by Karen Ysabelle R. David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk

With the world still reeling from the Iran war-induced global energy crisis, few countries have been as affected as the energy insecure Philippines. Fortunately for Manila, it has friends in high places: the World Bank just recently approved a US$1.02-billion loan to support the country’s energy transition. The question now: can it make the most of this windfall?

Meanwhile, Singapore last week just launched its Online Safety Commission to address the frustration of victims of harmful online activity. Once again, the city-state finds itself on the cutting edge of a digital frontier. One can only hope that the rest of Southeast Asia follows suit.

This new development in Singapore’s online landscape leads us to look back on how Vietnam is faring in the global race for digitalization. Just like the former, the latter is dealing with the risks that come with a world that is more digitally connected than ever before, as its e-commerce industry enters a booming new chapter.

The Philippines 🇵🇭

The World Bank’s US$1.02-Billion Bet on Philippine Energy

by Arianne De Guzman, in Bulacan

On 30 June 2026, the World Bank reportedly approved the Second Energy Transition and Climate Resilience Development Policy Loan (DPL), amounting to US$1.02-billion, for the Philippines to support the country’s clean energy deployment, invigorate electricity markets, and improve water management. While this indicates a vote of confidence in the country’s push for affordable electricity and better water services for the Filipinos, is the Philippines prepared to make the most of it?

The timing is significant. The Philippines remains behind in its shift to cleaner energy. According to the Energy Transition Index (ETI) 2026 published by the World Economic Forum, the country ranked 86th out of 120 countries, scoring 52.3 out of 100 — below the global average of 57.3. The report cited challenges in the country’s energy system, sustainability, and the affordability of electricity — issues that continue to burden Filipino households and businesses.

As the Philippines remains dependent on imported fossil fuels and has been exposed to volatile global fuel prices stemming from the geopolitical tensions in the Middle East, President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. has declared a national energy emergency until March 2027. Since the costs of the fuel account for a significant portion of electricity generation, its spikes in global prices are also reflected in Filipinos’ electricity bills.

It is precisely these challenges that the World Bank financing seeks to address. The loan will support key initiatives, including the operationalization of the Renewable Energy Market integration of electric vehicle charging into utility planning, and the launch of the first-ever offshore wind auction, targeting 3.3 gigawatts of contracted capacity by 2030. The World Bank projects that this offshore wind program could mobilize US$7-billion in private investment, which could generate employment opportunities across construction, engineering, and energy services.

However, financing alone cannot guarantee lower electricity prices. Despite the US$20-million being provided as a grant, the US$1-billion comes as a loan that must be repaid. The investment will pay off if the Philippine government can fully implement the planned initiatives on time. Otherwise, delays, possible cost overruns, and weak implementation could increase the country’s debt without even resolving the rising costs of electricity and improving the Philippines’ energy transition readiness.

The urgent need to modernize the country’s energy sector has become evident. The Philippines recently emerged as one of the top spenders on solar panels since the Iran war began. This surge does not stem solely from the rising electricity prices, but also from the country’s enormous renewable energy potential due to its geographic location and archipelagic structure. With abundant solar, wind, and geothermal resources, the Philippines has natural advantages necessary for a more resilient and diversified energy system. Ultimately, the success of the World Bank’s US$1.02-billion financing package will not be measured by the amount provided, but by the reforms it enables.


Arianne has experience in policy research at De La Salle University’s Jesse M. Robredo Institute of Governance, where she contributed to projects on systemic reform. She earned a degree in Political Science from Colegio de San Juan de Letran. Currently, she works in government relations, specializing in advocacy strategy, legislative monitoring, and stakeholder engagement. Beyond her professional work, she is actively involved in youth development and grassroots initiatives through the Rotaract Club of Santa Maria.

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Singapore 🇸🇬

Singapore's New Online Safety Commission Signals a Shift From Moderation to Enforcement

by Ryan

On 29 June, the Online Safety Commission (OSC) began operations in Singapore, giving the city-state a dedicated statutory agency with the power to compel platforms, group administrators, and individual users to act on harmful online content, rather than merely asking them to. The commission provides victims of online harms in Singapore a dedicated and easily accessible avenue to seek timely redress, and its launch coincided with the coming into force of statutory tort provisions under the Online Safety (Relief and Accountability) Act (OSRAA), which was passed in Parliament on 5 November 2025. The timing matters as much as the substance: Singapore has spent years building a patchwork of online harms legislation, from the Protection from Harassment Act in 2014 to the Online Criminal Harms Act in 2023, but this is the first instance of a regulator built specifically to move faster than the platforms it oversees.

The Commission’s initial mandate is narrow by design. In its first phase of operations, the OSC will support victims affected by five of the most prevalent and severe online harms: online harassment, including online sexual harassment; doxxing; online stalking; intimate image abuse; and image-based child abuse. Eight further categories, including deepfake abuse and online impersonation, are expected to follow at a later stage.

What makes the OSC notable is less the harm that it targets than the accountability structure underneath it. The commission was set up in response to the frustrations of victims of harmful online activity with the slow responses by online platforms, as the OSC has legal authority to compel platforms and group administrators to act quickly. That frustration was not abstract: officials cited platform response times that routinely stretched beyond four days.

The broader significance lies in what this does to the region’s regulatory center of gravity. Singapore’s framework is particularly significant because it demonstrates how Asian jurisdictions are developing independent online governance regimes that may diverge from both the American free speech approach and the European Union’s Digital Services Act model. Elsewhere in ASEAN, the response to platform-driven harm remains fragmented and largely reactive: Malaysia’s own commentators have pointed to Singapore’s Online Criminal Harms Act as a starting point while arguing that a broader, rights-based legal approach would help ASEAN move toward a unified framework for governing AI-enabled abuse. As deepfakes, non-consensual synthetic imagery, and cross-border scam networks increasingly ignore national boundaries, Singapore’s willingness to legislate direct, enforceable duties onto platforms gives the rest of Southeast Asia a live template.

Whether ASEAN member states follow that template individually or attempt something closer to regional coordination will say a great deal about how seriously the bloc intends to treat platform accountability as a shared governance problem. In a region where harmful content moves across borders faster than any single national regulator can chase it, the Commission’s real innovation may not be its enforcement powers at all, but the admission that speed, not scope, is now the measure of a functioning digital state.


Ryan is a final-year finance student at the Singapore University of Social Sciences (SUSS) with experience across venture capital, venture debt, and business development. He also holds a diploma in Law and Management from Temasek Polytechnic. His interests lie in how emerging technologies and economic trends shape business ecosystems and regional development in Asia.

Vietnam 🇻🇳

A New Chapter for E-Commerce

by Hang Nguyen, in Ho Chi Minh City

Due to the global race for digitalization, along with a surge in demand caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, e-commerce industries in Vietnam have experienced expansive growth within the last half decade. Shopee, TikTok Shop, Lazada, and Tiki dominate the country’s e-commercial landscape, with nearly 60% of the population — of various ages, genders, and geographical demographics — accessing these platforms to purchase goods. Vietnam’s e-commerce sector has recorded substantial growth and demonstrated robust performance: market value reached US$25 billion (20% growth) in 2024, ranking third in Southeast Asia, while entering the list of Top 5 economies leading in e-commerce growth in 2022.

The Vietnam E-commerce and Digital Economy Agency (VEDEA), under the Ministry of Industry and Trade (MoIT), recognizes the instrumental role of this industry in national and economic development, but simultaneously acknowledges that the accelerating pace of growth has presented opportunities as well as revealed many complications. E-commercial regulations have been anchored by only two government decrees: Decree No. 52/2013/ND-CP dated 16 May 2013, and the subsequently supplementing Decree No. 85/2021/ND-CP dated 25 September 2021. These documents lacked sufficient legal capacity, whereas Vietnam e-commerce markets were in need of control to ensure stable maturity. On 10 December 2025, the National Assembly voted to pass the Law on E-commerce, consisting of seven chapters and 41 articles to become effective on 1 July 2026.

The law acts as a “shield” in Vietnam’s transition from “rapid growth” toward “quality growth”, circumventing evident issues in Vietnam’s digital environment. Mr. Hoang Quang Phong, Vice Chairman of the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VCCI), highlighted the concerns regarding smuggling, trade fraud, and the online sale of counterfeit, fake and low-quality products. Dishonest e-commercial activities destroy customer trust, harm legitimate businesses, and expose consumers to health risks and meticulous digital scams. In 2025, VEDEA reported banning the operation of 13,700 violating shops on e-commerce platforms for counterfeit, banned, or untraceable products.

The Law on E-commerce introduces transparency into the legal framework, by unprecedentedly classifying four types of platforms with corresponding legal responsibilities: direct business e-commerce platforms; intermediary e-commerce platforms; social networks operating in e-commerce; and joint e-commerce platforms. The law imposes the obligation for e-commerce platforms to disclose ownership, data protection policies, the rights and obligations of parties, and algorithm criteria for product display; all sellers’ identity must be electronically verified. New provisions have also been established to fill the legal gaps existing with livestream sales and affiliate marketing, an emerging and rising domain, such as the prohibition of misleading product information by live streamers. The safety nets enacted by the law promises Vietnam’s economic track towards green, circular, and sustainable development.

However, considerations towards online vendors’ rights should also be discussed. The frequent additions of fees and regulations with shorter implementation deadlines strain sellers’ capacity and spike the competitive market. Mindful market growth must warrant the survivability of e-commercial businesses rather than favoritism towards consumers. Southeast Asia and ASEAN can provide valuable models, markets, and resources for Hanoi to enhance its national model for e-commerce, including the ASEAN Agreement on Electronic Commerce (2019), the ASEAN Digital Integration Framework (DIF), and the ASEAN Coordinating Committee on Electronic Commerce (ACCEC), among others.


Hang is a young researcher with academic experience in Vietnam and the United States. She has previously worked in public relations at the U.S. Consulate General in Ho Chi Minh City and the YSEALI Academy. Her research focuses on ASEAN centrality in the evolving Asia-Pacific landscape, with particular attention to Vietnam’s approach to trade, regional cooperation, and political economy in the face of external power dynamics and global volatility.

Editorial Deadline 07/07/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Siu Tzyy Wei, Lead Editor - Maritime Crescent Desk

This week, the Maritime Crescent finds itself crouched at the starting line of change, ready to accelerate.

In Indonesia, Nadiem Makarim’s sentencing shows what happens when attempts at reform outpaces the laws meant to protect it. Normally seen as the quiet whisper of the region, Brunei recently raised its voice for a regional infrastructure in tackling digital extremism sentiment. In a revisit of Malaysia’s story, new generation of doctors continue running full speed for the lives of their patients amidst a healthcare system long overdue for an upgrade.

This week’s stories move at different speeds but toward the same finish line: a region learning that standing still is no longer an option.

Indonesia 🇮🇩

The Cost of Competence

by Muhammad Rayhansyah Jasin

On June 30, the Jakarta Corruption Criminal Court sentenced Nadiem Anwar Makarim — GoJek founder and Indonesia’s former Minister of Education and Culture (2019–2024) — to 10 years in prison for his alleged corruption in dealing with the Chromebook procurement program for schools that occurred between 2019-2022. The verdict: a fine of Rp1 billion and Rp 809 billions of restitution money, due within a month of the sentencing, or face an additional five years of jail time. The court stated that the Chromebook procurement had been shaped by Google’s influence and ended up profiting Gojek to which Nadiem had claimed no involvement whatsoever. He has vowed to appeal, arguing that the case rests on an investigative error that overlooked how the procurement had actually saved money for the digitalization program. Despite no evidence of money flow towards Nadiem’s personal wealth, the judges reasoned that Nadiem’s decision still resulted in state financial loss and went against the corruption eradication goal. Notably, one of the five presiding judges dissented, stating that Nadiem’s malicious intention was never proven as stated in the public indictment.

Since his September 2025 arrest, Nadiem’s case drew significant public attention; from failed pre-trial appeal to overturn his suspect designation to repeated suspensions of court proceedings, and alleged intimidation tactics after military personnel were dispatched during Nadiem’s indictment session. Two dozen members of academia and anti-corruption NGOs also filed a legal brief by external parties in support of Nadiem, arguing that corruption charges should hinge on proven intent to enrich oneself or associates and not merely on the existence of state losses. Nadiem’s conviction risks criminalizing ordinary policy judgment calls, chilling future bureaucratic reform. Although the court accepted the plea, the verdict’s central reasoning was not that Nadiem made the wrong decision, but rather that the whole decision-making process had violated standard operating procedure and constituted systematic abuse of power.

Foreign investors have watched closely this trial and Nadiem’s verdict could add growing concerns over the fragility of rule-of-law in Southeast Asia’s largest economy. Predictability of doing business in Indonesia has been in limbo as President Prabowo Subianto’s militaristic leadership style chips away at the private sector. As Nadiem’s case became the latest display of prosecution against talented Indonesians that push against bureaucratic traditions, international confidence in Indonesia’s institutional capacity continues to dwindle in the face of authoritarian overreach that seems to conflate unlucky decisions with white collar crime. When that line is blurred, the risk is not just to one former minister or future political appointees, it is to the willingness of any public officials to take real transformative action in reforming bureaucracy. Which standard wins out in a given policy environment may depend less on legal doctrine than political alignments - a new battleground for future decisions.


Rayhan is pursuing an Erasmus Mundus Joint Master’s Degree in Public Policy at Central European University and the Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals. He holds a Bachelor of Social Sciences in International Relations and Political Economy from Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University. His current research focuses on the socio-economic impacts of Indonesia’s nickel mining industry on local communities and national development.

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Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳

Brunei, the SOCTPF, and CT Cooperation

by Wira Gregory Ejau, in Bandar Seri Begawan

On June 23 in Bangkok, Brunei and Thailand co-chaired the fifth Sub-Regional Counter-Terrorism Policy Forum (SOCTPF), bringing together senior officials from the eight countries - Australia, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand to address terrorism and violent extremism, with a specific focus on the digital domain. Brunei’s delegation was led by Acting Permanent Secretary for Security and Law at the Prime Minister’s Office, Awang Zulhusam bin Haji Abdul Samad.

The SOCTPF sits beneath the Sub-Regional Meeting on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Security at the ministerial level, and has operated since 2021 as the senior officials’ mechanism for translating that ministerial mandate into practical sub-regional cooperation. Notably, its membership includes Australia and New Zealand, both Five Eyes partners, participating alongside six Southeast Asian states in a forum that bridges Indo-Pacific CT cooperation across intelligence-sharing traditions and regional security architectures that do not always operate from common assumptions.

The substantive focus of the meeting was the accelerating use of digital infrastructure. Encrypted applications, gaming platforms, AI-generated content, and deepfakes by extremist networks for radicalisation and recruitment were discussed at length. While these are not novel concerns, the forum’s treatment of them has matured to center on building shared analytical tools for measuring and monitoring the conditions where radicalisation occurs online.

The most significant specific outcome is Brunei’s proposal for a Sub-Regional Sentiment Analysis Framework, which is a mechanism designed to operationalise the forum’s existing Glossary of Extremist Content Online into a common reference standard for tracking extremism sentiment across the sub-region’s digital spaces. The prior generation of sub-regional CT work concentrated on intelligence exchange, legal frameworks, and the movement of individuals. What Brunei is proposing is a shared methodological infrastructure of a mechanism for measuring the environment that produces threats. That is a more sophisticated and arguably more durable instrument, and it positions the SOCTPF’s outputs within a broader evidence-based policy framework at a time when the ASEAN Bali Work Plan on radicalisation and violent extremism is due for renewal.

Brunei has no significant domestic terrorism problem, and does not bring to this forum the operational depth of Indonesia who has dismantled major networks and prosecuted hundreds of terrorism cases, or the intelligence weight of the Five Eyes members at the table. Instead, it provides a level of institutional investment and analytical initiative through the Sentiment Analysis Framework. This contribution may yet prove to be technically ambitious, regionally applicable, and developed by a state whose value in the forum is not derived from the scale of the threat it faces at home.

Brunei will host the 6th SOCTPF in Bandar Seri Begawan in 2027, co-chaired with Malaysia, with the framework as its intended key deliverable. Whether the mechanism achieves the sub-regional uptake required to make it operationally meaningful will depend on how consistently the eight member states can align their definitions, data standards, and monitoring practices, but the 2027 forum will be Brunei’s moment to show whether the proposal survives translation from concept into shared regional practice.


Gregory is an MSc candidate in Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He works as a freelance writer specializing in international history, conflict, and counterterrorism, with experience in academia, investigative journalism, and voluntary uniformed service. He currently provides research assistance with the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) under their Southeast Asian Security and Defence Internship Programme and conducts investigations on regional security and transnational crime for a confidential company.

Malaysia 🇲🇾

Worn to the Bone

by Edrina Lisa Ozaidi, in WP Kuala Lumpur

We have often heard about the bustling, scary scenario in the emergency department of a hospital. Teleseries or medical dramas have taught us one thing — it takes a lot of staff to run a department smoothly. The Malaysian medical sector, however, faces a major crisis of staff retention, especially among junior doctors who battle against job security and burnout.

To understand the severity of the issue, one must understand the progression of problems. Back in 2016, the lack of permanent vacancies prompted the government to introduce the 5-year contract system, where junior doctors will serve 3 years of housemanship plus 2 years of compulsory placement. For those intending to specialise, 2 more years are needed.

This has caused a two-tier workforce, doctors who are already in placement and contract doctors that face a ceiling. While the placement was meant to address oversupply of talent and budgetary constraints, it further caused disparity, significant job insecurity, and career and specialisation pathways among junior doctors.

The suppressed frustration then caused a movement where doctors staged a nationwide strike during the pandemic. Unfortunately, the solution that was prompted by the government was to open more permanent posts and grant Hadiah Latihan Persekutuan (HLP) eligibility to contract officers to mediate the current tension while the systemic flaws are not yet addressed.

By 2025 and the current year, more systemic failures become more noticeable. The government also introduced a shift system intended to replace 24-hour-on-call shifts with 18-hour shifts. However, this integrated on-call hours into the regular work week, causing doctors to lose weekdays on-call allowances, a move that was criticised by the doctors association as a pay cut in disguise.

Recently, the health director-general issued a landmark circular capping house officer hours at 60-62 hours per week and strictly prohibiting 24-hour shifts. The new mandates also mention the implementation of three flexible work shifts (morning, evening, night), without considering the number of housemen available.

The directive stipulates that in the event of a lack of medical officers, the clinical workload for evening and night shifts must be borne entirely by medical officers and specialists to ensure compliance with house officers’ rest periods.

Private doctors’ associations call out that 60 hours remain burdensome compared to the international 40-hour standard (based in UK), while calling for the government to address the systemic failures. Unlike an official cap on trainee doctors’ work hours in Malaysia’s public service, medical officers often work 33 hours on-call shifts.

Recent statistics also reveal more systemic failure, where out of 5,000 housemanship positions offered, only 529 graduates reported for duty. While fewer graduates enter the public system, the burden on existing staff increases. Despite higher on-call allowances (raised by 40% in Budget 2026) and relocation aids, doctors are leaving for the private sector or overseas for better opportunities and pay, and Malaysia needs to step up in its system to ensure the rate of doctors’ retention improves.

Edrina is a communications professional with a background in international relations. She holds a degree from the University of Nottingham Malaysia and has worked across public relations and social media for organizations in the development, education, and corporate sectors. Her work focuses on crafting narratives around regional affairs and strengthening media engagement across Southeast Asia.

Editorial Deadline 04/07/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk

Across the Mekong Belt, the same rivers that sustain Southeast Asia’s economies are now testing its governments — forcing hard choices about water, power, and who gets to control both. Where the Mekong runs dry, Cambodia is racing against El Niño, watching thousands of hectares of rice fields wither before drought turns into disaster. Meanwhile, upstream on the Ayeyarwady, Myanmar’s junta is reviving the long-frozen Myitsone Dam with Beijing’s backing, betting Chinese money can outweigh the fury of 10,000 people facing displacement. Just across the border in Laos, that same regime’s leader was welcomed with ceremony and a fresh Mekong dam deal, proof that legitimacy can be built one handshake at a time. Finally, Thailand shows that it’s not only water moving through the region unchecked, as a flight attendant’s arrest in Melbourne exposed how Golden Triangle heroin is riding first class on trusted uniforms, a reminder that no single country can police a borderless network alone.

Cambodia 🇰🇭

Cambodia Stressed by El Niño As 18,000 Hectares of Rice Fields Face Water Shortage

by Malai Yatt, in Phnom Penh

Cambodia seems to be pressured by the upcoming climate change risk caused by El Niño, with the recent warning made by Prime Minister Hun Manet, who is instructing relevant ministries and institutions to prepare a response to the El Niño natural phenomenon, which Cambodia is currently experiencing.

As stated in the official statement in late June, Manet has told the Ministry of Water Resources and Meteorology, in cooperation with capital and provincial administrations, to continue monitoring developments and to inform citizens about the consequences of this climate change.

At the same time, he also told the National Committee for Disaster Management to cooperate with capital and provincial administrations to prepare necessary means to intervene and rescue citizens in case of emergency.

It should be noted that the Pacific Ocean’s El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO) is listed as the most influential climate driver on Earth.

“Its cycles of warm and cool waters in the central and eastern equatorial Pacific alter where ocean heat is released into the atmosphere, influencing atmospheric circulation, temperatures, precipitation and other weather events that affect agriculture, wildfires and marine fisheries around the globe”, according to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.

Historical El Niño events have triggered crop failures, food insecurity, and market volatility. However, today people possess the ability to pinpoint exactly which farming regions are most vulnerable to severe drought, offering governments and farmers a critical opportunity to prepare.

As reported by the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), “In Asia, the risk extends to critical global markets. El Niño can weaken the summer monsoon across many countries, including Cambodia, putting rainfed crops such as rice and maize under stress during the critical growing season”

Reflecting on Cambodia, as of July 1, a total of 18,362 hectares of rice fields in Ek Phnom and Sangke districts had been affected, 7,769 in Ek Phnom and 10,593 in Sangke, Battambang province, with authorities saying the water shortage might be influenced by the El Niño climate pattern.

Following a stable start to the year, climate models have now converged, signaling the imminent arrival of El Niño with a high degree of certainty. According to Wilfran Moufouma Okia, Chief of Climate Prediction at the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), the weather phenomenon is expected to steadily strengthen in the coming months.

In short, as El Niño strengthens globally, Cambodia’s proactive planning remains crucial to safeguarding local rice production and maintaining national food security.

Malai is a reporter at Kiripost, where she has worked for more than three years, driven by a strong commitment to amplifying the voices of underserved communities. Her reporting focuses on economic and foreign affairs.

Myanmar 🇲🇲

Myanmar Regime Pushes Ahead With Contested Myitsone Dam

by Myat Moe Kywe

Fifteen years after mass protests forced its suspension in 2011 under Thein Sein’s government, Myanmar’s military regime is moving to revive the China-backed Myitsone Dam introduced in 2006 between the military regime under Than Shwe and CCP-controlled China Investment (CPI). The plan is alarming local communities along the Ayeyarwady River, who fear losing their homes and a waterway central to their livelihoods.

The push follows former junta chief Min Aung Hlaing’s June 2026 visit to Beijing. There, he secured his first major diplomatic engagement with China’s leadership since its self-nominated presidency. The visit resulted in 18 MoUs agreed between Beijing and Naypyitaw. The dam’s revival was among the proposals discussed.

Kachin State’s junta-appointed chief minister, Khet Htein Nan, who accompanied him on the trip, has since told Reuters that Myanmar aims to complete the $3.6 billion project within roughly eight years. He says an agreement with China on the timeline has already been reached.

For residents near the confluence of the Mali and N’Mai rivers, the stakes are personal. Independent assessments done in 2013 have found the dam would flood an area roughly the size of Singapore and displace more than 10,000 people. Villages, farmland, and sites central to Kachin identity would be submerged.

Ninety percent of the electricity generated was originally intended for export to China — a term that fueled the 2011 suspension and remains unresolved. ASEAN Frontier could not confirm whether that arrangement has since changed.

Financial pressure looms over the decision either way. Cancelling the contract could trigger compensation claims of roughly $800 million. Continued suspension carries estimated annual “standby” costs of $50 million. Back in 2019, civil society organisations alongside journalist, writers have voiced a one dollar campaign where the citizens will pay one dollar each to compensate for suspension of the dam.

That shows the public dismissal of the dam projects.

However, military officials have framed the dam as a fix for the country’s chronic blackouts. President’s Office spokesperson Khaing Khaing Soe said the project could supply more than half the electricity Myanmar urgently needs, while acknowledging officials are weighing local concerns over flooding and displacement. Min Aung Hlaing has told his cabinet that Myanmar would already have nationwide power coverage had the project not been halted years ago.

Officials say at least 26 public meetings held across Kachin State have shown support for the project. But civil society groups and journalists say the sessions are stage-managed under military rule, where open dissent carries real risk.

Opposition has not gone away. The Kachin Independence Army, which controls much of the area upstream of the dam site, continues to reject the project outright. Analysts also point to a March 2026 earthquake that killed thousands in central Myanmar, warning it has sharpened concerns about building a 152-meter dam in an active seismic zone.

As Naypyidaw courts Beijing for economic support and legitimacy, families along the Ayeyarwady risk being overshadowed by the imperatives of regime survival and regional geopolitics.


Myat is a B.A. graduate in Politics, Philosophy, and Economics. She has interned at The Asia Foundation in Washington, D.C., and she has also worked as a summer research assistant at the Centre for Policy and Innovation (CRPI), gaining experience in research and analysis. Her work focuses on civic engagement, gender, youth leadership, and community development.

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Lao PDR 🇱🇦

Myanmar’s Leader Makes Laos His First ASEAN Stop

by Thongsavanh Souvannasane, in Vientiane

Myanmar’s junta chief-turned-president Min Aung Hlaing paid a state visit to Laos from 3 to 5 July, his first visit to an ASEAN member state since assuming the country’s civilian presidency.

Lao President Thongloun Sisoulith extended the invitation to mark the 70th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the two nations, established in July 1955.

The visit builds on groundwork laid in June, when Lao Foreign Minister Thongsavanh Phomvihane traveled to Naypyidaw and discussed expanding bilateral cooperation.

Min Aung Hlaing’s trip to Vientiane returned that engagement to the highest level.

He held talks with Thongloun, National Assembly President Xaysomphone Phomvihane, and Prime Minister Sonexay Siphandone, covering trade, tourism, education, health, energy, border development, security, and cooperation against online scams.

The two governments signed the agreements on tourism cooperation and a sister-city partnership between Naypyidaw and Vientiane, and Myanmar donated 640 doses of antivenom medicine to Laos.

The visit’s most substantial outcome came on 4 July, when officials signed a Joint Development Agreement in Vientiane to study a hydropower dam along the Mekong River on the 230-kilometer Laos-Myanmar border. The proposed project would carry an installed capacity of up to 2,790 megawatts, with a feasibility study expected to take 34 months.

On the final day of visit, Min Aung Hlaing also traveled to Luang Prabang, Laos’ UNESCO World Heritage city, where provincial party chief Bounleuam Manivong welcomed him and his delegation with a Baci blessing ceremony, calling the visit a boost to Laos-Myanmar friendship.

The warmth of the reception sits uneasily alongside Myanmar’s record since Min Aung Hlaing seized power in a February 2021 coup that ousted the elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi, the Nobel Peace Prize laureate who has remained detained ever since, save for a recent transfer from prison to house arrest under his personal order.

The United Nations has reported more than 3 million people internally displaced by the conflict that followed, while the independent monitor ACLED estimates total conflict-related deaths above 100,000, making Myanmar’s civil war one of the deadliest active conflicts in Asia. Min Aung Hlaing ruled directly as military chief for five years before taking the civilian presidency in April, following elections that excluded Suu Kyi’s party and were not held in rebel-controlled territory.

That record has left ASEAN divided over how to treat his government, which the bloc largely froze out after the coup.

Laos’ welcome, following recent visits to India and China, raises questions about how far a fellow one-party state is willing to help normalize a leader many in the region and beyond still regard as illegitimate, and whether economic and infrastructure ties, like the new hydropower study, are being allowed to outpace accountability for the toll of the war at home.

Thongsavanh is a journalist from Laos with a background in English-language media. He graduated from the Lao-American Institute with a Diploma of the Arts in English and contributes to independent news platforms. His reporting focuses on environmental issues, socio-economic development, and geopolitics.

Thailand 🇹🇭

Thai Flight Attendant Incident Shows Why ASEAN Needs Urgent Cross-Border Narcotics Prevention

by Paranut Juntree, in Bangkok

The polished, elite image of an international airline crew member represents a category of trusted, low-scrutiny travelers. However, on June 25, 2026, a 26-year-old Thai flight attendant landed at Melbourne Airport on flight TG465 and raised the suspicions of Australian Border Force (ABF) officers. An X-ray examination of her luggage flagged over 1 kilogram of high-grade heroin, stitched deep within the linings of Thai traditional fabric tote bags. The heroin is estimated to have a street value of half a million dollars. The flight attendant was consequently arrested and the incident had launched a joint investigation between Thailand’s Office of the Narcotics Control Board (ONCB) and Australian Federal Police.

This incident exposes a highly calculated strategy by transnational drug cartels targeting open, freelance “carry-for-hire” social media groups. These platforms are heavily populated by flight crews, students, and frequent flyers looking to make money by selling their unused luggage allowance. Investing authorities uncovered digital footprints showing syndicates using anonymous burner accounts to solicit couriers, offering fees to transport what they claim are local textiles or souvenirs for relatives living abroad. This effectively weaponizes the institutional trust granted to airline uniforms, drug syndicates manage to shift 100 percent of the legal risk onto individuals doing side-gigs, while their identities remain safely hidden.

However, this arrest is a symptom of a much larger regional surge in narcotics trafficking. Following systemic instability inside the Golden Triangle, the notorious border region spanning Myanmar, Laos, and Thailand, opium cultivation and heroin processing have spiked dramatically. Since the drug is not produced inside Thailand, the country serves as an indispensable transit bottleneck and repacking hub.

To address this, Thailand immediately enforced a “Zero Trust” policy at its airports. Airline crews and pilots are now stripped of streamlined clearance and must undergo the intensive outbound security screenings as standard passengers. Additionally, Thailand’s Civil Aviation Authority (CAAT) legally banned all air crews from accepting third-party items or freelance “carry-for-hire” gigs.

However, a single country’s response cannot stop borderless networks. ASEAN must urgently strengthen cross-border prevention by shifting from slow diplomatic statements to aggressive operational integration. First, the ASEAN Airport Interdiction Task Force (AAITF) must be re-engineered into a live, automated intelligence-sharing hub to track digital smuggling syndicates before flights depart. Member states must also scale up localized direct “joint strike” operations along Mekong river borders to choke off supply lines at the source. Since transnational cartels operate fluidly across jurisdictions, ASEAN’s enforcement networks must forge robust, real-time intelligence coalitions with primary regional destination markets, most notably Australia, to synchronize inbound and outbound detection strategies.

Ultimately, while Thailand’s operation against transnational drug-trafficking may address its own domestic loopholes, isolated national actions cannot secure a deeply interconnected region, like ASEAN. If ASEAN fails to elevate its collective cross-border narcotics prevention, syndicates will simply pivot to other softer hubs in the region. True aviation and border security demand that all member states scale up unified intelligence operations and treat the entire region as a single, impenetrable defensive line against drug-trafficking and transnational crime.


Paranut has a background in advocacy, with experience in policy research, communications, and civic engagement across both the NGO and government sectors. As Thailand’s Youth Delegate to the United Nations, he represented Thai youth in global dialogues on migration, education, and human rights, championing inclusive policymaking. He holds a degree in political science with a specialization in international relations.

Editorial Deadline 04/07/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Karen Ysabelle R. David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk

War makes for strange bedfellows. In the case of the Iran war, with Prime Minister Lawrence Wong in Kazan for the ASEAN–Russia Commemorative Summit, Singapore has found itself thawing toward the northern giant. Can this fraught early stage — backlit by Russia’s own war with Ukraine — survive the twists and turns that characterize the international system of today, especially as Singapore takes over as ASEAN Chair next year?

Over in Hanoi, just before the end of June, the government broke ground on five urban railway lines spanning hundreds of kilometers. In its bid to chase double-digit GDP growth, will Vietnam’s multi-billion-dollar gamble pay off?

And in the Philippines, even the ongoing political noise unfolding in the highest levels of the government was drowned out by a tragedy last week: a school shooting — a rarity in the Philippines — that claimed the lives of three students. Too little, too late, the incident has led to pointing fingers and a national reckoning.

Singapore 🇸🇬

ASEAN–Russia Enmeshment and Singapore’s Role as an Intermediary

by Nurul Aini, in Singapore

After hosting May’s Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore attended the ASEAN–Russia Commemorative Summit upon the invitation of President Vladimir Putin from 17 to 18 June 2026. While the Dialogue witnessed China’s more indirect approach to the US–China dynamics and the US vocalized a desire for stability with China through high-level diplomatic preservation, the Summit demonstrated ASEAN’s attempt at building security and economic relations, with a third major power that has been characterized as internationally isolated.

There were three deliverables: the Kazan Declaration, the Joint Statement on Cultural Cooperation, and the ASEAN-Russia Comprehensive Plan of Action, which emphasized outcomes like cultural cooperation, energy security, trade and investments, digital economies, artificial intelligence, and more. In the Joint Statement, the ASEAN Community Vision 2045 and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Strategic Plan were both mentioned, alongside the Russian Federation’s Basic Principles of State Cultural Policy, demonstrating that both sides value each other’s cultural sovereignty.

Additionally, Singapore’s attendance highlighted its willingness to navigate complex relations with Russia, considering its targeted sanctions on military exports and financial activities as a result of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. As the oil crisis continues, Singapore emerges as an intermediary, with a London Stock Exchange Group data showing that Russian tankers are increasingly listing Singapore as their destination in January 2026, even though these usually indicate that only ship-to-ship transfers are done at nearby waters. Other countries such as Myanmar have a higher level of dependency on Russia for oil, while Cambodia has seen trade relations decline from 2021 to 2024, with a re-direction to defense industrial cooperation instead.

The differing engagement levels between ASEAN and Russia also means that this emerging relationship cannot simply be captured by unidirectional models or a clean application of the “omni-enmeshment” concept theorized by Shedden Professor of Strategic Policy Studies at the Australian National University, Evelyn Goh. According to Goh, ASEAN’s enmeshment strategy involves engaging major powers in the region’s strategic powers individually, while using ASEAN as a platform, where its objectives differ from “imperative of strategic diversification” to “the desire to boost regional leadership” and “ambitions of transforming great powers behavior,” through building a web of network between major powers while avoiding over-dependency. Goh’s examples revolve more around the emerging security concerns post-Cold War that necessitated the retention of an incumbent hegemon and the socializing of a rising challenger.

It can still be said that ASEAN is extending its omni-enmeshment strategy to a third major power, but now under structural conditions of multipolarity and institutional competition. What makes this relationship interesting is that Russia’s relations with ASEAN are heavily concentrated in sectors such as energy and arms, which has its own set of political complications. Perhaps, within the context where Russia is still constructing its institutional stakes within ASEAN, the relations between the SEA bloc and Russia can be understood more through a push and pull dynamic. Russia has counter-enmeshment strategies in place through its BRICS-EAEU-SCO institutional framework. Analysts like Joanne Lin have highlighted Moscow’s needs for ASEAN markets, characterizing ASEAN-Russia relations as a two-way relationship rather than a one-sided tilt, while considering how ASEAN will navigate through practical cooperations with Russia while avoiding validation of its invasion of Ukraine.

As of now, the emerging relationship between ASEAN and Russia remains at its early stages. As Prime Minister Lawrence Wong emphasized during the Summit, Singapore looks forward to having ASEAN work further with Russia when the country takes over as Chair of ASEAN in 2027.


Aini is currently pursuing a master’s degree in English literature at Nanyang Technological University. She has experience working in youth groups, contributing to the planning and management of outreach activities.

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Vietnam 🇻🇳

Track, TOD, and Transformation

by Tri Vo, in Ho Chi Minh City

On 22 June 2026, Hanoi officially initiated one of the most ambitious infrastructure initiatives in Vietnamese modern history. In the groundbreaking ceremony attended by the new Prime Minister Le Minh Hung, the capital commenced construction on five urban railway lines spanning more than 300 kilometers. With a preliminary price tag exceeding VND 1.3 quadrillion (roughly US$51 billion or about 10% of Vietnam’s 2025 GDP), such a mega endeavor represents a massive macroeconomic lever for a government aggressively chasing a double-digit GDP growth mandate. Unleashing billions of dollars into the domestic construction sector is, if anything, an economic sailwind for the larger economy.

The sheer scale of such a feat already appears staggering and requires the highest order of capacity. As such, Vietnam’s largest conglomerate, Vingroup — whose Vinhomes–VinSpeed joint venture is appointed as the EPC (engineering, procurement, and construction) general contractor — will be tasked with the delivery of Lines 1, 2, 8, 10, and 14 by 2030. Rather than simply tunneling beneath the existing downtown area, these routes are meant to shift commercial/residential gravity away from the highly congested urban core and toward the peripheries, relieving pressure on the capital’s center and allowing space to give the sometimes-chaotic area a facelift as part of the 100-year planning. For instance, the 81-kilometer Line 1 and 56.5-kilometer Line 2 will create high-speed corridors connecting the city center to Noi Bai International Airport in the suburbs, creating the necessary transportation convenience for families to move to the peripheries.

To finance and generate value from this massive US$51 billion gamble, Hanoi is heavily relying on the Transit-Oriented Development (TOD) model. By making sure that public transport will be followed by localized real estate development, the city plans to capture the land sales value appreciation that follows the construction and completion of rail infrastructure. Under recent policy directives, authorities are expediting land clearance and offering various incentives (like zoning, land-use certification, etc.) for developers to build high-density commercial and residential clusters adjacent to the new lines. This approach is already triggering a profound shift in real estate investment appetite, as institutional investors, such as Vinhomes, aggressively reposition their portfolios toward the suburbs like Ocean Park, anticipating the inevitable value uplift these transit hubs will bring about.

Overall, the short-term economic multiplier effect of this massive project is exactly what Hanoi needs on the economic front going into the second half of the year. Mobilizing capital for 300 kilometers of underground and elevated rail, not to mention facilities such as terminals, will require not just cash but an immense supply of construction materials and engineering labor. This massive domestic demand injection can act as a vital dose of adrenaline for the economy, which is straining under external pressure, including the current Middle Eastern conflict and rising protectionism in the US, a highly important export destination for Vietnam.

Ultimately, Hanoi’s five-line metro expansion is a high-stakes race against time. The city intends to have a fully operational 500-kilometer rail network by 2035, which means that the execution window is quite tight. However, success in this project, along with the entailing movement of people outside of the congested urban core, will present Hanoi’s ASEAN peers with a case in point on how to solve the immense pain of overcrowded urban centers straining services and livability across the region.


Tri has experience in management consulting and strategy, having worked with institutions such as the UNDP, The Asia Group, and ARC Group. He has provided strategic, legal, and operational insights to clients in sectors including manufacturing, energy, and technology. He holds both academic and professional experience related to Southeast and East Asia, with a focus on regional development and policy.

The Philippines 🇵🇭

When Children Carry Guns: Tacloban’s School Shooting and the Philippines’ Safety Reckoning

by Eduardo G. Fajermo Jr., in Angeles City

The Philippines is now confronting a question it has long treated as distant: what happens when the violence that haunts streets, online spaces, and homes enters the classroom? The 22 June school shooting at San Jose National High School in Tacloban City — where two students aged 14 and 15 allegedly opened fire, killed three students, and injured 20 others — has forced the country into a painful reckoning over guns, school security, bullying, online influence, and juvenile justice.

School shootings remain rare in the Philippines, but the Tacloban case showed how quickly rarity can become reality. The suspects used a 9mm Glock pistol and a .38-caliber revolver, with the weapons traced to a police officer relative and a security agency employee. The police recovered more than 40 shell casings, while videos circulating online showed students hiding and crying as the attack unfolded. The details matter because this was not merely a story of two minors committing violence. It was also a story of adult failure: firearms were accessible, school entry points were not secure enough, and warning signs may have gone unaddressed.

Authorities are now rethinking school safety. Civil defense officials said preparedness can no longer be limited to earthquakes and natural disasters, but must include “human-induced” and crime-related incidents. That shift is overdue: Philippine schools regularly drill students for fire and earthquake emergencies, but many are unprepared for armed violence.

The motive remains under investigation, but bullying has emerged as one possible factor. Police and officials have said the suspects may have acted out of retaliation after being bullied, while investigators are also examining online influences. In response, the government temporarily blocked the online game GoreBox, reportedly used by one suspect, while stressing the need to examine online risks to children. Yet the deeper issue is how grievance, isolation, bullying, access to firearms, and violent online spaces can converge around children who are already in distress.

The case has also revived the debate over juvenile sanctions. Under the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act, a child 15 years old or under at the time of the offense is exempt from criminal liability but must undergo an intervention program. Children above 15 but below 18 are also exempt unless they acted with discernment, meaning they understood the wrongfulness and consequences of their act. This legal framework means the 14-year-old suspect is generally handled through welfare intervention, while the legal treatment of the 15-year-old depends on age rules, discernment, and child-protection processes. The law also makes clear that exemption from criminal liability does not erase civil liability.

Public outrage is understandable. Three children are dead. Families are grieving. A community is traumatized. But lowering the age of criminal responsibility should not become a reflexive substitute for fixing the systems that failed before the first shot was fired. The question is not whether children who commit grave violence should be held accountable. They must be. The question is whether accountability stops with the child, or whether it climbs upward to the family, the firearm owner, the school, the platform, and the state.

The Tacloban shooting should not become a moral panic about “bad kids” or “bad games.” It should become a national audit of safety. Children did not only die because two classmates pulled the trigger. They died because a chain of protection broke long before the guns entered campus. In that broken chain lies the real case the Philippines must answer.


Eduardo is a Political Science graduate and MA Political Science candidate at the University of Santo Tomas, researching democracy, disaster governance, and inclusive policy in the Global South. He is a former faculty member at Holy Angel University, where he taught Philippine history and contemporary global issues. He also worked with a senator in the Guam Legislature, contributing to policy research and legislative analysis.

Editorial Deadline 30/06/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Siu Tzyy Wei, Lead Editor - Maritime Crescent Desk

Power is shifting across the region - in grids that falter, in technologies that accelerate, and in standards that redefine responsibility. This week, the Maritime Crescent traces those movements in different forms.

Brunei asks if ASEAN can grow together in the age of AI, while Indonesia faces the fragility of its coal-driven electricity and Malaysia reconsiders its approach to the refugee crisis.

This week’s story shows how power, whether technical, political or humanitarian, is being renegotiated, and how those shifts will shape who moves forward and who falls behind.

Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳

Can ASEAN Grow Together in the Age of AI?

by Syimah Johari, in Bandar Seri Begawan

Artificial intelligence (AI) is reshaping how countries approach healthcare, climate and economic growth. But while technology is advancing rapidly, not all countries are moving at the same speed. In Southeast Asia, this raises an important question: how can ASEAN ensure that its member states grow together in the age of AI?

Recently, member states of ASEAN were in attendance at the 22nd ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Science, Technology and Innovation (AMMSTI-22) held in Laos on June 26, 2026. Where they discussed how science and technology can help address some of the region’s most pressing challenges, from healthcare and climate change to food security and renewable energy. The meeting also saw the launch of new initiatives, including funding for AI-related research, a regional technology management platform and ASEAN’s first shared high-performance computing facility. Together, these developments signal a growing emphasis on regional cooperation as countries prepare for an increasingly digital future.

Beyond the announcements, the meeting highlighted a broader shift in ASEAN’s thinking. Rather than focusing solely on encouraging innovation within individual member states, discussions increasingly centred on how the region can build the institutions, standards and partnerships needed to support innovation collectively.

While the meeting introduced several new initiatives, it also highlighted a reality that ASEAN has long grappled with: member states are not all starting from the same point. Some countries have invested a lot more in AI research, digital infrastructure and innovation ecosystems, while others are still building the foundations needed to support these technologies. As AI becomes more integrated into healthcare, education and public services, these differences could become more pronounced. Without meaningful cooperation, technological progress may advance unevenly across the region, making it more difficult for ASEAN to achieve its vision of inclusive growth.

Rather than leaving each country to tackle these challenges on its own, ASEAN is beginning to invest in shared solutions. At this year’s meeting, member states supported initiatives such as funding for AI-related research through the ASEAN Science, Technology and Innovation Fund (ASTIF), the launch of a regional technology management platform, and ASEAN’s first shared high-performance computing facility. They also discussed the importance of developing regional standards for AI, particularly in healthcare, to ensure that innovation is accompanied by public trust and safety. While these initiatives may seem technical, they reflect a broader goal that is, creating a stronger foundation for countries to learn from one another and benefit from technological progress together.

The outcomes of AMMSTI-22 suggest that ASEAN’s approach to science and technology is becoming more practical and coordinated. As artificial intelligence continues to shape economies and societies, regional cooperation will become increasingly important. The challenge is no longer simply about adopting new technologies, but to ensure that all member states have the opportunity to benefit from them. After all, ASEAN’s strength has always rested on its ability to move forward together and the region’s future in AI may depend on whether it can continue to do so.


Syimah is a graduate of King’s College London with a BA in International Relations. With a strong focus on diplomacy, regional cooperation, and development policy, she is passionate about contributing to meaningful change through public service. Currently, she is involved in poverty alleviation work through a local NGO.

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Indonesia 🇮🇩

Powerless

by Rayhan Prabu Kusumo, in Jakarta

Throughout June, parts of Java went dark. PLN, the state electricity company, could not meet demand and cut power in rotation to keep the grid from collapsing. The shortfall on the country’s most populous island reached around two gigawatts. As the largest coal exporter in the world, Indonesia’s power plants run on the same resource.

Power plants are built to burn coal of a certain energy content, measured by the heat a kilogram releases. For weeks they were fed weaker coal, which forced them to run below their rated output. Two large private plants went offline at the same time for technical faults, and the grid tipped into deficit. Energy minister Bahlil Lahadalia put PLN’s uncontracted supply gap for the year at twenty million tonnes. In February, private power producers said their coal stocks had fallen to about ten days of operation, below the base level of twenty-five.

The cause is a price the government set in 2018 and has not moved since. Mining companies must sell a share of their output at home, and the state caps what power plants pay at seventy dollars a tonne. The rule counts tonnes, not quality, so miners can meet the obligation by delivering cheap, low-grade coal and shipping the better grade abroad, where it earns far more.

Power plants pay the lowest regulated price in the country, causing coal suppliers to serve them last. Electricity tariffs are frozen for political comfort, so the cost settles on PLN and the budget instead of households.

The weak rupiah widens the gap, because coal is priced in dollars and every fall in the currency makes the export sale more attractive and PLN’s purchases steeper. To make matters worse, the government cut this year’s production quota, shrinking the buffer that once covered domestic shortfalls.

The quick fix is to pay for the coal the plants need, by raising the cap or tying it to a benchmark that moves with the market. That keeps the lights on, but it only shifts the cost from miners to PLN and the budget, where most of it already sits. Indonesia has been here before. In January 2022, the same shortage forced the government to halt coal exports for a month to supply its own plants. The pattern returns because the exposure is never removed.

A capped coal price is a hidden subsidy that does two things at once; it keeps the country tied to coal, and it makes renewable alternatives look costly next to a fuel held down by law. The ultimate exit is the transition the government has already promised on paper, where PLN’s plan reserves more than forty gigawatts for clean energy. Once built, these plants burn no fuel. Sunlight, wind, water, and geothermal heat are not priced in dollars and cannot be shipped to a better buyer abroad, so the cost that bites every time the currency falls is simply not there.


Rayhan has a background in government affairs and public policy, with experience across government institutions and advisory firms. His work focuses on the intersection of geopolitics, policy, and risk, with expertise in advocacy, regulatory analysis, and stakeholder engagement. He holds a degree in Government from Universitas Padjadjaran, and has completed an exchange at Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Spain, focusing on global politics and sustainability.

Malaysia 🇲🇾

Biometrics and Borders

by Edrina Lisa Ozaidi, in WP Kuala Lumpur

In a landmark move to enhance national security and administrative precision, the Malaysian government has officially rolled out the Dokumen Pendaftaran Pelarian (DPP) framework. This strategic initiative represents a vital evolution in how the nation manages displaced populations, moving away from legacy systems towards a government-led biometric database. As of February 2026, there are approximately 215,600 refugees and asylum seekers registered with the UNHCR in Malaysia. The vast majority of them, recorded at nearly 194,000 people, hail from Myanmar.

The shift towards the DPP is a direct response to this visibility gap. Following the mandate of the National Security Council (MKN) Directive No. 23, the Malaysian Home Ministry recognises the urgency for “data sovereignty”.

Faced with a decline in third-country resettlement opportunities and the increasing prevalence of fraudulent documentation, the government is determined that a centralised, state-managed database could provide the security and reliability required in today’s complex geopolitical environment.

The DPP system is said to utilise advanced biometrics, voice recordings, and facial recognition technology. The transition comes with a clear objective—transitioning the responsibility of identification to the government to ensure Malaysia have full visibility of who is in the country and where they are located. Through identity verification developed by MIMOS, Malaysia’s national applied research centre, the system aims to effectively combat documentary forgery.

Home Minister Saifuddin Nasution Ismail recently emphasised that this initiative ensures the government is no longer operating with incomplete information but instead, possesses the comprehensive and verifiable data necessary to improve enforcement and policy formulation in the near future. The system rollout is characterised by a rigorous, multi-stage assessment process overseen by the Refugee Status Assessment Committee. Through this structured approach, the government aims to move past the ambiguity of the past.

The main intention of the DPP system is not to grant citizenship; rather, it serves as a management tool to streamline humanitarian oversight while potentially addressing labour shortages in critical, labour-intensive sectors like plantations, agriculture, and construction—all under strict Malaysian employment regulations.

While the government remains clear that the DPP focuses on systematic management rather than permanent settlement, its implementation is a crucial step in maintaining Malaysia’s social and economic stability.

By securing our borders through proper data management, the state is better positioned to protect its citizens while upholding its administrative responsibilities.

As Malaysia continues to navigate the complexities of regional migration in 2026, the new framework will be a testament to the government’s resolve to prioritise national security and effective governance. This framework functions as more than just a registration update. It hopes to build a commitment to a safer, more orderly Malaysia while contributing to the refugee crisis.


Edrina is a communications professional with a background in international relations. She holds a degree from the University of Nottingham Malaysia and has worked across public relations and social media for organizations in the development, education, and corporate sectors. Her work focuses on crafting narratives around regional affairs and strengthening media engagement across Southeast Asia.

Editorial Deadline 27/05/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk

This week, the Mekong Belt gave us a masterclass in the gap between looking like you’re solving a problem and actually solving it. In Myanmar, authorities staged arrests in Muse, paraded the numbers, and called it a crackdown — all while scam compounds keep flourishing just down the road. In Laos, the government joined a new Eurasian rail corridor stretching to Estonia — but the World Bank's verdict is blunt: tracks alone don't create a hub, only the policy reforms behind them do.

Bangkok, meanwhile, handed Chadchart Sittipunt a second term and a fresh mandate — but a landslide win doesn’t unclog a drain or rewrite which agency controls the buses. The hard part of governing a megacity of 18 million was never winning the election. And in Cambodia, Hun Sen showed up Beijing to remind everyone that “ironclad friendship” is doing a lot of heavy lifting these days, even as Chinese tourists quietly start booking elsewhere — scam headlines, it turns out, are bad for business.

Myanmar 🇲🇲

Myanmar’s Scam Economy Is Adapting

by Moe Thiri Myat

Myanmar’s scam economy is not disappearing under pressure. It is changing shape. During this week, new reports exposed three parts of the same regional crisis: thousands of trafficking victims still confined in militia-controlled compounds near Myawaddy, arrests connected to online fraud and gambling in Muse, and a smaller cross-border operation uncovered inside an ordinary apartment in Mae Sot, Thailand.

The most alarming evidence comes from the Myanmar–Thailand border. The Civil Society Network for Human Trafficking Victim Assistance estimates that more than 5,300 people remain trapped at four scam-centre locations, including around 1,600 Chinese nationals and citizens from across Southeast Asia, Africa, Russia and Brazil. This comes more than a year after Thailand led a multinational effort that removed around 5,000 people from scam hubs in the Myawaddy area. The continuing confinement of thousands suggests that the earlier operation disrupted only part of the industry.

At the same time, recent arrests indicate that scam-related activity is no longer limited to large, fortified compounds. In Muse, Myanmar authorities announced the arrest of 59 people allegedly involved in online gambling, including two Chinese nationals and 57 Myanmar nationals. Seven more Chinese nationals reportedly connected to telecommunications fraud were subsequently detained in the town. Authorities presented the arrests as evidence of a continuing national crackdown, but the repeated discoveries also show that criminal operations remain active in northern Shan State.

Reports that scam groups are also establishing themselves in Yangon, Mandalay, Naypyitaw and Mawlamyine deepen this concern. There is a movement from visible border enclaves towards smaller, dispersed operations embedded in urban areas. Such relocation makes detection harder and weakens an enforcement model focused mainly on demolishing compounds, deporting foreign nationals and arresting workers at individual sites.

Beyond Myanmar, the issue reflects a wider ASEAN challenge involving human trafficking, cybercrime, migration and illicit financial flows. The people reportedly trapped near Myawaddy include citizens from Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia and countries outside Southeast Asia. Thailand has become a major transit point for rescue, repatriation and investigation, while criminal networks reportedly involve Myanmar, Thai and Chinese nationals. No single country can address the problem through domestic arrests alone.

Ultimately, the recent raids are not evidence of stronger law enforcement, revealing how adaptable the scam economy has become. They may instead reveal how quickly it is learning to survive. Large compounds remain active near the border, while smaller operations appear in towns, cities and ordinary residential buildings. What looks like the dismantling of one criminal industry may therefore be its transformation into something more dispersed, less visible and much harder to trace. The critical question is whether ASEAN governments can move beyond closing individual buildings and arresting lower-level workers to identify organisers, financial networks, recruiters and protection structures.


Moe Thiri Myat is a senior at Parami University. Majoring in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics (PPE). Interested in analyzing emerging sociopolitical situations and developments, through her work as a Myanmar correspondent at The ASEAN Frontier she aims to explore how sociopolitical developments across Southeast Asia shape and are shaped by the situation in Myanmar.

Lao PDR 🇱🇦

Laos Joins Eurasian Rail Corridor Linking ASEAN to Europe

by Phonethida Sitthixay, in Vientiane

Laos’s international railway partnership is expanding beyond Asia to Europe after officially joining Corridor 2 of the Organisation for Co-operation between Railways (OSJD) during the Ministerial Conference held from 9 to 12 June.

The corridor connects Laos with regional and Eurasian railway networks through countries including Vietnam, China, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Estonia, creating new possibilities for the cross-border movement of goods and passengers, strengthening both trade flows and regional mobility between Southeast Asia and Europe.

Together with the Laos–China Railway and the planned Laos–Vietnam Railway, the initiative supports the country’s long-term ambition of transforming itself from a landlocked nation into a land-linked regional transport hub.

However, connectivity alone does not guarantee economic transformation. The more important question is whether railway-led connectivity can help Laos become a regional logistics and industrial hub rather than simply serving as a transit corridor.

According to the World Bank, while infrastructure such as cross-border railways can significantly boost trade flows and even increase national income, these gains depend heavily on complementary reforms. In the case of Laos, improved connectivity could raise aggregate income substantially and integrate the country into regional and global supply chains, but only if supported by policies that facilitate trade, improve the business environment, and strengthen logistics capacity.

Without such measures, there is a risk that Laos will remain a transit route rather than a value-creating hub. The key lesson is that becoming “land-linked” is not just about building infrastructure, but about ensuring that connectivity is matched with institutional readiness, efficient logistics systems, and the ability to attract investment into productive sectors.

Ultimately, the number of countries connected by rail may be less important than how effectively Laos converts connectivity into sustainable economic growth and long-term national development.


Phonethida Sitthixay holds a Bachelor of Arts in International Relations from the National University of Laos. She is currently a Senior Project Coordinator at AIF Group, where she works on government-led initiatives to modernize financial integration across public sector systems in Laos. She has experience in sustainable development policy, diplomacy, and economic reporting, having worked with the Global Green Growth Institute and The Laotian Times. Her interests focus on Laos’s diplomacy, regional integration, and its evolving role beyond ASEAN.

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Thailand 🇹🇭

What Does The Future Hold For Bangkok?

by Natamon Aumphin, in Bangkok

OOn June 28, 2026, Bangkok hosted a Bangkok Gubernatorial Election, which Chadchart Sittipunt, the former incumbent Bangkok governor, won with a majority of over 67%. The election received immense attention because it signifies the direction of the metropolitan city toward a commitment to urban reform and an increase in transparency. These commitments directly align with the global agenda on reforming urban areas, strengthening climate resilience, and repositioning the economy, which sets the benchmark for 2030. The benchmark year, hence, will determine whether Sittipunt can deliver the promise to the people.

Although the election is local, its impact stretches much beyond. As of 2026, Bangkok is home to over 18 million people, among whom roughly 5.3 million are eligible voters for the Bangkok Gubernatorial Election. According to the UN report, the number of latent population includes those in the vicinity of Bangkok who directly depend on Bangkok for living, working, and studying. Among those, oftentimes, the areas are merged with Bangkok, making them seem like a part of the capital, for example, Nonthaburi. Hence, regardless of the result, the election affects the latent population that depends on Bangkok to earn a livelihood. Nonetheless, this population is often hidden and unheard. One of the most prominent issues they face in Bangkok is the rising cost of living.

Although all candidates have pledged to make Bangkok a global city by 2030 by endorsing solution-based policies, the challenge lies within structural constraints and regulations. Moving beyond day-to-day activities, including trash management and pavement improvement, to tackling structural issues such as lowering transportation costs poses challenges. Despite progress seen within the last 4 years, with the notable ones being flood prevention and increasing green and creative space, challenges remain such as structural constraints, regulations, and transparency. Hence, this local election has an impact much beyond Bangkok. As the capital, Bangkok is often the first stop for tourists and an opportunity for the country. Hence, it is imperative for the city to progress further to reach the goal of being a sustainable urban city, which everyone can benefit from and contribute to.


Natamon has served as a rapporteur at the Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS Thailand). She has also worked as a research assistant on diplomatic issues in Southeast Asia. Her work focuses on how domestic politics shape foreign policy in the region. She holds a degree in international relations and has experience in policy analysis, event reporting, and regional research.

Cambodia 🇰🇭

Hun Sen’s Visit to China Confirms That China’s Policy Toward Cambodia Remains Unchanged

by Chandara Samban, in Kandal

Hun Sen, Senate President and acting head of state, is visiting China at the same time King Norodom Sihamoni is there on medical leave — meaning Cambodia’s two heads of state are both currently in the country’s long-standing partner. Hun Sen’s official visit underscores the enduring friendship between the two nations and reinforces Beijing’s security presence in Phnom Penh amid the ongoing border crisis with Thailand. Though no longer Prime Minister, Hun Sen remains a central figure in the China-Cambodia relationship.

Hun Sen’s visit ran from June 25 to 27, 2026, during which he met with top Chinese leaders, including President Xi Jinping, Premier Li Qiang, and National People’s Congress Chairman Zhao Leji. According to the Senate’s statement, the trip aims to deepen the “iron-clad friendship” between the two countries and expand comprehensive cooperation.

The Cambodian side considers the visit historic, coinciding as it does with the 75th anniversary of the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), which Hun Sen leads. He welcomed the upgrade of the strategic dialogue framework from 2+2 to 3+3 — now covering defense, foreign affairs, and interior — and reaffirmed Cambodia’s continued support for the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and China’s four global initiatives.

For his part, Xi proposed strengthening mutual trust between the two peoples and advancing the implementation of agreed development projects, particularly through deeper security cooperation.

Cambodia and China continue to align Cambodia’s five-pronged strategy with the BRI, accelerating development of the industrial-technology corridor and the fish-and-rice corridor. The two sides are also expanding cooperation in trade, artificial intelligence, clean energy, and high-speed rail, while strengthening parliamentary diplomacy and advancing their free trade agreement. Both governments emphasized the Funan Techo Canal project as a key contribution to the BRI in Cambodia.

Wu Xingyi, head of the Cambodia Studies Section at Guangxi University’s China-ASEAN Research Institute, told ChinaFocus that the visit shows China’s Cambodia policy remains unchanged, with continued focus on connectivity projects — expressways, airports, and logistics infrastructure — that strengthen supply chains. He noted that security cooperation has expanded from cracking down on online fraud to a broader stability mechanism under the 3+3 dialogue, alongside deepening people-to-people ties through tourism, youth exchanges, and Cambodia’s visa-free policy for Chinese citizens.

He added that China is reframing its relationship with Cambodia from an “ironclad friendship” to an “all-weather community with a shared future” — a model it may extend to other Southeast Asian partners — shifting from development cooperation alone toward a dual focus on development and security.

Geopolitical analyst Seng Vanly noted that Cambodia remains financially reliant on China, which in turn views Cambodia as a key regional partner. He pointed to China’s growing emphasis on cracking down on scams affecting Chinese nationals, and to declining Chinese tourism numbers tied to economic conditions and scam-related safety concerns — a trend Hun Sen is expected to address directly with Beijing.


Chandara is a freelance journalist with a focus on foreign affairs, security issues, and ASEAN affairs. He also serves as a Junior Counterterrorism Intelligence Analyst.

Editorial Deadline 27/06/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Karen Ysabelle R. David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk

Over the past year, Hanoi has been making headlines for its diplomatic dexterity and high-stakes hedging. But even when set against this backdrop, Vietnam’s hedging between the two Koreas — what with a Vietnamese General’s recent visit to Pyongyang, amid his country’s robust trade ties with Seoul — is a particularly tense high-wire act worth watching.

Meanwhile, Manila is having a bit of a tennis moment, thanks to the rise of tennis darling Alex Eala. Far from the pomp and circumstance of state visits and diplomatic exchanges, Eala’s success on the court is a reminder of the national impact and regional influence that sports diplomacy can wield.

But over in Singapore, a more sobering reminder, as the launch of thousands of flats across the city-state — while seemingly good news — is a sign of how intense housing demand has gotten. That challenge is not unique to Singapore; but the pressure compounds when it’s set in one of the world’s most densely populated metropolises.

Vietnam 🇻🇳

Vietnam’s Hedging Between the Koreas

by Sean Huy Vu

Vietnamese General Luong Tam Quang, a member of the Politburo and Minister of Public Security, led a high-level delegation to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) from 13 to 16 June. Invited by his North Korean counterpart in an effort to boost bilateral ties, the objectives of the meeting were to share experiences in “Party building, national governance, economic development.” Both sides also expressed a desire to improve people-to-people ties and shared experiences in law enforcement. Neither Vietnamese nor North Korean state media revealed the details discussed during the meeting.

The visit comes nine months after General Secretary To Lam met with Chairman Kim Jong Un in October 2025 to celebrate the 80th anniversary of the founding of the Workers’ Party of Korea. The two pledged to deepen cultural exchange and defense cooperation; a commitment made six years after the 2019 Hanoi Summit between United States President Donald Trump and Chairman Kim.

Many observers have been confused as to why Vietnam has been engaging with a pariah state. One reason is simply due to the shared communist legacy, as the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry (and much of the state apparatus) is quite ideological. One US official anonymously expressed dismay at the growing relations between Vietnam and North Korea, stating that the DPRK offers “absolutely nothing of value” and “costs” Vietnam. Some North Korea watchers have speculated that Vietnam is forming a communist axis with the DPRK and China.

Khanh Vu, a visiting scholar at Boston College and specialist in Asian communist security, however, has explained Vietnam’s intentions. Vietnam aspires to become a proactive middle power capable of mediating differences between countries, such as North Korea, South Korea, and the US. By maintaining relations with everyone, Vietnam can serve as a platform for diplomacy for potential future summits. Vu notes, nonetheless, that Hanoi’s “bold” outreach towards Pyongyang could affect its reputation globally if its visits are not carefully framed within the framework of multilateralism.

When compared to its relationship-building with South Korea, however, Vietnam’s visits to North Korea are largely symbolic. South Korea is Vietnam’s largest source of foreign direct investment, totaling US$92 billion by the end of 2024. Samsung alone is Vietnam’s largest source of FDI, employing over 120,000 workers, who produce half of the chaebol’s phones. South Korea is Vietnam’s third largest export market, valued at 6% of total trade, following the US and China. South Korea’s Lotte also provides substantial employment and upskilling of the workforce in the food and retail sectors.

Vietnam’s hedging between the Koreas is an extension of the larger geostrategic competition between the United States and China, as both Koreas lean towards their respective great power security guarantors. As the Trump administration disrupts global supply chains and energy markets through its foreign policy, increasing diplomacy with North Korea is an indirect way of engaging with the Sinosphere in Asia.


Sean is a scholar of East Asian history, culture, and international relations, with current research at Georgetown University examining working-class labor and human trafficking in the region. His broader interests include the social psychology of religion and identity politics. Sean previously taught modern Korean history at the University of California, Irvine, where he completed his B.A. in History, and later taught English in Ho Chi Minh City while studying Vietnamese language and culture. His writing has been published by UC Irvine, Johns Hopkins University, and Foreign Analysis.

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The Philippines 🇵🇭

Alex Eala and the Power of Sports Diplomacy

by Glenn Vincent N. Boquilon, in Angeles City

When people talk about diplomacy, they often think of presidents, foreign ministers, and international summits. Yet, diplomacy can also happen in places far from government offices. Sometimes, it takes place on a tennis court.

The recent rise of Filipino tennis player Alex Eala has drawn attention, not only because of her achievements, but also because of what they represent. Every time she competes on the international stage, she introduces the Philippines to audiences who may know little about the country. Under those circumstances, she demonstrates an often overlooked form of statesmanship: sports diplomacy.

Sports diplomacy refers to the usage of sports and athletes to build connections between countries and to improve a nation’s image globally. Unlike formal diplomacy, which is conducted through governments, sports diplomacy often works through public attention. In this arena, athletes become unofficial ambassadors. Their accomplishments can inspire interest, admiration, and goodwill toward their home countries.

Eala’s growing presence in international tennis has given the Philippines a rare opportunity in a sport traditionally dominated by larger and wealthier nations. She is now ranked 30th, according to the Women’s Tennis Association, after her play at the Berlin Tennis Open. Her achievements have brought on international media coverage and distinct attention to Filipino talent. For many young Filipinos, she has also become a symbol of what is possible through hard work and dedication.

The Philippines is not the only country in Southeast Asia that has benefited from sports diplomacy. Thailand has long used its success in Muay Thai to promote its culture internationally. Indonesia has also done the same through badminton, a sport that has become closely associated with national pride. Similarly, Singapore has invested heavily in hosting major sporting events and attracting international competitions. These efforts help countries gain visibility and strengthen their global presence.

Sports diplomacy has become increasingly important in a world where public perception matters. A country’s image is no longer shaped only by politics and economics. In this regard, culture, entertainment, and sports also play a crucial and defining role. Historically, successful athletes can create positive stories that travel across borders and reach audiences that traditional diplomacy may never reach. For example, the global rise of Manny Pacquiao helped shape international perceptions of the Philippines beyond politics, showing how sports figures can become symbols of national identity.

In Southeast Asia, sports have also helped reinforce regional ties. Events such as the Southeast Asian Games bring together athletes from different countries and encourage friendly competition. While nations compete for medals, these events also create opportunities for cultural exchange and mutual understanding. They remind people that regional cooperation is not limited to government meetings and official agreements.

Sports diplomacy is not only about improving a country’s image abroad. Success on the international stage can also encourage greater investment in sports programs, facilities, and athlete development at home. Alex Eala’s rise has already sparked discussions about the future of Philippine tennis and the support available to young athletes. More broadly, her success shows how sports can strengthen national pride while also building connections between countries. In an increasingly interconnected world, athletes are not just competitors; they can also serve as ambassadors for their nations.


Glenn holds a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from the University of Santo Tomas. His experience spans governance programs, policy development, and political research, having worked with the Ateneo School of Government and WR Numero Research on projects focused on electoral reform, public opinion, and regional development. He also helped coordinate the drafting of the Bangsamoro Local Government Code and supported the Academy of Multiparty Democracy.

Singapore 🇸🇬

Beyond the June 2026 BTO Launch: What It Reveals About Housing in Singapore

by Jennifer Hui En Tan, in Singapore

The June 2026 Build-To-Order (BTO) launch, which released 6,952 flats across seven projects, highlights the Singapore government’s continued commitment to public housing. As the majority of Singaporeans live in flats built by the Housing & Development Board, the BTO system remains a key pillar of social stability and home ownership. However, despite its benefits, there are still structural flaws within the system that have wider social consequences.

The BTO system has long been one of Singapore’s most important public housing policies, reflecting the state’s effort to keep home ownership accessible to ordinary citizens. In recent years, the government has ramped up supply; this latest expansion is significant because it signals recognition that housing demand remains intense, especially among young Singaporeans hoping to enter the property market. Authorities have also introduced measures such as projects with shorter waiting times to make the system more responsive to the needs of first-time buyers. The BTO model has helped sustain relatively high home ownership rates and has allowed many Singaporeans to buy subsidized flats at prices below those of the resale market.

However, these improvements do not fully resolve the deeper tensions built into the system. Although BTO flats are cheaper than resale flats because they are subsidized by the government, they are not necessarily affordable for all young couples. This burden is made heavier by Singapore’s rising cost of living, which can make housing feel less like a milestone and more like a financial strain. Even with shorter waiting time projects, the BTO system still requires couples to plan years ahead, often before they are fully ready financially or personally, which can either rush or delay marriages or having children. As a result, housing may be accessible on paper but still feel out of reach in practice, shaping not only where people live but also when they feel able to begin major life milestones.

This is why BTO should be understood not just as a housing policy but as a social policy with wider implications. In Singapore, housing has been closely tied to marriage and family formation, especially because home ownership is often seen as a practical prerequisite for settling down. When access to housing is delayed, expensive, or uncertain, the effects extend beyond the property market into broader concerns such as fertility, special mobility, and demographic decline. Singapore’s low fertility rate cannot be explained by housing alone, but the structure of the BTO system may still contribute by making marriage and parenthood feel more financially and logistically difficult.

This challenge is not unique to Singapore. Across ASEAN’s major urban centers, housing affordability is becoming an increasingly serious pressure as economic growth, urbanization, and rising land values reshape city life. In Thailand, high-rise condominiums have pushed prices beyond many households’ reach. Singapore’s BTO debate thus reflects a wider regional struggle to provide housing that is both affordable and supportive of family life.

In the end, the 2026 BTO launch reflects the government’s commitment to expanding supply and improving access to home ownership, but it also reveals that housing policy cannot be judged by flat numbers alone. As housing pressures rise across ASEAN cities, Singapore’s experience offers a useful case study of how urban housing policy can influence not just where people live, but how societies reproduce, remain stable, and imagine their future.


Jennifer is a final-year International Relations student at the Singapore Institute of Management, where she focuses on political engagement, diplomacy, and community governance. She is an active volunteer in her constituency, working closely with residents to understand local concerns, facilitate dialogue, and support community initiatives.

Editorial Deadline 23/06/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by by Siu Tzyy Wei, Lead Editor - Maritime Crescent Desk

Authority often hides in the wires - in the systems we trust, the signals we consume and the rules that shape them.

This week, the Maritime Crescent team explores how power flows through technology, finance and communication in ways that are less visible but deeply consequential. As Brunei’s digital drive leaves media literacy in the shadows, Indonesia’s central bank mandate bends under political weight, and Malaysia’s floodgates are struggling to push against sweeping powers over speech.

Together, they remind us that progress without discernment is fragile, and that the lines of authority - coded, legislated or broadcasted - require sharper scrutiny.

Indonesia 🇮🇩

Lender of First Resort

by Rayhan Prabu Kusumo, in Jakarta

On June 4, the Indonesian parliament passed a revision to the financial sector law that hands Bank Indonesia a new job. Under the revised Financial Sector Development and Strengthening law (UU P2SK), the central bank is now responsible for supporting real-sector growth and employment, on top of guarding the rupiah and prices. Foreign money was leaving and the rupiah broke through the psychological barrier of Rp 18,000 per US dollar. The government’s answer to that loss of confidence was to weaken the independence that makes the central bank worth trusting.

The old mandate was narrow. Bank Indonesia was to safeguard the value of the rupiah and keep inflation in check, and to do so in support of sustainable growth. Growth sat in the background as the purpose of stability rather than a goal of its own. In light of Prabowo’s 8% growth target, a new clause in the revised version directs the bank to create conditions for the real economy and for jobs, and other provisions widen the government’s reach into the bank’s own decisions.

These additional mandates are not unusual nor alarming. The US Federal Reserve answers and manages both prices and employment. A growth mandate would be defensible for Bank Indonesia in a calm year. The problem is what it is paired with and when it lands; the new duty to deliver growth arrives at the same moment the government gains more say over the bank’s decisions, and at a moment when the bank’s credibility is the main institution holding the currency up.

When prices are rising but jobs are scarce, an independent bank can hold interest rates high and defend the rupiah. A bank also ordered to deliver growth, and now under closer government control, will feel pressure to cut them instead, because lower rates spur hiring even as they push the currency down further.

Indonesia has run this arrangement before. Under the 1968 law, the central bank was an agent of development and the keeper of the state’s accounts, an instrument of whatever the government wanted built. After the downfall of Suharto, independence was written into law in 1999 on purpose, because a bank that prints for the government’s plans is part of how the country had reached that point. Misbakhun, the lawmaker who chairs the commission that steered the revision, has called it a return to the bank’s New Order role — approvingly, though it reads better as a warning.

There is a fair case on the other side. Some economists read the wider law as useful, capable of deepening Indonesia’s thin capital markets and drawing some foreign money back, and parts of it may do exactly that. But independence does not work like the other provisions. It cannot be added back later by regulation, because it is a reputation, built slowly and priced daily, and far easier to spend than to rebuild. The test will come with the first hard decision. When inflation and the growth target pull against each other, the rate Bank Indonesia sets will read either as its own call or as the President’s. The region’s investors will know the difference, and they will be reading for it.


Rayhan has a background in government affairs and public policy, with experience across government institutions and advisory firms. His work focuses on the intersection of geopolitics, policy, and risk, with expertise in advocacy, regulatory analysis, and stakeholder engagement. He holds a degree in Government from Universitas Padjadjaran, and has completed an exchange at Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Spain, focusing on global politics and sustainability.

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Malaysia 🇲🇾

The MCMC Floodgates

by Farah

On 12 June, the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission (MCMC) released a consultation paper on proposed targeted amendments to the Communications and Multimedia Act 1998 (CMA). The changes aim to keep the law relevant amid rapid technological shifts and evolving market practices. Key proposals include stronger investigative powers for the regulator and a new statutory right for individuals and businesses to sue those who breach the Act.

Since its inception, the CMA has been controversial. Today, its reach extends far beyond telecoms to include social media platforms, satellite operators, network and infrastructure providers, equipment-related businesses, and digital infrastructure players. In practice, it gives the MCMC sweeping authority over nearly every aspect of Malaysia’s communication ecosystem.

Critics argue the CMA undermines free expression, especially through Section 233. This provision criminalizes any communication which is “obscene, indecent, false, menacing or grossly offensive in character with intent to annoy, abuse, threaten or harass another person”. The Federal Court has upheld it as constitutional, saying it protects individuals from harm. This has only further empowered the government to tighten its control over online content, most recently by wielding the CMA against the dissemination of materials related to race, religion and royalty (3R), particularly those that are provocative, insulting, or that incite hatred or could trigger public tension.

The most contentious proposal is Section 46A, known as the “Deeming Provision”. It empowers the Communications Ministers to bypass normal registration and simply declare that certain platforms are automatically regulated by the MCMC. In January 2026, this was used to classify all social media and internet messaging service providers with more than 8-million user threshold. But with rumors on removing the 8-million user threshold rising, such a reality would give MCMA power to regulate virtually any platform, raising concerns about arbitrary authority and free speech.

The real-life impact of the Communications and Multimedia Act is increasingly apparent, with MCMC ordering more content takedowns each year. Although it is imperative to acknowledge that online harms must be curtailed and that the regulator has a duty to oversee such dangerous content, caution must still be exercised to ensure the constitutional right to freedom of speech is upheld. The broad and volatile provisions in the CMA must be judiciously confined to draw clear boundary lines of the MCMC’s scope of power.


Farah is an external TAF contributor.

Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳

The Other Literacy

by Lily

Amid Brunei’s push to strengthen digital literacy, the national discussion around media literacy has remained conspicuously muted and, at times, been neglected. Perhaps, media literacy is a blind spot that matters more than its digital counterpart.

Media literacy is the capacity to think critically about what people see, share and believe online. It simultaneously helps people to make better, well-informed decisions through weighing sources. In contrast, digital literacy is the ability to operate and access the tools themselves. For instance, navigating a device or app, and creating information safely using digital technologies. One fixates on judgement while the latter concerns access. Ideally, the two deserve equal weight, since championing one over the other is ultimately counterproductive.

The government’s investment in digital literacy is undoubtedly reasonable. Schools have been substantially upgraded with well-equipped interactive digital devices, hybrid learning, and IT embedded in the curriculum, all with the intention of preparing future readiness among students. Despite getting the youth confident with technology, it is not the same as teaching them to question what it shows them. The difficulty arises precisely when fluency in using technology is mistaken for the ability to understand what appears on it.

This gap that has been left open invites a less comfortable reading. Unlike digital fluency, media literacy is, by nature, subjective. It teaches and encourages people to form their own views and to accept that others will differ. This openness shades into free expression, a value the state has tended not to encourage, which may explain some of the silence. Additionally, it also asks citizens to question sources, weigh claims, and trust their own judgement over received authority. A population that is good at utilising information but not at questioning it is easier to govern. One need not assume the reason because it is deliberate; whether by neglect or by quiet preference, ignorance has a way of serving those who rule.

None of this means the digital push is misguided. Rather, it is incomplete. A citizenry can be wired, connected and skilled, yet still be unable to understand the depths of a message. Advancements with technological skills without discernment is not progress, but only a quicker way to be led.


Lily is an external TAF contributor.

Editorial Deadline 20/06/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk

This issue of the Mekong Belt follows the money — and in each case, it ends up somewhere other than where it was supposed to go. In Myanmar, FIFA sold World Cup broadcasting rights to Mytel, a telecom company jointly owned by the junta and Vietnam's Ministry of National Defence, turning every fan's data package into a transfer payment to the same army accused of killing its own citizens. In Thailand, the credit rating held and investors poured in USD 2.7 billion, but the country’s own former fiscal advisor is warning that the surplus underwriting that stability is already ending. Meanwhile, in Laos, the government is chasing tourism targets nearly four times what the last plan actually delivered, while its biggest debt risk — the state power utility — has already had to hand over 90% of its transmission grid just to keep the lights on. And in Cambodia, Hun Manet toasted 70 years of friendship with Putin over a 2% trade "growth" figure that conceals an 80% collapse in bilateral trade since 2021.

Myanmar 🇲🇲

How FIFA’s World Cup Broadcast Deal Fuels Myanmar’s Military

by Ley Hlaing

AAs FIFA World Cup 2026 begins, tensions in Myanmar have escalated following FIFA’s decision to partner with the junta-owned company Mytel, granting it exclusive broadcasting rights as the sole authorized streaming platform in the country. FIFA’s decision has been widely criticized as a human rights violation and has exposed a broader hypocrisy in the organization’s ethical standards.

On May 25, 2026, Mytel’s TV360 — the junta-controlled telecom company’s mobile digital streaming platform for entertainment — was granted the exclusive rights to broadcast all 104 World Cup matches in Myanmar. Held once every four years, the World Cup is the world’s most popular sporting event — making it all the more striking that FIFA, in awarding these rights, has not only contradicted its own Human Rights Policy but actively undermined it. Article 3 of that policy commits FIFA “to avoid causing or contributing to adverse human rights impacts through its own activities and to address and remediate such impacts when they occur.”

FIFA’s decision has faced strong criticism from human rights groups working on Myanmar, including Justice For Myanmar and Burma Campaign UK, both of which have condemned the deal and called for its immediate cancellation, arguing that Mytel is a lucrative revenue source for a brutal and illegitimate military junta. Beyond these organizations, Myanmar citizens have also voiced frustration on Facebook, calling for boycotts and pointing to alternatives such as international free streaming platforms and VPN-enabled websites as ways to avoid TV360, since revenue from the platform flows directly to a military responsible for killing its own people. The way TV360 monetizes its World Cup broadcast adds further strain on a population already under severe economic hardship: viewers are required to purchase Mytel mobile data packages, since TV360 is the only way to access FIFA matches — funneling a captive audience directly into the military-linked platform’s ecosystem and weaponizing the soft power of sport, with free access offered for only 60 of the matches.

Ironically, Mytel is itself a joint venture between Myanmar’s military conglomerate, the Myanmar Economic Corporation, and Viettel — a company controlled by Vietnam’s Ministry of National Defence, which holds a 49% stake. This reveals a broader geopolitical profiteering network among state defense entities. In response to the backlash, and citing its own policies, Meta has removed TV360’s Facebook page — a significant outcome of the boycott campaign.

According to Burma Campaign UK, Mytel has largely escaped sanctions from international bodies such as the EU. The organization points to the EU and Switzerland’s failure to sanction Mytel as a factor that contributed to FIFA’s willingness to partner with the junta’s company. While the United States did sanction Mytel in 2025, a year later the company now holds a monopoly on broadcasting the world’s most popular sporting event — one for which the U.S. itself is serving as a host country.

In granting exclusive broadcasting rights to the junta’s own company, FIFA is not only violating international human rights standards but actively normalizing military rule in Myanmar. This partnership with the Myanmar military will stand as a lasting stain on FIFA’s record.

Ley Hlaing is a former Political Science student from the University of Yangon, Myanmar. Currently, he is pursuing his BA at Parami University with a major in Philosophy, Politics and Economics. His academic and professional interests span community development, literature, minority issues, and social impact research. Having held roles as Research Assistant, Student Mentor, and Facilitator for local initiatives, he has constantly supported project management in literature and education programs in Myanmar.

Thailand 🇹🇭

Why Thailand’s Stable Credit Rating Hides a Major Economic Warning

by Satid Sootipunya, in Bangkok

Thailand’s top fiscal expert warns the country against relying heavily on its old economic competencies after maintaining its BBB+ sovereign credit rating by S&P Global Ratings.

Former fiscal consultant to Prime Minister Anutin’s administration and Thailand’s top fiscal specialist Athiphat Muthitacharoen last week posted on his personal social media account, mentioning that the main reason S&P Global Ratings kept Thailand’s BBB+ sovereign credit rating was due to the country’s economic structural strengths, including its limited external debts, high level of international reserves, and mature bond and currency markets.

“Thailand’s persistent current account surplus, on the other hand, is about to change,” said Athiphat. “The country recorded a relatively large current account deficit in March due to its heavy reliance on imported oil. And Thailand’s current account surplus era is about to end due to the permanent surge in global oil prices, as well as increased imports of factory machinery amid the data center boom.”

In order to strengthen Thailand’s economic performance productively instead of relying on old economic capacities, Athiphat suggested that the government needs to build the nation’s new economic competitiveness.

“The big challenge of the Thai economy is not only maintaining its sovereign credit rating, but also cultivating the country’s new economic competitiveness through productivity-led growth, greater competitiveness through investment, and a credible fiscal framework,” said Athiphat.

For short-term sentiment, investors have poured a net USD 2.7 billion into Thai bonds and equity markets due to Thailand’srelatively high fiscal responsibility, while roughly USD 4.2 billion of foreign investment has been withdrawn fromIndonesia amid its government’s transparency crisis.

In April, Moody’s Ratings updated Thailand’s sovereign credit outlook to positive from negative due to reduced U.S. reciprocal tariffs, strong investment momentum, and political stability, while affirming its Baa1 credit rating.


Satid is a multimedia economic journalist and news anchor who covers macroeconomic trends, Thailand’s fiscal policy, and key regional developments for Bangkok Biz. A Journalism graduate from Thammasat University, he has reported on major issues such as the US–China trade tensions, the Myanmar crisis, and global corporate stories, drawing on prior newsroom experience at The Momentum, the Bangkok Post, AFP, and Varasarn Press. His work blends economic analysis, foreign affairs, and digital storytelling, with a strong focus on making complex financial and political topics accessible to Thai audiences.

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Lao PDR 🇱🇦

Tourism Growth and Fiscal Capacity in Laos

by Thipphavanh Virakhom, in Vientiane

Laos recorded 1.36 million international tourist arrivals in the first quarter of 2026 alone — an 8% increase over the same period last year, with notable growth from European, North American and Gulf markets. The government’s ambitions extend further still: 22 million visitors and USD 8 billion in tourism revenue by 2030, supported by expanding regional rail connections that position the country as a transit hub within ASEAN.

The recovery is real and worth noting. The more useful question, however, is not how many visitors arrive, but how that growth interacts with the fiscal pressures Laos faces as it approaches graduation from Least Developed Country status this November.

Some context helps frame the scale of the new target. The previous five-year plan aimed for 15 million visitors and reached roughly 5.83 million — about 39% of target. The new goal is therefore not simply an extension of recent momentum; it represents a substantially larger ambition than the sector has previously delivered, which is a reasonable basis for measured rather than unqualified optimism.

A second consideration is the relationship between tourist spending and public revenue, which are not interchangeable. Much of what visitors spend reaches hotels, guesthouses and tour operators, a significant share of it informally, while government revenue depends on what can be captured through taxation. This matters because domestic revenue collection in Laos has remained around 10–11% of GDP, among the lower rates in the region, even as debt servicing consumes close to a third of government revenue. Strengthening VAT enforcement and bringing more small tourism operators into the formal economy would likely determine how much of this growth translates into fiscal capacity rather than GDP alone.

A third factor is the infrastructure underpinning tourism growth. Public attention has often focused on the Lao-China Railway as a source of debt risk, but research suggests the larger burden lies elsewhere — primarily with Electricité du Laos, the state power utility, whose debt of roughly USD 5 billion represents close to 45% of total public debt. As part of efforts to stabilise its finances, the utility transferred a 90% stake in its transmission grid to a foreign state utility. A tourism sector aiming for substantially higher visitor numbers will depend on reliable power and transport infrastructure, the financial sustainability of which remains an evolving picture.

None of this suggests the tourism recovery is unfounded or that current strategy is misguided; expanding connectivity and diversifying source markets are reasonable long-term approaches. It does suggest that the relationship between visitor growth and fiscal sustainability deserves continued, careful observation rather than assumption. Whether tourism becomes a meaningful contributor to Laos’s broader financing needs will depend less on arrival numbers than on revenue capture and infrastructure resilience — both of which remain open, evolving questions worth following closely.


Thipphavanh holds a bachelor’s degree in international affairs. She is a governance and development professional specialising in rule of law, access to justice, and gender equality in Lao PDR. Her work focuses on strengthening justice sector institutions, advancing people-centred governance, and promoting gender-responsive systems. With extensive experience in project coordination, monitoring and evaluation, stakeholder engagement, and strategic communications, she has collaborated closely with national institutions and international partners to support inclusive and sustainable development.

Cambodia 🇰🇭

Cambodia and Russia Mark 70 Years of Diplomatic Ties at Kazan Summit

by Sokna Thea, in Phnom Penh

Prime Minister Hun Manet met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Kazan on June 19 on the sidelines of the ASEAN-Russia Commemorative Summit, using the occasion to mark the 70th anniversary of bilateral diplomatic relations, established in 1956, and to push for deeper cooperation across trade, energy, education, and security.

Hun Manet acknowledged Soviet assistance following the fall of the Pol Pot regime in 1979, including diplomatic backing, educational programmes, and infrastructure support that produced landmarks such as the Khmer-Soviet Friendship Hospital and a technical institute, and described Russia as a “longstanding and reliable partner” whose role Cambodia values regardless of shifting global alignments.

Putin, in turn, noted that the Kremlin continues to support energy, agriculture, telecommunications, and maritime infrastructure in Cambodia, and acknowledged that bilateral trade volumes had grown by roughly 2 percent. That figure, however, masks a broader slump. The Phnom Penh Post reported that Cambodia-Russia trade declined sharply from USD 239 million in 2021 to USD 55 million in 2024, a contraction widely linked to Western sanctions on Russia and Russian investors’ preference for the Chinese and Vietnamese markets.

On the economic agenda, Hun Manet requested Putin’s support for a free trade agreement between Cambodia and the Eurasian Economic Union. Putin invited Cambodian businesses to participate in the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok (September 1-4) and Russian Energy Week in Moscow in October, framing both events as entry points for expanded commercial contacts under the bilateral Intergovernmental Commission framework.

Educational ties received notable emphasis. Putin disclosed that more than 8,000 Cambodians have received higher education in Russia, that 160 students are currently enrolled, and that Russia provided 63 new scholarships in 2026. On the business side, Russian automotive group GAZ, founded in 1936, operating 15 manufacturing plants and exporting to 43 countries, expressed interest in entering Cambodia’s automotive sector after a June 18 meeting with the prime minister, though no formal commitment was made.

The bilateral talks took place within the larger ASEAN-Russia Commemorative Summit, which marked 35 years of dialogue relations and brought together leaders from all 11 ASEAN member states, including Cambodia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Singapore. Russia and ASEAN adopted four summit documents: the Kazan Declaration, a Comprehensive Plan of Action for 2026-2030, and joint statements on energy and cultural cooperation.

The summit unfolded as G7 nations, meeting concurrently in Évian-les-Bains, France, pledged “unwavering” support for Ukraine and announced further tightening of sanctions on Russia’s oil and gas sectors. Russia’s hosting of Southeast Asian heads of government in Kazan served, in part, as a visible counter-signal to that pressure.

Cambodia’s consistent position, maintaining ties with both Western partners and Russia while avoiding formal alignment with either side, reflects its long-standing multi-vector foreign policy, which Phnom Penh frames as one of political trust and shared interest rather than geopolitical allegiance.

Sokna has a background in International Affairs and Business & Commercial Law. He’s currently a Senior Project Coordinator at the Ministry of Economy and Finance of Cambodia, working on the Financial Management Information System (FMIS) Project. His professional focus is driven by entrepreneurship, business development, and financial technology, with a particular interest in how private-sector innovation drives Cambodia’s economic growth.

Editorial Deadline 20/06/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Karen Ysabelle R. David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk

In a world where natural disasters grow ever more frequent and ever more worse due to climate change, the disaster-prone countries of Southeast Asia are racing to find a way to slow the threat. This week in the Pacific Corridor, the Philippines and Vietnam are heeding the green light to go green.

For the Philippines, digital transformation and the green transition go hand-in-hand. But can the former really bring about the latter when the country’s electricity system and the hundreds of thousands of tons of electronic waste that it generates are not exactly shining examples of sustainability? Vietnam is navigating a similar paradox, as its accelerating policy push for a circular economy outpaces the reality on the ground. Hanoi must move beyond promises and policies if it hopes to make any difference at all.

But for the young people of Singapore this week, climate anxieties are a distant worry when compared to the frustrating reality of a confusing entry-level job market. In the absence of government policy, Singaporean youth are addressing the issue of youth unemployment by taking matters into their own hands.

Singapore 🇸🇬

When Students Build What Institutions Won’t: Singapore’s Youth-Led Job Intelligence Movement

by Ryan

In Singapore’s increasingly opaque entry-level job market, a small but growing cohort of students and recent graduates has taken matters into their own hands. One of the most notable results is didtheyghost.me, an open-source, community-driven platform that allows applicants to track internship applications, log interview timelines, and flag companies that never respond. Built by job applicants for job applicants, the platform describes itself not as a job scraper or another job board, but as something closer to an archive of the application experience itself, helping users to answer burning questions like how long it typically takes to hear back from a given company. A parallel community-maintained GitHub repository for Singapore’s Summer 2026 tech internships has already logged 439 commits from contributors adding and verifying listings, a quiet but telling display of collective self-organization.

These tools did not emerge in a vacuum. Just 74.4% of 2025 university graduates in the labor force secured a full-time job, down sharply from 87.5% of their 2022 counterparts, while the proportion unemployed and actively searching rose to 10.5% from 3.6% in 2022, and the median gross monthly salary has held flat at SGD4,500 for two consecutive years. Layered atop these cyclical pressures is a structural one: artificial intelligence (AI). The anxiety in Singapore is measurable: almost 30% of respondents in NTUC’s 2026 economic sentiments survey felt anxious that AI would replace their job, prompting the union to launch its AI-Ready SG initiative in February 2026, offering 50% subsidies for AI tools and training alongside structured learning pathways.

Singaporean students are not waiting passively for conditions to improve. Faced with a hiring market that increasingly values demonstrated experience over academic credentials, many are pursuing multiple internships before graduation. Most NUS, NTU, and SMU undergraduate programs already include at least one formal internship, with SMU requiring ten weeks as a graduation requirement, but for competitive students the curricular minimum has become a floor rather than a ceiling. The perceived value of internships among graduates rose to 38% in 2025 from 28% the year before, while only 23% now view academic results as an important factor in the job market. Students are simultaneously building portfolios of independent projects and pursuing AI certifications, with 59% of Singapore graduates believing AI skills provide a competitive edge, well above the global average of 40%. The graduating class of 2026 is also screening out roles that do not disclose compensation at a significantly higher rate than previous cohorts, signaling that this generation approaches the job search with a level of market intelligence that earlier cohorts lacked.

The challenge is not unique to Singapore. In Indonesia, unemployment among those aged 15 to 24 stands at 16.26%, the highest of any age group, and despite a national internship program, structural gaps persist. The Philippines recorded youth unemployment of 12.2%, prompting a new ten-year National Education and Workforce Development Plan. Vietnam’s youth unemployment rate among those aged 15 to 24 sits at 9.0%, four times the national average. Malaysia fares better, with graduate unemployment at 3.2% and overall unemployment falling to 2.9% by late 2025, the lowest since 2014, though skills mismatches remain a persistent concern across the region. Across all these markets, it is young people themselves who have most clearly diagnosed the problem and moved fastest to address it, whether by coding platforms to track hiring transparency, stacking internships to build real-world credibility, or upskilling into AI at a pace that institutions have struggled to match. In an environment where the rules of entry-level employment are being rewritten faster than policy can respond, that resourcefulness may prove to be the most transferable skill of all.


Ryan is a final-year finance student at the Singapore University of Social Sciences (SUSS) with experience across venture capital, venture debt, and business development. He also holds a diploma in Law and Management from Temasek Polytechnic. His interests lie in how emerging technologies and economic trends shape business ecosystems and regional development in Asia.

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The Philippines 🇵🇭

Why the Philippines needs a Green Foundation for Digital Transformation

by Arianne De Guzman, in Bulacan

Digital transformation and the green transition are considered as mutually reinforcing goals. While the former emphasizes economic growth and innovation, the latter prioritizes sustainability and climate resilience.

On 2 June 2026, Philippine Department of Trade (DTI) Secretary Ma. Cristina A. Roque stated that the recently signed ASEAN Digital Economy Framework Agreement (DEFA) is anticipated to boost investments to strengthen digital transformation and participation in the Philippine digital economy. The DEFA projects that the value of ASEAN’s digital economy will double in value to US$2 trillion by 2030, as it will accelerate cross-border digital trade, electronic commerce, digital payments, cybersecurity, and data governance.

“For the Philippines, the DEFA is set to bring real benefits to everyday Filipinos,” DTI Secretary Roque said. The agreement is expected to strengthen digital participation in the country and empower micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMES) by creating job opportunities.

While the economic benefits of digital transformation are becoming clearer, the green transition also becomes another major policy objective.

At first glance, digital transformation can help advance environmental goals, as it can reduce paper consumption, streamline transactions, and build efficient systems. In actuality, each online payment, AI-generated response, or cloud-based service relies on data centers, a facility where data is stored, processed, and transmitted.

As the Philippines positions itself as a data center hub in Southeast Asia, power demand is expected to increase substantially. Data centers require a significant amount of electricity and water through power grids and cooling systems, and generate volumes of electronic waste, contributing to carbon emissions and environmental pollution.

This creates a central policy dilemma: digital transformation depends on electricity, but its sustainability depends on how that electricity is produced. The Philippines’ electricity system is still heavily reliant on fossil fuels, with coal supplying about 60% and natural gas 18%, indicating that over three-quarters of power comes from non-renewable sources. In contrast, renewable energy adoption remains uneven, with greater reliance on geothermal and hydropower, while solar and wind still account for only a small share.

The same tension appears in electronic waste. In 2022, the Philippines generated around 537,000 metric tons of Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE), the highest volume in Southeast Asia. According to the 2024 Global E-waste Monitor published by the United Nations, the country remains the region’s largest producer of e-waste. This also provides another reflection about technological advancement — it reinforces the culture of rapid replacement, where electronic devices are continuously produced and discarded even when they remain functional. Green transition, in this sense, cannot rely on recycling alone. It also requires revisiting how technology is valued, designed, consumed.

Tools such as energy monitoring, Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) reporting systems, and access to green finance platforms are now digital by default. Businesses and institutions with digital capacity should be better able to comply with sustainability requirements and access climate-linked investment.

Digital transformation is not the core problem; the question is whether the Philippines is capable of adequately addressing its ecological implications. The Philippines thus finds itself navigating a dual transition: balancing the pursuit of digital advancements, all while keeping in mind ecological well-being.

This dual transition is contingent upon whether digital transformation is matched by balanced investments in digital infrastructure and clean energy and stronger environmental governance. Without this alignment, digital transformation risks undermining the very sustainability benefits it seeks to achieve.


Arianne has experience in policy research at De La Salle University’s Jesse M. Robredo Institute of Governance, where she contributed to projects on systemic reform. She earned a degree in Political Science from Colegio de San Juan de Letran. Currently, she works in government relations, specializing in advocacy strategy, legislative monitoring, and stakeholder engagement. Beyond her professional work, she is actively involved in youth development and grassroots initiatives through the Rotaract Club of Santa Maria.

Vietnam 🇻🇳

Vietnam’s Circular Ambition, Linear Reality

by Hang Nguyen, in Ho Chi Minh City

Vietnam’s accelerating policy ambitions for the post-2025 period have placed the circular economy alongside the digital and green economies as a core engine of the country’s new growth model. The 14th National Party Congress Resolution explicitly mandates that Vietnam “develop the digital economy, green economy, circular economy” and pursue “green conversion, energy transition, and structural transformation” as interlinked national priorities. Yet, as with the twin tensions between green and digital transitions explored previously, the circular economy presents its own paradox: an increasingly robust legal scaffolding that has, so far, failed to translate into meaningful behavioral change on the ground.

The policy trajectory has been swift. The term “circular economy” did not appear in any official Vietnamese document before 2016. By 2021, it had entered Party political discourse for the first time through the 13th Party Congress Resolution. The Law on Environmental Protection (2020) provided the first statutory definition — framing the circular economy as an economic model aimed at reducing raw material use, extending product lifecycles, and minimizing waste — and introduced Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) obligations for producers of plastics, electronics, batteries, and tires. Decision No. 687/QD-TTg followed in 2022 with ambitious quantitative targets: a 15% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions per GDP and recycling of 85% of plastic waste by 2030. Most recently, Decision No. 222/QD-TTg (January 2025) established a National Action Plan for Circular Economy by 2035, while Decree 110/2026/NĐ-CP and Decree 29/2026/NĐ-CP have refined EPR obligations and introduced a domestic carbon trading system, respectively.

The breadth of this regulatory output is considerable. The challenge, however, lies not in the absence of legislative ambition, but in the gap between policy intent and operational reality — a pattern that should be familiar to observers of Vietnam’s broader development strategy. The circular economy’s legal definition, enshrined in the 2020 law, remains narrowly environmental in orientation, focusing on emissions and waste reduction, all while overlooking the model’s deeper economic logic: optimizing resource flows across sectors, linking production chains, improving labor productivity, and generating new economic value. This framing limits policy instruments to environmental tools and fails to engage the business community on genuinely economic terms.

Compounding this is the fragmentation of relevant regulations across multiple laws — environmental protection, natural resources tax, forestry, and consumer rights — without a unifying framework or dedicated coordinating agency. Empirical research on circular agriculture in Vietnam’s Central Highlands found that national government mandates had a statistically insignificant influence on actual farm-level adoption of circular practices, underscoring the disconnect between top-down directives and ground-level behavior. The EPR system, while codified, is still embedding itself in producer compliance routines, and recycling infrastructure outside major urban centers remains severely underdeveloped.

For the circular economy to move beyond its current status as a well-documented aspiration, Vietnam must treat institutional architecture as the central reform priority. This means designating a coordinating body with cross-ministerial authority; synchronizing incentive structures across tax, finance, and procurement policy; and building the decentralized implementation capacity that local governments currently lack. Without this shift, Vietnam risks repeating the same pattern it faces in its green and digital transitions: coherent strategy, fragmented execution.


Hang is a young researcher with academic experience in Vietnam and the United States. She has previously worked in public relations at the U.S. Consulate General in Ho Chi Minh City and the YSEALI Academy. Her research focuses on ASEAN centrality in the evolving Asia-Pacific landscape, with particular attention to Vietnam’s approach to trade, regional cooperation, and political economy in the face of external power dynamics and global volatility.

Editorial Deadline 16/06/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Siu Tzyy Wei, Lead Editor - Maritime Crescent Desk

This week, the cauldron of Southeast Asia simmers - the heat coming more from just the weather.

In Indonesia, the streets and markets reveal what happens when fiscal fuel runs low and public trust, once again, boils over. In Brunei, talks of an upcoming visit to Kazan shows how small states must balance carefully amidst larger flames of great power rivalry. In Malaysia, the return of El Niño reminds us that climate itself is a change that tests resilience across food, water and health.

Together, these stories capture a region living at the boil. Diplomacy, economics and climate each add their own heat to the cauldron, and survival depends on how long the pot can be kept from spilling over.

Indonesia 🇮🇩

Running the Country on Empty?

by Rayhan Prabu Kusumo, in Jakarta

On June 12, after Friday prayers, around 1,500 students marched toward Bundaran HI behind a line of six thousand police. Their demands read like a list: bring fuel prices down, stop wasting the budget, roll back the costly flagship programs, pull the military back out of civilian institutions, and have the President acknowledge that his government has been making mistakes. It is tempting to treat these as five complaints, but they are closer to five symptoms of one thing.

The protest landed at the end of a bruising few months for the economy. The rupiah had been weakening since early in the year. Global oil prices were part of it, but the heavier pressure was sustained capital flight. Foreign investors had pulled a cumulative $3.36 billion from the Jakarta stock exchange by mid-year, and the Jakarta Composite Index was down more than 30% from its historical peak, the worst-performing equity index in the world for 2026. In the government securities market, foreigners booked net sales of Rp 15.43 trillion between the end of 2025 and May 2026, against net purchases of Rp 49.62 trillion in the same months a year earlier. The money was leaving on a judgment about where the budget was headed.

Against that, Pertamina raised non-subsidised Pertamax by more than 32%, announced in the middle of the night with no prior public warning, and the cost fell on the middle class that relies on it. A government with little room left moves in large steps like this one, because the room had been spent before the shock arrived.

The pressure in the markets traces back to a way of spending. Free meals, the Red-and-White village cooperatives, and the other flagships were each launched fast and large, ahead of the institutions meant to run them. Whatever the programs deliver, the commitment is fixed and the bill returns every year. That is the line foreign investors have been reading. Pulling their money out of Jakarta was a judgment on a government that keeps adding permanent costs faster than it builds the capacity to carry them.

The same spending pattern is what brings people into the street. The demonstrations have recurred since Prabowo took office in late 2024, against VAT increases, education cuts, parliamentary housing allowances, and the military’s creep into civilian institutions. What connects them is a steady loss of trust as the people no longer believe the government is working in their interest.

The rupiah has recovered from its all time low and the street has quieted, which is a real if narrow opening. It is not worth much spent on patching a single program, because the problem is the habit of committing to large, permanent programs before the capacity to run them exists. Investors across the region are reading the fiscal line, and the public stopped believing the press releases some time ago.


Rayhan has a background in government affairs and public policy, with experience across government institutions and advisory firms. His work focuses on the intersection of geopolitics, policy, and risk, with expertise in advocacy, regulatory analysis, and stakeholder engagement. He holds a degree in Government from Universitas Padjadjaran, and has completed an exchange at Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Spain, focusing on global politics and sustainability.

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Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳

The Road to Kazan

by Wira Gregory Ejau, in Bandar Seri Begawan

Between June 17-18, ASEAN leaders will travel to Kazan for the bloc’s first in-person summit with Russia since Sochi in 2016. Only a week ago, the Russian Embassy in Bandar Seri Begawan held its annual Russia Day reception on the 7th of June, a modest diplomatic occasion that, perhaps, precedes something considerably larger. Brunei will be among the ASEAN leaders invited by Vladimir Putin to attend the ASEAN-Russia Commemorative Summit in Kazan, marking 35 years of dialogue relations.

The visit to Kazan is an expression of ASEAN’s longstanding practice of maintaining dialogue with all major powers, independent of their conduct in other theatres. Brunei, as the current ASEAN-EU Dialogue Relations Coordinator for the 2024-2027 term, has spent the past several months at the institutional centre of Europe’s deepening engagement with Southeast Asia, such as hosting the 25th ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting in April, facilitating Germany’s bid for ASEAN Sectoral Dialogue Partnership, and stewarding a relationship that both sides are building toward its 50th anniversary in 2027.

During the outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian war in 2024, Brunei maintained a steadfast adherence to the doctrine of constructive neutrality. Notwithstanding the complexities of the current international legal landscape, Brunei expressed concern over the escalation of tensions and military actions in Ukraine without naming Russia explicitly. Maintaining this position while sending a head of state to meet Putin in person, on Russian soil, three years into that war, exemplifies engagement without endorsement, access without alignment.

What makes Kazan substantively interesting is the agenda Russia has brought to it: a successor Comprehensive Plan of Action for 2026-2030, a 10-year Strategic Program on Trade and Investment, and frameworks for alternative financial infrastructure designed in part to route around Western sanctions. These reflect Russia’s active courtship of the Global South as a structural response to Western economic pressure, and ASEAN’s collective presence at Kazan, Brunei’s included, lends that courtship a degree of multilateral legitimacy that Moscow has few other means of securing.

Whether Brunei translates summit attendance into deeper bilateral economic engagement with Russia is a separate question, and the existing bilateral relationship offers little basis for projecting significant expansion. What the Kazan visit does confirm is that Brunei’s diplomatic posture remains as multi-faceted as ever, as a practised reality that holds even when the vectors point in conspicuously different directions.


Gregory is an MSc candidate in Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He works as a freelance writer specializing in international history, conflict, and counterterrorism, with experience in academia, investigative journalism, and voluntary uniformed service. He currently provides research assistance with the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) under their Southeast Asian Security and Defence Internship Programme and conducts investigations on regional security and transnational crime for a confidential company.

Malaysia 🇲🇾

The Return of El Niño

by Muhammad Aiman Bin Roszaimi, in Cyberjaya

For Malaysia, El Niño is often associated with hotter days and water shortages. Yet the return of El Niño in 2026 represents a far more significant challenge. It is not merely a weather phenomenon but a national stress test that could expose vulnerabilities across Malaysia’s food security, water management, public health and economic resilience.

According to forecasts by the Malaysian Meteorological Department (MetMalaysia), El Niño conditions are expected to develop from mid-2026 and could persist until early 2027. Government agencies have warned that several states may experience rainfall reductions of between 40 and 60 per cent, accompanied by prolonged periods of hot and dry weather.

The most immediate concern is water security. Malaysia has experienced water disruptions during previous El Niño episodes, particularly when reservoir levels declined due to prolonged dry spells. Reduced rainfall can place pressure on dams, rivers and groundwater supplies, especially in urban areas with high demand and regions already facing infrastructure constraints. Recognising these risks, the government has begun preparations, including cloud-seeding operations, monitoring reservoir levels and identifying alternative groundwater sources.

Agriculture is likely to face even greater challenges. The Economy Ministry has warned that crop yields could decline by between 8 and 10 per cent as higher temperatures and reduced rainfall affect farming activities. Rice cultivation, fruits, vegetables and commodity crops such as palm oil could all experience productivity losses. Such disruptions would not only affect farmers’ incomes but could also contribute to higher food prices, adding pressure to households already coping with rising living costs.

The economic implications extend beyond agriculture. Reduced water availability can affect industrial production, while higher temperatures increase electricity demand as households and businesses rely more heavily on cooling systems. The government has already noted that El Niño could exacerbate existing economic pressures linked to global energy market uncertainties. In a worst-case scenario, simultaneous disruptions to food, water, and energy systems could create inflationary pressures that ripple across the broader economy.

Public health is another area of concern. El Niño can contribute to heat-related illnesses, haze events, and school closures. From 2015 to 2016, temperatures exceeding 37°C led to the closure of hundreds of schools in Northern Peninsular Malaysia. As climate change amplifies the intensity of extreme weather events, future heatwaves may become even more disruptive.

Malaysia’s response should not be limited to emergency measures, as the larger challenge lies in building long-term climate resilience. This includes investing in water infrastructure, improving agricultural adaptation through drought-resistant crops, strengthening early warning systems, and integrating climate risks into national economic planning. The government’s current whole-of-government approach involving NADMA, MetMalaysia, the Health Ministry and state authorities is a positive step, but sustained coordination will be crucial.

Ultimately, El Niño is a jarring reminder that climate-related risks are becoming increasingly intertwined with national security, economic stability, and societal well-being. The question is no longer whether Malaysia will experience the effects of El Niño, but whether it can transform recurring climate shocks into an opportunity to strengthen its resilience for the future.


Aiman is a PhD candidate in Security and Strategic Analysis at the National University of Malaysia. His research focuses on Malaysia’s space policy, ASEAN regional security, and the strategic implications of emerging technologies. His work explores how Malaysia’s defense policy and strategic culture shape its approach to outer space.

Editorial Deadline 13/06/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk

This week’s issue of the Mekong Belt shows that return is rarely as simple as the journey back. In Laos, five men crawled out of a flooded cave in Xaysomboun Province after ten days without food or water, but two of their companions remain unaccounted for underground. All while the rescue mission is suspended, and their families still waiting at the entrance with no answers. In Cambodia, nearly a million migrant workers were forced back across the Thai border in a crisis-driven reversal that left households stripped of income and buried in debt — and with 78% already planning to return to Thailand, the question is less whether they came home than whether home was ever a real option.
Meanwhile, the mysterious detention of Myanmar scholar Min Zin in Kunming raises unsettling questions about the cost of crossing into China for academic work. Finally, in Bangkok, Thailand’s “Thai Help Thai Plus 60/40” co-payment scheme offers 43 million citizens a brief cushion against inflation, though critics warn it is a fiscal shot that delays, rather than treats, the underlying ailment.

Lao PDR 🇱🇦

The Cave Keeps Two, For Now

by Thongsavanh Souvannasane, in Vientiane

Five men walked out of a flooded cave in Laos’ remote Xaysomboun Province on 30 May having survived more than ten days underground without food or water.

The world celebrated. But for two of their companions, still unaccounted for inside the same cave system, the story has no such ending, and may never.

The group entered the cave on 20 May.

When monsoon rains flooded the entrance and trapped them, one man escaped early and alerted authorities, triggering a multinational rescue operation that drew cave diving experts from Australia, Finland, Malaysia, Thailand, and beyond. Finnish cave diving expert Mikko Paasi, a veteran of the 2018 Tham Luang rescue in Thailand, was among those who responded, describing conditions inside as unlike anything in more than three decades of diving.

He wrote on Facebook that never in over 30 years of diving had he experienced such a claustrophobic and hostile environment.

Rescuers located five survivors deep inside on 27 May, more than 250 meters from the entrance, down a steep 45-degree subterranean slope. The passages narrowed in places to little more than 60 centimeters, roughly the width of a refrigerator, and filled with opaque, silty water.

One survivor, identified only as Meud, said in a video shared by a rescue group that the two missing men had entered the cave several days before the others and had descended much further.

Pumping water from the mine was the preferred strategy, but as the miners’ health began to decline rapidly and pumping showed little progress, the team attempted a hazardous underwater extraction. One man was successfully guided through a narrow 25-meter restriction on 29 May.

The risks were deemed too great to repeat, so pumping intensified instead, eventually lowering water levels enough for the remaining four to crawl out on their own the following day, to the astonishment of divers who were suiting up to go back in.

The two missing men were not among them.

Rescuers suspected they may be sheltering in an elevated rocky chamber deeper in the cave system. On 1 June, Thai chief rescuer Kengkard Bongkawong reported hearing knocking sounds from approximately 70 meters down a newly discovered vertical shaft, sounds he said did not appear to be echoes.

The news briefly raised hopes. But Australian diver Josh Richards later clarified in an interview with NBC’s show that the knocking had come from him as he attempted to signal the missing men, and that he heard nothing back.

Conditions steadily worsened.

Sections of the cave began to collapse, air quality deteriorated, and monsoon rains continued to flood the system faster than pumps could manage. On 6 June, the multinational mission was suspended.

Paasi wrote on Facebook that despite giving everything over two weeks, “you can’t fight nature.”

As international rescue teams packed up and headed home, the wives, children, parents, siblings, and friends of the two missing men remained at the cave site, still waiting, with no answers and no end in sight.

Rescuers have said they intend to return if weather conditions improve and the cave system becomes stable enough to resume operations.

Thongsavanh is a journalist from Laos with a background in English-language media. He graduated from the Lao-American Institute with a Diploma of the Arts in English and contributes to independent news platforms. His reporting focuses on environmental issues, socio-economic development, and geopolitics.

Cambodia 🇰🇭

Cambodia’s Migrants Caught Between Debt and the Thai Border

by Malai Yatt, in Phnom Penh

After border tensions with Thailand, the number of Cambodians in the overseas workforce has increased by 70%. Intensive government job-matching efforts have already helped 620,000 of the 973,000 returnees secure new employment at home

According to the recent report by the World Bank, “Cambodia’s overseas migrant workforce contracted sharply by 70%, falling to just 434,000 by December 2025. This collapse was precipitated by border tensions with Thailand in mid 2025, driving a sudden influx of nearly a million returnees and placing severe strain on domestic labor markets.”

State-led reintegration initiatives have become increasingly popular despite this pressure. Beginning in June 2025, authorities quickly implemented a thorough border response, simplifying paperwork and offering emergency food, transit registration, and family communication support, the report said.

According to a CENTRAL-based survey between August and October 2025, 85 percent of returnees are unable to make their payments, and 71 percent of them have debt. Their average monthly payback was $220, and their debt ranged from $30.80 to $35,000. It added that over 50 percent of respondents have planned to immigrate, whereas 78 percent of respondents stated they aim to return to Thailand.

According to the World Bank, the Cambodian government implemented competency-based tests to codify foreign talents and offered direct recommendations to companies and Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) institutions, backed by a dedicated job-matching hotline (1297), in order to assist labor market re-entry.

“These proactive measures yielded notable results: of the 973,000 total returnees in 2025, 98.5 percent from Thailand and 43.3 percent female, official data indicate that 620,000 successfully secured employment. This labor absorption was split evenly, with 310,000 returnees entering the formal sector and an equal number absorbed by the informal economy.”, the World Bank added.

It should be noted that Sun Mesa, the spokesperson for Cambodian Labour and Vocational and Training, confirmed that MLVT is committed to helping any returning workers find employment.

“No matter whether they have or don’t have an identity card, they can still apply for a job. We work to assist them, even with the document process,” he stressed.

Meanwhile, Khun Tharo, Programme Manager for the Centre for Alliance of Labour and Human Rights (CENTRAL), said that one of the most abrupt migration reversals since COVID-19, he continued, was the widespread return of Cambodian migrant laborers from Thailand during the border disputes in 2025.

He said the return was not a “managed reintegration process but a crisis-driven disruption,” leaving many households without access to help, income, or food security.

In conclusion, the sudden 70 percent drop in overseas employment ultimately failed to keep workers home, as severe debt is already driving the vast majority back toward the Thai border.

Malai is a reporter at Kiripost, where she has worked for more than three years, driven by a strong commitment to amplifying the voices of underserved communities. Her reporting focuses on economic and foreign affairs.

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Myanmar 🇲🇲

Questions Loom Around China’s Detention of Myanmar Scholar

by Myat Moe Kywe

The arrest of Myanmar scholar Min Zin by Chinese authorities on espionage allegations has sparked concern among academics and observers both at home and abroad, who view the case as highly unusual and politically significant.

China’s Foreign Ministry confirmed on June 12 that Min Zin, a dual U.S.-Myanmar citizen and executive director of the Institute for Strategy and Policy Myanmar (ISP-Myanmar), was placed under criminal detention on suspicion of “engaging in espionage activities that endanger China’s national security.” Chinese authorities have not publicly provided details of the allegations.

According to reports, Min Zin disappeared on June 3 after arriving in Kunming, Yunnan Province, to attend an academic meeting. Chinese officials later confirmed his detention and notified U.S. consular authorities. The U.S. State Department stated that it was aware of the case and was providing consular assistance.

What makes the case noteworthy is that China rarely detains foreign scholars, particularly those engaged in academic research rather than political activism. While Beijing has tightened controls on domestic academics, journalists, and civil society organizations in recent years, arrests of international researchers remain uncommon. Several reports noted that Min Zin had visited China numerous times before without incident.

The timing has therefore prompted questions; Why Now? The arrest comes only weeks after U.S. President Donald Trump visited Beijing for talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping aimed at stabilizing relations between the two countries and before Min Aung Hlaing pays a state visit to China between June 15 and 19. Some observers are asking whether the detention reflects broader geopolitical tensions or an increasingly expansive interpretation of national security by Chinese authorities.

Min Zin is a prominent researcher whose work focuses on Myanmar’s political transition, conflict dynamics, and China’s role in Myanmar. ISP-Myanmar has published research on issues including border trade, Chinese investment, rare-earth exports, and the strategic relationship between Beijing and Myanmar’s military authorities. These topics have become increasingly sensitive as China’s interests in Myanmar have expanded amid the country’s ongoing civil conflict in the post-coup

For Myanmar’s academic community, the central question remains unanswered: if Min Zin has long engaged with Chinese institutions and traveled to China repeatedly, why was he detained now? Until Chinese authorities provide more information, the case is likely to deepen concerns among scholars conducting research on China, Myanmar, and other politically sensitive regional issues.


Myat is a B.A. graduate in Politics, Philosophy, and Economics. She has interned at The Asia Foundation in Washington, D.C., and she has also worked as a summer research assistant at the Centre for Policy and Innovation (CRPI), gaining experience in research and analysis. Her work focuses on civic engagement, gender, youth leadership, and community development.

Thailand 🇹🇭

Thai Help Thai Plus 60/40: Immediate Economic Lifeline or Populist Procrastination?

by Paranut Juntree, in Bangkok

Thailand’s domestic economy is caught in a difficult squeeze. Against a 2.9% inflationary surge and escalating energy costs due to the conflict in the Middle East, the Ministry of Finance launched on June 1st the “Thai Help Thai Plus 60/40” co-payment program to cushion the blow for 43 million citizens. The program expands direct aid to 13.2 million state welfare cardholders while offering a 60% state subsidy on daily purchases for up to 30 million consumers via the “Pao Tang” application. By artificial-starting consumer spending, the government aims to prevent a severe contraction in public purchasing power and shield local businesses from collapse.

From a short-term perspective, the co-payment scheme yields undeniable, immediate benefits for the grassroots economy. By excluding major corporate franchises and limiting use to independent vendors and community stores, the scheme forces capital down to small retail levels. This targeting provides breathing space to a traditional retail ecosystem lacking the profit margins to survive the prolonged operating costs. For the population suffering from eroded disposable income, a maximum subsidy of THB 1,000 per month for 4 months operates as an effective cost-of-living shield.

However, the rapid rollout has triggered strong structural critique from policy analysts, trade organisations, and macroeconomists. The Thai Retailers Association has petitioned for expansion, noting that rigid non-corporate boundaries exclude vital supply chain segments in the economy, muting the multiplier effect. More critically, funding the co-payment program through an emergency borrowing decree or “Por Ror Kor” raises serious fiscal discipline flags. Borrowing extensive capital to subsidize daily consumption amounts to consuming future wealth without expanding the country’s underlying productive capacity. The Policy Watch also noted that the current co-payment scheme needed to take lessons from its predecessor, “Half-Half” co-payment program during the Covid-19. The “Half-Half” approach made sense during the Covid-19 pandemic, when massive emergency spending was justified because global interest rates were low and financial markets tolerated high deficits. Today, however, the situation has changed. Thailand’s fiscal situation has drastically deteriorated, having much less fiscal space and spiked public debt and rising interest burdens eating up the annual budget. With the current ultra-aging society demanding long-term healthcare and elderly welfare expenditures, the country is wasting its few remaining “fiscal bullets” on short-term populist measures instead of utilizing evidence-based targeting to maximize value.

This friction highlights a classic populist paradox. Consumption subsidies generate high public satisfaction, but their economic shelf-life is brief. Once the four-month window closes and state funding vanishes, consumer demand faces an immediate cliff because of root structural causes, such as low wages, high household debt, and low technological competitiveness. These aspects of the Thai economy remain unaddressed. The money invested in the co-payment scheme may have delivered far superior, compounding value if directed toward sustainable social safety nets or structural investments like logistic upgrades, green energy transitions, or extensive workforce retraining.

Ultimately, “Thai Help Thai Plus 60/40” serves as a vivid case study of a government trapped in reactive crisis management. Supporting small merchants during inflationary shock is an important policy necessity. Yet, substituting structural reform with continuous rounds of co-payment injections is unsustainable. For Thailand to break this cycle of stagnation, policymakers must transition from temporary cash injections toward high-return capital investments, transforming state interventions from an expensive, fleeting safety net into an enduring foundation for economic growth.


Paranut has a background in advocacy, with experience in policy research, communications, and civic engagement across both the NGO and government sectors. As Thailand’s Youth Delegate to the United Nations, he represented Thai youth in global dialogues on migration, education, and human rights, championing inclusive policymaking. He holds a degree in political science with a specialization in international relations.

Editorial Deadline 13/05/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Karen Ysabelle R. David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk

For many countries, a trade deficit is something almost like anathema. But for Vietnam, Tri Vo writes that the country’s recent US$13.8 billion deficit may just be the cost of double-digit growth ambitions and dreams of an economic boom. Rather than a sign of economic weakness, Hanoi may just end up surprising the world with what may actually be a show of strength.

Meanwhile, updates from the other countries of the Pacific Corridor: in the Philippines, Eduardo G. Fajermo Jr. reports that the country’s domestic political chaos intersected with diplomatic disappointment last week, after Manila lost its United Nations Security Council bid against Kyrgyzstan, a first in the history of its foreign affairs. In Timor-Leste, ASEAN membership could mean a more interconnected Southeast Asia and more educational opportunities for Timorese students, according to correspondent Lucreicha Jane in her first-ever article for The ASEAN Frontier. And from Singapore, Nurul Aini reports on the racial and religious tensions still brewing beyond rhetoric and underneath the surface of the city-state’s seemingly model society.

Vietnam 🇻🇳

The Deficit Momentum

by Tri Vo, in Ho Chi Minh City

When the National Statistics Office (NSO) released its macroeconomic data for the first five months of 2026, the headline figures presented quite a stark dichotomy. On the one hand, the domestic manufacturing engine is clearly overheating in a positive direction. The Index of Industrial Production in May increased by an impressive 8.8% compared to the same period last year, and overall exports surged by a massive 19.5% to US$215.66 billion, nearly half of Vietnam’s GDP. Yet, such unvarnished achievements have been somewhat besmirched by a staggering US$13.8 billion trade deficit, a sharp, albeit uncharacteristic, reversal from the US$5.1 billion surplus recorded during the exact same period in 2025.

At first glance, such a huge account deficit might raise some eyebrows, as it typically signals a loss of export competitiveness or a collapse in global demand, and thus other entailing economic problems down the road. However, a more granular analysis belies a phenomenon known as the deficit of expansion. In other words, this massive outflow of cash is not being driven by a surge in consumer imports (which remains modest) or a weakening export sector; rather, it can be a leading indicator showing that factories are proactively and aggressively stockpiling inputs.

Indeed, according to the latest trade breakdowns, imports of production materials accounted for 94.1% of total imports. Machinery, equipment, spare parts, electronics components, and base raw materials overwhelmingly dominate the import ledger, while finished consumer goods account for a paltry 5.9% of the total. Essentially, what this means is that manufacturers/constructors, both FDI and domestic, are importing billions of dollars in input today to fulfill the massive export orders scheduled for the third and fourth quarters. On another note, this move could be a hedge against supply volatility due to global instability.

Furthermore, such an aggressive procurement cycle directly aligns with top-down government growth targets. This is because, for Vietnam’s highly ambitious double-digit growth aspiration to be realized, a surge in input imports is a definite necessity, not merely a systemic glitch.

However, there remain some less salubrious aspects in this seemingly positive development, the most glaring of which is the immediate challenge for monetary policy. As importers demand more U.S. dollars to purchase overseas inputs, there is a real risk that this will reduce the country’s foreign reserves and weaken the Vietnamese Dong at a time when such reserves are already under high stress. Yet, what the next step should be will not be straightforward.

If the central bank tightens liquidity too aggressively to defend the domestic currency, it risks constricting the very firms Vietnam relies on to drive its ambitious economic target by raising their borrowing costs. Inversely, if the bank allows the Dong to continue its slide, inflation — already exacerbated by the global energy crisis — could depress purchasing power and reduce the standard of living.

Ultimately, Vietnam’s US$13.8 billion trade deficit is a necessary risk. It is the upfront cost for initiating and sustaining an economic boom in an increasingly inimical geopolitical landscape. The example of Vietnam, meanwhile, can serve as a powerful reminder for its ASEAN peers — many of whom are also incurring large trade surpluses — about the necessity of sacrificing such a seemingly ironclad mark of economic strength for future progress.


Tri has experience in management consulting and strategy, having worked with institutions such as the UNDP, The Asia Group, and ARC Group. He has provided strategic, legal, and operational insights to clients in sectors including manufacturing, energy, and technology. He holds both academic and professional experience related to Southeast and East Asia, with a focus on regional development and policy.

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The Philippines 🇵🇭

Seat Lost, Space Gained? The Philippines’ UNSC Bid and a Window for Domestic Repair

by Eduardo G. Fajermo Jr., in Angeles City

The Philippines’ bid for a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) ended on 3 June with a result that was decisive and not at all ambiguous. Kyrgyzstan secured the Asia-Pacific seat for the 2027–2028 term on the fourth ballot with 142 votes to the Philippines’ 49, clearing the two-thirds threshold of 128 and widening its lead round after round. It was the first time Manila failed to win after four successful runs since 1957.

Could we have seen this coming?

In pure vote math, perhaps not. But in the political logic of 2026, the loss was legible. Manila was campaigning for a seat that demands confidence in institutional steadiness, at precisely the exact moment that the Philippine state was staging a public stress test.

In other words, Manila was asking the world to trust it with a seat at the UN’s crisis table, all while its own upper chamber was struggling to keep order at home. Even if that did not “cause” the loss, it shaped the optics of reliability — an unspoken currency in New York that is difficult to quantify but easy to feel.

That credibility question has shadowed the Marcos government’s international ambitions before. In 2024, UN expert Irene Khan acknowledged the steps taken by the administration but stressed that more was needed, particularly in accountability for rights abuses and in addressing red-tagging practices. Those concerns are not unique to the Philippines, but they matter more when a country seeks a seat on a body that routinely debates atrocity prevention, humanitarian protection, and sanctions.

So is the loss a blessing in disguise?

It depends on what Manila does with the bandwidth it now has. A UNSC seat is not a ceremonial victory lap; it is two years of constant expectation, daily diplomacy, and a permanent spotlight on every contradiction a rival can amplify. In 2026, the Philippines is already headed into an unusually dense cycle of internal governance stress: Senate instability, an impeachment drama in the background, and International Criminal Court-linked political shocks that keep resurfacing through personalities rather than policy.

Avoiding the UNSC seat may therefore reduce the risk of what diplomats privately dread: being forced to defend domestic disorder while negotiating international crises. The UN Philippines office’s own retrospective emphasizes that past Filipino UNSC leaders navigated complex disputes and peacekeeping deployments, including the Council’s presidency and Haiti peacekeeping deliberations in the mid-2000s — precisely the kind of high-stakes engagement that demands a confident, disciplined state apparatus.

But there is also a cost. Losing the seat narrows Manila’s ability to shape agenda-setting from inside the chamber on issues that directly affect Southeast Asia–maritime tensions, humanitarian norms, and international legal discourse. It also complicates the Philippines’ claim to regional leadership just as it is expected to carry ASEAN’s chairmanship responsibilities, where credibility at multilateral forums can translate into leverage in quiet negotiations.

The UNSC loss is not a reprieve; it is a reckoning. It exposes that global influence cannot be willed into existence through campaign slogans alone. Influence requires institutional trust, and institutional trust is earned through domestic coherence — the boring work of rules, discipline, and credibility that holds even when politics gets hot.

If Manila wants to run again, and its history suggests it will, it will need to treat this defeat not as humiliation but as instruction. The world did not just cast ballots; it sent a message about what it rewards. And the Philippines now has time, perhaps its most valuable resource, to prove it can govern itself before asking to help govern the world.


Eduardo is a Political Science graduate and MA Political Science candidate at the University of Santo Tomas, researching democracy, disaster governance, and inclusive policy in the Global South. He is a former faculty member at Holy Angel University, where he taught Philippine history and contemporary global issues. He also worked with a senator in the Guam Legislature, contributing to policy research and legislative analysis.

Timor-Leste 🇹🇱

ASEAN Membership: What’s In It for Timorese Students?

by Lucreicha Jane

Timor-Leste just joined ASEAN. For Timorese students, this is more than just a political achievement; it could mean new opportunities that were not readily accessible before.

When Timor became part of ASEAN, it also became part of a much bigger regional space with many countries in Southeast Asia. This raises a simple question: “What does this actually change for students in real life?”

One of the main possible changes is access to educational opportunities. Being part of ASEAN could open more chances and scholarships, exchange programs, and study abroad opportunities across Southeast Asian countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore. Some of these opportunities already exist, but ASEAN membership may make them more structured and easier to access.

With regard to student exchange programs, instead of being rare or limited, exchanges between universities in ASEAN countries could become a more regular occurrence. This means students might have more chances to study abroad for short periods of time, join training programs, or experience different education systems in the region. There are also youth and skills development programs within ASEAN. These programs often focus on leadership, entrepreneurship, climate issues, and digital skills. Timorese students could now take part in more of these regional activities, which may help them prepare for future employment.

Beyond education, ASEAN membership also means connection. Students in Timor-Leste are now part of a wider student network across Southeast Asia. This could help in building friendship, academic cooperation, and even career opportunities. But even with all of these possibilities, one important question remains: “Will students actually take these opportunities?” Having access is one thing, but being ready and informed is another.

In the end, ASEAN membership is not just about politics or government decisions. For students, it could shape their education, skills, and future paths, but only if they are willing and ready to seize those opportunities.


Lucreicha Jane is an International Relations undergraduate at the Universidade Nacional Timor Lorosa'e (UNTL), with interests in international law, governance, and youth leadership. She previously served as General Secretary of the JCI Timor-Leste Local Chapter Dili Women Entrepreneurs (2024–2025) and as Executive Vice President of the Student Council at UNTL's Faculty of Social Sciences and Politics.

Singapore 🇸🇬

Racial and Religious Peace Beyond Mere Rhetoric

by Nurul Aini, in Singapore

At the back of the Singaporean collective consciousness is the constant reminder of the 1964 racial riots, where a misunderstanding between the Chinese and Malay communities resulted in violent and bloody clashes. Hence, every year on 21 July, we commemorate Racial Harmony Day, with celebrations done more widely in schools. During this time we are reminded of how important it is for each community to carry out the responsibility of holding together the social fabric through mutual understanding and cooperation so as to not allow history to repeat itself. However, from time to time, issues of race and religion emerge and society once again confronts the reality that racial harmony should not be confined merely to yearly rhetoric, but something that should be practiced.

Recently, a local digital creator (@olliechinny) posted her reflection on being a Chinese person in Switzerland. Documenting some of her experiences, she noted that due to the language barrier between herself and the Swiss community, she felt excluded during certain interactions. She acknowledges that, in Singapore, she had been brought up in a comfortably homogenous environment where she attends “Chinese Schools. Chinese Church.” She then writes, “[t]his was probably also how my Malay and Indian colleagues might have felt back home.” There were mixed reactions to this post — some saw it as a necessary part of her journey to realizing the minority experience in Singapore. Others took a jab at her opinion, even using the same format and wording of her post to satirize the seemingly out-of-touch nature of the original post, while also pointing out both the casual and outward racism faced by brown people in Singapore. In other words, it would have been unfortunately easy for her to sympathize with the minority community, if she had only attempted to communicate beyond her circle. Opinions have also emerged characterizing Singapore’s approach to race as frozen in time and paradoxical, where mechanisms in place to unite the different races also mean that race is more emphasized than ever. Yet, spontaneous discourse about it also remains limited.

A few weeks later, a report was launched against a video of the Islamic call to prayer (azan) during a heritage tour in Pulau Ubin. NParks has since then dismissed the report, citing that the azan during the tour is part of a respectful heritage demonstration. Wan, the tour guide who is also a descendant of the Ubin Orang Pulau, defended this by saying that this was part of an immersive soundscape experience that aimed to allow participants to imagine how the sound might have traveled through the space from the now-demolished mosque to the ears of those living around the area. There has been an outpouring of support for him, with Member of Parliament Alvin Tan reiterating the purpose of the azan and emphasizing the mutual respect and understanding that the community should practice. Unrelated to the issue but relevant to the topic is Professor Syed Farid Alatas’ opinion that Singapore and Malaysia’s racial relations is based more on tolerance than it is on deep mutual understanding. It thus becomes essential to cast aside any hatred and preconceived notions and seek ways to deepen knowledge on other races and religion and find common grounds.

The encouragement towards building understanding should begin with the fundamental question aptly posed in an article by Rice Media: When faced with the unfamiliar, why is the first instinct to silence it?


Aini is currently pursuing a master’s degree in English literature at Nanyang Technological University. She has experience working in youth groups, contributing to the planning and management of outreach activities.

Editorial Deadline 09/06/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Siu Tzyy Wei, Lead Editor - Maritime Crescent Desk

As the world becomes harder to read and harder to insulate against, the Maritime Crescent looks at three neighbours who navigate uncertainty in different ways.

In Brunei, a new national committee signals that the sultanate is building its formal structures to watch, assess and prepare before the next shock hits. In Malaysia, the Unity Government is discovering that the coalition which survived a hung parliament may not survive its own ambitions, as state-level rivalries begin to unravel what federal necessity stitched together. In Indonesia, we revisit Jakarta’s defence modernisation drive to ask whether the fiscal and currency pressures beneath that ambition are beginning to test the real cost of strategic autonomy.

In their own ways, this week’s stories are about preparation and survival - one building for it, one hoping it’s enough, and one asking what it costs to remain ready.

Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳

The Sultanate on Lookout

by Syimah Johari, in Bandar Seri Begawan

On 4th June 2026, Brunei established The National Committee on Addressing the Impact of the Middle East Conflict, a pre-emptive coordination mechanism to assess risks, manage potential disruptions, and safeguard national interests. While the conflict is unfolding far from Southeast Asia, the establishment of the committee highlights how distant geopolitical crises increasingly require local responses. It also reflects a broader shift in how security is being understood across ASEAN.

The government of Brunei has been closely monitoring developments in the Middle East and their potential implications for the global economy. Although geographically distant, the conflict has put energy markets, shipping routes and international supply chains under immense pressure. At a point where the world is barely adjusting to the rising costs from the COVID-19 pandemic, the conflict has triggered even higher costs for imported goods and increased economic uncertainty. For Brunei, this means bracing the current blows to its economy via the national stockpile policy, management of strategic supplies, but also the concurrent assessment of medium and long term implications of the conflict to national energy, food, healthcare and development sectors that are deeply dependent on international supply chains.

This reflects a broader regional trend. Traditionally, security has been associated with defence measures, borders and diplomacy. However, in an interconnected world where money, power and defence intertwine, security is redefined to include economic resilience, supply chain stability and access to essential goods. Today, economic resilience is just as important as national security - without it, a nation bears the costs not only to the disruptions of supply chains and growing competition for resources, but the changing nature of geopolitical relations and its overall sovereignty.

For Brunei, these concerns are the mold to the Committee. The country’s economy, while still dependent on oil and gas, is relatively small and highly open, with a strong reliance on imports for essential goods. In other words, the sultanate is highly dependent on the relations it has to its international counterparts and the global supply chain for food, manufactured goods and services to keep its people well fed and safe, thus making it extremely sensitive to the external price fluctuations and disruptions in global markets, As such, the creation of a Committee to manage Brunei’s survival amidst the Middle East conflict reflects a vital whole-of-government strategy to adapt and survive amidst turbulent and volatile realities it observes and experiences.

While the national committee was established to specifically address the impact of the Middle East conflict on the country, its significance extends beyond a single crisis. The committee reflects a broader shift in how Brunei is approaching geopolitical exposure - institutionalising its awareness that international disruptions can rapidly translate into domestic economic disruption, and that resilience is no longer an aspiration but an active policy priority.


Syimah is a graduate of King’s College London with a BA in International Relations. With a strong focus on diplomacy, regional cooperation, and development policy, she is passionate about contributing to meaningful change through public service. Currently, she is involved in poverty alleviation work through a local NGO.

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Malaysia 🇲🇾

United, For Now

by Edrina Lisa Ozaidi, in WP Kuala Lumpur

In November 2022, Malaysia’s general election resulted in a “hung parliament” where no single coalition had enough seats to form a government. To break the deadlock, the King intervened and proposed a “Unity Government”.

This forced long-time rival coalitions to work together — Pakatan Harapan (PH), led by the current prime minister, Anwar Ibrahim, a reformist coalition that had spent decades fighting against the establishment and Barisan Nasional (BN), which is the traditional establishment party that had governed Malaysia for over 60 years until its historic 2018 defeat.

For nearly four years, this “coalition of rivals” has maintained stability at the federal stage but remained bitter competitors at the local and grassroots level. Both sides are now preparing to compete against each other in the upcoming state election.

The current tension stems from a fundamental misalignment between the federal-level cooperation and state-level survival. In Johor, UMNO has moved to assert dominance, signalling its intention to contest all 56 state seats rather than maintaining a seat-sharing pact with its federal partner, Pakatan Harapan (PH). BN’s Chairman, Ahmad Zahid Hamidi, reminded its role as a “unity government enabler” in the fragile governing coalition to its federal partner.

In a tit-for-tat response, the PH-led administration in Negeri Sembilan dissolved its assembly, effectively ending the uneasy truce and pushing both state elections towards a high-stakes, three-cornered fight. Alternatively, Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s administration always prioritises political stability over the systemic reforms promised to the electorate. This has left the government more vulnerable to these localised revolts.

The structural flaws of the current administration are getting more difficult to ignore. Analysts point out that the Unity Government operates through the consensus, thus sacrificing long-term policy to avoid immediate collapse. As state election looms — infrastructure projects and reform agendas such as the “Maju Johor 2030” plan — are being weaponised as campaign tools, stalling long-term governance for short-term electoral optics.

The result is a “wait-and-see” culture among investors and civil servants. With growing speculation of an early general election (GE16) by late 2026, the bureaucracy has become increasingly cautious, delaying regulatory approval and fiscal measures.

When a government spends more time managing internal fissures than executing policy, it is the public that ultimately pays the price through stagnating development and policy inconsistency. Malaysia now stands at a crossroads. The Prime Minister has hinted that snap polls could be called if coalition cracks continue to widen. However, calling for national elections during a period of high economic sensitivity may only deepen the divide.

For the Unity Government to survive its remaining term, it must transition from a reactive state of “crisis management” to being proactive in genuine reforms. If the coalition continues to cannibalise itself in the states while clinging to power at the federal level, it risks losing not just the next election, but the core legitimacy of its power that was brought in 2022. Only time will tell if the Unity Government can survive its own internal contradiction.


Edrina is a communications professional with a background in international relations. She holds a degree from the University of Nottingham Malaysia and has worked across public relations and social media for organizations in the development, education, and corporate sectors. Her work focuses on crafting narratives around regional affairs and strengthening media engagement across Southeast Asia.

Indonesia 🇮🇩

What the Budget Numbers Don’t Show

by Hree Putri Samudra, in Jakarta

Defense modernization is one of the easier things to sell in Jakarta. The announcements are familiar by now: Rafales from France, J-10s from China, PT PAL talking about unmanned submarines, another parliamentary hearing where the budget edges upward and officials speak of momentum. The ambition is real enough. What gets less attention is the part that starts after the cameras are gone. Procurement contracts do not end at signing. They arrive later as maintenance obligations, spare-parts orders, software updates, fuel bills, and invoices priced against a rupiah sitting closer to Rp17,500 than the Rp16,500 the budget was built around.

On paper, Rp187.1 trillion suggests a government still serious about defense modernization. The exchange rate complicates that story. Rafale contracts, T-50i sustainment, and billions in foreign financing behind the J-10 acquisitions are tied to currencies Indonesia does not control. The budget approved in Jakarta remains numerically intact as the rupiah weakens. At current rates, the difference runs into hundreds of millions of dollars, enough to turn maintenance, ammunition, and training from routine planning questions into budgeting problems.

This is usually where the public conversation loses track of how defense budgets actually work. When conversations revolve only on capital, what gets squeezed are the less visible elements that keep a military running. Refitting schedules stretch. Spare-parts procurement slows. Exercises get reduced because fuel and operating costs no longer match the assumptions made months earlier. Nobody announces lower sortie rates or delayed maintenance cycles. It is here that currency pressure leaves its mark - not in procurement headlines but in the quieter erosion of readiness.

Indonesia has been bearing this defence budgeting imbalance for years. Procurement and personnel absorb attention and money more easily than sustainment ever does. Maintenance, readiness, and lifecycle costs tend to sit further down the priority list until the exchange rate forces them back into view. When the rupiah is relatively stable, the system muddles through. Under sustained depreciation, the distance between what Indonesia formally owns and what the TNI can reliably operate becomes harder to ignore.

Defense is competing inside a tighter budget than the headline numbers suggest. Oil assumptions have shifted, debt servicing is heavier, and Makan Bergizi Gratis now carries Rp335 trillion, almost double the military allocation. Prabowo has defended the program and understandably so. But when some spending lines are politically difficult to touch, adjustment rarely disappears. It tends to move elsewhere, often into maintenance, training, and delayed upgrades.

The foreign policy effects are harder to measure but still worth noticing. Governments under fiscal pressure negotiate differently, especially when procurement financing narrows and economic assumptions become harder to defend. Jakarta’s commitment to large-scale US energy purchases was presented as partnership, and while there is no reason to dismiss that outright, tighter budgets usually leave less room to bargain comfortably.

Bebas dan aktif - free and active - was always a doctrine with a material premise: that Indonesia would be substantial enough, stable enough, and solvent enough that genuine independence was possible. That premise hasn’t collapsed. But it isn’t free, rather, it is getting more costly to sustain.


Hree is a Policy Fellow at the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network (APLN) where she leads research and policy interventions on Indo-Pacific nuclear security and AI governance. She previously served as a Research Fellow at the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) and has managed multi-country security portfolios across all 10 ASEAN member states. Her work examines the intersection of emerging technologies, strategic stability, and the evolution of regional security architectures. She specializes in institutional risk assessment and the application of open-source intelligence (OSINT) for strategic monitoring. Her current research focuses on how technological shifts such as AI and advanced verification tools reshape escalation dynamics and multilateral cooperation in a multipolar world.

Editorial Deadline 16/05/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk

Across the Mekong Belt this week, big projects are being built. Just don't ask who they're built for. In fact, across the four countries, the pattern is the same: the deals get made, the tracks get laid, and dissent gets paved over.

In Myanmar, Min Aung Hlaing flew to New Delhi to use handshakes to reframe its junta as a diplomatic partner, with India's infrastructure and security interests quietly lending the regime a legitimacy it has never earned. In Laos, a USD 20 billion trade roadmap and a railway extension to the South China Sea deepen Vientiane's integration into China's regional supply chain, but that connectivity seams to arrive faster than the regulatory frameworks meant to govern it.

Meanwhile, in Thailand, a trillion-dollar Land Bridge moves forward under cabinet protection, quietly bypassing the parliament and the southern fishing communities who will bear the cost. And in Cambodia, Hun Manet is headed to Kazan to meet Putin — a trip that says less about Russia and more about Phnom Penh’s determination to keep its options open, whoever is watching.

Myanmar 🇲🇲

What Min Aung Hlaing’s India Visit Really Means

by Moe Thiri Myat

This week’s update starts with Myanmar junta chief Senior Min Aung Hlaing’s first visit to India and meeting with India Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Many believe the visit represents more than just a routine diplomatic engagement. Publicly framed around economic cooperation, regional connectivity, and strategic development projects such as the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project, the diplomatic side of the visit revolved on border cooperation and bilateral ties. Yet, the visit reveals a tendency beyond infrastructural development or trading purposes, raising questions regarding Myanmar’s democratic trajectory when regional powers begin treating the Junta as a normal government.

This visit comes at a moment when Myanmar’s military regime seeks international legitimacy after the elections, as the junta continues to face intense resistance from ethnic armed organisations and pro-democracy forces across the country. Despite persistent conflict, humanitarian deterioration, and international criticism, Min Aung Hlaing’s appearance in India signals that parts of the region are increasingly willing to engage the regime as a political reality rather than as an isolated military government. India’s discussion for high-level meetings and trade cooperation gives the regimes a significant victory. For a junta that has faced international condemnation since the 2021 coup, such engagement helps restore an image of diplomatic acceptance.

New Delhi has long viewed Myanmar through the lenses of border security, Northeast India’s stability, counterinsurgency cooperation, connectivity, and competition with China. Projects such as the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project are central to India’s regional strategy, linking India’s eastern seaboard to its Northeast through Myanmar. From this perspective, engagement with whoever controls Naypyidaw may appear pragmatic. However, this pragmatism has democratic costs. When economic corridors, infrastructure projects, and security cooperation proceed without serious attention to political legitimacy, they risk strengthening the very institutions responsible for Myanmar’s democratic breakdown. Development projects are never politically neutral in a conflict setting. They can shape territorial control, revenue flows, and the regime’s ability to claim administrative authority.

Beyond Myanmar, it mirrors a growing tension within ASEAN and the broader Indo-Pacific region regarding the balance between democratic values and regional management problems. The implications extend beyond Southeast Asia. India, often positioned internationally as the world’s largest democracy, now faces increasing scrutiny over whether its Myanmar policy aligns with its democratic identity or primarily reflects geopolitical calculations linked to China, border security, and regional influence.

Ultimately, Min Aung Hlaing’s India visit should not be read only as an economic or diplomatic event. It is part of a wider regional normalisation process. The critical question is whether India’s engagement will encourage a political pathway that supports Myanmar’s democratic future, or whether it will further entrench the junta by giving it external recognition, economic opportunity, and diplomatic breathing space.


Moe Thiri Myat is a senior at Parami University. Majoring in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics (PPE). Interested in analyzing emerging sociopolitical situations and developments, through her work as a Myanmar correspondent at The ASEAN Frontier she aims to explore how sociopolitical developments across Southeast Asia shape and are shaped by the situation in Myanmar.

Lao PDR 🇱🇦

Trade Ambitions and Railway Expansion Reshape ASEAN

by Phonethida Sitthixay, in Vientiane

As Laos and China marked 65 years of diplomatic ties, officials of both nations unveiled a bold new plan: a USD 20 billion trade target and a railway expansion that could reshape ASEAN’s economic map.

In the weeks leading up to the anniversary, Lao Minister of Industry and Commerce Malaythong Kommasith met with Chinese Minister of Commerce Wang Wentao on May 21, with both sides ending up agreeing on four strategic pillars to reach the 2030 target: agriculture, industrial cooperation, digital trade, and green energy. In recent years, China has already stood as Laos’ largest trading partner and investor, but the roadmap signals a shift toward diversified growth, positioning Laos as more than a recipient of infrastructure projects.

At the meeting, both sides pledged to upgrade the 1998 Laos–China Trade Agreement, focusing on market access, e‑commerce, trade facilitation, and payment settlement mechanisms. Moreover, China agreed to promote Laos’ energy security by increasing fuel supplies after the Middle East crisis, while also enhancing cooperation in renewable energy and electric vehicles. In agriculture, the two sides plan to establish local fertilizer production by combining Laos’ potash reserves with Chinese imports of phosphorus and nitrogen.

Connectivity is also central to the vision. The China–Laos Railway (LCR), which has already transported millions of tons of goods across ASEAN markets, began its first major capacity expansion this week. To further streamline the target, the Lao National Assembly approved a multi‑billion‑dollar extension from Thakhek to Vietnam’s Vung Ang seaport, this helps to open a direct corridor to the South China Sea.

Complementing these moves, the Lao government also launched a new smart customs system on June 1 at the Thanaleng Dry Port, streamlining clearance at a hub that links Laos to Thailand and serves as a gateway to Vietnam, Myanmar, and China.

As Laos and China celebrate 65 years of ties, the focus now shifts to achieving the ambitious USD 20 billion trade target by 2030. Railway expansion and customs modernization are expected to boost regional connectivity and logistics, positioning Laos as a vital bridge within ASEAN supply chains. However, a report warns that the pace of integration will depend on how effectively Laos manages regulatory reforms and balances its reliance on Chinese investment with broader regional partnerships.


Phonethida holds a Bachelor of Arts in International Relations from the National University of Laos. She previously worked at The Laotian Times, where she developed her skills in news writing and reporting, and served as a Political-Economic Fellow at the U.S. Embassy in Vientiane. As TAF's Laos correspondent, she brings a focus on governance, sustainable development, and Laos' evolving role in the regional order.

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Thailand 🇹🇭

A Trillion Dollar Mega-Project without Public Participation?

by Natamon Aumphin, in Bangkok

On May 29, Thailand’s lower house voted to allow new studies of the Land Bridge to be under the cabinet rather than the parliament, undermining parliament’s check-and-balance mechanisms.

Conventionally, it is a practice for the parliament to establish subcommittees to review the feasibility of mega projects, particularly the controversial ones that face public criticism. These committees invite diverse stakeholders to consult the project, ensuring comprehensive confrontation, as reflected in the past studies. Although some of the existing studies raise doubt about its research design, the latest one is even more skeptical. In fact, the proposal is not in the policy submitted to the Office of Election of Thailand and the attempt to push the project forward is rather rapid and publicly opaque. Therefore, it raises questions about public participation, particularly from civil society, and potential corruption.

Even though the Land Bridge, by principle, favors industrial sectors domestically and internationally, the impact mostly lies on the local Southern people, who rely mainly on the ocean for sustenance. Nonetheless, building this mega project is estimated to have massive environmental impact, for example, on the seabed with an abundance of sea life, coral reefs, and water quality. Similar projects, such as the Eastern Economic Corridor, have proven to be inefficient, said Natthaphong Ruengpanyawut, the opposition from the People’s Party. Despite GDP growth, the EEC decreases the security and welfare of the people in the area due to pollution, contamination, and concentrated benefits.

Therefore, reflecting back on the Land Bridge, if the government continues to neglect public participation, the livelihood of the local people and the local economy will erode as they benefit little from the trillion-dollar transport corridor while needing to face the impact. In fact, as the majority of the people rely on the Andaman and Gulf of Thailand sea, the project will likely hurt rather than benefit them. The only groups that will gain advantage are large industrialists and foreign nations such as China that have always criticized the dominant role of the Malacca Strait managed by Singapore, the key US ally in Southeast Asia.

Natamon has served as a rapporteur at the Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS Thailand). She has also worked as a research assistant on diplomatic issues in Southeast Asia. Her work focuses on how domestic politics shape foreign policy in the region. She holds a degree in international relations and has experience in policy analysis, event reporting, and regional research.

Cambodia 🇰🇭

The Kazan Gambit

by Chandara Samban, in Kandal

Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet is set to travel to Kazan, Russia, for an ASEAN-Russia summit where he is expected to meet President Vladimir Putin — a move observers see as Phnom Penh’s effort to balance ties with major powers while under close Western scrutiny.

Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet is set to attend the ASEAN-Russia Summit marking the 35th anniversary of ASEAN-Russia relations in Kazan, Russia. The summit, which will be held from June 17 to 18, 2026, will be the first time Russia has hosted the event and aims to strengthen the strategic partnership between the two sides. This information was provided by the RT Moscow office and confirmed by Cambodia’s Permanent Secretary of State at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Eat Sophea, to TAF on June 7, 2026.

According to Cambodia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the summit, which will be attended by the leaders of ASEAN member states, will focus on four key areas. First, trade, technology, renewable energy, AI, smart cities, political-security cooperation, and cybersecurity. Second, expanding cooperation in renewable energy, artificial intelligence, and smart city technologies. Third, preparing an action plan for 2026–2030 to deepen political, security, and socio-cultural cooperation. And fourth, promoting dialogue on cybersecurity, transnational crime, food security, and energy security.

Cambodia also plans to hold a bilateral meeting between Hun Manet and Putin, alongside meetings with other ASEAN leaders. Amid ongoing tensions with Thailand over land and maritime borders, Eat Sophea said Phnom Penh will reaffirm its commitment to resolving the dispute through international principles.

Thong Mengdavid, Deputy Director of the China-ASEAN Studies Centre, said the visit reflects Cambodia’s neutral foreign policy and creates opportunities for cooperation with Russia in security, energy, technology, and education. On ASEAN-Russia ties, he described the relationship as one of “strategic pragmatism,” where Russia needs ASEAN as a gateway beyond China, while ASEAN values Russia for supporting ASEAN Centrality through diversified partnerships. He also urged Cambodia to raise the Thailand border dispute at the summit and seek regional support for a peaceful resolution.

Geopolitical analyst Seng Vanly said the visit demonstrates Hun Manet’s commitment to balanced, independent diplomacy. “In the regional context, ASEAN and Russia maintain a strategic partnership that is cautious but necessary,” he said, noting shared interests in Asia-Pacific stability and multilateralism. On the border dispute with Thailand, however, Vanly cautioned against raising it at the summit to avoid ASEAN friction, and instead urged Cambodia to pursue legal mechanisms such as UNCLOS.

From the Russian perspective, Dr. Bulat Akhmetkarimov, an international relations scholar based in Phnom Penh, said the summit offers both sides a valuable platform for dialogue amid growing global fragmentation. He noted ASEAN’s growing importance in Russia’s “Turn to the East” policy and suggested Russia could offer an additional avenue for the Cambodia-Thailand dispute. On that issue, Akhmetkarimov noted Russia must balance its historically close ties with Cambodia against its significant economic interests with Thailand, which is set to chair ASEAN in 2027.


Chandara is a freelance journalist with a focus on foreign affairs, security issues, and ASEAN affairs. He also serves as a Junior Counterterrorism Intelligence Analyst.

Editorial Deadline 06/06/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Karen Ysabelle R. David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk

As the month of May drew to a close, we saw the movers and shakers of the world’s defense community flock to Singapore for the annual Shangri-La Dialogue, Asia’s premier security summit. Set against a backdrop of heightened geopolitical tensions and complex security risks, the summit nevertheless provides a neutral venue for connection and discussions. For host Singapore, the summit was also a chance to reinforce its enviable role as a trusted convener for Asia and the rest of the world.

For Vietnam, whose own President To Lam gave the opening keynote address at the Dialogue, it was an opportunity to see and be seen as one of the region’s rising middle powers. At the same time, the Vietnamese leader highlighted in his speech the multiple crises facing the world today and the fragmented security environment that middle powers must learn to navigate.

But for the Philippines, foreign affairs takes a backseat amid the Vice President’s upcoming impeachment trial and a chaotic Senate. In the midst of head-spinning developments, a coalition of concerned citizens have launched Bantay Senado in an effort to keep the public informed and aware during a time of unprecedented political uproar.

Singapore 🇸🇬

Asia at a Crossroads: What the Shangri-La Dialogue 2026 Reveals About the Region’s Security Future

by Jennifer Hui En Tan, in Singapore

The yearly Shangri-La Dialogue was held from 29 May to 31 May 2026, hosting more than 550 defense ministers, military chiefs, diplomats, and security analysts at Asia’s most closely watched security forum. This year’s dialogue opens against the backdrop of Middle East tensions, energy price volatility, and global supply chain uncertainty. Launched in 2002 by the International Institute for Strategic Studies with the support of the Singapore government, the Shangri-La Dialogue has grown into Asia’s premier defense summit, enabling decision makers from across Asia Pacific, North America, Europe, and the Middle East to share policy response to common threats.

Throughout the years, the Shangri-La Dialogue has established itself as the region’s most important platform for strategic and defense diplomacy. The forum allows governments to explain their security policies, exchange perspectives on emerging threats, and engage directly with counterparts to manage tension and build confidence. In an era where geopolitical rivalries increasingly shape regional affairs, such opportunities for dialogue have become more valuable than ever.

This year’s dialogue shifted focus on a multitude of issues, such as the United States’ strategy in the Indo-Pacific, the strategic competition between the United States and China, and China’s evolving role in the Asia Pacific region. Furthermore, the dialogue focuses on the Middle East conflict and tensions involving Iran.

China’s level of participation has been increasingly viewed as a barometer of its broader relationship with Western powers and its willingness to engage in regional security discussions. As tensions between Beijing and Washington persist over issues ranging from Taiwan to trade and technology, China’s intentions and policy positions are closely monitored and are of interest.

Despite the significance of the Shangri-La Dialogue, it often remains a forum for discussion rather than decision-making. The summit does not produce binding agreements but is rather a platform for signaling intentions, communicating positions, and publicly airing disagreements. This limitation, however, does not diminish its importance. The dialogue’s value lies in its ability to provide a space where competing powers can engage directly despite heightened tensions. This helps reduce the risk of misunderstanding and miscalculations.

Singapore’s role as host carries significance: the state’s position as a neutral convener shows that the dialogue serves as a function that goes beyond formal agenda, but rather serves as a signal of the region’s continued relevance to the global security order. The summit reflects the broader balancing act faced by many Southeast Asian nations. ASEAN members continue to navigate the complex relationship between the United States and China to maintain productive ties with both, all while avoiding being drawn into great power rivalry.

As geopolitical tensions intensify and security challenges become increasingly interconnected, the Shangri-La Dialogue remains vital for fostering communication and strategic engagement. Though the summit does not produce binding agreements, its significance lies in bringing together key decision-makers to exchange views and manage tensions. The summit also reinforces Singapore’s role as a trusted and neutral convener in a fragmented international environment. As Asia navigates an increasingly uncertain strategic landscape, the Shangri-La Dialogue serves as an important reminder that dialogue, diplomacy, and cooperation remain essential to preserving regional stability.


Jennifer is a final-year International Relations student at the Singapore Institute of Management, where she focuses on political engagement, diplomacy, and community governance. She is an active volunteer in her constituency, working closely with residents to understand local concerns, facilitate dialogue, and support community initiatives.

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Vietnam 🇻🇳

Vietnam at the Shangri-La Dialogue

by Sean Huy Vu

The Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD), Asia’s premier security summit, was held in Singapore during the last weekend of May. The event is hosted annually by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), a British think tank, and brings together diplomats, military officials, scholars, journalists, and key sectors of the private sector.

This event was the first time Vietnam, represented by President To Lam, made the opening keynote address at the forum. The Dialogue occurs just one month after President To’s election by the National Assembly, and during his first tours of Thailand and Singapore since reassuming office.

The SLD occurs amid a world of turmoil: the war in Iran, the conflict between Thailand and Cambodia, concerns over freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, and concerns about the autonomy of Taiwan. In its 2026 Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment, the IISS warned of the growing risks of nuclear conflict — particularly in the Korean peninsula — and the vulnerability of the Malacca Strait as a maritime chokepoint. It also criticized ASEAN’s rotating Special Envoy chair mechanism for preventing long-term stakeholder engagement over resolving the civil war in Myanmar.

These were some of the issues President To Lam indirectly touched on in his address. “While all nations continue to speak of peace, stability, and cooperation,” he remarked, “the strategic environment is marked by growing lack of trust, fragmentation, and unchecked competition.”

President To identified three “crises” occurring in the world: a crisis in the international order; a crisis in development models; and a crisis in strategic trust. In the first crisis, “commitments are repeatedly affirmed yet undermined in practice… [and] laws are interpreted selectively.” In the second crisis, economic development pathways are disrupted and can “evolve into social and political instability.” The final crisis, the decline of trust between states, can lead to a security dilemma. “Managing differences within a rules-based framework,” To Lam stated, ensures that “competition remains bounded, responsible and predictable.” He stressed the need for “rapid communication channels… transparency, dialogue, substantive information-sharing… clear codes of conduct… [and] robust technological norms” so that humans, rather than AI, are responsible for their own security.

Vietnam’s aspirations for maintaining a rules-based order contrast sharply with the United States. Rather than returning to the “utopian” status quo of the past 30 years, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth communicated the Trump administration’s ambitions to assert a more hegemonic foreign policy based on “realism.”

To Lam’s speech echoes Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s speech at the World Economic Forum earlier this year. It captures the hopes and fears of middle powers in proactively shaping the international order for peaceful, stable development amid great power rivalry. Vietnam is arguably the archetypal middle power, having hosted summits with all members of the United Nations Security Council in less than a year between 2024 and 2025. Not only does the country’s participation at the IISS summit elevate its status internationally as a rising power on the global stage, it enhances its political legitimacy at home.


Sean is a scholar of East Asian history, culture, and international relations, with current research at Georgetown University examining working-class labor and human trafficking in the region. His broader interests include the social psychology of religion and identity politics. Sean previously taught modern Korean history at the University of California, Irvine, where he completed his B.A. in History, and later taught English in Ho Chi Minh City while studying Vietnamese language and culture. His writing has been published by UC Irvine, Johns Hopkins University, and Foreign Analysis.

The Philippines 🇵🇭

Why Citizen Coalitions Matter for Democracy

by Glenn Vincent N. Boquilon, in Angeles City

In democracies, power has always been rooted in the people. Citizen movements have long played a crucial role in ensuring that democratic institutions and practices are held intact. In the Philippines, the launch of Bantay Senado reflects this continuing tradition. Composed of students, academics, professionals, and ordinary citizens, the coalition seeks to monitor the upcoming impeachment trial of Philippine Vice President Sara Duterte. The network also aims to provide a comprehensive and inclusive understanding of the proceedings for the ordinary Filipino.

Formally launched at De La Salle University last 3 June, Bantay Senado’s call to action highlights the need to be cautiously aware (mapagmatyag), openly informed (magpaliwanag), and show necessary clamorous defiance (mangalampag) throughout the impeachment trial. The network reiterates the Senate’s obligation and constitutional duty to conduct a fair and unbiased trial. The coalition spokesperson and convener, Prof. Cleve Arguelles, said that the network is non-partisan, and that regardless if the Vice President is convicted or found innocent, the trial is being held for the sake of the Filipinos and the mandate of the 1987 Constitution.

Public oversight is an often overlooked aspect of democracy. Coalitions like Bantay Senado show how organized citizen movement can encourage public participation in governance across groups. They take on the vital role of aiding checks and balances and ensuring that no abuse of power nor political ambition takes precedence over national interests. At present, the Senate of the Philippines has been riddled with controversies spanning from an incumbent senator evading an arrest warrant from the International Criminal Court to involvement in the infamous flood control scandal. These further reinforce the need for a watchdog like Bantay Senado, as all of these are intertwined in the country’s current political climate.

As of their launch, Bantay Senado has recorded over 300 volunteers across the Philippines. One of the main initiatives of the network is to organize town hall meetings and bring the dialogue to the masses. These conversations will be done in everyday language, ensuring that complex terms and jargon are broken down and made easily digestible for ordinary citizens. Information materials posted on different social media platforms shall also be translated into major Philippine languages to reach a wider audience. Through these efforts, the coalition hopes to encourage greater public participation and help citizens better understand a process that could have significant implications for the country’s democratic institutions.

A huge front in monitoring the impeachment trials entails fighting off disinformation and misinformation campaigns. Carlo Flores, Executive Director of Team Pinas emphasized that this is the first impeachment trial in the country where social media and artificial intelligence can greatly influence public narratives. Therefore, Bantay Senado also has a responsibility to provide accurate and accessible information about the proceedings. The network aims to do this by offering fact-based explanations and regular updates. This will help the public separate verified information from misleading claims and ensure that discussions surrounding the trial remain grounded in evidence rather than speculation.

As the impeachment trial moves forward, it is imperative that the public continues to demand accountability and transparency from the Senate. While that narrative writes itself, another important story is unfolding alongside it: a new tale of citizens coming together to consolidate democratic practices and institutions. The Bantay Senado network serves as a reminder that power truly belongs to the people. Time and time again, it has been proven that democracy works best when people are willing to engage and be informed.


Glenn holds a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from the University of Santo Tomas. His experience spans governance programs, policy development, and political research, having worked with the Ateneo School of Government and WR Numero Research on projects focused on electoral reform, public opinion, and regional development. He also helped coordinate the drafting of the Bangsamoro Local Government Code and supported the Academy of Multiparty Democracy.

Editorial Deadline 02/06/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by the Maritime Crescent Desk

This week, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei faced different challenges related to leadership, public services, and social responsibility. In Indonesia, President Prabowo's proposal to introduce French language education after his visit to France sparked criticism, with observers questioning the lack of a clear implementation plan and broader foreign policy direction. In Malaysia, an LRT derailment highlighted long-standing problems with public transport infrastructure and concerns about the country's heavy reliance on private vehicles. In Brunei, growing online hostility toward local content creators revealed tensions within the #SapotLokal movement, raising questions about the difference between constructive criticism and online hate.

Malaysia 🇲🇾

Malaysia’s Mobility Infrastructure Problem

by Sydney Gan, in Kuala Lumpur

On the 28th of May, a Light Rail Transit (LRT) passenger train was derailed in Chan Sow Lin Station due to a track switch fai­lure. All 25 passengers were evacuated safely with no injuries reported, but the incident has sparked significant backlash against the Ministry of Transport, the breaking point in consecutive public transport failures over the years.

Since then, the MADANI government has ordered the Land Public Transport Agency (Apad) to take maximum punitive action against Prasarana Malaysia Bhd and to set up an independent task force to spearhead the investigation. The Ministry of Transport is also concurrently mulling a comprehensive internal audit of Prasarana’s rail transit systems beyond LRT services, to preemptively address future risks of infrastructure-related incidents.

Experts from the Malaysian Chinese Association noted that such measures must be backed by political will to implement post-audit policy recommendations, stating that the risk of recurrence remains unsustainably high if they are not. Other transport experts cast doubt on the government’s capability to conduct an audit at all, highlighting the lack of technical talent to sufficiently uphold institutional accountability. Ultimately, the Ministry’s measures are taken to be merely stopgap measures, with the government often taking a reactive rather than a long-term, proactive approach to transport governance reform.

This case exposes a deeper, systemic failing in Malaysia’s mobility infrastructure network, which must be seen together with Malaysia’s disregard for first- and last-mile connectivity. In peri-urban and even central urban areas, Malaysians struggle with significant station-level gaps, often forced to depend on driving to access public transport. As walkability in Malaysia is limited - due to highways and major roads surrounding neighborhoods, the lack of pedestrian-friendly infrastructure, and personal safety risks - non-drivers are completely alienated from accessing rail and bus transit in the first place. From this, a unique demand for e-hailing emerges as a Malaysian necessity, rather than a luxury, to which there are few to no alternatives.

The crippling over-reliance on car travel is especially acute against the backdrop of Malaysia’s fuel crisis. With nearly 40% of the country’s crude oil requirements transiting through the Strait of Hormuz, the MADANI government is struggling to maintain fuel prices and subsidies across the nation, which directly impacts drivers on the ground. With this weak existing infrastructure, is Malaysia at all equipped to shoulder the burden of a suddenly incapacitated, automobile-dependent population?

The rakyat’s sensitivity towards fuel pricing is being blatantly leveraged by the government to form populist policies, in order to curry favor towards targeted voter bases. This risks diluting the issue into mere political rhetoric - one must venture to examine with a critical lens why such an over-reliance on fuel exists in the first place, and why the Malaysian government has allowed the infrastructure weaknesses to persist all this while, until we are left straining under the weight of the geopolitical crisis. This incident should serve as a wake-up call to the government to take swift, strategic, forward-looking action, lest Malaysia risk significantly lagging behind in the future of mobility in Southeast Asia.


Sydney holds a Bachelor of Laws from King’s College London, where she focused on Human Rights Law, Criminology, and Public & Administrative Law. She is an Analyst at Asia Group Advisors, providing policy analysis and strategic guidance across the tech, sustainability, and gaming sectors in Southeast Asia. Prior to joining AGA, she worked in the social development sector in London, contributing to the Ukraine Judicial Training Programme through research on war crimes adjudication and the development of a legal training curriculum with high court magistrates.

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Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳

The Selective Solidarity of #SapotLokal

by Maryam Zulaidi

Lately, there has been a noticeable surge of hate across multiple social media platforms towards Bruneian ‘online personalities’. Oddly enough, the waves of hate derive from the locals themselves. is a movement across the Malay nations i.e Brunei and Malaysia in support of empowering independent local enterprises. Despite that, this slogan is narrowly interpreted as many still fail to acknowledge content creation as a genuine form of work. Thus, with the exclusion of gig workers, their solidarity is rather contradictory. There remains a reluctance among a minority of Bruneians to recognise them as influencers. Anonymous users have justified their standing by stating that these media personalities do not bring any positive impacts to the world and are constantly feeding into controversies. Most comments are evidently malicious whilst the rest are disguised under “constructive criticism”. What must be understood here is that there is a fine line between constructive criticism and hate speech.

According to the UN, hate speech is “any kind of communication in speech, writing or behaviour, that attacks or uses pejorative or discriminatory language with reference to a person or a group on the basis of who they are, in other words, based on their religion, ethnicity, nationality, race, colour, descent, gender or other identity factor.” Applying our context into the definition, it is mainly the prejudiced writing and/or speech that is used against Bruneian media personalities. In contrast, constructive criticism is a helpful remark that points out something wrong whilst giving suggestion(s) of improvement. For instance, if a Tiktok personality posts culturally insensitive content, a viewer flags the harm their content may bring and recommends that the creator delete the video and educate themselves regarding the matter. The intent of constructive criticism is therefore, not to demean but to encourage others to improve. While the two words are seemingly distinguishable on paper, they are often conflated in practice.

That said, the blame is not entirely one-sided. One should not blindly accuse the anonymous accounts, because a few of these media personalities may also struggle to understand the criticism and confuse them for hate. Consequently, they too, unintentionally fuel the provocation. Regardless of them choosing a public life, it does not give us the right to strip them of their autonomy. This choice does not justify for creators to endure personal attacks and constant ridicule. Most importantly, this act of bullying contradicts the basis of the nation’s ideology of nilai-nilai murni; good values and ethics that all Bruneians should practice.

Anonymity plays a central role in this all. When people hide behind screens, they feel protected from their accountability. This phenomenon, coined by John Suler, is called the ‘online disinhibition effect’. In a nation where mental health is still a cultural taboo, the consequences of pervasive digital aggression transcends the screen. Discreetly accumulating into a crisis that Brunei has yet to openly confront.


Maryam is a first-year International Relations and Politics student at the University of Sheffield, with an academic focus on Southeast Asia—particularly Maritime Southeast Asia—and the Middle East. She aspires to a career in diplomacy and academia and is committed to fostering international dialogue and advancing scholarly engagement with global issues. Beyond her academic work, she pursues creative interests and voluntary initiatives that broaden her perspectives on public service.

Indonesia 🇮🇩

Prabowo’s Lip Service Language-Diplomacy

by Muhammad Rayhansyah Jasin

Skipping annual prayer congregations, buying qurban animals with the state budget, this year’s Ied Adha celebrations has been marked with a slurry of controversies by President Prabowo Subianto who also decided to spend the religious festivities abroad in France. Visiting for the third time between January - May 2026, Prabowo’s May trip, postponed since April, was meant to lay the groundwork for a future strategic partnership with France and convening the first high-level Indonesia-France business council. The visit also saw a commercial agreement worth US$3.5 billion centered on energy resilience, trade, and defense cooperation. As a show of diplomatic gesture in front of President Emanuel Macron in the Elysee Palace, Prabowo instructed French language education to be introduced for all school levels in Indonesia. Another agreement also explored possible French language training programs to include police forces.

Prabowo’s education instructions are not without precedence. During Brazil’s President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva’s visit to Indonesia in late October 2025, Prabowo also stated that the government has mandated the education ministry to start teaching Portuguese. Prabowo’s haphazard vision of language diplomacy rests on global demand for more versatile skilled workers. Yet, six months on, there has not been any national guidelines or framework conceived regarding that announcement with no clear implementation from the education ministry. Observers have lamented Prabowo’s last week instruction to be no different with the Portuguese debacle, signifying the former general’s flip-flopped and unplanned foreign policy.

Both Portuguese and French have been added as priority languages alongside Spanish, Russian, English, Arabic, Japanese, Korean, and Mandarin to be taught in universities. Still, the move is seen to be based on Prabowo’s quick judgement instead of a bottom-up recommendation from academia and business leaders alike. Legislators also commented that the government must restrain from drafting education policies without considering the preparedness of education infrastructure, adequate teachers, and students’ basic needs.

Prabowo’s language diplomacy reflects a broader tendency in his foreign policy to prioritise impromptu initiatives over a coherent long-term diplomatic roadmap. This approach has attracted criticism, particularly regarding the frequency and cost of his overseas trips. Following his visit to Paris on May 28, reports from Flightradar24 indicated that a planned stop in Rome was cancelled at the last minute in favour of a direct return to Jakarta. Rumours also circulated that proposed visits to Hungary and Austria failed to materialise because no heads of state were available to welcome his entourage.

Criticism has extended beyond scheduling concerns. Former Deputy Foreign Minister Dino Pati Djalal urged Prabowo to reduce his overseas travel, noting that he has spent roughly one out of every six days abroad over the past eighteen months, with some trips reportedly costing hundreds of billions of rupiah. While Cabinet Secretary Teddy Indra Wijaya defended these expenses by claiming that any budget overruns were personally covered by Prabowo, concerns remain about fiscal discipline and policy consistency.

Deepening ties with the European Union, particularly France, is important for Indonesia’s strategic position. However, these efforts should complement, rather than overshadow, Jakarta’s leadership role within Southeast Asia. Without close coordination with neighbouring states, Indonesia risks weakening its influence within ASEAN while pursuing broader global ambitions.


Rayhan is pursuing an Erasmus Mundus Joint Master’s Degree in Public Policy at Central European University and the Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals. He holds a Bachelor of Social Sciences in International Relations and Political Economy from Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University. His current research focuses on the socio-economic impacts of Indonesia’s nickel mining industry on local communities and national development.

Editorial Deadline 01/06/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk

This issue of the Mekong Belt analyzes how governments across the region are managing the stories they tell, uncovering where the plot diverges from reality. In Myanmar, Min Aung Hlaing has rebranded a coup as a "National Resurgence," complete with a 100-Day Plan that reads more like a press release than a policy: big words, big promises, but no recovery plan for the economy. In Cambodia, Hun Sen signed a royal pardon with one hand and kept every political shackle in place with the other: Kem Sokha walks free, but he can't run, vote, or even leave the country, which raises the question of what exactly was pardoned.

Meanwhile, in Laos, the government actually decided not to tell a story, saying nothing for three days while seven men suffocated underground. It was their families, posting frantically on Facebook, who broke the story the state refused to tell. And in Thailand, record FDI numbers make for dazzling headlines, but when the raw materials are all imported and the knowledge stays with the multinationals, a boom that doesn't root locally is just a story about someone else's growth.

Myanmar 🇲🇲

Myanmar Regime’s 100-Day Plan

by Ley Hlaing

The newly transformed regime under self-proclaimed president Min Aung Hlaing has launched a 100-Day Plan following the formation of its cabinet. The plan prioritizes the rebranding of the regime and the normalization of military rule, but its stated goals sharply contradict the realities on the ground.

Shortly after forming a cabinet of 31 key ministries, Min Aung Hlaing announced the blueprint at the first cabinet meeting on April 20, 2026, setting a deadline of July 21, 2026. State-owned media and regime mouthpieces have since largely portrayed the plan as a National Resurgence. Comprising two main parts — ministry-specific projects and a peace process — the plan reflects severely limited administrative capacity and relies on a broad, generalized scope. The ministry-specific component covers only five of the 31 ministries: Finance and Revenue; Education; Health; Cooperatives and Transport; and Digital Development and Communications. Critics have pointed out that the plan lacks any meaningful measures for economic recovery and is limited in its implementation coverage.

The second component — the peace process — is heavily emphasized, calling on ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) to join peace talks within 100 days and urging heartland People’s Defense Forces (PDFs) to surrender. This mirrors a long-standing tactic of successive military governments: using negotiations to fracture anti-junta resistance. While the invitation is extended to both signatory and non-signatory members of the National Ceasefire Agreement (NCA), it makes no mention of the parallel government, the National Unity Government (NUG). Former NCA signatories have been actively resisting the junta since the coup, and most resistance leaders and spokespeople have expressed no interest in or trust toward the invitation, stating that the regime is reviving the NCA simply because “they need it.” That perceived need points to possible hidden agendas behind this outsized peace overture toward groups the regime once labeled terrorists — among them: normalizing the regime within the 2008 Constitutional framework, resuming Chinese-backed projects under pressure from Beijing, and seeking reintegration into the international community.

While the plan’s goals are prominently declared, the realities are strikingly different. Driven in part by the global energy crisis, reports indicate that average prices of basic food items in Myanmar have risen by 19 percent since late February 2026, deepening hunger among a population already struggling to meet basic needs. The security situation is equally alarming: forced conscription has effectively transformed into human trafficking. Young men, including underage boys, are no longer safe after dark, with forcible recruitment now occurring in major cities such as Yangon and Mandalay — a grim escalation that directly contradicts the regime’s calls for peace. Meanwhile, additional ministries have since joined the 100-Day Plan: Electricity and Energy has pledged to ensure national energy sufficiency and support long-term economic development, while Immigration and Population has moved to implement the La Min project, which involves issuing Citizenship Scrutiny Cards and Unique IDs.

Min Aung Hlaing’s 100-Day Plan is ultimately a survival strategy for a closed regime, not a viable blueprint for recovery. Its “National Resurgence” branding obscures a collapsing economy, a sham peace process designed to splinter resistance, and an intensifying forced conscription campaign fueling a regional human trafficking crisis and accelerating the erosion of Myanmar’s middle class. The international community should recognize these peace overtures for what they are — and respond by rejecting them outright and cutting the economic and political lifelines sustaining the junta’s continued warfare.

Ley Hlaing is a former Political Science student from the University of Yangon, Myanmar. Currently, he is pursuing his BA at Parami University with a major in Philosophy, Politics and Economics. His academic and professional interests span community development, literature, minority issues, and social impact research. Having held roles as Research Assistant, Student Mentor, and Facilitator for local initiatives, he has constantly supported project management in literature and education programs in Myanmar.

Cambodia 🇰🇭

Kem Sokha Pardoned in Cambodia, but Political Ban Remains

by Sokna Thea, in Phnom Penh

Cambodia’s acting head of state Hun Sen signed a royal decree on 25 May 2026 that pardons opposition figure Kem Sokha from a 27-year prison term for treason. The pardon frees him from his sentence only. A lifetime ban on politics and a five-year ban on leaving the country both stay in place, so he walks free but cannot run for office, vote, or travel abroad.

Hun Sen, now Senate president, signed the decree for King Norodom Sihamoni, who is in Beijing for prostate cancer treatment. Under the constitution, the Senate president acts as head of state when the king is abroad. Prime Minister Hun Manet, Hun Sen’s son, requested the pardon and called it a step toward national unity.

Police arrested Sokha in September 2017 and charged him with conspiring with a foreign power, mainly over a 2013 video of a speech about democracy work. A court convicted him in March 2023 after a trial that UN experts said was politically motivated. He spent more than eight years in jail and house arrest. The Phnom Penh Court of Appeal upheld the verdict on 30 April 2026 and added the travel ban, just 25 days before the pardon.

The case removed the main electoral challenger to the ruling party. Weeks after the arrest, the Supreme Court dissolved Sokha’s Cambodia National Rescue Party in November 2017. With no rival, Hun Sen’s party won every seat in the 2018 election and has held full control since.

Analysts read the timing as image management. The exiled Khmer Movement for Democracy, led by Mu Sochua, called it a political chess move that only shifts Sokha from house arrest to political confinement. Pressure on Cambodia has grown. The US sanctioned ruling-party senator and Hun Sen ally Kok An in April 2026 over scam compounds, while the European Union still withholds full trade access over rights concerns. Washington, meanwhile, cut a threatened 49 percent tariff on Cambodian goods to 19 percent in a 2025 trade deal. Phnom Penh also hosts the Francophonie Summit in November 2026.

The move signals Hun Sen retains decisive influence after handing the premiership to his son in 2023. It also fits a wider pattern in Southeast Asia, where Thailand’s Constitutional Court dissolved the election-winning Move Forward Party in 2024. Rights groups warn that dozens of other government critics remain jailed. Human Rights Watch welcomed the release but said it was deplorable that Sokha remains barred from politics and from leaving the country. Sokha, now 72, said he will not seek revenge and plans to enter the monkhood to honor his gravely ill mother.


Sokna has a background in International Affairs and Business & Commercial Law. He’s currently a Senior Project Coordinator at the Ministry of Economy and Finance of Cambodia, working on the Financial Management Information System (FMIS) Project. His professional focus is driven by entrepreneurship, business development, and financial technology, with a particular interest in how private-sector innovation drives Cambodia’s economic growth.

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Lao PDR 🇱🇦

Seven Men Trapped in Flooded Laos Cave

by Thongsavanh Souvannasane, in Vientiane

Eight days on, and seven men are still trapped underground in northern Laos, and no one has heard from them since the cave sealed shut.

The men, aged in their twenties and thirties, entered a cave in Longcheng district, Xaysomboun Province, on 20 May. Heavy rain triggered flash flooding and a landslide that blocked the entrance, trapping them inside a subterranean gold mine. Authorities were alerted by a member of the group who managed to escape before the exit was blocked.

The story did not break immediately.

For nearly three days, no official announcement came. It was the trapped men’s siblings and family members who raised the alarm, posting desperate appeals on Facebook, tagging rescue organizations, and sharing information in Lao-language community groups. That grassroots surge pulled the story into public view across Laos and the region.

Why the men entered the cave remains disputed.

Initial reports say around eight villagers were hired by a Chinese mining company to search for gold, earning about LAK 100,000 (USD 4.58) a day, and one escaped before the tunnel flooded. Other accounts suggest they went in independently. There has been no official confirmation, though rescuers say the cave was frequented by locals looking for gold despite repeated safety warnings.

On May 23, Lao authorities formally wrote to Thai rescue teams requesting their assistance, citing Thailand’s specialist diving expertise and the rescuers’ depth of experience in flooded cave operations. The request brought a 26-member Thailand-based team to Xaysomboun within days.

About 100 people from Laos and Thailand are now at the site.

To reach the trapped men, rescuers must navigate a 340-meter flooded tunnel, with some passages just 60 centimeters wide. Teams pump water around the clock and thread fresh air through a pipe deep into the system. On 26 May, they broke through 15 meters of sand and gravel in a single day, closing in on the chamber where the men are believed to be sheltering on an elevated ledge with natural airflow.

Then, on the night of 26 May, operations halted. Two rescuers suffered dizziness inside the cave, forcing teams to suspend overnight diving and clear all personnel from the tunnels. The setback, however, came with one piece of encouraging news: water levels inside the cave had dropped nearly two meters, a sign that the round-the-clock pumping is working, and that conditions may be more favorable when teams resume at dawn.

On 25 May, Thailand-based diver Norrased Palasing and Finnish specialist Mikko Paasi, both Tham Luang veterans whose experience navigating submerged, narrow cave systems puts them at the front of this rescue, arrived to join contingent leader Kengkard Bongkawong, who coordinated the 2018 Tham Luang rescue in Chiang Rai Province. Thai instructor Parasu Komaradat provides remote guidance as authorities continue pumping water and preparing diving operations to ensure the safety of all involved.

There has been no contact with the trapped men since they went in. As of 27 May, the rescue operation remains ongoing.


Thongsavanh is a journalist from Laos with a background in English-language media. He graduated from the Lao-American Institute with a Diploma of the Arts in English and contributes to independent news platforms. His reporting focuses on environmental issues, socio-economic development, and geopolitics.

Thailand 🇹🇭

Thailand’s FDI Boom Masks Weak Local Benefits

by Satid Sootipunya, in Bangkok

Thailand’s Board of Investment (BOI) attracted record Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs) of over USD 27 billion (1 trillion baht) to the Kingdom in the first quarter this year, driven by electronic-related industries amid the Artificial Intelligence (AI) boom.

Secretary General of BOI Narit Therdsteerasukdi said in a statement that Thailand’s investment environment has been buoyed by the diverted flow of foreign investment caused by geopolitical shifts and the relocation of manufacturing bases.

In the three months ended March 2026, investment promotion applications were submitted for 24 projects worth 1.016 trillion baht, 2.4 times higher than the same period last year.

Accelerated by geopolitical tensions and the China-plus-one policy, several multinational data center and cloud service companies are eyeing Thailand as their new regional hub, including TikTok Systems, Skyline Data Center and Cloud Services, Global Switch, and Evolution Data Centres.

Former Thailand’s Finance Minister Dr. Somkid Jatusripitak supported this development, saying that the Thai government should attract quality FDIs instead of focusing only on volume. The administration should utilize incoming foreign investment to support Thailand’s future development.

“We must act as architects — designing what kind of future we want for the country,” said Dr. Somkid. This includes addressing rural poverty and improving the livelihoods of farmers.

Despite the surge in FDI applications, the Bank of Thailand (BOT) reported that the use of locally sourced raw materials has declined, with the majority of production inputs being imported.

The report also mentioned that Thailand’s FDI value has increased 1.8 times over the past five years compared with the pre-COVID-19 period, fueled by data centers and cloud services. However, Thailand’s new industrial structure remains concentrated mainly in the midstream and downstream segments.

The big question is whether Thailand will experience another major takeoff from the current flow of FDIs given the changing global investment landscape.

The answer may be no if the government focuses only on the quantity of FDIs instead of quality: requiring multinational companies to transfer knowledge to Thai workers and increasing the use of local content.


Satid is a multimedia economic journalist and news anchor who covers macroeconomic trends, Thailand’s fiscal policy, and key regional developments for Bangkok Biz. A Journalism graduate from Thammasat University, he has reported on major issues such as the US–China trade tensions, the Myanmar crisis, and global corporate stories, drawing on prior newsroom experience at The Momentum, the Bangkok Post, AFP, and Varasarn Press. His work blends economic analysis, foreign affairs, and digital storytelling, with a strong focus on making complex financial and political topics accessible to Thai audiences.

Editorial Deadline 30/05/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Karen Ysabelle R. David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk

Singapore: a country internationally renowned for its wealth, economic development, and high standard of living. For its human rights situation? Not so much. Its recent Universal Periodic Review before the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council only shone the spotlight on the shortcomings and blind spots of a country that has otherwise been held as an exemplar for the rest of Southeast Asia.

In the Philippines, spectacle and scandal continue to rock the Senate for the nth week in a row. With a parliamentary power struggle, a senator on the run, and a looming impeachment trial, the actual hard work of democracy and governance has been left by the wayside.

And Vietnam this week grapples with the paradox and the delicate balancing act of simultaneous environmental and digital transformation. For the sake of its grand targets and promises, Hanoi must learn the difficult task of reconciling the two.

Singapore 🇸🇬

Singapore at the UN Human Rights Review: What Was Raised and What Comes Next

by Jennifer Hui En Tan, in Singapore

On 12 May 2026, representatives from 142 countries converged in Geneva to deliver recommendations to member states and to Singapore as part of its fourth Universal Periodic Review (UPR) before the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council. The review marks a significant moment in Singapore’s ongoing engagement with the international human rights framework, one that the country has participated in since the UPR’s establishment in 2006. The recommendations put forward during the session span a range of issues, and Singapore has indicated that it will examine them before providing its formal response to the Human Rights Council.

The UPR is a peer review mechanism through which every UN member state has the opportunity to assess the human rights situation in other member states roughly once every five years. The UPR universally applies non-binding recommendations to all 193 UN member states. Notably, Singapore ranks 13th on the UN Human Development Index and first in the Asia Pacific for Gender Equality on the UN Gender Inequality Index. These rankings reflect the achievements of Singapore’s human rights standing globally. However, they are not the main focus of the fourth UPR, which centered on areas where international recommendations diverged from Singapore’s current domestic practices.

During the UPR review, issues on the table included the death penalty, migrant workers, and LGBTQ+ rights. The most heavily contested issue was Singapore’s use of capital punishment: 41 countries made recommendations relating to the death penalty, reflecting the growing international consensus against its use. Notably, Singapore has long defended its position on capital punishment, explaining this measurement as a cornerstone of the state’s low-crime, high-order social compact.

Several countries recommended extending anti-discrimination protections to LGBTQ+ individuals and called for the establishment of a national human rights institution. Singapore repealed Section 377A of the Penal Code in 2022, though the UPR suggested further steps on legal equality and institutional oversight as areas for continued development.

Singapore’s UPR does not exist in a regional vacuum, and through an ASEAN lens adds important texture to the debate. With regard to the death penalty, Singapore is not an outlier within Southeast Asia. Several ASEAN member states continue to use capital punishment, situating Singapore within a regional norm even as that norm diverges from global abolitionist trends. This context does not blunt the international criticism, but it does complicate the picture of isolation that critics paint.

Singapore’s fourth UPR ultimately reflects the complexity of evaluating a state that excels by many conventional measures yet continues to draw sustained international attention on a distinct set of rights issues. What the process does provide, however, is a structured moment of international accountability, one that places Singapore’s domestic policy choices in conversation with evolving global norms. As Singapore considers its formal response to the 142 recommendations received, the outcome will signal not only its immediate policy intentions but also how it sees its role in shaping the human rights standards that the international community is collectively building.


Jennifer is a final-year International Relations student at the Singapore Institute of Management, where she focuses on political engagement, diplomacy, and community governance. She is an active volunteer in her constituency, working closely with residents to understand local concerns, facilitate dialogue, and support community initiatives.

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The Philippines 🇵🇭

The Philippine Senate’s Wag the Dog Politics

by Arianne De Guzman, in Bulacan

In the 1997 political satire Wag the Dog, a Hollywood producer and a presidential spin doctor fabricated a fictional war in Albania to distract the American public from a sex scandal involving the U.S. President seeking reelection. Through staged footage and patriotic music, the film shows how politicians can manipulate public perception by turning politics into spectacle and entertainment to distract the public from critical issues.

This May, the Philippine Senate reflected a similar pattern. Instead of holding an orderly deliberation on proposed legislative measures and cases, national attention repeatedly shifted toward dramatic spectacles of controversy and confrontation. These performances captured more media attention than the bills and resolutions that should have been tackled, as well as the issues that required government oversight.

On 11 May, Senator Ronald “Bato” dela Rosa reappeared in the Senate after six months of absence, following Ombudsman Jesus Crispin Remulla’s announcement that the International Criminal Court (ICC) had a warrant of arrest against him for his alleged role in former President Rodrigo Duterte’s war on drugs campaign. Thereafter, a Senate leadership coup occurred to remove Senator Vicente “Tito” Sotto, with Senator dela Rosa’s vote helping install Senator Alan Peter Cayetano as Senate President.

The timing of these political spectacles mattered, as they unfolded ahead of Vice President Sara Duterte’s impeachment trial, where the Senate will serve as the impeachment court.

Following the transmittal of impeachment articles from the House of the Representatives to the Senate, another spectacle emerged. On 13 May, a shooting incident and lockdown inside the Senate happened, where Senator dela Rosa sought protective custody. Senate President Alan Peter Cayetano claimed that National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) agents attacked the Senate to serve the warrant. However, the Department of the Interior and Local Government and the police later concluded, based on CCTV footage, that there had been no attack, and that all the shots heard came from inside the building.

Public reports and social media attention shifted away from impeachment evidence, focusing instead on the closure of Senate gates, tensions between Senators Robin Padilla and Kiko Pangilinan, alleged gunshots, dramatic Facebook live broadcasts, and videos of Senator dela Rosa evading authorities.

The Senate, as one of the country’s accountable mechanisms, becomes secondary to spectacle because dramatic performances generate more engagement compared to complex deliberations. Filipino citizens, instead of being treated as rational political actors, are reduced to consumers of politics as entertainment.

The Wag the Dog politics is not simply about distraction — it is the transformation of democratic institutions into spaces governed by media logic. Unlike the film, the war on drugs campaign and the ICC case against former President Duterte are not fabricated. Investigations, legal proceedings, and political polarization are real. However, the way these events are staged, amplified, and consumed redirects public attention away from the national concerns.

The Philippine Senate ended the month of May by demonstrating how political spectacle shapes democratic life, where visibility and performance often matter as much as governance itself.


Arianne has experience in policy research at De La Salle University’s Jesse M. Robredo Institute of Governance, where she contributed to projects on systemic reform. She earned a degree in Political Science from Colegio de San Juan de Letran. Currently, she works in government relations, specializing in advocacy strategy, legislative monitoring, and stakeholder engagement. Beyond her professional work, she is actively involved in youth development and grassroots initiatives through the Rotaract Club of Santa Maria.

Vietnam 🇻🇳

The Paradox of Green and Digital Economies

by Hang Nguyen, in Ho Chi Minh City

As Vietnam identifies grandiose targets for epochal economic development for 2030, the constant reiteration of the key words “digital economy,” “sustainable development,” “high-tech innovation,” and “green finance” in published resolutions and papers demonstrate a clear vision for growth. In the 14th National Party Congress Resolution, digital transition and digital transformation were, for the first time, comprehensively embedded as cross-cutting structural drivers. These two strategies, while sharing similar strategic importance, have distinctive and conflicting applications.

Vietnam’s 14th National Party Congress Resolution entails forward-looking stats: an average GDP per capita of around US$8,500 by 2030; manufacturing and processing account for approximately 28% of GDP; total wealth accumulation reaches around 35–36% of GDP; and final consumption rate reaches around 61–62%. Vietnam remains apprehensive of falling into the middle-income trap as recent geopolitical risks and turbulence have shaken previous beliefs on secure growth, encouraging the state to bolster domestic industries with long-term sustainable practices. Following the trajectory of global trends, Vietnam has increasingly directed its attention toward the development of green and digital economies. However, the question of whether these transitions are compatible concurrently has not been answered.

Both environmental and digital transformation are restructuring the work force by creating more job opportunities but also increasing the requirements for skilled labor and creating employment gaps in Vietnam. Furthermore, the increased incorporation of digital tools in energy-intensive sectors will increase the efficiency and sustainability of many economic and social activities. While European political discourse has already initiated research and forums surrounding the synergetic or conflicting dynamic of these two tracks of developmental transformation, this topic is only just gaining momentum in the Vietnamese media in recent months.

As much as these “twin” transitions are driving a new direction of policy-making and sustainable growth, many conflicting aspects might challenge this dual-track approach. Digital technologies may simultaneously offset some of the environmental gains they bring. Achieving environmental targets may mean pulling back on certain technologies, which could slow digital advancement in specific industries, while sustainability efforts might also put a brake on economic expansion. By the same token, tackling wealth inequality could draw resources away from ecological initiatives and vice versa, while digital technologies may increase energy demands associated with ICT production and use. Additionally, trade partners have tightened import requirements as a result, such as Europe’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) and England’s Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD).

In order to properly deal with the contradictions that arise due to the need for both green and digital transformations, Vietnam must ensure that technological advancement aligns with sustainability. Instead of focusing on fast-paced digitalization without considering its impact on environmental goals, Vietnam needs to focus on digitalization powered by renewable sources, smart manufacturing processes, and skills development in both green and digital sectors. Within the region, the various ASEAN agreements including ASEAN Digital Economy Framework Agreement (DEFA), ASEAN Smart Cities Network, and ASEAN Power Grid provide important opportunities for cooperation in the areas of renewable energy, digital trade, and sustainable finance.


Hang is a young researcher with academic experience in Vietnam and the United States. She has previously worked in public relations at the U.S. Consulate General in Ho Chi Minh City and the YSEALI Academy. Her research focuses on ASEAN centrality in the evolving Asia-Pacific landscape, with particular attention to Vietnam’s approach to trade, regional cooperation, and political economy in the face of external power dynamics and global volatility.

Editorial Deadline 26/05/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Siu Tzyy Wei, Lead Editor - Maritime Crescent Desk

This week, fragile lines run through the Maritime Crescent’s strategic landscape, shaping both trade and defence.

In Indonesia, every shipment of palm oil, coal, and nickel braces for an incoming change in its tradeflow, a bottleneck that risks turning commercial routes into chokepoints of control. In Malaysia, the cancellation of a missile deal exposes fragile lines of trust in the global arms market, where neutrality no longer guarantees access to advanced technology. Meanwhile in Brunei, new ties with Germany sketches fresh lines of interdependence, marking the sultanate’s first steps into a wider transregional architecture.

These fragile lines are not abstractions — they are the seams where power, confidence, and control can fray, and where the region’s future will be tested.

Indonesia 🇮🇩

A Bottleneck Republic

by Rayhan Prabu Kusumo, in Jakarta

By 2027, every shipment of palm oil, coal, nickel and other strategic commodities leaving Indonesia will have to pass through one state owned enterprise (SOE). PT Danantara Sumberdaya Indonesia sits inside the country’s sovereign wealth super-fund. Producers will keep producing, but the state will handle paperwork, foreign buyer contracts, and logistics. Jakarta says the policy will plug the billions lost each year to under-invoicing and offshore profit parking, and build a national champion comparable to Saudi Arabia’s Aramco or Malaysia’s Petronas. The question for the region is whether the design can actually deliver on either goal.

The case for action is genuine. Indonesian exporters have long self-reported volumes and prices to customs, affiliates have routinely traded with affiliates at questionable pricing, and proceeds have been parked offshore for years, so the revenue gap that the government wants to close is not imagined. This is also not an insular move, because the past year has seen the administration create other state companies under Danantara to absorb seized palm oil estates and mining concessions.

The design raises serious questions. First, the aspiration to emulate those national champions will prove difficult, because they are themselves the producers, while the new SOE owns nothing and sits as a marketing layer above producers it does not control. Indonesia exports hundreds of grades of palm, coal and nickel, and how one entity prices all of them fairly remains unresolved. Secondly, long-term supply contracts have also not been addressed. The closest historical precedent is the BPPC clove monopoly of 1990 to 1998, which was sold with the same language about stabilising prices and capturing leaking rents, and which ended with collapsed farm-gate prices and a decade of damage to the clove industry.

Beyond the bilateral disruption, foreign buyers lose counterparty certainty when a state body is inserted late in a supply chain, which makes trade finance harder. Indonesian producers, in turn, hand decades of buyer relationships and pricing intelligence to an intermediary that has neither. The implications also travel across ASEAN, since Indonesia is the bloc’s largest commodity exporter, so a Jakarta bottleneck will reach Malaysian refiners, Singaporean traders and regional shipping schedules while signalling to regional investors that resource nationalism in Southeast Asia’s biggest economy is hardening. Closer to home, Indonesia itself faces a challenge: a single discretionary chokepoint may produce new forms of leakage through plethora of risks that historically have often exceeded the leakages such systems were designed to fix.

On balance, few would dispute the reasonable goal of recovering rent lost abroad, but whether this design can deliver it is a separate question. A marketing layer placed above producers it does not own, holding discretion over thousands of pricing decisions and answering only to one centre of authority, will produce outcomes shaped by its incentive structure regardless of policy intent. Through 2027, the real test of PT Danantara Sumberdaya Indonesia’s survival are whether export volumes hold up, whether Indonesian prices stay anchored to world benchmarks, and whether long-term foreign buyers continue signing contracts.


Rayhan has a background in government affairs and public policy, with experience across government institutions and advisory firms. His work focuses on the intersection of geopolitics, policy, and risk, with expertise in advocacy, regulatory analysis, and stakeholder engagement. He holds a degree in Government from Universitas Padjadjaran, and has completed an exchange at Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Spain, focusing on global politics and sustainability.

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Malaysia 🇲🇾

Trust on the Line

by Muhammad Aiman Bin Roszaimi, in Cyberjaya

Malaysia’s dispute with Norway over the cancellation of the Naval Strike Missile (NSM) deal is more than a procurement controversy. It has evolved into a broader strategic lesson about the risks of defence dependency, political conditionality and the fragility of trust in the global arms market.

The issue emerged after Norway revoked export approvals for the NSM system intended for Malaysia Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) programme, despite Kuala Lumpur having reportedly fulfilled almost all contractual obligations since the agreement was signed in 2018. Malaysia had already paid approximately 95 per cent of the contract value before the cancellation took effect.

For Malaysia, the implications are significant. The NSM was not merely an optional add-on, but a core anti-ship capability intended to arm the Royal Malaysian Navy’s delayed Maharaja Lela-class LCS fleet. Without the missile system, the broader logic behind the LCS modernisation programme becomes strategically weakened.

Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim described Norway’s move as “unilateral and unacceptable”, warning that such actions could undermine confidence in European defence suppliers. Malaysia has since pursued compensation claims reportedly exceeding RM1 billion, including both direct payments and indirect integration costs.

However, the incident reveals something deeper than a contractual dispute. It highlights how defence procurement today is increasingly shaped not only by commercial agreements, but also by geopolitical alignment and export control politics. Norway defended its decision by stating that some of its “most sensitive” defence technologies would now be restricted to allies and close strategic partners amid a changing global security environment.

This rationale carries uncomfortable implications for middle powers like Malaysia. Traditionally, Southeast Asian states have pursued diversified defence relations to avoid excessive dependence on any single bloc or great power. Malaysia itself has long practised a hedging strategy which maintains defence cooperation with Western, Asian, and regional partners simultaneously. Yet the NSM episode suggests that neutrality alone may no longer guarantee reliable access to advanced military technology.

In many ways, this reflects a broader transformation in the international defence industry. Arms transfers are increasingly becoming instruments of strategic trust rather than purely market-based transactions. Export controls, technology access and interoperability are now closely tied to alliance structures and geopolitical positioning. The result is a more fragmented defence ecosystem where political alignment matters as much as purchasing power.

Domestically, the controversy also places additional pressure on Malaysia already troubled LCS programme, which has faced years of delays, cost overruns and scrutiny over governance failures. The missile cancellation further complicates efforts to restore public confidence in Malaysia naval modernisation agenda. Even if compensation is eventually secured, replacing the NSM system would likely require new integration processes and further delays.

At the regional level, the incident may encourage Southeast Asian states to reconsider how they assess defence suppliers. Reliability, political predictability and long-term strategic assurance may become increasingly important alongside capability and price. Malaysia’s warning that the episode could affect regional confidence in Norwegian or even broader European defence partnerships reflects this growing concern.


Aiman is a PhD candidate in Security and Strategic Analysis at the National University of Malaysia. His research focuses on Malaysia’s space policy, ASEAN regional security, and the strategic implications of emerging technologies. His work explores how Malaysia’s defense policy and strategic culture shape its approach to outer space.

Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳

A Milestone in ASEAN-EU Relations

by Wira Gregory Ejau, in Bandar Seri Begawan

During his visit to Berlin from 18 to 19 May 2026, Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah met with Federal President Frank-Walter Steinmeier for bilateral discussions on defense technology, industrial cooperation, and the future of ASEAN-EU relations. These talks carry significant weight, occurring at a pivotal moment in the institutional trajectory of the ASEAN-EU partnership.

Three weeks prior, Brunei hosted the 25th ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting in Bandar Seri Begawan, which was co-chaired by EU High Representative Kaja Kallas and Brunei’s own Foreign Affairs Minister. The Berlin visit was its direct diplomatic sequel for Brunei, conducted at the head-of-state level. Brunei currently serves as Country Coordinator for ASEAN-EU Dialogue Relations for the duration of the 2024-2027 term, and 2027 marks the 50th anniversary of EU-ASEAN dialogue relations, which is a milestone that both sides are actively building toward. The Sultan’s visit to Berlin comes at a time when European strategic interest in Southeast Asia is running at a historically significant level.

The most analytically consequential specific outcome of the visit is when Brunei, in its capacity as Country Coordinator, is currently positively considering Germany’s request to become an ASEAN Sectoral Dialogue Partner, a status currently held by Pakistan, Norway, Switzerland, and Turkey, amongst others, a move that would give Germany a structured bilateral channel with ASEAN that is distinct from the EU-level relationship. In the recent years, Germany has been deepening its Indo-Pacific engagement - publishing its Indo-Pacific Guidelines in 2020 and accelerating that orientation after 2022. A Sectoral Dialogue Partnership would formalise that engagement institutionally and mark a qualitative step beyond what any other EU member state has individually secured with the bloc.

The bilateral visit provides the material texture of the relationship, which includes ongoing cooperation through the Muara Maritime Services joint venture, Lufthansa Technik’s involvement in Brunei’s aviation sector, and the Brunei Fertiliser plant. All projects cover maritime, aviation, and industrial domains, with discussions touching on prospects for expanded defence technology cooperation and collaboration in the nano sector. Laying foundations on security-industrial cooperation marks a notable beginning to Brunei-Germany relations - unorthodox even - a move that extends past Brunei’s traditional energy-focused external partnerships.

Finally, both leaders also acknowledged the structural linkage between Southeast Asian and European security amid rising global tensions. This framing reflects a broader shift in diplomatic discourse, in which regional security orders that once operated largely independently are increasingly understood as interdependent. Ultimately, the development of Brunei-Germany relations amidst the former’s role as the ASEAN-EU Coordinator displays an intelligent use of timely opportunity in positioning itself as a notable partner in the transregional architecture.


Gregory is an MSc candidate in Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He works as a freelance writer specializing in international history, conflict, and counterterrorism, with experience in academia, investigative journalism, and voluntary uniformed service. He currently provides research assistance with the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) under their Southeast Asian Security and Defence Internship Programme and conducts investigations on regional security and transnational crime for a confidential company.

Editorial Deadline 23/05/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)