by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk

This week's issue of the Mekong Belt features four articles that each, in their own way, ask who bears the cost of a state's unfinished business. In Laos, farmers and rural communities continue to live with the literal remnants of a war fought over fifty years ago, as UXO contamination and deforestation trap the country's most vulnerable in a cycle of poverty. Meanwhile, Myanmar inches back toward ASEAN's table through a cautious virtual meeting, raising the question of whether diplomatic re-engagement can — or should — outpace accountability. Across the border, Thailand's private sector is sounding the alarm on a demographic time bomb, as a shrinking workforce and a creaking immigration system threaten to undermine decades of industrial growth. And in Cambodia, 790 juvenile offenders have been transferred to border centres to perform military engineering support — a government initiative that blurs the line between rehabilitation and conscription, drawing scrutiny from international humanitarian law.

Lao PDR 🇱🇦

Land, Lives, and Laos

by Thipphavanh Virakhom, in Vientiane

Laos is a country still shaped by a war it never declared. Between 1964 and 1973, almost 3 million tonnes of bombs were dropped on its territory, this was the most heavily bombed country in history based on its population. Out of 270 million small bombs dropped, nearly a third failed to explode and are still dangerous today.

Fifty years on, this is not history. It is the daily reality for millions of people. Roughly 25% of Laos’s villages remain contaminated with unexploded ordnance (UXO). Over 22,000 people have been killed or injured since the war ended. The number of victims has dropped to about 300 a year. That shows things are improving, but it still means 300 people are hurt or killed every single year.

The people most at risk are not statistics, They are farmers who cannot safely work their land, children growing up in communities where the soil still holds danger, women and girls in remote villages far from healthcare and support when accidents happen. Poverty and UXO contamination feed each other. Unsafe land means less income which means less capacity to move away or recover.

Laos is facing a major forest crisis alongside its bomb problem. The country used to be 70% forest, but illegal logging dragged that down to 40% by 2010. Even though more than half of the population relies on the forest to make a living, losing these trees costs the country nearly a fifth of its economy every year. While a new plan to plant 10 million trees will help, the loss of these forests hurts the poorest rural communities the most, the very same people who are already trapped living on land filled with hidden wartime bombs.

Policies and frameworks exist. Laos has integrated UXO clearance into its national development plan. It was among the first countries to ratify the Convention on Cluster Munitions and will chair the treaty’s Third Review Conference in Vientiane this coming September. But frameworks alone are not enough. What is still needed is consistent, long-term funding reaches the village level. Community-based clearance and reforestation programmes that actively included women, ethnic minorities, and the rural poor, not just as beneficiaries but as decision-makers. Stronger regional accountability within ASEAN, where only two of eleven member states have fully joined the cluster munitions treaty. And honest recognition that recovery takes generations, not project cycles.

Sustainable development in ASEAN cannot be complete while one of its members is still clearing bombs from its farmland and watching its forest disappear. This is calling for partnership. The kind that shows up in budgets, in technical support, and in political will that outlasts any single conference commitment cycle. The bomb and the trees are not separate issues. They are one. The question of whether the most vulnerable people in Southeast Asia Nations can finally live safely, on land that nourishes rather than threatens them. That question deserves a serious and sustained answer including from Laos, from ASEAN, and from the wider international community.


Thipphavanh holds a bachelor’s degree in international affairs. She is a governance and development professional specialising in rule of law, access to justice, and gender equality in Lao PDR. Her work focuses on strengthening justice sector institutions, advancing people-centred governance, and promoting gender-responsive systems. With extensive experience in project coordination, monitoring and evaluation, stakeholder engagement, and strategic communications, she has collaborated closely with national institutions and international partners to support inclusive and sustainable development.

Myanmar 🇲🇲

ASEAN Agrees to Virtual Talks With Myanmar's Foreign Minister

by Myat Moe Kywe

ASEAN has agreed to hold a virtual meeting with Myanmar’s foreign minister, the bloc’s secretary-general said Thursday. This signals a cautious shift toward re-engaging with Myanmar’s military government, which ASEAN has largely distanced itself from since the 2021 coup.

ASEAN Secretary-General Kao Kim Hourn confirmed the development on the sidelines of the bloc’s summit in the Philippines. “It’s very clear that today the ASEAN foreign ministers agree that there will be an engagement with Myanmar, with the foreign minister of Myanmar, that they will have a virtual meeting coming up in the very near future,” he told Reuters.

Myanmar’s leadership has been barred from top ASEAN meetings since the military’s 2021 coup unleashed a lethal crackdown on dissent and spiralled into civil war. The decision to hold a virtual ministerial-level meeting — rather than a physical seat at the summit table — reflects the bloc’s attempt to thread a difficult needle: resuming dialogue while avoiding the optics of full rehabilitation of a regime still prosecuting a brutal conflict against its own people.

Kao Kim Hourn said Myanmar had indicated it wanted to normalise ties with the 11-member grouping, but that its neighbours want to see concrete progress on de-escalation, dialogue and humanitarian aid access before any broader re-engagement, according to Free Malaysia Today.

The announcement did not emerge in a vacuum. The decision to hold talks with Myanmar’s top diplomat came after Thailand’s foreign minister told Reuters he would propose the idea, with the aim of building consensus within ASEAN for greater engagement.

Bangkok has been among the most active in pushing for Myanmar’s return to regional forums. Thailand reportedly sent a congratulatory message to junta chief Min Aung Hlaing after he assumed the presidency under the military’s rebranded regime.

On May 18, the Philippines and Myanmar held their fifth round of Foreign Policy Consultations in Manila — co-chaired by Myanmar’s Deputy Foreign Minister U Ko Ko Kyaw and Philippine Undersecretary Leo M. Herrera-Lim — covering trade, investment, energy and transnational crime. The Philippines’ decision to invite only a deputy minister, rather than a senior political figure, appeared calibrated to signal engagement without full endorsement.

The pattern points to a bloc under quiet strain. While ASEAN has collectively reaffirmed Myanmar’s exclusion from high-level political summits, a position reiterated in Cebu during 48th ASEAN Summit, individual member states have also engaged functional ties with Naypyidaw on their own terms, creating a growing gap between the bloc’s stated position and the diplomatic reality on the ground.

Now, with the bloc’s agreement on holding the virtual meeting, it is likely to shift the bloc’s stance on Myanmar. Once scheduled, it, will be the most formal contact between ASEAN’s foreign ministers and the junta’s top diplomat since Myanmar’s exclusion began. Critics are likely to argue it rewards a regime that has shown little genuine movement on the bloc’s Five-Point Consensus — its own roadmap for resolving the crisis — which remains largely unimplemented more than four years after it was agreed upon.

Kao Kim Hourn also said the possibility of creating a special envoy for Myanmar with a remit beyond one year was part of ongoing discussion, with some unspecified issues still to be resolved.

The virtual meeting is being presented as a cautious way to keep communication open without formally recognizing the junta. However, it raises a deeper question: beyond ASEAN’s diplomatic calculations and gradual re-engagement, will this kind of engagement actually reflect or address the realities and concerns of people in Myanmar?


Myat is a senior undergraduate student majoring in Politics, Philosophy, and Economics. She has interned at The Asia Foundation in Washington, D.C., and she has also worked as a summer research assistant at the Centre for Policy and Innovation (CRPI), gaining experience in research and analysis. Her work focuses on civic engagement, gender, youth leadership, and community development.

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Thailand 🇹🇭

Thailand’s Demographic Time Bomb

by Paranut Juntree, in Bangkok

Thailand is sprinting toward a demographic cliff. Long celebrated as the primary industrial engine of Southeast Asia, the Kingdom’s domestic labor pool is drying up at a globally unprecedented rate.

Thailand has already become an aged society where more than 20% of its population is 60 or older, combined with a shrinking birth rate and unprepared effects of the current Iran-US conflict and the hikes in energy and production costs. This workforce crisis reached a critical flashpoint on May 20, 2026, when the Joint Standing Committee on Commerce, Industry and Banking (JSCCIB) slashed its national GDP growth forecasts. Led by the newly appointed chairwoman of the Federation of Thai Industries (FTI), Pimjai Leeissaranukul, the private sector issued a definitive ultimatum that vital industries like manufacturing, construction, agriculture, and hospitality are starving for personnel, risking total collapse without an immediate, massive influx of foreign labor.

However, welcoming migrant workers requires Thailand to confront an uneasy paradox. While the private sector demands the immediate relaxation of immigration barriers to maintain national competitiveness, the physical infrastructure governing these workers is fundamentally insufficient. A key friction point is the Ministry of Labour’s e-Work Permit system. Due to technical bottlenecks and unintegrated databases, the digital framework frequently leaves renewals in administrative limbo. The JSCCIB notes that these bureaucratic delays have inadvertently stripped thousands of legally documented, tax-paying migrants of their status, pushing them into illegal undocumented vulnerability due to systemic state shortcomings.

This legal gray zone also highlights ethical and human rights risks. When official channels become impossibly slow, desperate employers may turn to unregulated brokers. This immediately subjects vulnerable individuals to transnational trafficking, excessive recruitment debts, and possibly forced labor. This danger is magnified by the ongoing crisis in a neighboring country like Myanmar, where displaced populations are constantly crossing the border fleeing conflict rather than purely pursuing economic migration.

Furthermore, the government must actively manage public perception on migrant labor. For decades, domestic policy has treated migrant communities as transient national security threats rather than permanent pillars of economic integration. A clear example of this is the restricted right of migrant workers to unionize and protect their interests. While public sentiment often resists the influx of foreign labor due to concerns over domestic job competition, the business sector faces a starkly different reality. For employers, there is a critical shortage of domestic workers willing to fill ‘3D’ jobs (dirty, dangerous, and difficult). To neutralize domestic anxieties that migrants are exhausting public resources, policy must frame structured, low-cost health insurance schemes and worker protections as an investment that makes foreign labor budget-neutral and beneficial for provincial infrastructure.

While the private sector is already pushing to expand G2G (government-to-government) agreements to bring in new demographics from South Asai, money and quotas alone cannot fix flawed institutional logic. Easing borders is merely a temporary solution if the domestic framework remains hostile. As Thailand grapples with an aging society, treating migrant workers with basic human dignity, streamlining legal registration, and ensuring fair wages is no longer just a human rights protection gesture but an economic survival mechanism of the country.


Paranut has a background in advocacy, with experience in policy research, communications, and civic engagement across both the NGO and government sectors. As Thailand’s Youth Delegate to the United Nations, he represented Thai youth in global dialogues on migration, education, and human rights, championing inclusive policymaking. He holds a degree in political science with a specialization in international relations.

Cambodia 🇰🇭

Cambodia Transfers 790 Juvenile Offenders to Support Military Engineering and Frontlines

by Malai Yatt, in Phnom Penh

Following Prime Minister Hun Manet’s directive, nearly 800 juvenile offenders were moved to specialised centers to perform national service, focusing on vocational rehabilitation and engineering support for frontline military operations

According to the official announcement, after Manet has ordered the supportive measures for gangsters who engage in harmful practices and order insecurity in society, the government bodies have been working to transfer juveniles to the border.

It should be noted that on April 20, PM was instructed to carefully organise and transfer juvenile offenders to perform work assisting frontline operations in printing and other appropriate tasks, in order to support both the frontline military and the engineering corps.

“As a result, on May 21, the General Department of Prisons arranged the transfer of a total of 790 male juvenile offenders from educational and correctional centres and capital-province prisons to continue their sentences at two target educational and correctional centres.

It added that there are listed as the 4th Correctional Education Center (in Pursat Province), totaling 651 individuals, and the Preah Vihear Provincial Prison, totaling 139 individuals.

The transfer of these juvenile offenders was intended to enhance correctional education and rehabilitation through participation in vocational training programs, to build personal skills, and to engage in activities beneficial to the local community, according to Manet’s Facebook post.

Comparing the new initiative to one convention, it’s similar to the Third Geneva Convention, which protects prisoners of war. It lays out specific guidelines for their care and release, as well as defining their rights. Other individuals who are robbed of their freedom due to armed conflict are likewise protected by international humanitarian law.

In a previous announcement, the PM has suggested that sending gang members and young offenders to perform military duty at the border could benefit the country and shorten prison sentences.

“Currently, we arrest and imprison them, but what we lose is rice. Some change their lives after release, but others return to gang activity,” the Prime Minister said, adding that they would not serve on the frontline but take on support roles.

“[We’re] not handing them a gun; they should build trenches, it helps the engineering division,” Manet said, citing an example, he added.

In short, Cambodia has transferred 790 juvenile offenders to border centers, shifting from standard imprisonment to military engineering support and vocational rehabilitation to improve national security and discipline.

Malai is a reporter at Kiripost, where she has worked for over two years, driven by a strong commitment to amplifying the voices of underserved communities. Her reporting focuses on economic and foreign affairs.

Editorial Deadline 23/05/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Karen Ysabelle R. David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk

There’s rarely a dull moment in Philippine politics. But the dramatic events that unfolded last week — shots fired in the Senate building, with senators and journalists scrambling for cover, and ending with a fugitive senator fleeing in the dark of the night — seemed straight out of a Hollywood plot. With fingers pointing and smoke and mirrors galore, the Senate has captured the country’s attention, but for all the wrong reasons.

Away from the excitement in Manila, Vietnam presents a sobering counterpoint: the country’s impressive trade surplus has also drawn the wrong kind of attention. Hanoi must now fight to preserve its own economy against a protectionist and suspicious United States, all while hoping to offer a playbook for the rest of the ASEAN members.

Meanwhile, Singapore’s famously strict drug rehabilitation framework is undergoing a change as it softens its approach on first-time drug abusers. But with combating drug abuse still a priority for ASEAN, it would be a mistake to think that the city-state remains anything but as hardline as ever in its broader drug stance.

The Philippines 🇵🇭

Philippine Senate Under Attack: Gunshots, a Fugitive Senator, and the Cracks in Democratic Restraint

by Eduardo G. Fajermo Jr., in Angeles City

If the Philippine Senate is meant to embody institutional restraint, this week delivered the opposite: a senator sought by the International Criminal Court (ICC) used the chamber as a temporary refuge, gunfire was reported inside the Senate complex, and the political blame game erupted almost as quickly as the security lapse itself. In a country already operating under coalition fracture and impeachment pressure, the Senate became the week’s pressure point.

Sen. Ronald “Bato” dela Rosa, a Duterte ally and former police chief, briefly surfaced from hiding and took refuge in the Senate as authorities moved to enforce the ICC-linked arrest request. The confrontation that followed ended with gunshots heard inside the Senate compound and dela Rosa slipping back into hiding, an image that punctured the Senate’s claim to control its own premises and procedures.

Authorities have since zeroed in on the Senate’s own security leadership. Senate officials acknowledged a warning shot was fired; separate reports said the first shot came from within Senate security, and probes are underway into how firearms were used and who gave the orders.

What followed was as politically revealing as the gunfire. Minority senators say they were being blamed or insinuated as complicit because they “went home early,” implying they supposedly knew something would happen. Sen. Panfilo Lacson rejected that claim as “unfair” and “malicious,” saying none of them had advance knowledge of the shooting incident.

The implication matters because it shows how Senate fractures quickly become weaponized. Instead of a unified institutional response to a security breakdown, the chamber slipped into factional storytelling. Lacson warned that insinuations against the minority were irresponsible and that the Senate should recover dignity through restraint and maturity.

Besides the pointing fingers about the shooting, the minority bloc was also removed from chairmanship of key committees after voting against Sen. Alan Peter Cayetano. These assignments are not simply administrative perks in the Philippines; they are power instruments that determine which investigations proceed, which hearings get oxygen, and which narratives become institutional records.

The Senate is also juggling the constitutional weight of an impeachment track against Vice President Sara Duterte. That backdrop makes every security and leadership decision politically charged, because senators are simultaneously thinking about legal duty, coalition survival, and the next election cycle.

The most telling detail is not the gunfire itself, but what came after: a senator slipping away despite state declarations of enforcement, and lawmakers trading insinuations instead of locking down a common institutional story. When a Senate cannot prevent its own premises from becoming a sanctuary, and cannot prevent a security incident from becoming a blame war, it exposes the fragile seam between law and loyalty.

Democratic institutions do not only weaken when they are attacked from the outside. They weaken when the people entrusted to uphold procedure treat law as negotiable and crisis as a political weapon. This week, the Philippine Senate did not merely face a legal confrontation, it revealed how quickly rules can collapse into factions, and how easily a chamber meant to restrain power can be pulled into protecting it. If this remains unresolved, the precedent will outlive the gunshots: not that the Senate was attacked, but that it blinked.


Eduardo is a faculty member at Holy Angel University, where he teaches courses on Philippine history and contemporary global issues. He is currently pursuing a Master’s degree in Political Science at the University of Santo Tomas, with a research focus on disaster governance, environmental politics, and the urban poor in the Philippines.

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Vietnam 🇻🇳

To Trade Under Strain

by Tri Vo, in Ho Chi Minh City

For the past year, Vietnam’s export machine has fired on all cylinders, weathering the undulating waves of global commercial instability. The numbers are indeed impressive: according to the U.S. Trade Representative, the goods trade deficit with Vietnam hit US$178.2 billion in 2025, driven by products such as electronics, machinery, apparel, and food. Such an at-first-glance victory is nothing but gild that has increasingly become a lightning rod of unwanted attention for Ha Noi. Indeed, as 2026 unfolds, the U.S. Department of Commerce (DoC) has sharply intensified its scrutiny of such trade imbalance, starting with anti-dumping duties on Vietnamese seafood exports. Yet, stress is also being felt across a wide range of vital sectors.

The most immediate pressure points are emerging in renewable energy. During the week of the 11^th of May, a coalition of American solar panel manufacturers, including industry majors like First Solar and DYCM Power, filed a formal request with the DoC to start a new anti-circumvention inquiry. The complaint asserts that foreign enterprises are exploiting third-party nations by using Chinese-origin wafers to produce solar cells, whereas they are then assembled into finished modules in Vietnam and Ethiopia before being exported to the U.S. market. Such complaints, especially given that it hews close to recently leveled U.S. accusations that Vietnam is a transshipment hub for Chinese goods wanting to skirt higher tariffs, can then be utilized as evidence of widespread commercial malpractice on the part of Ha Noi, thus opening the floodgates for more punitive measures.

In addition, looming over these probes is the broader, structural disadvantage of Vietnam’s legal trade standing in the view of the U.S. government. Despite a massive lobbying effort involving dozens of American business associations, the DoC officially denied Vietnam’s request for the designation of a “market economy” in August 2024. Such a trivial label is more critical than it meets the eye, as without it, Vietnam remains classified as a non-market economy. Under such a label, regulators routinely disregard the actual, on-the-ground production costs of Vietnamese companies during anti-dumping investigations, instead relying on surrogate values from third-party nations. This rigid mathematical framework almost invariably presents a far-from-realistic picture of Vietnam as a major export dumper, resulting in quite unfair import duties.

To defend its hard-won trade surplus, Vietnam’s Ministry of Industry and Trade is proactively working to forestall potential further punitive measures. As such, Vietnamese manufacturers are being forced to dramatically increase their supply chain transparency, especially regarding product origin rules. Exporters must now rigorously document the traceability of their inputs, not just the final assembly, thereby proving to skeptical U.S. trade officials that the raw materials and components used in those Vietnamese goods are indeed locally sourced, rather than merely a veneer for imported goods from China.

As global trade continues to fracture along geopolitical fault lines, Ha Noi’s very ability to navigate such a minefield will dictate its ability to fulfill the ambitious double-digit growth rate of this year and those to come. More than that, Vietnam’s response playbook can prove applicable beyond its borders, as ASEAN peers are also mired in trade disputes with a much more protectionist America and in need of policy lessons from peer nations to preserve their own economies.


Tri has experience in management consulting and strategy, having worked with institutions such as the UNDP, The Asia Group, and ARC Group. He has provided strategic, legal, and operational insights to clients in sectors including manufacturing, energy, and technology. He holds both academic and professional experience related to Southeast and East Asia, with a focus on regional development and policy.

Singapore 🇸🇬

Singapore Extends a Hand Without Loosening Its Grip

by Ryan

A quiet but meaningful shift in Singapore’s drug rehabilitation framework signals the city-state’s evolving approach to first-time offenders, even as it doubles down on enforcement and regional solidarity.

Singapore’s approach to drug policy has long been characterized by its uncompromising firmness, but a policy change announced on 15 May at the country’s third annual Drug Victims Remembrance Day marks a deliberate evolution in how the city-state treats those at the earliest stage of dependency. Law Minister and Second Minister for Home Affairs Edwin Tong announced that, effective from 16 May 2026, all first-time drug abusers who voluntarily surrender to the Central Narcotics Bureau (CNB) will no longer be sent to a Drug Rehabilitation Center (DRC). Instead, they will be placed directly on community-based drug supervision with compulsory case management, a shift that keeps rehabilitation out of an institutional setting while maintaining close state oversight.

The change is not a softening of Singapore’s broader drug stance but rather a calibrated expansion of a pathway that already existed in a narrower form. Under the Enhanced Direct Supervision Order introduced in 2019, first-time abusers assessed as low-risk could already avoid the DRC in favor of community supervision managed by the Singapore Anti-Narcotics Association. The updated policy extends this to all first-time surrenderers, provided they have not surrendered more than twice and are not currently wanted by the authorities or under active investigation. Those who come forward will continue to undergo regular counseling sessions employing psychology-based methods such as goal-setting and family engagement, alongside hair or urine testing conducted by the CNB.

The practical reach of this change, at least initially, is modest. According to CNB data, only around 30 first-time abusers surrendered themselves in the entire period from 2020 to March 2026. But the policy’s significance lies less in its immediate scale than in what it signals about the direction of Singapore’s rehabilitation philosophy. By removing the DRC as the automatic first response to voluntary self-disclosure, the government is reinforcing the incentive structure for early help-seeking, treating the act of surrender as an intervention point worth rewarding with a less disruptive response.

That incentive matters against a troubling statistical backdrop. Singapore recorded 68 drug-related deaths in 2025, a 15% increase from the year before. The number of new abusers aged below 20 increased by 22% from 2024 to 2025, with over half of all new abusers arrested in the past three years being under 30, and the youngest arrested in 2025 just 12 years old. Cannabis remains a particular concern, with seven in ten cannabis abusers arrested in 2025 being new users, of whom 63% were below 30. Despite this, the CNB has reported encouraging rehabilitation outcomes elsewhere: the two-year recidivism rate for the 2023 DRC release cohort fell by 4.7% to 26.1% compared with the previous cohort.

This announcement arrived alongside a broader regional framing. Tong emphasized that ASEAN member states share a strong consensus on tackling drug abuse, and confirmed that an annual ASEAN Drug Victims Remembrance Day will be observed on 26 June beginning this year, with member states invited to share stories of drug victims from their own countries. The initiative builds on Singapore’s chairmanship of the 46th ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting on Drug Matters in August 2025.

For ASEAN, where member states face rising youth drug use and the persistent challenge of balancing public health outcomes with rule-of-law commitments, Singapore’s incremental but deliberate policy recalibration offers a template worth watching closely.


Ryan is a final-year finance student at the Singapore University of Social Sciences (SUSS) with experience across venture capital, venture debt, and business development. He also holds a diploma in Law and Management from Temasek Polytechnic. His interests lie in how emerging technologies and economic trends shape business ecosystems and regional development in Asia.

Editorial Deadline 19/05/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Siu Tzyy Wei, Lead Editor - Maritime Crescent Desk

Progress, it turns out, always comes with fine print.

This week, we look beneath the surface of stories that ask the same question: what is the true cost of development, and who is left to foot the bill when announcement fades and minutiae takes hold?

In Indonesia, Hree P. Samudra pulls back the curtain on Jakarta’s modernisation ambitions to trace what the headline budget figures conceal: currency depreciation, deferred maintenance and slow erosion of military readiness that often go unnoticed. In Brunei, Syimah Johari examines the proposed Brunei-Miri Bus Link - a welcome step towards the region’s most active cross-border corridors, but one whose promise hinges on questions of infrastructure, border capacity and whether a new but slower route can compete with long-existing commuting habits. In Malaysia, Edrina Ozaidi turns to the wards where young doctors are stretched thin by a system that asks them to bear the human cost of a healthcare structure long overdue for reform.

Together, this week’s correspondents remind us that progress rarely arrives without hidden tolls. The costs that matter seldom break the surface, but are the ones that emerge quietly, long after the cameras stop rolling.

Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳

Between Speed and Access

by Syimah Johari, in Bandar Seri Begawan

Bruneians have long travelled to Miri for short getaways, affordable shopping, and access to a wider range of services and attractions. Despite the frequency of cross-border movement, travelling to and from Miri can be inconvenient due to border procedures, transport logistics, and reliance on private vehicles. This ongoing mobility has prompted discussions surrounding the proposed Brunei-Miri Bus Link, an initiative aimed at improving cross-border connectivity by formalising an already active travel corridor. The proposed weekly airport-to-airport route is estimated to take around three hours, notably longer than travelling by private vehicle, raising questions over why a slower public transport alternative is being introduced when faster private travel options already exist.

At present, cross-border movement between Brunei and Miri is already frequent, with many travelling between the two locations on a regular basis. However, movement remains heavily reliant on private vehicles due to flexibility and convenience, making travel largely informal and demand-driven. Much of this movement is also socially and economically motivated, including travel for shopping, work, education, and leisure. With this in mind, the proposed Brunei-Miri Bus Link was introduced by Malaysia’s Deputy Tourism, Arts and Culture Minister, Chiew Choon Man, who stated that the initiative could help boost cross-border tourism between the two countries. As the proposal remains in its preliminary stages, further bilateral discussions are expected to take place.

Despite the continued reliance on private vehicles to travel between Brunei and Miri, there are underlying logistical challenges that could make the proposed bus link an attractive alternative. While travelling by car offers greater flexibility and shorter travel times, factors such as fuel costs, parking fees, vehicle security, and border delays can make cross-border travel more costly and demanding for individuals. In this sense, the proposed bus link could provide a more cost-efficient and centralised mode of transport, reducing some of the planning and logistical burdens associated with private travel.

This is particularly relevant for Bruneians who use Miri as a transit point through Miri International Airport as a more affordable international option. A 2025 study focusing primarily on Brunei visitors to Miri found that approximately 56 per cent travelled there for overseas flights. As such, a dedicated bus service could potentially improve accessibility and convenience for such travellers.

However, concerns surrounding efficiency still remain. The proposed bus journey is estimated to take around three hours- longer than travelling by private vehicle due to road limitations and possible delays at immigration checkpoints. During peak travel periods, processing larger groups of passengers places additional pressure on existing border infrastructure, affecting travel flow and waiting times. This raises broader questions about whether supporting infrastructure and border procedures are prepared to accommodate the proposed service effectively.

Ultimately, the proposed Brunei-Miri Bus Link reflects a shift towards formalising an actively evolving pattern of cross-border movement. Its effectiveness will therefore depend on how well it fits into current travel behaviour and whether it can offer a practical and accessible alternative for regular cross-border travellers.


Syimah is a graduate of King’s College London with a BA in International Relations. With a strong focus on diplomacy, regional cooperation, and development policy, she is passionate about contributing to meaningful change through public service. Currently, she is involved in poverty alleviation work through a local NGO.

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Malaysia 🇲🇾

Worn to the Bone

by Edrina Lisa Ozaidi, in WP Kuala Lumpur

We have often heard about the bustling, scary scenario in the emergency department of a hospital. Teleseries or medical dramas have taught us one thing — it takes a lot of staff to run a department smoothly. The Malaysian medical sector, however, faces a major crisis of staff retention, especially among junior doctors who battle against job security and burnout.

To understand the severity of the issue, one must understand the progression of problems. Back in 2016, the lack of permanent vacancies prompted the government to introduce the 5-year contract system, where junior doctors will serve 3 years of housemanship plus 2 years of compulsory placement. For those intending to specialise, 2 more years are needed.

This has caused a two-tier workforce, doctors who are already in placement and contract doctors that face a ceiling. While the placement was meant to address oversupply of talent and budgetary constraints, it further caused disparity, significant job insecurity, and career and specialisation pathways among junior doctors.

The suppressed frustration then caused a movement where doctors staged a nationwide strike during the pandemic. Unfortunately, the solution that was prompted by the government was to open more permanent posts and grant Hadiah Latihan Persekutuan (HLP) eligibility to contract officers to mediate the current tension while the systemic flaws are not yet addressed.

By 2025 and the current year, more systemic failures become more noticeable. The government also introduced a shift system intended to replace 24-hour-on-call shifts with 18-hour shifts. However, this integrated on-call hours into the regular work week, causing doctors to lose weekdays on-call allowances, a move that was criticised by the doctors association as a pay cut in disguise.

Recently, the health director-general issued a landmark circular capping house officer hours at 60-62 hours per week and strictly prohibiting 24-hour shifts. The new mandates also mention the implementation of three flexible work shifts (morning, evening, night), without considering the number of housemen available.

The directive stipulates that in the event of a lack of medical officers, the clinical workload for evening and night shifts must be borne entirely by medical officers and specialists to ensure compliance with house officers’ rest periods.

Private doctors’ associations call out that 60 hours remain burdensome compared to the international 40-hour standard (based in UK), while calling for the government to address the systemic failures. Unlike an official cap on trainee doctors’ work hours in Malaysia’s public service, medical officers often work 33 hours on-call shifts.

Recent statistics also reveal more systemic failure, where out of 5,000 housemanship positions offered, only 529 graduates reported for duty. While fewer graduates enter the public system, the burden on existing staff increases. Despite higher on-call allowances (raised by 40% in Budget 2026) and relocation aids, doctors are leaving for the private sector or overseas for better opportunities and pay, and Malaysia needs to step up in its system to ensure the rate of doctors’ retention improves.


Edrina is a communications professional with a background in international relations. She holds a degree from the University of Nottingham Malaysia and has worked across public relations and social media for organizations in the development, education, and corporate sectors. Her work focuses on crafting narratives around regional affairs and strengthening media engagement across Southeast Asia.

Indonesia 🇮🇩

What the Budget Numbers Don’t Show

by Hree Putri Samudra, in Jakarta

Defense modernization is one of the easier things to sell in Jakarta. The announcements are familiar by now: Rafales from France, J-10s from China, PT PAL talking about unmanned submarines, another parliamentary hearing where the budget edges upward and officials speak of momentum. The ambition is real enough. What gets less attention is the part that starts after the cameras are gone. Procurement contracts do not end at signing. They arrive later as maintenance obligations, spare-parts orders, software updates, fuel bills, and invoices priced against a rupiah sitting closer to Rp17,500 than the Rp16,500 the budget was built around.

On paper, Rp187.1 trillion suggests a government still serious about defense modernization. The exchange rate complicates that story. Rafale contracts, T-50i sustainment, and billions in foreign financing behind the J-10 acquisitions are tied to currencies Indonesia does not control. The budget approved in Jakarta remains numerically intact as the rupiah weakens. At current rates, the difference runs into hundreds of millions of dollars, enough to turn maintenance, ammunition, and training from routine planning questions into budgeting problems.

This is usually where the public conversation loses track of how defense budgets actually work. When conversations revolve only on capital, what gets squeezed are the less visible elements that keep a military running. Refitting schedules stretch. Spare-parts procurement slows. Exercises get reduced because fuel and operating costs no longer match the assumptions made months earlier. Nobody announces lower sortie rates or delayed maintenance cycles. It is here that currency pressure leaves its mark - not in procurement headlines but in the quieter erosion of readiness.

Indonesia has been bearing this defence budgeting imbalance for years. Procurement and personnel absorb attention and money more easily than sustainment ever does. Maintenance, readiness, and lifecycle costs tend to sit further down the priority list until the exchange rate forces them back into view. When the rupiah is relatively stable, the system muddles through. Under sustained depreciation, the distance between what Indonesia formally owns and what the TNI can reliably operate becomes harder to ignore.

Defense is competing inside a tighter budget than the headline numbers suggest. Oil assumptions have shifted, debt servicing is heavier, and Makan Bergizi Gratis now carries Rp335 trillion, almost double the military allocation. Prabowo has defended the program and understandably so. But when some spending lines are politically difficult to touch, adjustment rarely disappears. It tends to move elsewhere, often into maintenance, training, and delayed upgrades.

The foreign policy effects are harder to measure but still worth noticing. Governments under fiscal pressure negotiate differently, especially when procurement financing narrows and economic assumptions become harder to defend. Jakarta’s commitment to large-scale US energy purchases was presented as partnership, and while there is no reason to dismiss that outright, tighter budgets usually leave less room to bargain comfortably.

Bebas dan aktif - free and active - was always a doctrine with a material premise: that Indonesia would be substantial enough, stable enough, and solvent enough that genuine independence was possible. That premise hasn’t collapsed. But it isn’t free, rather, it is getting more costly to sustain.


Hree is a Policy Fellow at the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network (APLN) where she leads research and policy interventions on Indo-Pacific nuclear security and AI governance. She previously served as a Research Fellow at the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) and has managed multi-country security portfolios across all 10 ASEAN member states. Her work examines the intersection of emerging technologies, strategic stability, and the evolution of regional security architectures. She specializes in institutional risk assessment and the application of open-source intelligence (OSINT) for strategic monitoring. Her current research focuses on how technological shifts such as AI and advanced verification tools reshape escalation dynamics and multilateral cooperation in a multipolar world.

Editorial Deadline 16/05/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk

This week's issue of the Mekong Belt looks into the gap between state action and state accountability. From Vientiane to Naypyidaw, passing through Bangkok and Phnom Penh, governments across the region are moving: passing laws, making arrests, convening summits, greenlighting megaprojects. Still, the harder question is always the same: who bears the cost, and who stays protected?

In Laos an enforcement surge has led to the detention of over 1,500 cybercrime suspects in a single month — but the architects of the scam networks remain untouched, and a 99-year lease makes it easy to ask how deep this crackdown can really go. In Myanmar, we sit in on an ASEAN that can’t agree on what to do next. Four years after the coup, Cebu showed a bloc that knows the status quo is broken but can’t commit to anything that would fix it. Meanwhile, in Thailand, the Land Bridge debate is back and with it so is a central question: with a 1.24% return rate, a trillion-baht price tag, and coastal communities on the line, who exactly does this megaproject serve? Finally, Cambodia's new conscription law clears parliament: two years of mandatory service for men aged 18–25, no pay, imprisonment for draft dodgers, and economists warning it could shave 0.5% off GDP annually.

Lao PDR 🇱🇦

Laos’ War on Scams

by Thongsavanh Souvannasane, in Vientiane

More than 1,500 scam suspects are detained in a single month. For a country long accused of looking the other way on cybercrime, the numbers coming out of Laos in May 2026 demand a closer look.

On 12 May, Bokeo provincial authorities dismantled a multinational call center scam gang in Ton Pheung district, detaining 62 suspects and confiscating computers and mobile phones. It was the third major operation in the province in less than two weeks, following 71 arrests in Houayxay on 4 to 5 May and 159 detentions in Ton Pheung on 11 May. Later on 7 May, authorities separately transferred 605 suspects from alleged fraud operations in Savannakhet Province to Vientiane for investigation, involving nationals from eight countries.

Combined with an early April sweep that detained 742 suspects, the total number of individuals detained in connection with cybercrime across Laos in the first half of May alone exceeded 1,500.

This is not incremental enforcement. It is a surge.

At the April cabinet meeting, Prime Minister Sonexay Siphandone ordered agencies to make cybercrime enforcement a top national priority, warning that officials found involved face disciplinary action. On 30 April, Minister of Public Security Vanthong Kongmany visited the Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone (GTSEZ) in Bokeo to reinforce enforcement on the ground, a rare show of ministerial presence in the zone.

Since 2023, nearly 2,800 suspects from 27 nationalities have been arrested in the GTSEZ alone.

The urgency is not purely domestic. In February 2026, UN Human Rights Chief Volker Türk named Laos as a key location hosting large-scale scam operations targeting victims worldwide. With US enforcement actions escalating across the region and Laos now on the international record, Vientiane can no longer afford to be seen as passive. There is also a subtler risk: as crackdowns disrupt operations elsewhere in the Mekong, criminal networks have consistently relocated across borders.

Laos must act, or risk becoming the region’s last safe harbour.

Yet the enforcement record raises hard questions. A December 2025 inspection of 475 buildings inside the GTSEZ found full compliance and no illegal activity, a finding difficult to reconcile with thousands of arrests in the same zone in the same year. The most plausible explanation is one the government has not offered: that operators received advance warning.

More fundamentally, the vast majority of those arrested are low-level workers, many of them trafficking victims themselves. The financiers and organizers who built the system have not appeared in any arrest announcement.

The structural obstacle is still harder. The Lao state granted its operator a 99-year lease, an inherent conflict of interest that sets a ceiling on how far this crackdown can go. Tax revenue in the zone dropped 49% in 2025 as 551 businesses shut down. Operations are being disrupted. But disruption is not dismantlement. Laos’ war on scams is real, whether it reaches the people who built the system is the question that matters.


Thongsavanh is a journalist from Laos with a background in English-language media. He graduated from the Lao-American Institute with a Diploma of the Arts in English and contributes to independent news platforms. His reporting focuses on environmental issues, socio-economic development, and geopolitics.

Myanmar 🇲🇲

The Bloc That Blinks

by Moe Thiri Myat

Breaking news from Myanmar emerged at the 48th ASEAN Summit in Cebu, Philippines, highlighting the Myanmar crisis as one of the region’s most difficult diplomatic challenges. More than four years after the 2021 military coup, the leaders of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states continue to express frustration over the slow progress in Myanmar’s ongoing affairs while remaining divided over the approaches they should collectively take.

Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. criticized the lack of progress under ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus since its initiation in 2021. Many leaders also acknowledged the need for alternative approaches to move the situation forward and restore stability in Myanmar. Moreover, Marcos stated that ASEAN members wanted to “find ways to change the processes that are currently in place.”

Thailand, on the other hand, has increasingly positioned itself as one of the strongest advocates for greater engagement with Naypyidaw. Thailand’s Prime Minister Anutin stated that current political developments in Myanmar — regarding the release of President U Win Myint and reports concerning Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s wellbeing — were positive signs for dialogue. This signals Thailand’s willingness to support more direct communication between ASEAN and Myanmar’s military officials. Moreover, Thailand’s foreign minister even proposed inviting other regional countries to engage with diplomats as part of a “step-by-step process” toward greater engagement.

There are ongoing differences even within ASEAN, as some member states prioritize political accountability and legitimacy while others focus more on practical concerns including border security, trade disruptions, humanitarian access, migration, and regional stability. Regionally, the Myanmar crisis also intensifies these external issues, such as border management, economic development, transnational crime, refugee flows, and regional security.

Myanmar’s military has grown increasingly outspoken under ASEAN pressure. On May 10, Myanmar’s foreign ministry accused some ASEAN countries of discrimination and of violating the ASEAN Charter by restricting Myanmar’s participation in high-level meetings. Naypyidaw also argued that Myanmar has remained a responsible ASEAN member since joining the bloc in 1997 and has continued fulfilling its obligations despite ongoing political tensions.

However, ASEAN leaders still have not recognized Myanmar’s recent election process, and senior junta leaders remain excluded from ASEAN summits; only low-level representatives have been permitted to participate on behalf of the country.

Beyond ASEAN’s internal divisions, China plays a crucial role: its relationships with both Myanmar’s military leadership and several ethnic armed organizations operating near the border reveal that Myanmar’s crisis is embedded in larger power dynamics. This creates an additional challenge for ASEAN. Even though the bloc continues to search for collective solutions through its own diplomatic mechanisms, some of the most powerful actors are still shaping realities beyond ASEAN-led processes. Therefore, ASEAN’s ability to act collectively is complicated not only by disagreements among member states but also by the broader geopolitical environment surrounding Myanmar.

For more than four years since the coup, the Myanmar crisis has continued to test ASEAN’s unity, credibility, and ability to respond collectively to an internal crisis among member states. While ASEAN leaders agree that the current situation cannot remain stagnant, member states still appear divided over what an effective and realistic path forward should look like — particularly as the crisis is increasingly shaped not only by ASEAN itself but also by larger regional powers with competing interests.


Moe Thiri Myat is a senior at Parami University. Majoring in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics (PPE). Interested in analyzing emerging sociopolitical situations and developments, through her work as a Myanmar correspondent at The ASEAN Frontier she aims to explore how sociopolitical developments across Southeast Asia shape and are shaped by the situation in Myanmar.

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Thailand 🇹🇭

Who is Benefiting From Thailand’s Land Bridge?

by Natamon Aumphin, in Bangkok

In recent weeks, debate over developing the Land Bridge project in southern Thailand — connecting the Andaman Sea and the Gulf of Thailand — has surged. The debate has been revived by the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz, which has prompted fresh calls to reduce reliance on the Strait of Malacca and to boost the local economy at the macro level. Nonetheless, despite promises of economic gain, opponents have raised concerns about the project’s damaging impact on the coastal environment and local communities. As the megaproject aims to connect Ranong and Chumphon through the construction of deep-sea ports and industrial railways, topsoil and nearby areas would need to be removed — which could damage marine life, coral reefs, and the livelihoods of southern communities who rely on the sea through fisheries, farming, and tourism.

According to a study from Chulalongkorn University, the economic internal rate of return (EIRR) is very low, at only about 1.24%. While another study conducted by the Office of Transport and Traffic Policy and Planning (OTP) exists, the project study area in Ranong covers only 1 kilometer, within which lie the Ramsar site and national parks. Likewise, the target areas for developing deep-sea ports in Chumphon are situated near wetlands — sites that are vital for natural habitats, support human livelihoods, and absorb natural disasters.

On top of environmental concerns, the development of the Land Bridge would incur approximately 1 trillion baht (USD 30.67 billion ), which would worsen the public debt, which already approaches the 70% of GDP ceiling. To alleviate the financial burden, the government has proposed the public-private partnership (PPP) model. To facilitate this, the government is pushing the Southern Economic Corridor (SEC) draft — a special regulation designed to attract investors. Nonetheless, the draft has been a subject of contention among locals and human rights groups, who see it as benefiting investors too much while neglecting the needs and rights of local people. If the draft is passed, investors could own land, local oversight power would diminish, and resources would be absorbed into the project instead of going to the people.

Therefore, even though the megaproject has an ambitious aim — claiming to generate employment, increase regional and national growth, and benefit the people — the forecasted reality may be different. Evidence suggests that wealth would be concentrated among a few capitalists, further contributing to Thailand’s already high domestic inequality, while people’s lives would be upended: from sustaining themselves through the sea and tradition, to earning a living through construction and logistics that damage their own homes. Many scholars have also agreed on this point and urged the government to redevelop and enhance existing projects before building new ones. Nonetheless, the central question remains: if the project goes ahead, who does the government prioritize? Who does the wealth belong to? And will the livelihoods of local communities and the environment be endangered or compensated?

Natamon has served as a rapporteur at the Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS Thailand). She has also worked as a research assistant on diplomatic issues in Southeast Asia. Her work focuses on how domestic politics shape foreign policy in the region. She holds a degree in international relations and has experience in policy analysis, event reporting, and regional research.

Cambodia 🇰🇭

Cambodian Parliament Adopts Military Conscription Draft Law

by Chandara Samban, in Kandal

The Cambodian National Assembly passed a military conscription law on May 12, 2026, requiring men aged 18 to 25 to serve in the military for two years, while women may join on a voluntary basis. The law aims to strengthen national defense, instill patriotism among young people, and provide them with additional life skills. However, the law remains controversial, particularly due to public concerns over livelihood issues, loss of family income, labor shortages in the private sector, and the possible impact on young people’s education.

The conscription law was previously proposed by the Cambodian government in 2025 but was put on hold following Cambodia’s border crisis with Thailand. By mid-2026, the government resumed discussions on the law with amendments to the earlier version, which had originally been proposed in 2006 but was never implemented. Under the revised law, young men between the ages of 18 and 25 will be required to serve in the military for 24 months and remain reserve soldiers until the age of 45. It is also being considered that registered individuals will have to attend short annual training courses even after completing their two-year service. The law exempts women, who may participate voluntarily, as well as people with disabilities, monks and religious priests , and individuals who play important roles for the nation. In cases of non-compliance or evasion, registered individuals could face imprisonment ranging from six months to five years. In addition, if there are insufficient recruits, a lottery-style “lucky draw” system may be used among registered individuals.

In parliament, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet stressed that the law is important for strengthening Cambodia’s military capacity, particularly in enhancing the nation’s self-reliance and defense capabilities. Responding to concerns and criticism surrounding the law, Hun Manet defended military service describing it as an honor rather than a burden, and called on both young people and their parents to support the initiative.

On this issue, Chheang Vannarith, Chairman of the National Assembly Advisory Council (NAAC), showed support for the law, arguing that Cambodia must be well prepared for war amid growing global uncertainty. He stated that the law would help modernize the national defense sector for a small state like Cambodia, particularly by strengthening military capacity to protect both land and maritime borders. He also said military service would help provide civilians with military education and a better understanding of their roles and defense techniques.

Geopolitical analyst Seng Vanly believes the law is important for recruiting young people into the military, as many active-duty soldiers today are aging and need to be replaced by a younger generation. He added that the government is likely pursuing this law because voluntary recruitment may become increasingly difficult in the future.

Despite support for the law, concerns remain. Many Cambodians expressed worries on social media that the law could be implemented unfairly, disproportionately affecting the poor and powerless. Some fear losing their income and being unable to support their families because military service is unpaid, while businesses are concerned about losing workers needed for production and services. About this, Casey Barnett, former president of the American Chamber of Commerce in Cambodia (AmCham), argued that the Cambodian government could consider alternatives to mandatory military service. He suggested that the state could instead introduce policies encouraging citizens to have children and support childcare in order to build strong and high-quality human capital for the future. He believes that implementing conscription could reduce Cambodia’s economic growth by 0.5% of GDP due to the annual loss of more than 300,000 workers, while also affecting education, career development, and delaying marriage, which could ultimately impact population growth.


Chandara is a freelance journalist with a focus on foreign affairs, security issues, and ASEAN affairs. He also serves as a Junior Counterterrorism Intelligence Analyst.

Editorial Deadline 16/05/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Karen Ysabelle R. David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk

Last week, in sunny Mactan on the island of Cebu in the Philippines, leaders from across Southeast Asia flocked together for the 48th ASEAN Summit. As the ASEAN Chair for 2026, Manila is expected to lead the region in deepening cooperation and integration. But against a backdrop of historic global instability and domestic political chaos, Manila’s stint as Chair may end up becoming more difficult than most.

For Vietnam, the Summit was a reminder of its 50 years of diplomatic relations with the Philippines, and of the growing economic and security cooperation between the two. Yet as Hanoi’s response to the South China Sea issue — a cause near and dear to Manila’s heart — remained muted, it was also a reminder that there is still much left to be desired with regard to intra-ASEAN cooperation.

And in Singapore, a proposed government-run dating platform to help address the city-state’s fertility crisis has caught the attention of the public. But without addressing the root causes of the crisis, can the government playing matchmaker really do much to help?

The Philippines 🇵🇭

ASEAN focuses on stability amid global uncertainty

by Glenn Vincent N. Boquilon, in Angeles City

The 48th ASEAN Summit and Related Meetings were held in Cebu, Philippines, from 6 to 8 May 2026 under the leadership of President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. The convening of ASEAN leaders comes at a time when the region is facing extensive economic and geopolitical pressures. The dialogue this year continues to revolve around cooperation, security, and resilience. However, there is a need to focus on global conflicts, food and energy stability, and strengthening ASEAN unity.

The summit carries the theme “Navigating Our Future, Together.” The tone can be seen as more practical than symbolic. Regional cooperation and integration are expected to be centered in all the discussions. In this regard, leaders are being counted on to present clear and feasible agreements rather than broad statements that highlight a change in approach, thus putting more weight on concrete steps and actionable plans that can help manage the challenges the region is facing.

Due to recent escalations in the Middle East, energy has become one of the most urgent concerns internationally. Like the Philippines, many Southeast Asian countries rely on imported fuel to help operate multiple industries. Accordingly, the current bottleneck poses a great challenge for different sectors regionally. Consequently, there is pressure to look beyond short-term solutions and think about long-term energy security. ASEAN’s goal must be to reduce vulnerability and build more stable systems.

Food security is also a part of this year’s discussions. Supply disruptions and rising costs have made it harder for many countries to maintain stable food systems. This is not only an economic issue but also a social one, with many communities susceptible to food insecurity. The Secretary-General of ASEAN, Kao Kim Hourn, said that there is also a need for more effective management of regional food reserves. When steady access to food is ensured, national and regional stability may also follow.

Undoubtedly, disaster resilience remains a priority. The region continues to face frequent natural disasters, from strong typhoons to flooding, rising sea levels, and earthquakes. These calamities disrupt and destroy infrastructure, economies, livelihoods, and communities. Dave Gomez, Presidential Communications Secretary, announced that ASEAN member states have pushed for collaborative frameworks that would enhance early warning systems for different communities and faster humanitarian response for affected areas.

Energy security, food stability, and climate resilience are closely interlinked. A disruption in one field can quickly trickle down and affect others, therefore reinforcing the need for ASEAN leaders to integrate their responses and improve knowledge-sharing capabilities. A coordinated approach would be most effective rather than treating each problem on its own.

The summit also highlights ASEAN’s challenge of balancing regional cooperation with national interests. While member states share common concerns, each country still has its own priorities.

The Philippines’ chairmanship positions it at a strategic vantage point to open discussions close to it, particularly on challenges revolving around maritime security, energy stability, disaster resilience, and regional cooperation. These, too, continue to shape regional priorities. This places it in a strong position to push for solutions that are both national and regional in nature.

Ultimately, the real test comes after the summit ends. The actual development that takes place is what people should look out for. In this instance, agreements and plans matter. However, implementation and effective program execution take precedence. As global risks continue to prove their interconnectivity, ASEAN’s ability to act together will define its role in the years to come.


Glenn holds a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from the University of Santo Tomas. His experience spans governance programs, policy development, and political research, having worked with the Ateneo School of Government and WR Numero Research on projects focused on electoral reform, public opinion, and regional development. He also helped coordinate the drafting of the Bangsamoro Local Government Code and supported the Academy of Multiparty Democracy.

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Vietnam 🇻🇳

Vietnam–Philippine Relations and the 48th ASEAN Summit

by Sean Huy Vu

Under the theme “Navigating Our Future, Together,” the 48th ASEAN summit was held from 7 to 8 May in Cebu, Philippines. Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. stressed the importance of the Summit against the backdrop of the war in Iran, rising fuel prices, and inflation. With over 90% of its oil imported from the Middle East, the Philippines used its chairmanship to initiate the creation of an energy sharing mechanism for the region. However, the specific logistics regarding the distribution of the oil — as to whom, when, where, and how — remain unknown.

Prime Minister Lê Minh Hưng attended the event on behalf of Vietnam, making this his first overseas trip. At the event, Lê also advocated for improvements in human security issues, such as food and energy. He also promoted deeper economic integration within the region, in harmony with Manila’s desire for a regional digital economic framework and AI regulation.

The Philippines also expressed aspirations for resolving territorial disputes in the South China Sea. The Philippines has faced challenges in asserting its sovereignty against Chinese vessels in the area, despite a 2016 tribunal ruling in favor of the Philippines that dismisses China’s nine-dash line claim as illegitimate. President Marcos stated ASEAN will have a maritime center based in the Philippines to ensure the region’s freedom of navigation. Traffic in the South China Sea is estimated to be worth over US$3 billion; should any disruption occur in the area, it would be comparable to the current situation in the Strait of Hormuz, according to President Marcos.

By contrast, Vietnam made very few overt remarks on the South China Sea issue, instead cautiously focusing on pragmatic economic issues. Like the Philippines, Vietnam also has several maritime disputes with the People’s Republic of China, specifically over the Paracel and Spratly Islands. It made its grievances international in 2010 when the country was chair of the ASEAN summit, and partly contributed to the Obama administration’s “pivot to Asia” foreign policy.

Vietnam’s decision not to openly stress its maritime disputes with China at the summit suggests tensions between the two are cooling and becoming more manageable at the bilateral level. A few weeks ago, Chinese authorities unilaterally declared part of the East Sea as off-limits for fishing, including in areas Vietnam deems as part of its sovereignty. Vietnam’s foreign ministry criticized China for the declaration.

Besides global and regional issues, Vietnam and the Philippines took the occasion to celebrate 50 years of diplomatic relations. During the Vietnam War, the Philippines served as a critical military hub for the US. The US used its naval and aerial bases there to repair and re-fuel its ships and planes as well as provide ammunition, food, and medical services to its personnel. Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Sr. — the father of the current President — was an ardent anti-communist and only recognized South Vietnam as the legitimate government. He was ousted in a coup in 1986.

Despite historical differences, Vietnam and the Philippines are growing closer in the realms of economic and security cooperation. Trade between both countries is approaching US$10 billion annually, and they have jointly strengthened maritime law enforcement via search and rescue operations with the US. With this said, since Manila is a treaty ally of Washington, one can expect Hanoi to maintain some distance in the relationship, in order to remain neutral in the strategic competition between the US and China.


Sean is a scholar of East Asian history, culture, and international relations, with current research at Georgetown University examining working-class labor and human trafficking in the region. His broader interests include the social psychology of religion and identity politics. Sean previously taught modern Korean history at the University of California, Irvine, where he completed his B.A. in History, and later taught English in Ho Chi Minh City while studying Vietnamese language and culture. His writing has been published by UC Irvine, Johns Hopkins University, and Foreign Analysis.

Singapore 🇸🇬

Are free dates what young Singaporeans really need?

by Jennifer Hui En Tan, in Singapore

Singapore’s resident total fertility rate (TFR) fell to 0.87 in 2025, the lowest on record and among the lowest globally. In response, the Government Technology Agency (GovTech) has been exploring “Firstdate,” a proposed government-run dating platform for singles aged 35 and below. The idea came to public attention after surveys were circulated on CrowdTask, a government feedback platform, seeking opinions on the service’s design. GovTech has since clarified that the proposal is in a “very early, exploratory stage” and that most such ideas do not proceed beyond the concept or research phase. Nonetheless, the proposal raises an important question of whether the government truly understands what young Singaporeans need and whether a dating platform reflects that understanding.

The central limitation of a dating platform as a demographic policy tool is that it addresses access to potential partners, not the conditions that shape decisions about marriage and parenthood. A 2024 YouGov survey found that 36% of Gen Z and 42% of millennials in Singapore already use dating apps. The barrier faced by many young Singaporeans is not meeting people, but the affordability and stability required to commit to long-term partnership and family life. The more pressing constraints are structural, such as housing costs, work-life balance, the financial burden of raising children, and limited caregiving support. These factors affect not just whether couples form, but whether they choose to have children at all. Getting people on more first dates does not resolve these underlying pressures, and there is limited evidence that increasing match rates translates directly into higher birth rates.

The debate around Firstdate reflects a wider tension in Singapore’s approach to its demographic challenge. The government has acknowledged the severity of the crisis, with the National Population and Talent Division announcing a new workgroup in April 2026 and findings expected by early 2027, but proposed interventions have at times felt misaligned with the concerns young Singaporeans express most often.

Other ASEAN governments have attempted similar interventions with limited success. Thailand, which recorded a TFR of 1.1 in 2023, has introduced cash incentives for newborns and extended parental leave, yet its birth rate has continued to decline. Vietnam, once considered a demographic outlier in the region, has seen its TFR drop below replacement level in urban centers despite active government campaigns encouraging larger families. The evidence across the region suggests that even well-resourced, sustained policy efforts struggle to reverse the trend once it takes hold.

A government dating platform may offer genuine utility for some users, and should not be dismissed outright. However, it is more appropriately understood as a supplementary measure than a substantive response to falling birth rates. For the numbers to shift meaningfully, the conversation will need to turn toward the structural conditions that shape whether starting a family feels feasible at all.


Jennifer is a final-year International Relations student at the Singapore Institute of Management, where she focuses on political engagement, diplomacy, and community governance. She is an active volunteer in her constituency, working closely with residents to understand local concerns, facilitate dialogue, and support community initiatives.

Editorial Deadline 12/05/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Siu Tzyy Wei, Lead Editor - Maritime Crescent Desk

This week, we turn our gaze inward to the front yards of our own neighborhood. From filling our own plates to parliamentary floors and GDP reports, a shared question emerges: how much more can we depend on the systems that are the skeleton to our daily lives, and who bears the cost when fractures start to emerge?

In Malaysia, Sydney unpacks the Negeri Sembilan political crisis that may signal something far larger for Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s government ahead of the looming general election. In Brunei, Maryam Zulaidi traces the understated vulnerability of a nation that imports what its own soil could grow, and asks whether household self-sufficiency could be a safety net that policy alone cannot provide. In Indonesia where wealth flows outwards faster than it trickles down, Rayhan Jasin asks who does growth actually serve.

Our front yard, as it turns out, demands more than appearances. We ask not whether our front yards are growing, but whether we are truly tending to them.

Malaysia 🇲🇾

The Negeri Sembilan Plot

by Sydney Gan, in Kuala Lumpur

On April 27, all fourteen United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) assemblymen from Negeri Sembilan withdrew their support from the state government, led by Pakatan Harapan (PH) Chief Minister Datuk Seri Aminuddin Harun. They cited loss of confidence due to interference in an ongoing crisis involving four chieftains seeking to depose the state ruler. With the Chief Minister left with a minority government, opposition leaders from Perikatan Nasional (PN) subsequently announced their support for UMNO, urging for a UMNO-Barisan Nasional (BN) replacement to take Aminuddin’s place. These developments were escalated to the federal level, prompting mediation by Prime Minister and PH chairman Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim and BN Chairman and Deputy Prime Minister Datuk Seri Ahmad Zahid Hamidi. As of now, Aminuddin remains in his seat, with Anwar downplaying the likelihood of an early state election triggered by the crisis.

As this political crisis unfolds, the government’s tenous marriage of convenience stands tested, with UMNO striving for the independence and power of its heyday.

This political upheaval, contained as it is at a state level, no doubt signals a possible UMNO-Pakatan Harapan divorce. Historic rivals with clashing ideologies, this partnership was only formed out of necessity following the hung parliament in the 15th General Election (GE15). UMNO, having been in power for 61 consecutive years before being ousted by Mahathir Mohamad’s PH government in 2018, is characterized as voraciously ambitious and unsatisfied with its demotion to second fiddle. Although BN Chairman Zahid Hamidi claimed that the Negeri Sembilan move was carried out unilaterally by the assemblymen and that Umno remains cooperative with the Unity Government, he later issued a statement confirming that UMNO will most likely contest independently of PH in the coming general election, further muddying the second-term viability of this partnership.

Where does this leave Pakatan Harapan as a ruling coalition? PH appears to be keeping its head above water - but only just, as Anwar’s government battles one controversy after another with every passing week, covering issues from Communist book bannings to major government budget slashes, notably in the Ministry of Health, in favor of populist fuel subsidy policies. With the Negeri Sembilan crisis ongoing, analysts have suggested that PH may take advantage in pushing the narrative that UMNO is betraying the people’s mandate and exploiting the royal institution, in order to curry good favor from its waning voter base. But the question remains: is this strategy powerful enough to weigh against the growing superpower that is UMNO’s decades-long political capital?

Although Anwar’s term is only due to terminate in early 2028, persistent rumors are swirling around a potential snap election as early as Q3 of 2026. It remains to be seen whether an early general election, in light of UMNO’s struggle to retain power, will be the most strategically sound decision for Anwar to retain leadership for his much coveted second-term.


Sydney holds a Bachelor of Laws from King’s College London, where she focused on Human Rights Law, Criminology, and Public & Administrative Law. She is an Analyst at Asia Group Advisors, providing policy analysis and strategic guidance across the tech, sustainability, and gaming sectors in Southeast Asia. Prior to joining AGA, she worked in the social development sector in London, contributing to the Ukraine Judicial Training Programme through research on war crimes adjudication and the development of a legal training curriculum with high court magistrates.

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Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳

Food Security Starts at Home

by Maryam Zulaidi

Brunei is heavily import-dependent for food, achieving self-sufficiency only in poultry and eggs. In 2023, 43.1% of Brunei’s imports on edible fruits and nuts, to list a few: avocados, mangoes, melons, papayas, bananas came from Malaysia alone. This amounted to approximately 31 million USD of Brunei’s total 72 million USD edible fruit and nut import bill in 2023, a striking figure for a nation of fewer than 500, 000 people. Notably, all these edible fruits can be grown in Brunei’s own tropical climate.

This dependency becomes increasingly perilous as the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) stated a 3-month increase in global food prices affected by the Middle East conflict. Fellow ASEAN member states like Malaysia have called for their citizens to harvest quick-yielding crops in preparation of a possible disruption in food supply. It is also the very country Brunei relies on most for its imports of fruits.

Though comprehensive data is limited, the general public have already begun to feel the strain of increased prices of essential food. Nasi katok - a staple dish consisting of rice, fried chicken and chilli paste - that traditionally costs 1BND has now been marked up to almost 2BND by several vendors. This poses an important question: could individual households help sustain their own livelihood by growing and harvesting their own produce?

The short answer is yes. Historically, Bruneians have been self-sufficient, relying on its rich biodiversity of rivers, forests and coastal waters for food and trade to sustain their communities. However, in the modern Bruneian society driven by demanding work schedules and other priorities, the government should consider the idea of retaining such traditions. In an era of uncertainty, instilling a nation-wide belief of self-sufficiency can generate a sense of security that can withstand the disruptions of war, supply chain pressures and shipping crises. With a mandate, strategised promotion and public education, household self-sufficiency could serve as a powerful safety net for both the nation and its people.

Perhaps it is time to revive the old Bruneian traditions of being self-sufficient.


Maryam is a first-year International Relations and Politics student at the University of Sheffield, with an academic focus on Southeast Asia—particularly Maritime Southeast Asia—and the Middle East. She aspires to a career in diplomacy and academia and is committed to fostering international dialogue and advancing scholarly engagement with global issues. Beyond her academic work, she pursues creative interests and voluntary initiatives that broaden her perspectives on public service.

Indonesia 🇮🇩

Breaking Down Indonesia’s Startling Q1 2026’s Growth Story

by Muhammad Rayhansyah Jasin

A triumphant speech by the Ministry of Finance Purbaya Yudhi Sadewa cited Indonesia’s 5.61% growth for q1 2026 as proof of breaking the 5% middle-income trap. Head of the Central Statistics Agency (BPS), Amalia Widyasanti, attributed this growth to the expenditure side of household consumption 5.52% and investment 5.96% with government spending jumping 21.8%. Seasonal tailwinds–namely Ramadan, Nyepi, and the Lunar New Year–amplified by the Mudik mobility–propelled growth in transportation and service by 8-9% with BPS flagging biggest contributions coming from industrial expansion in commerce, construction, manufacturing, and agriculture, averaging 5% rise each. Conversely, export revenue crawled just 0.90%, supported by nickel, lead, and aluminum derivatives, while imports surged 7.18% on spiking global fuel prices following the Iranian War. Nevertheless, trade balance held positive of US$3.3 billion by March 2026, extending Indonesia’s 71-month trade surplus run since May 2020.

The elephant of this growth however centers on Subianto’s flagship policy, the Free Nutritious Meal (MBG) program which catapulted the food and accommodation sector by a whopping 13.1%. MBG’s budget realization soared to 54.4 trillion, up from 700 billion during the same period last year, driven mainly by construction of >6,700 public kitchens (SPPG) and their hiring spree. However, this massive MBG project itself has exacted a heavy fiscal toll: Q1 2026’s state budget deficit expanded by 1.4% to 240 trillions rupiah with primary balance posted negative 95 trillions, reversing last year’s surplus of 21.9 trillion. At its core, MBG functions like a short-term stimulus with little multiplier effect, potentially shaving future growth by 0.2% as it crowds out productive capital expenditures.

Indonesia’s fuel capacity shortage and manufacturing contraction have also pushed rupiah to record low of 17,500/USD, down 4% since January. As Bank Indonesia’s forex intervention keeps burning reserves and fuel subsidies worsening debt accumulation, temporary halt in MBG, the Red-White Cooperation projects and defense spending becomes essential to dampen rupiah’s slide. The IHSG index has also cratered 34% to 6,807 points with foreign investors pulling US$1.7 billion exposing the 5.61% growth figure’s failure to inspire confidence.

Measured against ASEAN peers: Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines which posted 4.6%, 5.3%, 1.9%, 2.8% respectively, Indonesia’s 5.61% appears competitive, trailing only behind Vietnam’s astounding 7.8%. Yet context deflates the celebration: last year’s low 4.6% base inflates this quarter’s optics, while those five ASEAN currencies outperformed the dollar as rupiah extended losses. Business associations slammed this growth as “asymmetric” as fiscal benefits funneled mostly to SPPG owners and depreciating rupiah forced companies to postpone capital spending and cease new hiring leading to reduced profitability and limited business expansion. Ultimately, growth quality hinges on its drivers: short-term transfers yield fleeting gains, whereas sustained investment in education, health, and welfare compounds into fundamental economic development. Sadly, Indonesia’s Q1 growth breakdown reflects a government still failing to grasp this principle.


Rayhan is pursuing an Erasmus Mundus Joint Master’s Degree in Public Policy at Central European University and the Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals. He holds a Bachelor of Social Sciences in International Relations and Political Economy from Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University. His current research focuses on the socio-economic impacts of Indonesia’s nickel mining industry on local communities and national development.

Editorial Deadline 09/05/2025 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk

Across the Mekong Belt this week, the bill for a past of neglect is coming due.

In Myanmar, the military junta and radical monks are contributing to the revival of anti-Muslim hate speech and ultra-nationalist mobilisation — a pattern that mirrors the climate that preceded the 2017 Rohingya genocide according to observers’ warnings. In Laos, a cassava factory discharged industrial wastewater into the Xe Don River for over a month before authorities acted, killing hundreds of kilograms of fish and leaving riverside communities without a safe water source. Meanwhile, in Thailand, the cabinet has pushed through a 6-billion-dollar "energy transformation" fund with so little detail that the opposition is calling it a blank cheque — raising serious questions about whether structural reform is the goal or merely the cover. And in Cambodia, the ambition to reach high-income status by 2050 is running headlong into decades of underinvestment in education, healthcare, and infrastructure that no single decree can quickly reverse.

Myanmar 🇲🇲

Revival of Ultra-Nationalist Movements and Anti-Muslim Hate Speeches in Myanmar

by Mozart

New waves of ultra-nationalist movements and patterns of anti-Muslim hate speech are re-emerging in Myanmar. Driven by a strategic alliance between the military junta and radical monks to consolidate power, state-sanctioned Islamophobia — reinforced by discriminatory post-earthquake reconstruction and aggressive rhetoric surrounding ICJ hearings — is being amplified through social media, threatening to exacerbate regional instability and mirror past atrocities against Muslim populations.

On 2 May 2026, authorities and MaBaTha-aligned monks raided a tuition centre in Daw Pone Township’s Nway Aye ward, Yangon. Radical monk U Taw Wun Tha and nationalist media outlets like Myanmar Post framed the incident as a crackdown on “illegal Bengalis” from Buthidaung and Maungdaw who were allegedly teaching “unknown scripts,” although investigations revealed that the students and teachers held valid identification documents — including pink and green cards — and were primarily internally displaced persons from Rakhine State.

This systemic exclusion was further demonstrated during the humanitarian crisis following the 7.7-magnitude earthquake on 28 March 2025. The disaster resulted in over 1,600 deaths, with many victims being Muslim worshippers gathered for Ramadan prayers. While the military junta’s official damage reports detailed the destruction of 670 monasteries and 290 pagodas, they pointedly omitted the destruction of over 50 mosques. Many of these mosques collapsed, and long-standing bureaucratic restrictions had prevented the Muslim community from obtaining the permits necessary for repairs even a year after the disaster, forcing them to worship in temporary spaces near the destroyed buildings.

Parallel to these local events, nationalist movements have weaponised international legal proceedings, particularly the resumed merits hearing of the Rohingya genocide case at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in early 2026. During the hearing, both Sitagu Sayadaw and Ashin Wirathu were accused of mobilizing hate speech and contributing to a genocide campaign. The military junta and radical figures like Ashin Wirathu consistently frame the ICJ hearings as a conspiracy funded by the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). These international developments are used to fuel domestic hate speech, portraying the legal accountability process as an existential threat to Buddhist Myanmar and its sovereignty. Facebook, Telegram, and Tiktok serve as the primary platforms for the rapid spread of hate speech.

These patterns of dehumanisation and religious scapegoating serve as a grave reminder of past atrocities in Myanmar. The resurgence also appears to be accelerating. Observers note that the present rhetoric and militia mobilisation mirror the climate that preceded the 2017 Rohingya genocide, which displaced over 700,000 people. Similar state-sanctioned violence was seen during the 2013 Meiktila pogrom and the 1997 Bago and Mandalay riots. In Bago, historical records show that mosques were targeted by mobs including soldiers dressed in monastic robes, a tactic used to provide ideological cover for military-led violence. Across decades, the persistent use of dehumanising slurs like “kalar” and “illegal Bengali” has been a consistent precursor to systemic violence against Muslim populations. Without immediate international monitoring and accountability for these extremist actors, the cycle of violence is likely to repeat, and the junta will continue positioning itself as the only institution capable of restoring order — often using these crises to undermine democratic forces and justify its brutal rule.

Mozart is a research assistant at Mosaic Myanmar and is currently pursuing a Bachelor of Arts in Liberal Arts and Sciences at Parami University. His academic and professional interests span community development, minority issues, and social impact research. He has held roles including service-learning intern, student mentor, and operations coordinator for local initiatives, supporting project management, monitoring and evaluation, and education programs in Myanmar.

Lao PDR 🇱🇦

Laos Names Cassava Factory as Culprit in Xe Don Pollution Case

by Thipphavanh Virakhom, in Vientiane

An official investigation has confirmed industrial wastewater as the cause of a mass fish kill along the Xe Don River, raising urgent questions about environmental enforcement, community protection, and corporate accountability.

On 9 May 2026, Lao authorities officially confirmed what riverside communities in Salavan and Champasak had suspected for weeks: a cassava starch processing factory illegally discharged wastewater into the Xe Don River, killing an estimated 460 kilograms of fish across five villages and affecting two provinces.

The findings came from a joint investigation led by the Department of Environment under the Ministry of Agriculture and Environment, alongside multiple government departments, two provincial authorities, and Champasak University.

The Investigation found that Khounmixay Kongxedone Co., Ltd., located in Kongxedone District, Salavan Province, had been documented discharging wastewater illegally as early as 21 March 2026 and more than a month before fish deaths were first observed on 23 April.

The wastewater reduced dissolved oxygen (DO) levels in the river below national environmental standards. Without sufficient oxygen, the fish suffocated and died. When rains arrived in late March, rising water carried decomposed carcasses downstream into Champasak Province which is why the crisis appeared to spread.

Water quality measurements taken at 11 sites between 2–5 May confirmed that current levels of pH, electrical conductivity, dissolved oxygen, and temperature have returned within national standards, although ecological recovery takes considerably longer."

The factory has been suspended under official order No. 1395/MAE.SV, and legal action is being pursued under Decree No. 389/PM on Environmental Impact Assessment (2022).

Why does this matter beyond the river? The Xe Don is a shared lifeline for drinking water, irrigation, fishing, and daily livelihoods. When oxygen is stripped from a waterway by industrial effluent, it does not just kill fish. It destabilises an entire ecosystem that rural communities depend on, often without alternatives.

There is also a direct human health dimension. Contaminated water and affected fish pose real risks particularly for children, pregnant women, and elderly residents, who are most exposed and least able to seek alternatives. The government’s public advisory not to use river water or consume dead fish was necessary, but it prompts a harder question: what do communities do when the river they rely on is suddenly off-limits?

Rivers do not belong to any single industry. Under international human rights standards, including the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs), endorsed by the UN Human Rights Council in 2011. Both governments and businesses carry a shared responsibility to prevent harm to people and the environment. For Laos, upholding these principles is not only a matter of international commitment, but a practical foundation for sustainable development. When a factory’s operations contaminate a shared waterway, it is not merely an environmental violation. It is a human rights concern. The communities downstream had no say in that decision, yet they bear the full cost.

What needs to happen now? Authorities have announced legal action, factory suspension, and ecosystem restoration requirements. These are necessary steps. In parallel, communities deserve – transparent, regular water quality updates in accessible formats and local languages; immediate livelihood support for fishing families who lost income during the affected period; and independent verification of the restoration process, with meaningful community participation.

This case is not isolated. The Xe Don incident is a clear reminder that effective environmental monitoring, enforced EIA compliance, and accessible grievance mechanisms are not bureaucratic formalities but they are protections for people’s lives, health, and futures. The river can recover. But only if the systems meant to protect it are taken seriously by industry and government alike.


Thipphavanh holds a bachelor’s degree in international affairs. She is a governance and development professional specialising in rule of law, access to justice, and gender equality in Lao PDR. Her work focuses on strengthening justice sector institutions, advancing people-centred governance, and promoting gender-responsive systems. With extensive experience in project coordination, monitoring and evaluation, stakeholder engagement, and strategic communications, she has collaborated closely with national institutions and international partners to support inclusive and sustainable development.

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Thailand 🇹🇭

Thailand’s Energy Transformation Push Faces ‘Blank Cheque’ Criticism

by Satid Sootipunya, in Bangkok

The Thai cabinet has approved a 6-billion-dollar bill to transform its economy away from fossil fuel reliance, amid criticism from the opposition People's Party, which describes it as a blank cheque for unlimited government spending.

Thea Asia-Pacific is the most vulnerable region in this energy-price crisis, especially Thailand due to its over-reliance on imported oil. he country relies on imports for 90% of its oil consumption, and 50% of those imports are shipped through the temporarily shut Strait of Hormuz.

To mitigate the impact of surging oil prices on households and implement structural reform, the Thai government last week passed an emergency decree authorising 400 billion baht (roughly 12 billion dollars) in borrowing. The first 6 billion dollars will be used for household subsidies, while the other 6 billion dollars will fund what Finance Minister Ekniti Nitithanprapas calls “energy transformation initiatives”.

According to the Emergency Decree on Borrowing, Finance Minister Ekniti's energy transformation plans include items such as energy efficiency initiatives, renewable and clean energy promotion, the transition from fossil fuels to clean energy, greenhouse gas emissions reduction, carbon credit development and monetization, new economy infrastructure and innovation development, and climate adaptation and resilience measures.

Deputy leader of the opposition People's Party Sirikanya Tansakun called the emergency decree a "blank cheque," allowing the government to spend freely without clear details on which concrete projects it intends to implement to transform Thailand into a greener economy.

“The government shouldn’t rush to pass the 6 billion dollars intended for energy transformation since the initiatives are intended to have medium- to long-term impacts anyway. There is still time to think carefully,” said Sirikanya.

She added that, based on the previous two emergency decrees authorising the government to borrow more money, the government tended to provide very few details. “It is like signing a blank cheque for them to borrow as much money as they want to do whatever they want,” said the deputy leader of the opposition.

Keiju Mitsuhashi, the ADB's Energy Director, told local media outlet Bangkok Business News during the ADB Annual Meeting in Uzbekistan last week that the bank is in talks with the Thai government to support the Kingdom's green energy transition. he forms of support are still being discussed; potential options include financing methods such as green bond issuance instead of direct lending.

The ADB's Energy Director also suggested that the administration spend the 6-billion-dollar fund on power grid initiatives allowing people to sell their own clean energy directly, as well as on building power storage infrastructure.

During the meeting, the ADB announced a plan to lend USD 70 billion to its member countries by 2035 for building the Pan-Asia Power Grid and regional digital infrastructure, costing USD 50 and 20 billion respectively.


Satid is a multimedia economic journalist and news anchor who covers macroeconomic trends, Thailand’s fiscal policy, and key regional developments for Bangkok Biz. A Journalism graduate from Thammasat University, he has reported on major issues such as the US–China trade tensions, the Myanmar crisis, and global corporate stories, drawing on prior newsroom experience at The Momentum, the Bangkok Post, AFP, and Varasarn Press. His work blends economic analysis, foreign affairs, and digital storytelling, with a strong focus on making complex financial and political topics accessible to Thai audiences.

Cambodia 🇰🇭

How far is Cambodia from reaching its goal of high-income status in 2050?

by Sokna Thea, in Phnom Penh

Cambodia’s ambition to reach high-income country status by 2050 faces major structural hurdles. The country would need to raise its Gross National Income (GNI) per capita by more than fivefold, from USD 2,520 in 2024 to around USD 14,000. At present, Cambodia is only about 11% of the way from the lower-middle-income threshold to the high-income threshold, highlighting the need for capable and adaptive institutions to avoid the middle-income trap.

The first major constraint is human capital and education financing. Although education spending rose to 2.2% of GDP in 2022, much of the increase went to wages, with the wage bill rising 27% between 2017 and 2021, while capital spending fell by 20%. Public education remains officially free, but parents still bear high costs. A recent study found that households spend an average of approximately USD109–121 per child per year on secondary education, with private tutoring forming a substantial portion of the burden. A large share of parents continue to pay for supplementary tutoring and related expenses. As a result, 30% of surveyed firms say they face hiring difficulties because workers are not sufficiently qualified.

The second major challenge is the healthcare sector, which faces financial and operational pressure. Current health expenditure stands at 4.6% of GDP, while out-of-pocket payments account for 60% of total health spending, causing financial hardship for 22% of the population. More than 80% of citizens seek care from private providers rather than public ones. Public facilities remain under strain, with 88% of referral hospitals and 65% of health centers reporting critical understaffing. Informal payments are also widely seen as a problem, with 60% of surveyed individuals identifying them as the most common form of corruption in the sector. Bureaucratic delays add to the problem, as around 64% of health centers and 62% of referral hospitals take more than a month to prepare their budgets.

The third barrier is infrastructure and regulatory friction. Only 16.6% of Cambodia’s road network is paved, falling to just 5% for the country’s 42,000 kilometers of rural roads. Public investment has relied heavily on external financing, at around 5% of GDP, and public-private partnerships, at 14% of GDP. However, project planning remains weak. he transport sector alone has proposed 174 projects worth USD 36.6 billion over a ten-year cycle, without adequate prioritization of maintenance. Complex procedures also continue to slow business activity and limit competition. It takes about 28 days to obtain an import license in Cambodia, compared with 13.2 days in Vietnam, while export clearances take an average of 30 days. Courts are another concern, with 57% of firms identifying them as a major obstacle.

These challenges are closely linked. A highly centralized public administration gives public sector workers an 18.8% overall wage premium over private sector workers, but service quality remains weak because of limited accountability and fragmented multi-year budgeting. To move beyond this low-growth path, Cambodia would need a more merit-based civil service, fully digital public services, and more decentralized financial management. Without faster institutional reform and a stronger link between spending and measurable results, the goal of high-income status by 2050 remains difficult to achieve.


Sokna has a background in International Affairs and Business & Commercial Law. He’s currently a Senior Project Coordinator at the Ministry of Economy and Finance of Cambodia, working on the Financial Management Information System (FMIS) Project. His professional focus is driven by entrepreneurship, business development, and financial technology, with a particular interest in how private-sector innovation drives Cambodia’s economic growth.

Editorial Deadline 9/05/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Karen Ysabelle R. David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk

Hawker centers, kopi tiams: in Southeast Asia and beyond, Singapore is famed for its communal food culture. But now, solo dining is on the rise in the dynamic Lion City, leading to a question with possible deeper implications: are Singaporeans growing lonely?

Meanwhile, over in deeply collectivist Philippines, the recent celebration of Labor Day on 1 May is a reminder of the social context of work in the country and how intimately intertwined labor is with Filipino family culture. But in a country with historically weak labor governance, does a once-a-year holiday really hold any meaning?

And in Vietnam, a new era has begun in Hanoi, with Tô Lâm now serving simultaneously as General Secretary of the Communist Party and the State President. With a political transition comes a slew of resolutions and a rash of diplomatic exchanges. But can the country sustain this momentum?

Singapore 🇸🇬

Why Are Singaporeans Dining Alone?

by Ryan

Singapore’s food culture has long been built around the shared table. Hawker meals, zi char dinners, hotpot, dim sum, and family-style restaurant dishes all assume that eating is something people do together. Yet solo dining is becoming increasingly visible across the city, from quick weekday lunches to premium tasting menus. According to The Straits Times, several restaurants in Singapore have reported a rise in solo diners, with Burnt Ends seeing a 50% increase in recent years, while Cloudstreet and Restaurant Born reported respective increases of around 40% and 20%.

At first glance, the trend could suggest that Singaporeans are becoming lonelier. There is some truth to this, but the full picture is more complicated. Dining alone is not always a sign of social isolation. For many, it is a practical response to urban life. Work schedules are more fragmented, flexible work has changed lunch habits, and younger consumers are more comfortable doing activities independently. Eating alone can be a way to decompress, avoid coordinating schedules, or enjoy food without the social pressure of making sure someone else is having a good time.

Still, the rise of solo dining should not be separated from wider social changes. Singapore’s average resident household size fell to 3.06 persons in 2025, reflecting smaller households and changing family structures. The number of seniors aged 65 and above living alone has also more than doubled, from 42,100 households in 2014 to 87,200 in 2024. Singapore’s Ministry of Health has noted that older adults who live alone are twice as likely to report depressive symptoms compared with those who do not live alone.

Loneliness is not only an elderly issue. A 2023 Institute of Policy Studies poll found that Singaporeans aged 21 to 34 reported the highest levels of loneliness and social isolation among surveyed age groups, especially if they were single. The same poll found that 53% of respondents aged 21 to 34 found it easier to talk to people online, while 56% sometimes felt anxious about speaking to people in person. In this context, the solo diner may represent two different realities at once: the empowered individual enjoying personal freedom, and the urban resident navigating weaker everyday social ties.

Compared with other Southeast Asian countries, Singapore’s situation is shaped by its density, high cost of living, and highly structured work culture. In the Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand, and Malaysia, meals are also deeply social, often tied to family, community, and extended kinship networks. But stronger communal dining cultures do not automatically protect societies from loneliness. Gallup found that reported loneliness in Southeast Asia ranged from 33% in the Philippines to just 6% in Vietnam.

For Singapore, the key question is not whether solo dining is good or bad. It is whether people are dining alone by choice or by circumstance. A person eating alone after a long workday, enjoying a book at a restaurant, or treating themselves to a tasting menu may be expressing independence. But a person eating alone because they have no one to call, no time to maintain friendships, or no social space outside work is experiencing something more worrying.


Ryan is a final-year finance student at the Singapore University of Social Sciences (SUSS) with experience across venture capital, venture debt, and business development. He also holds a diploma in Law and Management from Temasek Polytechnic. His interests lie in how emerging technologies and economic trends shape business ecosystems and regional development in Asia.

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The Philippines 🇵🇭

The Political Economy and Social Dimensions of Labor in the Philippines

by Arianne De Guzman, in Bulacan

Every year on 1 May, Labor Day is commemorated in the Philippines to highlight the value and contributions of the Filipino workers to society. Beyond advocating for minimum wage increases and better working conditions, work in the Philippine context carries deep social meaning. It is not merely an economic activity — it is a moral obligation, an indication of dignity, and a central axis around which family life and identity revolve.

Work is deeply embedded in kinship, as earnings are rarely treated as purely individual income, but as a shared resource within extended families. This is tied to the concept of utang na loob [debt of gratitude], a cultural value that dictates how eldest children in a Filipino household are morally obligated to reciprocate or repay those who have provided them with significant help, even at the cost of personal sacrifice. According to one study, this dynamic exists because the family is considered as the primary unit of Philippine society, reinforcing such social behavior to maintain harmony. In the context of financial practices, a study of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) found that income and remittances are often allocated for household expenditures, indicating that economic capital is converted into social obligation. Labor, therefore, not only sustains livelihood, but relationships, making it clear that working to give back is central to being a good family member.

Work also functions as a key site of identity formation, where employment becomes closely tied to perceptions of respectability. Studies show that professional roles shape how individuals see themselves, with the type of work they do influencing their sense of identity. Beyond personal perception, employment signals status and social standing, offering a sense of security, belonging, and recognition. In the Philippines, these dynamics are reinforced by cultural expectations and family pressures, where being employed is linked to fulfilling social obligations and being valued.

At the same time, it is necessary to recognize that the Philippine family culture does not arise from cultural values alone, but is intensified by limited public welfare systems, inaccessible social services, and persistent economic insecurity. It is also shaped by weak labor governance characterized by wage regulation, contractualization practices, and reliance on overseas labor deployment to manage the lack of domestic job opportunities and stimulate economic growth through remittances. Thus, family-based obligation to share income is not only cultural, but also a response to historically weak labor governance.

Labor Day, then, is not merely a moment of recognition for Filipino workers. It is a reminder of how deeply work is embedded in Philippine social life. In a society where family remains the central unit, labor is experienced not only as an economic condition, but also as a moral one. Any policy reforms such as wage increases and improved labor protections are insufficient, but they must also be understood alongside historical, structural, and political conditions that reinforce these deeply rooted family expectations.


Arianne has experience in policy research at De La Salle University’s Jesse M. Robredo Institute of Governance, where she contributed to projects on systemic reform. She earned a degree in Political Science from Colegio de San Juan de Letran. Currently, she works in government relations, specializing in advocacy strategy, legislative monitoring, and stakeholder engagement. Beyond her professional work, she is actively involved in youth development and grassroots initiatives through the Rotaract Club of Santa Maria.

Vietnam 🇻🇳

Vietnam’s New Era of Strategic Leadership

by Hang Nguyen, in Ho Chi Minh City

Vietnam is entering a decisive political transition.

In early April, the 16th National Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam concluded and laid the groundwork for a complete reconfiguration of political power for the next five years.

Beyond just simply a refresh of personnel, this leadership transition changes how power is organized and exercised. At the center of this shift is To Lam, who now simultaneously holds the two highest offices in Vietnam: the General Secretary of the Communist Party and the State President. This dual role is an unprecedented consolidation of power in recent years, signaling a departure from Vietnam’s long-standing model of collective leadership toward a more centralized system. While some could argue that this change allows for effective coordination and streamlined procedures, especially in response to geoeconomic challenges, critics point out its resemblance to China’s current leadership model. Critical questions are being raised regarding checks and balances within the political system, and whether continued reliance on internal party mechanisms can still maintain stability and prevent the excessive concentration of authority. This will unfold alongside ongoing anti-corruption campaigns.

At the same time, the state government has released eight major new resolutions focused on cutting, decentralizing, and simplifying administrative procedures and business conditions. The government will amend and supplement 163 legal documents (including 155 decrees), which will abolish 184 administrative procedures, decentralize 134, and simplify 349. Additionally, 890 business conditions will be removed with the aim to cut more than 50% of compliance time and costs for business. Furthermore, we can see more forward momentum in economic development and fiscal autonomy through the legislative adoption of a public debt management plan and the medium-term public investment plan for the 2026-–2030 period. The legislative body will amend and supplement the Law on Personal Income Tax, the Law on Valued-added Tax, the Law on Corporate Income Tax, and the Law on Special Consumption Tax. This demonstrates a strategic shift in boosting state capacity through socio-economic prioritization.

Vietnam has ramped up its foreign diplomacy to an unprecedented level. High-level diplomatic exchanges have been consistently conducted between Vietnam and its cooperative partners’ political leaders: Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, South Korean President Lee Jae Myung, Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico, and Estonian Minister of Foreign Affairs Margus Tsahkna, along with state visits to China, Sri Lanka, and India. In alignment with its “bamboo diplomacy” approach, Vietnam is actively diversifying its strategic partnerships in order to maintain strategic balance amid the constant geopolitical tensions instigated by the West. It can also be observed that Vietnam is leaning towards establishing robust and resilient cooperation with Asian counterparts. Does this signal Vietnam’s incremental departure from the Western sphere of influence, particularly the United States?

Vietnam’s transition signals more than leadership change — it reflects a strategic recalibration of power, governance, and diplomacy. Under Tô Lâm, centralization, reform, and diversified partnerships aim to boost resilience. Yet tensions remain. The key test will be whether Vietnam can sustain growth, balance global ties, and maintain stability, all while ensuring effective and accountable governance.


Hang is a young researcher with academic experience in Vietnam and the United States. She has previously worked in public relations at the U.S. Consulate General in Ho Chi Minh City and the YSEALI Academy. Her research focuses on ASEAN centrality in the evolving Asia-Pacific landscape, with particular attention to Vietnam’s approach to trade, regional cooperation, and political economy in the face of external power dynamics and global volatility.

Editorial Deadline 05/05/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Siu Tzyy Wei, Lead Editor - Maritime Crescent Desk

This week’s stories call us to look into the hidden toll of systems, especially when our lives depend on them. In Indonesia, a commuter tragedy in Bekasi pushed correspondent Rayhan Prabu to expose how infrastructure upgrades more often than not, only follow disaster, leaving workers to navigate unsafe commutes and stagnant wages. Meanwhile, Muhammad Aiman highlights the delicate balance between fiscal reform and household survival vis-a-vis Malaysia’s current subsidy rationalisation. Brunei’s Wira Gregory shines light on the deliberate construction of a bilateral economic architecture with China that has grown beyond petrochemicals into digital and agri-food supply chains.

Together, our correspondents remind us that the costs of living are borne by everyday workers, households and small states. Here, perhaps it is worth evaluating the measure of how governments choose to act, or delay, when structural pressures demand more than another workaround.

Indonesia 🇮🇩

End of the Line

by Rayhan Prabu Kusumo, in Jakarta

On April 27, a long-distance express train plowed into the rear of a stopped commuter train at Bekasi Timur Station, east of Jakarta. The car it hit was the women-only carriage. All sixteen casualties were women. Ninety-six others were taken to hospital.

Bekasi is Greater Jakarta’s industrial and residential belt - dense with factories and housing complexes, it houses 2.6 million people - largely because housing in Jakarta is out of reach and the commuter line makes the distance workable. Most of the women in that carriage were workers — heading home or to a shift.

Women-only cars are a fixture on Indonesian commuter lines, unremarkable to anyone who rides them regularly. On that night, it was that car that absorbed the full force of the collision.

Swiftly, President Prabowo pledged roughly Rp4 trillion (USD230 million) to upgrade level crossings across Java - a risk long visible and unaddressed. Monetary compensation only comes after a disaster forces it to. Infrastructure that millions depend on daily is treated as an afterthought until it stops being one in the worst possible way.

Commuting is not the only social issue treated that way. Wages have grown minimally, leaving Indonesian workers among the lower-paid in the region despite productivity gains that should have translated into better take-home pay. Informality is widespread and rising: a large share of the workforce has no contracts, no benefits, and no real recourse. And the geography of work — the reason Bekasi exists as it does, the reason those women were on that train at that hour — reflects a country that has built its economy around cheap, mobile labor.

The current administration has shown it can move resources and political will when it chooses to. But the programs defining its identity speak to a different set of priorities. For workers, the question has never really been whether the government cares. It is what the government considers worth caring about first.

Moving Indonesian manufacturing up the value chain requires an industrial environment that successive governments have gestured toward without actually building, without which workers have nowhere to go but down. Indonesia’s minimum wage is set through a formula that consistently underestimates what it actually costs to live. A wage policy that tracks productivity and real living costs rather than those assumptions would start to correct that. Moreover, a city that builds affordable housing near employment centers, would mean fewer workers making the long commute that cost those women their lives.

Unsurprisingly, the most structurally doable yet most consistently neglected, is enforcement. Laws exist, what often doesn’t is the will to make them stick. And that requires no new policy, just commitment to follow through on the ones already written.

Women-only cars were a practical solution to a problem that should not exist. They did not keep their passengers safe. Indonesia’s workers have been riding practical solutions for a long time — workarounds for wages that don’t stretch, protections that don’t hold, cities that weren’t built with them in mind. At some point, the answer cannot keep being another workaround.


Rayhan has a background in government affairs and public policy, with experience across government institutions and advisory firms. His work focuses on the intersection of geopolitics, policy, and risk, with expertise in advocacy, regulatory analysis, and stakeholder engagement. He holds a degree in Government from Universitas Padjadjaran, and has completed an exchange at Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Spain, focusing on global politics and sustainability.

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Malaysia 🇲🇾

Rationalising Subsidies

by Muhammad Aiman Bin Roszaimi, in Cyberjaya

Malaysia subsidy rationalisation represents a strategic shift from a blanket to a targeted fiscal framework, necessitated by the escalating cost of subsidies which recently strained the national budget. The primary objective is to consolidate public finances while curbing leakages, specifically the cross-border smuggling of diesel and the consumption of subsidised goods by high-income earners and non-citizens.

A major milestone in this transition occurred with the rationalisation of diesel subsidies in Peninsular Malaysia, where the retail price was allowed to float to market rates. To mitigate the immediate economic shock, the government introduced the BUDI MADANI program, which provides monthly cash transfers to eligible logistics providers and individual diesel vehicle owners.

This model serves as a precursor for the planned adjustments to RON95 petrol, where the top tier of earners will eventually pay market prices while the vast majority of the population remains protected. Similar tiered approaches have already been applied to electricity tariffs, where high-volume domestic users and industrial sectors face higher rates while the majority of households are insulated through rebates.

However, the impact of subsidy rationalisation in the current environment is complex and uneven. On the positive side, economists recognise that rationalisation can significantly improve Malaysia’s fiscal position and create policy space for development spending or social protection. It also aligns with broader structural reforms, including efforts to rebalance revenue constraints and enhance spending efficiency, rather than relying on subsidies as a blunt redistributive tool.

At the same time, the policy carries immediate socio-economic risks. The removal or reduction of subsidies, particularly fuel subsidies, can translate into higher living costs, either directly through price increases or indirectly via transportation and supply chain effects. Evidence suggests that such measures may compress household disposable income, especially among middle-income urban groups who are more exposed to market-priced fuel. More critically, vulnerable populations may experience disproportionate hardship if compensatory mechanisms are insufficient or poorly timed.

Beyond material effects, the political economy dimension of subsidy reform is equally significant. Public resistance to subsidy removal is well documented, with support often contingent on how reforms are framed and communicated. Studies show that acceptance increases when reforms are presented as redistributive and equitable, rather than purely fiscal measures. In Malaysia’s current context, policymakers have explicitly acknowledged this challenge, emphasising the need for clear communication to prevent misinformation and maintain public trust. Economists similarly warn that poorly communicated reforms risk triggering public backlash, particularly at a time when cost-of-living pressures remain acute.

Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim has emphasized that the success of these reforms hinges on clear public communication and the efficiency of the civil service in explaining the necessity of the shift. This is crucial to curb misinformation and ensure that the transition from traditional income classifications to a more nuanced one. Ultimately, Malaysia is navigating a complex policy evolution where the long-term goal of market efficiency must be carefully managed against the immediate realities of the cost of living.


Aiman is a PhD candidate in Security and Strategic Analysis at the National University of Malaysia. His research focuses on Malaysia’s space policy, ASEAN regional security, and the strategic implications of emerging technologies. His work explores how Malaysia’s defense policy and strategic culture shape its approach to outer space.

Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳

COMTIEC 6 and Continuing Brunei-China Relations

by Wira Gregory Ejau, in Bandar Seri Begawan

On April 23 in Bandar Seri Begawan, senior officials from Brunei and China convened the sixth iteration of the Consultation Meeting on Trade, Investment and Economic Cooperation ( COMTIEC), reaffirming commitments across the Belt and Road Initiative, digital economy, agriculture, and logistics cooperation.

The six iterations of COMTIEC have represented the institutionalisation of a relationship that both sides have invested in sustaining across shifting geopolitical conditions that operate beneath the threshold of political visibility. The scaffolding has long since been built on a deep relationship of notable intentionality that has long existed since China’s BRI alignment with Brunei’s Wawasan 2035 development framework, the establishment of the Brunei-Guangxi Economic Corridor, the Hengyi petrochemical complex, and the designation of Pulau Muara Besar as an industrial zone with Chinese investment. This has arguably produced a unique, bilateral architecture that is considerably more layered than most comparable small-state partnerships, with COMTIEC 6 extending it further into the maintenance of digital economy, innovation, and agri-food supply chains.

The language employed on the subject of regional and international issues, particularly the joint reaffirmation of “open markets, regional integration, and a rules-based, transparent and non-discriminatory multilateral trading system, with the World Trade Organisation at its core” is notable at a moment when US tariff escalations have placed the assumptions underlying the multilateral trading order under a degree of pressure. The inscription of WTO-centrism into a bilateral communiqué, therefore, locates both parties within an increasingly contested institutional landscape and does so in an outward-facing record.

China’s commitment at COMTIEC 6 to building economic corridors that position Brunei as a regional logistics hub is worth disaggregating, as the Pulau Muara Besar zone sits on deep-water access. The extension of COMTIEC cooperation into agri-food supply chains and digital economy infrastructure suggests the relationship is consciously broadening its sectoral base, which is a development consistent with both Wawasan 2035’s diversification logic and China’s wider interest in anchoring regional digital and food supply architectures.

The original axis of the relationship was heavily concentrated in petrochemicals and downstream energy, with the Hengyi refinery and the PMB zone being its most visible expressions. COMTIEC 6 extends the agenda explicitly, and adds a dimension specifically directed at micro, small and medium enterprise integration through Chinese trade platforms and expos. This element is distinct from the mega-infrastructure logic that has characterised earlier phases of the relationship. MSME market access through the China ASEAN Expo and the China International Import Expo represents a commercialisation pathway that operates at a different scale and involves Brunei’s private sector in ways that capital-intensive infrastructure projects structurally might not cover. If commitments follow through, the cumulative effect is a relationship that is broader-based and therefore more resilient to any single sectoral disruption, playing into the economic diversification strategy required of its external partnerships.

What COMTIEC 6 ultimately illustrates is the difference between a bilateral relationship and a bilateral architecture. The former depends on political will; the latter accumulates its own institutional gravity across sectors, mechanisms, and iterations.


Gregory is an MSc candidate in Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He works as a freelance writer specializing in international history, conflict, and counterterrorism, with experience in academia, investigative journalism, and voluntary uniformed service. He currently provides research assistance with the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) under their Southeast Asian Security and Defence Internship Programme and conducts investigations on regional security and transnational crime for a confidential company.

Editorial Deadline 02/05/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk

Some people disappear suddenly. Others are made invisible slowly, by systems, states, and silences that find it convenient to look away. This week’s issue of the Mekong Belt is about the latter.

In Laos, young women and girls from poor ethnic minority communities are vanishing into trafficking networks that stretch across borders — while a state that identified only 85 victims in all of 2024 and prosecuted none of the traffickers behind them looks the other way. In Myanmar, a single photograph surfaces after four years of silence: Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, seated on a wooden bench. With no timestamp, no video, no independent verification, this can hardly be considered a proof of life, and only deepens the uncertainty surrounding her fate.

Meanwhile, in Thailand, the EU has stepped in with EUR 15 million to make the landmark right-to-work policy for Myanmar displaced persons actually function, but bureaucracy, geography, and implementation gaps keep doubts looming. Finally, in Cambodia, the crisis is buried in balance sheets: NPLs at a ten-year high, growth projections revised down, and a graduation from Least Developed Country status that risks arriving before the country is ready for it.

Lao PDR 🇱🇦

Sold, Trapped, and Silenced: The Exploitation of Lao Women and Girls

by Thongsavanh Souvannasane, in Vientiane

Young Lao women and girls, many from poor ethnic minority communities, are disappearing into trafficking networks that stretch far beyond their villages and borders.

What they were promised was opportunity. What they found was exploitation.

The roots of the crisis trace back to around 2013, when rapid foreign economic investment accelerated a large influx of nationals into the country. The 2021 opening of the Laos-China Railway further eased access. As enforcement tightened elsewhere in the region, traffickers and sex offenders increasingly redirected operations to Laos, where oversight remained weak and penalties lenient.

Traffickers lure Lao women abroad through fraudulent marriage schemes.

China’s severe gender imbalance, a legacy of the one-child policy that left 30 million more men than women, continues to generate demand for foreign brides.

Between 2008 and 2018, an estimated 3,000 Lao women were deceived and sold into such arrangements, with bride prices reaching USD 22,500. Only 600 are known to have returned home. Forced surrogacy networks have also reportedly re-emerged in northern Laos as recently as 2025.

The exploitation of children has drawn particular international alarm.

Official data shows one-third of girls in Laos marry before age 18, the highest rate in ASEAN, a vulnerability traffickers exploit systematically. The US State Department identifies nationals from multiple countries across Asia, Europe, and the Pacific among those traveling to Laos specifically to abuse children, operating through hotels, restaurants, and online platforms, openly advertising services involving minors.

The pattern of offending is often serial.

In June 2025, immigration police at Wattay International Airport intercepted a 21-year-old woman from Savannakhet Province about to be trafficked abroad through a fraudulent marriage scheme. Eight suspects were detained, four of them foreign nationals.

Later that year, a Japanese national was arrested in Luang Prabang with three girls aged 12 to 16. He had been arrested in Laos just months earlier, fined, and released, and had faced similar charges in the Philippines in 2017. Lao authorities have since reclassified such offences as rape and human trafficking, carrying significantly harsher sentences.

Both Japan and South Korea have been forced into rare public responses.

Japan’s Embassy in Laos issued an explicit warning in June 2025, after a Japanese resident in Vientiane petitioned the government over social media posts where men openly boasted about child sex tourism. South Korea’s Embassy followed in September 2025, warning nationals that offences carry criminal penalties under both Lao and Korean law.

Despite both warnings, arrests have continued into 2026.

The US State Department’s 2025 Trafficking in Persons Report downgraded Laos to Tier 3, its lowest ranking, citing endemic corruption and zero prosecutions of traffickers connected to its Golden Triangle Special Economic Zones. The government identified only 85 trafficking victims in all of 2024, down from 168 the year before.

Until prosecutions match the scale of the crime, Laos will remain defined by the impunity it offers to those who prey on its most vulnerable.


Thongsavanh is a journalist from Laos with a background in English-language media. He graduated from the Lao-American Institute with a Diploma of the Arts in English and contributes to independent news platforms. His reporting focuses on environmental issues, socio-economic development, and geopolitics.

Myanmar 🇲🇲

Proof of Life Campaign Intensifies After Military Releases Photo of Aung San Suu Kyi

by Myat Moe Kywe

Myanmar’s military junta has released the first public image of ousted leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in years, alongside a partial reduction of her prison sentence as part of a religious amnesty marking the Full Moon Day of Kason.

The photograph, broadcast by state media on April 30, shows the 80-year-old Nobel Laureate seated on a wooden bench, flanked by two uniformed personnel. It marks the first official visual confirmation of her condition since May 2021, shortly after the military coup that removed her elected government from power. Since then, she has remained in strict isolation, with no public appearance, video, or independent access granted. The military has repeatedly denied requests from international actors and family members alike.

In late 2022, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was sentenced to more than 30 years in prison on charges including corruption, election fraud, incitement, and violations of Myanmar’s Official Secrets Act — charges widely condemned as politically motivated. Her sentence was subsequently reduced to 27 years. On April 30, authorities announced a further reduction of one-sixth as part of a broader amnesty covering 1,519 prisoners, including 11 foreigners, granted, according to state media, “for the sake of public peace and humanitarian reasons.”

The image arrives amid a global proof-of-life campaign led by the All in One Piece Movement, an advocacy group established by her son, Kim Aris. The movement has spent months mobilizing international governments and civil society to demand transparency regarding her health and whereabouts. While the photograph offered some reassurance, it also raised new concerns: there was no timestamp, no accompanying video, and no independent verification. “As a son, I have no information,” Kim Aris said. “My request is to verify that my mom is alive, to be able to communicate with her, and to see her free.” Rather than ending public concern, the image has intensified calls for stronger proof.

The timing has drawn attention. The release came shortly after Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to Myanmar, prompting speculation that regional diplomacy may have influenced the junta’s decision. Although official Chinese statements on the visit made no mention of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lin Jian later told foreign media that “Aung San Suu Kyi is a long-standing friend of China” and that Beijing has consistently monitored developments regarding her situation. He added that China supports Myanmar in pursuing a development path suited to its national conditions and supports all parties in achieving lasting peace and reconciliation. Whether Wang Yi’s visit quietly contributed to the release of the photograph remains unclear.

For many people from Myanmar, at home and abroad, the message remains unchanged: one photo is not proof of life. The demand for transparency, dignity, freedom for Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the release of all political prisoners, and justice for Myanmar continues.


Myat is a senior undergraduate student majoring in Politics, Philosophy, and Economics. She has interned at The Asia Foundation in Washington, D.C., and she has also worked as a summer research assistant at the Centre for Policy and Innovation (CRPI), gaining experience in research and analysis. Her work focuses on civic engagement, gender, youth leadership, and community development.

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Thailand 🇹🇭

Can Europe’s Treasury Bridge Thailand’s Refugee Work Permit Gap?

by Paranut Juntree, in Bangkok

When Thailand launched its “Right to Work” policy for displaced persons fleeing Myanmar in October 2025, the policy was hailed as a landmark humanitarian blueprint for self-reliance in response to the US aid cuts. However, the rollout quickly collided with reality. Hampered by bureaucratic friction and a “learning-as-we-go” approach, the policy’s effectiveness has been tested by administrative complexity. Now, a new cornerstone has arrived. On April 20, 2026, the European Union launched a EUR 15 million (570 million baht) sustainable solutions program, titled “Supporting Thailand’s Transition to Self-Reliance & Inclusion: Preparing Myanmar Displaced Persons for Inclusive Future.”

While Thailand provided the legal blueprint, the EU is now providing the operation engine. This strategic investment would test whether international capital can dissolve bureaucratic deadlocks and transform over 80,000 Myanmar displaced persons from temporary shelters from aid-dependent residents into active economic contributors.

A major hurdle with the Right to Work policy has been the geographic isolation of temporary shelters, many of which are distant from active labor markets. The EU’s allocation of EUR 10.5 million to an International Rescue Committee (IRC)-led consortium targets this directly. By funding vocational training and importantly, employment matching, the EU is effectively subsidizing the Thai Ministry of Labour’s workload. This prepares refugees for the market, transforming them into desirable employees rather than administrative challenges in the policy.

One of the primary barriers to inclusion has been the public fear that refugees would exhaust Thai public resources, particularly in terms of health. To counter this, the EU is investing EUR 2 million via Expertise France and the M-Fund, a non-profit health insurance scheme for migrant workers in Thailand. This “health de-risking” strategy strengthens local health systems to absorb the 40,000 working-age displaced persons. By utilizing low-cost, non-profit insurance models, the program demonstrates that a refugee workforce can be budget-neutral, or even a net positive for provincial infrastructure.

Furthermore, EUR 2.5 million is dedicated to UNHCR-led child protection and inclusion in national frameworks. By ensuring that women, children, and people with disabilities are integrated into essential services, the investment addresses the human dignity at the heart of the “aid to agency” shift in refugee management.

The EU’s funding provides a stable three-year horizon for 2026 until 2028, offering a necessary buffer against recent shocking US aid cuts. However, money only fixes the cost as it cannot fix the logic. The infrastructure for the Right to Work is still in its maturing stages. If issues regarding labor movement, protection, and health services are not managed with clear, consistent policy, the framework may remain vulnerable to implementation gaps.

As Thailand grapples with a labor shortage, an aging population, and a refugee humanitarian crisis, this EUR 15 million represents not only a relief but an invitation to humanitarian excellence. While the EU is helping to construct the bridge, the responsibility now lies with the Thai government to ensure the path is clear for refugees in temporary shelters to cross it.


Paranut has a background in advocacy, with experience in policy research, communications, and civic engagement across both the NGO and government sectors. As Thailand’s Youth Delegate to the United Nations, he represented Thai youth in global dialogues on migration, education, and human rights, championing inclusive policymaking. He holds a degree in political science with a specialization in international relations.

Cambodia 🇰🇭

Cambodia’s 2026 Economic Outlook Amid Recent Shocks

by Malai Yatt, in Phnom Penh

Cambodia faces an uncertain 2026 outlook as rising banking risks and global geopolitical tensions test its export-driven economic resilience.

According to the ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO), external pressures are compounded by domestic banking vulnerabilities, including rising non-performing loans (NPLs), and persistent uncertainty surrounding the border dispute with Thailand. The country’s upcoming graduation from Least Developed Country status by 2029 adds another layer of risk, potentially undermining export competitiveness and increasing financing costs if the transition is not carefully managed.

Local media reports that Cambodia’s NPL ratio for the entire banking sector reached a ten-year high of 8.6% in 2025, with projections suggesting it could surpass 10% in 2026 as Middle East-driven fuel inflation weighs on domestic consumption, exports, agriculture, and tourism. Commercial banks saw their NPL ratio rise from 7.2% in 2024 to 8.3% in 2025, while microfinance institutions saw a decline from 15.4% to 14.8%. Financial institutions restructured USD 1.9 billion, or 9% of USD 5.7 billion in outstanding loans — though experts note that without restructuring, the ratio would have been considerably higher.

Despite these pressures, AMRO estimates that Cambodia’s economy grew by 5.3% in 2025, supported by strong garment exports, steady foreign direct investment, and swift policy responses. Growth is expected to slow further to 4.3% in 2026. Lead economist Jinho Choi noted that “proactive and targeted policy support, together with structural reforms, will be important to sustain medium-term growth.”

In response to the fuel price crisis, Prime Minister Hun Manet has ordered relevant stakeholders to introduce measures easing the value-added tax burden on gasoline and diesel. Mines and Energy Minister Keo Rottanak confirmed that the government has continued to lower taxes across fuel products to prevent costs from fully passing through to consumers.

Cambodia must balance targeted policy support and structural reform to maintain resilience against rising NPLs and shifting global trade dynamics — a narrow path, but not an impossible one.

Malai is a reporter at Kiripost, where she has worked for over two years, driven by a strong commitment to amplifying the voices of underserved communities. Her reporting focuses on economic and foreign affairs.

Editorial Deadline 02/05/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Karen Ysabelle R. David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk

Even as the instability in the Middle East continues to capture the world’s attention, the Philippines is facing a brewing crisis all its own, as impeachment proceedings against Vice President Sara Duterte have exposed a drug-stained paper trail that may just tarnish her family’s popularity. With the Duterte patriarch in The Hague, can the family survive this latest debacle?

But for the other countries of the Pacific Corridor this week, the war in the Middle East remains an ever-looming — and the greater — threat. For Timor-Leste, the war has raised questions about the country’s long-term energy strategy and security. In Vietnam, dreams of double-digit GDP growth are clashing with the creeping reality of war-induced inflation. And Singapore, for all that it dreams of the stars and the sea as it invests in the space and maritime sectors, is just as vulnerable to the earthly concerns caused by regional conflicts.

The Philippines 🇵🇭

Numbers, Narcos, and a War on Drugs: The Duterte Impeachment Enters a New, Sharper Phase

by Eduardo G. Fajermo Jr., in Angeles City

The impeachment proceedings against Vice President Sara Duterte have entered a phase where the political argument is being driven less by rhetoric and more by documents: wealth declarations, bank-flagged transaction summaries, and now a tax-enforcement move that brings another institution into the picture. In late April, the Bureau of Internal Revenue ordered the issuance of letters of authority to audit Duterte and her husband, Manases “Mans” Carpio, after a finding of probable cause to warrant investigation, adding a parallel pressure point as the House inquiry continues.

Besides the assassination plot against the incumbent President, at the center of the impeachment track now are two overlapping allegations: first, that Duterte’s Statements of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALNs) contain inconsistencies or omissions; and second, that the financial activity described in hearing presentations and Anti-Money Laundering Council-related summaries does not square with what appears in those SALNs. Lawmakers flagged the mismatch between Duterte’s declared net worth — rising from PHP 7.2 million (2007) to PHP 71.058 million (2022) and PHP 88.512 million (2024) — and the reported scale of bank transactions referenced in the proceedings, noting that her SALNs from 2019 to 2024 reflected no declared “cash on hand” or “cash in bank.”

The impeachment narrative escalated further after former Senator Antonio Trillanes IV presented a sworn claim during the hearings that members of the Duterte family received or encashed PHP 181.6 million in checks from a person he identified as alleged Davao drug lord Samuel “Sammy” Uy, with a breakdown that included sums Trillanes attributed to Sara Duterte and other family members.

Still, the allegation carries a political weight that goes beyond pesos and paper trails, because it collides directly with the Duterte brand. Rodrigo Duterte built his national presidency around a brutal anti-drug campaign, a “war on drugs” now at the core of an International Criminal Court (ICC) case. In late April 2026, the ICC confirmed charges against the former President and committed him to trial, with the court stating that there were substantial grounds to believe he bore criminal responsibility in connection with killings tied to that campaign.

This creates a dissonance that the impeachment proceedings are now implicitly exploiting: a political legacy framed as a crusade against narcotics is being pursued internationally for alleged crimes against humanity, while at home the family is facing impeachment-linked allegations of receiving funds from an individual branded as a drug figure. Even if those allegations are ultimately contested, the optics are corrosive. The “war on drugs” was sold domestically as moral clarity and hard discipline; allegations of narco-linked money suggest a different — and politically damaging — moral economy: enforcement rhetoric on one hand, suspect financial entanglements on the other.

This Philippine episode reads as a textbook case of how democratic accountability can become multi-institutional: legislature, financial intelligence mechanisms referenced in hearings, and now tax enforcement moving in parallel. But it also shows how accountability disputes in Southeast Asia frequently merge moral narrative with institutional procedure. The Duterte name remains electorally powerful, yet the ICC’s advancement of the elder Duterte’s case demonstrates that reputational shields do not automatically hold in international forums.

The House may count votes, but the public is counting contradictions. The Duterte project rose on a promise that the state would be ruthless against drugs and corruption, yet it now confronts allegations that strike at the very moral authority it claimed. With the patriarch of that legacy headed to trial overseas, the Philippines is forced to confront a brutal question at home: can a movement built on punishment survive scrutiny of its own receipts? Because in politics, the harshest verdict is not defeat, it is exposure.


Eduardo is a faculty member at Holy Angel University, where he teaches courses on Philippine history and contemporary global issues. He is currently pursuing a Master’s degree in Political Science at the University of Santo Tomas, with a research focus on disaster governance, environmental politics, and the urban poor in the Philippines.

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Timor-Leste 🇹🇱

Timor-Leste and the Question of Long-Term Energy Strategy

by Ricardo Valente, in Dili

Timor-Leste is once again spending millions of dollars to secure fuel in a global market it does not control. This raises the same policy question: is the country building energy security through long-term strategy, or relying mainly on emergency fuel purchases when global prices rise?

Earlier this month, the Government approved a direct award (“adjudicação direta”) worth around USD 168.8 million to purchase about 80 million liters of diesel through Esperanca Timor Oan (ETO) — a Timorese-owned energy company founded on specializing in fuel import, storage, and distribution. The Government presented the decision as necessary to secure national fuel supply during a period of rising international prices.

However, the procurement method has also raised public discussion. Diligente reported concerns about transparency, especially because the contract was awarded through direct negotiation instead of an open competitive process. This adds to wider questions about how large energy-related spending decisions are managed.

The urgency of fuel procurement is linked to global energy risks. According to the Lowy Institute, countries that depend heavily on imported fuel are more vulnerable to global oil shocks because they lack strong internal systems that are capable of handling shocks. Even indirect geopolitical tensions, including risks around key shipping routes such as the Strait of Hormuz, can affect global oil prices and quickly pass through to import-dependent economies like Timor-Leste.

This situation highlights a structural challenge. Timor-Leste imports most of its refined fuel, meaning national supply is closely tied to external markets and private suppliers. In practice, this often means making rushed purchases when prices go up, rather than stable long-term planning.

Speaking at a regional energy summit, President Jose Ramos-Horta acknowledged this vulnerability, stating that “our electricity system currently depends almost entirely on imported diesel,” warning that as global prices rise, the impact is directly on fiscal pressure and the cost of living. He also noted that recent Government measures, including large fuel purchases, “buy time, but are emergency measures, not lasting solutions.”

At the center of the system is TIMOR GAP, the state-owned oil and gas company responsible for the country’s petroleum interests. It plays an important strategic role, but in practice its ability to keep fuel supply stable and act as a national safety buffer is still limited, with most fuel import and distribution handled through commercial companies. This difference between its official role and what it can actually do continues to raise questions about how the country’s energy system is governed and structured.

The broader issue is no longer only about fuel procurement, but about the direction of Timor-Leste’s energy strategy. Energy security is not just about buying fuel during shortages, but about reducing exposure to repeated global shocks through better planning, storage systems, and clearer institutional roles.

This also leads to a longer-term question: whether Timor-Leste’s energy strategy will continue to rely mainly on imported fuel, or whether it can gradually diversify towards more stable and locally produced energy sources, including renewable energy, as part of a broader system of resilience. As President Ramos-Horta emphasized, reducing dependence on imported diesel through investment in renewable energy is not only a climate goal, but “an economic and strategic necessity.”

For now, as global energy markets remain unstable, Timor-Leste faces a clear policy challenge. The real test for Timor-Leste’s energy strategy is not whether it can secure fuel in a crisis, but whether it can reduce the need to keep doing so.


Ricardo is a media and communication practitioner and International Relations graduate based in Dili, Timor-Leste. He is the founder of Gen-Z Talk Timor-Leste, a youth-led digital platform dedicated to civic engagement and public dialogue. His work focuses on amplifying young voices, promoting social awareness, and contributing to conversations on society, politics, economy, governance, digital rights, and security.

Vietnam 🇻🇳

Domestic Consumption for Double-Digit Growth

by Tri Vo, in Ho Chi Minh City

As Vietnam approaches Reunification Day (30 April) and International Labor Day (1 May), an important holiday period, the domestic economy faces a critical litmus test. For the first quarter of 2026, the country’s growth narrative has been overwhelmingly dominated by a booming manufacturing export sector. However, to achieve the government’s highly ambitious mandate of double-digit GDP growth for 2026, export momentum alone will be far from sufficient; for so grand a goal, the market of 100 million people must open its wallet.

The most manifest indicators of this domestic spending appetite are currently visible in the aviation and tourism sectors. Indeed, anticipating a massive wave of movement, Vietnam Airlines, the country’s flagship carrier, has aggressively increased capacity at a ballpark of nearly 1.12 million seats across its domestic and international networks, a 15.5% rise compared to the same period last year.

Yet, the will to spend is colliding with the unenviable reality of inflation hitting. Driven by ongoing geopolitical tensions in the Middle East and persistently high jet fuel prices, carriers are actively scaling back less profitable routes while significantly raising fares. For instance, return airfares from Hanoi to popular tourist hubs like Phu Quoc have skyrocketed. Currently, these tickets are priced between VND 5 million and VND 5.5 million on Vietnam Airlines, while even budget carrier Vietjet Air is charging between VND 3.5 million and VND 5 million (50–60% of the country’s average monthly salary).

Consequently, locations easily accessible by car or train are experiencing a boom. Near the capital of Hanoi, Ninh Binh has seen its search volumes nearly triple, while coastal Vung Tau, reachable from the economic center Ho Chi Minh City within 2 to 3 hours, has recorded an increase of over 40% in booking interest. This more prudent approach suggests that while the Vietnamese middle class has accumulated disposable income after 30 years of economic opening, they remain highly vulnerable to the undulatory ripple of inflation.

Recognizing the rising spending hesitance, policymakers have deployed fiscal stimulus to induce more consumption. The most consequential of these measures is the National Assembly’s official resolution to extend the 2% VAT reduction through 31 December 2026. By lowering the standard tax rate from 10% to 8% on a wide array of consumer goods and services, with newly added categories like transportation, logistics, and IT products, the government is attempting to create a positive feedback loop that tackles affordability in both the upstream and downstream of goods, thus overriding consumer anxiety to stimulate purchasing power.

When the General Statistics Office releases its retail sales and services data in early May, how much and how far such stimulus works will be revealed. If the upcoming week does not deliver a substantial pump in domestic consumption, it will put more pressure on the second half of the year to reach the current growth goal. More substantially, however, such an event would serve as a sign that the capital flowing into the economy, either in the form of foreign or public investment, has not yet fully trickled down to ordinary households, thus presenting a profound challenge for policymakers trying to steer the economy toward the lofty growth ambitions not just for 2026 but beyond.


Tri has experience in management consulting and strategy, having worked with institutions such as the UNDP, The Asia Group, and ARC Group. He has provided strategic, legal, and operational insights to clients in sectors including manufacturing, energy, and technology. He holds both academic and professional experience related to Southeast and East Asia, with a focus on regional development and policy.

Singapore 🇸🇬

Ground to Space Ambitions

by Nurul Aini, in Singapore

Singapore is augmenting opportunities in the space and maritime sector. On 1 April 2026, the National Space Agency of Singapore (NSAS) was established under the Ministry of Trade and Industry. According to Dr. Tan See Leng, the Minister-in-Charge of Energy and Science and Technology, the NSAS will serve as a governing body to provide decisive leadership so that Singapore can seize opportunities in the expanding space economy. The NSAS is also a stronger institutional and statutory body than the Office for Space Technology and Industry (OSTIn), expanding its scope to not only promote the sector but also to maintain a sustainable approach to space. As outlined by OSTIn’s guidelines, all space activities should be in line with the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and the International Organization for Standardization.

Singapore’s approach aims to be multidisciplinary, where domains like robotics, engineering, artificial intelligence (AI), and law coalesce even for sectors that may not deem themselves directly involved in the space sector. Challenges remain for the expanding space sector — talents for the workforce still need to be amplified as people on the ground are unfamiliar with the space domain. There are, however, multiple outreach efforts such as one tapping the interest of pre-university students: one example is MANGOSAT, a nanosatellite created by 22 pre-university students, set to be launched into space in 2028 to collect advanced images for environmental and agricultural purposes.

According to Ms Michelle Khoo from Deloitte, the space sector is also predicted to provide an estimated US$100 billion potential cumulative boost to Southeast Asia’s GDP, with increased adoption of earth observation technology being the leading domain in the space sector.

Meanwhile, when it comes to the maritime sector, Singapore will be investing SGD 100 million in maritime research and development over the next five years. This aims to drive research and development efforts in autonomous port operations, alternative fuels, smart ships, and intelligent and integrated port services. According to Acting Transport Minister Jeffrey Siow, the maritime industry faces challenges including cyber threats, the rapid development of AI, and gaps in technology, regulatory frameworks, and bunkering infrastructure for transition to alternative fuels.

Regional and international connectivity remain important for Singapore for both sectors. The NSAS has conducted international partnerships, including hosting the 33rd ASEAN Sub-Committee on Space Technology and Applications (SCOSA). A report by Deloitte also outlines that collaborative models like SCOSA can develop sustainable governance models fit for the emerging international space ecosystem. The recent renewal of the partnership between Singapore’s Maritime and Port Authority with Shanghai Maritime University also drives knowledge exchange and maritime development.

When it comes to issues regarding the blockade, in an interview with CNBC, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vivian Balakrishnan, highlighted that Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore are strategically aligned when it comes to keeping the Strait of Malacca open, without toll charges. While the Indonesian Finance Minister, Purbaya Yudhi Sadewa, had initially floated the idea of a levy on the Strait of Malacca, he afterwards reiterated Indonesian Foreign Minister Sugiono’s stance that there will be no tariffs on the Strait, in alignment with international law. Malaysia’s Foreign Minister Mohamed Hasan later reiterated that decisions regarding the Strait cannot be made unilaterally and must involve all four countries, including Thailand.

Singapore’s investment in the space and maritime sectors is part of the country’s effort at developing resilience through internal coherence and strategic connectivity. Although begun years before, it comes at a time when a blockade at a significant chokepoint like the Strait of Hormuz has been proven to cause a systemic shock with far-reaching repercussions.


Aini is currently pursuing a master’s degree in English literature at Nanyang Technological University. She has experience working in youth groups, contributing to the planning and management of outreach activities.

Editorial Deadline 28/04/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Siu Tzyy Wei, Lead Editor - Maritime Crescent Desk

This week’s spread is not just about food security, it’s about politics, faith and survival. For appetisers, Brunei is working to carve out its place in the agrifood sector, using the stage of the FAO Regional Conference to signal its ambitions for its livelihood beyond oil and gas.

For the entree, Malaysia’s pig farming industry sits on a smoking bed of cultural sensitivities, environmental pressures and recurring disease outbreaks, reminding us how fragile supply chains can be when faith and policy are served simultaneously.

As the last course, ASEAN is working the margins of a system already in decline. With great powers paralysed, the bloc’s value lies in controlling text, shaping safeguards and extracting incremental gains before consensus collapses entirely.

Together, these stories show that Southeast Asia’s future is not guaranteed. Securing a spot at the buffet means navigating crises, balancing tradition with modernization, holding together the systems that keep both supply and stability from unravelling, and ensuring that stomachs are filled not just today, but also tomorrow. There may be no second helpings - except the urgency to get it right from this point forth.

Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳

Brunei’s Agrifood Push

by Syimah Johari, in Bandar Seri Begawan

From 20th to 24th April 2026, Brunei hosted the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)’s 38th Regional Conference for Asia and the Pacific for the first time. As the host, the sultanate sought opportunities to highlight its cultural heritage, local cuisine and progress on the multilateral stage. Beyond its ceremonial significance, the regional conference was also a timely opportunity for the country to position its agrifood sector on that same stage, showcasing not only its active goals and pursuits towards economic diversification, but also proving itself as a capable and reliable regional partner in food security.

Given the country’s ongoing reliance on oil and gas, the agrifood industry has been identified as one of the five key pursuits for its foreseeable economic future - a growing emphasis closely tied to broader concerns around food security. Just like many Southeast Asian countries, Brunei’s food security remains significantly dependent on food imports; however, global disruptions – including pandemics, geopolitical conflicts and supply chain challenges have only exposed the vulnerability of existing systems. For a small state like Brunei, such pressures are immediately and exponentially felt, thus fueling the urgency to secure its agrifood sector as a strategically necessary economic priority. In this context, hosting the FAO Regional Conference for Asia and the Pacific places Brunei represents a significant opportunity to achieve what it has set out to achieve.

Brunei’s agrifood sector is not starting from scratch. A sturdy base of local producers and small and medium-sized enterprises reflects ongoing development, alongside increasing recognition of the sector as a national priority in line with broader diversification efforts. This gradual expansion is also evident in continued cross-border trade, with exports to Sabah and Sarawak reaching BND 0.34 million between 2023 and 2025. While arguably modest, this still reflects a sector that has been steadily taking longer runs to achieve its grand goal of economic growth beyond oil and gas.

With food security highlighted as a growing global priority, the conference facilitated greater cooperation among participating countries and reinforced the importance of strengthening agrifood systems in the face of evolving global challenges. For a country whose survival is notoriously reliant on natural resources that many wish to have, Brunei’s growing focus on agrifood reflects a greater urgency to address its finite reality. In a time where supply chains are struggling to withhold the pressures pushed by post-pandemic socioeconomic stratifications and geopolitical crises like the US-Iran war, hosting the FAO Regional Conference for Asia and the Pacific is not just about being part of the conversation, but a pursuit of securing long-term survival, stability and prosperity. While Brunei has successfully engineered a platform for such conversations to emerge with greater urgency, the next step lies in ensuring that multilateral conversations do not succumb into yet another political echo chamber, and instead transform into physical, workable solutions for a shared future.


Syimah is a graduate of King’s College London with a BA in International Relations. With a strong focus on diplomacy, regional cooperation, and development policy, she is passionate about contributing to meaningful change through public service. Currently, she is involved in poverty alleviation work through a local NGO.

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Malaysia 🇲🇾

Pigs, Pandemics, and Policy

by Edrina Lisa Ozaidi, in WP Kuala Lumpur

In a multicultural Malaysia, the Chinese community have long dominated pig farming to meet domestic pork demand. Today, the industry finds itself intersected between market demands, environmental challenges and deep-rooted cultural sensitivities.

Islam is the official religion practised by the majority Malay-Muslim population, making up around 63.5% of Malaysians. In the Holy Quran, Al-Baqarah 2:173 declares pork haram (forbidden) for Muslims; avoiding pork is thus fundamentally viewed as a submission to divine command.

While non-Muslims retain the right to raise, buy and sell pigs as well as consume pork, the religious taboo has shaped public discourse, policy and zoning decisions in ways that affect the entire sector. Current political discourse maintains that issues around pig farming centre on farm management, biosecurity and environmental compliance rather than faith itself.

Amplified media coverage often isolates the issue.

Media coverage often amplifies the industry’s key problems on the grounds of pollution. Compared to other livestock, pigs produce more liquid-like wastewater, causing pipes to churn out pig waste into muddy slurry pits. In the foreground, concrete housing and defunct oil palm plantations line up the blackish river.

These are inherent critiques of pig farming, yet underlying factors — fragmented land use, urban sprawl encroaching on older farms, and inconsistent zoning — receive less attention.

Historical trauma colours much of the narrative.

From 1998 to 1999, the Nipah virus spread from fruit bats to pigs and then to humans, killing 105 people and led to the culling of nearly 40–50% of the national herd at the time.

The drastic measure contained the zoonotic disease, but severely impacted the billion-ringgit industry as a biosecurity scar.

Today, the sector faces a recurring crisis: African Swine Fever (ASF)

Since 2021, ASF has repeated the culling of tens of thousands of pigs, further eroding the supply chain and driving up pork prices, hitting consumers and small operators hardest.

The industry finds itself in a systemic trap.

Small-scale farms, often lacking secure land titles or capital, struggle to afford the shift to “closed-house systems” with advanced wastewater treatment and biosecurity measures.

Setting up even one modern closed-house building can cost around RM1 million, with full modernisation running RM15,000–30,000 per sow - a price that leaves smaller companies vulnerable to the next outbreak and/or regulatory crackdown.

Because Muslim dominant state governments hold primary authority over land zoning and licensing, some are pushing for farm centralisation or mandatory modernisation, while others grapple with proximity issues as residential areas expanding toward existing operations.

Federal efforts, also dominated by political Islam, include incentives like tax breaks for closed systems, but implementation varies and long-term supply chain planning remains fragmented.

A more integrated overhaul is needed.

Malaysia’s pork industry needs to move beyond cycles of crisis and cull.

From clearer zoning that separates farms from sensitive areas, affordable modernisation support for smaller operators, stronger biosecurity infrastructure, to transparent public communication, this is not merely an agricultural story.

A multicultural country navigating increasing religious influence in public life, the future of pig farming tests how Malaysia balances economic livelihoods, environmental sustainability, food security and social harmony.


Edrina is a communications professional with a background in international relations. She holds a degree from the University of Nottingham Malaysia and has worked across public relations and social media for organizations in the development, education, and corporate sectors. Her work focuses on crafting narratives around regional affairs and strengthening media engagement across Southeast Asia.

Indonesia 🇮🇩

The Quiet Leverage Washington Keeps Underestimating

by Hree Putri Samudra, in Jakarta

When Ambassador Do Hung Viet banged the gavel on 27 April to open the Eleventh NPT Review Conference, he walked into the worst room any chair has inherited in the treaty’s fifty-six years. New START lapsed in February and nobody bothered to replace it. Operation Epic Fury had already turned much of Iran’s nuclear estate into gravel, and a withdrawal bill was making the rounds in the Majlis. Paris, never one to read the room, had pulled eight European capitals under its “dissuasion avancée” umbrella, while Riyadh was reportedly being handed enrichment rights in exchange for staying useful. The Secretary-General opened with funeral diction, telling delegates that “arms control is dying”. In that mess, ASEAN’s leverage is not decorative. It is structural, and Washington keeps refusing to see it.

Most Western capitals are reading Vietnam’s presidency as a polite turn at the rostrum, courtesy of a Non-Aligned Movement nomination, which is exactly the misjudgement that costs final documents. With the P5 in pieces, Moscow and Beijing visibly closing ranks against the P3, and not a single P5 consultation paper on the table for the first time anyone in the secretariat can remember, the Vietnamese chair is the only person in the building still holding a working steering wheel. Hanoi’s drafters know it. They can lift paragraphs from the 2022 Chair’s draft on risk reduction and Article VI benchmarks, the ones Moscow signed off on before the Ukraine carve-out detonated the floor, and slip them back into circulation. That is text control, and text control is how these conferences are actually won.

ASEAN brings three things to that desk it routinely undersells. The SEANWFZ Treaty remains the only nuclear-weapon-free zone whose protocol the P5 has refused to sign, with the same U.S. reservations on transit and continental shelf and the same French squeamishness on negative security assurances sitting on the table since 1995, despite a 2016 P5 communiqué pledging readiness to sign “at the soonest possible time”. More importantly, the bloc delivered early, disciplined support for the TPNW, with Thailand ratifying on opening day in 2017, without tearing itself in half, a trick the New Agenda Coalition has never quite pulled off. And the Philippine ASEAN chairmanship under “Navigating Our Future, Together” gives Vietnam the political cover to operate in New York without looking exposed.

For ASEAN, the internal mess most outsiders write off as paralysis is the actual point. Jakarta still does activist disarmament, Kuala Lumpur owns the humanitarian file, and Singapore guards safeguards and IAEA technical credibility, even as it stays pointedly outside the TPNW because rules-based pragmatism has its limits when alliance partners are watching. Hanoi works the NAM nomination while keeping back channels warm in every P5 capital, Manila quietly squares EDCA basing with its non-proliferation commitments, and Bangkok keeps ASEANTOM’s plumbing from rusting. That spread is what lets the bloc talk to nuclear-armed states and abolitionists in the same breath without sounding ridiculous to either.

Even so, the ceiling deserves to be named. Phnom Penh will not let through anything Beijing finds inconvenient, and Vientiane will quietly back it up, which means coordinated ASEAN language on AUKUS Pillar I or on a Chinese arsenal moving past six hundred warheads is simply not happening. What ASEAN can do is convert that silence into currency and spend it on the SEANWFZ Protocol and on safeguards.

Naval propulsion is where that trade gets serious. The AUKUS Article 14 arrangement has handed Brasília’s PROSUB programme the template it had been waiting for, and Tehran’s delegation is reading every comma. Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur have already aired their unease in the IAEA Board through successive 2024 governors’ interventions without forcing a vote, and that restraint is exactly the raw material Vietnamese drafting can convert into language tightening Article 14 implementation without naming AUKUS, the only formulation Canberra and Beijing both swallow.

In New York, the DPRK punctuated the week by firing its seventh missile test of the year, cluster-warhead Hwasong-11s arcing east while delegates argued procedure, and Pyongyang’s empty seat is precisely why NNWS unity is hardening into something the P5 cannot wave away. ASEAN cannot move that file. It can still move three others, the P5 ratification timetable for the SEANWFZ Protocol, naval propulsion safeguards language that stops the AUKUS template from being copy-pasted, and a chair’s summary that keeps the disarmament pillar breathing if consensus dies on the floor. Two consecutive failed RevCons have already pushed NNWS unity to its highest pitch since 2003. ASEAN is not here to save the treaty, only to bank what it can before the architecture goes.


Hree is a Policy Fellow at the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network (APLN) where she leads research and policy interventions on Indo-Pacific nuclear security and AI governance. She previously served as a Research Fellow at the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) and has managed multi-country security portfolios across all 10 ASEAN member states. Her work examines the intersection of emerging technologies, strategic stability, and the evolution of regional security architectures. She specializes in institutional risk assessment and the application of open-source intelligence (OSINT) for strategic monitoring. Her current research focuses on how technological shifts such as AI and advanced verification tools reshape escalation dynamics and multilateral cooperation in a multipolar world.

Editorial Deadline 25/04/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk

Myanmar takes the stage this week, as the junta stages a pardon designed for international consumption: former President U Win Myint might have been freed, but Aung San Suu Kyi is still missing, and nothing fundamentally changed.

Meanwhile, Beijing’s hand is growing visible across the region. In Laos, a high-level delegation travels to Beijing carrying a personal letter from the president, renewing commitments on railways, energy, and natural resources. The friendship is real and valued, but so is the debt, and so is the classroom that sits half-empty while the budget bends toward repayment. In Cambodia, the strategic embrace is now institutional: a 2+2 dialogue, a 3+3 expansion already agreed, warships arriving at a moment of regional tension. Beijing is not just an investor anymore: it is a security partner, a mediator, and increasingly, a guarantor of the status quo. Thailand alone attempts to chart its own course, announcing a diplomatic vision built on independence and regional leadership. Whether that vision can survive a domestic reality shaped by the same geopolitical currents it hopes to navigate is the question its foreign minister has yet to answer.

Myanmar 🇲🇲

A Pardon Designed to Deceive

by Moe Thiri Myat

The junta made a striking move this week, as one of the country’s imprisoned leaders was released, raising an immediate question: why now? Why him?

U Win Myint was released on April 17 and returned to his family during Thingyan. The same amnesty did not free Daw Aung San Suu Kyi: her sentence was only reduced, her location remains unclear, and the UN’s response was notably restrained. Secretary-General António Guterres reiterated the need to release all those arbitrarily detained and create conditions for a political process.

The release came at a telling moment, after Min Aung Hlaing assumed the presidency through an electoral process widely condemned as unfree and exclusionary. In an effort to soften the regime’s image on the global stage, the junta offered a controlled political gesture while tightening its grip on the power transition. It gives the junta a political asset — a display of mercy at a crucial moment, seeking recognition from regional and international actors.

Why release U Win Myint, but not Daw Aung San Suu Kyi? That contrast may signal a subtle but calculated move, not a genuine political opening. As Suu Kyi’s whereabouts remain uncertain, her son, Kim Aris, is publicly still asking the regime for a “proof of life”. In that light, the release of U Win Myint can be read not as a real opening, but as a lower-risk concession: one that generates goodwill headlines while avoiding the far greater political consequences that Suu Kyi’s release would carry.

The picture becomes clearer when looking at what followed. Reports indicate that U Win Myint’s residence in Naypyidaw remains under strict surveillance, with visitors subjected to identity checks and close monitoring. Concerns also persist around Section 401 and the possibility of re-arrest, pointing to a tightly managed release. The junta appears to be offering visibility without real freedom — enough to project goodwill, but not enough to allow unrestricted political activity.

The situation calls for a strong international response. The Philippines, as ASEAN Chair in 2026, described the move only as a “constructive response,” stressing that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and all remaining political prisoners must still be released to support meaningful dialogue and the Five-Point Consensus. That response suggests regional actors are not accepting the junta’s narrative of reconciliation.

The release of U Win Myint is not a humanitarian gesture. It is a political test — whether one carefully staged pardon can help the junta gain diplomatic space, soften international pressure, and present military rule in a more acceptable form without making deeper concessions.


Moe Thiri Myat is a senior at Parami University. Majoring in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics (PPE). Interested in analyzing emerging sociopolitical situations and developments, through her work as a Myanmar correspondent at The ASEAN Frontier she aims to explore how sociopolitical developments across Southeast Asia shape and are shaped by the situation in Myanmar.

Lao PDR 🇱🇦

What China’s Embrace Really Means for Laos

by Thipphavanh Virakhom, in Vientiane

Last week, a high-level Lao delegation travelled to Beijing, carrying a personal letter from President Thongloun to Chinese President Xi Jinping. China marked 2026 as the “Year of Laos-China Friendship,” renewing commitments on railways, energy, and natural resources. It was a moment that reflected the depth of a relationship built over decades, and a timely reminder that strong partnerships are most powerful when they rest on strong foundations at home.

Laos has made real progress. Government revenues are up, inflation is easing from 24.5% a year ago to 8.5% today, and the country returned to international bond markets last year.

At the same time, debt repayments remain large, leaving limited room in the budget for the things families need most, schools, clinics, and roads. Engaging with international financial frameworks such as those offered by the IMF and the G20 could help Laos find a more sustainable path forward, one that protects essential services while honouring its commitments.

Behind the economic numbers are real children and real families. Education spending has dropped significantly over the past decade, and the effects are visible in classrooms across the country. Today, only about one in five children can read properly by grade three, and nearly 450,000 young people of secondary school age are not in school at all.

Many young people, especially from rural and indigenous communities, are leaving Laos to find work abroad, where wages can be significantly higher. Fulfilling the government’s own commitment to dedicate 18% of the national budget to education, and closing the current USD 250 million education funding gap, would send a clear message that investing in the next generation is a national priority.

Building Trust Through Good Governance. Laos is moving in the right direction. The country’s anti-corruption score has improved meaningfully over the past decade, and Laos is now recognised as one of eight Asia Pacific countries to have made significant progress since 2012. Governance reforms introduced in 2025 are beginning to take effect at the local level, which is encouraging.

Continuing this momentum matters enormously, not just symbolically, but practically. Better governance means more efficient use of every public dollar, stronger investor confidence, and broader opportunities for all Laotians.

A Seven-Month Opportunity. Laos is scheduled to graduate from Least Developed Country status in 2026, a milestone that reflects decades of hard work and development progress. It also comes with new responsibilities, as some forms of special international support will change after graduation. The next seven months are a genuine opportunity: to advance debt discussions, protect investment in education, and build the accountable institutions that people and investors alike are looking for.

The Laos-China friendship is genuine and valued. So is the relationship between the Lao government and its own people. Strengthening both begins with the same commitment , putting people first, in every budget and every plan.


Thipphavanh holds a bachelor’s degree in international affairs. She is a governance and development professional specialising in rule of law, access to justice, and gender equality in Lao PDR. Her work focuses on strengthening justice sector institutions, advancing people-centred governance, and promoting gender-responsive systems. With extensive experience in project coordination, monitoring and evaluation, stakeholder engagement, and strategic communications, she has collaborated closely with national institutions and international partners to support inclusive and sustainable development.

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Thailand 🇹🇭

Thai Diplomacy 2.0: Promise or Performance?

by Natamon Aumphin, in Bangkok

On April 20, 2026, Sihasak Phuangketkeow, the current foreign minister, reflected on the future of Thailand’s foreign policy with international and domestic media, outlining a continuity of proactive diplomatic strategy aimed at bringing Thailand back to the global stage. The plan for proactive diplomacy has been in place since 2023, when he first assumed the leading position at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). Nonetheless, doubts about the proactive role remain, as Thailand faces daily crises — mostly from geopolitical turbulence disrupting day-to-day economic activities.

Thailand was once known and praised for its flexible approach to foreign policy, dubbed bamboo diplomacy, particularly during the Cold War. That reputation shifted after the coup d’état in 2014, which sparked criticism of a loss of direction, a drift from the global agenda, and a broader regression. To revamp Thailand’s global standing and branding, Sihasak and his cabinet have sought to reposition Thailand’s leadership role in ASEAN — as it once held — through strategic proactive diplomacy. The plan was announced during his first term in late 2023. However, due to prolonged political instability, the strategy appeared intermittent. As Prime Minister Anutin consolidated his position in parliament, the MFA was able to press forward with the strategy, now dubbed Thai Diplomacy 2.0.

The new diplomacy strategy is intended as a continuation of Thai Diplomacy 1.0, seeking to balance short-term crisis management with long-term goals by prioritizing the interests of the nation and its people. The latest strategy, however, shifts focus toward regional, economic, and human security, while its predecessor addressed broader issues including the environment, green transition, and digital expansion — in alignment with ASEAN’s long-term roadmap.

Nonetheless, while the new strategy looks promising, further assessment is needed to determine whether it represents a genuine commitment to repositioning Thailand on the global stage or merely a performative one. The MFA has stated its intention to engage with civil society transparently and democratically. The reality on the ground, however, is less encouraging: authorities are tightening enforcement of the lèse-majesté law to sideline the opposition People’s Party and its reform wing; the Clean Air Bill faces the prospect of being dropped; and weakening institutions have left accountability over election transparency in limbo. Coupled with stagnant economic growth and an energy crisis, these domestic realities must be addressed before the government can credibly claim to be reemerging as a regional leader. Without that foundation, the plan risks becoming a paper tiger — ill-equipped to help the nation adapt to a rapidly shifting geopolitical environment.

Natamon has served as a rapporteur at the Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS Thailand). She has also worked as a research assistant on diplomatic issues in Southeast Asia. Her work focuses on how domestic politics shape foreign policy in the region. She holds a degree in international relations and has experience in policy analysis, event reporting, and regional research.

Cambodia 🇰🇭

Cambodia and China Hold First “2+2” Strategic Dialogue Meeting

by Chandara Samban, in Kandal

Cambodia and China have agreed to strengthen cooperation across security and development, following the first round of their new 2+2 strategic dialogue. Experts believe China is seeking to pull Cambodia further into its strategic orbit as part of its broader effort to counter U.S. influence in the region, while both sides frame the engagement as natural bilateral cooperation in line with existing agreements.

On April 22, 2026, the two countries held their inaugural 2+2 strategic dialogue, covering foreign affairs and security. The Chinese side was represented by Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Defense Minister Dong Jun; the Cambodian side by Foreign Minister Prak Sokhonn and Defense Minister Tea Seiha. Both sides welcomed the comprehensive strategic partnership established in 2023, reaffirming mutual trust and unwavering support for each other’s positions. Cambodia expressed full support for China’s Belt and Road Initiative and its four global initiatives on development, security, civilization, and governance. Both countries also agreed to expand the format to a 3+3 dialogue by adding internal security to the agenda.

Wang Yi outlined six points of agreement: mutual support for core interests, including Cambodia’s continued backing of the One-China principle; advancement of economic corridors and the Funan Techo Integrated Water Resources Management Project; deepening political and security ties, including jointly opposing so-called “color revolutions”; cooperation on combating online scams; Chinese assistance in strengthening Cambodia’s military capabilities; and mutual support on the international stage.

Seng Vanly, a Phnom Penh-based geopolitical analyst, sees the dialogue as part of a deliberate Chinese strategy to integrate Cambodia more deeply into its regional network. “From China’s perspective, Cambodia is the most reliable partner in implementing global security in the Chinese style — less concerned with human rights and more focused on maintaining state power,” he said. “This engagement is not purely humanitarian, but aimed at shaping the regional order in line with Beijing’s strategic interests.” He also noted that Wang Yi’s visits to Cambodia, Thailand, and Myanmar signal China’s growing ambition to position itself as a regional mediator on issues — from the Cambodia-Thailand border dispute to Myanmar’s internal crisis — that directly intersect with its own interests.

Regarding China’s influence on Cambodia, a recent CSIS report found that China remains Cambodia’s largest investor, with approximately 75% of Cambodians viewing Chinese influence positively. The report recommends that the United States deepen engagement with the Cambodian people to remain competitive in the region — a sign that Beijing’s political and cultural outreach is widening beyond economics. This suggests that China continues to be a key player in the eyes of some Cambodian officials, business leaders, and citizens who expect continued Chinese investment. At the same time, Beijing is expanding political and cultural cooperation, as seen in initiatives such as this strategic dialogue forum, as well as other efforts like Track II mediation initiatives on the Cambodia–Thailand border dispute.

Overall, Cambodia and China are deepening a relationship that now spans trade, diplomacy, and security. China is not only consolidating economic ties but actively expanding into internal and external security cooperation, with the goal of making the bilateral relationship more durable and strategically cohesive. The recent arrival of Chinese-provided warships in Cambodia, at a moment of heightened tensions with Thailand, underscores how quickly that cooperation is taking on tangible form.


Chandara is a freelance journalist with a focus on foreign affairs, security issues, and ASEAN affairs. He also serves as a Junior Counterterrorism Intelligence Analyst.

Editorial Deadline 25/04/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Karen Ysabelle R. David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk

It’s a dilemma faced by every young country: focus on the bright promises of the future, or look back on the struggles of the past? As Amandina Maria Helena da Silva writes, twenty-three-year-old Timor-Leste is no exception. Even as Dili now steps into the spotlight, the women survivors of the country’s decades-long struggle for independence find themselves relegated to the shadows.

Meanwhile, this week, Vietnam and the Philippines both look uneasily beyond their borders. In Vietnam, Sean Vu reports on what President Tô Lâm’s recent state visit to China reveals about Hanoi’s delicate balancing act between “an assertive Beijing and an unpredictable Washington.” Manila, too, is fretting about its security, as the fast-paced world of today brings with it a whole host of new security risks, as discussed by Glenn Vincent N. Boquilon.

As Timor-Leste grapples with its past and Vietnam and the Philippines focus on a chaotic present, Singapore, as ever, looks toward the future, writes Jennifer Tan. Faced with a slowing job market, the city-state is confronting the problem presented by artificial intelligence head-on by offering its citizens the opportunity to reskill and upskill through a government initiative.

Timor-Leste 🇹🇱

Voices Forgotten in Independence

by Amandina Maria Helena da Silva, in Dili

During the 1975–1999 conflict, in order to control the resistance of Timor-Leste, sexual violence against women and girls was widespread and perpetrated in a systematic manner in multiple locations across the country. At present, many women survivors have reached old age, facing emerging social, economic, and health difficulties, all while feeling as though they have been neglected by the state.

Despite their situation, women survivors continue fighting to gain recognition from the government or state that they are active contributors to the independence of Timor-Leste, and not only the combatants.

As documented by AJAR-TL (Asia Justice and Rights Timor-Leste), survivors continue to experience profound sadness, pain, and anger stemming from past events that have shaped their suffering up to the present, such as living with stigma and discrimination; poverty; no food; no adequate shelter; and living with severe diseases and trauma. Yet these experiences remain unrecognized by the state. For survivors, official recognition is not merely symbolic; it is essential to restoring their dignity and affirming the value of their lives.

In the context of the celebration of the International Day of the Right to Truth and Dignity of Victims, as reported by RTTL Roman ba Nasaun, survivor Rosa Belo expressed feeling unable to overcome the painful experiences of the past and that she continues to live with their enduring impact. Meanwhile, the daughter of survivor Idalina emphasized the importance of protecting and recognizing victims, acknowledging that they also made significant contributions to the struggle for independence.

Furthermore, the Director of AJAR-TL emphasized that this represents an opportunity to call upon both the public and relevant authorities to uphold the dignity of victims and to ensure that their right to adequate reparations is fully recognized and fulfilled.

However, although Timor-Leste has been independent for almost 24 years, the recognition and dignification of survivors’ voices has not been prioritized as a national concern. While survivors live in conditions of poverty, suffering from multiple illnesses, and experiencing painful deaths, the question must be asked: independence for whom?

Besides this, the Centro Nacional Chega-CNC has made an effort to develop a draft law and policy on reparations for victims. The draft is presently undergoing public consultation following its completion, and it will subsequently be submitted to the Council of Ministers for approval.

Amandina is a human rights advocate working with Asia Justice and Rights Timor-Leste on the Interim Reparation to Women Survivors project. She previously worked with UNDP Timor-Leste’s Accelerator Lab and has contributed to human rights and health initiatives through several youth and civil society organisations. Her interests lie in justice, youth empowerment, and community-based social change in Timor-Leste.

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Vietnam 🇻🇳

Is Vietnam Leaning Towards China?

by Sean Huy Vu

After his election by the National Assembly, President Tô Lâm made his first state visit to China from April 14–17. During this trip, both leaders expressed their desire to boost trade and cooperation between their countries. Vietnam hopes to export more machinery and agricultural products, while Beijing intends to increase its investment in Vietnam’s green energy and transportation infrastructure, among other initiatives.

Tô Lâm’s visit comes as Vietnam’s political elite reform the regime to more closely imitate China’s institutions. At the 3+3 strategic dialogue last month, the two countries pledged to increase cooperation in their Ministries of foreign affairs, national defense, and public security. Tô Lâm himself broke with precedent and unified both the roles of State President and Party General Secretary, just like in China.

Even among Vietnam’s domestic populace, there appears to be a shift. Social media posts (especially on TikTok), online searches, and language learning data suggest that Vietnamese attitudes towards China are becoming less hostile, according to Reuters. Nguyen Khac Giang of the Yusof-Ishak Institute explained that, “Young Vietnamese online sound less strident about China than before, but that owes more to the state’s increasingly tightening control of nationalism than to fading resentment.”

But social media algorithms and like counts can distort reality. A recent poll by ISEAS shows that over 59% of Vietnamese elites favor the United States over China in a hypothetical forced choice. In contrast, 52% of respondents across ASEAN chose China. A major source of friction between Beijing and Hanoi is the South China Sea, where Chinese vessels employ gray zone, coercive tactics against Vietnamese fishermen for the sea’s water and airspace, as well as fishing grounds. The territorial disputes resonate with the nationalism of the Vietnamese public, whose ancestors experienced centuries of conflict with China, the most recent being the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War. Another area of competition between China and Vietnam is the latter’s role as a diversified source for production and export in global supply chains, especially for the United States and its allies.

Thus, Vietnam is not aligning closer with China, but is continuing its “struggle and cooperation” approach (đấu tranh và hợp tác). Although Vietnam remains one of the United States’ major supporters, this popular sentiment cannot be easily translated into policy since Vietnam remains deeply integrated with China’s economy and maintains several territorial disputes. Any overt tilt towards Washington could result in consequences for the ruling party in Hanoi. As Gregor Polling of the Center for Strategic and International Studies notes, “In the new world ​of U.S. revisionism, keeping China at arm’s length in favour of U.S. investment or U.S. preferred standards just isn’t seen as viable anymore.”

To balance between an assertive Beijing and an unpredictable Washington, Vietnam has increasingly leveraged several of its Comprehensive Strategic Partnerships (CSP). In the midst of turmoil in the Middle East, “Hanoi has turned to Japan and South Korea for crude oil assistance and is seeking alternative jet fuel suppliers,” after China suspended exporting their refined fuel to neighbors. South Korean President Lee Jae Myung met with his Vietnamese counterpart for a four-day visit in an aim to boost economic and people-to-people ties. South Korea is already Vietnam’s largest source of foreign direct investment (FDI), at 25% of the total, equivalent to approximately US$99 billion, and the relationship is expected to grow. Should Vietnam continue to successfully diversify its relations, the need to lean towards either the United States or China will be unnecessary.


Sean is a scholar of East Asian history, culture, and international relations, with current research at Georgetown University examining working-class labor and human trafficking in the region. His broader interests include the social psychology of religion and identity politics. Sean previously taught modern Korean history at the University of California, Irvine, where he completed his B.A. in History, and later taught English in Ho Chi Minh City while studying Vietnamese language and culture. His writing has been published by UC Irvine, Johns Hopkins University, and Foreign Analysis.

Singapore 🇸🇬

Is Singapore’s Upskilling Push Actually Working?

by Jennifer Hui En Tan, in Singapore

Singapore’s job market has experienced a notable slowdown in recent years, with job postings dropping 17% and companies increasingly preferring contract roles over permanent positions due to economic uncertainty. In response, the government has intensified initiatives for citizens to upskill SkillFuture programs. Since 2024, individuals aged 40 and above received a SGD 4,000 non-expiring credit to top up their skills and pursue new career goals, a move further accelerated by the rapid rise of AI. Despite the push, an important question remains: are these initiatives delivering their intended impact?

Singapore has shown the sharpest drop in job postings in five years since March 2021, with a 4.5% dip in February 2026 and 58% of employers planning to freeze headcount. Despite the current job market having more jobs compared to pre-pandemic times, the concentration in skilled sectors made the level of entry higher for the overall population. This issue is directly linked to the overall rise of AI and digital technologies, as employers plan to utilize and upskill employees to work alongside AI. Furthermore, 30% of respondents in a NTUC survey stated that they felt anxious that AI would or could replace their jobs in the future.

SkillsFuture is an initiative by the Singaporean government to incentivize citizens to reskill and upskill by providing subsidies and credits. So far, 555,000 individuals have enrolled in a SkillsFuture-supported program, and the Career Transition Program under SkillsFuture recorded that 72% of individuals who completed the course secured employment in their new sector within six months of completion. This reflects the program’s effectiveness in lowering barriers to training and encouraging broader participation across age groups.

Steps to maintain high quality and relevant training have been initiated by SkillsFuture. By tightening course approval and renewal, this ensures that training programs are encouraged to actively invest in workforce development. Initiatives to launch a revamped portal with AI powered personalized guidance and curated recommendations for in demand skills to direct users towards pathways that align with their interested industry’s needs and long-term economic priorities.

Within Southeast Asia, similar skill development incentives have been introduced to strengthen workforce competitiveness. Indonesia has introduced the Kartu Prakerja program, a large-scale, government-funded upskilling initiative which has reached 14.3 million beneficiaries across 34 provinces. Indonesia’s program stands out as one of the region’s most extensive and well-documented national upskilling initiatives. Notably, 92% of participants selected training based on their individual needs, while 95% reported a skill improvement upon completion, suggesting a strong alignment between training provision and user-driven demand, as well as positive perceived outcomes.

Overall, while Singapore’s SkillsFuture initiative has significantly improved access to training and shows promising indicators in employability outcomes and skills acquisition, its long-term economic impact remains mixed and still evolving. The program has lowered barriers to lifelong learning and helped many individuals transition into new roles, particularly in a rapidly changing labor market shaped by AI and structural shifts. However, challenges such as uneven employer participation, varying relevance of courses, and uncertainty over measurable wage and productivity gains suggest that SkillsFuture’s effectiveness is not yet fully maximized. Moving forward, its success will depend on strengthening the alignment between training, industry demand, and tangible career outcomes, ensuring that upskilling translates more directly into sustained economic resilience and workforce competitiveness.


Jennifer is a final-year International Relations student at the Singapore Institute of Management, where she focuses on political engagement, diplomacy, and community governance. She is an active volunteer in her constituency, working closely with residents to understand local concerns, facilitate dialogue, and support community initiatives.

The Philippines 🇵🇭

Rethinking Security in a Changing World

by Glenn Vincent N. Boquilon, in Angeles City

Since the Cold War, national security has been defined and understood through military terms. Discussions were centered on armed conflict, protection from external threats, and maintaining state sovereignty. While this is still the case today, the definition has continuously evolved. Security is no longer just about borders and weapons. It now covers a wider range of risks that affect economies, the technological landscape, and other important domains of life.

However, traditional defense still plays an important role. Countries like the Philippines continue to invest in military modernization. The Armed Forces of the Philippines’ (AFP) Re-Horizon 3 is a prime example of this, as the program seeks to shell out around US$35 billion for military upgrades. They also continue to strengthen alliances with various countries that could help protect the country.

Recent escalations in the disputed territory that the Philippines calls the West Philippine Sea, including confrontations during resupply missions, show that upholding sovereignty and territorial defense are still principal concerns. As gray zone tactics are becoming more pervasive in nature, strategic engagements must also follow. At the same time, joint exercises with partners such as the United States Armed Forces under agreements highlight how alliances continue to shape security strategy.

Simultaneously, new security risks are becoming harder to predict. Economies today depend on systems that can be vulnerable to disruption. Power grids, transport networks, communication systems, and digital platforms are all critical infrastructures that can be easily manipulated in an attack. The Philippines is not new to cyber attacks, with several official government websites having been targeted in recent months. Regionally, ransomware threats in Singapore and Indonesia show how these challenges can disrupt services and affect public trust. Thus, digital vulnerability and cybersecurity are other important domains that must be considered when thinking of national security.

Adding to this, energy security is another challenge. The tensions between the United States and Iran have pushed oil prices to an all-time high. Many countries in Southeast Asia, including the Philippines, rely on imported fuel. With limited access to this essential element, disruptions have occurred across multiple industries. As a response, the Philippine government has declared a state of national energy emergency. Time and time again, geopolitical tensions entail a degree of instability across the globe.

There is also a growing focus on the need to safeguard information systems. Protecting sensitive data is pivotal to national security. As technology advances, threats are becoming more sophisticated and complex. Reports of disinformation campaigns and concerns over foreign interference during elections are a prevalent issue in Southeast Asia. These highlight how challenges in security have gone beyond physical borders and spread to digital landscapes. Ultimately, governments must pay closer attention to data protection, digital platforms, and the role of information in shaping public opinion.

Many of these challenges are shared by countries in Southeast Asia, as they work to uphold sovereignty while also dealing with economic pressures and technological risks. Regional efforts through ASEAN include cooperation on cybersecurity, disaster response, and economic resilience. While each country responds differently to threats, there is a growing understanding that security now requires coordination across borders. Knowledge management and information sharing are pivotal to regional security.

In the end, redefining security means adjusting to a more complex and ever-changing world. Defense remains important, but it is no longer enough on its own. Countries must now protect not only their borders, but also their economies, systems, and institutions. For the Philippines and the wider ASEAN region, this extensive approach is becoming ever more essential in navigating today’s security challenges.


Glenn holds a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from the University of Santo Tomas. His experience spans governance programs, policy development, and political research, having worked with the Ateneo School of Government and WR Numero Research on projects focused on electoral reform, public opinion, and regional development. He also helped coordinate the drafting of the Bangsamoro Local Government Code and supported the Academy of Multiparty Democracy.

Editorial Deadline 21/04/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Siu Tzyy Wei, Lead Editor - Maritime Crescent Desk

This week, the Maritime Crescent is bearing a weight that is too heavy to carry. In Indonesia, the law faculty of a well known university buckles under the moral burden of a sexual abuse scandal that exposes cracks in the very institution meant to uphold justice. Malaysia, long reliant on brown energy, now finds itself struggling to surmount the weight of political neglect as the search for renewable sources of energy becomes urgent and unavoidable. In Brunei, the small state shoulders the mounting responsibility as it hosts Australia’s Prime Minister Albanese in negotiating food and energy security in a world of tightening supply.

Together, these stories remind us of the weight we are carrying - institutions, systems and states lifting more than they can bear, revealing both the fragility of their foundations and the resilience demanded of them.

Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳

Wading through the Mire

by Maryam Zulaidi

For the past two months, the ongoing conflict between Iran and the United States of America has tempered the flow of vessels to and from the Strait of Hormuz, severely disrupting energy supply chains around the globe and leaving nations in the continents of Asia and Oceania to feel its adverse impacts. This uncertainty has threatened nations such as Australia to expeditiously secure essential commodities from other sovereign states away from the region of conflict as the nation is highly dependent on imported fertilisers where 69% of its urea is sourced from the Middle East.

In Australia’s efforts of shielding itself from a domestic food and energy shortage, the state is currently and actively finding alternative trading nations in place of Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatar. Southeast Asia is second to the Middle East in sourcing urea to Australia. Among the incoming 300,000t of urea shipments, only one is from the Gulf while the rest are supplied from Brunei and Indonesia. Though, Indonesia’s urea fertiliser supplies may be under threat, and as a result, it is urgently showing interest in securing food and energy agreements with neighboring nations such as Brunei, Singapore and Malaysia. Brunei represents a safe haven for Australia due to its geographical proximity as well as being the most accessible option. As of recent, the sultanate supplies 11% of Australia’s urea imports.

Last Tuesday, 14th April 2026, marked Australia’s Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s first diplomatic visit to Brunei with the purpose of potentially increasing supply of diesel and urea fertiliser following his visit to the Brunei Fertilizer Industries (BFI). The comprehensive partnership between the nation and Brunei witnessed the signing of a joint statement on energy and food security between the two countries. The statement upholds their commitment to alert each other and stay clear from any unsubstantiated import and export restrictions regarding matters related to the trade of energy and food supplies. Australia, as Brunei’s top trading partner, brings considerable economic gains to the sultanate due to its import reliance even as urea prices remain competitive on raw materials – it is understood that 6,000t of granular urea has been sold by BFI for $710/t fob.

Taken together, the partnership between Australia and Brunei indicates a sharper purpose: broader calibration of global supply chains, mainly energy and food in reaction to the present geopolitical instability. A silver lining amidst thundering grey skies, Brunei finds itself opportunities derived not only from trade, but is also positioning itself as a cornerstone partner in a world increasingly imperiled by resource uncertainty.


Maryam is a first-year International Relations and Politics student at the University of Sheffield, with an academic focus on Southeast Asia—particularly Maritime Southeast Asia—and the Middle East. She aspires to a career in diplomacy and academia and is committed to fostering international dialogue and advancing scholarly engagement with global issues. Beyond her academic work, she pursues creative interests and voluntary initiatives that broaden her perspectives on public service.

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Malaysia 🇲🇾

The Renewable Rush

by Sydney Gan, in Kuala Lumpur

As the conflict in the Middle East rages on, the looming energy crisis in Malaysia exposes an over-reliance on fossil fuels and begs the question: what are Malaysia’s choices when oil inevitably runs out?

Despite the strategic, non-partisan posturing, Malaysia is unable to escape the apparent fact that the Strait of Hormuz’s closure represents a chokehold on Malaysia’s precious oil supply - and that, as it stands, Malaysia is ill-prepared for sufficient alternatives. Malaysia’s energy sector is heavily reliant on fossil fuels, with coal and natural gas comprising over 90% of electricity generation. In an effort to introduce green energy options, the government has introduced key policy frameworks such as the National Energy Transition Roadmap (NETR), which aims at achieving net-zero emissions by 2050. On all accounts, Malaysia has an advantage in advancing the renewable energy agenda: its equatorial location provides abundant solar energy, and it has since evolved into an international hub for solar technology manufacturing. However, government policies in practice demonstrated reluctance and a lack of political will to aggressively push for renewable energy adoption, the inertia of which was successfully blown under the radar for years - until now, when the threat of an energy crisis is swiftly coming to a head.

Presently, Malaysia is considering the large-scale adoption of two renewable energy sources. The first is biofuel, for which Malaysia currently has 19 production plants that process the sludge or by-product of crude palm oil to produce alternative fuel options. Deputy Prime Minister Datuk Seri Dr Ahmad Zahid Hamidi singled out biofuel as the a viable long-term solution to reduce diesel prices, as this renewable energy source has already undergone vehicle testing. A formal proposal has been submitted to the National Economic Action Council (MTEN) to urge the upscaling of further biofuel efforts and further cross-ministerial collaborations to ensure nationwide low production costs through efficient integration.

Concurrently, the MADANI Government is also seriously considering developing nuclear energy programmes. Science, Technology and Innovation Minister YB Chang Lih Kang cautions that this lower-carbon source would be adopted merely complementarily to current existing sources, in order to ensure resilient energy over the long term. Currently, small modular reactors are being studied as part of the government’s feasibility study assessing nuclear power’s role as a stable base-load supply. Unlike its biofuel counterpart, nuclear energy is a relatively unexplored option in Malaysia and lacks well-established infrastructure. Coupled with a generalised hesitation towards adoption due to the threat of nuclear fallout, Malaysia tiptoes around this proposed alternative, caught between its necessity and its high risk of radioactivity

As Malaysia faces uncertain times ahead, renewable energy alternatives emerge not just as a ‘nice-to-have’, but as a need. It would seem that Malaysia has jumped onto the bandwagon a touch too late, but it is the subsequent policy push that will be significant to see Malaysia finally develop towards its green and sustainability goals.


Sydney holds a Bachelor of Laws from King’s College London, where she focused on Human Rights Law, Criminology, and Public & Administrative Law. She is an Analyst at Asia Group Advisors, providing policy analysis and strategic guidance across the tech, sustainability, and gaming sectors in Southeast Asia. Prior to joining AGA, she worked in the social development sector in London, contributing to the Ukraine Judicial Training Programme through research on war crimes adjudication and the development of a legal training curriculum with high court magistrates.

Indonesia 🇮🇩

When Justice Breaks, Again

by Muhammad Rayhansyah Jasin

On April 14, videos of the internal ethics forum at University of Indonesia (UI) went viral when 16 male law students were summoned over their group chat involving lewd discussions of fellow female students, staff, and lecturers. The Faculty of Law’s As the Student Executive Board (BEM) demanded public apologies, immediate expulsions and stronger campus guidelines. The faculty suspended the students’ academic status for 45 days, stipping them of positions in student organisations while internal proceedings continue

Under Indonesia’s 2022 Anti-Sexual Violence Law, non-physical harrassment, including digital abuse, is a crime. Universities in Indonesia were required to establish anti-sexual violence and prevention task Force (Satgas PPKS) in 2023; later extended under Regulation No.55/2024. Yet, the UI case shows how legal frameworks alone cannot prevent misconduct - even when perpetrators are law students aware of the gravity of their actions. Many held leadership roles, even handling past harassment cases, underscoring the hypocrisy and depth of the problem.

This case reflects the normalization of misogyny running rampant around Indonesian campuses. A resurfaced clip from Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB) showed students singing “Erika”, a anthem filled with sexist remarks and obscene lyrics; at Padjadjaran University, a lecturer allegedly coerced an exchange student for explicit images; University of Sultan Ageng Tirtayasa expelled a student caught recording in a women’s restroom. Harassment persists despite regulations, eroding trust in institutions meant to safeguard students.

The scale is alarming. Education watchdog Network for Education Watch Indonesia (JPPI) reported 233 cases of violence in educational institutions in the first 4 months of 2026, nearly half involving sexual harassment. Such figures highlight that safe spaces cannot exist only n paper. The UI case must serve as more than a wake-up call - it is evidence for a moral emergency within higher education.

Regionally, Southeast Asia faces similar challenges. The sexual trafficking industry employs up to 300,000 people working behind the sexual human-trafficking industry, while WHO estimates one in three women in ASEAN states experience violence, higher than the global average. Campuses - supposedly the safest public spaces - have become hotspots of abuse is a jarring indictment of cultural complacency.

Indonesia’s universities now stand at a crossroads. They can continue treating harassment as isolated scandals, or they can confront the entrenched culture that normalises misogyny and undermines private spaces. For policymakers, the lesson is clear: laws and task forces are not enough. Enforcement must be consistent, leadership accountable and campus culture reshaped to prioritise dignity and safety.

The UI case should not fade into another headline - it must mark the reminder of a broader reckoning - one that forces institutions to lift the weight of responsibility they have long avoided, and in proving that higher education can be a space of justice.


Rayhan is pursuing an Erasmus Mundus Joint Master’s Degree in Public Policy at Central European University and the Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals. He holds a Bachelor of Social Sciences in International Relations and Political Economy from Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University. His current research focuses on the socio-economic impacts of Indonesia’s nickel mining industry on local communities and national development.

Editorial Deadline 18/04/2025 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk

When crises arrive from outside, what matters most is what you have built within to defend yourself. This week’s issue finds the Mekong countries caught between external shocks and internal fragilities, and the distance between the two is shorter than governments would like to admit.

Cambodia is absorbing three simultaneous blows: a border conflict that sent hundreds of thousands of workers home, a fuel crisis draining foreign exchange, and a scam economy still corroding investor confidence. Each shock alone would already be tough to manage. Together, they have pushed growth projections to their lowest in years. In Laos, the numbers are looking just as uncomfortable: inflation already above target, debt constraining every policy response, and a fuel shock that hit households before the government had any cushion to soften it.

Meanwhile, In Myanmar, the revolution's closest allies are being peeled away one by one. Not by the junta, but by China's calculated pressure on the very groups that once dealt it its greatest defeats. Finally, Thailand too has been suffering the shockwaves rippling from the Middle East, but its advanced digital infrastructure allows it to do what few others can: get relief to the right people without resorting to costly blanket subsidies.

Cambodia 🇰🇭

Cambodia’s Growth Outlook Falls as Three Crises Hit at Once

by Sokna Thea, in Phnom Penh

Cambodia’s economic outlook for 2026 has been revised down sharply by major institutions. The World Bank now projects 3.9% growth, the ADB 4.5%, while the government still holds to a 5.0% target. The downgrade comes as inflation reached 5.6% in March 2026, tourism weakened, and investment confidence came under further pressure.

The first shock is the Cambodia-Thailand border conflict. The ADB estimates that the border closure alone cut Cambodia’s GDP growth by about 1.4 percentage points. Around 900,000 to 950,000 Cambodian migrant workers in Thailand returned home, and remittances dropped 37%, from USD 2.95 billion to USD 1.86 billion in 2025. Trade was also hit hard. The Poipet-Aranyaprathet crossing, which handles more than 70% of bilateral land cargo, was closed, blocking about USD 460 million per month in trade flows. Tourism suffered as well, with Angkor Wat arrivals down 34% year on year by March 2026.

The second shock is the energy crisis. Cambodia imports virtually all of its refined fuel and has no domestic refining capacity, leaving it highly exposed to global price swings. Since late February 2026, diesel prices surged by as much as 87%, regular gasoline rose 30% to 35%, and LPG increased about 70%. More than 2,000 of Cambodia’s 6,300 petrol stations were initially paralyzed, while fuel imports reached USD 606 million in January and February 2026 alone. The shock is now pushing up production costs across garments, transport, and agriculture.

The third shock is the scam economy, which continues to damage both reputation and investment. Cambodia-based scam operations are estimated at USD 12.5 billion to USD 19 billion a year. The US Treasury sanctioned 146 targets linked to the Prince Group network, and the US Department of Justice seized about USD 15 billion worth of Bitcoin tied to Chen Zhi’s network. Foreign direct investment fell 37% year on year, according to the Council for the Development of Cambodia. The decline reflects a drop from a higher 2024 baseline, though Cambodia still attracted about USD 5.2 billion in 2025, with more than 70% coming from China. An AmCham survey also found that the share of firms expecting profit declines rose from 20% to 34%.

These shocks are interconnected. The border conflict disrupted fuel supply routes, while higher energy costs added pressure across export sectors. Meanwhile, scam-related reputational damage continues to slow tourism recovery and limit investor diversification. Compared with regional peers, Cambodia’s outlook is now clearly weaker. Vietnam is projected at 7.2%, while Indonesia stands at around 5.2%.

The key question is whether this represents only a temporary slowdown or something more structural. The ADB had earlier projected 6.2% growth for 2026 before recent downgrades. The current range, from 3.9% to 4.5%, suggests Cambodia may be moving into a lower growth path if the Middle East conflict remains unstable and border and scam-related risks continue to weigh on the economy.


Sokna has a background in International Affairs and Business & Commercial Law. He’s currently a Senior Project Coordinator at the Ministry of Economy and Finance of Cambodia, working on the Financial Management Information System (FMIS) Project. His professional focus is driven by entrepreneurship, business development, and financial technology, with a particular interest in how private-sector innovation drives Cambodia’s economic growth.

Lao PDR 🇱🇦

Lao New Year Relief as Rising Costs Strain Daily Life in Laos

by Thongsavanh Souvannasane, in Vientiane

Rising living costs continue to affect households nationwide, with the impact most pronounced in the capital Vientiane, where prices of food, transport, and basic services are rising steadily.

Over the past year, inflation has been driven mainly by higher fuel costs, currency pressure, and reliance on imports, steadily reducing purchasing power. For many residents, daily expenses now take up a larger share of income, leaving less room for savings or non-essential spending.

A typical urban daily budget reflects this pressure.

Meals that once cost around 15,000 to 20,000 kip (USD 0.68 to 0.90) now often exceed 35,000-60,000 kip (USD 1.5 to 2.7), while transport costs have risen alongside fuel prices. Higher fuel costs have also pushed up logistics expenses, feeding into broader increases in goods and services.

Recent projections by the Asian Development Bank show that economic growth in Laos is expected to slow to around 4.0% in 2026, down from 4.4% in 2025, before a slight recovery to 4.5% in 2027.

Inflation, after easing to 7.7% in 2025, is projected to rise again to around 9.8% in 2026. In the first quarter of 2026, it already stood at around 7%, remaining above the government’s target of keeping inflation below 6% over the next five-year term.

Fuel prices remain a key driver of rising costs.

Following escalation in the Middle East, diesel prices in Laos surged sharply from around 19,970 kip (USD 0.9) per liter in late February to over 50,000 kip (USD 2.26) by mid-April 2026, an increase of more than 150%. As Laos relies heavily on imported fuel, global price shocks quickly translate into domestic inflation.

At the same time, structural challenges persist.

Public and publicly guaranteed debt is estimated at around 82% of GDP, limiting fiscal space and constraining policy responses. External risks, limited foreign exchange buffers, and banking sector pressures continue to weigh on the economic outlook.

Despite gradual stabilization supported by exports, tourism recovery, and infrastructure development, these gains have yet to fully ease household-level pressures.

As a result, many people are adjusting their spending habits, eating at home more often, reducing non-essential purchases, and prioritizing basic needs.

Compared to neighboring Thailand, where higher wages and more diversified supply chains provide greater resilience, consumers in Laos remain more exposed to external shocks.

Despite these challenges, mid-April brings brief relief as Laos celebrates Lao New Year (Pi Mai Lao) from around 13 to 16 April. The traditional water festival is marked by water splashing, religious ceremonies, and family gatherings.

While it does not change economic realities, it offers a short pause from financial pressures and a moment of collective relief.


Thongsavanh is a journalist from Laos with a background in English-language media. He graduated from the Lao-American Institute with a Diploma of the Arts in English and contributes to independent news platforms. His reporting focuses on environmental issues, socio-economic development, and geopolitics.

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Myanmar 🇲🇲

Myanmar’s Neighbors Prioritize Self-interests Over Morality

by Mozart

Amid international neglect of Myanmar’s political crisis, its neighbors are increasingly prioritizing their own interests by engaging with the junta and supporting its plans to suppress dissent, ignoring the will and suffering of the Myanmar people. In fact, the junta’s actions are largely dictated by the political calculations of neighboring states, particularly China.

On the third day of the Thingyan festival, April 15, 2026, the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) issued a statement formally congratulating junta leader Min Aung Hlaing on becoming Myanmar’s president, indicating its hope to collaborate with his leadership on peace negotiations through political means. The statement frustrated many during the Thingyan break, as a group once considered an enemy of the junta appeared poised to become its partner under pressure from a neighboring country.

The TNLA is one of the three members, alongside the Arakan Army and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), of the Brotherhood Alliance, which launched the highly successful Operation 1027 in late 2023, severely weakening the junta by seizing towns, military bases, and key trade routes. However, China-brokered ceasefires had already strained the alliance by early 2026: the MNDAA began handing back control of Lashio to the junta in April 2025, and the TNLA agreed to return Mogok in October 2025. China holds significant influence over both groups, and its facilitated peace process leaves little room for dissent from either party. The episode reveals, with some irony, that durable peace in Myanmar may be impossible without Chinese involvement — and that such involvement comes on Beijing’s terms alone.

These groups had repeatedly pledged solidarity with the people of Myanmar. That position has now reversed — not due to internal conviction, but external pressure. The junta’s heavy reliance on China for surveillance infrastructure, combined with Beijing’s leverage over regional armed forces, illustrates a realist politics that places strategic interest firmly above political morality. China needs Myanmar stable enough to advance its economic agenda, including Belt and Road Initiative projects such as the Kyaukphyu Deep Sea Port and cross-border pipelines. Beyond Shan State, China is also pressing the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) to enter negotiations with the junta to stabilize the broader region.

China is not the only enabler of the regime’s survival — but it is arguably the most significant. Other neighbors have adopted similarly realist stances. Thailand’s dependence on Myanmar’s natural gas, and its desire to limit refugee and migration flows, have led Bangkok to continue engaging with the military leadership, often bypassing ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus. India’s Act East policy and its competition with China have led New Delhi to maintain ties with the junta in order to protect infrastructure projects such as the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project and to manage instability along its border.

Together, these regional dynamics have created what might be called a buffer of indifference — one that shields the junta from full international isolation. While Western sanctions bite, Myanmar’s neighbors provide the economic lifelines and diplomatic cover the regime needs to endure. By facilitating a sham electoral process in late 2025 and early 2026, these states are not seeking a democratic solution, but a manageable one that protects their investments. The Myanmar people find themselves fighting not only a domestic military dictatorship, but a regional geopolitical order that treats their suffering as secondary to trade and security.


Mozart is a research assistant at Mosaic Myanmar and is currently pursuing a Bachelor of Arts in Liberal Arts and Sciences at Parami University. His academic and professional interests span community development, minority issues, and social impact research. He has held roles including service-learning intern, student mentor, and operations coordinator for local initiatives, supporting project management, monitoring and evaluation, and education programs in Myanmar.

Thailand 🇹🇭

Thailand's Digital Edge in an Analog Crisis

by Satid Sootipunya, in Bangkok

The status of the Strait of Hormuz remains uncertain. The Iranian government announced on Friday that it would be ‘completely opened’ during a 10-day ceasefire, signaling relief to countries across the world, including Thailand; however, the waterway was shut once again on Saturday.

The sense of uncertainty directly affects the movement of assets worldwide, including energy prices. Experts said that even though the war ends today, the impact of developments in the Middle East on global energy prices – especially Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) – would still persist due to attacks on energy infrastructure in the region. For example, LNG infrastructure in Qatar’s Ras Laffan Industrial City, a major exporter to many nations including Thailand, has been severely affected.

As such, the world will face persistently elevated energy prices for an extended period since it potentially takes 3-5 years for those infrastructures to resume operation, according to an expert.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF), in its latest Economic Outlook in April 2026, suggested that governments should implement targeted subsidies on energy prices instead of broad-based measures, given limited fiscal space in many countries.

For example, Thailand is experiencing prolonged fiscal deficits of 3–4% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), meaning that allocating public funds to untargeted energy subsidies would further strain its already-stretched public finances.

Krishna Srinivasan, Director of the Asia and Pacific Department (APD) at the IMF, said during the launch of the Asia Pacific Economic Outlook that the Thai economy is highly exposed to developments in the Middle East due to its heavy reliance on oil and LNG imports through the Strait of Hormuz, accounting for 8–10% of GDP. Given Thailand’s relatively high public debt of 65–66% of GDP, targeted subsidies are recommended.

“Thailand’s debt is on the higher side,” Krishna said, adding, “make sure that you use your fiscal resources wisely.”

Ekniti Nitithanprapas, Deputy Prime Minister of Thailand and Minister of Finance, said during the session “Governor Talks: Thailand – Navigating Macroeconomic Stability and Growth in a Turbulent World,” that although the Thai economy is relatively vulnerable in this oil price crisis, one area where Thailand can perform well is in implementing targeted subsidies for vulnerable individuals.

Ekniti said Thailand’s digital infrastructure is among the most advanced in the region, allowing individuals to transfer money instantly between banks without transaction fees through the government-backed PromptPay system, using only telephone or 13-digit identification numbers. Through the registration system in the digital platform, it enables the government to identify vulnerable groups and deliver relief measures directly.

“Currently, we are developing a [digital] oil and Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) wallet to mitigate the impacts of the war on Thai people as well,” said Ekniti, adding that “we need to target only households severely affected by the war. We cannot implement broad-based measures because our fiscal space is limited.”

On 27 March 2026, the Thai administration announced several relief packages for 5 vulnerable groups directly affected by the spike of energy prices, including low-income households, public transportation drivers, farmers in the agricultural sector, fishermen, as well as SMEs and government contractors.


Satid is a multimedia economic journalist and news anchor who covers macroeconomic trends, Thailand’s fiscal policy, and key regional developments for Bangkok Biz. A Journalism graduate from Thammasat University, he has reported on major issues such as the US–China trade tensions, the Myanmar crisis, and global corporate stories, drawing on prior newsroom experience at The Momentum, the Bangkok Post, AFP, and Varasarn Press. His work blends economic analysis, foreign affairs, and digital storytelling, with a strong focus on making complex financial and political topics accessible to Thai audiences.

Editorial Deadline 18/04/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Karen Ysabelle R. David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk

Twenty-three years after gaining independence, all eyes are on Timor-Leste, ASEAN’s newest member state. As the country takes its place on the world stage with its memberships in ASEAN and the World Trade Organization, correspondent Ricardo Valente highlights the challenges, pressures, and risks that inevitably come with a country’s growing pains. Is Dili ready for the spotlight?

Not that the older countries of the Pacific Corridor are safe from their own challenges. In Vietnam, Hang Nguyen reports on the persistent problem of brain drain, as highly skilled Vietnamese professionals are lured away by better prospects abroad. Writing from Singapore, correspondent Ryan writes about the city-state’s increasingly selective graduate job market, meaning that while Singaporean fresh graduates look inward, their prospects may also be far and few in between. And in the Philippines, the national energy emergency resulting from the war in Iran is becoming progressively more intertwined with what Eduardo G. Fajermo Jr. calls “an already volatile political season” in Manila.

Timor-Leste 🇹🇱

Ready for Regional and Global Economic Opportunity — But at What Cost?

by Ricardo Valente, in Dili

As Timor-Leste prepares to deepen its integration into the regional and global economy — including its admission to ASEAN and membership in the World Trade Organization — the country is also entering a new phase of economic opportunity. These milestones are expected to expand trade, attract foreign investment, and position Timor-Leste more firmly within regional markets.

At the national level, this direction has been recently reinforced through engagement between the Government and the CCI-TL (Chamber of Commerce of Timor-Leste), where attracting foreign investment has been identified as a key priority.

However, analysts suggest that integration also brings new pressures.

A Lowy Institute analysis highlighted concerns that Timor-Leste’s entry into ASEAN comes with significant institutional demands, including the ability to participate in complex regional processes and manage a high volume of agreements. For a country with limited administrative capacity, this transition may present practical challenges in implementation and coordination.

At the same time, concerns raised by La’o Hamutuk highlight potential economic risks. The organization has warned that deeper integration, particularly through free trade arrangements, may expose Timor-Leste’s small and underdeveloped economy to stronger regional competition, raising questions about the readiness of local industries to compete.

These broader concerns intersect with recent developments in the country’s investment landscape.

Reporting by The Guardian has drawn attention to a proposed resort project in Timor-Leste linked to individuals allegedly associated with a regional online scam network. While no wrongdoing has been established within the country, the case has raised questions about how foreign investment is assessed and the extent to which risks are scrutinized.

In response, President José Ramos-Horta stated that the allegations remain unverified and reaffirmed Timor-Leste’s openness to foreign investors, noting that action would be taken if credible evidence emerges.

A separate case reflects another dimension of the challenge. The long-delayed Pelican Paradise Resort project, once promoted as a strategic tourism investment, is now being considered for cancellation after years of limited progress.

Taken together, these developments point to a broader issue: as Timor-Leste opens its economy, the question is not only how to attract investment, but how to ensure it is credible, well-managed, and effectively implemented.

ASEAN and WTO integration is likely to reshape expectations around how investment is managed, increasing pressure on accountability, delivery, and sustainability. Deeper integration brings opportunity, but also closer scrutiny.

These challenges are not unique to Timor-Leste, as they are also faced by many emerging economies. However, as the country steps onto a larger economic stage, its ability to manage this balance will be critical.

The promise of investment is clear. The question that remains is whether the systems to support it are ready.


Ricardo is a media and communication practitioner and International Relations graduate based in Dili, Timor-Leste. He is the founder of Gen-Z Talk Timor-Leste, a youth-led digital platform dedicated to civic engagement and public dialogue. His work focuses on amplifying young voices, promoting social awareness, and contributing to conversations on society, politics, economy, governance, digital rights, and security.

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Vietnam 🇻🇳

Vietnam’s Brain Gain

by Hang Nguyen, in Ho Chi Minh City

Vietnam has undergone three major main waves of brain drain: the post-Vietnam War refugee crisis of the 1970s–1980s, the Đổi Mới economic reforms’ transition period, and the twenty-first century surge of self-financed Vietnamese international students studying abroad. Young individuals are attracted by greater earning potential, welfare programs, and infrastructure in Western countries, leaving behind the lower wages, heavy pollution, and lacking social welfare of Vietnam. The whittling number of domestic talents strains national economic growth, especially in innovative industries such as STEM, healthcare and medicine, academia, and finance, among many others.

To circumvent this rising concern, the Vietnamese government has rolled out multiple initiatives over the years. On 3 April, Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh signed Decision No. 530/QD-TTg, approving a national program to attract foreign experts and overseas Vietnamese scholars to Vietnam. This plan targets an increase of 500 academic experts for full-time leadership positions in universities and vocational training institutions, with a further 1,500 headcount in academic, research, or collaborative placements by 2035. Most significantly, at least 30 outstanding foreign experts will be recruited by the government to innovate and lead spearhead projects in education, training, scientific research, and technology transfer. This effort is a strategic developmental agenda aimed to achieve the goals in Vietnam 2035: Towards Prosperity, Creativity, Equity and Democracy.

Future reforms will address previous challenges deterring foreign or foreign-trained talent. Quality-of-life considerations, such as environmental pollution, air quality, limited social welfare systems, and disparities in public services, have heavily influenced the decision-making of experts and overseas Vietnamese skilled workers. Additionally, administrative paperwork and legal procedures — lengthy visa processes, work permit requirements, and tax regulations — can create significant obstacles and discourage potential candidates. The wage gap between Vietnam and developed economies remains substantial, while domestic industries in high-technology and scientific research are still in a developing phase. Self-financed Vietnamese international students and overseas professionals lack the incentive to return to the country, where opportunities and welfare are comparatively less appealing.

Further reforms will focus on financial mechanisms and institutional autonomy, allowing public institutions greater flexibility in resource allocation and performance-based remuneration. Administrative procedures will be streamlined, including work permits, visas, and residency processes. With the further introduction of supportive policies on housing, living conditions, and essential public services, experts and their families will experience a smoother process settling down in Vietnam.

Ultimately, the emigration of highly-skilled professionals is not a phenomenon unique to Vietnam; it is also a problem for Southeast Asian neighbors Malaysia and Indonesia. This shared concern presents an opportunity for regional cooperation in developing policies that both attract global expertise and encourage the return of overseas talent. In order for Southeast Asia’s economic landscape and innovation ecosystems to catch up with the rest of the world, higher education is an utmost priority.


Hang is a young researcher with academic experience in Vietnam and the United States. She has previously worked in public relations at the U.S. Consulate General in Ho Chi Minh City and the YSEALI Academy. Her research focuses on ASEAN centrality in the evolving Asia-Pacific landscape, with particular attention to Vietnam’s approach to trade, regional cooperation, and political economy in the face of external power dynamics and global volatility.

Singapore 🇸🇬

Fresh Graduates, Uneven Prospects

by Ryan

Singapore’s graduate job market is becoming more selective, and the latest data shows that the strain is not being felt evenly. Fresh graduates from private education institutions offering bachelor’s-level external degree programs saw just 46.9% enter full-time permanent work in the 2024/2025 survey, while median monthly pay for those who did remained flat at SGD3,500. Even graduates from Singapore’s six autonomous universities faced softer conditions: 74.4% secured full-time permanent roles in 2025, down from the previous year, although their median monthly salary held at SGD4,500. In other words, the market has cooled for everyone, but the gap between autonomous and private pathways remains wide.

That divide matters because it reflects more than just salary differences. Singapore’s autonomous universities still carry a stronger labor-market signal: they are publicly funded, more selective, and generally more integrated with employers through internships, structured career services, and established alumni networks. In contrast, the private education landscape is more varied. SkillsFuture Singapore’s survey covers 26 private institutions and focuses specifically on full-time external degree programs, which already makes the category more heterogeneous than the autonomous university system. That said, the private track is not uniformly weak. Health sciences graduates from private institutions posted a 76.5% full-time permanent employment rate and a median salary of SGD3,935, showing that outcomes improve when courses are tightly linked to clear industry demand.

The bigger story is that Singapore’s graduate market is not collapsing. It is tightening. The Ministry of Education has said that the post-pandemic hiring surge of 2022 and 2023 was always likely to normalize, and that vacancies have moderated as firms adopt a more cautious stance amid economic and geopolitical uncertainty. That explanation is important. Singapore’s graduates are still entering one of the region’s most formalized labor markets, but in a slower cycle, employers appear to be rewarding brand recognition, job readiness, and course relevance more aggressively. This helps explain why the autonomous–private divide becomes more visible precisely when hiring slows.

Compared with the rest of ASEAN, Singapore’s challenge looks less like a jobs crisis and more like a sorting mechanism. In Malaysia, the graduate unemployment rate fell to 3.2% in 2024, but skill-related underemployment remained substantial, suggesting that many degree holders are still working below their qualifications. In Indonesia, youth unemployment for those aged 15 to 24 stood at 16.9% in August 2025. In the Philippines, official data for December 2025 showed a youth employment rate of 87.8%, implying youth unemployment of about 12.2%. In Vietnam, youth unemployment was 8.2% in the second quarter of 2025. The World Bank has warned that across East Asia and the Pacific, many workers are moving not into high-productivity manufacturing, but into lower-productivity and often informal services, while employers still struggle to find technical and digital skills.

That is what makes Singapore’s data so revealing. The country still offers stronger graduate outcomes than much of Southeast Asia, but its internal hierarchy is becoming harder to ignore. A degree alone is no longer enough. What increasingly matters is where it comes from, how closely it maps to labor market demand, and whether graduates leave school with skills that employers can use immediately. For Singapore, the policy challenge is not only to preserve graduate employment, but to narrow the quality gap between institutions. For ASEAN, the lesson is broader: expanding higher education is the easy part. Building a labor market that can absorb graduates into productive, well-matched jobs is much harder.


Ryan is a final-year finance student at the Singapore University of Social Sciences (SUSS) with experience across venture capital, venture debt, and business development. He also holds a diploma in Law and Management from Temasek Polytechnic. His interests lie in how emerging technologies and economic trends shape business ecosystems and regional development in Asia.

The Philippines 🇵🇭

Oil Shock, Trust Shock: Why the Philippines’ Energy Emergency Is Becoming a Governance Test

by Eduardo G. Fajermo Jr., in Angeles City

A conflict thousands of kilometers away is now shaping daily life in the Philippines in ways that go beyond price boards at gasoline stations. As the Iran war pushes oil markets into a new round of volatility, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. has framed the moment as a national energy emergency, while Filipinos brace for higher transport and food costs and ask a harder question: will the government’s response feel competent, fair, and timely?

That question matters because the energy crunch is colliding with a wider crisis of confidence. Pulse Asia noted that corruption sits at the center of how Filipinos assess leadership, with fighting against corruption cited as the leading reason for trusting Marcos among those who trust him, while broader survey context shows impeachment developments and governance controversies shaping the political atmosphere. When a shock hits, trust becomes a multiplier: it can buy time for policy to work, or accelerate public impatience when relief appears uneven.

The Straits Times captured that tension through the story of a 72-year-old jeepney driver who broke down in tears after missing documentation requirements tied to a PHP5,000 fuel subsidy rollout, at a moment when he feared for his livelihood. The narrative resonated because it was not only about hardship. It was about eligibility rules, administrative friction, and whether state assistance reaches the most exposed sectors fast enough to matter.

Economic pain is also visibly forcing a recalibration of how government and schools operate. The Commission on Higher Education allowed higher education institutions to shift, if necessary, to up to 100% online delivery as a temporary arrangement during the national energy emergency, citing energy conservation pressures.

Work arrangements across the bureaucracy are being reshaped too. Malacañang temporarily moved toward a four-day work week for offices under the executive branch and a directive to cut electricity and fuel consumption by 10% to 20%. What might look like a technical adjustment carries political meaning: when the state itself scales back physical operations to conserve fuel, it signals the depth of the disruption, and invites scrutiny over preparedness.

Pulse Asia’s March 2026 media release also situates the energy crunch within an already volatile political season, noting parallel developments such as impeachment proceedings and high-salience governance controversies that heighten polarization and public judgment. In such an environment, an energy crisis is not simply “external.” It becomes domestic the moment citizens experience unequal access to relief, inconsistent enforcement, or unclear communication.

The crisis is also affecting the Philippines’ regional posture. As ASEAN chair this 2026, the country is moving hundreds of preparatory meetings online to cut costs, with Marcos planning to press ASEAN partners to focus on energy and food security at upcoming summits. This is an ASEAN lens worth noting: domestic price shocks can reorder regional agendas, pushing maritime and security flashpoints into the background as governments prioritize the immediate economics of stability.

The energy emergency is becoming a referendum on state capacity and political legitimacy at the same time. If relief feels accessible and rules feel humane, the government may regain space to govern through a turbulent second half of the term. If relief feels exclusionary or slow, the oil shock may harden the public’s broader doubts about leadership, deepening a crisis of trust that cannot be solved by subsidies alone.


Eduardo is a faculty member at Holy Angel University, where he teaches courses on Philippine history and contemporary global issues. He is currently pursuing a Master’s degree in Political Science at the University of Santo Tomas, with a research focus on disaster governance, environmental politics, and the urban poor in the Philippines.

Editorial Deadline 14/04/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Siu Tzyy Wei, Lead Editor - Maritime Crescent Desk

This week at the Maritime Crescent is all about appearances and the politics behind them.

Amidst the ongoing oil crisis, Brunei, Indonesia and Malaysia join hands in launching SEAFA, a trilateral fertiliser alliance designed to shield the region from global supply shocks. With Brunei becoming the host of the secretariat, Wira Gregory looks into the Sultanate’s role as the secretariat host and its evolving identity as a quiet architect of resilience, a role that may move far beyond the stretches of hard power.

As Malaysia sails again with the second Global Sumud Flotilla, Muhammad Aiman explores the weight of moral solidarity that it now carries as a growing stakeholder across contested waters. Beyond humanitarian aid, can the nation-wide support for a flotilla of symbols and intentions truly shift the tides of justice?

In Indonesia, society meets with Koperasi Merah Putih, a state initiative that promises transformation but inevitably returns to old familiarity. Beneath the banners of progress, Rayhan Prabu explores whether the program risks becoming a monument of appearances rather than a vessel for much needed change.

At face value, these stories unravel a tapestry of gestures - alliances built, flotillas launched and cooperation unveiled - revealing how the three nations navigate the delicate balance between image and intent.

Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳

SEAFA and the Sovereignty of Food Security

by Wira Gregory Ejau, in Bandar Seri Begawan

As the Strait of Hormuz remains in limbo following the outbreak of the US-Israeli war on Iran in late February, effectively disrupting approximately one-third of global seaborne fertiliser trade, Brunei, Malaysia and Indonesia have launched the Southeast Asia Fertiliser Association (SEAFA) on 6 April. Established by Pupuk Indonesia, Petronas Chemicals Group, and Brunei Fertiliser Industries, SEAFA presents as one of the more strategically consequential multilateral moves in recent ASEAN memory.

Prior to the crisis in the Middle East, the Strait of Hormuz served as a corridor through which roughly one-third of globally traded fertiliser normally transits. In a period when diplomatic posturing is critical, many governments have kept their cards to themselves, making it difficult to gauge domestic preparedness for shocks. Urea and ammonia have become commodities with volatile availability, with the spring planting season across the Northern Hemisphere having collided with an agricultural input crisis. Urea and ammonia have become commodities of volatile availability, colliding with the Northern Hemisphere’s spring planting season. Unlike oil, fertiliser markets lack internationally coordinated strategic reserves; the machinery for crisis response simply does not exist at the institutional level.

That being said, Brunei, Indonesia and Malaysia occupy a position of rare strategic complementarity. Indonesia and Brunei possess domestic fertiliser production capacity that exceeds national requirements, while Malaysia remains a net importer, exposed precisely where the others are insulated. Together, they span both sides of the energy-fertiliser nexus, which is the chain by which liquefied natural gas (LNG) is converted into nitrogen fertiliser. In turn, this underwrites crop yields across the region. Crucially, both Indonesia and Malaysia are also significant LNG exporters. This carries the capability for all three nations to sit astride the input-output chain that runs from Gulf gas fields to Southeast Asian farms, with potential leverage at both ends.

SEAFA is a hedge against the logic that regional blocs dependent on external chokepoints for agricultural inputs effectively outsource their sovereignty. While it would be premature to assume that an industry association may function as a treaty mechanism, its founding represents the difference between building structural resilience and managing crisis optics after the fact. If SEAFA evolves as intended, with a strong focus on expanding membership, coordinating LNG-linked production inputs, and developing a collective voice in international agri-commodity governance, it could represent the trio’s first serious attempt to convert resource complementarity into collective strategic leverage.

For a small state whose strategic footprint is significantly measured, Brunei’s role as secretariat host for the institutional architecture of a regional body is multilateral statecraft that extends its presence and confers legitimacy at a cost structure that hard power cannot match. The question SEAFA ultimately poses to the region is whether ASEAN is prepared to treat food security as the structural geopolitical issue it has now demonstrably become.


Gregory is an MSc candidate in Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He works as a freelance writer specializing in international history, conflict, and counterterrorism, with experience in academia, investigative journalism, and voluntary uniformed service. He currently provides research assistance with the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) under their Southeast Asian Security and Defence Internship Programme and conducts investigations on regional security and transnational crime for a confidential company.

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Malaysia 🇲🇾

Malaysia’s Flotilla Diplomacy

by Muhammad Aiman Bin Roszaimi, in Cyberjaya

Malaysia’s participation in the Global Sumud Flotilla 2.0 (GSF 2.0) reflects more than a humanitarian gesture, it is a convergence of public sentiment and state-level diplomacy. As the Gaza crisis continues to shape global discourse, Malaysia involvement offers insight into how middle powers navigate moral politics and international constraints.

At its core, the GSF 2.0 is a transnational, civilian-led movement aimed at delivering humanitarian aid to Gaza through maritime routes. Drawing participants from over 70 countries, it aoperates as a non-violent grassroots movement grounded in global solidarity with Palestinians.

At the societal level, Malaysia’s ivil society organisations, humanitarian NGOs and grassroots movements have played a central role in mobilising participation. Malaysian contingents in earlier flotilla missions included doctors, journalists, and activists, the humanitarian nature of the mission more than the political nature of the crisis it serves.

Three key factors drive this mobilisation.

First, there is a strong moral and religious dimension, where solidarity with Palestine is framed within the global Muslim community as a humanitarian obligation transcending borders. Second, the flotilla is a movement that visibly thrives on active participative, encouraging Malaysians to move beyond symbolic protests into direct action. Third, it reflects a broader Global South solidarity narrative, positioning Malaysia alongside other developing nations advocating for justice in international affairs.

That being said, the flotilla remains a political symbol. Its focus on aid delivery ultimately highlights the political blockade of Gaza, a plight perceived by the global audience as systemic injustice.

Malaysian government response has evolved from rhetorical support to more active engagement. On January 2026, Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim confirmed that Malaysia will be directly involved in Global Sumud 2.0, alongside more than 80 countries.

This shift signals an important transition for Malaysia. From being an observer, the nation is now an active stakeholder in the humanitarian crisis. The government frames its involvement as part of a broader “moral struggle” to uphold humanitarian principles and justice irrespective of borders, race, or religion. At the same time, Putrajaya has taken a firm diplomatic stance when previous flotilla missions were intercepted. Malaysia condemned such actions as violations of international law and demanded the immediate release of detained activists, including its own citizens.

However, the government position also reflects a careful balancing act. While supporting GSF 2.0, Malaysia continues to rely on diplomatic channels to engage with international partners in amplifying Palestinian concerns.Ultimately, Malaysia involvement in GSF 2.0 sits at the intersection of normative foreign policy and strategic signalling. Domestically, it reinforces the government’s alignment with public sentiment. Internationally, it positions Malaysia as an advocate for humanitarian justice within the Global South.

Yet, the same concerns echoes. Previous flotilla missions were intercepted before reaching Gaza, underscoring the constraints faced by non-state humanitarian initiatives in contested geopolitical spaces.

In this sense, Malaysia’s participation is less about immediate material impact and more about shaping narratives where it is asserting that even middle powers and civil societies can challenge the status quo, if only symbolically.


Aiman is a PhD candidate in Security and Strategic Analysis at the National University of Malaysia. His research focuses on Malaysia’s space policy, ASEAN regional security, and the strategic implications of emerging technologies. His work explores how Malaysia’s defense policy and strategic culture shape its approach to outer space.

Indonesia 🇮🇩

Red, White, and The Price of Appearances

by Rayhan Prabu Kusumo, in Jakarta

The Indonesian government is now accepting applications for a new batch of Sarjana Penggerak Pembangunan Indonesia—a go-to-scheme designed to accelerate college graduates into leadership roles of the Prabowo’s administration flagship programs. This time, they are being deployed to run village-level cooperatives under Koperasi Merah Putih.

For fresh graduates entering one of Southeast Asia’s tightest job markets, the offer looks tempting: a title, a salary, a sense of national purpose, and perhaps most meaningfully, a formal employment status. Yet behind the promise is a program that is expensive, poorly structured, and in a particularly cruel twist, potentially harmful for the very people it claims to help.

Koperasi Merah Putih was pitched by the Prabowo administration as a grassroots economic intervention to establish cooperatives across Indonesia’s roughly 80,000 villages. Each cooperative would build on what a village already produces or does well—deepening its value chain, connecting it to broader markets, turning a local advantage into something more durable. Done right, it could have been Indonesia’s version of China’s Township and Village Enterprises: state-facilitated, locally rooted, and oriented toward real productive activity.

Instead, most cooperatives have become just a little more than glorified retail cooperatives, selling basic goods in communities already saturated with small traders doing exactly that. In Indonesia, MSMEs account for 99% of businesses and 97% of employment, with retail and trade dominating the sector. By injecting state-backed cooperatives into the same space, the government is competing with the economy ordinary Indonesians already built to survive.

And it is doing so at enormous cost. With each cooperative requiring at least Rp3 billion to stand up, the program’s price tag runs to a minimum of Rp240 trillion (~USD 14.1 billion). Such a figure is likely conservative, given that the program has already drawn on public funds well beyond its designated budget lines. To put that in context, the Free School Meal program—the administration’s premier flagship program and the most expensive social program in Indonesian history at Rp335 trillion a year (~USD 19.7 billion)—is running simultaneously. The economic case for either spending commitment has never been convincingly made, let alone both at once.

The ingredients for genuine transformation were all there—nationwide reach, significant funding, and a structure capable of catalysing industrial development. Instead, the government used all of them to build grocery stores. A program with the scale and state backing to meaningfully move the needle on Indonesia’s long-stalled structural transformation was handed a mandate it was more than capable of fulfilling. What it chose to do with that mandate was to walk down the path of familiarity again.

Indonesia does not need another player in the trade space. It needs industrial development and an economy that can actually absorb the graduates it keeps producing. Koperasi Merah Putih, as it stands, offers none of that, only the appearance of trying. And it is a spectacularly expensive appearance to keep up.


Rayhan has a background in government affairs and public policy, with experience across government institutions and advisory firms. His work focuses on the intersection of geopolitics, policy, and risk, with expertise in advocacy, regulatory analysis, and stakeholder engagement. He holds a degree in Government from Universitas Padjadjaran, and has completed an exchange at Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Spain, focusing on global politics and sustainability.

Editorial Deadline 11/04/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Tony, in Bangkok

A new year begins across mainland Southeast Asia, but familiar challenges persist. Laos faces the annual return of transboundary haze, with regional agricultural burning once again pushing air quality to hazardous levels and highlighting the limits of national solutions to a cross-border crisis. Meanwhile, in Myanmar, a lawsuit against Telenor over alleged data sharing with the military underscores ongoing concerns over corporate accountability and digital rights following the 2021 coup. In Thailand, a fragile US Iran ceasefire offers only temporary relief, as energy insecurity and reactive policies expose deeper structural vulnerabilities during Songkran.

Lao PDR 🇱🇦

Laos and the Mekong Burning Season. Why Does the Air Pollution Problem Keep Coming Back?

by Thipphavanh Virakhom, in Vientiane

Burn bans return each January. The smoke returns each March. And the cycle begins again, not because no one cares, but because the problem runs deeper than any single policy can reach.

These previous weeks, Vientiane’s air crossed into hazardous territory. But the smoke did not start here. Prevailing westerly winds carry haze from burning fields in Myanmar’s uplands into northern Thailand and Laos. Agricultural fires in Vietnam and Yunnan, China add to the drift. What any one community inhales in March is, in large part, the accumulated output of an entire sub-region. Chiang Mai, just across the Thai border, ranked as the most polluted city in the world on the 1st of April, a reminder that this is a regional emergency that happens to land most visibly in national headlines.

If the smoke crosses every border freely, can any single country’s policies realistically solve this alone? ASEAN has had a legally binding agreement on transboundary haze since 2002, ratified by all ten member states. Yet a critical structural gap remains, the agreement contains no sanction clause for countries that fail to meet their obligations. Cooperation exists – Lao, Thailand and Myanmar are now sharing satellite fire-detection data but it remains early and uneven.

When the same burn ban is issued each January and the smoke returns each March, what does that tell us about the distance between regulation and the institutional muscle required for effective implementation? Laos is not without policy. This dry season brought a strengthened nationwide burn ban, expanded provincial monitoring responsibilities, and a World Bank-backed USD 37.85 million pollution management programme running through 2031. Yet PM 2.5 exceeded safe limits across every province this season. The gap between policy on paper and outcomes on the ground often comes down to enforcement capacity – local authorities in many provinces lack the staff, equipment, and budget to act constantly, producing uneven compliance rather than a national response.

If governments are the main actors driving this change, what obligations come with that role and how do we measure whether those obligations are being met for the communities most affected? Upload farming communities practice slash and burn not out of ignorance, but because it works for their conditions, low cost, no need for external inputs, and adapted to steep terrain with poor soils. Research on agricultural transitions in Laos consistently shows that farmers only shift practices when alternatives earn them at least as much per workday, are reliably marketable, and do not leave them food-insecure during the transition period. It requires not just policy but sustained investment in extension services, accessible markets, land security and time – elements that top-down bans alone cannot provide.

The burning season is not a mystery. Its causes are well documented, its geography mapped from satellite, its health consequences measured. What remains unresolved is the harder work such as aligning policy with enforcement capacity, national rules with regional cooperation, and agricultural change with the real conditions of rural life. None of these are quick fixes. But the smoke returning each year proves that the current approach has not yet closed the distance between intention and outcome, pushing us to seek better alternatives.


Thipphavanh holds a bachelor’s degree in international affairs. She is a governance and development professional specialising in rule of law, access to justice, and gender equality in Lao PDR. Her work focuses on strengthening justice sector institutions, advancing people-centred governance, and promoting gender-responsive systems. With extensive experience in project coordination, monitoring and evaluation, stakeholder engagement, and strategic communications, she has collaborated closely with national institutions and international partners to support inclusive and sustainable development.

Myanmar 🇲🇲

Telenor Faces Lawsuit Over Alleged Data Sharing With Myanmar Military

by Myat Moe Kywe

A Norwegian telecommunications giant, Telenor, is facing a lawsuit filed on April 8 over allegations that it shared customer data with Myanmar’s military following the 2021 coup. The case was brought by a Swedish non-profit, Justice and Accountability Initiative, on behalf of Myanmar citizens who claim their personal data was handed over without consent. The lawsuit is supported by the Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations (SOMO) and the Open Society Justice Initiative (OSJI).

Telenor entered Myanmar’s telecom market in 2014 and quickly became one of the country’s leading providers. However, after the military seized power,, the company announced its withdrawal in March 2022, citing an “extraordinary situation” that made continued operations untenable. In May 2022, Telenor completed the sale of its Myanmar business to Lebanese investment firm M1 Group and majority-owner Shwe Bayin Phyu Group, the military-linked local conglomerate with interests in petroleum, one of the military-linked businesses being listed in Open Sanctions announced by the U.S. Department of Treasury.

According to the lawsuit, between the coup and its exit, Telenor allegedly complied with military requests to provide customer data, including location information. Reuters reported that data linked to at least 1,253 phone numbers may have been shared, with Telenor’s headquarters in Norway advising its local team to comply with junta directives. In the news reported by DW, the company did not deny the allegations but said “Telenor Myanmar had no real options. We could not play Russian roulette with the lives of our employees.”

Civil society activist Aung Thu, who was arrested in September 2021, told Reuters that his data was among those shared. Other reports, including from DW News, suggest that such data may have contributed to arrests, imprisonment of activists, and even the 2022 execution of a prominent political figure, Phyo Zeya Thaw.

The lawsuit demands compensation of €9,000 (about $10,500) for each individual whose data was allegedly shared. Legal counsel Beini Ye from OSJI stated that, “if this lawsuit is successful, this case would be the first to hold a telecoms company to account for not sufficiently protesting user data from access by an authoritarian regime.”

The legal action comes amid growing concerns over digital surveillance in Myanmar. Since the coup, the military government has expanded its control over telecommunications and internet use. Most recently, authorities introduced mandatory registration of mobile devices through the International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) system and the Central Equipment Identity Register (CEIR).

Digital rights advocates warn that such measures could further erode privacy. Thit Nyan, a researcher at the Myanmar Internet Project, cautioned that without proper legal safeguards, systems like CEIR could become powerful tools for surveillance and repression.

Since the military coup in 2021, internet and mobile communications in Myanmar have increasingly been subject to monitoring and censorship, raising ongoing concerns about the safety and rights of users in the country. The outcome of the lawsuit is likely to be closely watched both at home and abroad, as scrutiny grows over accountability and the protection of personal data in Myanmar’s telecom sector.


Myat is a senior undergraduate student majoring in Politics, Philosophy, and Economics. She has interned at The Asia Foundation in Washington, D.C., and she has also worked as a summer research assistant at the Centre for Policy and Innovation (CRPI), gaining experience in research and analysis. Her work focuses on civic engagement, gender, youth leadership, and community development.

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Thailand 🇹🇭

The US-Iran Ceasefire: A Fragile Relief for Global Markets, A Permanent ‘War-Tax’ for Thailand

by Paranut Juntree, in Bangkok

To global markets, the April 8 ceasefire between the U.S. and Iran, mediated by Pakistan is a temporary diplomatic and economic victory. However, to the Thai consumer, it is a mirage. While the price of a liter of diesel may eventually tick downward following the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, the price of a plate of Pad Kra Pao and countless other daily essentials may not, and continue to climb.

The damage has already been done. Higher energy and logistics costs are now “baked in” to the economy, as oil serves as the foundation for everything from manufacturing power to product distribution. While the ceasefire has paused the large-scale conflict, it has not halted the permanent upward shift in the cost of living in Thailand, combined with a volatile political climate for an administration already accused of favoring “gray capital” over common citizens.

In Thailand, inflation is projected to rise in Q2 2026, reaching 3.4% as higher costs become a permanent fixture. When oil prices spike, consumer goods also rise. Yet, when a ceasefire may provide a temporary relief, those prices may remain “sticky” as businesses are hesitant to lower costs due to ongoing war-risk surcharges on shipping and the need to recoup losses from the month-long shock.

Furthermore, the ceasefire does nothing to fill the 56.2-billion-baht hole in the Thai Oil Fuel Fund. Even if global crude prices drop, the Thai government must keep domestic prices high to replenish the fund used for previous diesel-price caps. The 6-baht diesel hike implemented on March 26 is not merely a temporary measure, it is a long-term “war-tax” on the Thai public.

The Anutin administration also faces a deepening trust deficit. Early in the conflict, suppliers were suspected of hoarding fuel to wait for price hikes, undermining the 30-baht subsidy. The “missing” 57 million liters of fuel in early April fueled suspicions of middlemen gas-stocking to manipulate the market. This has set in deep-seated outrage, as the public perceives the government as unable or unwilling to control profiteering.

In a move that further fuels a scarcity mindset, the government proposed “wartime rationing,” suggesting petrol stations close from 10 PM to 5 AM. Coming during Songkran, Thailand’s most vital travel season, this policy keeps the public in a state of panic despite the ceasefire news.

The 14-day ceasefire is a fragile relief that fails to address Thailand’s structural vulnerabilities. It is a precarious pause, held together by unagreed terms and shadowed by ongoing regional friction and persistent conflict spillover, which threatens to collapse the truce at any moment. With the ever-present risk of the Strait of Hormuz re-closing, the Thai government must move beyond performative crackdowns on hoarders and develop a robust, transparent energy reserve plan and action steps towards rising inflation. Without a clearer strategy, if the conflict continues, the domestic fallout of the crisis will far outlast its temporary peace.


Paranut has a background in advocacy, with experience in policy research, communications, and civic engagement across both the NGO and government sectors. As Thailand’s Youth Delegate to the United Nations, he represented Thai youth in global dialogues on migration, education, and human rights, championing inclusive policymaking. He holds a degree in political science with a specialization in international relations.

Cambodia 🇰🇭

Cambodia Faces Energy Concerns Amid Middle East War

by Chandara Samban, in Kandal

This week, in our Cambodia coverage, we revisit the March 16 issue by Chandara Samban.

The Middle East conflict, stemming from escalating tensions between Iran and the Israel-US alliance, has entered its third week since late February. The crisis has created widespread instability across the region, with nearly ten countries reportedly targeted by missile and drone attacks. France, Germany, and the United Kingdom have also become involved, further escalating the situation.

Among the most pressing consequences is a growing global energy crisis. The Strait of Hormuz — a critical oil transportation corridor — has been temporarily closed by Iranian forces since the conflict’s opening phase. Countries dependent on oil imports are now facing severe supply disruptions. In Cambodia, citizens have grown increasingly anxious over rising fuel prices, given the country’s limited reserves and uncertain supply outlook.

Oil prices have surged to approximately US$119 per barrel, the highest level since 2022. Cambodians are already feeling the impact, with regular gasoline climbing to around US$1.30 per liter and diesel reaching US$1.54.

Minister of Mines and Energy Keo Rattanak has echoed public concern, warning that Cambodia’s current oil reserves could only last until April without new imports. The ministries of Mines and Energy and Commerce have pledged to coordinate a response in line with the Prime Minister’s directives. As of March 13, around 2,000 gas stations had temporarily closed due to fuel shortages. Authorities have prohibited stations from withholding stock in anticipation of higher prices.

According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), the Strait of Hormuz accounts for nearly 20% of global oil supply — and roughly 90% of oil destined for Asia. Any disruption to this route carries serious consequences for the broader Asian economy, where Cambodia’s dependence on imported fuel leaves it particularly exposed.

In response, some Cambodians have proposed practical alternatives: greater use of public transportation, a shift toward electric vehicles, or simply walking shorter distances where feasible.

Economist Hong Vannak of the Royal Academy of Cambodia told The ASEAN Frontier that while the situation raises legitimate energy security concerns, it is unlikely to trigger a severe economic crisis. “Oil transported through the Strait of Hormuz accounts for around 20% of global supply, which means alternative supply channels may still be available,” he said, adding that OPEC members and other major players would likely seek solutions, with Russian oil a potential option if U.S. sanctions were eased.

Vannak noted that the government has taken steps to monitor and regulate fuel prices, while some private institutions have introduced temporary measures such as remote work policies. He also recommended expanding the use of solar and electric energy — and, looking further ahead, urged the government to attract investors to establish a domestic oil refinery, which would significantly strengthen Cambodia’s long-term energy security.


Chandara is a freelance journalist with a focus on foreign affairs, security issues, and ASEAN affairs. He also serves as a Junior Counterterrorism Intelligence Analyst.

Editorial Deadline 11/04/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Karen Ysabelle R. David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk

More than a month into the war in Iran, the countries of the Pacific Corridor are still grappling with the blowback of a distant conflict. For the small city-state of Singapore, there is little it can do about the closure of the Strait of Hormuz aside from diplomatic overtures. Just like most of the rest of the world, it is locked in a stalemate by a war it did not ask for and one that it has no stakes in.

The repercussions of the war are being felt not just by states. In the Philippines, ordinary Filipinos are buckling under the strain, as round after round of fuel price hikes have led to higher transportation costs that are beginning to spill over to the cost of everything else. In response, the Philippine government has turned to stopgap measures to try and alleviate the problem.

Meanwhile, in Vietnam, a look at the start of a new regulatory era for its property sector. Can new laws put into place succeed in turning a long-languishing sector into an economic driver for the country?

Singapore 🇸🇬

Singapore’s Navigation of the Strait

by Nurul Aini, in Singapore

When a disruption happens someplace far away from the nation, there are two possible responses: 1) to dismiss such events as beyond our domain of concern and relegate it to yet another event in foreign affairs; or 2) to care but only to the extent of their practical implications on our daily lives. The latter is an understandable reaction, especially for many who are trying to survive with the high cost of living while juggling daily responsibilities. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz tests the awareness, principles, and adaptability of a small nation like Singapore to a changing world order.

In a statement made by Prime Minister Lawrence Wong on 19 March 2026 regarding the Middle East conflict, he reiterates that a break in international law, which may be perceived as an abstract issue, could signal grave tangible implications for small states, as countries become more inclined to use force as a means to gain rather than through peaceful engagements.

Additionally, in a doorstop interview in Japan, Wong spoke about navigating through historical sensitivities in the name of diplomacy, as he hopes that Japan can, “clearly articulate its position on these issues and put to rest these outstanding historical issues.” He explained that Singapore-Japan relations are part of maximizing strategic space, all while emphasizing ASEAN centrality with “an open and inclusive regional architecture with ASEAN at the center, while we in ASEAN engage with all the major powers,” thus making for “a stabler and more inclusive architecture that will maximize our chances for peace and shared prosperity.”

Lawrence Anderson, a former Singapore diplomat, foregrounds the importance of recalibration, where increased cooperation with regional and extra-regional partners become significant to “strengthen global commitment to international law and respect for rules,” diversifying such relationships beyond being purely for economic means.

The practicality in Singapore’s approach remains as it closely monitors the situation while providing help to relevant businesses and individuals affected. The U-Save and Service & Conservancy Charges (S&CC) rebate outlined in Budget 2026 is set to be rolled out in April, which will offset expenses for utilities for lower- and middle-income households. The effectiveness of its impact remains to be seen as the closure of the Strait continues. Community Development Council (CDC) voucher handouts, which can be spent in supermarkets and shops involved in the scheme, will be given in June 2026 instead of the original planned disbursement in January 2027. Businesses will receive an increase in Corporate Income Tax rebate to 50%. As of 7 April 2026, government assistance that includes a SGD200 increase in the Cost of Living Payment payout and additional help for eligible platform workers adds another SGD1 billion to what was announced during the recent Budget.

Additionally, according to the chief executive of the Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore (MPA), Mr Ang Wee Keong, the closure of the Strait is an opportunity for Singapore to explore cleaner maritime fuel. Yet, Singapore is not excluded from lingering worries in other domains such as disruptions to food supply chains and fuel reserves. While the war may initially feel distant, the effects on Singapore are gradually felt through daily ‘small’ disruptions, where adjustments to policies and budgets become necessary, inevitably propelling us to be concerned and aware about global politics.


Aini is currently pursuing a master’s degree in English literature at Nanyang Technological University. She has experience working in youth groups, contributing to the planning and management of outreach activities.

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The Philippines 🇵🇭

Fueling Hardship

by Arianne De Guzman, in Bulacan

As the Holy Week concluded, Filipino motorists, commuters, and Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) braced for another round of fuel price hikes, with gasoline, diesel, and kerosene prices rising again last 7 April 2026, marking the 13th consecutive week of price increases for gasoline and the 15th for diesel and kerosene.

The Philippines, the first country to declare a state of national energy emergency and one of the most oil-dependent economies in the Southeast Asia region, is heavily reliant on imported oil, sourcing 98% of its supply from the Persian Gulf. This dependence leaves the country susceptible not only to the ripple effects of the United States (US) and Israel’s war on Iran but also to the challenges caused by its negligible domestic production.

Beyond this broad outlook, risks and issues also became a daily calculation for many Filipinos. In the transportation sector, one of the largest consumers of oil products, jeepney drivers are among the most immediately affected. Mr. Romeo Esmenda, a jeepney driver in Quezon City, shared that prior to the US and Israel’s bombing of Iran, he often spent around PHP3,000 (US$49.91) while still earning PHP1,500 (US$24.96) in profit. Currently, filling his jeepney tank costs PHP6,000 (US$99.83), yet his profit has decreased to just PHP300 (US$4.99).

They are not alone.

Mr. Mike Olea, a Filipino who owns a small, family-owned food shop, also shared that the prices of cooking gas, meat, and other key ingredients have increased sharply in recent weeks, prompting him to rethink his spending and business strategy. He added that his food shop relies on an 11-kilogram cylinder of cooking gas every week; however, the 30% increase has induced significant pressure on his business expenses. Mr. Olea revisited raising menu prices and reducing meat and vegetable servings, as he observed fewer customers visiting due to rising living costs.

Commuters, too, are feeling the impact.

Ms. Emma Almadrones reported higher spending on transportation costs, often taking extra rides or seeking alternative ways to get to work, stating that some jeepney drivers are now making fewer trips than usual or have completely stopped operating. With food prices also increasing, she prefers to bring lunch to work and walk home instead of waiting for a ride.

In response, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. signed an executive order (EO) activating the Unified Package for Livelihoods, Industry, Food, and Transport (UPLIFT), a program focused on providing fuel subsidies, commuter assistance, and expanding public transportation services. Sonny Africa, an economist and Executive Director of IBON Foundation, stated that his policies are contingent on existing government funds, raising doubts whether it will be sufficient if prices continue to rise. President Marcos also signed Republic Act No. 12316, allowing the suspension or reduction of fuel excise taxes, which is expected to take effect this April. Senator Panfilo “Ping” Lacson noted that the Philippine government could lose around PHP200 billion in revenues, with a potential recommendation to suspend the value-added tax (VAT), which could reach over PHP320 billion.

For many Filipinos, the oil crisis illustrated how global economic events intersect with local realities. It also highlights the importance of human-centered policies, not just market stabilization, to sustain livelihoods and strengthen communities. While recent diplomatic efforts alleviate the oil crisis, community resilience and support for vulnerable sectors remain central to how the Philippines weathers the ongoing crisis.


Arianne has experience in policy research at De La Salle University’s Jesse M. Robredo Institute of Governance, where she contributed to projects on systemic reform. She earned a degree in Political Science from Colegio de San Juan de Letran. Currently, she works in government relations, specializing in advocacy strategy, legislative monitoring, and stakeholder engagement. Beyond her professional work, she is actively involved in youth development and grassroots initiatives through the Rotaract Club of Santa Maria.

Vietnam 🇻🇳

The Laws of the Land

by Tri Vo, in Ho Chi Minh City

As the first quarter of 2026 comes to an end, the release of comprehensive market reports by major international consultancies provides the most definitive look yet at Vietnam’s property sector operating under a fully modernized legal framework. The set of regulations — comprising the revised Housing Law, the Real Estate Business Law, and the Land Law 2024 — officially took effect in August 2024, aiming to resolve years of legal ambiguities. Now, more than eighteen months into this new regulatory era, Q1 data reveal that the market has transitioned from a long period of paralysis into a time of relatively sustainable growth. But this time is different. Vietnam’s real estate sector is not experiencing a speculation frenzy; instead, macroeconomic conditions and stringent new compliance standards are reshaping the landscape to favor well-capitalized developers with high legal compliance.

A central catalyst for this structural shift is the overhaul of land valuation. The new Land Law abolished the rigid, state-mandated land price framework, requiring provincial authorities to implement market-aligned land prices starting from 1 January 2026. While this transition increases the financial obligations for developers, it effectively de-risks the sector for foreign institutional investors by establishing a predictable, market-driven mechanism for land acquisition and compensation.

The practical effects of this legislative environment are reflected in regional absorption rates. In Hanoi, apartment prices have continued to rise alongside robust sales volumes, with market activity overwhelmingly dominated by large-scale, integrated mega-projects from established developers. Conversely, Ho Chi Minh City has a slower trajectory, dominated by new supply constraints but steady price appreciation, now driven (in the suburban areas) by resilient owner-occupier demand rather than just speculative flipping.

Beyond the residential segment, the commercial and industrial real estate segments remain the indisputable engines of the market. This resilience is underpinned by Vietnam’s broader macroeconomic stability, highlighted by an impressive inflow of foreign direct investments of over US$38 billion in the previous year. Industrial park owners, in particular, are capitalizing on the new legal provisions that allow for more flexible rental arrangements. Indeed, such regulations allow for easier subleasing to multinational manufacturing tenants seeking to rapidly set up operations in the country.

Ultimately, the Q1 2026 property data signals a maturation of the Vietnamese real estate market. This is done by flushing out less-qualified actors, leaving a consolidated arena of larger players capable of navigating the higher compliance costs. As the government aggressively pursues its ambitious double-digit economic growth mandate for the year, a legally transparent and structurally sound real estate market has transformed from a systemic vulnerability into a stabilized pillar of Vietnam’s long-term economic expansion.


Tri has experience in management consulting and strategy, having worked with institutions such as the UNDP, The Asia Group, and ARC Group. He has provided strategic, legal, and operational insights to clients in sectors including manufacturing, energy, and technology. He holds both academic and professional experience related to Southeast and East Asia, with a focus on regional development and policy.

Editorial Deadline 07/04/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)