.

The Tacloban shooting should not become a moral panic about “bad kids” or “bad games.” It should become a national audit of safety. Children did not only die because two classmates pulled the trigger. They died because a chain of protection broke long before the guns entered campus. In that broken chain lies the real case the Philippines must answer.


Eduardo is a Political Science graduate and MA Political Science candidate at the University of Santo Tomas, researching democracy, disaster governance, and inclusive policy in the Global South. He is a former faculty member at Holy Angel University, where he taught Philippine history and contemporary global issues. He also worked with a senator in the Guam Legislature, contributing to policy research and legislative analysis.

Editorial Deadline 30/06/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Siu Tzyy Wei, Lead Editor - Maritime Crescent Desk

Power is shifting across the region - in grids that falter, in technologies that accelerate, and in standards that redefine responsibility. This week, the Maritime Crescent traces those movements in different forms.

Brunei asks if ASEAN can grow together in the age of AI, while Indonesia faces the fragility of its coal-driven electricity and Malaysia reconsiders its approach to the refugee crisis.

This week’s story shows how power, whether technical, political or humanitarian, is being renegotiated, and how those shifts will shape who moves forward and who falls behind.

Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳

Can ASEAN Grow Together in the Age of AI?

by Syimah Johari, in Bandar Seri Begawan

Artificial intelligence (AI) is reshaping how countries approach healthcare, climate and economic growth. But while technology is advancing rapidly, not all countries are moving at the same speed. In Southeast Asia, this raises an important question: how can ASEAN ensure that its member states grow together in the age of AI?

Recently, member states of ASEAN were in attendance at the 22nd ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Science, Technology and Innovation (AMMSTI-22) held in Laos on June 26, 2026. Where they discussed how science and technology can help address some of the region’s most pressing challenges, from healthcare and climate change to food security and renewable energy. The meeting also saw the launch of new initiatives, including funding for AI-related research, a regional technology management platform and ASEAN’s first shared high-performance computing facility. Together, these developments signal a growing emphasis on regional cooperation as countries prepare for an increasingly digital future.

Beyond the announcements, the meeting highlighted a broader shift in ASEAN’s thinking. Rather than focusing solely on encouraging innovation within individual member states, discussions increasingly centred on how the region can build the institutions, standards and partnerships needed to support innovation collectively.

While the meeting introduced several new initiatives, it also highlighted a reality that ASEAN has long grappled with: member states are not all starting from the same point. Some countries have invested a lot more in AI research, digital infrastructure and innovation ecosystems, while others are still building the foundations needed to support these technologies. As AI becomes more integrated into healthcare, education and public services, these differences could become more pronounced. Without meaningful cooperation, technological progress may advance unevenly across the region, making it more difficult for ASEAN to achieve its vision of inclusive growth.

Rather than leaving each country to tackle these challenges on its own, ASEAN is beginning to invest in shared solutions. At this year’s meeting, member states supported initiatives such as funding for AI-related research through the ASEAN Science, Technology and Innovation Fund (ASTIF), the launch of a regional technology management platform, and ASEAN’s first shared high-performance computing facility. They also discussed the importance of developing regional standards for AI, particularly in healthcare, to ensure that innovation is accompanied by public trust and safety. While these initiatives may seem technical, they reflect a broader goal that is, creating a stronger foundation for countries to learn from one another and benefit from technological progress together.

The outcomes of AMMSTI-22 suggest that ASEAN’s approach to science and technology is becoming more practical and coordinated. As artificial intelligence continues to shape economies and societies, regional cooperation will become increasingly important. The challenge is no longer simply about adopting new technologies, but to ensure that all member states have the opportunity to benefit from them. After all, ASEAN’s strength has always rested on its ability to move forward together and the region’s future in AI may depend on whether it can continue to do so.


Syimah is a graduate of King’s College London with a BA in International Relations. With a strong focus on diplomacy, regional cooperation, and development policy, she is passionate about contributing to meaningful change through public service. Currently, she is involved in poverty alleviation work through a local NGO.

Support Us

Indonesia 🇮🇩

Powerless

by Rayhan Prabu Kusumo, in Jakarta

Throughout June, parts of Java went dark. PLN, the state electricity company, could not meet demand and cut power in rotation to keep the grid from collapsing. The shortfall on the country’s most populous island reached around two gigawatts. As the largest coal exporter in the world, Indonesia’s power plants run on the same resource.

Power plants are built to burn coal of a certain energy content, measured by the heat a kilogram releases. For weeks they were fed weaker coal, which forced them to run below their rated output. Two large private plants went offline at the same time for technical faults, and the grid tipped into deficit. Energy minister Bahlil Lahadalia put PLN’s uncontracted supply gap for the year at twenty million tonnes. In February, private power producers said their coal stocks had fallen to about ten days of operation, below the base level of twenty-five.

The cause is a price the government set in 2018 and has not moved since. Mining companies must sell a share of their output at home, and the state caps what power plants pay at seventy dollars a tonne. The rule counts tonnes, not quality, so miners can meet the obligation by delivering cheap, low-grade coal and shipping the better grade abroad, where it earns far more.

Power plants pay the lowest regulated price in the country, causing coal suppliers to serve them last. Electricity tariffs are frozen for political comfort, so the cost settles on PLN and the budget instead of households.

The weak rupiah widens the gap, because coal is priced in dollars and every fall in the currency makes the export sale more attractive and PLN’s purchases steeper. To make matters worse, the government cut this year’s production quota, shrinking the buffer that once covered domestic shortfalls.

The quick fix is to pay for the coal the plants need, by raising the cap or tying it to a benchmark that moves with the market. That keeps the lights on, but it only shifts the cost from miners to PLN and the budget, where most of it already sits. Indonesia has been here before. In January 2022, the same shortage forced the government to halt coal exports for a month to supply its own plants. The pattern returns because the exposure is never removed.

A capped coal price is a hidden subsidy that does two things at once; it keeps the country tied to coal, and it makes renewable alternatives look costly next to a fuel held down by law. The ultimate exit is the transition the government has already promised on paper, where PLN’s plan reserves more than forty gigawatts for clean energy. Once built, these plants burn no fuel. Sunlight, wind, water, and geothermal heat are not priced in dollars and cannot be shipped to a better buyer abroad, so the cost that bites every time the currency falls is simply not there.


Rayhan has a background in government affairs and public policy, with experience across government institutions and advisory firms. His work focuses on the intersection of geopolitics, policy, and risk, with expertise in advocacy, regulatory analysis, and stakeholder engagement. He holds a degree in Government from Universitas Padjadjaran, and has completed an exchange at Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Spain, focusing on global politics and sustainability.

Malaysia 🇲🇾

Biometrics and Borders

by Edrina Lisa Ozaidi, in WP Kuala Lumpur

In a landmark move to enhance national security and administrative precision, the Malaysian government has officially rolled out the Dokumen Pendaftaran Pelarian (DPP) framework. This strategic initiative represents a vital evolution in how the nation manages displaced populations, moving away from legacy systems towards a government-led biometric database. As of February 2026, there are approximately 215,600 refugees and asylum seekers registered with the UNHCR in Malaysia. The vast majority of them, recorded at nearly 194,000 people, hail from Myanmar.

The shift towards the DPP is a direct response to this visibility gap. Following the mandate of the National Security Council (MKN) Directive No. 23, the Malaysian Home Ministry recognises the urgency for “data sovereignty”.

Faced with a decline in third-country resettlement opportunities and the increasing prevalence of fraudulent documentation, the government is determined that a centralised, state-managed database could provide the security and reliability required in today’s complex geopolitical environment.

The DPP system is said to utilise advanced biometrics, voice recordings, and facial recognition technology. The transition comes with a clear objective—transitioning the responsibility of identification to the government to ensure Malaysia have full visibility of who is in the country and where they are located. Through identity verification developed by MIMOS, Malaysia’s national applied research centre, the system aims to effectively combat documentary forgery.

Home Minister Saifuddin Nasution Ismail recently emphasised that this initiative ensures the government is no longer operating with incomplete information but instead, possesses the comprehensive and verifiable data necessary to improve enforcement and policy formulation in the near future. The system rollout is characterised by a rigorous, multi-stage assessment process overseen by the Refugee Status Assessment Committee. Through this structured approach, the government aims to move past the ambiguity of the past.

The main intention of the DPP system is not to grant citizenship; rather, it serves as a management tool to streamline humanitarian oversight while potentially addressing labour shortages in critical, labour-intensive sectors like plantations, agriculture, and construction—all under strict Malaysian employment regulations.

While the government remains clear that the DPP focuses on systematic management rather than permanent settlement, its implementation is a crucial step in maintaining Malaysia’s social and economic stability.

By securing our borders through proper data management, the state is better positioned to protect its citizens while upholding its administrative responsibilities.

As Malaysia continues to navigate the complexities of regional migration in 2026, the new framework will be a testament to the government’s resolve to prioritise national security and effective governance. This framework functions as more than just a registration update. It hopes to build a commitment to a safer, more orderly Malaysia while contributing to the refugee crisis.


Edrina is a communications professional with a background in international relations. She holds a degree from the University of Nottingham Malaysia and has worked across public relations and social media for organizations in the development, education, and corporate sectors. Her work focuses on crafting narratives around regional affairs and strengthening media engagement across Southeast Asia.

Editorial Deadline 27/05/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk

This week, the Mekong Belt gave us a masterclass in the gap between looking like you’re solving a problem and actually solving it. In Myanmar, authorities staged arrests in Muse, paraded the numbers, and called it a crackdown — all while scam compounds keep flourishing just down the road. In Laos, the government joined a new Eurasian rail corridor stretching to Estonia — but the World Bank's verdict is blunt: tracks alone don't create a hub, only the policy reforms behind them do.

Bangkok, meanwhile, handed Chadchart Sittipunt a second term and a fresh mandate — but a landslide win doesn’t unclog a drain or rewrite which agency controls the buses. The hard part of governing a megacity of 18 million was never winning the election. And in Cambodia, Hun Sen showed up Beijing to remind everyone that “ironclad friendship” is doing a lot of heavy lifting these days, even as Chinese tourists quietly start booking elsewhere — scam headlines, it turns out, are bad for business.

Myanmar 🇲🇲

Myanmar’s Scam Economy Is Adapting

by Moe Thiri Myat

Myanmar’s scam economy is not disappearing under pressure. It is changing shape. During this week, new reports exposed three parts of the same regional crisis: thousands of trafficking victims still confined in militia-controlled compounds near Myawaddy, arrests connected to online fraud and gambling in Muse, and a smaller cross-border operation uncovered inside an ordinary apartment in Mae Sot, Thailand.

The most alarming evidence comes from the Myanmar–Thailand border. The Civil Society Network for Human Trafficking Victim Assistance estimates that more than 5,300 people remain trapped at four scam-centre locations, including around 1,600 Chinese nationals and citizens from across Southeast Asia, Africa, Russia and Brazil. This comes more than a year after Thailand led a multinational effort that removed around 5,000 people from scam hubs in the Myawaddy area. The continuing confinement of thousands suggests that the earlier operation disrupted only part of the industry.

At the same time, recent arrests indicate that scam-related activity is no longer limited to large, fortified compounds. In Muse, Myanmar authorities announced the arrest of 59 people allegedly involved in online gambling, including two Chinese nationals and 57 Myanmar nationals. Seven more Chinese nationals reportedly connected to telecommunications fraud were subsequently detained in the town. Authorities presented the arrests as evidence of a continuing national crackdown, but the repeated discoveries also show that criminal operations remain active in northern Shan State.

Reports that scam groups are also establishing themselves in Yangon, Mandalay, Naypyitaw and Mawlamyine deepen this concern. There is a movement from visible border enclaves towards smaller, dispersed operations embedded in urban areas. Such relocation makes detection harder and weakens an enforcement model focused mainly on demolishing compounds, deporting foreign nationals and arresting workers at individual sites.

Beyond Myanmar, the issue reflects a wider ASEAN challenge involving human trafficking, cybercrime, migration and illicit financial flows. The people reportedly trapped near Myawaddy include citizens from Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia and countries outside Southeast Asia. Thailand has become a major transit point for rescue, repatriation and investigation, while criminal networks reportedly involve Myanmar, Thai and Chinese nationals. No single country can address the problem through domestic arrests alone.

Ultimately, the recent raids are not evidence of stronger law enforcement, revealing how adaptable the scam economy has become. They may instead reveal how quickly it is learning to survive. Large compounds remain active near the border, while smaller operations appear in towns, cities and ordinary residential buildings. What looks like the dismantling of one criminal industry may therefore be its transformation into something more dispersed, less visible and much harder to trace. The critical question is whether ASEAN governments can move beyond closing individual buildings and arresting lower-level workers to identify organisers, financial networks, recruiters and protection structures.


Moe Thiri Myat is a senior at Parami University. Majoring in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics (PPE). Interested in analyzing emerging sociopolitical situations and developments, through her work as a Myanmar correspondent at The ASEAN Frontier she aims to explore how sociopolitical developments across Southeast Asia shape and are shaped by the situation in Myanmar.

Lao PDR 🇱🇦

Laos Joins Eurasian Rail Corridor Linking ASEAN to Europe

by Phonethida Sitthixay, in Vientiane

Laos’s international railway partnership is expanding beyond Asia to Europe after officially joining Corridor 2 of the Organisation for Co-operation between Railways (OSJD) during the Ministerial Conference held from 9 to 12 June.

The corridor connects Laos with regional and Eurasian railway networks through countries including Vietnam, China, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Estonia, creating new possibilities for the cross-border movement of goods and passengers, strengthening both trade flows and regional mobility between Southeast Asia and Europe.

Together with the Laos–China Railway and the planned Laos–Vietnam Railway, the initiative supports the country’s long-term ambition of transforming itself from a landlocked nation into a land-linked regional transport hub.

However, connectivity alone does not guarantee economic transformation. The more important question is whether railway-led connectivity can help Laos become a regional logistics and industrial hub rather than simply serving as a transit corridor.

According to the World Bank, while infrastructure such as cross-border railways can significantly boost trade flows and even increase national income, these gains depend heavily on complementary reforms. In the case of Laos, improved connectivity could raise aggregate income substantially and integrate the country into regional and global supply chains, but only if supported by policies that facilitate trade, improve the business environment, and strengthen logistics capacity.

Without such measures, there is a risk that Laos will remain a transit route rather than a value-creating hub. The key lesson is that becoming “land-linked” is not just about building infrastructure, but about ensuring that connectivity is matched with institutional readiness, efficient logistics systems, and the ability to attract investment into productive sectors.

Ultimately, the number of countries connected by rail may be less important than how effectively Laos converts connectivity into sustainable economic growth and long-term national development.


Phonethida Sitthixay holds a Bachelor of Arts in International Relations from the National University of Laos. She is currently a Senior Project Coordinator at AIF Group, where she works on government-led initiatives to modernize financial integration across public sector systems in Laos. She has experience in sustainable development policy, diplomacy, and economic reporting, having worked with the Global Green Growth Institute and The Laotian Times. Her interests focus on Laos’s diplomacy, regional integration, and its evolving role beyond ASEAN.

Support Us

Thailand 🇹🇭

What Does The Future Hold For Bangkok?

by Natamon Aumphin, in Bangkok

OOn June 28, 2026, Bangkok hosted a Bangkok Gubernatorial Election, which Chadchart Sittipunt, the former incumbent Bangkok governor, won with a majority of over 67%. The election received immense attention because it signifies the direction of the metropolitan city toward a commitment to urban reform and an increase in transparency. These commitments directly align with the global agenda on reforming urban areas, strengthening climate resilience, and repositioning the economy, which sets the benchmark for 2030. The benchmark year, hence, will determine whether Sittipunt can deliver the promise to the people.

Although the election is local, its impact stretches much beyond. As of 2026, Bangkok is home to over 18 million people, among whom roughly 5.3 million are eligible voters for the Bangkok Gubernatorial Election. According to the UN report, the number of latent population includes those in the vicinity of Bangkok who directly depend on Bangkok for living, working, and studying. Among those, oftentimes, the areas are merged with Bangkok, making them seem like a part of the capital, for example, Nonthaburi. Hence, regardless of the result, the election affects the latent population that depends on Bangkok to earn a livelihood. Nonetheless, this population is often hidden and unheard. One of the most prominent issues they face in Bangkok is the rising cost of living.

Although all candidates have pledged to make Bangkok a global city by 2030 by endorsing solution-based policies, the challenge lies within structural constraints and regulations. Moving beyond day-to-day activities, including trash management and pavement improvement, to tackling structural issues such as lowering transportation costs poses challenges. Despite progress seen within the last 4 years, with the notable ones being flood prevention and increasing green and creative space, challenges remain such as structural constraints, regulations, and transparency. Hence, this local election has an impact much beyond Bangkok. As the capital, Bangkok is often the first stop for tourists and an opportunity for the country. Hence, it is imperative for the city to progress further to reach the goal of being a sustainable urban city, which everyone can benefit from and contribute to.


Natamon has served as a rapporteur at the Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS Thailand). She has also worked as a research assistant on diplomatic issues in Southeast Asia. Her work focuses on how domestic politics shape foreign policy in the region. She holds a degree in international relations and has experience in policy analysis, event reporting, and regional research.

Cambodia 🇰🇭

Hun Sen’s Visit to China Confirms That China’s Policy Toward Cambodia Remains Unchanged

by Chandara Samban, in Kandal

Hun Sen, Senate President and acting head of state, is visiting China at the same time King Norodom Sihamoni is there on medical leave — meaning Cambodia’s two heads of state are both currently in the country’s long-standing partner. Hun Sen’s official visit underscores the enduring friendship between the two nations and reinforces Beijing’s security presence in Phnom Penh amid the ongoing border crisis with Thailand. Though no longer Prime Minister, Hun Sen remains a central figure in the China-Cambodia relationship.

Hun Sen’s visit ran from June 25 to 27, 2026, during which he met with top Chinese leaders, including President Xi Jinping, Premier Li Qiang, and National People’s Congress Chairman Zhao Leji. According to the Senate’s statement, the trip aims to deepen the “iron-clad friendship” between the two countries and expand comprehensive cooperation.

The Cambodian side considers the visit historic, coinciding as it does with the 75th anniversary of the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), which Hun Sen leads. He welcomed the upgrade of the strategic dialogue framework from 2+2 to 3+3 — now covering defense, foreign affairs, and interior — and reaffirmed Cambodia’s continued support for the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and China’s four global initiatives.

For his part, Xi proposed strengthening mutual trust between the two peoples and advancing the implementation of agreed development projects, particularly through deeper security cooperation.

Cambodia and China continue to align Cambodia’s five-pronged strategy with the BRI, accelerating development of the industrial-technology corridor and the fish-and-rice corridor. The two sides are also expanding cooperation in trade, artificial intelligence, clean energy, and high-speed rail, while strengthening parliamentary diplomacy and advancing their free trade agreement. Both governments emphasized the Funan Techo Canal project as a key contribution to the BRI in Cambodia.

Wu Xingyi, head of the Cambodia Studies Section at Guangxi University’s China-ASEAN Research Institute, told ChinaFocus that the visit shows China’s Cambodia policy remains unchanged, with continued focus on connectivity projects — expressways, airports, and logistics infrastructure — that strengthen supply chains. He noted that security cooperation has expanded from cracking down on online fraud to a broader stability mechanism under the 3+3 dialogue, alongside deepening people-to-people ties through tourism, youth exchanges, and Cambodia’s visa-free policy for Chinese citizens.

He added that China is reframing its relationship with Cambodia from an “ironclad friendship” to an “all-weather community with a shared future” — a model it may extend to other Southeast Asian partners — shifting from development cooperation alone toward a dual focus on development and security.

Geopolitical analyst Seng Vanly noted that Cambodia remains financially reliant on China, which in turn views Cambodia as a key regional partner. He pointed to China’s growing emphasis on cracking down on scams affecting Chinese nationals, and to declining Chinese tourism numbers tied to economic conditions and scam-related safety concerns — a trend Hun Sen is expected to address directly with Beijing.


Chandara is a freelance journalist with a focus on foreign affairs, security issues, and ASEAN affairs. He also serves as a Junior Counterterrorism Intelligence Analyst.

Editorial Deadline 27/06/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Wira Gregory Ejau

When Iran closed the Strait of Hormuz in March, the region began calculating who had oil. With crude production hovering between 110,000 and 127,000 barrels a day, the small sultanate of Brunei was never going to be a major substitute for a chokepoint that once carried more than 80% of the crude and liquefied natural gas the region consumed daily.

The Hormuz Strait crisis has altered the cost of energy relationships, extending beyond disrupted energy flows, as Iran continues to impose premiums on alignments that many states in Southeast Asia have had to pay, in one form or another. By the calculation that measures the political price of an oil barrel, Brunei is one of the most underpriced energy partners in Southeast Asia.

The most consequential development of the Hormuz crisis has been the mechanism that sits behind the disruption itself. Tehran has converted the Strait from a commercial right into a political instrument, using it as a ledger by selectively clearing passage for states it deems aligned and withholding it from those it does not. UNCLOS Article 38’s guarantee that transit passage through international straits is non- suspendable has been rendered conditional on the absence of alignment with Washington. States that have explicitly or implicitly declined to endorse the U.S.- Israeli strikes have found their tankers cleared; those that have aligned with Washington have not. What might be called a political economy of passage has emerged in place of the universal commercial right that international maritime law was supposed to guarantee.

Malaysia’s tankers cleared, but only after Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim publicly framed the U.S.-Israeli strikes as a threat that would bring the Middle East to “the edge of grave and sustained instability”, a statement that risked straining Western partnerships while buying passage. Thailand, a U.S. treaty ally, had to negotiate directly with Iran’s ambassador in Bangkok before a Bangchak Corporation tanker transited safely on March 23, but not before a Thailand-flagged bulk carrier was hit and damaged by Iranian projectiles two weeks prior. Indonesia, under President Prabowo, had joined Trump’s Board of Peace initiative in February, only to pause participation after the strikes left Jakarta navigating a domestic contradiction as a Muslim-majority state under simultaneous pressure from both directions. This especially culminated in the protracted negotiations to secure passage for two Pertamina tankers that remained stranded in the Strait for weeks. Despite Indonesia’s established diplomatic ties with Tehran, the situation remained increasingly complex until late April.

China, uniquely, appears to have paid nothing at all. Its flagged vessels have continued transiting throughout, operating within a framework that has quietly become the defining architecture of passage in the crisis. Reportedly, payments have even been processed in yuan, an arrangement that Deutsche Bank analysts have described as the most operationally specific challenge to dollar energy hegemony since the petrodollar system was formalised in 1974.

Without Debts…

Amidst the standard diplomatic echo of “grave concern” across the region, the statement issued by Brunei’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs on March 1 went conspicuously further than usual. The MFA strongly condemned the attacks as a “serious violation of sovereignty” and reaffirmed Iran’s right to self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter—a legal framing that most ASEAN governments with Western-facing interests conspicuously avoided.

Brunei did this without visible negotiation and without a public quid pro quo, at a time when its own embassy in Tehran had been shuttered over nine months ago. Whether calculated or not, the statement has theoretically placed the sultanate in good standing in Tehran’s political ledger, at no apparent diplomatic cost to its relationships elsewhere. For states the size of Malaysia or Indonesia, a statement of that kind would have constituted a measurable foreign policy commitment with downstream implications. For Brunei, it appears to have constituted neither a departure from its existing positions nor a concession to any single partner.

A crucial example of this is the structural relationship that the sultanate holds with China. The Hengyi Industries petrochemical complex at Pulau Muara Besar, which remains as one of the single largest foreign direct investments in the country, contributes roughly 10% of the annual GDP. In 2024, it sat at the centre of an estimated USD 2.8 billion in bilateral trade. These numbers are comparable to what other ASEAN states carry. What distinguishes Brunei is what it has not accumulated alongside them.

In comparison to other claimants in the South China Sea, Brunei shifted from hedging to deference. It joined the 2016 four-point consensus that fractured ASEAN’s unified stance on the South China Sea, permitted Chinese naval fleets to dock at Muara Port, and declined to contest incursions into its exclusive economic zone (EEZ). As the co-disputant with the smallest territorial claim, Brunei has never posed a significant challenge to Beijing, and Beijing has not needed to apply the kind of sustained pressure it has directed at the Philippines or Vietnam.

Where its neighbours have built up diplomatic debt with Beijing through ASEAN forum challenges, bilateral protests, and freedom-of-navigation manoeuvres, Brunei has accrued none as a product of its size and a product of its choices. While other ASEAN states approaching Beijing for help with navigating Iranian policy or waters might carry accumulated friction that complicates the conversation, Brunei remains free of diplomatic debt.

This model also runs in the other Westward direction, too. Shell has historically held a 50% stake in Brunei Shell Petroleum, embedding the sultanate within the Western commercial networks whose war-risk premium withdrawals have effectively shut the Strait to most other traffic. The British Forces Brunei garrison, which remains as one of the last permanent British military presences in Southeast Asia, anchors the western end of the country in Belait District, while the Hengyi refinery holds the eastern tip at Pulau Muara Besar: opposite ends of the national landscape, held simultaneously, each reflecting coexistence rather than competition.

Support Us

Against the standard of neutrality in the non-aligned tradition, Brunei’s foreign policy architecture is specifically designed so that no partner accumulates a grievance, and no relationship becomes a liability. Three decades of this have left Brunei uniquely unburdened at precisely the moment when buying from either a Gulf state or through U.S.-aligned channels carries complications.

As it stands, a partnership with Brunei offers an alternative, albeit small, supplier that carries no political alignment cost. An early indicator of this is reflected in Indonesia’s Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources’ confirmation of its ongoing assessment of energy cooperation with Brunei for C3 and C4 gas supply. What followed over the next eight weeks was a series of diplomatic events that echoed far beyond this one early indicator alone.

Within seventy-two hours of the Hormuz closure, Brunei’s Second Minister of Foreign Affairs Dato Erywan Yusof was in Moscow, holding substantive talks with Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, who described Brunei as a “reliable long-standing partner,” noting a record bilateral trade of nearly USD 900 million in 2025, with both sides having agreed to advance a formal consultation plan between their foreign ministries. On April 1^st, Brunei Fertiliser Industries joined Indonesia’s Pupuk Indonesia and Malaysia’s Petronas Chemicals Group in formally establishing the Southeast Asia Fertiliser Association (SEAFA), the first regional body of its kind, with its secretariat based in Bandar Seri Begawan. Anchoring SEAFA in Brunei extends its influence through multilateral design, securing legitimacy where hard power cannot, and pressing ASEAN to recognise food security in a crisis of chokepoint dependency.

Two weeks later, Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese visited Brunei in a working visit from April 14 to 16 that culminated in the signing of a Brunei-Australia Joint Statement on Energy and Food Security. Most recently, on April 27 to 28, Brunei co-chaired the 25th ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting in Bandar Seri Begawan, with freedom of navigation and the Strait of Hormuz formally on the agenda.

All these engagements form a pattern of different states and institutions from opposing geopolitical orientations that found Brunei to be a workable interlocutor within the same eight-week window of the Strait closing or during subsequent escalation of tensions following further blockades.

The zero-friction model has thus made Brunei one of the few nodes in the regional system that carries no diplomatic debt, with none of the approaches to or from Brunei requiring the sultanate to reposition itself relative to any others. Engaging Brunei sends little to no signal to Beijing, Washington, or Tehran. When alignment costs spike, as they have since February 28, a policy of non-confrontation produces outcomes that position smaller states like Brunei as a convenient interlocutor that lends legitimacy without demanding reciprocity.

…With Limits

Besides the fact that Brunei cannot substitute for the chokepoint, its bilateral ties simply do not translate into multilateral influence on behalf of neighbours. Friction- free ties do not extend China’s Hormuz passage arrangements to others, nor can it function as a forward base for Western strategic interests. As strong as any prior or subsequent statements might be, Brunei’s Islamic solidarity credentials, especially now with its newest alliance with Malaysia and Indonesia, depend on not being seen as instrumentalising them, and any attempt to convert diplomatic goodwill into specific commercial asks risks precisely that perception.

The structural pressures that Brunei was managing before February 28, including upstream production decline from maturing fields, a slow diversification program, and labour market pressures flagged in the ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office’s 2025 report, have not disappeared either. If anything, the global shock from the Hormuz closure will tighten the investment climate the sultanate needs to access.

Brunei’s case reflects a more precise account of what a sub-threshold state’s foreign policy can and cannot accomplish over time. For states operating below the threshold at which hedging, assertiveness, or hard alignment become credible options, the deliberate institutionalisation of non-confrontation into key bilateral relationships is a long-term architecture practised as a structural organising principle that accumulates optionality over time.

Some parts of this model are certainly not available for states such as the Philippines, Vietnam, or Indonesia due to their sizes, stakes, and choices that have made assertiveness rational and, in most cases, genuinely necessary. For other states below the threshold at which hard power and formal alignment become meaningful instruments, it is important to distinguish between managing one’s relationships with great powers and avoiding generating conditions that would require direct address altogether, recognising great power competition as a condition of the environment that requires states to rethink liabilities and recalibrate them accordingly for insulation from future alignment costs.

Gregory is an MSc candidate in Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He works as a freelance writer specializing in international history, conflict, and counterterrorism. With experience in academia, investigative journalism, and voluntary uniformed service, he focuses on regional security developments across the Asia-Pacific, combining strategic analysis with practical field insights.

by Karen Ysabelle R. David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk

Over the past year, Hanoi has been making headlines for its diplomatic dexterity and high-stakes hedging. But even when set against this backdrop, Vietnam’s hedging between the two Koreas — what with a Vietnamese General’s recent visit to Pyongyang, amid his country’s robust trade ties with Seoul — is a particularly tense high-wire act worth watching.

Meanwhile, Manila is having a bit of a tennis moment, thanks to the rise of tennis darling Alex Eala. Far from the pomp and circumstance of state visits and diplomatic exchanges, Eala’s success on the court is a reminder of the national impact and regional influence that sports diplomacy can wield.

But over in Singapore, a more sobering reminder, as the launch of thousands of flats across the city-state — while seemingly good news — is a sign of how intense housing demand has gotten. That challenge is not unique to Singapore; but the pressure compounds when it’s set in one of the world’s most densely populated metropolises.

Vietnam 🇻🇳

Vietnam’s Hedging Between the Koreas

by Sean Huy Vu

Vietnamese General Luong Tam Quang, a member of the Politburo and Minister of Public Security, led a high-level delegation to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) from 13 to 16 June. Invited by his North Korean counterpart in an effort to boost bilateral ties, the objectives of the meeting were to share experiences in “Party building, national governance, economic development.” Both sides also expressed a desire to improve people-to-people ties and shared experiences in law enforcement. Neither Vietnamese nor North Korean state media revealed the details discussed during the meeting.

The visit comes nine months after General Secretary To Lam met with Chairman Kim Jong Un in October 2025 to celebrate the 80th anniversary of the founding of the Workers’ Party of Korea. The two pledged to deepen cultural exchange and defense cooperation; a commitment made six years after the 2019 Hanoi Summit between United States President Donald Trump and Chairman Kim.

Many observers have been confused as to why Vietnam has been engaging with a pariah state. One reason is simply due to the shared communist legacy, as the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry (and much of the state apparatus) is quite ideological. One US official anonymously expressed dismay at the growing relations between Vietnam and North Korea, stating that the DPRK offers “absolutely nothing of value” and “costs” Vietnam. Some North Korea watchers have speculated that Vietnam is forming a communist axis with the DPRK and China.

Khanh Vu, a visiting scholar at Boston College and specialist in Asian communist security, however, has explained Vietnam’s intentions. Vietnam aspires to become a proactive middle power capable of mediating differences between countries, such as North Korea, South Korea, and the US. By maintaining relations with everyone, Vietnam can serve as a platform for diplomacy for potential future summits. Vu notes, nonetheless, that Hanoi’s “bold” outreach towards Pyongyang could affect its reputation globally if its visits are not carefully framed within the framework of multilateralism.

When compared to its relationship-building with South Korea, however, Vietnam’s visits to North Korea are largely symbolic. South Korea is Vietnam’s largest source of foreign direct investment, totaling US$92 billion by the end of 2024. Samsung alone is Vietnam’s largest source of FDI, employing over 120,000 workers, who produce half of the chaebol’s phones. South Korea is Vietnam’s third largest export market, valued at 6% of total trade, following the US and China. South Korea’s Lotte also provides substantial employment and upskilling of the workforce in the food and retail sectors.

Vietnam’s hedging between the Koreas is an extension of the larger geostrategic competition between the United States and China, as both Koreas lean towards their respective great power security guarantors. As the Trump administration disrupts global supply chains and energy markets through its foreign policy, increasing diplomacy with North Korea is an indirect way of engaging with the Sinosphere in Asia.


Sean is a scholar of East Asian history, culture, and international relations, with current research at Georgetown University examining working-class labor and human trafficking in the region. His broader interests include the social psychology of religion and identity politics. Sean previously taught modern Korean history at the University of California, Irvine, where he completed his B.A. in History, and later taught English in Ho Chi Minh City while studying Vietnamese language and culture. His writing has been published by UC Irvine, Johns Hopkins University, and Foreign Analysis.

Support Us

The Philippines 🇵🇭

Alex Eala and the Power of Sports Diplomacy

by Glenn Vincent N. Boquilon, in Angeles City

When people talk about diplomacy, they often think of presidents, foreign ministers, and international summits. Yet, diplomacy can also happen in places far from government offices. Sometimes, it takes place on a tennis court.

The recent rise of Filipino tennis player Alex Eala has drawn attention, not only because of her achievements, but also because of what they represent. Every time she competes on the international stage, she introduces the Philippines to audiences who may know little about the country. Under those circumstances, she demonstrates an often overlooked form of statesmanship: sports diplomacy.

Sports diplomacy refers to the usage of sports and athletes to build connections between countries and to improve a nation’s image globally. Unlike formal diplomacy, which is conducted through governments, sports diplomacy often works through public attention. In this arena, athletes become unofficial ambassadors. Their accomplishments can inspire interest, admiration, and goodwill toward their home countries.

Eala’s growing presence in international tennis has given the Philippines a rare opportunity in a sport traditionally dominated by larger and wealthier nations. She is now ranked 30th, according to the Women’s Tennis Association, after her play at the Berlin Tennis Open. Her achievements have brought on international media coverage and distinct attention to Filipino talent. For many young Filipinos, she has also become a symbol of what is possible through hard work and dedication.

The Philippines is not the only country in Southeast Asia that has benefited from sports diplomacy. Thailand has long used its success in Muay Thai to promote its culture internationally. Indonesia has also done the same through badminton, a sport that has become closely associated with national pride. Similarly, Singapore has invested heavily in hosting major sporting events and attracting international competitions. These efforts help countries gain visibility and strengthen their global presence.

Sports diplomacy has become increasingly important in a world where public perception matters. A country’s image is no longer shaped only by politics and economics. In this regard, culture, entertainment, and sports also play a crucial and defining role. Historically, successful athletes can create positive stories that travel across borders and reach audiences that traditional diplomacy may never reach. For example, the global rise of Manny Pacquiao helped shape international perceptions of the Philippines beyond politics, showing how sports figures can become symbols of national identity.

In Southeast Asia, sports have also helped reinforce regional ties. Events such as the Southeast Asian Games bring together athletes from different countries and encourage friendly competition. While nations compete for medals, these events also create opportunities for cultural exchange and mutual understanding. They remind people that regional cooperation is not limited to government meetings and official agreements.

Sports diplomacy is not only about improving a country’s image abroad. Success on the international stage can also encourage greater investment in sports programs, facilities, and athlete development at home. Alex Eala’s rise has already sparked discussions about the future of Philippine tennis and the support available to young athletes. More broadly, her success shows how sports can strengthen national pride while also building connections between countries. In an increasingly interconnected world, athletes are not just competitors; they can also serve as ambassadors for their nations.


Glenn holds a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from the University of Santo Tomas. His experience spans governance programs, policy development, and political research, having worked with the Ateneo School of Government and WR Numero Research on projects focused on electoral reform, public opinion, and regional development. He also helped coordinate the drafting of the Bangsamoro Local Government Code and supported the Academy of Multiparty Democracy.

Singapore 🇸🇬

Beyond the June 2026 BTO Launch: What It Reveals About Housing in Singapore

by Jennifer Hui En Tan, in Singapore

The June 2026 Build-To-Order (BTO) launch, which released 6,952 flats across seven projects, highlights the Singapore government’s continued commitment to public housing. As the majority of Singaporeans live in flats built by the Housing & Development Board, the BTO system remains a key pillar of social stability and home ownership. However, despite its benefits, there are still structural flaws within the system that have wider social consequences.

The BTO system has long been one of Singapore’s most important public housing policies, reflecting the state’s effort to keep home ownership accessible to ordinary citizens. In recent years, the government has ramped up supply; this latest expansion is significant because it signals recognition that housing demand remains intense, especially among young Singaporeans hoping to enter the property market. Authorities have also introduced measures such as projects with shorter waiting times to make the system more responsive to the needs of first-time buyers. The BTO model has helped sustain relatively high home ownership rates and has allowed many Singaporeans to buy subsidized flats at prices below those of the resale market.

However, these improvements do not fully resolve the deeper tensions built into the system. Although BTO flats are cheaper than resale flats because they are subsidized by the government, they are not necessarily affordable for all young couples. This burden is made heavier by Singapore’s rising cost of living, which can make housing feel less like a milestone and more like a financial strain. Even with shorter waiting time projects, the BTO system still requires couples to plan years ahead, often before they are fully ready financially or personally, which can either rush or delay marriages or having children. As a result, housing may be accessible on paper but still feel out of reach in practice, shaping not only where people live but also when they feel able to begin major life milestones.

This is why BTO should be understood not just as a housing policy but as a social policy with wider implications. In Singapore, housing has been closely tied to marriage and family formation, especially because home ownership is often seen as a practical prerequisite for settling down. When access to housing is delayed, expensive, or uncertain, the effects extend beyond the property market into broader concerns such as fertility, special mobility, and demographic decline. Singapore’s low fertility rate cannot be explained by housing alone, but the structure of the BTO system may still contribute by making marriage and parenthood feel more financially and logistically difficult.

This challenge is not unique to Singapore. Across ASEAN’s major urban centers, housing affordability is becoming an increasingly serious pressure as economic growth, urbanization, and rising land values reshape city life. In Thailand, high-rise condominiums have pushed prices beyond many households’ reach. Singapore’s BTO debate thus reflects a wider regional struggle to provide housing that is both affordable and supportive of family life.

In the end, the 2026 BTO launch reflects the government’s commitment to expanding supply and improving access to home ownership, but it also reveals that housing policy cannot be judged by flat numbers alone. As housing pressures rise across ASEAN cities, Singapore’s experience offers a useful case study of how urban housing policy can influence not just where people live, but how societies reproduce, remain stable, and imagine their future.


Jennifer is a final-year International Relations student at the Singapore Institute of Management, where she focuses on political engagement, diplomacy, and community governance. She is an active volunteer in her constituency, working closely with residents to understand local concerns, facilitate dialogue, and support community initiatives.

Editorial Deadline 23/06/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)