by Karen Ysabelle R. David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk

In early September, parts of the Pacific Corridor woke up to dark skies overhead: it was transboundary haze, long the bane of ASEAN environmental cooperation. This year, as it faced deteriorating air quality, it was again Singapore’s turn to grapple with the question: why is this particular regional problem so difficult to solve?

The haze has become a recurring issue. And as the climate emergency becomes ever more urgent, more and more extreme weather phenomena will keep crossing national borders. Almost a year since the article was first published, we take a look back at the typhoons that deluged parts of Vietnam in September and October 2025 — how much has really changed since then?

But for the Philippines, there may be clear skies ahead: in a historic milestone, the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao held its first-ever parliamentary elections. This is only just the latest step in the region’s decades-long peace process, but for now, the forecast is of cautious optimism.

Singapore 🇸🇬

Singapore Haze Returns: Why Does a Regional Problem Remain so Difficult to Solve?

by Jennifer Hui En Tan, in Singapore

Singapore has experienced a deterioration in air quality since early September, with haze affecting parts of the island. On 4 September, the 24-hour Pollutant Standards Index (PSI) reached 101 in the central region, entering the “Unhealthy” range for the first time since 8 October 2023. The National Environment Agency (NEA) has linked the current haze conditions to moderate to dense smoke plumes from fires in Southern and Central Sumatra and parts of Kalimantan. With prevailing winds blowing from the southeast and south, smoke has drifted toward Singapore and neighboring states.

The immediate source of the current haze is smoke from land and forest fires in Indonesia. During periods of dry weather, fires in parts of Sumatra and Kalimantan can produce significant amounts of smoke. The geography of the region means that this smoke does not necessarily remain within the area where the fire occurs. This makes haze a regional environmental issue, rather than one that can be managed entirely within the borders of a single country.

Singapore works with the ASEAN Specialized Meteorological Center, which monitors hotspots, smoke plumes, weather conditions, and regional haze, providing information that helps countries assess the development and movement of fires and smoke across Southeast Asia. The current episode illustrates the difficulty of addressing environmental problems when the causes and effects cross national boundaries.

ASEAN has established a regional legal and institutional framework for addressing transboundary haze. The ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution (AATHP)

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was signed in 2002 and provides cooperation on monitoring, prevention, preparedness, national and joint emergency response, and scientific research. ASEAN has also established procedures for countries to share information and coordinate emergency responses when fires become severe enough to cause transboundary haze. However, individual countries remain responsible for preventing and controlling their own territories. This means that while ASEAN provides mechanisms for monitoring and regional coordination, effective prevention and response still depend largely on national action.

For Singapore, this means that managing haze involves more than responding when air quality deteriorates. Regional monitoring, early warning, prevention, and cooperation between ASEAN member states remain important in reducing the likelihood and severity of future haze episodes.

Singapore’s latest haze episode highlights the progress and limitation of ASEAN regional response. While mechanisms provide a framework for monitoring and emergency coordination, preventing transboundary haze ultimately depends on action within individual countries. As weather conditions become increasingly challenging, sustained regional cooperation and stronger prevention efforts will remain essential to reducing the impact of haze on Singapore and its neighbors.


Jennifer is a final-year International Relations student at the Singapore Institute of Management, where she focuses on political engagement, diplomacy, and community governance. She is an active volunteer in her constituency, working closely with residents to understand local concerns, facilitate dialogue, and support community initiatives.

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Vietnam 🇻🇳

The Climate Emergency in Vietnam

by Hang Nguyen, in Ho Chi Minh City

Note: This article was first published in Issue 19 of the Pacific Corridor newsletter on 17 October 2025.

Late September and early October saw Vietnam battered by a rapid succession of flash floods, landslides, vigorous rainstorms, and violent winds delivered by Typhoon Bualoi (Typhoon No. 10) and Typhoon Matmo (Typhoon No. 11). Extreme weather events hit the northern and central provinces annually; however, local residents and businesses still continue to be inundated with damages to their livelihoods and infrastructure. The lack of efficient climate change resilience further exacerbates civilian distress, signaling a call for urgency for the national government and regional institutions to ramp up natural disaster capacity-building and mitigation initiatives.

As of 11 October, preliminary statistics have reported catastrophic losses: 238 dead or missing, 367 injured, 258,000 private residences severely damaged, 500,000 hectares of agricultural rice fields destroyed, and automobile damages racking up to VND 76 million (US$3 million). Roads, schools, banks, health services, and other public infrastructure have suspended operations. The total economic loss is currently estimated to be tens of trillions VND (several billion US$), a burden to be placed on the Vietnamese government, taxpayers, and businesses.

Viewed from a more humanitarian perspective, the aftermath of flooding has devastated civilian normalcy in the afflicted regions. People have reported losing their entire life savings, properties, and important paperwork such as the “Pink Book” (Certificate of Land Use Rights) in the current calamities; livestock displaced; inability to contact family; no running water or electricity; and left to hopelessly wait for rescue forces. This is particularly the case in the agriculture-predominant regions of the Mekong Delta and of the central coasts, leaving the agricultural backbone of the nation critically incapacitated. Videos have surfaced on online platforms, portraying the cruelty of these historic typhoons and the despair of affected families.

In a swift response to the crisis, the government has mobilized military and security forces for emergency relief within hours after the incident. Notably, Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh issued Decision No. 2221/QD-TTg to allocate aid from the 2025 central budget contingency fund worth VND 140 billion (US$5.6 million) for recovery and rebuilding in four northern provinces. Agencies and individuals have also participated in disaster relief efforts by donating and volunteering. While these expeditious short-term responses are well-coordinated and demonstrate solidarity amongst the Vietnamese people, the reliance on reactive measures rather than sustainable preventive frameworks will persist to disrupt civilian life on a frequent basis.

Vietnam’s recent calamities reflect the broader pattern of climate vulnerability across Southeast Asia, exposing the need for more extensive regional disaster mitigation and response mechanisms. Given that neighboring countries such as the Philippines also recently contended with the tropical cyclone Matmo, this presents an incentive to conduct data sharing and cross-border collaboration. The similar extreme weather phenomena that occurred across Southeast Asia reveals the shared exposure and susceptibility to environmental degradation. Ultimately, as climate risks transcend national borders, the coordination of ASEAN’s approach would facilitate more efficient capacity-building and would be indispensable to safeguarding livelihoods across the region.


Hang is a young researcher with academic experience in Vietnam and the United States. She has previously worked in public relations at the U.S. Consulate General in Ho Chi Minh City and the YSEALI Academy. Her research focuses on ASEAN centrality in the evolving Asia-Pacific landscape, with particular attention to Vietnam’s approach to trade, regional cooperation, and political economy in the face of external power dynamics and global volatility.

The Philippines 🇵🇭

From Peace Agreement to Political Institution

by Glenn Vincent N. Boquilon, in Angeles City

On 14 September 2026, the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) held its first-ever regular parliamentary elections. Over 2.4 million registered voters took part, choosing the people who will sit in the region’s first elected parliament.

This vote matters for more than just picking new leaders. It marks the region’s move away from an appointed, transitional government and toward one that is chosen directly by the people. Since the BARMM was created, the Bangsamoro Transition Authority has run things on an interim basis. In this situation, the parliament will answer to voters instead of being appointed.

The election is also a milestone in Mindanao’s decades-long peace process. BARMM exists because of the 2014 peace deal between the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, which aims to end armed conflict and give the Bangsamoro people real self-governance. Voters in the region later approved the Bangsamoro Organic Law in a 2019 plebiscite, paving the way for the region as it exists today.

What makes this election unique is BARMM’s system of government. Unlike the rest of the country, which follows a presidential system, BARMM uses a parliamentary one. It is the only region in the country to do so. Its 80-member parliament is made up of party representatives, district representatives, and sectoral representatives. Parliament members will then choose the region’s chief minister from among themselves.

This setup encourages political parties and coalitions to cooperate to form a working government. How well they collaborate after the election may matter just as much as who actually won seats.

Turnout was strong, with Commission on Elections reporting that over 80% of registered voters cast ballots, higher than expected. Most polling went smoothly, although there were some reports of election-related violence in a few areas. The high turnout is a good sign of public engagement, but the security incidents are a reminder that challenges remain.

Beyond the Philippines, BARMM’s experience offers a case study for other parts of Southeast Asia dealing with questions of autonomy and regional representation. It showcases how a peace agreement can eventually evolve into a functioning electoral system.

Ultimately, this election is not the endpoint for Bangsamoro’s peace process. This is just the next phase of it. In this regard, the real test now is whether the newly elected parliament can build trust, stay stable, and actually deliver results for the people it represents.


Glenn holds a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from the University of Santo Tomas. His experience spans governance programs, policy development, and political research, having worked with the Ateneo School of Government and WR Numero Research on projects focused on electoral reform, public opinion, and regional development. He also helped coordinate the drafting of the Bangsamoro Local Government Code and supported the Academy of Multiparty Democracy.

Editorial Deadline 15/09/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Siu Tzyy Wei, Lead Editor - Maritime Crescent Desk

Some numbers hold together only if no one looks too closely.

This week, Brunei’s PISA scores read as a national success story, until the data beneath them raises a harder question about what is actually being measured, and for whom. Malaysia faces a different pressure: a population ageing faster than the policies meant to support it, where the fixes that would have worked are running out of time to matter. Meanwhile, Indonesia’s long-delayed protections for ride-hailing workers promise greater revenue sharing and social security, but leave deeper questions around algorithmic management, gender inequality, employment status and the government’s commitment to platform workers unresolved.

Three different countries, the same pattern underneath: what looks stable on the surface is rarely the whole picture.

Because the numbers that reassure us are usually the ones no one has stress-tested yet.

Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳

Behind the Rank

by Maryam Zulaidi

The OECD published its Programme for International Students Assessment (PISA) 2025 results on 8 September 2026, marking Brunei’s participation for the third time since 2018 and its largest sample to date. At 5,740 students, headlines reported that Brunei ranked among the top three in ASEAN for mathematics and science, and second in reading. Regional standing, however, does not reveal the full picture about the distribution of achievement within the country.

Brunei remains below the OECD average across four categories, including reading and computational problem solving. Results for science, mathematics and reading were stronger in 2022 than in 2025. Scores fell by six points in science, seven in mathematics and four in reading relative to 2022. However, this decline warrants attention rather than alarm since the OECD recorded a similar pattern of deterioration across most participating nations.

The sensible question is who is underperforming. Thirty-nine percent of Bruneian 15-year olds sat in the top international quartile of socio-economic status. They are among the most materially advantaged students in the world, yet averaged at 480 points in science, significantly less than students in Singapore, Chinese Taipei and Macau. If advantaged students are underperforming, the limitation cannot be material resources.

The report also highlights that the gap between disadvantaged and advantaged students is consistent with the OECD average and has narrowed since 2018, primarily due to an improvement seen in the former group and stagnancy in the latter. The proficiency distribution makes the consequences visible. Thirty-nine percent of Bruneian students fell below baseline proficiency in science and forty-five percent in mathematics, indicating that a concerning demographic of students cannot reliably apply their knowledge into real life situations. The results allude to a wider constraint than a subject-specific one; improvement at the lower spectrum of the distribution alongside stagnation at the upper end directs attention towards instruction rather than the students themselves.

Another finding that did not make the headlines is that accounts of bullying are higher than the OECD average of twenty in 2025 and higher than Brunei’s own figure in 2022. Thirty-four percent of Bruneian students reported experiencing bullying at least a few times a month. Arguably, the lower figure in 2022 was likely a consequence of the pandemic disruptions rather than a genuine improvement. Unlike the previous scores, this is a finding the ministry can tackle directly.

The significance of the recent cycle is that Brunei now holds three comparable data points. The 2018 report established a baseline, the two cycles cannot determine a genuine shift from one cycle to the next, whereas the third and recent results begin to shape a trajectory. This allows Brunei’s Ministry of Education to determine whether performance is improving, declining or holding steady. The value of this PISA exercise lies in what the data reveals about where the education system is falling behind and not in the regional nor global rankings.


Maryam is a first-year International Relations and Politics student at the University of Sheffield, with an academic focus on Southeast Asia—particularly Maritime Southeast Asia—and the Middle East. She aspires to a career in diplomacy and academia and is committed to fostering international dialogue and advancing scholarly engagement with global issues. Beyond her academic work, she pursues creative interests and voluntary initiatives that broaden her perspectives on public service.

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Indonesia 🇮🇩

Promises on Hold

by Amallia Utami

There is a discrepancy between the statements made by President Prabowo Subianto and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia regarding the enactment and finalisation of Presidential Regulation No. 27 of 2026 on the Protection of Online Ride-Hailing Workers. On May 1, 2026, President Prabowo announced that the policy regulating protections for drivers had been established. These protections include social security and a more favourable revenue-sharing arrangement for drivers. However, in mid-August 2026, the State Secretary stated that the regulation was not yet complete and would be issued in late August or early September 2026. Yet there has been no further update, and the status of the finalisation remains unclear.

President Prabowo’s speech highlighted several areas of focus for the regulation. For instance, it addressed the reduction of commission fees, or “deposits”, that have long been considered a burden for drivers. Initially, drivers received only 80% of the fare, while the proposed regulation aimed to increase their share to 92%. Some platforms have already implemented this policy for their driver-partners per July 2026. The regulation also touched upon minimum wages, job security, and health insurance. However, there are several other issues that warrant attention within this regulatory framework.

First, artificial intelligence and algorithms present significant concerns. Algorithms currently influence how rewards are allocated to drivers who work continuously. This may be one reason why some drivers work excessively long hours each day. The situation is further complicated by schemes that require drivers to complete a specific number of trips within a short timeframe, potentially compromising their safety.

The situation of female drivers, who are particularly vulnerable, also requires attention. Platform governance frameworks developed without a gender perspective may place an undue burden on female drivers by creating a “double burden”. Positioned merely as partners (mitra), these drivers lack access to basic needs such as minimum wages, sick leave, or even maternity leave. Their earnings are influenced by how many tasks they have completed and algorithmic rankings, while they may also have to manage household responsibilities.

Secondly, algorithms can serve as a mechanism for managing workers without appearing to be management. The role of the supervisor has not necessarily disappeared. Instead, it has been transformed. What warrants attention is the use of algorithms to automate tasks such as work allocation, reward determination, and performance monitoring, while also influencing workers’ access to future work opportunities.

Higher earnings is an immediate need for drivers and couriers, as changes to revenue sharing can have the direct impact on their livelihoods. However, financial improvements alone cannot address the insecurity created by algorithmic management or the absence of employment protections. The delayed finalisation of the regulation raises questions about the government’s commitment to protecting platform workers, especially when its status remains unclear. While the proposed provisions could improve workers’ financial security, stronger protections should address deeper inequalities created by algorithmic management and gaps in employment protection adequacy.


Amallia is a media and culture graduate from the University of Glasgow with experience in journalism and creative writing. Her interests lie in democracy, media and communication, particularly how contemporary media environments shape self-censorship, misinformation, and disinformation.

Malaysia 🇲🇾

Malaysia’s Incoming Grey Tsunami

by Edrina Lisa Ozaidi, in WP Kuala Lumpur

Declining fertility rate, rising life expectancies and rising living costs, among others, indicates that Malaysia is transitioning into an ageing society at a pace that far outstrips many of its regional neighbours.

Department of Statistics Malaysia (DOSM) data indicates that citizens aged 65 and above have reached 8.4% of the total population, with 12 states officially classified as “ageing states”. The data is not just a demographic forecast, but a shifting population category that also reshapes households, healthcare networks and the national economy.

The question: Is Malaysia ready to accommodate the already-coming grey tsunami?

Currently, Malaysia’s ageing population is rooted in two intersecting trends. On one end, life expectancy climbed steadily, crossing the 75-year threshold. On the other, total fertility rates have plummeted well below the 2.1 replacement level. This is driven by shifting socioeconomic dynamics, urbanisation and the soaring cost of raising children in urban areas.

An inverting demographic pattern means fewer births are feeding into the workforce. A surge of retirees will also emerge, requiring long-term social, medical and financial support. The Malaysian government recognises the gravity of this demographic shift, and an initial structural counter plan has been laid out.

Initiatives including strategic proposal such as The National Ageing Blueprint (NAB) under 13th Malaysia Plan (MP), the National Plan of Action for Older Persons (2026-2030), and the Malaysia Care Strategic Framework and Action Plan (2026-2030) all aim to gradually enforce eldercare infrastructure and social protection reforms, ranging from geriatric care to preventative community health.

However, the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia warn that the country’s physical and financial architecture is profoundly unprepared. Urban centers, where a vast majority of the elderly population resides, remain glaringly unfriendly for older citizens. Malaysia’s heavy car-centric transportation model, coupled with deficient first-mile and last-mile pedestrian infrastructure, effectively strand older adults with physical or cognitive impairment. Although sporadic efforts like demand-responsive transit vans offer glimmers of hope, nationwide age-friendly urban needs remain largely absent.

Adding to this is a ticking financial time bomb: the persistent fragility of retirement savings. Successive rounds of permitted Employees Provident Fund (EPF) with withdrawals over recent years have hollowed out the nest eggs of millions of Malaysians. This “grey line” in EPF savings means that instead of enjoying secure golden years, a vast cohort of future seniors will face forced economic precarity, compelled to stay in the workforce long past retirement age simply to survive.

Transforming the country into an age-friendly nation requires a synchronised overhaul - from unifying transport planning to strict protection of retirement funds. If policymakers fail to bridge the gap between macro-growth narratives and the grassroots realities of an ageing population, the country risks running out of time before it runs out of money.


Edrina is a communications professional with a background in international relations. She holds a degree from the University of Nottingham Malaysia and has worked across public relations and social media for organizations in the development, education, and corporate sectors. Her work focuses on crafting narratives around regional affairs and strengthening media engagement across Southeast Asia.

Editorial Deadline 14/09/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk

This week, legitimacy was something several institutions tried to protect or manufacture, with mixed success. In Myanmar, former junta leader and now-President Min Aung Hlaing collected a fourth ASEAN red-carpet welcome in Cambodia, a reminder that recognition from neighboring capitals is not the same as recognition from his own people. In Laos, the Vientiane court handed down life sentences and billions of kip in penalties to former bank officials, an attempt to restore faith in a financial system whose credibility was compromised from the inside. In Cambodia, that same appetite for legitimacy showed up in the Funan Techo Canal's new $1 billion financing deal — proof the project can attract serious capital, even as the risk gets quietly routed through a joint concessionaire rather than the state. And in Thailand, a new deportation regulation dressed up as routine "public order" housekeeping instead strips refugees of appeal rights and edges the country closer to forced returns it has legally promised not to make.

Myanmar 🇲🇲

Myanmar President’s Travels Not For The Country, But For His Own Legitimacy

by Ley Hlaing

Myanmar’s general-turned-president Min Aung Hlaing has been continuously engaging in foreign visits since his presidency started. Having experienced diplomatic isolation and lack of recognition from the rest of the world, these endless travels reveal the notorious truth of the regime’s desperation to revive their role in ASEAN and engage in international relations.

On September 11, 2026, the junta president visited Cambodia in his latest travel and met separately with Head of State Hun Sen and the Head of Government, Hun Manet. This official visit also included a welcoming ceremony with a red-carpet reception and a military guard of honor upon his arrival in Phnom Penh. In the presence of Min Aung Hlaing and Prime Minister Hun Manet, officials from both nations signed four key agreements aimed at boosting cross-border cooperation on protection of investments, avoidance of double taxation, cultural cooperation, and in the information sector. During the trip, the former junta leader strongly emphasized that Myanmar is actively working to strengthen and restore its cooperation within ASEAN. Critics have been warning that this visit, as well as other recent ones, is an attempt to weaken ASEAN’s decision and approach on the Myanmar issues.

Needless to say, the countries officially welcoming Min Aung Hlaing’s visits, such as India, China, Laos, Thailand, Belarus, Russia and most recently Vietnam, are doing so because they prioritize their own benefits over lives of the people of Myanmar, enabling the regime’s survival and undermining the human right abuse across Myanmar. From the beginning of his official visits, many right groups have asked the officials of these countries to arrest Min Aung Hlaing and deliver him to the Internal Criminal Court. Still, no action was taken and his visits actually grew in number.

In this latest trip, Cambodia became the fourth ASEAN country to welcome Myanmar’s President. Cambodia’s role in Myanmar’s issue has been significant as Hun Sen himself served as the rotating Chair of ASEAN in 2022 and visited Nay Pyi Taw in the first foreign official to visit Myanmar after the military coup. Since then, ASEAN’s 11 members started to divide on the Myanmar issue positioning, all while the number of ASEAN countries that officially welcomed the junta leader has increased to four. Still, offshore countries like Malaysia and the Philippines remain consistent on their approach on Myanmar with the five point consensus, showing that Min Aung Hlaing’s diplomatic efforts is mainly working on neighboring countries, which maintain higher interests in stabilizing Myanmar’s situation, no matter the human cost.

However, analysts examined that there might not be any significant changes in ASEAN’s stance on Myanmar until early 2027, when the group’s chairmanship will pass from The Philippines to either Singapore or Thailand, which is actively advocating to fully re-integrate Myanmar into ASEAN. On top of this, there are still other regional giants like India and China that have strong influence on the Myanmar’s domestic affairs.

These countries need Myanmar to be stable not primarily for the people of Myanmar, but for their own benefits and interests. Providing legitimacy to figures like Min Aung Hlaing ultimately deepens fractures within ASEAN, stalling collective efforts toward a peaceful resolution and prioritizing short-term geopolitical interests over regional stability and human rights.

Ley Hlaing is a former Political Science student from the University of Yangon, Myanmar. Currently, he is pursuing his BA at Parami University with a major in Philosophy, Politics and Economics. His academic and professional interests span community development, literature, minority issues, and social impact research. Having held roles as Research Assistant, Student Mentor, and Facilitator for local initiatives, he has constantly supported project management in literature and education programs in Myanmar.

Lao PDR 🇱🇦

Vientiane Court Delivers Severe Penalise in Major Banking Corruption Cases

by Souriya Bounpaseuth, in Vientiane

When corruption reaches the financial system, the consequences can extend well beyond the individuals involved. It can affect public resources, foreign-exchange operations and confidence in institutions entrusted with managing money. That broader question sits behind two corruption and money laundering cases decided by the Vientiane Capital court last week.

A major corruption case involving former banking officials has resulted in life sentences, asset confiscations and billions of kip in financial penalties, following judgments announced by the Vientiane Capital People’s Court on 8 September.

The two cases involved 10 former employees in the banking sector, including five women, and allegations ranging from abuse of official positions and irregular foreign-exchange transactions to bribery and money laundering. Together, the cases involved reported losses of more than LAK 2.29 trillion, equivalent to approximately USD 102.6 million.

The first case centred on two former senior officials of the Bank of Lao PDR, including a former Head of the Monetary Policy Department and a former Head of the Services Department. They were accused of abusing their positions to take foreign currency from central bank reserves and provide unrestricted foreign services.

The court sentenced the defendants to life imprisonment and imposed fines equivalent to one percent of the report damage. One defendant was also ordered to compensate a commercial bank more than LAK 142.71 billion. The court ordered the confiscation of assets, including bank accounts, land and vehicles, to transfer to the state. The second defendant died during the proceedings and therefore did not receive a criminal punishment.

The second case involved eight former bank employees convicted of corruption and money laundering. The allegations included foreign-currnecy transactions conducted outside agreed contract rates, the receipt of bribes, and the conversion of illicit proceeds into assets and bank deposits.

One defendant was convicted after allegedly receiving USD 95,459.97 and THB 1 million through foreign-currency transactions. The defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment and fined one percent of the relevant amount.

Another defendant received a prison sentence in connection with a LAK 180 million bribe from a fuel-import company. Although initially sentenced to seven years, the term was reduced by four years following restitution, resulting in a four-year sentence and a one percent fine.

A further defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment after being convicted of corruption and money laundering involving LAK 24.125 billion obtained through negotiations with foreign-exchange applications.

Other defendants received prison sentences ranging from 16-20 years, with some terms reduced following restitution. Another defendant received a life sentence.

The court also ordered the confiscation of bank accounts, land, vehicles and other assets connected to the cases.

The bigger story is not simply how much money was involved, but how the alleged misconduct was able to take place. The cases put a spotlight on the controls surrounding foreign-exchange operations, the responsibilities of officials entrusted with financial authority, and the mechanisms available to recover assets. In that sense, the court rulings are not only about punishment; they also raise broader questions about the safeguards needed to protect the integrity of the financial system.

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Cambodia 🇰🇭

Funan Techo Canal Secures US$1 Billion Financing Deal

by Sokna Thea, in Phnom Penh

Cambodia’s landmark Funan Techo Canal project reached a major financial milestone this week with the signing of an estimated US$1 billion commercial debt facility, revealing a more complex corporate structure behind the project than the usual narrative of direct bilateral state lending.

On September 9 in Xiamen, China Exim Bank formally signed a financing agreement with Funan Techo Coastal-Inland Waterways Co. to fund the Funan Techo Integrated Water Resources Management Project. Instead of being a direct sovereign loan paid to the Cambodian government, the credit facility was issued directly to the joint Cambodian-Chinese project company responsible for delivering the megaproject under a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) and public-private partnership (PPP) model, according to official bulletins from the Agence Kampuchea Presse.

The deal also helps explain the different financing figures reported in recent weeks by international and regional media. Early reports often described Beijing as “footing the entire bill” for the 180-kilometer waterway. However, the financing package is more divided. The new US$1 billion facility is specifically for the main commercial civil works under the BOT concessionaire. Separately, a US$200 million concessional facility arranged in July serves as targeted state-level development financing, according to The Phnom Penh Post.

This layered financing approach shows how China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has developed across Southeast Asia. Instead of relying mainly on large sovereign loans that can create public concerns over debt, Chinese policy lenders are increasingly using special-purpose vehicles (SPVs) and mixed corporate financing. For international observers following Indochina, this distinction is important. Cambodia’s sovereign balance sheet is less directly exposed to default liabilities, while operational risks, toll collection revenues, and long-term control of the asset are placed more directly with the joint concessionaire.

The financing closure comes amid continuing geopolitical concerns within ASEAN. The canal will connect the Bassac River south of Phnom Penh directly to the Gulf of Thailand at Kep, allowing Cambodian cargo to bypass Vietnam’s Mekong Delta ports. Hanoi has repeatedly raised concerns about downstream water flows, salinity intrusion into the agricultural delta, and possible maritime security implications, as reported by the Khmer Times. Phnom Penh maintains that the project is purely economic, aimed at reducing transport costs, improving irrigation, and strengthening Cambodia’s control over its own logistics.

By securing the nearly US$1 billion debt package, Cambodia and its partners have cleared one of the most important hurdles facing the canal, demonstrating that the project can attract commercial financing. As construction work accelerates under the BOT framework, the project is becoming a case study in modern infrastructure diplomacy, where commercial concession risks are being managed alongside major regional geopolitical interests.

Sokna has a background in International Affairs and Business & Commercial Law. He’s currently a Senior Project Coordinator at the Ministry of Economy and Finance of Cambodia, working on the Financial Management Information System (FMIS) Project. His professional focus is driven by entrepreneurship, business development, and financial technology, with a particular interest in how private-sector innovation drives Cambodia’s economic growth.

Thailand 🇹🇭

How Thailand’s Deportation Regulation B.E. 2569 Deepens Risks for Refugees

by Satid Sootipunya, in Bangkok

On August 28, 2026, the Prime Minister’s Office Regulation on Deportation B.E. 2569 (2026) officially came into effect. While framed as an administrative update to streamline removals and safeguard public order, the decree creates an alarming structural vulnerability for the tens of thousands of urban refugees and asylum seekers seeking safety across Thailand.

Because Thailand is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention, non-citizens, regardless of whether they hold UNHCR documentation or await status determination (asylum-seekers), are legally designated as unauthorized migrants under the Immigration Act, B.E. 2522 (1979). Under Clause 5(1) of the new regulation, unlawful entry or staying without authorization serves as an immediate trigger for removal. The regulation concentrates final removal authority directly within the Ministry of Interior without providing standard judicial appeal rights. As a result, human rights NGOs may lack the legal standing to appeal deportation orders for recognized refugees or asylum-seekers in Thailand. Furthermore, courts and prison authorities are mandated to notify the Ministry immediately upon issuing fines or suspended sentences to foreign nationals. For refugees working informally to survive or caught up in routine urban sweeps, minor administrative infractions now directly feed them into a rapid deportation pipeline.

This structural vulnerability is further compounded by the ineffectiveness of domestic protection frameworks. The Royal Thai Government introduced the National Screening Mechanism (NSM), back in 2020, to evaluate claims for “Protected Person” status, conceptually parallel to UNHCR’s Refugee Status Determination (RSD). However, the NSM remains largely ineffective for urban refugees and asylum-seekers in its current stage. Because the mechanism operates under the Immigration Bureau without legal immunity for overstayers, applying for protection creates a dangerous Catch-22: initiating or undergoing NSM screening frequently exposes applicants to arbitrary arrest or requires them to be detained in the Immigration Detention Center (IDC) prior to receiving status determination. Furthermore, the text of the new Deportation Regulation fails to clarify whether individuals holding Protected Person status under the NSM are explicitly exempt from deportation.

The central peril for refugees and asylum-seekers under the new regulation is refoulement, the forced return of individuals to countries where they face persecution, torture, or death. While Clause 8 of the text permits an alternative third-country transfer if return poses a severe risk, the procedural requirements render it nearly impossible. The request must be processed diplomatically within just seven days of the deportation order, require written consent, and be fully funded by the requesting entity. For a refugee or asylum-seeker trapped inside an IDC, organizing international diplomatic intervention within a single week is a near-impossible barrier.

Thailand’s 2023 Act on Prevention and Suppression of Torture and Enforced Disappearance, fulfilling legal duties under the UN Convention Against Torture (UNCAT), explicitly prohibits returning individuals to harm. Yet, the new regulation fails to integrate systematic human-rights risk assessments into its fast-track removal process. Even before the regulation took effect, there were numerous instances of deportations or attempted deportations of individuals at risk of such harm. Without targeted protection screening, the regulation risks turning routine immigration enforcement into a systematic forced returns, exposing vulnerable refugees to catastrophic risk.

To uphold the country’s non-refoulement obligations, the Thai government should establish clear legal mechanisms to safeguard recognized refugees and active asylum-seekers from fast-track deportation. Guaranteeing an automatic stay of removal for individuals registered with UNHCR would ensure domestic enforcement aligns with human rights standards without compromising public safety.


Satid is a multimedia economic journalist and news anchor who covers macroeconomic trends, Thailand’s fiscal policy, and key regional developments for Bangkok Biz. A Journalism graduate from Thammasat University, he has reported on major issues such as the US–China trade tensions, the Myanmar crisis, and global corporate stories, drawing on prior newsroom experience at The Momentum, the Bangkok Post, AFP, and Varasarn Press. His work blends economic analysis, foreign affairs, and digital storytelling, with a strong focus on making complex financial and political topics accessible to Thai audiences.

Editorial Deadline 12/09/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Haniva Sekar Deanty, Managing Editor - TAF

This week’s Pacific Corridor issue looks at markets where outcomes increasingly depend on how well two sides respond to one another.

In Singapore, the final quarter of 2026 will test whether major new housing launches can still draw strong demand as buyers become more selective, placing greater pressure on developers to get pricing, location and timing right.

In Ho Chi Minh City, a rise in business suspensions and dissolutions points to mounting pressure on smaller firms, even as new enterprises continue to enter the market and officials maintain confidence in the city’s broader growth outlook.

Meanwhile, we revisit the Philippines as it prepares for the 15% Global Minimum Tax, where the government faces its own balancing act: protecting tax revenues while ensuring that investment incentives remain competitive under a changing international tax regime.

Whether between developers and buyers, businesses and market conditions, or taxation and investment, neither side of the equation operates alone. Sometimes, it really does take two to tango.

Singapore 🇸🇬

Singapore's Q4 Launch Wave Will Show Whether Demand Survived the Cooldown

by Ryan

Singapore’s private housing market is about to face its most consequential test of the year. Thomson Reserve, a 1,268-unit development jointly built by UOL Group, Singapore Land Group and CapitaLand Development on the former Thomson View site in District 20, opens its sales preview on October 3, with a public launch expected roughly two weeks later (Thomson Reserve). Around the same time, City Developments Limited is preparing to bring the 570-unit Lucerne Grand to market at Lakeside Drive, beside Jurong Lake Gardens (Jamus Property). Together with a cluster of smaller projects, these launches will determine whether developers can still generate strong turnout after a year in which momentum has clearly cooled.

The headline numbers explain why so much attention rides on the fourth quarter. Developers sold 4,885 new private homes, excluding executive condominiums, in the first seven months of 2026, an 11.6% decline from 5,527 units over the same period last year. But the number of units launched fell even further, down 28.7% to 4,516 from 6,334, which means the sales dip reflects a thinner launch calendar more than a genuine retreat in appetite. The sales-to-launch ratio actually climbed to roughly 1.08, above the five-year average of 1.05 and the first reading past 1.0 for a January-to-July period since 2022.

What has shifted is buyer behavior at the point of sale. Launch-weekend take-up rates averaged just under 55% for projects launched in July, well below the 70%+ norm of recent years. July itself illustrated the split: Dunearn House in the Core Central Region and Lentor Gardens Residences in the suburbs both opened to respectable but unspectacular results, selling 56% and 54% of their units respectively over opening weekend. Prices, meanwhile, are still climbing, just more slowly. The Urban Redevelopment Authority’s private residential price index rose 0.5% quarter on quarter in the second quarter, down from 0.9% in the first, bringing the first-half gain to 1.4% against 1.8% a year earlier.

None of this points to a market in distress. Singapore’s government has kept the Additional Buyer’s Stamp Duty, loan-to-value limits and total debt servicing ratio unchanged since April 2023, even as it has pushed Government Land Sales supply to 9,320 confirmed units for 2026, more than 50% above the past decade’s annual average. That combination, tight demand-side rules alongside generous new supply, has produced a soft landing: prices are still rising, but launches are no longer guaranteed to clear regardless of price or location.

That distinction, between a market that rewards everything and one that rewards the right things, is becoming the defining feature of real estate cycles across Southeast Asia. Malaysia’s revival rests on affordability and policy support, Indonesia’s on demographic breadth, Thailand’s on ease of foreign ownership, while Singapore increasingly competes on institutional discipline and supply transparency. As each market moves past its own version of easy, broad-based growth, it is the developers who study their buyers rather than the cycle, and the buyers who study the unit rather than the headline, who will still be standing when the tide goes out.


Ryan is a final-year finance student at the Singapore University of Social Sciences (SUSS) with experience across venture capital, venture debt, and business development. He also holds a diploma in Law and Management from Temasek Polytechnic. His interests lie in how emerging technologies and economic trends shape business ecosystems and regional development in Asia.

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Vietnam 🇻🇳

Ho Chi Minh City's Revolving Door

by Hang Nguyen, in Ho Chi Minh City

Ho Chi Minh City’s economy is exhibiting a notable structural pattern in 2026: a growing imbalance between the rate at which businesses enter the market and the rate at which they leave it. In the first eight months, more than 43,000 enterprises exited the city’s market, representing a 24.4 percent increase over the same period last year. Of this total, 9,703 enterprises completed formal dissolution procedures, a 164 percent increase, while a further 33,390 enterprises suspended operations on a temporary basis.

By comparison, 38,253 new enterprises registered over the same period, while a further 13,582 businesses resumed operations. Nguyen Khac Hoang, Head of the Municipal Statistics Office, characterized the current entry-to-exit ratio as approximately 10 to 8, a figure that compares unfavorably with the national ratio of roughly 10 to 6.

Several underlying factors appear to account for this trend. Pham Binh An, Deputy Director of the Ho Chi Minh City Institute for Development Studies, attributed the difficulty primarily to small and medium-sized enterprises, citing a shortage of new orders, weakening consumer demand, elevated logistics costs, and constrained access to capital. Although interest rates have eased in accordance with government directives, they remain comparatively burdensome for smaller firms. Limited capacity to accommodate digital and green transformation requirements has further compounded these pressures.

A separate administrative factor also warrants consideration. Officials have indicated that a substantial share of the increase in formal dissolutions stems from a nationwide campaign, led by the Ministry of Finance, to clean up long-dormant tax identification records. Many of the enterprises now completing dissolution procedures had, in practice, ceased operations years earlier without formally closing their tax files. As authorities have accelerated review of these dormant accounts, a considerable backlog is now being processed, inflating the reported dissolution figures without necessarily reflecting a deterioration in current business conditions.

This administrative explanation, however, accounts for only part of the pattern observed. The 33,390 enterprises that suspended operations, an increase of 7.82 percent, more plausibly reflect present-day cost and demand pressures rather than the resolution of historical administrative backlogs. This assessment is further supported by export growth of 7.8 percent in Ho Chi Minh City, which trailed the national growth rate of 22.8 percent, alongside industrial production growth that likewise lagged the nationwide figure. Taken together, these indicators suggest that the exit trend reflects genuine strain on the private sector’s smaller and less capitalized enterprises, rather than statistical artifact alone.

Municipal authorities maintain that the trend does not jeopardize the city’s double-digit growth target for the year, pointing to offsetting indicators such as a 167 percent increase in foreign direct investment and budget revenue that has exceeded projections. At the same time, officials have proposed measures to simplify dissolution procedures and offset the costs associated with formally exiting the market, an implicit acknowledgment that the process of closing a business remains administratively burdensome in its own right.

Overall, the available evidence points to a pattern of elevated business turnover rather than outright contraction. New enterprises continue to enter the market at a steady pace, but a growing proportion of existing firms, particularly smaller enterprises with limited financial reserves, are electing to suspend or discontinue operations in the face of sustained cost pressure, tightened credit conditions, and uncertain demand.


Hang is a young researcher with academic experience in Vietnam and the United States. She has previously worked in public relations at the U.S. Consulate General in Ho Chi Minh City and the YSEALI Academy. Her research focuses on ASEAN centrality in the evolving Asia-Pacific landscape, with particular attention to Vietnam’s approach to trade, regional cooperation, and political economy in the face of external power dynamics and global volatility.

The Philippines 🇵🇭

Global Minimum Tax (GMT) Could Reshape Philippine Tax Incentives for Multinational Enterprises (MNEs)

by Arianne De Guzman, in Bulacan

The Philippines is moving toward the implementation of the 15% Global Minimum Tax (GMT) as tax collections are projected to increase by 9% annually until 2028, according to the Department of Finance (DOF) on Monday, 17 August. While the country aligns its tax system with the international rules, the Marcos administration will need to balance attracting investments through tax incentives with protecting government tax revenues.

Since November 2023, the Philippines has been a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)/G20 Inclusive Framework on Base-Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS). One of its key initiatives is the GMT under the Two-Pillar Solution. Under this framework, the Global Anti-Base Erosion (GloBE) Rules generally apply to large multinational enterprises (MNEs) with annual revenues of at least EUR750 million in at least two of the last four years. The rules establish a 15% effective tax rate (ETR) on a jurisdictional basis.

This does not mean that all Philippine companies will suddenly pay a 15% tax. Instead, when an in-scope MNE’s jurisdictional ETR falls below the 15% after under the GloBE rules, an additional “top-up tax” may be imposed to bring the rate closer to 15%. For the country, this could strengthen tax collection by limiting the ability of MNEs to reduce their ETR through tax incentives and other mechanisms.

This creates a policy trade-off. Higher tax revenues could strengthen government finances, but making incentives less valuable could affect the Philippines’ ability to attract foreign investment. Conversely, maintaining incentives without assessing their economic returns could limit potential revenue gains.

The CREATE MORE Act provides one possible direction through its Enhanced Deductions Regime (EDR). Under the EDR, registered business enterprises are subject to a 20% corporate income tax on income from registered activities while receiving additional deductions for qualified expenses. Compared with other incentives that significantly reduce the ETR, the EDR supports business activity while keeping the ETR above the 15% minimum.

The proposed Qualified Domestic Minimum Top-up Tax (QDMTT) could also allow the Philippines to collect the applicable top-up tax domestically, instead of allowing another jurisdiction to collect it under the GloBE rules. As of July 2026, the DOF convened an interagency technical working group (TWG), with 5 sub-technical groups, to lead the drafting of legislation and prepare the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) systems. The Marcos administration targets implementation to begin on 1 January 2027, with tax collection expected in 2028. Since the legislation has yet to be enacted, the treatment of existing Philippine tax incentives remains an important area to monitor.

Large MNEs should assess whether the GMT could reduce the value of their existing Philippine tax incentives and quantify any potential top-up tax. They should also track policy developments on how incentives can be structured to continue supporting investment while remaining compliant with the GMT.

The DOF and investment promotion agencies, such as the Board of Investments (BOI) and the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA), should provide clear guidance and outlook on how the GMT will interact with existing tax incentives and whether these incentives will remain effective until their expiration. The Marcos administration should also assess GMT-compatible incentives, including expenditure-based and investment-linked incentives, to preserve the Philippines’ ability to attract MNEs without simply reducing their ETR below 15%.

The GMT is shifting the focus of tax incentives from tax savings toward investment-driven incentives. Tax incentives may still be a key consideration, but GMT implementation may focus on rewarding activities that create economic value in the Philippines.


Arianne has experience in policy research at De La Salle University’s Jesse M. Robredo Institute of Governance, where she contributed to projects on systemic reform. She earned a degree in Political Science from Colegio de San Juan de Letran. Currently, she works in government relations, specializing in advocacy strategy, legislative monitoring, and stakeholder engagement. Beyond her professional work, she is actively involved in youth development and grassroots initiatives through the Rotaract Club of Santa Maria.

Editorial Deadline 07/09/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Siu Tzyy Wei, Lead Editor - Maritime Crescent Desk

Power is easiest to understand when you can see who holds it.

This week, Brunei strengthens the capabilities that could see it take on a greater role in regional disaster relief. Indonesia, meanwhile, moves closer to giving the state a power anti-corruption reformers have wanted for decades: the ability to seize assets without first securing a conviction. Malaysia, meanwhile, finds itself at the centre of another contest over power: whether attracting the infrastructure behind the AI race is enough to give it a stake in the technology itself.

Three different kinds of power, three very different questions about what happens when it is put to use.

Because the question is never just who has the power. It is who gets to hold it, and what keeps them from holding it too tightly.

Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳

Brunei, PACAF, and Interoperability in the Right Domain

by Wira Gregory Ejau, in Bandar Seri Begawan

From August 25 to September 5, US Pacific Air Forces and the Royal Brunei Air Force conducted PACIFIC ANGEL 26-1, a joint search and rescue exercise staged at Rimba Air Base in Bandar Seri Begawan. The exercise covered overland and overwater personnel and equipment airdrops, aeromedical operations, cargo handling, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief response.

While Brunei’s armed forces are small, well-funded relative to the state’s size, and professionally capable, its forces are not necessarily configured for high-intensity combat roles alongside a major power. In the development of its operational toolkit for regional emergency contingencies, PACIFIC ANGEL develops durable and arguably more immediately useful interoperability in the domain where Brunei’s military can realistically contribute to regional operations. Southeast Asia is among the world’s most disaster-prone regions, with its exposure to typhoons, earthquakes, and flooding across a maritime geography where rapid aerial response is not an enhancement but a necessity. A Royal Brunei Air Force capable of integrating seamlessly into PACAF-led HA/DR operations is a force multiplier that extends well beyond what Brunei’s own assets could achieve independently.

PACIFIC ANGEL follows Pahlawan Warrior 26, which officially concluded on the 20th of August at Tutong Camp, where a US Army and Oklahoma National Guard exercise with the Royal Brunei Land Forces covered jungle warfare, land navigation, medical evacuation, and unmanned aircraft systems. Before that, US Pacific Air Forces conducted air domain awareness training with the Royal Brunei Armed Forces in January, and a US Air Force MQ-9 Reaper was deployed to Brunei in May. The cumulative picture across 2026 of bilateral military relationship develops a consistent pattern and depth across air, land, and SAR domains simultaneously.

For a small state, interoperability with the dominant regional military power is a form of presence within a security architecture that the smaller state would be unable to sustain through its own resources alone. This embeds the Royal Brunei Armed Forces more firmly into the potential for future operational and planning frameworks of US Pacific Command, establishing Brunei as a reliable and integrated partner in its regional posture.

What the concentrated exercise calendar of 2026 ultimately suggests is that the Brunei-US military relationship is deepening, and that the domain in which Brunei is investing most visibly is precisely the one where its contribution to regional security is most credible and most sustainable.


Gregory is an MSc candidate in Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He works as a freelance writer specializing in international history, conflict, and counterterrorism, with experience in academia, investigative journalism, and voluntary uniformed service. He currently provides research assistance with the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) under their Southeast Asian Security and Defence Internship Programme and conducts investigations on regional security and transnational crime for a confidential company.

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Indonesia 🇮🇩

Careful What You Wish For

by Rayhan Prabu Kusumo, in Jakarta

On August 27, a crowd gathered outside the parliament in Jakarta. Many had come from Pati, a regency five hundred kilometres away. By the end of the afternoon they succeeded in pressuring leaders to sign a letter promising to pass the Asset Forfeiture Bill by the fifteenth of December, and pledging to resign if they failed. A street protest that ends in a signed promise and a resignation pledge is not how these things usually go here.

This demand is old and, on the surface, entirely reasonable. For decades, anti-corruption reformers have asked for a law that lets the state take back stolen wealth, and for just as long, governments have found reasons not to pass it. The bill would let prosecutors and law enforcement seize assets tied to a crime, in some cases without waiting for the owner to be convicted. Countries serious about corruption have tools like this. Indonesia, which claws back only a fraction of what is stolen from it, plainly needs one.

The trouble is that the feature which makes the law powerful is the one that makes it dangerous. Seizing a person’s property before proving them guilty reverses the order a legal system usually runs in. The burden falls on the owner to show the money is clean, and the constitution’s protection of property and of innocence begins to bend.

Take Tom Lembong, prosecuted in a sugar-import case and then pardoned by presidential decree, an enforcement machine switched on and off by politics. Now picture that machine able to freeze your house while it decides. Members of the House writing the bill admit fearing it themselves, that it could become a tool to attack opponents. Others argue that money laundering may be quietly kept out of its reach, which would leave it fearsome to the weak and toothless against the strong.

Now, as this brief once probed, Indonesia’s anti-corruption enforcement is split among rival forces that investigate one another. A legal way to take the assets of whoever the stronger side calls guilty is the tool those two conditions were waiting for. Others have walked this road. The United States built civil forfeiture to break drug empires and ended up with police taking ordinary people’s cars and cash on suspicion alone, a practice its own critics came to call policing for profit. A power sold against kingpins rarely stays aimed at kingpins. And the tidy revival of this bill, the out-of-town crowd, the signed letter, the neat deadline, sits strangely beside how the real protests were met, the ones smeared as foreign-funded.

Nevertheless, it is not wrong for pro-reformists to want this bill passed. Corruption bleeds the country, recovery of stolen money is shamefully slow, and safeguards can be written into any text. The safeguard that matters most doesn’t live in text, but in weak institutions that need strength and integrity to rightfully wield the law. A law like this is only as safe as the people who control it.


Rayhan has a background in government affairs and public policy, with experience across government institutions and advisory firms. His work focuses on the intersection of geopolitics, policy, and risk, with expertise in advocacy, regulatory analysis, and stakeholder engagement. He holds a degree in Government from Universitas Padjadjaran, and has completed an exchange at Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Spain, focusing on global politics and sustainability.

Malaysia 🇲🇾

Hosting the AI Race

by Muhammad Aiman Bin Roszaimi, in Cyberjaya

Malaysia is becoming one of Southeast Asia’s most important destinations for artificial intelligence infrastructure. But as billions of ringgit flow into data centres, is Malaysia building its own technological power, or simply becoming the infrastructure that powers someone else’s?

Australia-based Firmus signed a multi-year agreement with OpenAI to provide computing capacity from two Malaysian data centres. The deal makes OpenAI an anchor customer and will see Nvidia’s next-generation Vera Rubin processors deployed across Firmus’ Asia-Pacific operations. Reuters describes Malaysia as Southeast Asia’s fastest-growing data-centre market, although the expansion is increasingly drawing scrutiny over electricity and water consumption.

On the surface, this is exactly the kind of investment Malaysia wants. Data centres bring foreign capital, construction, digital infrastructure, skilled employment, and connections to the global AI economy. They strengthen Malaysia’s position between Singapore and other emerging regional hubs while giving the country a larger role in the infrastructure behind the next generation of AI.

But infrastructure is not the same thing as technological ownership.

Malaysia is reportedly considering Huawei’s Ascend 910C chips for a RM2 billion sovereign AI initiative aimed at giving the country greater control over sensitive national data. The project would be operated through Telekom Malaysia, according to people familiar with the matter, although the government has not publicly confirmed that Huawei has been selected.

This is where Malaysia’s AI strategy becomes strategically interesting. First, how can Malaysia capture more value from the global AI boom? Second, how can Malaysia prevent critical national data and computing capabilities from becoming excessively dependent on foreign technology providers? These are not necessarily the same problem.

A country can host the world’s largest AI companies while remaining dependent on foreign chips, cloud platforms, software ecosystems, and intellectual property. The servers may sit in Malaysia, the electricity may come from Malaysia, and the buildings may be constructed by Malaysian companies. Yet the most valuable technological layers can still belong elsewhere.

This is also why the current debate over Huawei should not be reduced to a simple “China versus America” question. For Malaysia, the deeper issue is “strategic dependence”.

Choosing one foreign technology ecosystem over another does not automatically produce technological sovereignty. It may simply change the source of dependency. True technological sovereignty requires Malaysia to develop capabilities to design, adapt, secure, and eventually own critical technologies rather than merely procure them.

Therefore, the danger is not that Malaysia attracts too much AI investment, but that Malaysia succeeds at attracting AI infrastructure without succeeding at moving up the technological value chain.

Malaysia does not need to become self-sufficient in every layer of the AI ecosystem. That would be unrealistic. But it does need to identify which dependencies are acceptable and which capabilities are too strategically important to outsource indefinitely.

The real test of Malaysia’s AI ambition, therefore, is not whether OpenAI, Nvidia, Huawei, or other technology giants choose Malaysia.

It is what Malaysia becomes because they do. That distinction matters beyond Malaysia, too.


Aiman is a PhD candidate in Security and Strategic Analysis at the National University of Malaysia. His research focuses on Malaysia’s space policy, ASEAN regional security, and the strategic implications of emerging technologies. His work explores how Malaysia’s defense policy and strategic culture shape its approach to outer space.

Editorial Deadline 05/09/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk

While some threats arrive suddenly in the region, others have been sitting in the ground, or building in the atmosphere, for decades. In Laos, the Third Review Conference of the Convention on Cluster Munitions opens in Vientiane this month in a country still living with the consequences of the largest bombing campaign per capita in history — timing made sharper by Norwegian People's Aid's decision to turn down USD 40 million in US funding rather than accept new restrictions, shrinking an already thin field of deminers as casualties keep climbing. In Thailand, Bangkok is fighting a newer threat, rolling out over 300 Heat Escape Rooms to protect residents from extreme heat, a model now being adapted in Iloilo City, Philippines, as urban heat resilience becomes a regional necessity. And in Cambodia, Phnom Penh unveiled a USD 1.2 billion economic package to shield vulnerable households and small businesses from Middle East-driven inflation and slowing growth, part of Prime Minister Hun Manet's broader argument that economic resilience is itself a form of national defense.

Lao PDR 🇱🇦

Laos to Host Cluster Bomb Treaty Review Amid Donor Retreat

by Thongsavanh Souvannasane, in Vientiane

Laos will host the Third Review Conference of the Convention on Cluster Munitions in Vientiane from 14 to 18 September, gathering states parties in the country hit hardest by unexploded bombs anywhere in the world.

Lao Foreign Minister Thongsavanh Phomvihane will preside over the meeting, which opens days after one of the country’s longest-serving demining partners announced it was scaling back its work here.

On 3 September, Norwegian People’s Aid said it was turning down roughly NOK 400 million, about USD 40 million, in US State Department funding.

The department’s new terms would have barred the group from working on abortion, gender equality, and diversity, not just in US-funded projects but across all of its operations. NPA said it would cut around 1,700 jobs worldwide and scale down work in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Iraq.

NPA is one of only six groups clearing bombs in Laos: the national UXO Lao and the Lao army’s Unit 58, plus four international NGOs, NPA, the HALO Trust, MAG, and Humanity & Inclusion.

NPA has been active in Laos’ southern provinces, Salavanh, Champasak, Attapeu, and Sekong, since 1997, and has also carried out work in the country’s northern region. Its pullback shrinks an already small field.

Laos remains the most heavily bombed country per capita in history.

Between 1964 and 1973, US forces dropped 2.5 million tons of ordnance, including cluster bombs that scattered hundreds of smaller submunitions on impact. Roughly 30 percent failed to explode. An estimated 22,000 Lao citizens have been killed or injured since, and the danger has not gone away: officials recorded 15 accidents in 2025, causing 25 casualties, including six deaths.

The economic damage runs deep too. Laos is still a lower-middle-income country and one of the world’s Least Developed Countries, a status it is due to leave in November 2026.

According to UNDP, 42 of the 46 poorest districts in Laos are contaminated with unexploded bombs, cutting off farmland and raising costs in areas that can least afford it.

The US is not Laos’ only donor. Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, the UK, Canada, and the European Union have all funded clearance work in recent years, often through UNDP. Some US funding also continues: on 26 August, Lao and MAG officials signed a new agreement adding USD 15 million for clearance in Xieng Khouang province through 2027.

As of 2024, Washington remained Laos’ single largest donor, having given nearly USD 400 million since 1995.

Still, NPA’s exit adds to a pattern that began with the Trump administration’s dismantling of USAID in 2025. A USD 30 million disability and survivor-support program, USAID Okard, lost 80 percent of its staff, leaving nearly 20,000 vulnerable Lao citizens, including 176 bomb survivors, largely without help.

Laos now heads into its own conference with a mixed picture: some donors staying steady, one key partner pulling back, survivor support badly weakened, and casualties still climbing every year.

Thongsavanh is a journalist from Laos with a background in English-language media. He graduated from the Lao-American Institute with a Diploma of the Arts in English and contributes to independent news platforms. His reporting focuses on environmental issues, socio-economic development, and geopolitics.

Thailand 🇹🇭

How Bangkok’s Dialogue Exchanges Inspire Urban Heat Resilience Initiatives In The Philippines

by Natamon Aumphin, in Bangkok,

After a hazardous temperature in summer, Bangkok shared its lessons through regional dialogue to help Iloilo City in the Philippines combat urban heat and create an ASEAN network of urban heat resilience initiatives. Currently, the rising temperature has moved beyond the effects of climate change. It has become a public health risk and perpetuated inequality, affecting vulnerable groups such as the elders, children, outdoor workers, and low-income communities. Particularly, those who reside in the city may experience prolonged heat trapped in buildings and concrete roads. Because of insufficient green spaces, the heat is hard to cool off; hence, residents are prone to extreme heat, especially during the day, which makes certain groups vulnerable to health risks.

With this issue at hand, the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA) rolled out an Urban Resilience Action Plan in March, featuring Cooling Centers across the capital as an immediate measure to compete with high heat. These heat escape rooms are air-conditioned spaces where people can come and relieve heat before heading out to continue their day. So far, there are over 313 Heat Escape Rooms equipped with air conditioners, drinking water, and medical supplies, stationed around the city. These centers have gained attention among elderly people, reflected in feedback footage in the BMA official Facebook page. As a positive spillover, Bangkok’s Cooling Centers initiative prompted an ASEAN neighbor, the Philippines, to follow its footsteps through the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), United Nations.

Through ESCAP’s Regional Training Workshop on Advancing Urban Heat Resilience in Asia, organized in April 2026 in Bangkok, and the project “Enabling Urban Action to Enhance Climate Resilience in Asia,” supported by the United Kingdom’s Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office, the programs serves as a platform to connect and enable ideas exchanges between policymakers of different areas and cities. Matthew Perkins, Economic Affairs Officer, Environment and Development Division at ‌ESCAP, provided an exclusive excerpt stating that learning from BMA reinforced Iloilo City to enhance its approach toward providing heat relief to its citizens.

“Cooling hubs were not pursued instead of other heat-response measures, but rather as one immediate and practical intervention within a broader approach to urban heat resilience,” said Matthew. “The cooling hubs, therefore, offered an early opportunity to translate regional learning into practical local action while contributing to a more comprehensive response to extreme heat.” Until the present, the cooling centers in Iloilo City have served over 3,800 people who use the facility not only to cool off themselves during the extreme heat but also to seek basic medical monitoring and assistance.

One crucial key to success is localization by adapting ‌relief measures to local specifics and needs. For example, Bangkok repurposed parts of public spaces, public schools, public medical centers, and government buildings and opened a part of those spaces for public use to combat the scorching temperature. Meanwhile, Iloilo City started at a much smaller scale by building three cooling hubs and placing them in strategic locations where there is more pedestrian traffic and community activities.

These approaches reflect how each city approaches urban heat resilience differently, taking capacity, resources, and limitations into consideration. In fact, Bangkok has a budget limit and is constrained by bureaucratic processes. Hence, repurposing the existing infrastructure is the best option at the moment to deliver an immediate heat relief network to citizens. Likewise, Iloilo City started small to ensure the effectiveness of the program before expanding the measures.

Nonetheless, Matthew recognized the limitation. “Cooling hubs can provide meaningful protection to the people who use them, but a relatively small number of facilities cannot address heat exposure across an entire city.” All in all, these short-term approaches are only part of the long-term solution, ranging from building green infrastructure to enhance green innovation and ensuring public readiness, aligning with ASEAN’s roadmap for Extreme Heat Protection through Passive Cooling.


Natamon has served as a rapporteur at the Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS Thailand). She has also worked as a research assistant on diplomatic issues in Southeast Asia. Her work focuses on how domestic politics shape foreign policy in the region. She holds a degree in international relations and has experience in policy analysis, event reporting, and regional research.

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Cambodia 🇰🇭

Cambodia Unveils USD 1.2B Economic Package to Counter Global Crises

by Malai Yatt, in Phnom Penh

The Cambodian government launched a USD 1.2 billion “Comprehensive Intervention Program” to stabilize livelihoods, support vulnerable families and MSMEs, create jobs, and bolster economic resilience amid ongoing global economic and geopolitical crises.

According to the official announcement, the government planned expenditure of the budget to ensure the stability of the people’s livelihoods and strengthen the resilience of Cambodia’s economy and society in the short and medium term.

Aun Pornmoniroth, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Economy and Finance said that following the COVID-19 crisis, Cambodia continues to face the changes in the global trade regime, crackdowns on online scam operations, border issues, and particularly the crisis in the Middle East, which has driven up petroleum and gas prices and created inflationary pressures.

Despite being a small country, Cambodia maintains a clear vision and proactive approach in implementing intervention measures. As a result, Cambodia’s economy achieved 5.3 percent growth in 2025, but is projected to slow to 4.1 percent in 2026 due to the impact of the Middle East war.

It should be noted that In 2025, Cambodia’s working-age population stood at roughly 13.1 million, comprising 6.8 million women and 6.3 million men, with 7.8 million residing in rural regions and 5.3 million in urban centers, according to National Institute of Statistics’s survey.

The national labor force participation rate rose to 71.6% in 2025, a notable increase from 69.3% in 2019, with male participation at 77.7% and female participation at 65.9%. By sector, services employed the largest portion of the workforce at 43%, while industry and agriculture accounted for 29.4% and 27.6%, respectively, the survey added.

Regarding this, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet stated that amid the global and internal challenges, Cambodia must pursue a strong economy, sufficient resources, people with stable livelihoods and strong knowledge, only then can we safeguard peace. It cannot be asked from others.

That reinforces the inseparable link between economic resilience and peace. Nations with weak economies are more vulnerable to external pressure, political, economic, or strategic, he said.

Conversely, economically strong nations possess greater autonomy in decision-making and are better equipped to defend national interests. Meanwhile,

economic strength also underpins the sustainability and modernization of defense capabilities, Improved living standards and poverty reduction, and Social stability and internal cohesion, Manet added.

In conclusion, as part of development and economic recovery, this comprehensive intervention reinforces national autonomy by supporting vulnerable households, empowering the workforce, and securing sustainable growth to safeguard peace amid global turbulence.

Malai is a reporter at Kiripost, where she has worked for more than three years, driven by a strong commitment to amplifying the voices of underserved communities. Her reporting focuses on economic and foreign affairs.

Myanmar 🇲🇲

Thailand’s Engagement with Myanmar Junta Raises Questions Over ASEAN Centrality

by Myat Moe Kywe

Thailand welcomed Myanmar’s newly branded president and former military coup leader, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, with a red-carpet reception during his official visit on August 6–7, drawing backlash from civil society groups in both Myanmar and Thailand.

According to National Thailand, Foreign Affairs Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow said Thailand’s foreign policy toward Myanmar is guided primarily by a commitment to ASEAN unity and practical regional stability. Yet bilateral discussions during the visit rarely focused on ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus or the ongoing civil war in Myanmar.

Instead, the talks placed significant emphasis on strengthening cross-border commerce, with the two countries seeking to accelerate bilateral trade toward a target of US$12 billion. Thailand and Myanmar also planned to convene a Joint Trade Commission meeting between their commerce ministers.

The two governments additionally signed four separate agreements, including one concerning cross-border river pollution management. Thai communities and civil society groups have been raising concerns over transboundary river pollution linked to mining activities in Myanmar, particularly rare-earth mining, with contaminated waterways flowing into northern Thailand. The pollution has been a growing concern for communities that depend on the rivers for their livelihoods and daily lives.

However, Thailand’s Cabinet approved the Terms of Reference (TOR) for a Joint Working Group on Water Quality Management in Border and Transboundary Rivers with Myanmar’s regime has been widely criticized among civil society and environmental watchdogs in Thailand.

The ETOs Watch Coalition, a network of civil society organisations monitoring transboundary investments and human rights violations in the region, argued that while international environmental cooperation is necessary, it must address the root causes of pollution, protect public rights and operate transparently. Without these safeguards, they warned, such cooperation could create “a false sense of progress” while legitimising Myanmar’s military regime.

The visit carries broader diplomatic significance as Myanmar’s military-backed administration seeks to consolidate legitimacy following elections widely described by critics as a “sham election.” Thailand’s willingness to engage directly with Min Aung Hlaing therefore raises questions about how other ASEAN member states may respond, particularly those that have remained cautious about direct engagement with the junta.

Thailand’s approach also presents a test for ASEAN centrality. While Bangkok frames its engagement as necessary for regional stability and ASEAN unity, the limited attention given to the bloc’s Five-Point Consensus and Myanmar’s ongoing conflict highlights a tension between pragmatic bilateral engagement and ASEAN’s collective response to the crisis.

Whether Thailand’s approach becomes a precedent for wider ASEAN engagement with Myanmar’s military-backed government remains a question for the bloc and for the credibility of ASEAN’s role in addressing the region’s most persistent political crisis.


Myat is a B.A. graduate in Politics, Philosophy, and Economics. She has interned at The Asia Foundation in Washington, D.C., and she has also worked as a summer research assistant at the Centre for Policy and Innovation (CRPI), gaining experience in research and analysis. Her work focuses on civic engagement, gender, youth leadership, and community development.

Editorial Deadline 05/08/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by the Pacific Corridor Desk

This issue looks across four Southeast Asian countries at very different questions of governance, development, and national identity. In the Philippines, the NLEX flooding exposes weaknesses in infrastructure resilience, emergency response, and accountability on one of the country’s most important transport corridors. In Singapore, Prime Minister Lawrence Wong’s 2026 National Day Rally combines multilingual appeals to national identity with new family policies, ASEAN priorities, and development plans. Vietnam’s technology boom highlights the country’s shift toward electronics and semiconductor-related manufacturing, while also raising concerns about dependence on foreign investment and limited domestic participation.

The Philippines 🇵🇭

Built for Speed, Trapped in Slow Motion: What the NLEX Fiasco Revealed

by Eduardo G. Fajermo Jr., in Angeles City

On a road built to save time, motorists paid tolls to lose nearly an entire day. After southwest monsoon rains flooded the Tulaoc section of the North Luzon Expressway (NLEX) in San Simon, Pampanga, queues stretched for approximately 10 kilometers, while some travelers remained stranded for almost 24 hours.

For readers outside the Philippines, NLEX is the principal tolled gateway from Metro Manila to Central and Northern Luzon. It connects with the Subic–Clark–Tarlac Expressway and the wider northern expressway network, serving Clark International Airport, the Subic Bay seaport, industrial zones, agricultural provinces, and Central Luzon’s growing logistics and manufacturing corridor.

The flood therefore did more than inconvenience holidaymakers. It immobilized workers, buses, delivery vehicles, and freight trucks on an artery connecting the capital with major production and distribution centers.

Truck driver Edgardo Viray said he was running out of diesel and money and had only six pieces of pandesal (small Filipino bread rolls) to share with his assistant. Elsewhere in the gridlock, chickens being transported to a factory reportedly died from the intense heat.

Public anger centered as much on bodily indignity as on travel time. One widely shared firsthand account described a 13-hour journey marked by hunger, limited phone service, and a female passenger unable to change her sanitary pad.

Cardinal Pablo Virgilio David, who said he was trapped for nearly five hours, called for an investigation by the Toll Regulatory Board and raised the possibility of collective legal action. Other motorists and politicians demanded toll refunds, reflecting a basic expectation: those paying for a premium road should receive timely warnings, competent traffic management, and meaningful assistance when the system fails.

The flooding itself was not solely an expressway problem. Pampanga Governor Lilia Pineda said water was backing up because low-lying downstream towns such as Macabebe and Masantol were already full, preventing floodwater from draining toward Manila Bay, while Public Works Secretary Vince Dizon said the sheer volume of water meant pumping alone would be insufficient.

Even MacArthur Highway, the principal alternative to NLEX, was heavily flooded and partly impassable. Motorists were consequently left with few usable diversions, exposing the lack of redundancy in one of Luzon’s most important transport corridors.

The operator has since apologized and announced additional flood-control measures, including 300-meter concrete barriers on both sides of the affected section, pumping operations, and further pavement elevation once the Tulaoc Bridge is raised. These measures may be necessary, but their timing reinforces the impression that contingency planning continues to follow disasters instead of getting ahead of them.

The episode also exposed fragmented responsibility. The private operator manages the expressway and its warnings, further pavement elevation depends on the completion of a bridge project, provincial officials point to a wider river-basin problem, and the Toll Regulatory Board is expected to enforce the concession’s service obligations.

Every institution can explain the part under its jurisdiction. Motorists, however, experienced the combined failure of the whole system.

The failure also has a significant economic dimension. During the first half of 2026, NLEX recorded an average of 352,067 vehicle entries per day, generating PHP15.77 billion in toll revenue and PHP7.46 billion in net income.

Those figures do not establish negligence, but they demonstrate the scale and commercial maturity of the concession. NLEX users are not beneficiaries of a free public service: they are customers paying a regulated operator for faster and more predictable movement.

These dispersed losses matter in a country already burdened by expensive logistics. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development estimates that logistics costs amount to approximately 27% of Philippine wholesale prices—higher than in Vietnam and Thailand—partly because of the country’s archipelagic geography but also because of transport inefficiencies.

NLEX was built to sell speed, but the flood revealed the slow machinery of fragmented governance. When motorists pay to spend an entire working day trapped, the Philippines is not merely stuck in traffic; it is paying for connectivity that disappears when it is needed most. In a country of storms, disaster preparedness is not charity after the flood.


Eduardo is a Political Science graduate and MA Political Science candidate at the University of Santo Tomas, researching democracy, disaster governance, and inclusive policy in the Global South. He is a former faculty member at Holy Angel University, where he taught Philippine history and contemporary global issues. He also worked with a senator in the Guam Legislature, contributing to policy research and legislative analysis.

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Singapore 🇸🇬

National Day Rally 2026 Showcases Bold Moves and Rhetoric by the Government

by Nurul Aini, in Singapore

As per the tradition of National Day rallies, the structure of Singapore’s Prime Minister Lawrence Wong’s 2026 speech followed an expected flow. He began first in Singapore’s national language which is the Malay Language. This is then followed by other official languages such as Mandarin and English. While he did not speak in Tamil, his rally was broadcasted through audio dubbing of his English speech by the Vasantham channel and radio Oli 96.8FM.

Unlike the then Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, PM Wong did not have a ‘magic cup’ that he drank from that would prompt a language switch. Yet, what makes this year’s rally particularly interesting was that his speeches moved beyond linguistic accommodation. As he maneuvered between the Malay, Chinese and English languages, his metalinguistic approach translated into the construction of different parts of the Singaporean identity. The ideas and policies accompanying the speech amplify the idea that these differing identities should contribute to national cohesion.

In the Malay language, he spotlighted it as part of the Singaporean identity and the language of marching instruction of the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF). He encouraged the learning of the Malay language and culture so as to improve regional relationships with immediate neighbouring countries that may prove beneficial to Singapore’s economy and its people. Almost similar to the rhetoric in Malay, his Mandarin speech promoted the use of Mandarin Chinese in households that are now increasingly monolingually English-speaking. Alluding to the recent issue of the Teochew version of Dear You that sparked debate over media regulations and restrictions, he also announced that the government will ease dialect restrictions on movies as long as Mandarin dubbed versions are available.

Switching to the English language, his speech became more policy-oriented. He announced that enhanced financial support will be given to assist more families over a longer period of time to encourage the raising of more children. Core financial mechanisms remain the same as the government utilizes existing tools such as cash gifts and Edusave grants for newborns, Child Development Account (CDA), and Post Secondary Education Account (PSEA).

Within these mechanisms, each child now will be supported with nearly $70,000 until they are 17 years old. At birth, each child will receive $10,000 regardless of birth order thus focusing on equality of birth order compared to the previous policy. New policies such as annual credits of $2000 will also be given to each child from age 1 to 16 years old with another $10,000 top up in their PSEA account at age 17.

Moreover, as Singapore is set to take over ASEAN chairmanship in 2027, PM Wong also emphasised on “ASEAN centrality and unity, deepen[ing] regional integration, and mak[ing] ASEAN a more effective single market.”

He also announced the land merger of Singapore’s outer islands. This has brought about concerns of its environmental impact on the sea. Eventually, while certain policies sound good theoretically, their effectiveness remains to be tested and deliberated.


Aini is currently pursuing a master’s degree in English literature at Nanyang Technological University. She has experience working in youth groups, contributing to the planning and management of outreach activities.

Vietnam 🇻🇳

Chance in the Chips

by Tri Vo, in Ho Chi Minh City

Vietnam’s macroeconomic profile is undergoing a rapid, structurally substantial transition. For decades, the country has relied heavily on low-value-added retail goods such as garments, footwear, and basic smartphone assembly to drive its export economy. Today, the picture has altered markedly, with advanced technology hardware, specifically computer components and AI-related infrastructure, decisively dictating the next phase of the country’s growth trajectory. With global spending on traditional retail goods cooling under the battering of high inflation, the high-tech manufacturing sector can act as the propeller keeping Vietnam relatively on track to reach its double-digit growth ambition for the rest of 2026.

The sheer scale of this transition is most manifest in the annual trade figures. In fact, Vietnam’s exports of computers, electronic products, and other relevant components are expected to surge dramatically by up to 20% in 2026, with total electronics trade turnover reaching a record US$170 billion in the first five months alone. The North American market emerges as the primary destination of this huge trade upsurge. Electronics shipments specifically to the United States dominated the export ledgers, hitting US$22.5 billion in the same five-month period and maintaining its position as Vietnam’s largest export market, but this time, for something much more technologically intensive.

This trade influx represents a calculated geoeconomic realignment on a firmer footing. As Washington and Beijing’s relations sour due to increasing geopolitical competition, multinational corporations are aggressively de-risking and diversifying their supply chains, moving production away from mainland China to avoid both the Trump administration’s punitive tariffs and national security concerns. In such a febrile milieu, Vietnam has successfully positioned itself as a viable alternative for global firms. Vietnam’s emergence is aligned with existing economic currents as technology manufacturers, despite geopolitical instability, still need to expand their production footprints, especially in semiconductor testing/packaging to head off the anticipated massive needs for AI infrastructure in the coming years.

Yet all that glitters is not gold, or, in this case, silicone; scaling this massive tech manufacturing footprint requires substantial upfront capital expenditure, resulting in severe short-term trade imbalances. In the first seven months of 2026, the broader electronics sector posted an overall trade deficit of US$12.3 billion. This was primarily driven by the computers and components sub-sector, which recorded an astonishing US$45 billion deficit as manufacturers aggressively imported chips, specialized machinery, production lines, and other raw materials. Nevertheless, belying such an alarmist appearance and rather than signaling a loss of export competitiveness, this massive outflow of capital indicates that foreign factories are actively expanding their production capacity to meet the government’s lofty double-digit economic growth aspiration for the second half of the year, targets that are now more pressing as the first half had impressive but still only single-digit growth.

As 2026 enters its final quarter, Vietnam’s technology boom remains structurally vulnerable: FDI enterprises overwhelmingly dominate the sector, leaving domestic firms peripheral and growth exposed to shifts in the business cycle. To capture lasting economic value, Vietnam must urgently develop domestic science and engineering talent and integrate local firms into advanced supply chains, offering ASEAN peers a model for moving from mere hosts of foreign investment to active participants in the 21st-century technology boom.


Tri has experience in management consulting and strategy, having worked with institutions such as the UNDP, The Asia Group, and ARC Group. He has provided strategic, legal, and operational insights to clients in sectors including manufacturing, energy, and technology. He holds both academic and professional experience related to Southeast and East Asia, with a focus on regional development and policy.

Timor-Leste 🇹🇱

Timor-Leste Celebrates 51 Years of FALINTIL

by Amandina Maria Helena da Silva, in Dili

Every year, Timor-Leste celebrates the FALINTIL (Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor) day to celebrate the struggle of the armed forces for the struggle for independence–the armed forces include the contribution of men and women fighter resistance. Nationally, this day is not recognized as a public holiday, but rather as a day of tolerance. The celebration lasts only half a day, marked mainly by the raising of the national flag to honor the heroes of the struggle and the military.

This year 20 August 2026, the government organized a ceremony to celebrate FALINITL Day on ‘Matebian’ mountain where the mountain also became a shelter for the armed forces to fight in the past conflict–through mobilizing the local residents, Veterans, ministries, government, women survivors and people.

This celebration is not only about remembering the past, but also about strengthening unity for the future. In his opening speech, Major General ‘Domingos Raul “Falur Rate Laek’ reflected on His speech that ‘In Matebian, we are not brought back to past tragedies, but learn to make peace. In this way, we leave a legacy of peace and not division to future generations’.

The following speech by the President of Timor-Les and also Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces ‘José Ramos Horta’ honored and respected all those who contributed to the struggle of Timor-Leste itself, especially those in the struggle of the armed forces. At the same time he also recognized the struggle of Women for Timor-Leste Independence.

From the above speeches, we realized that the fight from Timor-Leste Independence is about Collectiveness– not only men on the frontline to fight against the enemy but also women soldiers and women sexual violence survivors. But in popular narrative of Falentil Day is mostly people remembering men resistance leaders. The question is why are women voices missing from FALINTIL Day?


Amandina is a human rights advocate working with Asia Justice and Rights Timor-Leste on the Interim Reparation to Women Survivors project. She previously worked with UNDP Timor-Leste’s Accelerator Lab and has contributed to human rights and health initiatives through several youth and civil society organisations. Her interests lie in justice, youth empowerment, and community-based social change in Timor-Leste.

Editorial Deadline 1/09/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Haniva Sekar Deanty, Managing Editor - TAF

This week’s Maritime Crescent looks at what happens when familiar problems are treated as emergencies, even when the warning signs have long been visible.

In Indonesia, Gemala Asyura looks at recurring forest and land fires across Kalimantan and Riau have once again brought hazardous haze, school closures, and cross-border disruption. While El Niño has worsened conditions, the concentration of hotspots within corporate concessions raises a more persistent question: how long can a recurring and partly preventable crisis continue to be managed primarily through emergency response?

In Malaysia, Edrina Lisa examines strong headline growth sits uneasily alongside concerns over living costs, subsidy reforms, and an increasingly fragmented political landscape. As the country marks another year of independence, the challenge for the Madani government is not simply sustaining economic momentum, but ensuring that national progress is felt beyond the macroeconomic figures.

Meanwhile, Syimah Johari argues that Brunei’s gradual shift toward cashless payments reveals a quieter question of preparedness and accessibility. Digital options are expanding, but their uneven adoption among smaller vendors shows that technological transition depends as much on practicality and habit as it does on infrastructure.

Emergencies do not always arrive without warning. Forest fires return with the dry season, economic frustration builds beneath positive indicators, and payment systems evolve long before cash disappears from daily life.

Indonesia 🇮🇩

We Didn't Start the Fire

by Gemala Asyura, in Pekanbaru

It has not been a month since the devastating magnitude 7.7 earthquake struck Flores, East Nusa Tenggara (NTT) in August 2026 leaving 111+ dead and 110,000+ displaced. Indonesia faces another severe seasonal forest and land fires (karhutla) that have intensified through August 2026 as the dry season peaked. Karhutla refers to forest and land fires that can spread rapidly, especially during the dry season. Indonesia’s Meteorology, Climatology, and Geophysics Agency (BMKG) claimed the fires were driven by El Niño, causing the thick haze to blanket several cities, up to the point where residents in Palangka Raya admit day time feels like night time.

However, El Niño is a frequent and recurring event that is mostly predictable. By now the government is supposed to have the solution to prevent the same thing happening rather than relying on annual emergency responses to minimise the damage each time it does. The scale of this fire is massive, with people can barely see the road when they travel, schools shut down, smoke even gets indoors and the air quality in Kalimantan hits the dangerous category. The haze has become so severe that it has spread to neighboring Malaysia, forcing more than a hundred schools in Sarawak to close.

President Prabowo Subianto held a limited cabinet meeting specifically to get ahead of El Niño impacts, focusing on two things, securing national water reserves and blocking potential forest and land fires with the main target on rewetting peatlands. So far, the government deployed 30 helicopters in Kalimantan for water bombing and aerial patrols, alongside fixed-wing patrol aircraft, they also do weather modification or cloud seeding conducted in West Kalimantan to induce rainfall, contingent on suitable cloud conditions.

Greenpeace’s research found the majority of karhutla cases are linked to palm oil and pulp/paper companies clearing land by burning, meaning this isn’t purely a natural disaster that recurs on its own. This is why simply putting out the fire after it happened will not solve the problem. The government needs to come up with a long-term prevention system rather than just reactive firefighting and rewetting peatlands. There should have been precautions taken before it happened. In order to minimize the impact, the government should implement and invest in preventive measures every time the peak of the dry season is about to arrive. One may not always be able to contain a fire, but one can certainly prevent it from starting.

According to Friends of the Earth Indonesia (WALHI) the majority of hotspots in Kalimantan are located within corporate concessions. Out of a total of 34,262 hotspots, 25,524 points or roughly 74% are situated inside licensed areas. Most of them are in palm oil plantation concessions, mining concessions, and forestry utilization claimed by the Campaign Coordinator at WALHI National, in late July. This reinforces the suspicion that land and forest fires are not caused by El Niño alone, but also by illegal land burning within licensed areas.

Under Prabowo, Indonesia faced two major 2026 disasters, the Flores earthquake and El Niño-driven fires across Kalimantan and Riau leaving 200,000+ hectares burned, 10.6M + exposed to haze. His government responded with strong relief efforts, however, this response looks stronger on relief and reactive firefighting than on addressing root vulnerability. Clearing land by burning is prohibited under Article 69(1)(h) of Law No. 32/2009 on Environmental Protection and Management, but legal loopholes still permit land-clearing by fire, which is the main driver in this recurring problem. No matter how much water you pour on the roots, it won’t put out a fire caused by a completely different root problem.


Gemala holds a degree in International Relations, with a focus on contemporary global issues. In addition to her years of undergraduate study, she has hands-on experience in early childhood education, having worked in both teaching and teaching assistant roles. She now pursues journalism as a practical extension of her academic background, with a focus and scope centered on ASEAN regional dynamics and social issues.

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Malaysia 🇲🇾

Malaysia’s Paradox of Progress

by Edrina Lisa Ozaidi, in WP Kuala Lumpur

Parades are held in Putrajaya Square, and fireworks and drones light the sky since National Day eve. In the past two days, all Malaysian social media feeds are swamped with National Day wishes from brands and corporations alike. However, as Malaysia stepped into September 2026, the country found itself in a peculiar paradox.

On paper, the national macro-narrative is remarkably bold and positive: Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim highlighted in his National Day address that Malaysia’s second-quarter GDP growth surged to a robust 6.0%, trade numbers continue to rise to a high ceiling point, and international tech giants are said to have been pouring billions into Malaysia’s local semiconductor and digital infrastructure.

Yet, away from the celebrations, the socio-political pulse tells a far more complex story. The foundational question facing the nation post-Merdeka is not just about economic survival, but a test to national unity: Can Malaysia endure the persistent undertow of ethnic polarisation and fractured political realpolitik?

The most pressing friction point in Malaysian society today is the widening gap between national economic metrics and grassroots lived realities. While national coverage reported a 60% Q2 growth rate as a marked triumph for the Madani administration, another question that should be pondered is: is this small comfort for working-class families facing high living costs, new taxes, and cut subsidies, or are better solutions coming?

Political actors on both sides of the aisle have been quick to point out and weaponise this disconnect. Opposition narratives frequently frame federal economic reforms—such as targeted diesel rationalisation and tax implementation—as proof of a government out of touch with citizens.

Conversely, federal authorities argue that these bitter pills are essential to safeguard the country’s long-term financial sovereignty, while reminding citizens that Malaysia is still servicing debts linked to 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB) scandal, as well as liabilities involving institutions such as Tabung Haji and Felda.

However, federal leaders also admit that navigating this tightrope, especially with the upcoming national budget, requires more than sound fiscal policy; it demands an empathetic narrative that bridges the cold logic of macroeconomic spreadsheets with the daily anxieties of the electorate.

Compounding these economic anxieties is an increasingly volatile political landscape. The mid-2026 state election cycle in Johor and Negeri Sembilan served as a harsh wake up call for the federal Unity Government. It proved that the forced collaboration between historic ideological rivals—Pakatan Harapan and Barisan Nasional—remains deeply fragile at the grassroots.

As parties recalibrate ahead of upcoming electoral battles, the competition for the center has intensified. Parties are discovering that traditional ethnic-centric politicking no longer guarantees victories, yet a purely technocratic appeal risks sounding elitist. Voters, particularly the youth, are increasingly fatigued by political posturing, shifting their gaze toward pragmatic delivery, governance, and tangible economic opportunities.

Sixty-nine years after independence, Malaysia’s greatest asset remains its multi-ethnic fabric, yet remains as the most sensitive terrain. The challenge for contemporary leadership is to ensure that the pursuit of high-tech modernisation does not leave behind rural and marginalised urban communities.

If the Madani government is to successfully navigate the remainder of its mandate, it must deliver equitable prosperity. The battle for the center cannot be won through politics and macroeconomic data alone; it will be decided in the daily lives of Malaysians who are looking for a reason to believe that the nation’s collective promise includes them.


Edrina is a communications professional with a background in international relations. She holds a degree from the University of Nottingham Malaysia and has worked across public relations and social media for organizations in the development, education, and corporate sectors. Her work focuses on crafting narratives around regional affairs and strengthening media engagement across Southeast Asia.

Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳

Could Brunei’s Markets Be the Next Cashless Frontier?

by Syimah Johari, in Bandar Seri Begawan

Imagine walking through a food festival in Brunei, spotting something you want to try, only to realise you have no cash left. You ask the vendor if they accept card or QR payments. The answer is more likely to be a bank transfer – if they accept anything other than cash at all.

As pop-up markets, food events and local vendor initiatives become increasingly common across Brunei, these small moments raise a bigger question about how we pay. Last month, a cashless payment initiative was introduced at Gadong Night Market, partly to make spending more convenient for tourists. But beyond the night market, how far has Brunei really come in becoming cashless?

Cashless payment is certainly not new here. Brunei already has options such as Pocket, BIBD’s QuickPay, Progresif’s Ding! and TAIB’s Scan-to-Pay (STP), alongside the increasingly familiar option of transferring money through local banking apps. For many, transferring money from one bank account to another has become almost second nature.

Yet the experience can feel different depending on where we shop.

Walking into a newer café, restaurant or supermarket and paying by card, QR code or another digital method is increasingly common. At a night market, warong, food festival or temporary pop-up, however, cash can still feel like the safest bet.

There are understandable reasons for this. A permanent business may have regular customers and established systems for accepting different forms of payment. A small vendor setting up a stall for only a few days may have a different calculation. Payment terminals may come with costs, while transaction fees can matter more when margins are already small. There is also the simple reliability of cash: no internet connection, device or technical issue is needed to accept it.

For customers, meanwhile, cash remains familiar. Not everyone is equally comfortable with digital payments, particularly older customers who may prefer handling physical money. Going cashless, therefore, is not simply a matter of giving businesses another payment option. It is also about making that option practical for both the person selling and the person buying.

This is what makes the Gadong initiative interesting. Although introduced partly in response to tourists’ needs, making cashless payments more accessible at a night market could have benefits that extend beyond tourism. Visitors who are used to paying digitally may be more likely to spend when they do not have to worry about finding local currency. Vendors who see that demand may have more reason to offer digital payment options.

And as those options become more common at the markets and events that Bruneians themselves frequent, they may gradually become less of a novelty and more of an everyday habit.

Perhaps Brunei does not need to become completely cashless. But if the aim is to make digital payments a normal part of everyday life, the next step may not be getting another café to accept cards. It may be making it just as easy to pay the small vendor at the night market.


Syimah is a graduate of King’s College London with a BA in International Relations. With a strong focus on diplomacy, regional cooperation, and development policy, she is passionate about contributing to meaningful change through public service. Currently, she is involved in poverty alleviation work through a local NGO.

Editorial Deadline 29/08/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk

Min Aung Hlaing traded his military uniform for a civilian suit when he was declared Myanmar's president earlier this year, and the region has spent the months since treating that costume change as an open door. This week, Vietnam walked through it: Foreign Minister Lê Hoài Trung became the first Vietnamese foreign minister to visit Nay Pyi Taw since the 2021 coup, reviving a bilateral committee dormant since 2019 and expanding cooperation into defense, telecommunications, and trade. Cambodia made its own case for partnership on a bigger stage, hosting some 130 parliamentary leaders from over 30 countries who adopted the Phnom Penh Declaration, with Hun Sen and Hun Manet positioning Cambodia as a country that no longer just attends global diplomacy but convenes it. Thailand tested the same door earlier this month, giving Min Aung Hlaing a red-carpet welcome in Bangkok that drew backlash from human rights groups even as officials framed it as pragmatic regional engagement — a visit whose fallout is still unfolding, and one we're returning to this issue. And in Laos, a reminder that not every regional story this week is about diplomacy: flooding has now hit 654 villages across 42 districts, displacing over 95,000 people and killing at least four, with officials increasingly pointing to climate change as the disasters grow more frequent than the country's development plans have accounted for.

Myanmar 🇲🇲

Vietnam Expands Bilateral Cooperation with Myanmar

by Moe Thiri Myat

Vietnamese Foreign Minister Lê Hoài Trung visited Nay Pyi Taw on 26 August, marking the first bilateral visit by a Vietnamese foreign minister to Myanmar since the 2021 military coup. During the visit, Trung and Myanmar Foreign Minister Tin Maung Swe co-chaired the 10th Vietnam–Myanmar Joint Committee for Bilateral Cooperation, reviving a mechanism that had not met since March 2019. The meeting followed the exchange of new ambassadors in July and reviewed cooperation across government, parliament, local authorities and people-to-people ties.

The visit also broadened cooperation in defence, security and technology. The two sides agreed to expand delegation exchanges, military training and young-officer exchanges, alongside cooperation in search and rescue, disaster response, bomb and mine clearance, humanitarian assistance and military medicine. Discussions also covered telecommunications, digital government and the digital economy, extending bilateral cooperation beyond traditional diplomatic and economic ties.

Economic cooperation formed another major part of the discussions. Vietnam and Myanmar agreed to work toward raising bilateral trade to US$1 billion and to convene the 11th Joint Trade Sub-Committee to address barriers including import licensing, quarantine requirements, standards and customs procedures. The two countries also discussed expanding investment and improving conditions for Vietnamese businesses operating in Myanmar. Bilateral trade stood at around US$590 million in 2025, while Vietnam had 107 valid investment projects in Myanmar with registered capital of about US$1.4 billion as of the end of June 2026. Mytel, the telecommunications joint venture involving Vietnam’s military-linked Viettel group, remains one of the most prominent examples of bilateral commercial cooperation.

The visit also carried a political dimension. During a separate meeting with Lower House Speaker and Union Solidarity and Development Party chairman Khin Yi, Trung congratulated Myanmar on what Vietnam described as the successful organisation of the general election earlier in 2026 and acknowledged the new government’s initial period in office. Trung also formally invited Min Aung Hlaing to make a goodwill visit to Vietnam. The two countries discussed supporting one another in regional and international forums, including ASEAN and the United Nations.

The visit comes while ASEAN continues to manage its relationship with Myanmar through the Five-Point Consensus. The bloc has maintained restrictions on Myanmar’s political representation at ASEAN summits and foreign ministers’ meetings, while continuing to call for progress on ending violence, facilitating humanitarian assistance and promoting inclusive dialogue. ASEAN’s latest formal review of the Five-Point Consensus reaffirmed it as the principal framework for addressing the political crisis in Myanmar.

Vietnam’s visit adds to a series of recent contacts between Myanmar and individual ASEAN members. Min Aung Hlaing has travelled to Laos and Thailand this year, while Cambodia is preparing to receive him in September. Vietnam’s invitation could create another opportunity for high-level engagement within Southeast Asia. At the same time, the agreements reached in Nay Pyi Taw extend into defence, trade, telecommunications, digital infrastructure and coordination in regional forums, giving the visit significance beyond a routine diplomatic exchange and placing it within the wider evolution of Myanmar’s relations with its ASEAN neighbours.


Moe Thiri Myat is a senior at Parami University. Majoring in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics (PPE). Interested in analyzing emerging sociopolitical situations and developments, through her work as a Myanmar correspondent at The ASEAN Frontier she aims to explore how sociopolitical developments across Southeast Asia shape and are shaped by the situation in Myanmar.

Cambodia 🇰🇭

Parliamentary Leaders From Over 30 Countries Adopt Phnom Penh Declaration

by Chandara Samban, in Kandal

Around 130 parliamentary leaders from more than 30 countries adopted the Phnom Penh Declaration at the Second Inter-Parliamentary Conference of Speakers of Parliament, hosted by Cambodia, with the aim of promoting a global order founded on international law and the Charter of the United Nations. The declaration urges countries to resolve disputes peacefully rather than through violence or armed conflict, calling on the international community to embrace peace, justice, dialogue, and multilateralism at a time of escalating global tensions not seen in decades, particularly as major powers appear increasingly divided over international norms.

In the declaration, speakers of parliament, senators, and other legislators highlighted parliamentary diplomacy as an effective mechanism for addressing global crises, preventing conflicts, breaking diplomatic deadlocks, and facilitating the peaceful resolution of disputes and wars. They also expressed deep concern over ongoing armed conflicts, rising geopolitical tensions, economic uncertainty, food and energy insecurity, disruptions to global transportation routes, and the growing threat of cybercrime. These challenges, they said, require the international community to strengthen dialogue, negotiation, cooperation, and multilateralism.

During the conference, Cambodian Senate President Hun Sen and Prime Minister Hun Manet also voiced concern over both regional and global crises, including the ongoing border dispute between Cambodia and Thailand, as well as armed conflicts in other parts of the world. They emphasized the importance of dialogue and diplomatic engagement through forums such as the ISC, which provide countries with an opportunity to exchange views and seek peaceful solutions to shared challenges.

Hun Sen called for strengthening parliamentary diplomacy and proposed establishing a global network of parliamentary mediators to help prevent conflicts at an early stage. He said such a mechanism could reinforce the multilateral system and serve as a safeguard against the use of force, unilateral actions, and protectionist policies.

Prime Minister Hun Manet likewise urged countries to resolve disputes through peaceful means and in accordance with international law. He cited Cambodia’s own approach to its ongoing maritime dispute with Thailand, stressing the country’s commitment to international legal mechanisms, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and other principles of international law.

Cambodian leaders and several analysts described the conference as a successful demonstration of Cambodia’s growing role in international diplomacy. They said the event marked Cambodia’s transformation from a country that primarily participated in international summits into one capable of hosting major global conferences and providing a platform for the international community to discuss and develop practical mechanisms to address global challenges. They cited the adoption of the Phnom Penh Declaration as one of the conference’s most significant outcomes.


Chandara is a freelance journalist with a focus on foreign affairs, security issues, and ASEAN affairs. He also serves as a Junior Counterterrorism Intelligence Analyst.

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Thailand 🇹🇭

Min Aung Hlaing Visits Thailand, Sparking Protests Among Human Rights Groups

by Natamon Aumphin, in Bangkok

On August 6-7, 2026, Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul welcomed former Myanmar military junta leader Min Aung Hlaing on his first official visit after being declared the prime minister of Myanmar despite accusations of a rigged election. Under the framework of calibrated reengagement, the Thai prime minister aimed to reconnect with Myanmar after Naypidaw’s stalled effort to implement the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus. Although Myanmar is barred from engaging in the ASEAN Summit, Thailand’s prime minister believes that engaging with a neighbor that shares a border over 2,400 km is a necessity, despite criticism that Bangkok’s action is legitimizing the former military chief. The criticism is evident among human rights defenders as death tolls from the civil war in Myanmar reach over 100,000 people and due to the arrest warrant of the junta from the International Criminal Court (ICC).

Min Aung Hlaing’s visit to Bangkok has implications for Thailand on two levels. Firstly, realigning relationships with Myanmar entails economic benefits for both sides. In fact, Thailand was among Myanmar’s top foreign investors half a decade ago, ranging from petroleum to manufacturing, finance, hospitality, logistics, and wellness. Nonetheless, the invested capital has decreases due to the civil war. The resurgence of interest in investing in Myanmar was, hence, reflected in the Thailand-Myanmar Business Forum 2026, where more than 700 business-related representatives attended. For Thailand, this presents a new opportunity to amplify economic exchange with Myanmar and increase trade surplus after a massive decline in Cambodia-Thailand border trade. From gaining almost a hundred billion supplies in 2024 to gaining none in 2026.

Secondly, it sends signals about Thailand’s direction on the global stage. Some scholars argued that Thailand is associated with external and internal risk due to recalibrating the bilateral relationship with Myanmar. Sihasak Phuangketkeow, the Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, affirmed to the public that Thailand’s decision is to unify ASEAN, reintegrate Myanmar, and increase opportunities in the region while assisting Myanmar toward peace and stability. Nonetheless, it is unclear how Thailand will approach Myanmar on this matter as Myanmar has recently criticized the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus.

The skepticism in Myanmar’s commitment led to negative responses from civil society. In fact, some of the Myanmar residing in Thailand were seen to gather in front of the United Nations ESCAP Headquarters in Bangkok, discouraging the Thai government from legitimizing Min Aung Hlaing for fear of human rights violations. Another instance is when a member of parliament shouted “For Peace! For Humanity!” after being denied access to submit a petition to the House of Senate. These instances reflected concerns of the public toward human rights violation records of Min Aung Hlaing, which could not be ignored. Therefore, although Thailand and Myanmar share over 2,400 km of border, there needs to be a balance between recalibrating, constructive engagement, and a roadmap to regional peace.


Natamon has served as a rapporteur at the Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS Thailand). She has also worked as a research assistant on diplomatic issues in Southeast Asia. Her work focuses on how domestic politics shape foreign policy in the region. She holds a degree in international relations and has experience in policy analysis, event reporting, and regional research.

Lao PDR 🇱🇦

Floods in Laos Highlight Climate Risks

by Phonethida Sitthixay, in Vientiane

In August 2026, heavy rains unleashed severe flooding across Laos, displacing thousands of families and underscoring the growing threat climate change poses to the country’s development.

In the north, Luang Namtha Province was declared a disaster zone after flash floods swept through Boten near the Laos–China border. More than 30 villages were inundated, farmland and schools destroyed, and even the local airport forced to close. Water levels on the Tha River surged to 6.58 meters, well above the flood warning threshold.

In the south, Savannakhet Province saw the Xe Champhone River rise above danger level, flooding thousands of hectares of rice fields and affecting over 2,000 households. The floods cut off eight villages, with recovery efforts underway. Meanwhile, Champasack Province reported the Mekong River rising beyond alert levels.

The worst hit was Khammouane Province, where flooding affected over 60,000 people across all 10 districts, damaging 206 villages and nearly 9,500 households. More than 15,000 hectares of rice fields were destroyed, with losses estimated at LAK 100 billion (USD 4.4 million).

Nationwide, authorities estimate 654 villages across 42 districts have been hit, leaving 95,200 people impacted and at least four dead. Prime Minister Sonexay Siphandone has ordered immediate recovery measures, including road repairs, relief supplies, and stricter monitoring of dam safety and reservoir levels.

Officials admit floods are becoming more frequent and destructive. Between 2021 and 2025, Laos recorded 376 natural disasters affecting more than one million people, according to a government review. This year’s floods have already surpassed last year’s impact, with northern provinces like Luang Namtha and Phongsaly suffering damage rarely seen before.

Experts point to climate change as a key driver. Stronger monsoons and typhoons, combined with deforestation and poor land management, are intensifying floods. Typhoon Maysak and heavy rains dumped up to 140 mm in 24 hours this month, overwhelming rivers and reservoirs.

As Laos prepares to graduate from Least Developed Country (LDC) status by the end of 2026, the floods are a stark reminder that economic growth must be matched with climate resilience.


Phonethida Sitthixay holds a Bachelor of Arts in International Relations from the National University of Laos. She is currently a Senior Project Coordinator at AIF Group, where she works on government-led initiatives to modernize financial integration across public sector systems in Laos. She has experience in sustainable development policy, diplomacy, and economic reporting, having worked with the Global Green Growth Institute and The Laotian Times. Her interests focus on Laos’s diplomacy, regional integration, and its evolving role beyond ASEAN.

Editorial Deadline 29/08/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Karen Ysabelle R. David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk

The highly globalized world that we live in today can be likened to a spider’s web: complex, interconnected, yet ultimately, fragile. In the year 1989, the term “World Wide Web” was coined to refer to the massive information system that we can access on the Internet; fast forward to 2026, and technology has moved at such a blazing speed that it has strengthened the threads that connect us — but it may also have created today’s insecure and volatile world.

In the Philippines, a proposed nationwide cable system will improve Internet connectivity across the country, but it also raises concerns about the link between infrastructure and national security. Meanwhile, Singapore’s own national security concerns have led to the formation of a semiconductor partnership with India in an effort to guard against market disruptions in an uncertain global environment. And across Vietnam, the country’s Gen Z is using the power and reach of social media networks to hold a public official accountable for a fatal car crash.

The Philippines 🇵🇭

When Connectivity Becomes a Security Issue

by Glenn Vincent N. Boquilon, in Makati City

For years, infrastructure in the Philippines has mostly been treated as a development issue. Roads connect communities. Ports move goods. Power keeps businesses running. However, as the country becomes more connected, infrastructure is taking on another role. It is also becoming a matter of national security.

A recent proposal from PLDT, Globe, and Converge shows why. The three telecommunications companies are planning a US$500 million nationwide submarine cable system. The proposed network would improve domestic Internet connectivity and link different parts of the country.

Upon first glance, this looks like a telecommunications project. However, it is much bigger than that. Submarine cables carry data and communications across countries. When these systems are damaged, the effects can reach businesses, government services, and ordinary users. For the Philippines, having more cable connections can also provide alternatives when one part of the network is disrupted.

Additionally, the proposed system could also support sensors that detect earthquakes, tsunamis, and maritime activity. This shows how infrastructure can serve civilian needs while also supporting national security. Furthermore, the government has also made it easier to maintain these systems. In July, the Bureau of Customs introduced rules allowing qualified cable-laying and repair vessels to temporarily enter the Philippines without duties and taxes, subject to certain conditions. This can help reduce delays when submarine cables need to be repaired.

In hindsight, these developments point to a wider change in how infrastructure should be viewed. Nonetheless, building a system is only one part of the job. Governments must also consider what happens when that system is damaged or disrupted. A network that cannot recover quickly can become a weakness during a crisis.

The same applies to energy facilities, ports, and transport networks. These systems keep the economy moving. A major disruption can quickly become an economic and security problem.

The issue is also becoming important across Southeast Asia. Singapore has built extensive infrastructure linking it to global markets. Indonesia is expanding connections across its large archipelago. Vietnam is investing in infrastructure as its role in regional supply chains grows.

Greater connectivity creates opportunities, but it also creates new risks. For the Philippines, the challenge is not simply to build more. It is to build infrastructure that can withstand disruption.

A submarine cable may look like a piece of technology. A port may look like a transport facility. But when these systems become essential to daily life and the economy, protecting them becomes part of protecting the country itself.


Glenn holds a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from the University of Santo Tomas. His experience spans governance programs, policy development, and political research, having worked with the Ateneo School of Government and WR Numero Research on projects focused on electoral reform, public opinion, and regional development. He also helped coordinate the drafting of the Bangsamoro Local Government Code and supported the Academy of Multiparty Democracy.

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Singapore 🇸🇬

Singapore and India’s Semiconductor Partnership: Building a More Resilient Asian Supply Chain

by Jennifer Hui En Tan, in Singapore

Semiconductors have become increasingly important to the global economy. As supply chain disruptions and technological competition push governments to strengthen their semiconductor capabilities, international partnerships have become an increasingly important part of national economic strategies. This was reflected in the 4th India–Singapore Ministerial Roundtable on 20 August 2026, where both countries discussed strengthening bilateral cooperation across several areas, including the semiconductor industry. The discussions build on the 2024 Semiconductor Ecosystem Partnership Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), which established a framework for cooperation between the two countries’ semiconductor ecosystems. For India and Singapore, the partnership is particularly significant because the two countries bring different but complementary strengths to the semiconductor supply chain.

For its part, India has been seeking to develop a stronger domestic semiconductor ecosystem and reduce its dependence on overseas supply chains. While the country has significant advantages in terms of its large domestic market, workforce, and growing technological capabilities, it also depends on a wider network of suppliers, equipment manufacturers, research institutions, logistics providers, and multinational corporations (MNCs). This is where Singapore can play an important role: the country has developed an established semiconductor ecosystem and significant experience integrating MNCs, suppliers, and supporting industries. Singapore’s position as a regional business and logistics hub also provides extensive connections to global semiconductor supply chains.

Singapore has highlighted that India’s interest extends beyond wafer fabrication and to the broader ecosystem surrounding semiconductor manufacturing. This creates a natural complementarity between the two countries, where Singapore contributes its established ecosystem and international connections, while India provides scale.

India’s growing semiconductor ambitions create opportunities for Singaporean semiconductor companies and small and medium enterprises to expand their operations. Singapore has noted that companies already operating in its semiconductor sector are exploring opportunities to bring supplies and ecosystem partners into India. As India develops its semiconductor capabilities, Singaporean companies could benefit from participating in this emerging ecosystem while gaining greater access to one of the world’s largest and fastest-growing markets. This cooperation also offers Singapore another location within its regional supply chains.This can allow companies based in the city-state to diversify their operations and build additional connections across Asia.

The partnership also reflects the changing geopolitical significance of semiconductors. They are increasingly viewed not only as an economic commodity, but also as a matter of national and strategic security.

As governments seek to reduce excessive dependence on individual suppliers or locations, diversification has become increasingly important. The Singapore–India partnership can therefore be viewed as an effort to build resilience through greater interdependence. By connecting Singapore’s established semiconductor ecosystem with India’s expanding capabilities, both countries can reduce their vulnerability to disruption in any single market.

A stronger Singapore–India semiconductor relationship could create opportunities for greater regional supply chain connectivity. Singapore could potentially serve as a bridge between India’s growing semiconductor ecosystem and companies, investors, and supply chain networks across Southeast Asia. As semiconductor supply chains become more geographically diversified, partnerships linking ASEAN with major economies such as India could help create a more resilient regional ecosystem.

The Singapore–India semiconductor partnership is ultimately about more than semiconductor manufacturing. It reflects a broader shift toward building resilient and diversified supply chains in an increasingly uncertain global environment. India’s scale and ambitions complement Singapore’s established semiconductor ecosystem and global connectivity, creating opportunities for both sides.


Jennifer is a final-year International Relations student at the Singapore Institute of Management, where she focuses on political engagement, diplomacy, and community governance. She is an active volunteer in her constituency, working closely with residents to understand local concerns, facilitate dialogue, and support community initiatives.

Vietnam 🇻🇳

Vietnam’s Gen Z Holds Official Accountable (for Traffic Fatality)

by Sean Huy Vu

In Hanoi, high school and college students have laid flowers at “Tree 55,” in commemoration of a fatal accident on 30 May last summer. “A difficult night. No miracles happened,” wrote user Đỗ Quanh Minha a week later, on 7 June. His sister Thuỳ, whom everyone in her family called Mina, had been hit by a BMW driving on the wrong side of the road, severing her leg, and “stopping her journey of discovering the world at the beautiful age of 18.” “Our family has lost a young person,” Đỗ continues. “The National High School Examination has lost a candidate.” After the flowers are laid at the “Tree of Justice,” police clean up the area and dispose of them.

At the time of the incident, only the suspect’s initials were published in state media, and no further investigation took place.

However, this summer, the Ministry of Culture ordered Vietnamese rapper MCK to revise his songs for allegedly containing “vulgar” lyrics. This incident against a popular icon provoked users to critically reexamine the fatal car crash that former National Assembly member Nguyen Sy Cuong, who is also the husband of Culture Minister Lam Thi Phuong Thanh, had potentially caused. In video footage, the Minister and her husband can be seen stepping out of their SUV after hitting Mina and her father. Rather than helping, Mr. Nguyen returned to his car while his wife fled the scene.

After weeks of silence, state media VTV attempted to settle the matter by confirming that Mr. Nguyen was, in fact, the driver of the BMW that killed Mina. Their video report, however, raised more questions due to its dubious sources. The crash occurred on 30 May, but Mr. Nguyen did not receive a toxicology report until the following day, and the report itself was not published until 4 June. The texts in the alleged documents contain misspellings of Nguyen’s name and errors with the license plate, among other details. Posts on Threads question how an allegedly sober man could drive into the wrong lane and strike a teenager.

A few days after the confirmation, Mina’s father, Đỗ Việt Hùng, appeared on state television expressing gratitude for the community’s care for his family. However, Mr. Đỗ then requested the public to stop drawing attention to the issue, stating, “It’s over already, and the problem has been resolved by the investigators very clearly. … We don’t have any complaints, doubts, or questions regarding the way investigators are resolving my family’s case.” The report went on to explain that the Đỗ family chose not to press charges since Mr. Nguyen allegedly compensated the victims for an undisclosed sum. The original post has since been removed, following online backlash doubting the authenticity of the father’s statement.

The incident reflects a larger pattern of corruption and civil society repression in Vietnam, where wealth and political connections can help elites evade responsibility. Despite state media’s efforts to avoid reporting on protests happening across Asia in recent years — from India to Nepal, Indonesia, and Thailand — Vietnam’s Gen Z has demonstrated that they are refusing to accept double standards and exploitation.


Sean is a scholar of East Asian history, culture, and international relations, with current research at Georgetown University examining working-class labor and human trafficking in the region. His broader interests include the social psychology of religion and identity politics. Sean previously taught modern Korean history at the University of California, Irvine, where he completed his B.A. in History, and later taught English in Ho Chi Minh City while studying Vietnamese language and culture. His writing has been published by UC Irvine, Johns Hopkins University, and Foreign Analysis.

Editorial Deadline 25/08/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Haniva Sekar Deanty, Managing Editor - TAF

This week’s Maritime Crescent looks at the conditions attached to choices that, on the surface, appear relatively straightforward.

In Brunei, Maryam Zulaidi revisits the region’s decades-long struggle with transboundary haze, questioning how far another appeal to the “ASEAN mechanism” can go when the economic incentives behind the fires and the absence of meaningful penalties remain largely unchanged.

In Indonesia, Amallia Utami examines mounting pressure on the country’s digital public sphere, where efforts to moderate harmful content increasingly intersect with restrictions on political expression, automated amplification, and persistent regulatory ambiguity.

Meanwhile, in Malaysia, Sydney Gan considers DAP’s decision to remain in Anwar Ibrahim’s unity government despite electoral setbacks and internal unease, with the party making clear that its continued support comes with expectations for reform.

Regional cooperation can only go so far without stronger accountability. Content moderation becomes increasingly contentious when its boundaries begin to encroach on political expression. And political loyalty becomes harder to sustain when promised reforms remain outstanding. In each case, the initial decision is only one part of the equation. What comes after may prove far more consequential.

Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳

Breathing the Same Smoke

by Maryam Zulaidi

To have lived in the Southeast Asian region means to have lived through seasons of haze coming from neighbouring countries. The people of ASEAN have been exposed to this environmental catastrophe for nearly three decades, making Bruneians no stranger to transboundary air pollution (TAP). Brunei, situated on the northern tip of Borneo, right above Indonesia’s future capital in Kalimantan, only amplifies this problem.

As of late, concerns regarding TAP have reemerged due to Kalimantan’s worsening forest fires rapidly diffusing into Sarawak, Sabah and Brunei. On August 22nd, Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim stated during the leaders summit, held in Bandar Seri Begawan, that both Malaysia and Brunei have agreed to jointly push the haze issue through the “ASEAN mechanism”. Brunei leverages this, using Malaysia’s heavier diplomatic weight within ASEAN as a cover to break from its own long-standing policy of non-interference.

This is not the first time such a statement or promise has been issued. The ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution was adopted, building on the Regional Haze Action Plan introduced in 1997. In the same year, El Niño first turned Kalimantan’s peatlands into an international health crisis - where roughly five million hectares were destroyed. Fast forward three decades, the region still finds itself in a diplomatic rinse and repeat cycle: hot weather forecasts arrive, smoke crosses borders, and a letter gets sent to the ASEAN Secretariat. The Singapore Institute of International Affairs has labelled 2026 the first ‘red’ risk year since 2023.

The uncomfortable truth is that the underlying economics of the fires haven’t changed. Land clearing through burning remains the cheapest method available to companies, and ASEAN’s haze framework has never carried real penalties. Nearly 30 years after the first action plan, it is a matter of corporations taking accountability and facing penalties, not just repeated joint statements. If successful, the cycle will be broken. And if not, Bruneians will be breathing this same story again next dry season.


Maryam is a first-year International Relations and Politics student at the University of Sheffield, with an academic focus on Southeast Asia—particularly Maritime Southeast Asia—and the Middle East. She aspires to a career in diplomacy and academia and is committed to fostering international dialogue and advancing scholarly engagement with global issues. Beyond her academic work, she pursues creative interests and voluntary initiatives that broaden her perspectives on public service.

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Indonesia 🇮🇩

The Growing Pressure on Digital Public Sphere

by Amallia Utami

Over the past five months, communication researchers and journalists in Indonesia have identified growing concerns within the country’s digital public sphere. According to a recent report by Tempo, four X users, previously posted criticisms regarding government policies and political communication, received warning notices from the platform requiring them to delete posts deemed to contain violence, hate speech, or privacy violations. Content is also liable to be taken down or have access restricted if deemed to violate platform safety standards or local laws. In its report, SAFEnet noted that from April to June 2026 was marked by practices restricting civil liberties, such as the silencing of dissent and recurring data violation.

SAFEnet verified that the Ministry of Digital Communication (Komdigi) issued requests to take down or restrict access to content addressing public issues and criticising government programmes. In 2026’s Q2, there was an increase of 37 cases involving internet access restrictions compared to the previous quarter. Meanwhile, violations of freedom of expression rose by 18 cases compared to the previous year. Protests that took place in several Indonesian cities between August and September 2025 are considered a turning point, marking the start of large-scale takedown and content removal actions by Komdigi.

A further concern lies in the information environment on social media, such as X, which appears to be manipulated by automated messaging. Monash University Indonesia identified organised re-uploads of videos and photos depicting student protests on social media, alongside centralised amplification, activities that would be impossible for human users to do on their own. For instance, certain accounts were capable of executing multiple distinct retweets within a span of less than a second, while specific accounts would also initiate and disseminate a narrative, which was then retweeted by thousands of other accounts. The narratives that emerged included claims of massive protests going unreported by the media or assertions that such stories had vanished from mainstream coverage.

The Komdigi responded differently when asked about the takedown and access restrictions. When asked by Tempo journalists, they offered no definitive answers, except asking them to wait for a response that first needed to be coordinated. The Komdigi Minister, Meutya Hafid, and the deputy minister did not respond to phone requests for confirmation. Meanwhile, when asked about access restrictions and the removal of content related to demonstrations, the minister admitted that she had never prohibited media outlets from covering them as long as they adhered to journalistic principles. She claimed that, per July 2026, almost 17,000 hoaxes were circulating on social media and urged people not to spread false information or engage in fearmongering using incorrect data.

Indonesia’s content moderation remains an ongoing dilemma due to vague legal definitions such as “negative content”. The problem is further worsened by data security vulnerabilities in government systems and a regulatory approach that lacks consultation with digital platforms and civil society. Furthermore, automated messages, especially those using AI tools, are dangerous because of the intense negative emotions they produce, such as anger and fear, by exploiting sensitive messages. This deliberate manipulation drives high engagement around deceptive content and traps the public inside ideological echo chambers. These practices will deepen polarization and erode public trust in constructive cross-perspective dialogue.

Safeguarding the digital public sphere against content manipulation is a crucial first step. The Indonesian government could update its regulatory frameworks, as current legal definitions of prohibited content stifle legitimate democratic discourse. Secondly, there is a need to enhance digital literacy, even in areas with low literacy rates, and to foster emotional intelligence among citizens.


Amallia is a media and culture graduate from the University of Glasgow with experience in journalism and creative writing. Her interests lie in democracy, media and communication, particularly how contemporary media environments shape self-censorship, misinformation, and disinformation.

Malaysia 🇲🇾

DAP’s Conditional Commitment

by Sydney Gan, in Kuala Lumpur

On 16 August, the Democratic Action Party (DAP) of Malaysia voted to remain in Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s MADANI unity government, despite Anwar’s coalition Pakatan Harapan’s (PH) recent state-level losses to a resurgent Barisan Nasional (BN). Consisting of five Cabinet posts, seven deputy minister positions and 40 parliamentary seats, DAP’s decision shores up Anwar’s immediate stability ahead of the General Election. Attention now shifts to Melaka, where DAP and Anwar’s party People’s Justice Party (PKR) will again contest under the PH banner against a stronger BN and new competitor Bersama.

DAP’s decision was backed by 88.2% of those voting. Supporters argued that leaving now would amount to abandoning voters and handing political advantage to rival parties, while jeopardising policy commitments already underway. Despite the landslide result, criticism has emerged over the low overall turnout, with more than 50% of DAP delegates absent from the special congress. Former member P. Ramasamy argued that the motion could have been defeated had more delegates attended, and that the low turnout may indicate internal unrest and a sign of dissatisfaction with the government.

DAP has also made clear that its support is not unconditional. The party expects Anwar to advance several institutional reforms by year-end, including separating the roles of Attorney General and Public Prosecutor, imposing a two-term limit on the prime minister, and finalising amendments to the Security Offences (Special Measures) Act (SOSMA) and the Peaceful Assembly Act. DAP remains hesitant to fully invest in the partnership without Anwar delivering on his reform agenda, as continued inaction will risk further erosion of public trust that could affect DAP’s longer-term prospects, even if it eventually separates itself from the PH coalition.

Amid political turmoil, poor state-level results, and DAP increasingly being scapegoated for broader government failings, some supporters believe that stepping down from government could re-earn goodwill for the party. Exiting the government would allow it to distance itself from unpopular decisions, rebuild a more independent political identity, and reposition itself as a stronger opposition force. However, withdrawal would also destabilise Anwar’s government and empower BN to push for an early General Election, at a time when neither PH nor DAP appears well-positioned to contest one comfortably. The decision to stay with PH is therefore the most risk-averse choice in the short run, but cannot feasibly protect DAP from the turning public sentiment in the long term.

The Melaka state election in October/November will provide the next indication of whether PH can maintain its power. Considering that BN remains the clear favourite for Melaka, currently holding 20 of the 28 seats in the State Legislative Assembly, a more realistic objective for PH is to defend support in urban constituencies rather than take control of the state government. DAP’s continued participation allows PH to enter the election as a functioning coalition rather than one in open crisis, but another weak showing would deepen questions over Anwar’s ability to rebuild support ahead of the federal election.


Sydney holds a Bachelor of Laws from King’s College London, where she focused on Human Rights Law, Criminology, and Public & Administrative Law. She is an Analyst at Asia Group Advisors, providing policy analysis and strategic guidance across the tech, sustainability, and gaming sectors in Southeast Asia. Prior to joining AGA, she worked in the social development sector in London, contributing to the Ukraine Judicial Training Programme through research on war crimes adjudication and the development of a legal training curriculum with high court magistrates.

Editorial Deadline 22/08/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk

A school structure, a flood response, a trade transition, and a growth model: this week's stories are really about the same question asked four different ways: who gets left behind when a system is tested? In Laos, the government's plan to shift from a 5+4+3 to a 6+3+3 school structure raises a harder question than scheduling: whether restructuring alone can close the gap between a child in Vientiane and one in a remote village, when regional test data already show Lao students lagging and gains concentrated among those already ahead. In Myanmar, monsoon floods displaced 220,000 people in Sagaing — and instead of activating a relief system, the junta blocked volunteer rescue teams, threatened aid workers with terrorism charges, and funneled help only to areas under its control, repeating a pattern of weaponized disaster response it has run since Cyclone Nargis in 2008. In Cambodia, LDC graduation is meant to mark the country's economic coming-of-age, but an ILO-backed study warns it could put 11% of employment at risk, concentrated among informal, self-employed, and low-skilled workers — the very people the country's social protection system is least equipped to catch. And in Thailand, the slowest growth of any major Southeast Asian economy this quarter showed how quickly consumption subsidies get overwhelmed once energy costs start eating into household spending.

Lao PDR 🇱🇦

Can Better Systems Mean Better Learning for Every Child?

by Souriya Bounpaseuth, in Vientiane

As Laos prepares to open the 2026–2027 school year, its education system is entering a period of significant change. But while much attention is being placed on the planned shift to a new 6+3+3 school structure, the bigger question is whether structural reform can translate into something more fundamental as it is better learning for every child.

Under the planned reform, Laos will move from the current 5+4+3 structure to six years of primary education, three years of lower secondary and three years of upper secondary education. The new structure is scheduled for broader implementation from the 2028–2029 academic year, meaning the coming school year marks an important preparation phase rather than the immediate start of the new system.

During the 2024–2025 academic year, the Ministry of Education and Sports reported progress in curriculum development, teacher support and education management. More than 4,000 volunteer teachers had their status addressed, while a new teacher salary structure with improved base pay and allowances was introduced in January 2026. The government has also identified reducing multi-grade classrooms, strengthening teacher education institutions and expanding ethnic boarding schools as priorities for more inclusive access to education.

Recent initiatives are also increasingly focused on what happens inside classrooms. In July, Laos and Japan launched the next phase of their primary mathematics education partnership, which will revise Grades 4–6 textbooks and teachers’ guides, strengthen teacher professional development and establish school-based continuous professional development across 35 districts.

The SEA-PLM 2024 assessment, the most recent comparable regional assessment of Grade 5 learning, shows a mixed picture. Across participating Southeast Asian education systems, mathematics outcomes improved between 2019 and 2024, but reading showed little overall progress, while gains were concentrated more among higher-performing students. Lao PDR remained below the regional average, with significant numbers of children performing at the lower proficiency levels.

Importantly, Laos is already using these findings to shape reform. At the national launch in March 2026, education authorities and partners identified curriculum improvement, teacher development, learning materials and more child-centred teaching as areas requiring action, with particular attention to disadvantaged and remote communities.

The challenge, then, is no longer simply designing a new education structure. It is connecting structure, teachers, curriculum, learning materials, financing and support for disadvantaged children into one functioning system.

As Laos moves towards 6+3+3, the ultimate measure of success may not be whether the reform is implemented on schedule, but whether a child in a remote village has the same opportunity to learn, progress and succeed as a child in Vientiane.

Can 6+3+3 become more than a change in the number of years children spend in each level of school and become a strategy that finally closes the gap between access and quality?

Myanmar 🇲🇲

Junta Troops Block Humanitarian Aid For Flood Victims

by Ley Hlaing

Myanmar is experiencing an increasing rise in water level and flood in the plain and delta regions. As the incident continued, the country’s junta, once again, has blocked the aid for livelihood relief for the victims affected by the flood, mirroring the same pattern of blockage and weaponization of humanitarian aid during the cyclones that happened in 2008 and 2023.

In August 2026, severe monsoon rains have once again triggered a catastrophic humanitarian crisis in Myanmar, with rising water levels submerging the country’s plain and delta regions like Sagaing and Irrawaddy. Heavy rainfall forced authorities to release massive volumes of water from the Thaphanseik Dam, causing the Mu River to overflow and inundate more than 200 villages across the Sagaing Region. Over 220,000 people have been affected, with at least 15 deaths reported as of August 10, many of whom were already internally displaced by ongoing military conflicts and are now experiencing a second disaster. Yet, instead of facilitating emergency relief, the military junta has actively blocked, harassed, and turned back local volunteer rescue teams and civil society aid groups at military checkpoints, including the Sagaing Yadanabon Bridge and Sagaing Hnapauk checkposts.

This blockade is a highly coordinated effort to weaponise humanitarian aid against the civilian population in resistance strongholds. Local administrators and police chiefs in Shwebo have threatened that anyone attempting to deliver flood relief to these areas will be prosecuted for supporting terrorism, warning that their homes and properties will be seized. In a stark display of selective relief, the junta has heavily publicised its aid efforts in regions under its firm control, such as Irrawaddy, while completely ignoring the crisis in Sagaing. Instead, the military has continued to conduct airstrikes on flood-hit Sagaing townships, while selectively airlifting food and medicine via helicopters strictly to villages controlled by its allied Pyu Saw Htee militias.

The junta’s actions mirror a dark, recurring historical pattern of using natural disasters to maintain political control at the cost of civilian lives. During Cyclone Nargis in May 2008, which devastated the Irrawaddy Delta and killed 140,000 people, the military regime deliberately blocked international humanitarian relief for weeks. Instead, the regime benefitted completing a referendum for their 2008 Constitution, while the country was in turmoil. Out of fear that Western powers would use the disaster as a pretext to overthrow their rule, the generals rejected lifesaving assistance from US, British, and French navy ships and helicopters, while army officials confiscated overseas relief supplies and sold them in local markets.

This weaponisation of disaster relief was repeated during Cyclone Mocha in May 2023. After the storm left millions of survivors in urgent need of aid, the junta suspended travel authorizations for international humanitarian organizations and demanded that all domestic distribution of supplies be handed over to military authorities, transforming a natural disaster into a man-made catastrophe. This pattern of gatekeeping was visible yet again during the March 2025 earthquake and the floods of Typhoon Yagi in late 2024, where the regime consistently chose to let its citizens suffer rather than risk losing absolute authority. Today, as telephone and internet lines remain cut in Sagaing, local volunteer groups are left to navigate rising waters, lack of food, and increasing medical emergencies entirely on their own.

Ley Hlaing is a former Political Science student from the University of Yangon, Myanmar. Currently, he is pursuing his BA at Parami University with a major in Philosophy, Politics and Economics. His academic and professional interests span community development, literature, minority issues, and social impact research. Having held roles as Research Assistant, Student Mentor, and Facilitator for local initiatives, he has constantly supported project management in literature and education programs in Myanmar.

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Cambodia 🇰🇭

Cambodia’s LDC Graduation Could Put 11% of Employment at Risk

by Sokna Thea, in Phnom Penh

Cambodia’s planned graduation from Least Developed Country (LDC) status in 2029 is a major development milestone, but it could also expose a large share of the workforce to pressure from higher trade costs and weaker export demand.

A June 2026 policy brief from Cambodia’s Ministry of Labour and Vocational Training and the International Labour Organization estimates that around 11% of employment could be affected under a full trade-loss scenario. The figure represents jobs at risk, not confirmed layoffs. The study notes that the impact could also appear through reduced working hours, slower hiring, temporary suspensions, lower earnings and weaker self-employment income.

The risk extends well beyond garment factories. The study finds the largest employment impacts in textiles, clothing and footwear, wholesale and retail trade, rice, fruits and nuts, vegetables and roots, and other agriculture-related activities. Transport and other supporting services could also feel the effects as weaker export demand reduces production, intermediate demand and household spending.

The profile of affected workers is particularly important. Informal workers account for 68% of affected employment, while self-employed workers make up 52%. Women account for 53% and low-skilled workers 86%. These groups are generally less protected against sudden income or job losses, making the transition a labour-market issue as much as a trade-policy issue.

The modelling also shows that the severity of the impact depends on how much of the trade shock is absorbed or mitigated. Under the study’s full-impact scenario, affected employment falls by about 11%. A targeted mitigation scenario brings the figure down to about 7%, while a lower-impact scenario reduces it to around 3%. The authors stress, however, that targeted support cannot fully prevent spillovers across the wider economy.

The trade exposure is significant. UN Trade and Development estimates that Cambodia could lose about 16.4% of its total exports if LDC-related trade preferences are lost after graduation. Its simulation puts the potential export loss at about USD 5.9 billion, based on 2023 trade data. Cambodia is particularly exposed to preference erosion because 80.5% of its exports in the simulation were directed to the 25 preference-granting economies covered by the analysis.

The European Union is one of the key markets to watch. Cambodia continues to benefit from the EU’s Everything But Arms (EBA) scheme, but only partially, after the EU withdrew some of its tariff preferences in 2020. EU data show that goods trade with Cambodia reached EUR 7.3 billion in 2025, with textiles and clothing accounting for 72% of EU imports from Cambodia.

The question for Cambodia is therefore not simply whether it will graduate from LDC status, but how it manages the transition. The Ministry-ILO study calls for stronger worker skills and social protection, support for firms to upgrade and comply with new trade requirements, deeper domestic value chains, and greater export diversification. Graduation is a sign of progress. But without a smooth transition, the gains from that progress could come with a significant cost for workers who have the fewest buffers.

Sokna has a background in International Affairs and Business & Commercial Law. He’s currently a Senior Project Coordinator at the Ministry of Economy and Finance of Cambodia, working on the Financial Management Information System (FMIS) Project. His professional focus is driven by entrepreneurship, business development, and financial technology, with a particular interest in how private-sector innovation drives Cambodia’s economic growth.

Thailand 🇹🇭

Thailand Scores Weakest ASEAN Growth at 1.9% as Energy Costs Bite

by Satid Sootipunya, in Bangkok

Thailand scored the weakest growth rate among six Southeast Asian economies in the second quarter as higher energy prices curbed household spending, offsetting the government’s consumption subsidy.

Thailand’s economy expanded 1.9% in the second quarter from a year earlier, slowing sharply from 2.8% in the first quarter, according to data released by the National Economic and Social Development Council on Monday.

The pace exceeded the 1.8% median estimate in a Bloomberg survey of economists, which ranged from 1.1% to 2.8%.

Quarterly, gross domestic product contracted 0.2%, compared with a revised 0.6% expansion in the previous quarter, the data showed.

Higher energy prices stemming from the conflict in the Middle East weighed on private consumption, offsetting stronger investment and government stimulus.

The reading left Thailand with the slowest growth among the six Southeast Asian economies, according to the council. Vietnam expanded 8.4% from a year earlier, followed by Malaysia at 6%, Singapore at 5.9%, Indonesia at 5.3%, the Philippines at 2.3%, and Thailand at 1.9%.

The figures are consistent with the latest releases from each country’s statistics agency, which reported growth of 5.9% in Singapore, 6% in Malaysia, 5.29% in Indonesia, and 2.3% in the Philippines over the same period.

The baht held its gains following the release, with the dollar falling 0.1% to 33.1 baht.

The second quarter was expected to mark the trough of the economic cycle, with a recovery beginning in the third quarter as Middle East tensions ease and stimulus measures take effect, Bank of Thailand spokesperson Chayawadee Chai-Anant said in late July.

The council projects full-year growth of 2% to 2.5%, driven by investment. Bloomberg’s consensus estimate stands at 1.9%.

The central bank held its benchmark one-day repurchase rate at 1%, the lowest since September 2022, at its June 24 meeting, with all seven Monetary Policy Committee members voting unanimously to keep the rate unchanged.


Satid is a multimedia economic journalist and news anchor who covers macroeconomic trends, Thailand’s fiscal policy, and key regional developments for Bangkok Biz. A Journalism graduate from Thammasat University, he has reported on major issues such as the US–China trade tensions, the Myanmar crisis, and global corporate stories, drawing on prior newsroom experience at The Momentum, the Bangkok Post, AFP, and Varasarn Press. His work blends economic analysis, foreign affairs, and digital storytelling, with a strong focus on making complex financial and political topics accessible to Thai audiences.

Editorial Deadline 22/08/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Karen Ysabelle R. David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk

In this week’s newsletter, we see the governments of the Pacific Corridor gamble and bet on promises and policies. The die is cast and all bets are off: let the chips fall where they may.

In Vietnam, the government has bargained the historic Hải Vân Pass in exchange for the development of international standard “resort city” Làng Vân. Will the weight of centuries of history withstand the grand promises of profits and jobs?

In Singapore, the government is placing its bet on everyday workplace culture driving up the country’s declining total fertility rate. Will decades of pro-natalist policy finally win when workplace norms change?

And in the Philippines, the government has gambled that the implementation of the 15% Global Minimum Tax could strengthen tax collection from multinational enterprises. Will years of tax reform finally culminate in a balance between attracting foreign investment and protecting government revenues?

Vietnam 🇻🇳

The Green Price of Vietnam's Growth Bargain

by Sophia

For decades, Đèo Hải Vân — the “Ocean Cloud Pass” separating Đà Nẵng from Huế — stood as a historical natural artifact and national pride of Vietnam. It was a strategic chokepoint once fought over by empires, and up until recently, a scenic view found on locals’ and foreigners’ bucket lists. Yet lately, a third identity has crowded in alongside the other two: Hải Vân is becoming real estate.

Since mid-2025, Vingroup’s Vinpearl has been building Làng Vân, a resort and urban complex covering 512 hectares at the foot of the pass, backed by nearly VND 44 trillion (or roughly US$1.7 billion) in investment. According to an environmental impact assessment that circulated online this summer, forest land has fallen to approximately 79% of the site. When aerial photos comparing the slopes before and after clearing began spreading on social media outlets in July, the reaction was fast and visceral. Phrases like phá rừng (meaning “deforestation”) and tanh bành (roughly “torn to pieces”) started trending, alongside images of rockslides onto the North–South railway that critics tied directly to the earthworks.

The government’s case for the project is not unfamiliar: this industrial development is necessary for national economic prosperity in the long term. Land that was hard to reach and generating little economic value gets converted into tax revenue, jobs, and tourism infrastructure. City officials point to more than 3,400 housing units already cleared for sale and over VND 12 trillion in projected contributions to Đà Nẵng’s budget. Vingroup describes it as an international standard “resort city” finally putting a long-stalled 2016 land grant to use. That is what trade development economics has always proposed: taking a landscape’s unpriced ecological value and converting it into a priced economic one in the hopes of jobs, revenue, and economic value to compensate for the environmental loss. Vietnam has made this same bargain at Phú Quốc, at Bãi Cháy, and along plenty of other coastlines.

Such grand projects receive national media reporting with numbers and profits, but rarely do they show the ecological trade-off, deforestation photos, or address public dissatisfaction regarding the lack of transparency. The general lack of national media coverage decreases the awareness of the locals and the general public, as sharper reporting has come mostly from diaspora outlets that many readers inside the country cannot easily access. As the greenery is plowed into bare land, the increasing risk of vulnerability to natural disasters and storms that annually hit the central region and strip locals of their means of livelihood is inevitably left unaddressed by national authorities or corporate representatives. The environmental concern of a project this size is not being addressed adequately, nor is the misalignment with the national commitment made at COP26 toward Vietnam’s net-zero emissions target by 2050.

The cultural dimension should not be ignored. In August, archaeologists excavating at Nam Chơn station and Chơn Sảng fort uncovered ramparts, gatehouses, and close to a thousand artifacts spanning the Trần, Chăm, and Nguyễn periods. Đà Nẵng’s heritage authority is now moving to list both sites for protection.

Đèo Hải Vân has outlasted dynasties and wars, but it may not outlast this decade of development. What is being cleared at its base is not just forestland; it is a buffer against landslides and storms that Đà Nẵng has long relied on, now being cut down for private profit. Is it economic progress or a bet that a coastline’s safety margin can be sold off without consequence?


Sophia is an external TAF contributor.

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Singapore 🇸🇬

Singapore Bets on Workplace Culture to Drive TFR

by Ryan

Singapore’s Marriage and Parenthood Reset Workgroup has spent the months since its April launch listening to citizens describe, in granular and often frustrated detail, why marrying and raising children in the city-state feels harder than it should. Speaking on 15 August at the Pasir Ris-Changi National Day Dinner, Minister in the Prime Minister’s Office Indranee Rajah, who chairs the nine-member interagency group, said that consensus had already emerged around a specific cluster of concerns: the cost of raising children, the need for time with family, caregiving arrangements, and housing. Rather than wait for the workgroup’s full report, due in early 2027, Indranee said interim recommendations would be announced by Prime Minister Lawrence Wong at the National Day Rally on 23 August, so as not to, in her words, lose time addressing an issue made more urgent by Singapore’s total fertility rate, which fell to a fresh low of 0.87 in 2025.

What distinguishes this exercise from Singapore’s decades of prior pro-natalist policy — which has leaned heavily on cash incentives, tax rebates, and subsidized fertility treatment since the 1980s — is its explicit focus on workplace culture as a lever alongside financial support. Indranee told reporters on the sidelines of the event that workplace norms were consistently on people’s minds during the workgroup’s consultations, and that officials are chasing a “win-win solution,” balancing employer and employee interests. That, she said, depends on “progressive, enlightened employers” and, crucially, on capable human resources professionals who can translate policy into practice rather than merely administer it on paper. Parents who spoke to The Straits Times ahead of the National Day Rally described wanting more childcare leave allocated per child, subsidies extended to medical bills and enrichment expenses, reduced stigma attached to taking maternity leave, and stronger mental health support in the early years of parenting. Indranee also confirmed that the government is revisiting the costs of raising children and access to affordable infant and child care, building on remarks Wong made in his National Day message on 8 August.

Notably, Indranee was careful to frame policy as necessary but insufficient on its own. She pointed instead to the cumulative weight of everyday gestures — an understanding employer who builds a family-friendly culture, a line supervisor willing to grant flexibility, or simply a friend who checks in — as forces that shape whether Singaporeans feel supported enough to start families in the first place.

The urgency is not abstract, nor is it uniquely Singaporean. Thailand’s fertility rate has converged with Singapore’s own, while Malaysia’s fell to 1.6 in 2022, its lowest in fifty years, driven by a steep drop among its ethnic Chinese population. Vietnam has followed a similar downward path despite remaining a comparatively young country on paper, with nearly 30% of its population projected to be sixty or older by 2050. The Philippines has also fallen below the replacement threshold and faces the same pressures of urbanization, rising living costs, and delayed marriage that have already reshaped fertility elsewhere in the region.

Across the region, it is workplaces, more than parliaments, that will likely determine whether policy actually changes behavior, whether that means a manager approving flexible hours without hesitation, an HR department building a genuine return-to-work pathway rather than a checkbox leave policy, or an employer treating a caregiving pause as ordinary rather than exceptional. In an environment where Singapore’s neighbors are only a decade or two behind its fertility curve, that shift in everyday workplace culture, more than any single subsidy, may prove to be the most transferable lesson of all.


Ryan is a final-year finance student at the Singapore University of Social Sciences (SUSS) with experience across venture capital, venture debt, and business development. He also holds a diploma in Law and Management from Temasek Polytechnic. His interests lie in how emerging technologies and economic trends shape business ecosystems and regional development in Asia.

The Philippines 🇵🇭

Global Minimum Tax (GMT) Could Reshape Philippine Tax Incentives for Multinational Enterprises (MNEs)

by Arianne De Guzman, in Bulacan

The Philippines is moving toward the implementation of the 15% Global Minimum Tax (GMT) as tax collections are projected to increase by 9% annually until 2028, according to the Department of Finance (DOF) on Monday, 17 August. While the country aligns its tax system with the international rules, the Marcos administration will need to balance attracting investments through tax incentives with protecting government tax revenues.

Since November 2023, the Philippines has been a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)/G20 Inclusive Framework on Base-Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS). One of its key initiatives is the GMT under the Two-Pillar Solution. Under this framework, the Global Anti-Base Erosion (GloBE) Rules generally apply to large multinational enterprises (MNEs) with annual revenues of at least EUR750 million in at least two of the last four years. The rules establish a 15% effective tax rate (ETR) on a jurisdictional basis.

This does not mean that all Philippine companies will suddenly pay a 15% tax. Instead, when an in-scope MNE’s jurisdictional ETR falls below the 15% after under the GloBE rules, an additional “top-up tax” may be imposed

Open

to bring the rate closer to 15%. For the country, this could strengthen tax collection by limiting the ability of MNEs to reduce their ETR through tax incentives and other mechanisms.

This creates a policy trade-off. Higher tax revenues could strengthen government finances, but making incentives less valuable could affect the Philippines’ ability to attract foreign investment. Conversely, maintaining incentives without assessing their economic returns could limit potential revenue gains.

The CREATE MORE Act provides

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one possible direction through its Enhanced Deductions Regime (EDR). Under the EDR, registered business enterprises are subject to a 20% corporate income tax on income from registered activities while receiving additional deductions for qualified expenses. Compared with other incentives that significantly reduce the ETR, the EDR supports business activity while keeping the ETR above the 15% minimum.

The proposed Qualified Domestic Minimum Top-up Tax (QDMTT) could also allow the Philippines to collect the applicable top-up tax domestically, instead of allowing another jurisdiction to collect it under the GloBE rules. As of July 2026, the DOF convened an interagency technical working group (TWG), with 5 sub-technical groups, to lead the drafting of legislation and prepare the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) systems. The Marcos administration targets implementation to begin on 1 January 2027, with tax collection expected in 2028. Since the legislation has yet to be enacted, the treatment of existing Philippine tax incentives remains an important area to monitor.

Large MNEs should assess whether the GMT could reduce the value of their existing Philippine tax incentives and quantify any potential top-up tax. They should also track policy developments on how incentives can be structured to continue supporting investment while remaining compliant with the GMT.

The DOF and investment promotion agencies, such as the Board of Investments (BOI) and the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA), should provide clear guidance and outlook on how the GMT will interact with existing tax incentives and whether these incentives will remain effective until their expiration. The Marcos administration should also assess GMT-compatible incentives, including expenditure-based and investment-linked incentives, to preserve the Philippines’ ability to attract MNEs without simply reducing their ETR below 15%.

The GMT is shifting the focus of tax incentives from tax savings toward investment-driven incentives. Tax incentives may still be a key consideration, but GMT implementation may focus on rewarding activities that create economic value in the Philippines.


Arianne has experience in policy research at De La Salle University’s Jesse M. Robredo Institute of Governance, where she contributed to projects on systemic reform. She earned a degree in Political Science from Colegio de San Juan de Letran. Currently, she works in government relations, specializing in advocacy strategy, legislative monitoring, and stakeholder engagement. Beyond her professional work, she is actively involved in youth development and grassroots initiatives through the Rotaract Club of Santa Maria.

Editorial Deadline 18/08/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Siu Tzyy Wei, Lead Editor - Maritime Crescent Desk

Direction is the first thing to go missing.

This week, Indonesia’s navy drifts into a drill it never meant to send a message with. Malaysia’s skies fill with smoke that started somewhere else. Brunei’s enforcers chase a drug trade moving faster than the frameworks meant to hold it. Three different waters, one shared problem: knowing which way is forward when the horizon won’t stay still.

What the horizon continues to waver, the hands holding the compass has to hold.

Indonesia 🇮🇩

Adrift

by Simon

On the morning of August 12, an Indonesian warship drew alongside a Chinese guided-missile frigate in the waters east of Taiwan and ran through a set of maneuvers. It was the first time China had exercised with a foreign navy there. Within hours, Taiwan called the drill dangerous and Washington called it destabilising. Jakarta said it was just a routine drill on the way home from Russia. In one morning, a country long known for its diplomacy had ended up on the wrong side of almost everyone.

To see why that matters, it is important to be reminded that Indonesia’s bebas-aktif doctrine - independent and active - meant that Indonesia belonged to no minilateral blocs; its weight in the region was therefore diplomatic and never military. Indonesia helped found ASEAN, helped broker an end to the war in Cambodia, and helped win the archipelagic principle that lets an archipelago hold together as a single state. That was the currency, to be trusted by every side because it was owned by none.

A foreign navy alongside China’s own on the east of Taiwan, reads as exactly the kind of image Beijing has sought elsewhere in the strait: proof, of a kind, that another country accepts a presence in waters it does not fully control. That is why Taiwan and Washington reacted, and why the routine framing did not hold. The ship was returning from an exercise with Russia and stopped to drill with China as a passing courtesy, the kind of call that looks routine at the point it is made and consequential only in hindsight. A state built on non-alignment can survive being read the wrong way once. What it cannot afford is for that reading to become a habit.

Indonesia’s own veteran diplomats and strategic think tanks have been warning of this for months. The picture they draw is consistent. A diplomacy that has turned reactive and personal, run by impulse and built around the President rather than the professionals who once conducted it, with a foreign minister widely seen as a presidential loyalist with no diplomatic background who is barely visible in the job he holds. ASEAN, the platform Indonesia’s influence was built on, is left to idle while Jakarta prefers deals struck one capital at a time. The patient institution-building has given way to something narrower and more defensive. And the drill is that shift at sea, which is motion without direction.

In fairness, a Taiwanese official said navies run exercises with all kinds of partners, and therefore a country that guards its independence owes Washington no explanation for talking to anyone. as much, that navies do this routinely. The complaint is not that Indonesia dealt with China, but that it did so without appearing to decide anything, and let its flag serve a message it would never have chosen to send. A generation ago, Indonesia wrote the rules other states followed in these waters. Today, it followed someone else’s.


Simon is an external contributor for The ASEAN Frontier.

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Malaysia 🇲🇾

The Return of Haze

by Muhammad Aiman Bin Roszaimi, in Cyberjaya

The haze has returned to Southeast Asia. Once again, Malaysia is breathing air polluted by fires that do not necessarily begin within its own borders. What makes the current episode particularly concerning is its timing, as Southeast Asia is entering a period of stronger El Niño conditions, potentially fuelling a dry and hot environment in which land and forest fires can spread rapidly.

Malaysia has already begun feeling the effects. In mid-August, several locations recorded unhealthy Air Pollutant Index (API) readings, with Sarawak among the worst affected. Samarahan, Serian and Kuching recorded particularly high readings, while unhealthy conditions were also reported in parts of Selangor, Kuala Lumpur and Putrajaya. The haze has been attributed largely to land and forest fires, particularly in neighbouring Indonesia.

The underlying problem, however, is more complicated than simply blaming “forest fires”. Land clearing and agricultural practices, including the use of fire, remain important drivers. Peatlands make the situation particularly difficult because drained peat can burn for extended periods and produce large quantities of smoke. El Niño does not create these fires, but it creates the conditions that allow them to start more easily, spread faster and become harder to extinguish.

The consequences extend well beyond poor visibility and into public health, disruption of livelihood from education to aviation and tourism. Malaysia experienced this in 2015 where almost 7,000 schools were closed as air pollution reached hazardous levels.

The problem is arguably regional by nature. Haze does not respect national borders, while the authority to prevent fires largely remains national. This has long been one of ASEAN’s most difficult environmental governance challenges.

ASEAN has responded through the 2002 ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution (AATHP), a framework for prevention, monitoring and cooperation. More recently, ASEAN established the Sub-Regional Ministerial Steering Committee and has been working towards operationalising the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Transboundary Haze Pollution Control. At its 27th meeting on July 2026, ASEAN members reaffirmed their commitment to the AATHP and supported initiatives on sustainable peatland and haze-free land management.

Yet the recurrent haze suggests that regional cooperation still has a gap between coordination and implementation. ASEAN can monitor hotspots, share information and coordinate assistance, but the most important interventions such as land management, enforcement against illegal burning and protection of peatlands still remain dependent on individual states.

Malaysia therefore needs to approach haze as more than an annual environmental emergency. Strengthening domestic fire prevention, satellite and hotspot monitoring, public health preparedness and coordination between federal and state authorities will be essential. At the ASEAN level, Kuala Lumpur should push for stronger joint monitoring, sustainable peatland management and financing mechanisms that make prevention economically viable.

The challenge is ultimately political as much as environmental.

ASEAN has spent decades developing mechanisms to manage transboundary haze. The question now is whether those mechanisms can prevent the next crisis rather than simply manage its consequences. If haze continues to return whenever El Niño arrives, Southeast Asia still lacks a genuinely regional solution.


Aiman is a PhD candidate in Security and Strategic Analysis at the National University of Malaysia. His research focuses on Malaysia’s space policy, ASEAN regional security, and the strategic implications of emerging technologies. His work explores how Malaysia’s defense policy and strategic culture shape its approach to outer space.

Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳

ASEAN's Drug Framework at the 47th ASOD

by Wira Gregory Ejau, in Bandar Seri Begawan

Between August 4 and 6, Brunei participated in the 47th ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting on Drug Matters (ASOD), held virtually under Thailand’s chairmanship. The delegation, led by Narcotics Control Bureau Director Datuk Paduka Mohd Zalani Ismail, joined senior officials from all ten ASEAN member states and Dialogue Partners to exchange views on the region’s drug situation and shape the next phase of cooperative policy, with the meeting’s most significant output being the launch of the ASEAN Drug Monitoring Report 2026.

The report’s findings demonstrate a sharp deterioration in progress, as UNODC data released in June confirmed that methamphetamine seizures in East and Southeast Asia reached 349 tons in 2025, which was a 48% increase over the previous year’s already-record figure, and more than five times the quantity seized a decade ago. Ketamine seizures simultaneously reached 52.5 tons, at an 185% increase from 2024. As it stands, these fluctuations are indicative of a regional drug market that has expanded faster than the enforcement architecture assembled to contain it.

The structural driver is Myanmar’s ongoing civil conflict, which has created conditions in Shan State under which industrial-scale methamphetamine production has expanded largely unchecked since 2021. The state that is the primary source of the regional drug crisis is simultaneously one in which ASEAN’s non-interference principle has constrained meaningful collective action. This places ASOD in an analytically uncomfortable position, whereby a cooperative policy forum whose central challenge is faced with a governance collapse that cooperative policy will find difficulty in resolving. Working group outcomes, treatment standards and preventive education represent genuine regional work, but it operates downstream of a production dynamic that must be addressed at source.

The current ASEAN Work Plan on Securing Communities Against Illicit Drugs ran from 2016 to 2025, and its Final Review is now underway, with meetings like these shaping the terms that define the bloc’s drug cooperation architecture for the next decade. The question now is whether said framework is specific to the synthetic drug surge and the maritime trafficking corridors that increasingly carry it, or to largely reproduce the assumptions of its predecessor.

As a small maritime border state with strict domestic enforcement, Brunei’s Narcotics Control Bureau sits within the Prime Minister’s Office and operates under a legal framework that maintains zero tolerance on drug offences. Characteristic of a transit risk state rather than a production or consumption centre of significant scale, Brunei’s contribution to ASOD is procedural and normative, with consistent participation, data contribution to the monitoring system, and sustained institutional presence. Flagged as a priority at the 47th ASOD, the preparation for the October ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Drug Matters will be the next indicator of how the bloc intends to respond to a regional drug situation that its existing tools have so far been unable to reverse.


Gregory is an MSc candidate in Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He works as a freelance writer specializing in international history, conflict, and counterterrorism, with experience in academia, investigative journalism, and voluntary uniformed service. He currently provides research assistance with the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) under their Southeast Asian Security and Defence Internship Programme and conducts investigations on regional security and transnational crime for a confidential company.

Editorial Deadline 15/08/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk

Every one of this week's stories comes with an official version, but also with harder questions sitting just outside it. In Laos, police detained 261 people in a single raid on the Thatluang Lake Special Economic Zone, pushing 2026's cybercrime arrests past 5,000, yet the government still hasn't said who owns the buildings these networks operate from or named a single financier. In Myanmar, Bangkok gave former junta leader Min Aung Hlaing a red-carpet welcome and signed a river-pollution agreement that civil society groups warn treats the symptom while ignoring who's mining the rivers in the first place. Meanwhile, in Thailand, Bangkok's push to fast-track a free trade deal with the Eurasian Economic Union is framed as pragmatic diversification, though it leaves open how far the country can lean toward Moscow without straining the Western partnerships it's courting at the same time. And in Cambodia, officials touted 90,000 new jobs and record investment as proof of durable growth, with barely a mention of the Middle East-driven cost pressures already straining the households those jobs are meant to support.

Lao PDR 🇱🇦

Arrests Climb, Masterminds Still at Large

by Thongsavanh Souvannasane, in Vientiane

Lao police detained 261 suspects in a single raid on the Thatluang Lake Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in Vientiane on 8 August, the largest haul yet in a crackdown that has swept up more than 5,000 people so far in 2026.

The scale of the arrests raises a question authorities have yet to answer: who actually owns the buildings these networks operate from?

The zone itself sits on a 365-hectare concession the Lao government granted to Shanghai Wanfeng Real Estate Co., Ltd. in 2011, under a 99-year lease running through 2110.

Officers seized thousands of computers and 2,355 mobile phones at the site alone. Chinese nationals made up the largest share of suspects at 153, followed by Vietnamese, Thai, and smaller groups of Taiwanese, Malaysian, South Korean, and Myanmar nationals.

Police say the investigation continues into the operation’s organizers. So far, none have been named.

The raid follows a similar pattern set on 1 August, when six coordinated strikes across Sikhottabong and Hatsayfong districts netted 63 suspects, and in July, when a raid on the ST Vegas complex in Hatsayfong detained 589 people, most of them Thai nationals later deported through the First Lao-Thai Friendship Bridge.

Prime Minister Sonexay Siphandone told the National Assembly in early July that cybercrime-related arrests had already topped 4,400 for the first half of the year, with nearly 1,000 in June alone.

Numbers since then push the total well past 5,000, based on Lao Ministry of Public Security figures reported through August.

Each raid follows a similar script: rented houses or hotel complexes, seized devices, foreign suspects deported or handed to their home governments, and property owners left unnamed in official statements.

That pattern extends beyond this crackdown.

Regional monitors have documented how scam compounds across the Mekong region routinely operate inside buildings leased from local business interests who face no public scrutiny, even as the workers found inside, some of them trafficking victims rather than willing operators, are processed and sent home.

Lao authorities have not said whether any property owner or financier faces charges in connection with the Thatluang Lake raid, the ST Vegas raid, or the string of others that preceded them this year.

Whether the raids mark a genuine dismantling of Laos’ scam economy, or a rotating cast of low-level arrests that leaves the financial architecture intact, depends on a detail the government has yet to disclose: who is being prosecuted, and who is simply being deported.

Thongsavanh is a journalist from Laos with a background in English-language media. He graduated from the Lao-American Institute with a Diploma of the Arts in English and contributes to independent news platforms. His reporting focuses on environmental issues, socio-economic development, and geopolitics.

Myanmar 🇲🇲

Thailand’s Engagement with Myanmar Junta Raises Questions Over ASEAN Centrality

by Myat Moe Kywe

Thailand welcomed Myanmar’s newly branded president and former military coup leader, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, with a red-carpet reception during his official visit on August 6–7, drawing backlash from civil society groups in both Myanmar and Thailand.

According to National Thailand, Foreign Affairs Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow said Thailand’s foreign policy toward Myanmar is guided primarily by a commitment to ASEAN unity and practical regional stability. Yet bilateral discussions during the visit rarely focused on ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus or the ongoing civil war in Myanmar.

Instead, the talks placed significant emphasis on strengthening cross-border commerce, with the two countries seeking to accelerate bilateral trade toward a target of US$12 billion. Thailand and Myanmar also planned to convene a Joint Trade Commission meeting between their commerce ministers.

The two governments additionally signed four separate agreements, including one concerning cross-border river pollution management. Thai communities and civil society groups have been raising concerns over transboundary river pollution linked to mining activities in Myanmar, particularly rare-earth mining, with contaminated waterways flowing into northern Thailand. The pollution has been a growing concern for communities that depend on the rivers for their livelihoods and daily lives.

However, Thailand’s Cabinet approved the Terms of Reference (TOR) for a Joint Working Group on Water Quality Management in Border and Transboundary Rivers with Myanmar’s regime has been widely criticized among civil society and environmental watchdogs in Thailand.

The ETOs Watch Coalition, a network of civil society organisations monitoring transboundary investments and human rights violations in the region, argued that while international environmental cooperation is necessary, it must address the root causes of pollution, protect public rights and operate transparently. Without these safeguards, they warned, such cooperation could create “a false sense of progress” while legitimising Myanmar’s military regime.

The visit carries broader diplomatic significance as Myanmar’s military-backed administration seeks to consolidate legitimacy following elections widely described by critics as a “sham election.” Thailand’s willingness to engage directly with Min Aung Hlaing therefore raises questions about how other ASEAN member states may respond, particularly those that have remained cautious about direct engagement with the junta.

Thailand’s approach also presents a test for ASEAN centrality. While Bangkok frames its engagement as necessary for regional stability and ASEAN unity, the limited attention given to the bloc’s Five-Point Consensus and Myanmar’s ongoing conflict highlights a tension between pragmatic bilateral engagement and ASEAN’s collective response to the crisis.

Whether Thailand’s approach becomes a precedent for wider ASEAN engagement with Myanmar’s military-backed government remains a question for the bloc and for the credibility of ASEAN’s role in addressing the region’s most persistent political crisis.


Myat is a B.A. graduate in Politics, Philosophy, and Economics. She has interned at The Asia Foundation in Washington, D.C., and she has also worked as a summer research assistant at the Centre for Policy and Innovation (CRPI), gaining experience in research and analysis. Her work focuses on civic engagement, gender, youth leadership, and community development.

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Thailand 🇹🇭

Why Thailand Is Fast-Tracking Trade with Eurasia

by Paranut Juntree, in Bangkok

In a clear signal of Thailand’s evolving foreign policy, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Sihasak Phuangketkeow led a high-level delegation to Moscow from 12th to 15th August 2026 to accelerate formal negotiations for a Free Trade Agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Meeting with Eurasian Economic Commission Board Chairman Bakytzhan Sagintaev and senior Russian officials, Thailand sought to break a decade of exploratory dialogue and shift into formal technical trade preparations. As global protectionism mounts and traditional trade negotiations stall, Thailand’s Eurasian push highlights that the country is leveraging pragmatism to secure new markets, safeguard supply chains, and maintain strategic autonomy.

The EAEU, comprising Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia, represents an integrated market of over 180 million consumers. Thailand first expressed intent to negotiate an EAEU FTA in 2015, following Vietnam’s landmark deal. However, institutional inertia, shifting domestic priorities, and post-2022 Western geopolitical sanctions slowed bilateral momentum to a crawl. The Thai Foreign Minister visit, following preparatory groundwork in Kazakhstan in June 2026, signals that private-sector demand is now driving diplomatic urgency to formalize institutional access with the Eurasian bloc. With bilateral trade with the EAEU surpassing USD2 billion, both sides intend to reactivate joint economic working mechanisms while technical feasibility studies are underway.

This re-engagement arrives at a pivotal structural moment for Thailand. Securing traditional Western trade deals remains fraught. Bilateral negotiations with the United States face asymmetric pressures, where Washington pushes for non-tariff concessions and strict rules-of-origin audits while maintaining baseline reciprocal tariffs. Meanwhile, negotiations for a Thai-EU FTA face hurdles over complex environmental mandates, like CBAM, strict intellectual property provisions, and open government procurement demands that risk burdening domestic businesses. Advancing EAEU negotiations now allows Thailand to construct a crucial buffer against these protectionist and high-compliance barriers elsewhere. Furthermore, with only Vietnam and Singapore holding operational EAEU agreements in ASEAN, Thai exporters, particularly in food processing, rubber, and auto parts, face compelling incentives to secure comparable access to our regional peers.

The economic horizon with EAEU presents high-yield opportunities alongside tangible operational friction. An FTA promises tariff reductions on Thai agricultural and industrial goods while securing direct access to Eurasian raw materials, fertilizer, and energy inputs. Reciprocal tourism also remains significant, driven by millions of Eurasian visitors. However, commercial execution may face steep hurdles in navigating secondary Western sanctions on financial networks that complicates cross-border payment settlements, while rigid sanitary inspections continue to delay agricultural clearance.

Ultimately, Thailand’s Eurasian maneuver is not an ideological shift away from traditional partners, but a calculated execution of diversification and non-aligned economic pragmatism. By building institutional bridges with the EAEU while simultaneously pursuing OECD accession and EU trade arrangements, Thailand reinforces its historical diplomatic strength by remaining flexible, multi-vectored, and open for business across competing global blocs.


Paranut has a background in advocacy, with experience in policy research, communications, and civic engagement across both the NGO and government sectors. As Thailand’s Youth Delegate to the United Nations, he represented Thai youth in global dialogues on migration, education, and human rights, championing inclusive policymaking. He holds a degree in political science with a specialization in international relations.

Cambodia 🇰🇭

Cambodia’s Industrial Sector Expands

by Malai Yatt, in Phnom Penh

Driven by strong investor confidence, Cambodia’s expanding industrial landscape continues to generate tens of thousands of vital new employment opportunities.

The number of factories in Cambodia increased by 845. Sun Mesa, spokesperson for the Ministry of Labor and Vocational Training, said on August 5, 2026, that during the first six months of 2026, the number of factories increased from 46,649 to 47,494, which is a notable growth and has created over 90,000 new job opportunities for citizens.

He also added that most of this growth occurred in the industrial sector, especially in the garment, sewing, footwear, and travel goods and bag production industries, where the number of factories increased from 2,725 to 2,890.

He confirmed that “More than 90,000 new jobs created in the first half of 2026 are clear evidence that Cambodia is continuing to create job opportunities for its citizens and strengthen the foundation for sustainable economic growth.”

Cambodia can still attract investment, increase the number of factories, and create new jobs continuously because investors trust its peace, political stability, pro-investment policies, and skilled workforce.

According to the Council for the Development of Cambodia (CDC), Cambodia approved 226 investment projects, with a total investment capital of approximately $4.7 billion, creating around 160,000 jobs.

In a recent interview with Bloomberg, Sun Chanthol, Vice Chairman of the Council for the Development of Cambodia (CDC), declared “Now, if we look at the numbers in 2024, we approved 414 projects worth $6.9 billion. In 2025, we approved 630 projects worth $10 billion.”

He hopes to be able to attract more investment from now until the end of 2026. But having said that, the war in the Middle East also has some impact on our investment, not only in Cambodia but in the whole in the world in the whole world.

“But having said that, our investment law does not discriminate against any investor. We encourage every investor to consider investing in Cambodia because of our pro-business government, our young, dynamic workforce, and our infrastructure”, he added.

In conclusion, with competitive investment policies, growing infrastructure, and strong political stability, Cambodia remains well-positioned to maintain its economic momentum and attract global capital despite broader international economic uncertainties.

Malai is a reporter at Kiripost, where she has worked for more than three years, driven by a strong commitment to amplifying the voices of underserved communities. Her reporting focuses on economic and foreign affairs.

Editorial Deadline 15/08/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Karen Ysabelle R. David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk

Across the Pacific Corridor this week, the age-old conflict between man and nature continues to play out in one of the world’s most climate-vulnerable regions. In the Philippines, monsoon rains have seen cities and provinces in much of the island of Luzon submerged in floods over the past week; meanwhile, in Singapore, the planned development of Maju Forest to make way for yet more housing has led to a public outcry and debates over the limits of development.

Over in Vietnam, Hanoi is confronting a problem of a different kind, as its lofty growth ambitions rest on rickety funding founded on the backs of overtaxed commercial banks. Similarly, in Timor-Leste, this year’s Pride March — which the country has celebrated for nearly a decade — has also run into issues with funding, in the wake of United States President Donald Trump’s budget cuts that have sent shockwaves through the LGBTQIA+ community all the way in Dili.

Whether ripples and shockwaves are the result of problems natural or man-made, it is the ordinary people of these four countries that are the first to pay the price.

The Philippines 🇵🇭

“Nature, Forgive Us”: Floods, Deaths, and the Price of Neglect

by Eduardo G. Fajermo Jr., in Angeles City

“Kalikasan, pasensya ka na sa mga tao.”

Nature, forgive us for what people have done.

That was the painful line attributed to 52-year-old June Lelis as he looked at tons of garbage swept into the Redemptorist Water Channel in Parañaque City. It was more than grief over trash. It sounded like a national confession: the floods now swallowing homes, roads, farms, churches, and schools are not caused by rain alone.

Across Luzon, the southwest monsoon enhanced by Tropical Cyclones Luis and Maymay turned another week of rain into another map of loss. The Office of Civil Defense said 19 people were reported killed and 15 others injured, with the province of Benguet recording the highest number of fatalities at 12, including landslide deaths in Baguio City, La Trinidad, and Atok.

Evacuations and flooding spanned several areas across the island of Luzon, from Quezon City, Marikina, Las Piñas, Parañaque, Manila, and Malabon in the National Capital Region, to the provinces of Bulacan, Batangas, Nueva Ecija, Pangasinan, Pampanga, and Zambales. In Calumpit, floodwaters reached chest-deep level and nearly rose to the roofs of houses; in Pampanga, churches in San Fernando were flooded; in Zambales, raging water and lahar damaged a bridge and forced more than 2,600 residents to evacuate.

The damage also entered classrooms and farms. The Department of Education said more than 6.5 million learners were affected by class suspensions, with 3,924 classrooms reported damaged. The Department of Agriculture earlier placed losses at PHP135.3 million, affecting 4,516 hectares and 6,010 farmers.

This is why “resilience” now feels too convenient. Filipinos are praised for surviving, but survival should not excuse weak preparation. A family that evacuates every rainy season is not proof that the system works. It is proof that the system keeps asking ordinary people to absorb failure.

This is why public anger over questionable spending matters, even if it should not consume the whole disaster story. On 11 August, reports on the confidential funds trial of the Office of the Vice President included testimony that tree planting and Christmas parties were allegedly listed among confidential expenses, while reported witnesses testified in a separate graft trial over alleged problems involving PHP455 million worth of ice-making machines.

No single peso can be said to have stopped one landslide. But every peso wasted is a peso unavailable for drainage, rescue boats, slope protection, evacuation centers, and early warnings.

In a country of storms, disaster preparedness is not charity after the flood. It is governance before the rain. When the state fails, the cost is not only counted in damaged roads, ruined crops, and submerged homes. It is counted in the names added to the dead.


Eduardo is a Political Science graduate and MA Political Science candidate at the University of Santo Tomas, researching democracy, disaster governance, and inclusive policy in the Global South. He is a former faculty member at Holy Angel University, where he taught Philippine history and contemporary global issues. He also worked with a senator in the Guam Legislature, contributing to policy research and legislative analysis.

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Singapore 🇸🇬

Housing vs. Nature vs. Heritage — Will Singaporeans Eventually Have a Choice?

by Nurul Aini, in Singapore

Hailed as a “City in Nature,” Singapore consistently has to navigate and balance between nature and the development of housing for its people. On 10 July 2026, the plan to remove two-thirds of Maju Forest — one of the few forested areas in Singapore — to make way for more housing was announced. Meanwhile, Gillman Barracks, a significant space for arts and lifestyle, has also been planned as a potential residential space for both private and public housing.

Upon announcement, citizens responded with mixed reactions. There were, however, strong opinions against the development of Maju Forest, such as through petitions calling for development to be directed to brownfield sites, and for the full environmental study of the space to be published. The petition highlights critically endangered species, such as the Sunda Pangolin and straw-headed bulbul, and recalled various forests that were lost as a result of housing development. To date, the petition has garnered over 43,000 signatures. Up until 6 August 2026, the Housing and Development Board (HDB) also accepted public feedback via an online portal.

Residents who live in the area stressed the relationship between living near a forest and how it has shaped the community’s character, sharing how differently children play and grow when in close proximity to greenery. Various social media posts also emerged, such as one by user @ckw.ada which questions whether Singapore’s approach of urban tree planting in place of mature forests will only worsen the urban heat island effects. Walks through the forest are also organized in the spirit of allowing citizens to appreciate the trail and understand what we can potentially lose as a result of rapid development, while users like @4one.sg bring viewers into the forest while educating them on the species found within.

Additionally, this issue was also intensely debated in Parliament. Workers’ Party MP Kenneth Tiong questioned why alternative sites with low-density populations cannot be used to develop more housing, as well as the role of ministries, such as the Ministry of Sustainability and Environment (MSE), in advocating for the forest. Meanwhile, the People’s Action Party (PAP) MP Alvin Tan stressed that the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) is part of an ongoing consultation process. The EIA is meant to be a systematic development process used by the government through agencies like the Urban Redevelopment Authority and the National Parks Board (NParks) to assess the impact of proposed development on the biophysical, social, and environmental makeup of the space. On a separate occasion, via a Facebook post, the Minister for Sustainability and the Environment, Grace Fu, highlighted that the MSE does not have a mandate on land use and planning and wrote about the hard trade-offs that Singapore sometimes must consider.

Gillman Barracks also underwent the Heritage Impact Assessment (HIA), with some infrastructures marked as high significance or exceptional. The development of this site has similarly gained traction amongst Singaporeans concerned with losing heritage sites.

Singapore is hailed as a modern city that harnesses technology and infrastructure for its progress. Yet, this episode on the Maju Forest does not necessarily show that Singaporeans resist development, but that they are not willing to partake in what could potentially be a sacrifice of their mental wellbeing and an alteration to a grounded lifestyle in the name of modern progress.


Aini is currently pursuing a master’s degree in English literature at Nanyang Technological University. She has experience working in youth groups, contributing to the planning and management of outreach activities.

Vietnam 🇻🇳

Beyond the Banks

by Tri Vo, in Ho Chi Minh City

Vietnam’s economy is running at a breakneck pace, having recorded a lofty GDP expansion of 8.18% in the first half of 2026, outpacing its ASEAN peers. However, beneath the surface of this macroeconomic triumph lies a profound structural vulnerability: that of an overstretched capital distribution system. To sustain the government’s ambitious double-digit growth mandate and propel Vietnam to the rank of high-income nations by 2045, total social investment demand is projected to escalate to a staggering US$1.46 trillion for the 2026–2030 period, nearly three times the country’s 2025 nominal GDP of US$530 billion. Such tremendous capital demands have prompted the critical questions of not just how to deploy but also how to source capital.

Both the Vietnamese public and private sectors have relied mostly on commercial banks to fund their economic expansion in the form of infrastructural financing. Yet, this dependency has now reached a critical threshold, as by the end of 2026’s first half, the economy’s total outstanding credit across the banking system had already exceeded US$795.5 billion. Such a high degree of leverage has posed a systemic bottleneck for continuing capital-raising efforts. Adding to this issue, liquidity pressure is intensifying across the banking sector, as seen in the rising deposit rates that are pushing borrowing costs higher, forcing banks to transition toward more selective lending. The situation has become serious enough to warrant repeated instructions from the State Bank of Vietnam to the banking sector to keep borrowing costs affordable to safeguard growth.

As banks tighten their belts, alternative funding channels are experiencing a notable spurt of life. The corporate bond market staged a remarkable comeback in the second quarter of 2026, with private placements surging ninefold from the previous quarter to over US$8.14 billion. However, such a liquidity injection is heavily skewed toward real estate. In fact, while commercial banks’ bond issuance year-by-year declined by nearly half, the real estate sector saw a fourfold increase in the same period. This development shows that alternative capital channels are being mostly directed toward the construction and real estate sectors, not the value-added manufacturing that can help boost Vietnam’s innovation, one of the goals of Vietnam’s economic ambitions.

To release the pressure valve for the banking sector, the state itself is injecting liquidity on a large scale through public infrastructure spending. By the end of July 2026, the Ministry of Finance reported the disbursement of approximately US$16.3 billion in public capital. While this represents 41.9% of 2026’s target and a notable year-on-year improvement, the pace remains uneven across sectors. Five ministries and several localities have disbursed less than 10% of their allocated funds, implying a certain degree of bottleneck in either bureaucratic matters or securing/initiating projects.

Ultimately, the path to a high-income economy cannot be paved solely with the wherewithals from the domestic commercial banking sector or the bond market, but also from external sources. Indeed, the construction of the International Financial Center in the economic hub of Ho Chi Minh City is a stark reminder of Vietnam’s seriousness in attracting foreign capital. That, along with upgrades in governance standards, the inclusion of diverse classes of assets in the market, and many other fledgling endeavors, will help pave the way toward a robust capital market capable of buttressing the country’s growth ambitions. Vietnam’s success will serve as a valuable lesson for developing ASEAN peers on graduating from an immature market dominated by traditional financial channels to one that is more interconnected with the wider world.


Tri has experience in management consulting and strategy, having worked with institutions such as the UNDP, The Asia Group, and ARC Group. He has provided strategic, legal, and operational insights to clients in sectors including manufacturing, energy, and technology. He holds both academic and professional experience related to Southeast and East Asia, with a focus on regional development and policy.

Timor-Leste 🇹🇱

The Pride Month for “Courage” to Collectivehood

by Amandina Maria Helena da Silva, in Dili

For almost one decade, Timor-Leste has celebrated Pride Month every year. It was first celebrated in June 2017 and was publicly supported by the previous Prime Minister Rui Maria de Araujo. The event drew support from international agencies, NGOs, and embassies — but that has changed over the last two years.

Since US President Donald Trump issued a statement about only recognizing two genders and cut the budget to support the LGBTQIA+ community across the world, Timor-Leste was heavily affected. This resulted in institutions that were previously active and fully funded the Pride March event, such as The Asia Foundation and the US Embassy in Timor-Leste, not fully supporting the empowerment of minority organizations like CODIVA Foundation and Arcoiris Timor-Leste due to the withdrawal of all funds that support LGBTQIA+ organizations. When hope fades, collective struggle grows stronger.

This year, there is a limitation of funding, but the state, through Head of State President Ramos Horta; relevant institutions; CSOs; social movements; and people continue to support minority groups through the Pride March, with the theme “Courage” — courage for a long life fighting for minority groups and humanity. This event was officially opened by the President of the Republic, who also affirmed that everyone deserves to live and love openly and honestly. The President reiterated his constitutional duty to protect the dignity of all citizens, fostering a society rooted in mutual respect and the absence of fear.

Besides that, RTTL News reported that the founder of Timor-Leste Pride, Natalino Ornai, stated that the event already has a lot of visibility, and many know about Pride March to support the LGBTQIA+ community, but in reality the minority community still faces a lot of discrimination. In some examples documented by Diligente, Domingos Pires, known as “Pildo,” expressed that she “was always alone and cried silently” due to years of suffering caused by bullying and discrimination. Meanwhile, Mário (fictitious name), a transgender man, spent years in silence, fearing the reaction of his family and society.

The stories of Pildo and Mário show that, despite some progress in raising awareness on human rights, many LGBTQIA+ people continue to face insults, humiliation, exclusion, rejection, and physical and psychological abuse. Clearly, there is a need to unite, not only for minority groups, but for women, the youth, and people in general.

Symbolism is not justice — minority communities need a state that moves beyond recognition to confront inequality, protect rights, and deliver meaningful change.


Amandina is a human rights advocate working with Asia Justice and Rights Timor-Leste on the Interim Reparation to Women Survivors project. She previously worked with UNDP Timor-Leste’s Accelerator Lab and has contributed to human rights and health initiatives through several youth and civil society organisations. Her interests lie in justice, youth empowerment, and community-based social change in Timor-Leste.

Editorial Deadline 11/08/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Siu Tzyy Wei, Lead Editor - Maritime Crescent Desk

The next turn rarely arrives without warning.

In Brunei, the spotlight on Visit Brunei 2027 raises a question of what comes after the year ends. In Indonesia, the discovery of firearms at a South Jakarta school unsettles assumptions about where insecurity can take root. In Malaysia, El Niño puts resilience to the test as a changing climate demands more than preparation for the familiar.

The region is moving forward, but not always along a predictable path. What comes next depends on whether institutions can recognise the turn before they are forced to take it.

This week’s issue is for the road ahead.

Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳

Turning Attention Into Opportunity?

by Syimah Johari, in Bandar Seri Begawan

As one of the world’s major tourism regions, Southeast Asia has long attracted massive numbers of visitors for various reasons. Recently, Brunei introduced Visit Brunei Year 2027 (VBY2027), in conjunction with the Diamond Jubilee of His Majesty. This initiative provides an opportunity for Brunei to position itself in the regional tourism spotlight. But in a region already crowded with established tourism destinations, what can Brunei offer that makes travellers choose to visit, and more importantly, return?

VBY2027 is set to be a year-long celebration, with six themed festivals covering areas such as culture, heritage, nature and the creative community. Promotional campaigns for initiative have already begun, with more than 50 events planned throughout 2027. From cultural celebrations to nature-based experiences, the year-long programme aims to showcase different aspects of what Brunei has to offer.

Within the region, neighbouring countries offer a wide range of attractions, from Thailand’s scenic beaches and active nightlife to Singapore’s well-established tourism industry and Malaysia’s cultural, food and nature experiences. While these destinations have their own appeal, Brunei offers something quieter and more distinct, with its pristine rainforests, Islamic heritage and tranquility. The VBY2027 celebrations also provide an added attraction, coinciding with His Majesty’s Diamond Jubilee that brings together royal celebrations, cultural activities and local festivities. Despite Brunei’s relative smallness, it can offer visitors the opportunity to experience a side of Southeast Asia that is more intimate, while also taking part in a significant moment in the country’s history. Rather than competing with its neighbours by offering more, Brunei could instead use its smaller scale to offer visitors a slower-paced and more personal experience, centred around its nature, culture and heritage.

However, uniqueness does not necessarily guarantee that tourists will come. While VBY2027 indeed provides an opportunity to attract more visitors, its success should not only be measured by the number of tourists arriving in Brunei. This is where coordination across different parts of government becomes important, as improvements in areas such as transport, accommodation, tourism activities and visitor services are often needed to strengthen the overall experience. More importantly, the benefits of tourism should extend beyond 2027, creating opportunities for local businesses, young people and communities to take part in the tourism industry. If VBY2027 only creates a temporary increase in visitors, its impact may be short-lived. The challenge for Brunei is therefore to turn the attention from 2027 into something that lasts beyond celebrations.

With Visit Brunei 2027 bringing together celebrations, culture, nature and local experiences, the year presents Brunei with an opportunity to showcase what makes the country unique within Southeast Asia. Beyond the celebrations, VBY2027 could also encourage greater interest in Brunei as a destination and create opportunities for the local tourism industry to grow.


Syimah is a graduate of King’s College London with a BA in International Relations. With a strong focus on diplomacy, regional cooperation, and development policy, she is passionate about contributing to meaningful change through public service. Currently, she is involved in poverty alleviation work through a local NGO.

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Indonesia 🇮🇩

Do Not Enter

by Gemala Asyura, in Pekanbaru

On July 10th 2026, a private school in Pondok Pinang, Kebayoran Lama, South Jakarta discovered hundreds of weapons inside an old, unused room. Initially used for student activities, the discovery ignited a police investigation that uncovered 996 total items found - 776 air revolvers, 215 air pistols, and 4 air rifles, all chambered in 4.5mm caliber bullets. The sole genuine firearm was a Franchi SPAS-15, a 12-gauge shotgun, which investigators traced to a man who died in 2020.

Later on, in early August, the police found more items such as long barreled weapons, ranging from short barreled weapons to ammunition making equipment; and a number of items suspected to be related to narcotics and pornographic CDs, including two joints of marijuana, a plastic bag suspected to contain methamphetamine, a bong, a glass pipe, lighters, and about 30 pornographic CDs. The school was appalled to find numerous items that had been apparently sitting in the school environment for years.

After further investigation, lawyers representing the former chairman of the school claimed that the weapons were licensed airsoft guns belonging to a company named PT Lokta Karya Perbakin (The All Indonesia Shooting and Hunting Sports Association), legally used to support the school’s extracurricular shooting program, specifically for national and regional sporting events. He says that the person who came up with the idea of having shooting extracurricular activities at school is Jenderal Suryo, he was a member of the school foundation’s board of trustees, but since has died. However, the foundation’s own legal counsel says longtime teachers have denied the school ever ran such a program, casting doubt on that explanation.

What started this discovery is a dispute between the foundation’s former chairman (IWD) and the school. In 2013, IWD allegedly embezzled school funds to purchase some land, all for it to be revealed that the land certificate was registered under his wife’s name. The school brought this matter to court after IWD was suspended in April 2026. The school was only able to access the locked room after the former chairman was removed from the premises. Investigations remains ongoing, as several rooms remain locked — the school believes IWD took the keys with him, necessitating police assistance to gain entry. Among the rooms yet to be searched is one described as resembling a bunker.

Beyond individual details, this points to a flawed governance model where private school foundations can operate with almost no external checks, and where weapons permits are granted without any follow up on how they’re actually stored or used. Moving forward, this raises real questions about whether yayasan(foundation)-run schools require mandatory, independent audits, whether weapons licenses should require periodic re-verification rather than one time approval, and whether single person control over sensitive spaces should even be allowed in institutions responsible for children. How the ongoing investigation and IWD’s case play out could set a precedent for how seriously these gaps get taken next time.


Gemala holds a degree in International Relations, with a focus on contemporary global issues. In addition to her years of undergraduate study, she has hands-on experience in early childhood education, having worked in both teaching and teaching assistant roles. She now pursues journalism as a practical extension of her academic background, with a focus and scope centered on ASEAN regional dynamics and social issues.

Malaysia 🇲🇾

El Niño’s Litmus Test

by Edrina Lisa Ozaidi, in WP Kuala Lumpur

The prolonged El Niño phenomenon puts Malaysia against a double blow caused by the shift in climate pressure. The phenomenon was forecasted to last until early 2027 and converge with a surge in regional transboundary haze.

Together, these environmental hazards threaten public health, strain local water reserves, and put the nation’s disaster management systems on high alert.

The Malaysian Meteorological Department recently projected below-average rainfall across parts of Peninsular Malaysia, Sarawak and Sabah, rapidly escalating the threat of localised drought.

In response, the Department of Irrigation and Drainage (DID) has deployed 606 portable emergency pumps nationwide designed to be mobilised within 24 hours to critical agricultural granaries, falling river basins, and depleting water treatment plants.

The pressure extends directly to the nation’s food security and agricultural sectors. Prolonged dry spells and drought cause vital paddy field and commercial crop yields to choke, forcing agricultural ministries to closely monitor 56 major state dams via advanced telemetry portals.

The goal remains clear; to carefully balance domestic tap water needs with agricultural irrigation demands, ensuring that a dry season does not morph into an economic or humanitarian shortage.

Adding to the parched conditions, persistent southern and south-western winds have carried smoke across international borders, triggering a sharp decline in regional air quality.

Multiple areas in Sarawak — including Serian, Semarahan, Kuching and Sri Aman have plunged into unhealthy Air Pollutant Index (API) readings, crossing the 150 threshold and severely restricting outdoor activities. The spikes in hot spots across the neighbouring regions have prompted state environmental boards to react aggressively by stepping up neighbourhood patrols and activating localised haze operation rooms to penalise industrial or agricultural land clearing.

Yet, domestic enforcement can only do so much against wind-borne pollution, highlighting the frustrating limitations of national borders in the face of cross-border environmental degradation.

As Malaysia navigates this dual crisis of water scarcity and poor air quality, the margin of error is shrinking. The government’s pivot toward proactive infrastructure deployment—such as real-time river basin monitoring systems and pre-positioned pumps—shows a welcome evolution in disaster preparedness compared to past decades.

However, these emergency responses remain fundamentally stopgaps against a larger structural threat. If El Niño persists as predicted, Malaysia will need to transition rapidly from emergency containment to deep structural adaptations in water conservation, agricultural zoning, and regional environmental diplomacy. For an administration striving to secure sustainable economic growth and protect vulnerable populations, safeguarding the nation’s environmental lifelines has never been more urgent.

Edrina is a communications professional with a background in international relations. She holds a degree from the University of Nottingham Malaysia and has worked across public relations and social media for organizations in the development, education, and corporate sectors. Her work focuses on crafting narratives around regional affairs and strengthening media engagement across Southeast Asia.

Editorial Deadline 08/08/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk

This week, visibility took several forms across the region, but it rarely came with freedom attached. In Myanmar, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was seen by an independent observer for the first time in years when the ICRC confirmed her wellbeing on 3 August, a rare proof-of-life moment that still left international calls for her unconditional release as urgent as ever. However, just across the border, the man responsible for her detention was the one being welcomed: Thai Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul hosted Min Aung Hlaing's first official visit since his disputed installation as Myanmar's prime minister, a bet on economic recalibration that human rights groups say legitimizes a regime under ICC indictment. Meanwhile, in Cambodia, newly confirmed US Ambassador Christopher Anderson pledged deeper security cooperation and raised human rights concerns in the same breath, leaving it to be seen which one Washington actually prioritizes in practice. And in Laos, ambitious new trade targets with Vietnam put Vientiane further into the regional spotlight, even as its widening ties with both Hanoi and Beijing show a country still working out how much independence it can afford while courting two much larger neighbors.

Myanmar 🇲🇲

Daw Aung San Suu Kyi Back in Focus

by Moe Thiri Myat

International attention to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s detention had been growing for months before she was seen by an outside representative this week. In April, her son Kim Aris helped launch a “Proof of Life” campaign, calling for independent confirmation of her health and whereabouts. In May, ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights backed the campaign and called for her unconditional release and independent access.

The issue soon became part of ASEAN’s diplomatic engagement with Myanmar. ASEAN Special Envoy and Philippine Foreign Secretary Ma. Theresa Lazaro sought access to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi as ASEAN increased contacts with Myanmar’s government and other political and armed actors. During a 12 July meeting with Myanmar Foreign Minister Tin Maung Swe, ASEAN was told that she was in good health and would be looked after. Thailand later supported direct access so those assurances could be independently verified.

The request came while Lazaro was pursuing wider consultations on Myanmar. On 13 July, she and Thai Foreign Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow met representatives of ethnic armed organisations and the military-established National Solidarity and Peacemaking Negotiation Committee to discuss an “inclusive national political dialogue.” Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, however, remained outside these engagements, and Lazaro was not granted a meeting with her. The contacts continued through the following weeks.

These diplomatic efforts also coincided with the final weeks of President Min Aung Hlaing’s 100-day peace initiative, which set 31 July as the deadline for armed groups to join discussions. The period ended with several major resistance organisations still outside the government-led process. On the same day, Min Aung Hlaing used his 31 July parliamentary address to criticise ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus and outline the government’s priorities after the 100-day period.

Three days later, on 3 August, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi met Arnaud de Baecque, the Myanmar representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross. The ICRC meeting included a private conversation conducted under the organisation’s procedures for visiting detainees. Photographs released by Myanmar authorities showed the 81-year-old former State Counsellor standing and meeting the delegation. The images provided rare independent confirmation of her condition after years in which reliable information about her health and detention had remained limited.

The visit quickly drew attention from her family, campaigners, governments, and regional organisations. Kim Aris welcomed the confirmation that his mother had been seen by an independent international organisation, while continuing to call for her release. The ICRC did not disclose details of the private conversation, in line with its confidential approach to detention visits, but the meeting marked a rare moment of outside access to one of Myanmar’s most prominent political prisoners.

The visit did not end international calls concerning her detention. On 7 August, the United States and ASEAN Chair again called for the unconditional release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and other political prisoners. The week therefore closed with independent humanitarian access finally taking place, while wider demands for her release, political prisoner releases, and continued international attention remained firmly in place.


Moe Thiri Myat is a senior at Parami University. Majoring in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics (PPE). Interested in analyzing emerging sociopolitical situations and developments, through her work as a Myanmar correspondent at The ASEAN Frontier she aims to explore how sociopolitical developments across Southeast Asia shape and are shaped by the situation in Myanmar.

Thailand 🇹🇭

Min Aung Hlaing Visits Thailand Sparking Protests Among Human Rights Groups

by Natamon Aumphin, in Bangkok

On August 6-7, 2026, Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul welcomed former Myanmar military junta leader Min Aung Hlaing on his first official visit after being declared the prime minister of Myanmar despite accusations of a rigged election. Under the framework of calibrated reengagement, the Thai prime minister aimed to reconnect with Myanmar after Naypidaw’s stalled effort to implement the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus. Although Myanmar is barred from engaging in the ASEAN Summit, Thailand’s prime minister believes that engaging with a neighbor that shares a border over 2,400 km is a necessity, despite criticism that Bangkok’s action is legitimizing the former military chief. The criticism is evident among human rights defenders as death tolls from the civil war in Myanmar reach over 100,000 people and due to the arrest warrant of the junta from the International Criminal Court (ICC).

Min Aung Hlaing’s visit to Bangkok has implications for Thailand on two levels. Firstly, realigning relationships with Myanmar entails economic benefits for both sides. In fact, Thailand was among Myanmar’s top foreign investors half a decade ago, ranging from petroleum to manufacturing, finance, hospitality, logistics, and wellness. Nonetheless, the invested capital has decreases due to the civil war. The resurgence of interest in investing in Myanmar was, hence, reflected in the Thailand-Myanmar Business Forum 2026, where more than 700 business-related representatives attended. For Thailand, this presents a new opportunity to amplify economic exchange with Myanmar and increase trade surplus after a massive decline in Cambodia-Thailand border trade. From gaining almost a hundred billion supplies in 2024 to gaining none in 2026.

Secondly, it sends signals about Thailand’s direction on the global stage. Some scholars argued that Thailand is associated with external and internal risk due to recalibrating the bilateral relationship with Myanmar. Sihasak Phuangketkeow, the Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, affirmed to the public that Thailand’s decision is to unify ASEAN, reintegrate Myanmar, and increase opportunities in the region while assisting Myanmar toward peace and stability. Nonetheless, it is unclear how Thailand will approach Myanmar on this matter as Myanmar has recently criticized the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus.

The skepticism in Myanmar’s commitment led to negative responses from civil society. In fact, some of the Myanmar residing in Thailand were seen to gather in front of the United Nations ESCAP Headquarters in Bangkok, discouraging the Thai government from legitimizing Min Aung Hlaing for fear of human rights violations. Another instance is when a member of parliament shouted “For Peace! For Humanity!” after being denied access to submit a petition to the House of Senate. These instances reflected concerns of the public toward human rights violation records of Min Aung Hlaing, which could not be ignored. Therefore, although Thailand and Myanmar share over 2,400 km of border, there needs to be a balance between recalibrating, constructive engagement, and a roadmap to regional peace.


Natamon has served as a rapporteur at the Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS Thailand). She has also worked as a research assistant on diplomatic issues in Southeast Asia. Her work focuses on how domestic politics shape foreign policy in the region. She holds a degree in international relations and has experience in policy analysis, event reporting, and regional research.

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Cambodia 🇰🇭

Christopher Anderson Confirmed by US Senate as Ambassador to Cambodia

by Chandara Samban, in Kandal

The US Senate confirmed Christopher Anderson as the next US ambassador to Cambodia on August 7, 2026, filling a post vacant since Patrick Murphy’s term ended in May 2024 under the Biden administration. Anderson, a career diplomat with 17 years of experience in foreign affairs and national security, has named cracking down on online scams his top priority. Analysts expect the confirmation to bring unprecedented US-Cambodia security cooperation, though some have raised concerns about an increased security focus given Cambodia’s mounting challenges: the world’s largest online scam industry, a border dispute with Thailand, and strained ties with Beijing.

Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in July, Anderson said he would draw on his diplomatic and national security background to strengthen bilateral ties on both the economic and security fronts. He called the scam crackdown a serious international security issue and stressed the importance of deepening trade ties — the US accounts for roughly 40% of Cambodia’s exports — alongside expanded military cooperation. He described it as a rare bright spot in Phnom Penh-Washington relations, crediting the Trump administration’s renewed attention to Hun Manet’s government. On human rights, he said: “The United States also remains concerned about human rights in Cambodia — including politically motivated trials and the suppression of free expression and assembly. I will press the Cambodian government to meet its obligations to its own citizens, clearly and consistently.”

Thong Mengdavid, deputy director of the China-ASEAN Studies Centre, called the appointment a positive signal of Washington’s strategic focus on Phnom Penh — particularly building the Cambodian army and police’s capacity to fight online scams. “The two countries will focus on cooperation in solving practical problems and pursuing common interests, especially strengthening the ability to prevent cross-border crimes, cybersecurity, intelligence-sharing, and identifying criminals,” he said, noting cybersecurity remains sensitive for Washington given the toll scams have taken on the US economy. Despite Cambodia’s ties with China, he said, the US still values the relationship and hopes to launch a joint legal study group for intelligence-sharing and technical assistance as a foundation for mutual trust.

Geopolitical analyst Seng Vanly said the appointment signals a more security-driven US foreign policy, marking “a turning point toward pragmatic engagement,” with the scam fight a growing area of cooperation — one that could ease tensions if successful, or fuel new friction if not. “The dispatch of a national security expert to Cambodia, in the context of geopolitical competition between the US and China, clearly shows that Washington views Cambodia through the security lens of the Indo-Pacific region,” he said, adding that the move signals US resolve to counter Chinese influence in the region.

William Piekos, an analyst at the Congressional Research Service, said past strain stemmed from Cambodia’s human rights record, restrictions on political space, and its ties with China — but predicted the Trump administration will deepen engagement through military cooperation and development aid. Relations last soured around 2017, after Cambodia dissolved the opposition Cambodia National Rescue Party and accused Washington of backing an effort to unseat Hun Sen’s government.


Chandara is a freelance journalist with a focus on foreign affairs, security issues, and ASEAN affairs. He also serves as a Junior Counterterrorism Intelligence Analyst.

Lao PDR 🇱🇦

Laos–Vietnam Trade Target Highlights Balancing Act in ASEAN

by Phonethida Sitthixay, in Vientiane

Laos and Vietnam have agreed to raise their bilateral trade value to USD 4 billion in 2026, with a longer‑term goal of USD 10 billion by 2030, underscoring the growing importance of their economic partnership.

Trade between the two neighbors reached USD 1.3 billion in the first half of 2026, driven by electricity exports, gold, and potassium chloride, while imports from Vietnam included diesel fuel, vehicles, and chemicals. Energy cooperation is expanding rapidly, with Vietnam approving electricity imports from 47 Lao projects totaling more than 8,260 MW.

China remains Laos’ largest trading partner and investor, with a USD 20 billion trade target by 2030 supported by the China–Laos Railway and customs modernization. Unlike Vietnam’s annual milestone, China’s target reflects a long‑term horizon, highlighting Laos’ dual strategy: immediate growth with ASEAN partners and strategic alignment with Beijing.

Connectivity projects reinforce this balancing act. The Vientiane–Hanoi expressway and Vientiane–Vung Ang railway are expected to reduce logistics costs and strengthen Laos’ role as a transit hub. Together with the China–Laos Railway, these corridors position Laos as a connector between its two largest neighbors and the wider ASEAN market.

Beyond Vietnam and China, Laos has also set trade targets with other ASEAN partners such as USD 11 billion with Thailand by 2027 and USD 700 million with Cambodia by 2030. These figures reflect Vientiane’s ambition to diversify and embed itself more deeply in regional supply chains, turning its landlocked geography into an advantage.

Laos’ trade goals are not just about numbers, they are about positioning itself at the heart of ASEAN’s connectivity drive. By linking Chinese supply chains with Vietnamese and Thai markets, Laos could become the small state that quietly shapes the region’s economic future.


Phonethida Sitthixay holds a Bachelor of Arts in International Relations from the National University of Laos. She is currently a Senior Project Coordinator at AIF Group, where she works on government-led initiatives to modernize financial integration across public sector systems in Laos. She has experience in sustainable development policy, diplomacy, and economic reporting, having worked with the Global Green Growth Institute and The Laotian Times. Her interests focus on Laos’s diplomacy, regional integration, and its evolving role beyond ASEAN.

Editorial Deadline 08/08/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Karen Ysabelle R. David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk

Southeast Asia is a region of staggering linguistic diversity. The multicultural city-state of Singapore is no exception; but with the growing influence from Mainland China driving up Mandarin’s economic value across the region, is it any wonder that a hierarchy of languages has emerged?

Over in Vietnam, China also enters the conversation, but only as a point of comparison: like its larger neighbor, Vietnam’s property bubble threatens to burst. With the cost of homes rising astronomically, the government is betting on social housing to fill in the gaps.

And in the Philippines, the President’s recent State of the Nation Address was an opportunity to look back on the administration’s achievements and priorities over the past year. But behind the flashy work of national politics are epistemic communities: a network of experts involved in the less glamorous nitty-gritty of governance.

Singapore 🇸🇬

The Future of Mother Tongue in Singapore

by Jennifer Hui En Tan, in Singapore

While the Ministry of Education’s (MOE) decision to expand mother tongue elective programs beginning in 2027 appears to reaffirm Singapore’s longstanding commitment to bilingualism, the policy also arrives at a moment when the value and visibility of languages are increasingly being shaped by forces beyond the classroom. Across Singapore and the wider Southeast Asian region, migration, investments, and shifting economic relationships are changing how languages are used in everyday life, raising questions about whether education policy can continue to anchor multilingualism in an increasingly market-driven linguistic landscape.

From 2027, MOE will widen access to the Tamil Language Elective Program at both the secondary and junior college level, building on the two-year program currently offered in selected secondary schools. The Chinese Language Elective Program at the junior college level is set for a parallel expansion, and the MOE is also broadening the Malay Special Program, which lets students with a mother tongue other than Malay pick it up as a third language. These initiatives deepen opportunities for students to engage with the literature, history, and cultural traditions of Singapore’s official mother tongue languages beyond conversational proficiency.

Yet language does not evolve solely through educational policy. Increasingly, it is also being shaped by economic incentives and demographic change. The growing presence of Mainland Chinese business owners and residents has visibly increased Mandarin’s footprint in commercial spaces. Unlike classroom instruction, this expansion is driven by market demand. As businesses adapt to serve Chinese consumers and investors, Mandarin acquires an economic value that extends beyond its role as one of Singapore’s official mother tongue languages.

This creates an important distinction. Singapore’s multilingualism has historically rested on the principle that Mandarin Chinese, Malay, and Tamil should enjoy equal institutional recognition. Yet if one language becomes increasingly associated with commercial opportunity while others remain primarily tied to cultural identity, public perception of their relative value shifts. In this context, the MOE’s expansion of Tamil and Malay electives can be read as a response to this asymmetry and an attempt to keep institutional investment from lagging too far behind market-driven visibility.

Singapore’s experience also reflects a wider regional trend. Across ASEAN, governments are navigating the growing influence of English as the global language of commerce, while also responding to Mandarin’s expanding economic reach through trade, investment, and migration. In Malaysia, the constitutional primacy of Bahasa Malaysia coexists with rising enrollment in Chinese medium education and sustained demand for Mandarin, fueled by both the country’s ethnic Chinese community and deepening economic ties with China. In the Philippines, English remains dominant in business and higher education, yet Mandarin instruction has expanded through universities, language centers, and commercial demand linked to Chinese investment and tourism. In both cases, market forces increasingly shape language acquisition alongside national education policies.

The expansion of mother tongue elective programs therefore represents more than a curriculum update, and reflects an effort to ensure that cultural heritage, national identity, and linguistic diversity remain protected, even as regional economic integration and demographic change alter the languages people encounter in everyday life.

As ASEAN becomes more economically integrated and Chinese influence continues to grow across the region, language policy is likely to become an increasingly important tool of nation-building rather than simply education. Singapore’s latest reforms suggest that preserving multilingualism in the twenty-first century is no longer just about teaching languages, but is about ensuring that market forces do not become the sole arbiters of which languages carry social, cultural, and economic significance.


Jennifer is a final-year International Relations student at the Singapore Institute of Management, where she focuses on political engagement, diplomacy, and community governance. She is an active volunteer in her constituency, working closely with residents to understand local concerns, facilitate dialogue, and support community initiatives.

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Vietnam 🇻🇳

Challenges in Vietnam's Property Market

by Sean Huy Vu

The People’s Committee of Hanoi recently announced that it had accepted a list of 54 new social housing projects for the current fiscal year. The developments are part of the municipal government’s larger plan to construct a minimum of 120,000 apartment units between 2026 and 2030, as city residents struggle to find affordable commercial housing.

For years, Vietnam has enjoyed a boom in its property market. This is due to increasing foreign direct investment in the country, as foreign companies build factories and subsidiaries in the Southeast Asian nation to reduce labor costs and secure their supply chains through diversification. The new service and manufacturing jobs have attracted rapid urbanization and population growth in Vietnam’s key cities, such as Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City, Hai Phong, and Ninh Binh.

Vietnam’s property market, however, has also been fueled by speculation. Both foreign and domestic buyers have purchased new apartments for rent, thereby decreasing inventory and creating rising demand through panic buying and increasing prices. Many developers prefer to market toward affluent buyers to generate higher profits and cover land and development costs. Social housing and mid-range housing, by contrast, require greater approval time and regulations, thereby yielding lower profit margins.

As of 2026, the average Vietnamese home in major cities cost nearly US$300,000, over thirty times higher than the average annual income per capita of US$4,970 in 2025. There now exists an imbalance between a demand for affordable housing and a high supply of premium units. In addition to relatively low incomes, low trust in financial institutions and high interest rates for mortgages — currently ranging between 12% and 14% — are also pricing out families.

Several young urban families have opted to rent rather than purchase. One man and his wife, interviewed by The Investor, saved US$38,000 for over eight years to buy a US$132,000 apartment. However, financing the remaining US$54,000 through a mortgage proved infeasible, given that the couple would have had to spend their entire monthly income of US$1,330 on the monthly principal and interest payments.

The central government has recognized the social implications of unaffordable housing. Without accessible apartments, workers, doctors, students, and teachers will have a harder time providing their skills and services to growing cities, thereby affecting Vietnam’s target of 10% annual GDP growth.

The government has pledged to construct a million new rental social housing units by 2030, with some being provided to soldiers, civil servants, and industrial workers on a complementary basis.

At its current trajectory, Vietnam risks experiencing a property bubble burst, just as China did not too long ago. Like their Chinese counterparts, Vietnamese borrowers can service their mortgages well before construction actually begins on a project, creating a potential redundancy in real estate. Although Vietnam’s population is still growing, unlike China’s, it is already projected to become an “aged society” as early as 2036. With potentially fewer buyers in the near future, Vietnam’s government and real estate sector will have to prepare accordingly.


Sean is a scholar of East Asian history, culture, and international relations, with current research at Georgetown University examining working-class labor and human trafficking in the region. His broader interests include the social psychology of religion and identity politics. Sean previously taught modern Korean history at the University of California, Irvine, where he completed his B.A. in History, and later taught English in Ho Chi Minh City while studying Vietnamese language and culture. His writing has been published by UC Irvine, Johns Hopkins University, and Foreign Analysis.

The Philippines 🇵🇭

SONA and the Influence of Epistemic Communities

by Glenn Vincent N. Boquilon, in Angeles City

Every year, the State of the Nation Address (SONA) becomes a major moment in Philippine politics. Held last 27 July 2026 at the Batasang Pambansa in Quezon City, the SONA served as the President’s platform to present the country’s priorities and direction. Much of the public attention focuses on the President’s message and the actions his administration plans to pursue.

However, behind many government decisions are people who do not always appear in the spotlight. They are researchers, scientists, academics, and technical specialists who help leaders navigate complex problems and design better policies. Individuals in the fields of Political Science and International Relations refer to these groups as epistemic communities: a network of experts who share knowledge and provide guidance on issues that require specialized understanding. These groups do not replace elected leaders, but they do influence how governments respond to a myriad of challenges.

This is evident in the priorities discussed during President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s State of the Nation Address. Several areas highlighted in the speech depend heavily on consultation with groups that possess technical prowess. One example is the government’s push for digital transformation and integration of artificial intelligence. Building a digital economy requires more than adopting new technologies. It involves understanding data protection, cybersecurity, digital infrastructure, and how these tools can improve public services. Researchers, technology experts, and academic institutions play an important role in helping governments make informed decisions.

The same applies to food insecurity. Improving agriculture is not only about increasing production. It requires knowledge about climate conditions, farming practices, supply chains, and changing economic conditions. Agricultural researchers help translate these challenges into policies that can benefit their communities. Another notable domain is disaster resilience. Here, expert knowledge is an essential factor. As one of the most disaster-prone countries globally, the Philippines relies on experts to understand risk and develop better preparedness strategies.

The growing importance of experts is not unique to the Philippines. Within Southeast Asia, governments are increasingly working with knowledge communities to combat national challenges. Singapore has built strong partnerships between government agencies, universities, and research institutions to support innovation and public policy. Additionally, Malaysia has strengthened cooperation between government and technical experts as it expands its digital economy. Furthermore, Vietnam has also relied on research and technical planning as it continues its economic transformation.

The rise of epistemic communities does not mean experts should replace our elected leaders. Conversely, it highlights the need for stronger partnerships between political leadership and specialized knowledge. For the Philippines, this is an important lesson, as many national challenges require solutions that go beyond one administration. The success of government is not measured only by the promises made in a speech, but by the expertise and institutions that turn those promises into results. As Southeast Asia faces more complex challenges, the countries that succeed will be those that know how to combine leadership with knowledge.


Glenn holds a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from the University of Santo Tomas. His experience spans governance programs, policy development, and political research, having worked with the Ateneo School of Government and WR Numero Research on projects focused on electoral reform, public opinion, and regional development. He also helped coordinate the drafting of the Bangsamoro Local Government Code and supported the Academy of Multiparty Democracy.

Editorial Deadline 04/08/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

By Dr. Ellie Chee Shi Yin

Malaysia is entering a demographic turning point that deserves careful thought. In mid-October 2025, the Department of Statistics Malaysia’s data highlighted a long-running trend that has been building for years. The country recorded 414,918 live births in 2024, the lowest figure since 1980, marking a 9.0 per cent decline from the previous year. Over the same period, the total fertility rate fell from 1.7 to 1.6 children per woman aged 15 to 49.

This shift coincides with a generational turning point. Generation X (born 1965–1980) has begun entering their 60s, having grown up and lived through a period when families were already becoming smaller. For members of the Silent Generation (born 1928–1945) and many Baby Boomers (born 1946–1964), ageing often unfolded within larger family networks, where adult children were commonly present and involved. That contrast is now surfacing in how people approach midlife and later-life planning, with younger generations following close behind.

Why does this matter now?

These figures matter because the number of Malaysians entering later life without children will continue to rise, affecting housing choices, care arrangements, and community expectations in ways that remain under-anticipated.

Family patterns, over time, have changed. Smaller households have become common, and a growing share of the population now reaches older age without children. This reality has begun to surface in ordinary settings where older adults seek help, guidance, and practical support, often revealing a mismatch between lived situations and inherited assumptions. The deeper issue lies in how later-life support continues to be imagined. Systems organised around family participation as a primary reference point encounter difficulty accommodating varied life courses. Responsibility then settles onto institutions, service providers, and community organisations, often through informal adjustment with limited planning.

This realisation struck me on a personal level while working on my study published in Urban Studies, where I explored how childless Baby Boomers find their place in senior living facilities still fundamentally designed for traditional families. When a participant used the word “oldphans”, it immediately drew a heartbreaking parallel with orphans. The term stayed with me, giving a name to a reality that is often hidden in plain sight: growing older without the ‘safety net’ of adult children, in a system that still expects them to be there.

Perhaps it is worth pausing on a quieter reality about adult life. People move through life with different hopes and expectations. Plans unfold unevenly. Some hope for children but life moves in another direction. Others choose a different path altogether. These realities grow out of health, relationships, timing, and circumstance. They form part of ordinary adult life and sit alongside many other routes into later years.

Those closing in on later life without children remain active members of society, planning carefully, staying connected, and contributing in meaningful ways. Institutional arrangements, however, often struggle to align with lives organised around different support structures. Access to care, responsibility-sharing, and decision-making take on a different texture when family involvement no longer serves as the default reference point.

Many arrangements around ageing in Malaysia still continue to assume the involvement of adult children. These assumptions appear in routine, expected ways. Forms request a family contact. Conversations turn instinctively towards sons or daughters. Procedures follow a familiar family picture influenced by earlier generations. As family sizes continue to narrow, these expectations carry greater weight for those whose lives fall outside that frame.

This is where the math of care becomes a human consequence.

This pressure already shows up in everyday care settings as the gap between the number of older adults and available caregivers continues to grow. What if one caregiver can only meaningfully support a limited number of people at any one time? As that gap grows, care risks becoming more procedural and less responsive, even with the best intentions.

Older adults, with children or without, remain part of society and merit systems designed with their lived realities in view. Are we as unprepared as we fear, or do we already have strengths to draw on? Family remains central for many people, grounded in long-standing traditions of care and responsibility. What is needed now is greater flexibility within systems and governance, allowing long-standing traditions to sit alongside changing life paths.

As more people reach later life without children, are systems ready for it?

Dr. Ellie Chee Shi Yin is a member of the Active Ageing Impact Lab at Taylor’s University and a Senior Lecturer at the School of Hospitality, Tourism and Events.

Edited by Marios T. Afrataios