By Siu Tzyy Wei, Lead Editor - Maritime Crescent Desk

Influence is not always about who holds the microphone. Sometimes, it is about who controls the stage. This week, Malaysia witnessed Formula 1’s transformation into a global platform for soft power. For Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, the spectacle also raises the question of whether international visibility can be converted into political confidence at home. Across the world, where Brunei’s new Foreign Minister made his debut on the world stage at the UN General Assembly, visibility has become its own form of currency. In Indonesia, visibility takes a different stage, as the revised Broadcasting Bill brings user-generated content on digital platforms into greater regulatory scrutiny. The debate is therefore not only about regulating harmful content, but also about who gets to define the boundaries of acceptable public expression online.

Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳

The New Voice for Brunei

by Maryam Zulaidi

The 81st UN General Assembly (UNGA) marked a significant moment for Brunei’s diplomacy, as HRH Prince Mateen made his debut at the High-Level Meeting as Minister of Foreign Affairs following his appointment earlier this year. As Brunei’s international spokesperson, he addressed a clear yet critical message regarding international order on the UN podium. The core message hints at overcoming double-standards between UN members, or trust among nations will erode. He presented the current state of Palestine as the defining example, stating that there can be no lasting peace without justice for the people of Palestine and that the conflict has become a test to the Organisation’s own credibility. Through this example, he argued that the decades of suffering of innocent Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank, including UN staff, journalists and medics killed while carrying out their duties is precisely why the UN Charter and international law must be enforced without exception. To strengthen accountability for crimes against peacekeepers, he emphasised that Brunei co-sponsored UN Security Council Resolution 2823 and therefore warned the spread of conflict and violence into neighbouring Lebanon, where UN peacekeepers have also been unjustifiably killed. Taken together, Brunei views that trust in the UN can only be restored through unprejudiced multilateral efforts by the UN, first starting with the conflict and oppression existing in Palestine.

This message carries weight for a tiny nation such as Brunei. Although Brunei has long supported the Palestinian cause at the UN, this was the second consecutive year in which Palestine stood at the centre of its national statement, following last year’s address by Dato Seri Setia Erywan Yusof, the Second Minister of Foreign Affairs. Though, its continued relevance can be understood through Brunei’s own interests. As a small state, Brunei relies on international law and the UN Charter to safeguard its sovereignty. Arguably, by insisting that these rules be upheld in Palestine, Brunei is also reinforcing the very principles that protect smaller nations from being overlooked. In this sense, defending the rules of Palestine is also indirectly defending them for Brunei.

Compared with last year’s statement, this year is much more direct and sharp in terms of tone. In 2025, the emphasis on Palestine and supporting its full UN membership is an inherent right. This year, it moved further toward accountability, UN’s credibility and the protection of peacekeepers. This shift reflects a changed context, in which ongoing suffering has made the question of enforcement, rather than solely recognition, increasingly urgent. It also implies that under HRH Price Mateen, Brunei intends to remain a consistent and principled voice on Palestine within the multilateral system.

During his stay in New York, Prince Mateen also attended a series of bilateral meetings on the sidelines of UNGA. This includes, discussions with his counterparts from Vietnam, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar, each focused on deepening economic and diplomatic ties. Together, these meetings reflect Brunei’s strong approach to foreign policy of building cooperation for mutual benefit with partners across Asia.


Maryam is a first-year International Relations and Politics student at the University of Sheffield, with an academic focus on Southeast Asia—particularly Maritime Southeast Asia—and the Middle East. She aspires to a career in diplomacy and academia and is committed to fostering international dialogue and advancing scholarly engagement with global issues. Beyond her academic work, she pursues creative interests and voluntary initiatives that broaden her perspectives on public service.

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Indonesia 🇮🇩

When Rules Silence

by Amallia Utami

Indonesia’s proposed revision of the Broadcasting Bill has raised concerns about the future of public expression on digital platforms. On 31 August 2026, the House of Representatives’ Legislative Body approved the harmonised bill for consideration. As the ongoing legislative processes continue, there are concerns over how the proposed regulations could affect the public’s participation on social media.

The proposed scope includes user-generated content (UGC) on digital platforms, such as TikTok, Instagram, and YouTube. This raises questions as decisions on what to publish are spread across many creators. Platforms still control distribution and moderation, but they do not exercise the same editorial control over every upload as broadcasters do over their programmes.

Remotivi researcher Muhammad Heychael warned that the threat of sanctions could encourage platforms to remove content whose status remains unclear. With broad restrictions, companies may find it safer to take a post down than to risk being penalised. This leaves users dependent on how platforms interpret the rules, including when their posts do not clearly violate them. The concern is that pressure to comply could lead platforms to remove lawful content simply because keeping it online carries an uncertain risk.

This could affect how people participate in raising issues online. A video about poor public services, for example, allows an individual experience to become a shared concern. Others may respond with similar experiences or demand an explanation from the institution involved. If such content is removed under unclear standards, the opportunities of building democratic space may be reduced. The concern extends beyond the person whose post disappears, since other people also lose opportunities to learn about problems and discuss them openly.

Another possible consequence is self-censorship among users. When the boundaries are unclear, users may hesitate to post criticism even when there is nothing unlawful about it. Some may soften their language or avoid certain subjects because they do not want to deal with the possible consequences. Discussions may continue, but without those who decide to withdraw. Their absence matters because experiences that could help others understand an issue may never be shared, leaving the discussion to those who feel able to keep speaking.

Addressing harmful content is a reasonable responsibility for digital platforms. However, the proposed rules should account for the way users produce content and the decisions platforms make about it. Clear limits and a workable process for challenging removals are needed, particularly when a post is taken down despite no clear violation. The revision therefore needs closer scrutiny over how it would operate in practice. Protecting users should include ensuring that they can raise concerns without feeling that silence is safer.


Amallia is a media and culture graduate from the University of Glasgow with experience in journalism and creative writing. Her interests lie in democracy, media and communication, particularly how contemporary media environments shape self-censorship, misinformation, and disinformation.

Malaysia 🇲🇾

Malaysia’s Need for Speed

by Sydney Gan, in Kuala Lumpur

Over the weekend, Malaysia was at the center of sporting action as the host of the 2026 Formula One (F1) Bahrain Grand Prix, welcoming more than 261,000 spectators. This opportunity - initially a one-off lucky break for Malaysia - has now introduced its potential permanent return to F1 as part of the circuit roster. Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim is effectively immortalized as the leader who brought back the sport into an entertainment-starved Malaysia. How will this affect, if at all, his prospects as the 16th General Election looms?

It all comes back to soft power: the successful organization of a large-scale sporting event lends Malaysia a subtle appeal and perceived legitimacy, thus positioning Malaysia favorably amongst its more powerful Western and Middle Eastern counterparts. This F1 competition alone brought together the support of the King of Malaysia with Bahrain’s King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa, and continued collaboration will no doubt open doors to closer diplomatic and trade relations with powerful international players.

The concept of spotlighting Malaysia on a global scale is not exactly new to Anwar. In 2025, he had an exemplary showing as the ASEAN Chair, notably brokering the KL Peace Accords to cease further disputes in the Cambodian-Thai border (a success that prompted murmurs about a potential Nobel Peace Prize nomination). Anwar’s ASEAN stint, though short-lived, effectively highlighted Malaysia’s full potential as a viable regional competitor, inspiring confidence within Malaysians and providing him great assurance for a second term - that is, before the house of cards that is the Unity Government threatened to dismantle at his very feet.

Now, with the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) pledging to contest independently from Anwar’s Unity Government in the upcoming General Election, Anwar is visibly struggling to uphold the power he once held fast. Internationally, his optics have never been better, but at home, he is forced to face his growing competition, as well as the slow erosion of his own coalition, where members are dropping out one-by-one to join rival Rafizi’s party Bersama. It is apparent that Anwar is increasingly banking on Malaysian goodwill and populist opinion to tide him over for the next national polls - in the upcoming 2027 Budget, Anwar is predicted to lead with indulgent allocations for increased subsidies and cash handouts, in order to appeal to the masses. The name of the game is to rebuild trust among voters, never mind that this eleventh-hour hurrah feels more like a last-ditch scramble rather than a sincere effort.

The soft power of sports is endearing and entertaining, but when it comes to real political prospects, it does little more than put a band-aid on a bullet wound. Anwar still has to confront the reality that his loss of followers can only be attributed to his lack of rigor in follow-through on his initial reform agenda. As the glamor of international sports pageantry dispels, a fierce and cut-throat political brawl remains to be played out, with the potential to hurtle Malaysia into further political uncertainty.


Sydney holds a Bachelor of Laws from King’s College London, where she focused on Human Rights Law, Criminology, and Public & Administrative Law. She is an Analyst at Asia Group Advisors, providing policy analysis and strategic guidance across the tech, sustainability, and gaming sectors in Southeast Asia. Prior to joining AGA, she worked in the social development sector in London, contributing to the Ukraine Judicial Training Programme through research on war crimes adjudication and the development of a legal training curriculum with high court magistrates.

Editorial Deadline 5/10/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk

Some things only look solid until they touch the ground. In Thailand, Bangkok's worst flooding in years left 10,000 pieces of luggage stranded at Suvarnabhumi, forced more than 70 flight cancellations, and ended with Thai Airways' CEO ousted by his own board, a reminder that a tourism recovery depends on what works when conditions turn bad. In Myanmar, a wave of foreign YouTubers is telling a different story from the safe distance of Yangon and Mandalay, with titles like "24 Hours Eating Noodles in War-Torn Myanmar." Locals and critics say these videos help the junta project a stability that young people living under forced conscription and night-time curfews don't recognize, and that a country's safety can't be judged from its best-protected streets. In Cambodia, the military service law that sat unenforced since 2006 is now real: about 3,000 young people signed up in the first days, with prison penalties for evasion and rights groups warning that the burden will fall hardest on those with the fewest means. And in Laos, the countdown to LDC graduation on November 24 is less a finish line than a landing, with officials themselves cautioning that the real risks begin once trade preferences start to phase out.

Thailand 🇹🇭

Bangkok’s Floods Uncovers a New Crack for Thailand’s Tourism Recovery

by Pathom Sangwongwanich, in Bangkok

Bangkok’s worst flooding in years has shifted from a public-infrastructure crisis into an aviation and tourism problem, which ultimately leads to the ousting of Thai Airways International Chief Executive Officer Chai Eamsiri. The move, mandated by the company’s board of directors with immediate effect on October 2, follows a week-long debacle as the national flag carrier canceled several flights and cut Bangkok departures because flood-related staff shortages crippled its aviation and ground service operations at Suvarnabhumi International Airport, leaving around 10,000 luggage stranded on terminal floors.

Chai’s dismissal is mainly rooted in failure to address crisis management, tarnishing the airline’s reputation and causing considerable losses to aviation operations, and a previous corruption allegation linked to wine procurement for in-flight service. The Ministry of Finance discovered that the purchase involved manipulation by the airline’s procurement department, which bought 860,000 wine bottles at a price of over 1,000 baht per bottle from a single supplier.

Chai, who joined the airline in 1985 and rose through the ranks to become chief financial officer before being appointed CEO in 2023, said the board of directors “didn’t give a reason” for his dismissal. Meanwhile, the flag carrier said in an exchange filing that the board of directors will conduct a fact-finding investigation of the crisis and Chai is suspended as CEO during the course of investigation.

Sumrid Sumneing, a board member of Thai Airways International, has been appointed as acting CEO in an attempt to manage the operational turmoil. Previously, the airline had announced the cancellation of more than 45 flights for October 1 and October 2 to address a backlog of more than 10,000 pieces of luggage and cargo, with plans to resume full-scale operations by October 3. Thai Airways International recently canceled 37 flights bound for domestic and international routes on September 29 and 30 and the cumulative tally was poised to reach over 70 flights as more cancellations for flights between October 1 and October 3 had been announced.

The disruption has raised questions beyond the immediate inconvenience to passengers. Tourism Minister Surasak Phancharoenworakul sharply criticized Thai Airways’ management prior to Chai’s dismissal, saying the episode risks undermining traveler confidence and damaging Thailand’s image as a tourism hub. “If you think your term is almost over and you are not going to do anything, I don’t think that’s acceptable. Resign, or consider stepping down quickly so that someone who wants to work can come in and help,” Surasak said.

That criticism comes at a sensitive time for Thailand’s tourism industry. Tourism is a key driver of Thailand’s economy, which has lagged regional peers since the pandemic, as it contributes to about 12% of GDP. Year-to-date foreign tourist arrivals were registered at 22.7 million, down 3.7% year-on-year, as of September 26, according to data from the Ministry of Tourism and Sports.

For international travelers, flooding that affects roads and neighborhoods may be an expected seasonal disruption. However, flooding that leaves luggage stranded at the country’s main international gateway is different. It can turn a weather event into a direct test of the country’s ability to keep its tourism infrastructure functioning.

The episode also highlights a broader challenge for Thailand because tourism recovery is not simply about bringing more visitors through the airport. It depends on whether the country can deliver a reliable experience once they arrive — from transportation and airports to hotels, attractions, and basic infrastructure.

Myanmar 🇲🇲

Foreign Travel Bloggers and Youtubers Claim Normalcy in Myanmar

by Ley Hlaing

Over the past two to three years, a couple of foreign influencers and youtubers have been claiming that Myanmar is a fun, safe country to travel and spend time on vacation, little do they know or they are intentionally ignoring the sufferings of people of Myanmar with their misleading thumbnails while joyfully immersing themselves in the junta’s mechanism of normalizing the turmoil with the use of tourism.

A few assertions by the youtubers and travel bloggers that Myanmar is going back to normal and safe to visit starting from 2022, have now become quite frequent especially after the former junta leader, Mig Aung Hlaing became president in 2026. A few critical questions should be asked: who are those people? And why do they come to Myanmar and claim the country is okay to visit now? Seeking answers to these questions will explain a broader part of the story. Their content titles are like “I Spend 72 Hours In A Country At War 🇲🇲,” “24 Hours Eating Noodles in War-Torn Myanmar 🇲🇲” portraying themselves as real great adventurers and culturalists, eating outside the local cuisine in Yangon and some major cities.

Recently, some local frustration came up with those foreign YouTubers using misleading and AI-generated thumbnails and praising a “fun, safe country” just only visiting the urban places like Yangon and Mandalay. Local residents note these creators enjoy strict “tourist privileges” in highly protected bubbles while remaining completely undermining to everyday local threats like forced conscription, sudden raids, and arbitrary detention which are not the primary targets applying on them. While these hypocrites foreign bloggers can easily ride on a taxi and go out at nights for exploratory fun to the Chinatown, a local youth would hardly go outside after 7PM MMT due to the forced conscription and scared of night crime in their own town and country. The local youth might ask if that is not hypocrisy, what else would be. Their ignorance is very inhumane and a complete total inconsideration.

In fact, they are within the junta’s mechanism of manufacturing stability. A comprehensive report in The Diplomat outlines how the military’s Ministry of Information actively manufactures narratives of stability. This includes state-backed media infrastructure designed to mask the ongoing crisis and push structural propaganda. Some people commented that these content creators are “junta’s unofficial assets” suspecting for doing contents like these, they might even have gotten a free visa or an invitation. The debate over whether visiting the country helps or hurts its citizens is long-standing. Analysis on New Mandala and historical features by The Diplomat explore how the state uses tourism and the reopening of travel to project normalcy and secure state revenue, even as resistance groups urge boycotts to block funds from reaching military-affiliated businesses.

Despite the fact that their own governments are declaring that Myanmar is a red zone and unsafe to travel, these bloggers are actively involving in spreading junta’s pleasure and narratives. Looking at those bloggers and their fame, many frustrated locals remark that these so-called bloggers are kind of trash, they cannot make those contents in their own soil, which triggers a brutal truth that it is a win-win situation for both the junta and these creators; the former manufacturing stability and reviving tourism and the latter, the fake and misleading popularity. It is their responsibility to what extent they express about a country they are shooting a content. However, it is way more dangerous and a misleading conclusion to say everything is sound and safe only after visiting cities like Yangon and Mandalay. On the other hand, those who work on the travel agencies and business, they see this is a great opportunity to showcase that some places in the country can be traveled and become renowned which is good for the country. All in all, safety is first for travel and thus if these content creators are truly adventurous, they should also go to the battling places and draw a conclusion. These bloggers should know that they can do better and it should always be questionable about the correct safety of a country one is travelling to and the true popularity will only be achieved when they do not paint false narratives on the lives of the people of Myanmar.

Ley Hlaing is a former Political Science student from the University of Yangon, Myanmar. Currently, he is pursuing his BA at Parami University with a major in Philosophy, Politics and Economics. His academic and professional interests span community development, literature, minority issues, and social impact research. Having held roles as Research Assistant, Student Mentor, and Facilitator for local initiatives, he has constantly supported project management in literature and education programs in Myanmar.

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Cambodia 🇰🇭

Cambodia Begins Enforcing Military Service Law as About 3,000 Apply in First Week

by Sokna Thea, in Phnom Penh

Cambodia has begun enforcing its new military service law, with about 3,000 young people signing up in the first day, Prime Minister Hun Manet said on Friday last week. The government has yet to release a detailed breakdown of the applicants, and the figure could rise as registration continues.

The law took effect in May 2026, replacing a 2006 statute that was never put into practice. Under the new rules, male citizens aged 18 to 25 can be required to serve for 24 months, up from 18 months under the old law. Women can also apply voluntarily.

Recruits will be chosen through a mix of voluntary enlistment and a draft lottery. The Ministry of National Defence will set an annual quota based on the armed forces’ needs. Officials have indicated a target of roughly 8,500 new recruits for 2026, but no official cap has been published.

Defense Minister Tea Seiha said registration forms are being handed out from October 1 to October 9, with completed forms accepted between October 10 and October 15. Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet called 2026 a “historic year” for the law and said future intakes would happen gradually each year.

Those selected will serve for 24 months. The first three months will be basic training, followed by practical postings. Hun Manet said training would cover not only combat skills but also radio communications, electronics repair, and aircraft maintenance. He added that recruits would learn about drones and artificial intelligence, describing the program as an investment in both national defense and young people’s skills.

The law includes penalties for avoiding service. In peacetime, evasion can lead to six months to two years in prison and fines of up to $1,000. During war or foreign attack, the penalty can rise to five years in prison and higher fines. Exemptions are granted to Buddhist monks, other religious clergy, and people with disabilities. Some citizens can request a deferral, including for up to one year in certain cases.

The move to enforce conscription comes after renewed security concerns along the Cambodia-Thailand border. Deadly clashes in 2025 left soldiers and civilians dead and displaced families. Hun Manet announced plans to start enforcing the law in mid-2025, shortly after those incidents.

Civil society groups say national service can be legitimate, but they urge strong safeguards. Am Sam Ath of the rights group LICADHO said the government must ensure adequate allowances and clear legal protections so recruits can return to their studies and jobs without harm. Ny Sokha of ADHOC warned that penalties may hit poorer citizens hardest and expressed concern over provisions that could be used against government critics. Observers are calling for transparent, corruption-free lottery and selection processes.

Sokna has a background in International Affairs and Business & Commercial Law. He’s currently a Senior Project Coordinator at the Ministry of Economy and Finance of Cambodia, working on the Financial Management Information System (FMIS) Project. His professional focus is driven by entrepreneurship, business development, and financial technology, with a particular interest in how private-sector innovation drives Cambodia’s economic growth.

Lao PDR 🇱🇦

Countdown to November 24 as Lao PDR prepares to Leave the LDC List

by Souriya Bounpaseuth, in Vientiane

On 24 November 2026, Laos is scheduled to graduate from the UN’s Least Developed Country (LDC) category, according to the UN’s LDC Portal. With the date weeks away, the government has restated its position publicly. On 25 September, on the sidelines of the 81st UN General Assembly in New York, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Thongsavan Phomvihane told the UN High Representative for the LDCs that Laos was fully prepared to graduate this year. He also asked for international support to strengthen the economy beyond graduation.

The case for graduation rests on measurable progress. Laos reached a Gross National Income (GNI) per capita of 2,503 USD in the 2024 UN review, well above the 1,306 USD graduation threshold, and has met all three criteria since 2021. Human development has been central. Officials note that progress in human assets contributed to Laos qualifying, and that further gains in health, education and nutrition will remain important after it leaves the category. The road has not been short, though. Laos first targeted 2020, then 2024, before settling on 2026.

Graduation does not mean support ends overnight. Laos’ Smooth Transition Strategy sets three goals: a smooth, quality and sustainable graduation. The strategy is part of a wider plan, since graduation preparations are embedded in the 10th National Socio-Economic Development Plan for 2026–2030. A transition period is reported to run until 2029, giving exporters, ministries and development partners time to adjust as LDC-specific measures phase out.

The effects will not be felt equally across the economy. A joint UN study listed on the LDC Portal found that textiles and clothing in five Asian LDCs, Laos among them, make heavy use of LDC trade preferences and are among the sectors most likely to be affected. The ILO has also stressed that responsible business conduct will be essential for maintaining market access and competitiveness, pointing to standards, skills and compliance as the next test for Lao enterprises.

Lao officials have been open about the risks ahead. At a UN meeting, Laos’ Permanent Representative to the UN, Thongphan Savanphet, cautioned that the period after graduation could be fragile if support measures were withdrawn too quickly, with shifts in climate, trade and digital technology bringing both opportunities and new risks. He also pointed to digital transformation, green growth and regional integration as possible routes to trade and investment and a more resilient economy.

The date on the calendar will mark a milestone, but the real measure of success will come afterwards whether growth holds, whether households benefit, and whether the economy becomes more resilient.

Editorial Deadline 03/10/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Karen Ysabelle David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk

In this week’s Pacific Corridor newsletter, we talk about one of life’s great inevitabilities: taxes.

In the Philippines, a proposed 15% global minimum tax on large multinational enterprises (MNEs) continues to make progress. But for investors, this begs the question: what happens when tax incentives result in an MNE’s effective tax rate falling below the 15% threshold? Meanwhile, Singapore’s small and medium enterprises are joining in on the AI adoption race that is fast becoming a trend in the region. But with the city-state’s larger firms still far ahead, can government initiatives such as tax deductions for AI spending do the trick in closing the gap?

Vietnam this week is focused on bigger problems as it tries to maintain its balance between two opposing giants, following Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to the United States in late September. With every move, the US and China can send shockwaves throughout the world, forcing smaller countries like Vietnam to be on constant alert.

The Philippines 🇵🇭

New Philippine Bill Proposes 15% Global Minimum Tax (GMT), But What Happens to Tax Incentives?

by Arianne De Guzman, in Bulacan

The Philippines has made progress toward imposing a 15% global minimum tax (GMT) on large multinational enterprises (MNEs), with the introduction of measures on how they would be supported during the transition and how tax incentives under the CREATE MORE and other special laws would be treated.

On 3 September 2026, Congressman Adrian Salceda filed House Bill (HB) 11114, a bill that would implement the Qualified Minimum Top-Up Tax (QDMTT) Tax based on the GMT. The bill is currently pending before the House Committee on Ways and Means. Under the proposed framework, in-scope MNEs would be mandated to pay a top-up tax in the Philippines when their effective tax rate (ETR) falls below 15%.

The policy issue for investors is what happens when tax incentives result in an MNE’s ETR falling below the given 15% threshold.

According to the latest technical guide by the Fiscal Incentives Review Board (FIRB), the adoption of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Global Anti-Base Erosion (GloBE) Rules (Pillar 2) would not automatically strip covered MNEs of their registered status or entitlement to tax incentives.

However, the FIRB made it clear that income tax-based incentives can lower an MNE’s tax liability and can translate into a lower ETR, which could, in turn, lead to potential QDMTT exposure, effectively attenuating the savings gained. These benefits include tax holidays, the 5% special corporate income tax rate, and reduced corporate tax brackets.

To maintain the Philippines’ investment competitiveness while complying with the GloBE Rules, the government is actively exploring non-income tax mechanisms and plans to expand the enhanced deductions regime. Those measures would shift the conversation toward expenditure- and production-based incentives, making tax incentives linked to investment rather than profits.

HB 11114 addresses the treatment of qualifying incentives through a Substance-based Tax Incentive Safe Harbor. As an option for an in-scope MNE, qualifying tax incentives under the Global Anti-Base Erosion (GloBE) Rules may be treated as Covered Taxes when determining the jurisdictional ETR, subject to a substance-based limitation. In practice, the safe harbor does not mean that the incentives stop reducing the taxes counted in the ETR calculation. Rather, qualifying incentives may be added to Covered Taxes when calculating the GloBE ETR, subject to the applicable limitation.

It is important to note that this distinction matters because the treatment of an incentive under the GloBE Rules can affect whether it contributes to a top-up tax liability. MNEs planning to invest in the Philippines must also look into their investment’s value after taxes.

Beyond tax incentives, HB 11114 also provides non-fiscal support for qualifying investments, such as research and development, workforce training, high-technology production, and enabling infrastructure. The FIRB would be required to conduct a quantified cost-benefit analysis and determine that the support is necessary to secure the investment and limited to the minimum amount necessary.

If enacted, the bill would shift the investment conversation from simply offering tax relief to determining which incentives remain effective under a 15% global tax floor and what other forms of support can be used alongside them under the proposed framework.


Arianne has experience in policy research at De La Salle University’s Jesse M. Robredo Institute of Governance, where she contributed to projects on systemic reform. She earned a degree in Political Science from Colegio de San Juan de Letran. Currently, she works in government relations, specializing in advocacy strategy, legislative monitoring, and stakeholder engagement. Beyond her professional work, she is actively involved in youth development and grassroots initiatives through the Rotaract Club of Santa Maria.

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Singapore 🇸🇬

Singapore's AI Adoption and the Gap It Still Has to Close

by Ryan

When a hotel chef phoned Alan Tan in March 2025 to ask about a missing order of 2,000 pieces of kueh (bite-sized snack), the third-generation owner of Peranakan heritage brand HarriAnns Nonya Table did not have a supply problem. He had a paperwork problem. Several pages of the hotel’s purchase order had failed to print, so the missing items never made it into the manual tally that administrative staff compiled each day for the central kitchen. “I told my kitchen staff: ‘I don’t care, you have to make the order right now,’” Tan recalled to The Straits Times. That scramble pushed a business built on three generations of handmade recipes toward an AI-enabled ordering and billing system, developed for under SGD 50,000 with half the cost underwritten by Enterprise Singapore’s Enterprise Development Grant, which now catches the tally errors that once threatened HarriAnns’ contracts with five-star hotels, which includes the Shangri-La and the Fullerton.

Across town, the beachside Italian restaurant Fico had a different kind of problem: it was leaving revenue on the table. Operator The Lo & Behold Group had long refused to overbook Fico’s East Coast Park capacity for fear of long waits, until a project team built a tool on Anthropic’s Claude Code that analyzed historical reservations, dining durations, and guest habits to identify windows when the restaurant could safely accept more bookings than its seating allowed. Within a month of its June rollout, the tool lifted weekend revenue by 2%, Chief Operating Officer Rifeng Gao told The Straits Times, noting that the underlying pattern was too granular for staff to track by hand.

Neither story involves a dramatic robotic overhaul, and that, increasingly, is the point of Singapore’s AI push. The Infocomm Media Development Authority (IMDA) reported in October that AI adoption among small and medium enterprises tripled in a single year, from 4.2% in 2023 to 14.5% in 2024, even as adoption among larger firms climbed from 44% to 62.5%. That gap matters as much as either figure: AI is fast becoming standard practice for big firms while remaining a minority pursuit among the smaller enterprises that dominate Singapore’s economy. Closing that gap is the explicit goal of the city-state’s policy architecture. The Productivity Solutions Grant and Enterprise Development Grant have underwritten AI purchases for years, and Budget 2026 layered on a 400% tax deduction for qualifying AI spending, capped at SGD 50,000 a year, alongside a new “Champions of AI” program run jointly by Enterprise Singapore and Digital Industry Singapore. A newer National AI Impact Program targets 10,000 firms and 100,000 workers by 2029.

That difference travels well past Singapore’s borders. A Lazada and Kantar survey of online sellers across ASEAN found Indonesian and Vietnamese merchants already using AI across 42% of business functions, with Singaporean and Thai sellers close behind and Malaysian sellers trailing at 26%, even as every government in the bloc claims a national AI strategy. What grants and targets cannot buy is the moment of decision that actually moves a small business from strategy to shop floor. That moment belongs to people like Alan Tan, insisting his kitchen make the order right now instead of writing off the loss, and Rifeng Gao, betting a single restaurant’s weekend on a tool nobody had tested before June. Ten thousand subsidized firms become ten thousand transformed ones only when enough owners, from Tiong Bahru to Ho Chi Minh City, make that same unglamorous choice: trusting the machine with the one problem that has quietly cost them money for years.


Ryan is a final-year finance student at the Singapore University of Social Sciences (SUSS) with experience across venture capital, venture debt, and business development. He also holds a diploma in Law and Management from Temasek Polytechnic. His interests lie in how emerging technologies and economic trends shape business ecosystems and regional development in Asia.

Vietnam 🇻🇳

Two Giants vs. Vietnam’s Strategic Balancing

by Hang Nguyen, in Ho Chi Minh City

Looking back on past decades, any political or diplomatic moment by the United States and China caused ripples in the trajectory of global affairs. The world has arguably been operating in a prolonged state of U.S.–China hegemonic competition, evident through prevalent themes and popularized International Relations terminology dedicated to navigating great power rivalry, including “BANI” (Brittle, Anxious, Nonlinear, Incomprehensible), “resilience”, and “hedging.”

Subsequent to President Trump’s state visit to Beijing in May, from 23 to 25 September, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and President Xi Jinping made his first official state visit to Washington D.C. in more than a decade. The delegation was welcomed by the Trump administration as a two-day high-level dialogue covering issues as varied as trade, Taiwan, Iran, AI, and fentanyl. Many thought pieces focused on analyzing the changes, symbolic or substantive, to U.S.–China relations. However, this article directs anticipation toward the implications on Vietnam.

Skeptic discourse with regard to Vietnam’s capacity to strategically balance cooperation with the United States and China already exists, only becoming more amplified with different possible developments.

In the scenario of U.S.–China’s mutual concession on regional issues, Vietnam may become vulnerable in its maritime disputes in the South China Sea, as Washington’s priority on a stable bilateral relationship could come at the expense of smaller claimants. Hanoi has long relied on the American naval presence and diplomatic support for the 2016 arbitral ruling to complicate Beijing’s calculations. Should détente lead Washington to quietly downplay these signals, China would face fewer external constraints in pressuring Vietnamese fishing and energy activities. The concern, therefore, is less a dramatic abandonment than a gradual erosion, in which the costs of resistance rise while American attention falls.

Economically, Vietnam has thrived on supply chain diversification away from China. A trade thaw could weaken firms’ incentive to relocate, while renewed scrutiny of transshipment could expose Vietnamese exporters to penalties from both sides. Yet the opposite scenario carries its own risks. Should the summit’s goodwill prove short-lived, Vietnam would again face pressure to choose sides through technology restrictions, security partnerships, or investment screening. Its “bamboo diplomacy” depends on both giants tolerating ambiguity, and confrontation narrows that space.

A subtler implication concerns leverage. Vietnam’s value to Washington has rested on being both a counterweight and a manufacturing alternative, and warmer U.S.–China ties may dilute both roles, making its hedging less rewarded. Beijing, meanwhile, may read a softer American posture as the green light to push bilateral negotiations over the South China Sea, where the asymmetry between the two claimants is at its starkest.

Doubts over Washington’s commitments could also strain ASEAN cohesion, weakening the collective voice Vietnam needs on maritime issues, while visible concessions at sea would test the domestic legitimacy Hanoi draws from both economic growth and the defense of sovereignty.

Ultimately, both outcomes of the summit carry costs for Vietnam. Détente risks making Hanoi less relevant, while rivalry risks making its choices harder. In an era of “BANI” dynamics, stability between giants is not necessarily stability for those beside them, further forcing countries like Ha Noi to be highly adaptive.


Hang is a young researcher with academic experience in Vietnam and the United States. She has previously worked in public relations at the U.S. Consulate General in Ho Chi Minh City and the YSEALI Academy. Her research focuses on ASEAN centrality in the evolving Asia-Pacific landscape, with particular attention to Vietnam’s approach to trade, regional cooperation, and political economy in the face of external power dynamics and global volatility.

Editorial Deadline 29/09/2025 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Siu Tzyy Wei, Lead Editor - Maritime Crescent Desk

This week, the ship that travels across the Maritime Crescent begins to adjust its sails.

In Indonesia, the people watch their coal industry as an indigenous tycoon rises and an old Chinese-Indonesian dynasty retreating knowing very well that the presidency, more than the market, now decides who rises and who gets squeezed. As Brunei advances on its maritime engagements with its Southeast Asian partners through multilateral cooperation and information sharing, Malaysia navigates new waves of opportunities and concerns with its recent rise in the global passport rankings.

Where the sails turn, the stories continue.

Indonesia 🇮🇩

Here Be Dragons

by Rayhan Prabu Kusumo, in Jakarta

In September, one of Indonesia’s largest coal producers began to change hands at a startling price. Haji Isam, a Kalimantan tycoon and President Prabowo’s most generous backer, agreed to buy into Bayan Resources after an opening offer roughly eighty per cent below market value. Bayan, a company owned by a Chinese-Indonesian tycoon Low Tuck Kwong, had just been hobbled by the government’s own coal quota, which capped how much it could sell. In the same weeks, the Hartono family, the country’s richest and long known for keeping its money at home, was moving more than a billion dollars abroad.

The obvious reading is a changing of the guard — an indigenous tycoon rising and an old Chinese-Indonesian dynasty retreating. Jakarta commentators call it the Nine Haji displacing the Nine Dragons. The evidence is clear. When Danantara, the state’s new investment fund, needed capital, much of it came from the Chinese-Indonesian conglomerates it was supposedly superseding, which lined up to buy its Patriot Bonds. The families at the top are the ones that have been there for decades. What has changed is what it costs them to stay.

The new cost is subordination. Haji Isam buys where the state permits and runs the projects it hands him, including its flagship food estate in Merauke. The Hartonos move money offshore as insurance and still buy the Patriot Bond to stay in favour. Both are responding to the same fact: the presidency, more than the market, now decides who rises and who gets squeezed. The instruments are discretionary, things like a coal quota granted or withheld, a tax inquiry that ends with someone stopped at the airport, a presidential speech denouncing robber barons. This is what explains the Bayan price. The state’s quota made the company cheap, and the state’s favourite was positioned to buy it.

Governments have done this before. A leader who distrusts a wealthy class seldom abolishes it; he brings it to heel. After Khodorkovsky was jailed in 2003, Russia’s remaining oligarchs understood that their fortunes existed at the Kremlin’s pleasure. Those who complied kept their money, and those who resisted lost it or took it to London. Indonesia’s version is gentler, applied through tax probes and travel bans as opposed to prison sentences, but the principle is the same. Private wealth is tolerated while it is useful to the centre.

There is a real case for what Prabowo is doing. The tycoons built their fortunes on political protection and cheap access to resources, wealth is extremely concentrated and skewed along ethnic lines, and making them pay more into the common account is a defensible aim. The problem is the method. Disciplining capital through discretion merely renegotiates wealth and power, with fewer names on the list and one office choosing them. The tycoons understand this, which is why some are buying and some are leaving. Everyone else gets an investment climate in which the most valuable asset is proximity to the president.


Rayhan has a background in government affairs and public policy, with experience across government institutions and advisory firms. His work focuses on the intersection of geopolitics, policy, and risk, with expertise in advocacy, regulatory analysis, and stakeholder engagement. He holds a degree in Government from Universitas Padjadjaran, and has completed an exchange at Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Spain, focusing on global politics and sustainability.

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Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳

Multilateral Maritime Engagement: Brunei Hosts ReCAAP Cluster Meeting

by Wira Gregory Ejau, in Bandar Seri Begawan

From September 21 to 24, the Royal Brunei Police Force and the National Maritime Coordination Centre co-hosted the ReCAAP Information Sharing Centre Cluster Meeting 2026 in Bandar Seri Begawan, bringing together senior officials from Brunei, Cambodia, China, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam to exchange threat assessments and coordinate responses to maritime crime across the sub-region.

Alongside the Royal Brunei Police Force, Royal Brunei Armed Forces, and the Maritime and Port Authority, the meeting included representatives from Brunei Gas Carriers, Brunei Shell Petroleum, and Brunei LNG. The presence of these energy sector stakeholders at the maritime security forum highlights the growing importance of evolving maritime security threats for an LNG-exporting economy based in a largely peaceful country. Brunei’s hydrocarbon revenues depend on the uninterrupted movement of vessels, which the ReCAAP framework exists to secure, as maritime insecurity is a direct threat to the infrastructure underpinning national income.

The Assistant Commissioner of Police Haji Hamri Aslan, who also serves as ReCAAP ISC Governor for Brunei, framed the forum’s purpose beyond piracy in the following statement: “ReCAAP Focal Points in Southeast Asia face common security challenges such as armed robbery against ships, contraband smuggling, IUU fishing and irregular human migration.” While addressing piracy in the conventional sense has remained of utmost importance, the cluster meeting also reflects a threat environment that has broadened considerably into grey-zone issues that encompass fishing violations, smuggling networks, and migration pressures that engage coastguard, police, military, and civilian agencies simultaneously.

ReCAAP’s Half Year Report for January to June 2026 of this year recorded 35 incidents of armed robbery against ships in Asia, which was a 64% decrease from 96 incidents in the same period in 2025, and the lowest figure for any first half-year since 2019. The Straits of Malacca and Singapore (SOMS) have historically been one of the region’s most active hotspots, and accounted for 60% of total incidents, but did see a 74% year-on-year reduction. This was attributed explicitly to coordinated law enforcement action by the littoral states and visible countermeasures by the shipping industry, with Philippine ports and anchorages being the notable counter-trend, rising from zero to ten incidents in the same period.

The SOMS improvement is directly attributable to Indonesian enforcement arrests in 2025, which followed intelligence coordination through the information-sharing infrastructure that ReCAAP exists to provide. In part, the cluster meeting provided an opportunity to examine that model of cause and effect, along with what actionable information sharing was produced and how it could be replicated elsewhere in the network.

Brunei’s hosting role follows the SOCTPF co-chairmanship in June, PACIFIC ANGEL in August, and anticipates the 6th SOCTPF in 2027. The consistent thread is a state-building institutional presence across multiple security architectures simultaneously through convening capacity, information exchange, and multilateral hosting. In a regional security environment where the most persistent threats are transnational rather than interstate, that is a credible and sustainable form of contribution.


Gregory is an MSc candidate in Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He works as a freelance writer specializing in international history, conflict, and counterterrorism, with experience in academia, investigative journalism, and voluntary uniformed service. He currently provides research assistance with the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) under their Southeast Asian Security and Defence Internship Programme and conducts investigations on regional security and transnational crime for a confidential company.

Malaysia 🇲🇾

Power to Move

by Muhammad Aiman Bin Roszaimi, in Cyberjaya

Malaysia’s passport has climbed to second place in the 2026 Passport Index Global Ranking, sharing the position with Singapore and behind the United Arab Emirates. Malaysian passport holders now have access to 175 destinations, including 129 visa-free destinations and 46 offering visa-on-arrival access.

The achievement is certainly worth noting. The more interesting question is not how many countries Malaysians can visit without a visa, but why so many countries are willing to let Malaysians enter with relatively few barriers in the first place? Passport strength is, in part, a product of diplomacy.

Visa-free access does not emerge simply because a country has a strong economy. It is negotiated through bilateral relations, assessments of migration and security risks, reciprocity and perceptions of political stability. The passport can be understood as one small, everyday manifestation of that diplomatic network.

Yet there is an important caveat before celebrating the number too much. “Passport power” is not the same as national power.

The ranking measures mobility and access. It does not measure military capability, economic size, technological capacity, diplomatic influence or the ability to shape international institutions. Nevertheless, the passport ranking captures international openness; in an increasingly fragmented world where states are tightening borders, screening travellers more closely and introducing new immigration restrictions, the ability of Malaysian citizens to move relatively freely across borders represents a form of accumulated diplomatic capital.

For a trading country seeking foreign investment, tourism, international education, professional mobility and deeper economic integration, economic mobility also matters. Although Malaysia seeks to position itself as a middle power, the country still depends partly on connectivity by maintaining multilateral relationships and remaining sufficiently open to engage with diverse partners.

But there is also a lesson here for Malaysian diplomacy. Maintaining passport strength requires more than celebrating rankings. But it does suggest that Malaysian citizens inhabit a country whose diplomatic doors remain unusually open to the world. And in an era when more countries are building walls, that openness is itself a form of strategic capital.


Aiman is a PhD candidate in Security and Strategic Analysis at the National University of Malaysia. His research focuses on Malaysia’s space policy, ASEAN regional security, and the strategic implications of emerging technologies. His work explores how Malaysia’s defense policy and strategic culture shape its approach to outer space.

Editorial Deadline 26/09/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk

Some plans work exactly as intended right up until they don't. In Myanmar, junta leader Min Aung Hlaing sat for his first Western interview since the 2021 coup hoping to project a rebuilt image to the world, only for TIME's "dictator" headline to trigger a public ban on the outlet and drag back into view the war and economic collapse the interview was meant to distract from. In Thailand, Bangkok's declarations of climate resilience at the UN ran headlong into a very different reality at home, as monsoon flooding across all 50 districts forced the postponement of a national election and exposed how far the city's infrastructure lagged behind its pledges. And in Laos, months of quiet containment measures against African Swine Fever weren't enough to keep the disease from reaching Vientiane's dinner tables, pushing pork prices up 50% and closing off even the informal cross-border workarounds families relied on.

Myanmar 🇲🇲

Rare Western Interview Brings Myanmar Junta Back Into Spotlight

by Myat Moe Kywe

A rare interview granted by Myanmar’s military juntas to a major Western outlet has ignited a sharp domestic backlash this week, even as it exposes the junta’s broader campaign to rebuild credibility with both its regional neighbors and the West.

TIME magazine published the piece, titled “Myanmar’s Dictator Wants to Rebuild Ties With the West,” on September 23, based on an interview conducted at the President’s Office in Naypyidaw on August 28 between Min Aung Hlaing and TIME’s Editor-at-Large, Charlie Campbell. It marked Min Aung Hlaing’s first interview with Western media since he seized power in the 2021 coup, and came months after Campbell first pitched the interview towards Myanmar’s regime in late April under the working title “The Future of Myanmar,” framed around regime efforts toward peace and stability.

The final product was far from what Naypyidaw anticipated. TIME’s headline flatly labeled Min Aung Hlaing a “dictator,” and the article repeatedly referred to him as a military leader who “calls himself President,” language that appears to have particularly made the regime publish a condemnation statement against TIME and Campbell. The regime responded by blacklisting Campbell, demanding the story’s removal, and banning TIME in Myanmar, accusing the outlet of failing to accurately reflect the answers given and of including “non-constructive writing, interviews with other individuals and unfounded commentaries.”

Inside the story, Min Aung Hlaing used the platform to press for sanctions relief, framing renewed engagement as mutually beneficial for Myanmar and the international community. On the long-stalled Rohingya repatriation agreement, he tied progress to the rollback of legal challenges against the state, warning that without movement the matter becomes unresolvable. He was noncommittal on a possible amnesty for Aung San Suu Kyi, saying it depends on her, while leaving room for reconsideration on the military’s part.

The interview did not occur in isolation. It follows a deliberate pattern of outreach by Min Aung Hlaing toward fellow ASEAN states since his inauguration as president, including bi-lateral state visits to Laos, Thailand, Vietnam, and Cambodia — trips regional and international media have cast as a “diplomatic comeback tour” as reported on Straits Time. Combined with the TIME sit-down, observers read the moves as a coordinated push to normalize the regime’s standing on two fronts simultaneously: consolidating legitimacy within ASEAN while testing the waters for a reset with the West.

Yet the article’s broader reporting undercut that narrative. It documented a military stretched by a civil war showing no sign of ending, a failing economy that has contracted sharply since the coup alongside a weakened Myanmar Kyats and collapsing foreign investment, and a regime increasingly reliant on Beijing and Moscow for military and diplomatic support.

This week’s development has put Myanmar back into the international spotlight through a rare interview with its military leader. What was intended as an opportunity for the regime to present its case to the West instead produced a storyline to reignite the story of what is happening in Myanmar, with its subsequent backlash from the regime against TIME drawing further attention to the story and the wider realities it sought to present.


Myat is a B.A. graduate in Politics, Philosophy, and Economics. She has interned at The Asia Foundation in Washington, D.C., and she has also worked as a summer research assistant at the Centre for Policy and Innovation (CRPI), gaining experience in research and analysis. Her work focuses on civic engagement, gender, youth leadership, and community development.

Thailand 🇹🇭

How Heavy Rain and Structural Vulnerabilities Deepen Crisis Across Bangkok

by Paranut Juntree, in Bangkok

On September 26, 2026, the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA) expanded its emergency disaster declaration across all 50 districts of the capital. While framed as an immediate administrative step to unlock emergency relief funds and mobilize citywide support, the decision underscores a profound structural vulnerability for millions of residents and working-class communities struggling to navigate an inundated urban landscape.

The primary trigger for the acute flooding was a series of intense monsoon downpours exceeding 300 mm of accumulated rainfall over a short span. However, the severity of the flooding exposes deeper, systemic failures rooted in Bangkok’s unsustainable urban planning. Decades of uncoordinated development, concrete coverage, and the loss of natural water retention zones have left the low-lying metropolis severely constrained. Compounded by ongoing land subsidence, Bangkok’s aging canal network and pumping systems quickly reach capacity during severe downpours. Water trapped in secondary streets and residential sub-districts cannot discharge efficiently into the Chao Phraya River, creating protracted urban pools. To assist displaced citizens and vulnerable groups, the BMA had to open temporary shelter centers inside municipal schools, distributing sandbag barriers and mobilizing utility vehicles for stranded commuters.

This physical paralysis immediately spilled over into civic life, creating unexpected friction around democratic participation. A notable casualty of this emergency was the nationwide Social Security Board election. Originally scheduled for late September to choose employer and employee representatives, the election ran into severe logistical obstacles as major transit routes, polling venues, and administrative centers across Bangkok and nearby provinces became inundated. Recognizing that flooded roads and disrupted public transit would systematically disenfranchise millions of insured workers unable to reach polling booths, the Social Security Office (SSO) ultimately issued an emergency postponement. The delay illustrates how fragile infrastructure can compromise fundamental institutional and democratic processes.

The ongoing inundation on the ground stands in stark contrast to Thailand’s high-level diplomatic engagement at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). While Thai representatives at UNG highlight national commitments to climate adaption, carbon neutrality, and the Sustainable Development Goals, the paralysis across the country’s capital highlights an execution gap between international policy pledges and local resilience. While multilateral advocacy for loss-and-damage support remains essential, the domestic crisis demonstrates that global diplomacy must be grounded in immediate, functional urban adaptation at home.

To uphold the country’s commitments to public safety and long-term climate resilience, the Thai government and municipal leaders should establish clear operational frameworks to safeguard urban communities from recurring climate disasters. Guaranteeing climate-resilient infrastructure and institutional adaption would ensure domestic governance aligns with international standards without compromising democratic participation and public safety.


Paranut has a background in advocacy, with experience in policy research, communications, and civic engagement across both the NGO and government sectors. As Thailand’s Youth Delegate to the United Nations, he represented Thai youth in global dialogues on migration, education, and human rights, championing inclusive policymaking. He holds a degree in political science with a specialization in international relations.

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Lao PDR 🇱🇦

Swine Fever Outbreak Widens Across Laos

by Thongsavanh Souvannasane, in Vientiane

Pork has all but vanished from some markets in Vientiane Capital, and the Lao-style barbecue buffets that Lao people love for their sliced pork belly are quietly swapping in beef and buffalo to keep the grills running.

The cause lies hundreds kilometers away, where African Swine Fever (ASF) has torn through 15 districts across seven provinces, killing or forcing the culling of nearly 13,000 pigs nationwide.

As of 17 September, 9,066 pigs died from the disease and a further 3,688 culled to break the chain of transmission.

The outbreak traces back to Namtuan village, Xayabouly district, in mid-June, when it had reached only two provinces. Within weeks, it swept through 38 villages across six districts of Xayabouly and 17 villages in Bountai district, Phongsaly Province.

ASF is a highly contagious viral disease affecting domestic and wild pigs, with a mortality rate close to 100 percent in infected animals, according to the World Organisation for Animal Health. It does not infect humans, though people can spread it between pigs through contaminated clothing, equipment, or food. Its economic toll is severe nonetheless, wiping out herds and disrupting pork supply chains from farm to kitchen.

This is not Laos’ first brush with the virus, which struck first in March 2019 in Toumlan district, Salavanh Province, in the south, before spreading nationwide and subsiding within a year, aided by COVID-19 border closures that limited the movement that spread it. This time, the disease has taken root far to the north, beginning in Xayabouly Province.

Officials blame illegal smuggling, unregulated pork trading, and farmers secretly selling meat from dead pigs at cut-rate prices, a practice that only accelerates the spread.

The government has moved to contain it.

The Prime Minister’s Office issued a notice on 10 September banning pork imports from abroad and tightening monitoring of pig movement between provinces. Xayabouly has gone further, banning the purchase, sale, and transport of pigs outright and setting up 19 checkpoints at border crossings and district and provincial boundaries.

Response teams have buried and disinfected infected livestock and distributed disinfectant, dewormer, and insecticide to affected farms.

Back in the capital, the squeeze is showing up in wallets.

Pork prices have jumped from a typical LAK 60,000 to 70,000 (USD 2.7 to 3.1) per kg to as high as LAK 90,000 (USD 4), even though authorities have not confirmed an outbreak in Vientiane Capital itself. Beef has followed, rising from around LAK 160,000 (USD 7.1) to between LAK 170,000 and 200,000 (USD 7.6 and 8.9) as shoppers switch over.

Residents who once crossed the Mekong bridges into Thailand for cheaper meat can no longer carry it back across the border, closing off one of the last workarounds left.

For now, with the outbreak still active and no end in sight, shoppers, restaurateurs, and farmers alike, in Vientiane and beyond, are left to adjust.

Thongsavanh is a journalist from Laos with a background in English-language media. He graduated from the Lao-American Institute with a Diploma of the Arts in English and contributes to independent news platforms. His reporting focuses on environmental issues, socio-economic development, and geopolitics.

Cambodia 🇰🇭

Cambodia Stock Index Soars to 4-Year High in August Trading Boom

by Malai Yatt, in Phnom Penh

Strong company fundamentals and resilient economic sentiment sparked a massive market rally on the Cambodia Securities Exchange in August, boosting daily trading volumes by roughly 300 percent over early 2026 averages as both local and institutional investors flooded the market.

In August, 2026, the market condition on the Cambodia Securities Exchange (CSX) gained

strong interest and active participation, with trading activity, trading volume, and share price surging sharply even as the annual dividend payout season has come to an end.

According to CSX’s official report, in August, the CSX Index closed at 541.02, an increase of 18 percent during the month and up nearly 28 percent over the first eight months of the year. Exceptionally, on August 26th, the index soared to 560.09, marking its highest level in the last four years (since March, 2022).

Furthermore, the average daily trading value in August reached KHR 3,175 million (almost $800,000), increasing approximately 300% compared to the daily figure across the first seven months of 2026.

“This positive momentum was driven by several key factors such as share prices remained

appealing relative to corporate potential and business fundamentals, historical dividend yields were strong, and listed companies reported positive financial performance and healthy growth in Q2, 2026”

CSX reported that 2,006 new trading accounts were opened in August alone, reflecting widespread public awareness and growing interest in the opportunity of generating additional income through equity investments. Alongside rising liquidity, investor participation also remarkably set a new record.

The actual figures testify to the resilient growth potential of Cambodia’s capital market. The

expansion of investor participation serves as a vital catalyst for the CSX to further broaden its services, develop new financial products, and modernize its technology infrastructure to serve a broader range of the interests of investors, the report added.

On September 10, Hong Sokhour, Royal Government Delegate in charge as CEO of the CSX confirmed that “CSX has a total of 28 listed companies, comprising 12 equity-listed companies and 16 corporate bond-listed companies. Collectively, these 28 companies have successfully raised approximately $720 million from the securities market.

Regarding the market performance, the average daily trading volume for the first eight months of 2026 increased by nearly 150 percent compared to 2025, with average daily trading value rising to $290,000, he added.

Overall, the CSX is experiencing sustained, resilient growth, driven by strong corporate performance, attractive dividend yields, and solid business fundamentals. This broadening public interest and institutional backing are providing a strong participation to expand its financial products.

Editorial Deadline 26/09/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Karen David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk

This week in the Pacific Corridor, we roll out the red carpet as we take a look at two of the region’s most high-profile and powerful families. In Vietnam, Thailand’s royal family makes a rare State Visit to Hanoi. But just beneath the pomp and circumstance of this royal affair, there lies the nitty-gritty goal of strengthening the economic ties between Vietnam and Thailand.

In the Philippines, the September 21 anniversary of the declaration of Martial Law has stirred not-so-distant memories of the Marcos political dynasty. With another Marcos as President, debates and discussions abound on the all-too-familiar topic of corruption. Can the current Marcos live up to his aspiration as an anti-corruption reformer, or is he all talk?

Away from the spotlight, in Timor-Leste, a growing wave of scam call center operations has brought growing concern — especially when the mastermind has yet to be found. Singapore is facing much the same conundrum: we take a look back to the start of the year, with the city-state confronting its own rise in scams.

Vietnam 🇻🇳

Beyond the Pageantry

by Tri Vo, in Ho Chi Minh City

Amidst the intensifying geopolitical contention within and without Southeast Asia, regional integration on a country-to-country basis is rapidly emerging as an effective countermeasure against the undulating waves of instability. Such a geopolitical chess move is being made under the spectacle of normal diplomatic engagements, under all the pomp and circumstance of international relations.

From 14 to 16 September, Thailand’s King Maha Vajiralongkorn and Queen Suthida embarked on a historic State Visit to Hanoi, marking the first such royal visit since the two nations established relations 50 years ago in 1976. While the ceremonial aspects of the trip heavily highlighted the diplomatic banality of deepening political trust and cultural affinity, the in-depth agenda, one that was out of sight and out of mind of the media as a whole, was firmly grounded in structural economic alignment. Indeed, beyond the outward pageantry, the visit was meant to accelerate the upgrade of Thailand–Vietnam bilateral relations into the tier of Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, thus binding the ties between the two nations ever more tightly.

The primary economic mandate of this partnership is the rapid and sustainable expansion of bilateral trade. In 2025, bilateral trade reached a mark of nearly US$22.1 billion. With such powerful momentum at their backs, policymakers from both Bangkok and Hanoi have eyed an aggressive immediate goal of US$25 billion. Yet, the sky has proved to be the limit even with so lofty a figure. Even as commercial relations are running red hot, diplomats and trade officials are actively laying the groundwork to push this figure toward an even more ambitious ballpark of US$50 billion in the longer term.

To achieve these massive trade volumes, Hanoi and Bangkok are rapidly implementing the “Three Connects” strategy. This framework targets the physical and institutional integration of supply chains, the alignment of grassroots business operations, and synchronized sustainable development strategies. Crucially, such a strategy is moving far beyond just trade. Recent high-level commercial exchanges have explicitly propounded bilateral cooperation in emerging fields such as artificial intelligence, semiconductor manufacturing, and biotechnology. Thailand has also offered to share its advanced capabilities in space technology and satellite utilization, further strengthening the economic ties between the two nations, not just on a superficial surface of ever-rising trade figures, but also on an even more meaningful level of engagement between the best and the brightest of both.

Ultimately, the Thai Royal Visit is not merely a commemoration of a fruitful 50-year relationship; it is a signal of two countries moving together, tying their bonds ever tighter under a more adverse milieu. As the world becomes more unstable, both nations are building mutual trust to the highest possible level, so that barriers may come undone, doubts may be unmade, and a new framework of partnership may emerge anew so that what will be is a Southeast Asia more interconnected and well-prepared to head off the challenges of the time. Such is the promise of deeper Vietnamese–Thai ties that it can serve as a stark reminder of the staying salience of bilateral relations within the larger bloc of ASEAN to act as a bedrock for group-wise solidarity.


Tri has experience in management consulting and strategy, having worked with institutions such as the UNDP, The Asia Group, and ARC Group. He has provided strategic, legal, and operational insights to clients in sectors including manufacturing, energy, and technology. He holds both academic and professional experience related to Southeast and East Asia, with a focus on regional development and policy.

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The Philippines 🇵🇭

The Dynasty That Outlived the Dictatorship

by Eduardo G. Fajermo Jr., in Angeles City

The Philippines did not celebrate Martial Law on 21 September 2026. It commemorated its victims by confronting its unfinished reckoning with power. Marches in Manila and Iloilo City tied the dictatorship’s legacy to alleged corruption in flood control projects and to the dynastic system protesters say protects impunity.

The symbolism was unavoidable: Ferdinand Marcos Jr., son of the former dictator, was the president receiving those demands. His father’s formal military rule lasted from 1972 to 1981, and the Philippine government later recognized 11,103 victims eligible for reparations for killings, disappearances, torture, and arbitrary detention.

The immediate grievance was the continuing controversy over failed or allegedly nonexistent flood control projects, which had already triggered major demonstrations in 2025. Progressive organization Sanlakas said protesters refused to forget both the horrors of Martial Law and the “impunity of corruption” exposed by the scandal.

In Iloilo, remembrance became a direct challenge to inherited political power. Former legislator Raoul Manuel argued that replacing individual officials would not repair a system that passes public office between relatives, while Jaro Archbishop Midyphil Billones urged Filipinos not merely to move on, but to “move forward” carrying history’s lessons.

Days earlier, the Supreme Court unanimously held that Congress has a constitutional duty to enact an anti-political dynasty law. Although the 1987 Constitution has mandated such a prohibition for nearly four decades and the House of Representatives approved a bill in June, no completed law had reached the president by the anniversary.

Political kinship is not proof of corruption, and a family name is not evidence of guilt. Yet when the same clans influence nominations, budgets, contractors, and succession, political competition narrows, oversight becomes personal, and citizens face formidable barriers to entering public life.

The historical connection between abuse and plunder is already written into Philippine law. The 2013 reparations statute allocated PHP10 billion, plus interest, from Swiss deposits adjudged by the Supreme Court to be ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses — using recovered assets to compensate victims of the same regime.

Corruption is therefore not simply money missing from a ledger. A ghost or substandard flood control project becomes a flooded home, a closed business, a missed wage, and a disrupted supply chain when the next typhoon arrives.

For ASEAN governments, investors and development partners, this is more than a Philippine political dispute. Corruption in one of the world’s most disaster-exposed states turns climate risk into preventable economic loss, weakens confidence in infrastructure spending, and undermines ASEAN’s aspiration to be a rules-based, people-centred community.

Marcos Jr. has attempted to place himself on the side of accountability. In July, he told Congress he was “not the president of my family,” while promising to pursue cases even when they touched allies or relatives. His cousin, former House Speaker Martin Romualdez, has denied the allegations.

The Palace has also said Marcos respects peaceful protest and that investigations will continue regardless of political ties. Political scientist Jean Encinas-Franco supplied the appropriate standard: “Rhetoric is fine, but actions are better.”

The son is not legally responsible for the father’s crimes, but the president is politically responsible for whether today’s government makes power less hereditary, procurement more transparent, and accountability non-negotiable. That requires independent investigations, open contracts, protected whistleblowers, public tracking of infrastructure projects, and an anti-dynasty law capable of preventing both simultaneous family control and choreographed succession.

A democracy that remembers torture but tolerates plunder has learned only half the lesson. In 2026, “Never Again” must also mean never again allowing public office, public money, and public memory to be captured by the few.


Eduardo is a faculty member at Holy Angel University, where he teaches courses on Philippine history and contemporary global issues. He is currently pursuing a Master’s degree in Political Science at the University of Santo Tomas, with a research focus on disaster governance, environmental politics, and the urban poor in the Philippines.

Timor-Leste 🇹🇱

Who is Behind the Scam Call Center Operations in Timor-Leste?

by Amandina Maria Helena da Silva, in Dili

The growing wave of scam call centers emerging across Timor-Leste is not merely a serious public concern — it is creating a deep political dilemma for the government, fueling growing speculation that some powerful figures within the ruling establishment may be protecting or supporting those behind these operations.

In July 2026 until now, Timor-Leste’s Scientific Criminal Investigation Police (PCIC), together with the National Strategic Intelligence Service, identified scam call center operations around the city of Dili, including in other municipalities like Oecusse and Liquiçá. Nearly 600 people were arrested during a police crackdown in Dili that was reported by ABC Australia — but not the mastermind.

In response to this case, the Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão directly accompanied the PCIC’ operations to dismantle and arrest the operator of these scam call centers. Through this operation, the Prime Minister also affirmed and declared that there is zero tolerance for the practice of illegal activities in Timor-Leste.

The discovery of scam call center operations in several parts of Timor-Leste has sparked growing public concern, with many people taking to social media and news sites to voice their views and raise questions. According to the director of human rights organization AJAR-TL, José Luis Oliveira, the growing invasion of online scam networks poses a serious threat to Timor-Leste’s future, including to the integrity and effectiveness of the country’s judicial system. Besides that, FRETILIN Secretary General Mari Alkatiri affirmed in Timor Post News that PM Xanana Gusmão should identify who facilitates foreign nationals to operate scam call centers in Timor-Leste — not just target operators who may themselves be victims.

Alongside the scam and mafia online operations flourishing in Timor-Leste, CNRT members in the National Parliament (PN) confirmed that they would sign a letter of political affirmation to ask PM Xanana Gusmão, as well as the CNRT Party President, to dismiss the President of the Council of Ministers, Agio Pereira Alves, because the CNRT regrets that some political figures have been linked to the operation of scam call centers in the country.

The above situations have attracted the attention of everyone including civil society. As said by Luta Hamutuk in Journal Independent, this shows that CNRT wants to promote the Mafia to hold power. However, Rafa News reported that PM Xanana Gusmão confirmed that he will not dismiss Agio Pereira from his role as Presidency of the Council of Ministers.

This dynamic creates controversy and contradictions. At the same time, the defendants in online fraud cases totaling 141 allegedly fled the territory of Timor-Leste — but the Executive Director of the Migration Service Assistant Commissioner of Police Jorge Monteiro said that he has not received official information about these individuals.

This leaves people asking: how did the accused manage to leave without Immigration knowing? And who helped them escape? This is not just about a weak border system — it is about accountability. People deserve to know how this happened, who was responsible, and whether anyone will be held accountable. If not, we will sacrifice our sovereignty for the mafia to control.


Amandina is a human rights advocate working with Asia Justice and Rights Timor-Leste on the Interim Reparation to Women Survivors project. She previously worked with UNDP Timor-Leste’s Accelerator Lab and has contributed to human rights and health initiatives through several youth and civil society organisations. Her interests lie in justice, youth empowerment, and community-based social change in Timor-Leste.

Singapore 🇸🇬

Navigating Truth in the Modern Digital Age

by Jennifer Hui En Tan, in Singapore

Note: This article was first published in Issue 30 of the Pacific Corridor on 9 January 2026.

Global connectivity through technological devices has grown rapidly throughout the last few decades. However, so have scam cases and online misinformation through the rapid development of artificial intelligence (AI) and deepfake software, making media literacy more important than ever. In the first half of 2025 alone, Singaporeans reportedly lost SGD 456 million to scams; measures such as the Protection from Online Falsehood and Manipulation Act (POFMA) are thus put in place to protect Singaporeans against misinformation. Media literacy is essential to Singapore’s societal wellbeing and national security, ensuring that citizens are equipped to recognize and navigate digital threats.

The ability to perceive deception and false information online has proven to be more critical now more than ever. Scam cases have cost Singapore SGD 3.4 billion since 2019 and SGD 1.1 billion in 2024 alone. The overall rise and accessibility to AI has shifted the dynamic and forced individuals to be more attentive with the content they see, with three quarters of Singaporeans concerned with the rise of deepfakes used in scams. Beyond scams, the overall rise in AI and deepfakes have also caused a rise in the spread of misinformation. During the 2025 General Elections, experts cautioned Singaporeans against misinformation through foreign interference.

Singapore has identified and is working to target such concerns by encouraging media literacy and preventing cyber threats through a multitude of angles. The Media Literacy Council, supported by the Singapore Infocomm Media Development Authority, develops and supports initiatives under the Digital for Life Movement, a project aiming to expand digital skills and encourage informed digital use. Besides education, Singapore has pushed against scams by implementing stricter laws against scammers. Since 30 December 2025, Singapore has implemented mandatory caning for scammers and given authorities the power to freeze accounts related to such activities. The POFMA, which was passed in 2019, empowers authorities to issue correction directions, remove harmful content, and limit the spread of misleading information that could undermine public trust or social stability. These efforts reflect Singapore’s approach to fostering a safer digital environment for the state.

The rapid rise in misinformation and scams are highly relevant to ASEAN, as misinformation has become a regional challenge, which threatens political stability and social trust. For instance, in the Philippines, AI-generated disinformation has intensified political tensions, exemplified by the 15 July 2025 incident where a woman discovered fabricated videos of her deceased brother being circulated to discredit her and advance political agendas. Malaysia faces similar vulnerabilities, with political actors commonly weaponizing disinformation to damage opponents’ reputations. The persistent use of false information for political gain highlights Malaysia’s ongoing struggle with digital manipulation and underscores the broader regional need for stronger media literacy and cross-border cooperation against misinformation.

In sum, the rapid rise of misinformation and scams underscores the urgent need for stronger media literacy efforts in Singapore and across ASEAN. Singapore’s approach illustrates how states can strengthen societal resilience. Yet cases from the Philippines and Malaysia demonstrate that misinformation remains a shared regional challenge, capable of influencing politics, eroding trust, and destabilizing communities. As ASEAN becomes more digitally interconnected, cultivating a well-informed and discerning citizenry is essential to safeguarding national security, preserving social cohesion, and ensuring a safer digital future for the region.


Jennifer is a final-year International Relations student at the Singapore Institute of Management, where she focuses on political engagement, diplomacy, and community governance. She is an active volunteer in her constituency, working closely with residents to understand local concerns, facilitate dialogue, and support community initiatives.

Editorial Deadline 21/09/2025 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Siu Tzyy Wei, Lead Editor - Maritime Crescent Desk

Across the Maritime Crescent, governance has always been recorded - on palm leaves, in policy briefs, in ministerial mandates. The lontar manuscripts of the Malay Archipelago were never meant to be permanent - they were inscribed on material that requires tending, reading and renewal to survive.

This week, the stories ask of the aforementioned three qualities of sustainability. Brunei, a small state continues to deliberate where it fits within its relationship with BRICS. Malaysia’s haze response, still underwhelming, pleads for a framework that has yet to be held to account. In Indonesia, a ministerial exit raises questions on how power moves in the archipelago.

The walls stand. The question is how long before delayed maintenance becomes too late.

Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳

As BRICS Expands, Where Does Brunei Fit?

by Syimah Johari, in Bandar Seri Begawan

Following the recent BRICS summit in New Delhi where leaders discussed reform of global governance, trade, development, energy, technology and the broader role of the Global South, the grouping continues to expand its engagement beyond its membership. With several Southeast Asian countries now participating as members or partners, geopolitical and economic dynamics in the region are evolving. Where, then, does a small ASEAN state fit within an increasingly diversified diplomatic landscape?

Several ASEAN countries are already engaging with BRICS in different capacities. Indonesia is a member, while Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam are among the grouping partner’s countries. Their participation provides additional channels for engagement with BRICS members and broader discussions on issues affecting the Global South. For Brunei, this creates both opportunities and deliberations. Although Brunei may not need to join BRICS to benefit from its expanding networks, it will need to monitor how the grouping affects ASEAN cohesion, regional economic competition and the balance of relations among China, Russia, India and other major powers.

The implications are particularly relevant to Brunei’s trade and energy interests. BRICS gather large markets and major economies, including energy producers. For Brunei, greater engagement among neighbouring ASEAN economies with BRICS could create avenues to diversify exports, attract investment and develop cooperation in energy, food security, technology and infrastructure. At the same time, closer economic ties with individual BRICS members would require careful management to avoid excessive dependence on any one market or partner.

Diplomatically, Brunei’s existing relationships with China and India, alongside its wider ties with other BRICS members, can give the sultanate room to engage through bilateral relationships and ASEAN-led platforms. For a small state, this flexibility can be valuable. Brunei can continue to engage in areas such as development, maritime cooperation and global governance while keeping ASEAN at the centre of its regional diplomacy. Rather than viewing BRICS as a choice between alignment and distance, Brunei could approach its growing presence in Southeast Asia as another avenue for dialogue and cooperation.

As BRICS cultivates a stronger presence in Southeast Asia, it is becoming part of the diplomatic and economic landscape surrounding Brunei. For Brunei, the question may not be whether to align itself closer to BRICS, but more about how to do so while keeping ASEAN at the centre of its regional outlook. For a small state like Brunei, maintaining that flexibility could allow it to build new economic and diplomatic partnerships without narrowing the relationships it already has.


Syimah is a graduate of King’s College London with a BA in International Relations. With a strong focus on diplomacy, regional cooperation, and development policy, she is passionate about contributing to meaningful change through public service. Currently, she is involved in poverty alleviation work through a local NGO.

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Malaysia 🇲🇾

Time’s Ticking

by Edrina Lisa Ozaidi, in WP Kuala Lumpur

Malaysia’s air quality continues to worsen, pushing Air Pollutant Index (API) readings into alarming rates. Yet again, the country finds itself stuck in a frustrating cycle. Fueled by El Niño, the current haze emergency has laid bare deep institutional fatigue.

As public health warnings continue to roll out, a hard look at the current administrative responses reveals a troubled reality; the state mechanisms are sluggish, reactive and disconnected from the much needed proactive agility. Is the current administration doing enough for the haze emergency compared to the past?

Currently, Malaysia’s tactics against the seasonal haze rely on both domestic containment strategies and regional diplomacy. The Department of Environment (DOE) constantly tracks real-time data through the Air Pollutant Index Management System (APIMS), which local authorities and state disaster committees use to coordinate emergency actions when the readings spike and, of course, provide open-source data for the public.

State governments have deployed targeted solutions like localised cloud-seeding operations to induce rainfall over heavily polluted pockets, alongside clamping down on domestic open burning permits. Healthwise, the Ministry of Health (MOH) issued continuous advisories and public messaging through various media networks. However, despite decades of experience with transboundary haze, the crisis continues to recur with punishing intensity.

Malaysia remains structurally hamstrung by its reliance on regional frameworks like the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution. Because enforcement depends on neighbouring political will and complex corporate concessions, diplomatic protocols lag in stopping fires at the sources, thus creating a transboundary deadlock.

The Human Rights Commission of Malaysia (SUHAKAM) has repeatedly pointed out that Malaysia lacks a dedicated Clean Air Act. Without a solid legal framework, domestic standards and broader public-interest litigation rights, environmental enforcement often defaults to fragmented local bylaws rather than a national mandate.

Public frustration also continues to build on the Ministry of Health (MOH) and the Ministry of Education (MOE). During past episodes, state distribution of genuine N95 masks to vulnerable communities were with far greater urgency. In contrast, recent policy responses have been lackluster, seen in the sharp incline of asthma and upper respiratory tract infections (URTI). For low-income families, advocating to wear appropriate masks without subsidised distribution amounts to an empty mandate.

Under standard guidelines, school closure are triggered only when the API threshold crosses critical limits, leaving students and teachers to endure the bad air condition long before administrative takeover. The pivot to home-based learning only arrived after public outcry and even then, initiatives or help for working parents were not established. Despite experience, better policies for working parents during school closure are an afterthought.

The recurring haze is no longer a surprise weather anomaly. Malaysia needs to move past its slow reactions and expedite the process of delivering a solid framework that holds its stakeholders rightfully and fully accountable.


Edrina is a communications professional with a background in international relations. She holds a degree from the University of Nottingham Malaysia and has worked across public relations and social media for organizations in the development, education, and corporate sectors. Her work focuses on crafting narratives around regional affairs and strengthening media engagement across Southeast Asia.

Indonesia 🇮🇩

No Surprise Here

by Gemala Asyura, in Pekanbaru

One would usually postpone answering a phone call during an important meeting, but Purbaya was told to pick up his phone right away. He stepped away to answer it, only to find out that he had been effectively and immediately terminated from his role. He never returned to the meeting. Within hours, the position was handed over to his deputy, Suahasil Nazara. Purbaya’s removal also followed the abrupt resignation of Bank Indonesia Governor Perry Warjiyo weeks earlier, intensifying scrutiny of Indonesia’s economic leadership.

President Prabowo Subianto appointed Purbaya Yudhi Sadewa as finance minister in September last year, replacing Sri Mulyani Indrawati amid the 2025 protests. Two top officials leaving so close together suggests something more - perhaps real instability at the top of Indonesia’s economic leadership. So what actually triggered it? All signs point to one thing, a reshuffle of officials at Customs and Tax, just four days before he was fired. Purbaya himself said the firing was “partly” about an internal staff reshuffle at the ministry. He insists he didn’t disagree with Prabowo on policy, just with some other officials.

On September 10, Purbaya rotated around 350 to 400 officials across the Finance Ministry. Most of them worked at two agencies, The Directorate General of Taxes and the Directorate General of Customs and Excise (Bea Cukai). While Purbaya has been shaking up Bea Cukai in recent months, investors like Fitch and Moody’s have cut Indonesia’s credit outlook. Moreover, the rupiah hit historic lows under Purbaya. So the firing may have been about both internal friction and market pressure at the same time.

In early 2026, Prabowo wanted to disband Bea Cukai entirely and outsource its functions to the Swiss surveillance firm Société Générale de Surveillance (SGS), a system Indonesia had used decades earlier during the New Order era. So why did Purbaya’s September reshuffle draw the President’s attention quickly?

One possible explanation is that it touched people closer to Prabowo himself. Customs Director General Djaka Budhi Utama wasn’t just any official. According to The Star, citing Reuters, he got handpicked directly by Prabowo, and was a former member of Prabowo’s special forces team. When Purbaya rotated officials under Djaka without his agreement, it may have read less as routine institutional cleanup and more as a move affecting figures within the President’s own network.

In hindsight, Purbaya is the eighth minister replaced across six separate waves of reshuffles within Prabowo’s Kabinet Merah Putih (Red and White Cabinet) in just 23 months. That’s an average of one reshuffle wave roughly every four months since Prabowo took office, making cabinet turnover a defining feature of his presidency rather than a rare event.

This also raises the question of whether Prabowo is relying too heavily on his power to reshuffle the cabinet. The President has the prerogative right, but using it eight times in under two years without clear proof of improvement makes it fair to ask whether this power is being used to fix real problems, or just to keep control over people close to him.


Gemala holds a degree in International Relations, with a focus on contemporary global issues. In addition to her years of undergraduate study, she has hands-on experience in early childhood education, having worked in both teaching and teaching assistant roles. She now pursues journalism as a practical extension of her academic background, with a focus and scope centered on ASEAN regional dynamics and social issues.

Editorial Deadline 19/09/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk

This week's headlines run from floodwaters to backroom diplomacy, but the thread connecting them is who gets left to clean up the mess. In Thailand, Bangkok Climate Action Week puts youth advocates at the center of the city's green agenda, though funding and educational support still lag the enthusiasm. Meanwhile, Cambodia hosts its first international conference on combating online scams even as U.S. lawmakers and rights groups question whether the crackdown reaches the officials allegedly protecting the scammers.

As for Myanmar and Laos, this week our coverage follows up on previous stories, looking at Vietnam's foreign minister makes the first bilateral visit to Myanmar since the 2021 coup and at the toll of Laos’ recent floodings.

Thailand 🇹🇭

From Climate Citizens to Bangkok Climate Action Week 2026

by Natamon Aumphin, in Bangkok

Bangkok Climate Action Week 2026 (BKKCAW) is just around the corner, from 3-11 October, 2026, led by Just Transition Incubator (JUTI) in collaboration with the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA) and partners. The event reflects the core Bangkok mission under the current Bangkok Governor Chadchart Sittipunt: to make Bangkok liveable socially and economically. The event encompasses diverse stakeholders, ranging from governmental entities to civil societies, and expands the scope so it is relevant to everyone.

Leo Horn-Phathanothai, founder of JUTI and co-chair of BKKCAW steering committee, highlighted that climate is similar to economy. It is a reflection of policy decisions and political will, which needs people’s participation and consent. This way BKKCAW 2026 is not merely just another climate event, but is rather a third space for the public to gather, track progress, and be active in the green agenda, which align with broader ASEAN goals and could enable regional cooperation. To effectively forward the agenda, everyone has to be involved including youth.

Benyapa Achariyakaroon, founder of Green Youth, a youth-led environmental organization aiming to create accessible climate education, said that being able to participate in BKKCAW 2026 means more opportunities to raise awareness about climate change to a wider audience. By expanding how climate change can affect job security as a whole, she hopes that the public will find climate education more relevant in their daily lives and gain new understanding of the topic through career workshops and panel talks.

As a youth working in environmental advocacy for over four years, Benyapa applauded Bangkok for having youth participation in green spaces. Nonetheless, she voiced her concerns about building the next generations of environmental advocates due to the lack of educational support, funding, and public understanding in climate advocacy. Although she sees more effort, space for youth participation in the climate agenda is still limited, which undermines the goal to achieve green agendas of the city, country, and ASEAN because of the lack of bottom-up efforts.

She highlighted that, to make environmental advocacy sustainable, it is imperative to have educational structure to prepare youth to be long-term agents of change, guiding support to raise funds for projects, as well as public endorsement through policy. Because people cannot escape from the impact of climate change, she urges the public to think more about building a liveable planet and have faith in change. Before ending the interview, she stressed the importance of people’s pressure and community-centered approach, saying that these are the two key points to enable change from a small unit which could have an impact to the broader society.


Natamon has served as a rapporteur at the Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS Thailand). She has also worked as a research assistant on diplomatic issues in Southeast Asia. Her work focuses on how domestic politics shape foreign policy in the region. She holds a degree in international relations and has experience in policy analysis, event reporting, and regional research.

Cambodia 🇰🇭

Cambodia to Host First International Conference on Combating Online Scams

by Chandara Samban, in Kandal

Cambodia is set to host its first international conference on combating online scams from September 23 to 24, 2026. Experts and representatives from approximately 20 countries are expected to attend, alongside the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and INTERPOL, which are collaborating on the event.

The conference aims to achieve three key objectives: first, to develop a deeper understanding of the complex evolution of the online scam ecosystem; second, to strengthen international cooperation in law enforcement; and third, to facilitate the exchange of experiences and best practices in combating this modern form of crime.

The Cambodian government has presented the hosting of the conference as a positive development, particularly in anticipation of the potential adoption of significant documents outlining joint international efforts to tackle technology-facilitated crimes.

However, as Cambodia prepares to host this major international conference, the government under Prime Minister Hun Manet has implemented a series of rigorous measures against online scam operations. These include large-scale nationwide crackdowns, the arrest of alleged key ringleaders such as Chen Zhi and his associates, and a months-long campaign that has resulted in the deportation of tens of thousands of foreign nationals.

The government has also cited its October ban on online casino gambling as another positive outcome of its enforcement efforts. Between July 2025 and August 2026, authorities reportedly investigated 830 suspected locations and conducted raids on 663 sites, dismantling 86 large-scale online scam operations and expelling more than 20,000 foreign suspects.

Nevertheless, concerns over the effectiveness of these efforts persist, as reflected in recent reports, calls for further investigations and sanctions against individuals allegedly involved, and indications that online scam activities continue to emerge.

Notably, in mid-September, U.S. Representatives Brian Mast, Chair of the Foreign Affairs Subcommittee, and John Moolenaar, Chair of the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party, wrote to the U.S. government requesting a 180-day investigation into several influential Cambodian figures, including Hun To, a nephew of former Prime Minister Hun Sen; Sar Sokha, Minister of Interior; Dy Vichea, Deputy National Police Chief; and Neth Savoeun, National Police Chief, among other senior officials.

The lawmakers alleged that these individuals may be facilitating or enabling criminal organizations to conduct online scam operations through corruption or complicity. They argued that sanctions against individuals involved, particularly influential figures, are necessary to make anti-scam efforts more effective. They also claimed that scam activities have continued despite previous Cambodian government crackdowns, which they characterized as ineffective and associated with human rights concerns.

Another report, released in mid-September by the U.S.-based National Democratic Institute (NDI), highlighted gaps in Cambodia’s crackdown efforts, particularly in relation to accountability, political factors, and financial networks, which the report said are hindering further progress.

This comes despite previous Cambodian enforcement actions and the freezing of more than $300 million in assets. The NDI report also pointed to allegations that certain influential Cambodian figures are implicated in, or allegedly provide protection for, online scam operations.

Cambodian Minister of Information Neth Pheaktra described the hosting of the international conference as a reflection of Cambodia’s political will to crack down on and prevent online scams. He called for unified international cooperation, emphasizing that the issue is a global challenge rather than one facing Cambodia alone. He also noted that Cambodia itself has been a victim of online scams and has previously worked with various countries to address the problem.

However, attention will now turn to the outcomes of the international conference and the measures that follow. These could provide an opportunity for Cambodia, a small Southeast Asian nation to strengthen its capacity to combat online scams and other technology-related crimes, particularly as it continues to face criticism from parts of the international community over the limited results of previous crackdowns.


Chandara is a freelance journalist with a focus on foreign affairs, security issues, and ASEAN affairs. He also serves as a Junior Counterterrorism Intelligence Analyst.

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Myanmar 🇲🇲

Vietnam Expands Bilateral Cooperation with Myanmar

by Moe Thiri Myat

Vietnamese Foreign Minister Lê Hoài Trung visited Nay Pyi Taw on 26 August, marking the first bilateral visit by a Vietnamese foreign minister to Myanmar since the 2021 military coup. During the visit, Trung and Myanmar Foreign Minister Tin Maung Swe co-chaired the 10th Vietnam–Myanmar Joint Committee for Bilateral Cooperation, reviving a mechanism that had not met since March 2019. The meeting followed the exchange of new ambassadors in July and reviewed cooperation across government, parliament, local authorities and people-to-people ties.

The visit also broadened cooperation in defence, security and technology. The two sides agreed to expand delegation exchanges, military training and young-officer exchanges, alongside cooperation in search and rescue, disaster response, bomb and mine clearance, humanitarian assistance and military medicine. Discussions also covered telecommunications, digital government and the digital economy, extending bilateral cooperation beyond traditional diplomatic and economic ties.

Economic cooperation formed another major part of the discussions. Vietnam and Myanmar agreed to work toward raising bilateral trade to US$1 billion and to convene the 11th Joint Trade Sub-Committee to address barriers including import licensing, quarantine requirements, standards and customs procedures. The two countries also discussed expanding investment and improving conditions for Vietnamese businesses operating in Myanmar. Bilateral trade stood at around US$590 million in 2025, while Vietnam had 107 valid investment projects in Myanmar with registered capital of about US$1.4 billion as of the end of June 2026. Mytel, the telecommunications joint venture involving Vietnam’s military-linked Viettel group, remains one of the most prominent examples of bilateral commercial cooperation.

The visit also carried a political dimension. During a separate meeting with Lower House Speaker and Union Solidarity and Development Party chairman Khin Yi, Trung congratulated Myanmar on what Vietnam described as the successful organisation of the general election earlier in 2026 and acknowledged the new government’s initial period in office. Trung also formally invited Min Aung Hlaing to make a goodwill visit to Vietnam. The two countries discussed supporting one another in regional and international forums, including ASEAN and the United Nations.

The visit comes while ASEAN continues to manage its relationship with Myanmar through the Five-Point Consensus. The bloc has maintained restrictions on Myanmar’s political representation at ASEAN summits and foreign ministers’ meetings, while continuing to call for progress on ending violence, facilitating humanitarian assistance and promoting inclusive dialogue. ASEAN’s latest formal review of the Five-Point Consensus reaffirmed it as the principal framework for addressing the political crisis in Myanmar.

Vietnam’s visit adds to a series of recent contacts between Myanmar and individual ASEAN members. Min Aung Hlaing has travelled to Laos and Thailand this year, while Cambodia is preparing to receive him in September. Vietnam’s invitation could create another opportunity for high-level engagement within Southeast Asia. At the same time, the agreements reached in Nay Pyi Taw extend into defence, trade, telecommunications, digital infrastructure and coordination in regional forums, giving the visit significance beyond a routine diplomatic exchange and placing it within the wider evolution of Myanmar’s relations with its ASEAN neighbours.


Moe Thiri Myat is a senior at Parami University. Majoring in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics (PPE). Interested in analyzing emerging sociopolitical situations and developments, through her work as a Myanmar correspondent at The ASEAN Frontier she aims to explore how sociopolitical developments across Southeast Asia shape and are shaped by the situation in Myanmar.

Lao PDR 🇱🇦

Floods in Laos Highlight Climate Risks

by Phonethida Sitthixay, in Vientiane

Since July 2026, heavy rains unleashed severe flooding across Laos, displacing thousands of families and underscoring the growing threat climate change poses to the country’s development.

In the north, Luang Namtha Province was declared a disaster zone after flash floods swept through Boten near the Laos–China border. More than 30 villages were inundated, farmland and schools destroyed, and even the local airport forced to close. Water levels on the Tha River surged to 6.58 meters, well above the flood warning threshold.

In the south, Savannakhet Province saw the Xe Champhone River rise above danger level, flooding thousands of hectares of rice fields and affecting over 2,000 households. The floods cut off eight villages, with recovery efforts underway. Meanwhile, Champasack Province reported the Mekong River rising beyond alert levels.

The worst hit was Khammouane Province, where flooding affected over 60,000 people across all 10 districts, damaging 206 villages and nearly 9,500 households. More than 15,000 hectares of rice fields were destroyed, with losses estimated at LAK 100 billion (USD 4.4 million).

Nationwide, authorities estimate 654 villages across 42 districts have been hit, leaving 95,200 people impacted and at least four dead. Prime Minister Sonexay Siphandone has ordered immediate recovery measures, including road repairs, relief supplies, and stricter monitoring of dam safety and reservoir levels.

Officials admit floods are becoming more frequent and destructive. Between 2021 and 2025, Laos recorded 376 natural disasters affecting more than one million people, according to a government review. This year’s floods have already surpassed last year’s impact, with northern provinces like Luang Namtha and Phongsaly suffering damage rarely seen before.

Experts point to climate change as a key driver. Stronger monsoons and typhoons, combined with deforestation and poor land management, are intensifying floods. Typhoon Maysak and heavy rains dumped up to 140 mm in 24 hours this month, overwhelming rivers and reservoirs.

As Laos prepares to graduate from Least Developed Country (LDC) status by the end of 2026, the floods are a stark reminder that economic growth must be matched with climate resilience.


Phonethida Sitthixay holds a Bachelor of Arts in International Relations from the National University of Laos. She is currently a Senior Project Coordinator at AIF Group, where she works on government-led initiatives to modernize financial integration across public sector systems in Laos. She has experience in sustainable development policy, diplomacy, and economic reporting, having worked with the Global Green Growth Institute and The Laotian Times. Her interests focus on Laos’s diplomacy, regional integration, and its evolving role beyond ASEAN.

Editorial Deadline 19/09/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Karen Ysabelle R. David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk

In early September, parts of the Pacific Corridor woke up to dark skies overhead: it was transboundary haze, long the bane of ASEAN environmental cooperation. This year, as it faced deteriorating air quality, it was again Singapore’s turn to grapple with the question: why is this particular regional problem so difficult to solve?

The haze has become a recurring issue. And as the climate emergency becomes ever more urgent, more and more extreme weather phenomena will keep crossing national borders. Almost a year since the article was first published, we take a look back at the typhoons that deluged parts of Vietnam in September and October 2025 — how much has really changed since then?

But for the Philippines, there may be clear skies ahead: in a historic milestone, the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao held its first-ever parliamentary elections. This is only just the latest step in the region’s decades-long peace process, but for now, the forecast is of cautious optimism.

Singapore 🇸🇬

Singapore Haze Returns: Why Does a Regional Problem Remain so Difficult to Solve?

by Jennifer Hui En Tan, in Singapore

Singapore has experienced a deterioration in air quality since early September, with haze affecting parts of the island. On 4 September, the 24-hour Pollutant Standards Index (PSI) reached 101 in the central region, entering the “Unhealthy” range for the first time since 8 October 2023. The National Environment Agency (NEA) has linked the current haze conditions to moderate to dense smoke plumes from fires in Southern and Central Sumatra and parts of Kalimantan. With prevailing winds blowing from the southeast and south, smoke has drifted toward Singapore and neighboring states.

The immediate source of the current haze is smoke from land and forest fires in Indonesia. During periods of dry weather, fires in parts of Sumatra and Kalimantan can produce significant amounts of smoke. The geography of the region means that this smoke does not necessarily remain within the area where the fire occurs. This makes haze a regional environmental issue, rather than one that can be managed entirely within the borders of a single country.

Singapore works with the ASEAN Specialized Meteorological Center, which monitors hotspots, smoke plumes, weather conditions, and regional haze, providing information that helps countries assess the development and movement of fires and smoke across Southeast Asia. The current episode illustrates the difficulty of addressing environmental problems when the causes and effects cross national boundaries.

ASEAN has established a regional legal and institutional framework for addressing transboundary haze. The ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution (AATHP) was signed in 2002 and provides cooperation on monitoring, prevention, preparedness, national and joint emergency response, and scientific research. ASEAN has also established procedures for countries to share information and coordinate emergency responses when fires become severe enough to cause transboundary haze. However, individual countries remain responsible for preventing and controlling their own territories. This means that while ASEAN provides mechanisms for monitoring and regional coordination, effective prevention and response still depend largely on national action.

For Singapore, this means that managing haze involves more than responding when air quality deteriorates. Regional monitoring, early warning, prevention, and cooperation between ASEAN member states remain important in reducing the likelihood and severity of future haze episodes.

Singapore’s latest haze episode highlights the progress and limitation of ASEAN regional response. While mechanisms provide a framework for monitoring and emergency coordination, preventing transboundary haze ultimately depends on action within individual countries. As weather conditions become increasingly challenging, sustained regional cooperation and stronger prevention efforts will remain essential to reducing the impact of haze on Singapore and its neighbors.


Jennifer is a final-year International Relations student at the Singapore Institute of Management, where she focuses on political engagement, diplomacy, and community governance. She is an active volunteer in her constituency, working closely with residents to understand local concerns, facilitate dialogue, and support community initiatives.

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Vietnam 🇻🇳

The Climate Emergency in Vietnam

by Hang Nguyen, in Ho Chi Minh City

Note: This article was first published in Issue 19 of the Pacific Corridor newsletter on 17 October 2025.

Late September and early October saw Vietnam battered by a rapid succession of flash floods, landslides, vigorous rainstorms, and violent winds delivered by Typhoon Bualoi (Typhoon No. 10) and Typhoon Matmo (Typhoon No. 11). Extreme weather events hit the northern and central provinces annually; however, local residents and businesses still continue to be inundated with damages to their livelihoods and infrastructure. The lack of efficient climate change resilience further exacerbates civilian distress, signaling a call for urgency for the national government and regional institutions to ramp up natural disaster capacity-building and mitigation initiatives.

As of 11 October, preliminary statistics have reported catastrophic losses: 238 dead or missing, 367 injured, 258,000 private residences severely damaged, 500,000 hectares of agricultural rice fields destroyed, and automobile damages racking up to VND 76 million (US$3 million). Roads, schools, banks, health services, and other public infrastructure have suspended operations. The total economic loss is currently estimated to be tens of trillions VND (several billion US$), a burden to be placed on the Vietnamese government, taxpayers, and businesses.

Viewed from a more humanitarian perspective, the aftermath of flooding has devastated civilian normalcy in the afflicted regions. People have reported losing their entire life savings, properties, and important paperwork such as the “Pink Book” (Certificate of Land Use Rights) in the current calamities; livestock displaced; inability to contact family; no running water or electricity; and left to hopelessly wait for rescue forces. This is particularly the case in the agriculture-predominant regions of the Mekong Delta and of the central coasts, leaving the agricultural backbone of the nation critically incapacitated. Videos have surfaced on online platforms, portraying the cruelty of these historic typhoons and the despair of affected families.

In a swift response to the crisis, the government has mobilized military and security forces for emergency relief within hours after the incident. Notably, Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh issued Decision No. 2221/QD-TTg to allocate aid from the 2025 central budget contingency fund worth VND 140 billion (US$5.6 million) for recovery and rebuilding in four northern provinces. Agencies and individuals have also participated in disaster relief efforts by donating and volunteering. While these expeditious short-term responses are well-coordinated and demonstrate solidarity amongst the Vietnamese people, the reliance on reactive measures rather than sustainable preventive frameworks will persist to disrupt civilian life on a frequent basis.

Vietnam’s recent calamities reflect the broader pattern of climate vulnerability across Southeast Asia, exposing the need for more extensive regional disaster mitigation and response mechanisms. Given that neighboring countries such as the Philippines also recently contended with the tropical cyclone Matmo, this presents an incentive to conduct data sharing and cross-border collaboration. The similar extreme weather phenomena that occurred across Southeast Asia reveals the shared exposure and susceptibility to environmental degradation. Ultimately, as climate risks transcend national borders, the coordination of ASEAN’s approach would facilitate more efficient capacity-building and would be indispensable to safeguarding livelihoods across the region.


Hang is a young researcher with academic experience in Vietnam and the United States. She has previously worked in public relations at the U.S. Consulate General in Ho Chi Minh City and the YSEALI Academy. Her research focuses on ASEAN centrality in the evolving Asia-Pacific landscape, with particular attention to Vietnam’s approach to trade, regional cooperation, and political economy in the face of external power dynamics and global volatility.

The Philippines 🇵🇭

From Peace Agreement to Political Institution

by Glenn Vincent N. Boquilon, in Angeles City

On 14 September 2026, the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) held its first-ever regular parliamentary elections. Over 2.4 million registered voters took part, choosing the people who will sit in the region’s first elected parliament.

This vote matters for more than just picking new leaders. It marks the region’s move away from an appointed, transitional government and toward one that is chosen directly by the people. Since the BARMM was created, the Bangsamoro Transition Authority has run things on an interim basis. In this situation, the parliament will answer to voters instead of being appointed.

The election is also a milestone in Mindanao’s decades-long peace process. BARMM exists because of the 2014 peace deal between the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, which aims to end armed conflict and give the Bangsamoro people real self-governance. Voters in the region later approved the Bangsamoro Organic Law in a 2019 plebiscite, paving the way for the region as it exists today.

What makes this election unique is BARMM’s system of government. Unlike the rest of the country, which follows a presidential system, BARMM uses a parliamentary one. It is the only region in the country to do so. Its 80-member parliament is made up of party representatives, district representatives, and sectoral representatives. Parliament members will then choose the region’s chief minister from among themselves.

This setup encourages political parties and coalitions to cooperate to form a working government. How well they collaborate after the election may matter just as much as who actually won seats.

Turnout was strong, with Commission on Elections reporting that over 80% of registered voters cast ballots, higher than expected. Most polling went smoothly, although there were some reports of election-related violence in a few areas. The high turnout is a good sign of public engagement, but the security incidents are a reminder that challenges remain.

Beyond the Philippines, BARMM’s experience offers a case study for other parts of Southeast Asia dealing with questions of autonomy and regional representation. It showcases how a peace agreement can eventually evolve into a functioning electoral system.

Ultimately, this election is not the endpoint for Bangsamoro’s peace process. This is just the next phase of it. In this regard, the real test now is whether the newly elected parliament can build trust, stay stable, and actually deliver results for the people it represents.


Glenn holds a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from the University of Santo Tomas. His experience spans governance programs, policy development, and political research, having worked with the Ateneo School of Government and WR Numero Research on projects focused on electoral reform, public opinion, and regional development. He also helped coordinate the drafting of the Bangsamoro Local Government Code and supported the Academy of Multiparty Democracy.

Editorial Deadline 15/09/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Siu Tzyy Wei, Lead Editor - Maritime Crescent Desk

Some numbers hold together only if no one looks too closely.

This week, Brunei’s PISA scores read as a national success story, until the data beneath them raises a harder question about what is actually being measured, and for whom. Malaysia faces a different pressure: a population ageing faster than the policies meant to support it, where the fixes that would have worked are running out of time to matter. Meanwhile, Indonesia’s long-delayed protections for ride-hailing workers promise greater revenue sharing and social security, but leave deeper questions around algorithmic management, gender inequality, employment status and the government’s commitment to platform workers unresolved.

Three different countries, the same pattern underneath: what looks stable on the surface is rarely the whole picture.

Because the numbers that reassure us are usually the ones no one has stress-tested yet.

Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳

Behind the Rank

by Maryam Zulaidi

The OECD published its Programme for International Students Assessment (PISA) 2025 results on 8 September 2026, marking Brunei’s participation for the third time since 2018 and its largest sample to date. At 5,740 students, headlines reported that Brunei ranked among the top three in ASEAN for mathematics and science, and second in reading. Regional standing, however, does not reveal the full picture about the distribution of achievement within the country.

Brunei remains below the OECD average across four categories, including reading and computational problem solving. Results for science, mathematics and reading were stronger in 2022 than in 2025. Scores fell by six points in science, seven in mathematics and four in reading relative to 2022. However, this decline warrants attention rather than alarm since the OECD recorded a similar pattern of deterioration across most participating nations.

The sensible question is who is underperforming. Thirty-nine percent of Bruneian 15-year olds sat in the top international quartile of socio-economic status. They are among the most materially advantaged students in the world, yet averaged at 480 points in science, significantly less than students in Singapore, Chinese Taipei and Macau. If advantaged students are underperforming, the limitation cannot be material resources.

The report also highlights that the gap between disadvantaged and advantaged students is consistent with the OECD average and has narrowed since 2018, primarily due to an improvement seen in the former group and stagnancy in the latter. The proficiency distribution makes the consequences visible. Thirty-nine percent of Bruneian students fell below baseline proficiency in science and forty-five percent in mathematics, indicating that a concerning demographic of students cannot reliably apply their knowledge into real life situations. The results allude to a wider constraint than a subject-specific one; improvement at the lower spectrum of the distribution alongside stagnation at the upper end directs attention towards instruction rather than the students themselves.

Another finding that did not make the headlines is that accounts of bullying are higher than the OECD average of twenty in 2025 and higher than Brunei’s own figure in 2022. Thirty-four percent of Bruneian students reported experiencing bullying at least a few times a month. Arguably, the lower figure in 2022 was likely a consequence of the pandemic disruptions rather than a genuine improvement. Unlike the previous scores, this is a finding the ministry can tackle directly.

The significance of the recent cycle is that Brunei now holds three comparable data points. The 2018 report established a baseline, the two cycles cannot determine a genuine shift from one cycle to the next, whereas the third and recent results begin to shape a trajectory. This allows Brunei’s Ministry of Education to determine whether performance is improving, declining or holding steady. The value of this PISA exercise lies in what the data reveals about where the education system is falling behind and not in the regional nor global rankings.


Maryam is a first-year International Relations and Politics student at the University of Sheffield, with an academic focus on Southeast Asia—particularly Maritime Southeast Asia—and the Middle East. She aspires to a career in diplomacy and academia and is committed to fostering international dialogue and advancing scholarly engagement with global issues. Beyond her academic work, she pursues creative interests and voluntary initiatives that broaden her perspectives on public service.

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Indonesia 🇮🇩

Promises on Hold

by Amallia Utami

There is a discrepancy between the statements made by President Prabowo Subianto and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia regarding the enactment and finalisation of Presidential Regulation No. 27 of 2026 on the Protection of Online Ride-Hailing Workers. On May 1, 2026, President Prabowo announced that the policy regulating protections for drivers had been established. These protections include social security and a more favourable revenue-sharing arrangement for drivers. However, in mid-August 2026, the State Secretary stated that the regulation was not yet complete and would be issued in late August or early September 2026. Yet there has been no further update, and the status of the finalisation remains unclear.

President Prabowo’s speech highlighted several areas of focus for the regulation. For instance, it addressed the reduction of commission fees, or “deposits”, that have long been considered a burden for drivers. Initially, drivers received only 80% of the fare, while the proposed regulation aimed to increase their share to 92%. Some platforms have already implemented this policy for their driver-partners per July 2026. The regulation also touched upon minimum wages, job security, and health insurance. However, there are several other issues that warrant attention within this regulatory framework.

First, artificial intelligence and algorithms present significant concerns. Algorithms currently influence how rewards are allocated to drivers who work continuously. This may be one reason why some drivers work excessively long hours each day. The situation is further complicated by schemes that require drivers to complete a specific number of trips within a short timeframe, potentially compromising their safety.

The situation of female drivers, who are particularly vulnerable, also requires attention. Platform governance frameworks developed without a gender perspective may place an undue burden on female drivers by creating a “double burden”. Positioned merely as partners (mitra), these drivers lack access to basic needs such as minimum wages, sick leave, or even maternity leave. Their earnings are influenced by how many tasks they have completed and algorithmic rankings, while they may also have to manage household responsibilities.

Secondly, algorithms can serve as a mechanism for managing workers without appearing to be management. The role of the supervisor has not necessarily disappeared. Instead, it has been transformed. What warrants attention is the use of algorithms to automate tasks such as work allocation, reward determination, and performance monitoring, while also influencing workers’ access to future work opportunities.

Higher earnings is an immediate need for drivers and couriers, as changes to revenue sharing can have the direct impact on their livelihoods. However, financial improvements alone cannot address the insecurity created by algorithmic management or the absence of employment protections. The delayed finalisation of the regulation raises questions about the government’s commitment to protecting platform workers, especially when its status remains unclear. While the proposed provisions could improve workers’ financial security, stronger protections should address deeper inequalities created by algorithmic management and gaps in employment protection adequacy.


Amallia is a media and culture graduate from the University of Glasgow with experience in journalism and creative writing. Her interests lie in democracy, media and communication, particularly how contemporary media environments shape self-censorship, misinformation, and disinformation.

Malaysia 🇲🇾

Malaysia’s Incoming Grey Tsunami

by Edrina Lisa Ozaidi, in WP Kuala Lumpur

Declining fertility rate, rising life expectancies and rising living costs, among others, indicates that Malaysia is transitioning into an ageing society at a pace that far outstrips many of its regional neighbours.

Department of Statistics Malaysia (DOSM) data indicates that citizens aged 65 and above have reached 8.4% of the total population, with 12 states officially classified as “ageing states”. The data is not just a demographic forecast, but a shifting population category that also reshapes households, healthcare networks and the national economy.

The question: Is Malaysia ready to accommodate the already-coming grey tsunami?

Currently, Malaysia’s ageing population is rooted in two intersecting trends. On one end, life expectancy climbed steadily, crossing the 75-year threshold. On the other, total fertility rates have plummeted well below the 2.1 replacement level. This is driven by shifting socioeconomic dynamics, urbanisation and the soaring cost of raising children in urban areas.

An inverting demographic pattern means fewer births are feeding into the workforce. A surge of retirees will also emerge, requiring long-term social, medical and financial support. The Malaysian government recognises the gravity of this demographic shift, and an initial structural counter plan has been laid out.

Initiatives including strategic proposal such as The National Ageing Blueprint (NAB) under 13th Malaysia Plan (MP), the National Plan of Action for Older Persons (2026-2030), and the Malaysia Care Strategic Framework and Action Plan (2026-2030) all aim to gradually enforce eldercare infrastructure and social protection reforms, ranging from geriatric care to preventative community health.

However, the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia warn that the country’s physical and financial architecture is profoundly unprepared. Urban centers, where a vast majority of the elderly population resides, remain glaringly unfriendly for older citizens. Malaysia’s heavy car-centric transportation model, coupled with deficient first-mile and last-mile pedestrian infrastructure, effectively strand older adults with physical or cognitive impairment. Although sporadic efforts like demand-responsive transit vans offer glimmers of hope, nationwide age-friendly urban needs remain largely absent.

Adding to this is a ticking financial time bomb: the persistent fragility of retirement savings. Successive rounds of permitted Employees Provident Fund (EPF) with withdrawals over recent years have hollowed out the nest eggs of millions of Malaysians. This “grey line” in EPF savings means that instead of enjoying secure golden years, a vast cohort of future seniors will face forced economic precarity, compelled to stay in the workforce long past retirement age simply to survive.

Transforming the country into an age-friendly nation requires a synchronised overhaul - from unifying transport planning to strict protection of retirement funds. If policymakers fail to bridge the gap between macro-growth narratives and the grassroots realities of an ageing population, the country risks running out of time before it runs out of money.


Edrina is a communications professional with a background in international relations. She holds a degree from the University of Nottingham Malaysia and has worked across public relations and social media for organizations in the development, education, and corporate sectors. Her work focuses on crafting narratives around regional affairs and strengthening media engagement across Southeast Asia.

Editorial Deadline 14/09/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk

This week, legitimacy was something several institutions tried to protect or manufacture, with mixed success. In Myanmar, former junta leader and now-President Min Aung Hlaing collected a fourth ASEAN red-carpet welcome in Cambodia, a reminder that recognition from neighboring capitals is not the same as recognition from his own people. In Laos, the Vientiane court handed down life sentences and billions of kip in penalties to former bank officials, an attempt to restore faith in a financial system whose credibility was compromised from the inside. In Cambodia, that same appetite for legitimacy showed up in the Funan Techo Canal's new $1 billion financing deal — proof the project can attract serious capital, even as the risk gets quietly routed through a joint concessionaire rather than the state. And in Thailand, a new deportation regulation dressed up as routine "public order" housekeeping instead strips refugees of appeal rights and edges the country closer to forced returns it has legally promised not to make.

Myanmar 🇲🇲

Myanmar President’s Travels Not For The Country, But For His Own Legitimacy

by Ley Hlaing

Myanmar’s general-turned-president Min Aung Hlaing has been continuously engaging in foreign visits since his presidency started. Having experienced diplomatic isolation and lack of recognition from the rest of the world, these endless travels reveal the notorious truth of the regime’s desperation to revive their role in ASEAN and engage in international relations.

On September 11, 2026, the junta president visited Cambodia in his latest travel and met separately with Head of State Hun Sen and the Head of Government, Hun Manet. This official visit also included a welcoming ceremony with a red-carpet reception and a military guard of honor upon his arrival in Phnom Penh. In the presence of Min Aung Hlaing and Prime Minister Hun Manet, officials from both nations signed four key agreements aimed at boosting cross-border cooperation on protection of investments, avoidance of double taxation, cultural cooperation, and in the information sector. During the trip, the former junta leader strongly emphasized that Myanmar is actively working to strengthen and restore its cooperation within ASEAN. Critics have been warning that this visit, as well as other recent ones, is an attempt to weaken ASEAN’s decision and approach on the Myanmar issues.

Needless to say, the countries officially welcoming Min Aung Hlaing’s visits, such as India, China, Laos, Thailand, Belarus, Russia and most recently Vietnam, are doing so because they prioritize their own benefits over lives of the people of Myanmar, enabling the regime’s survival and undermining the human right abuse across Myanmar. From the beginning of his official visits, many right groups have asked the officials of these countries to arrest Min Aung Hlaing and deliver him to the Internal Criminal Court. Still, no action was taken and his visits actually grew in number.

In this latest trip, Cambodia became the fourth ASEAN country to welcome Myanmar’s President. Cambodia’s role in Myanmar’s issue has been significant as Hun Sen himself served as the rotating Chair of ASEAN in 2022 and visited Nay Pyi Taw in the first foreign official to visit Myanmar after the military coup. Since then, ASEAN’s 11 members started to divide on the Myanmar issue positioning, all while the number of ASEAN countries that officially welcomed the junta leader has increased to four. Still, offshore countries like Malaysia and the Philippines remain consistent on their approach on Myanmar with the five point consensus, showing that Min Aung Hlaing’s diplomatic efforts is mainly working on neighboring countries, which maintain higher interests in stabilizing Myanmar’s situation, no matter the human cost.

However, analysts examined that there might not be any significant changes in ASEAN’s stance on Myanmar until early 2027, when the group’s chairmanship will pass from The Philippines to either Singapore or Thailand, which is actively advocating to fully re-integrate Myanmar into ASEAN. On top of this, there are still other regional giants like India and China that have strong influence on the Myanmar’s domestic affairs.

These countries need Myanmar to be stable not primarily for the people of Myanmar, but for their own benefits and interests. Providing legitimacy to figures like Min Aung Hlaing ultimately deepens fractures within ASEAN, stalling collective efforts toward a peaceful resolution and prioritizing short-term geopolitical interests over regional stability and human rights.

Ley Hlaing is a former Political Science student from the University of Yangon, Myanmar. Currently, he is pursuing his BA at Parami University with a major in Philosophy, Politics and Economics. His academic and professional interests span community development, literature, minority issues, and social impact research. Having held roles as Research Assistant, Student Mentor, and Facilitator for local initiatives, he has constantly supported project management in literature and education programs in Myanmar.

Lao PDR 🇱🇦

Vientiane Court Delivers Severe Penalise in Major Banking Corruption Cases

by Souriya Bounpaseuth, in Vientiane

When corruption reaches the financial system, the consequences can extend well beyond the individuals involved. It can affect public resources, foreign-exchange operations and confidence in institutions entrusted with managing money. That broader question sits behind two corruption and money laundering cases decided by the Vientiane Capital court last week.

A major corruption case involving former banking officials has resulted in life sentences, asset confiscations and billions of kip in financial penalties, following judgments announced by the Vientiane Capital People’s Court on 8 September.

The two cases involved 10 former employees in the banking sector, including five women, and allegations ranging from abuse of official positions and irregular foreign-exchange transactions to bribery and money laundering. Together, the cases involved reported losses of more than LAK 2.29 trillion, equivalent to approximately USD 102.6 million.

The first case centred on two former senior officials of the Bank of Lao PDR, including a former Head of the Monetary Policy Department and a former Head of the Services Department. They were accused of abusing their positions to take foreign currency from central bank reserves and provide unrestricted foreign services.

The court sentenced the defendants to life imprisonment and imposed fines equivalent to one percent of the report damage. One defendant was also ordered to compensate a commercial bank more than LAK 142.71 billion. The court ordered the confiscation of assets, including bank accounts, land and vehicles, to transfer to the state. The second defendant died during the proceedings and therefore did not receive a criminal punishment.

The second case involved eight former bank employees convicted of corruption and money laundering. The allegations included foreign-currnecy transactions conducted outside agreed contract rates, the receipt of bribes, and the conversion of illicit proceeds into assets and bank deposits.

One defendant was convicted after allegedly receiving USD 95,459.97 and THB 1 million through foreign-currency transactions. The defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment and fined one percent of the relevant amount.

Another defendant received a prison sentence in connection with a LAK 180 million bribe from a fuel-import company. Although initially sentenced to seven years, the term was reduced by four years following restitution, resulting in a four-year sentence and a one percent fine.

A further defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment after being convicted of corruption and money laundering involving LAK 24.125 billion obtained through negotiations with foreign-exchange applications.

Other defendants received prison sentences ranging from 16-20 years, with some terms reduced following restitution. Another defendant received a life sentence.

The court also ordered the confiscation of bank accounts, land, vehicles and other assets connected to the cases.

The bigger story is not simply how much money was involved, but how the alleged misconduct was able to take place. The cases put a spotlight on the controls surrounding foreign-exchange operations, the responsibilities of officials entrusted with financial authority, and the mechanisms available to recover assets. In that sense, the court rulings are not only about punishment; they also raise broader questions about the safeguards needed to protect the integrity of the financial system.

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Cambodia 🇰🇭

Funan Techo Canal Secures US$1 Billion Financing Deal

by Sokna Thea, in Phnom Penh

Cambodia’s landmark Funan Techo Canal project reached a major financial milestone this week with the signing of an estimated US$1 billion commercial debt facility, revealing a more complex corporate structure behind the project than the usual narrative of direct bilateral state lending.

On September 9 in Xiamen, China Exim Bank formally signed a financing agreement with Funan Techo Coastal-Inland Waterways Co. to fund the Funan Techo Integrated Water Resources Management Project. Instead of being a direct sovereign loan paid to the Cambodian government, the credit facility was issued directly to the joint Cambodian-Chinese project company responsible for delivering the megaproject under a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) and public-private partnership (PPP) model, according to official bulletins from the Agence Kampuchea Presse.

The deal also helps explain the different financing figures reported in recent weeks by international and regional media. Early reports often described Beijing as “footing the entire bill” for the 180-kilometer waterway. However, the financing package is more divided. The new US$1 billion facility is specifically for the main commercial civil works under the BOT concessionaire. Separately, a US$200 million concessional facility arranged in July serves as targeted state-level development financing, according to The Phnom Penh Post.

This layered financing approach shows how China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has developed across Southeast Asia. Instead of relying mainly on large sovereign loans that can create public concerns over debt, Chinese policy lenders are increasingly using special-purpose vehicles (SPVs) and mixed corporate financing. For international observers following Indochina, this distinction is important. Cambodia’s sovereign balance sheet is less directly exposed to default liabilities, while operational risks, toll collection revenues, and long-term control of the asset are placed more directly with the joint concessionaire.

The financing closure comes amid continuing geopolitical concerns within ASEAN. The canal will connect the Bassac River south of Phnom Penh directly to the Gulf of Thailand at Kep, allowing Cambodian cargo to bypass Vietnam’s Mekong Delta ports. Hanoi has repeatedly raised concerns about downstream water flows, salinity intrusion into the agricultural delta, and possible maritime security implications, as reported by the Khmer Times. Phnom Penh maintains that the project is purely economic, aimed at reducing transport costs, improving irrigation, and strengthening Cambodia’s control over its own logistics.

By securing the nearly US$1 billion debt package, Cambodia and its partners have cleared one of the most important hurdles facing the canal, demonstrating that the project can attract commercial financing. As construction work accelerates under the BOT framework, the project is becoming a case study in modern infrastructure diplomacy, where commercial concession risks are being managed alongside major regional geopolitical interests.

Sokna has a background in International Affairs and Business & Commercial Law. He’s currently a Senior Project Coordinator at the Ministry of Economy and Finance of Cambodia, working on the Financial Management Information System (FMIS) Project. His professional focus is driven by entrepreneurship, business development, and financial technology, with a particular interest in how private-sector innovation drives Cambodia’s economic growth.

Thailand 🇹🇭

How Thailand’s Deportation Regulation B.E. 2569 Deepens Risks for Refugees

by Paranut Juntree, in Bangkok

On August 28, 2026, the Prime Minister’s Office Regulation on Deportation B.E. 2569 (2026) officially came into effect. While framed as an administrative update to streamline removals and safeguard public order, the decree creates an alarming structural vulnerability for the tens of thousands of urban refugees and asylum seekers seeking safety across Thailand.

Because Thailand is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention, non-citizens, regardless of whether they hold UNHCR documentation or await status determination (asylum-seekers), are legally designated as unauthorized migrants under the Immigration Act, B.E. 2522 (1979). Under Clause 5(1) of the new regulation, unlawful entry or staying without authorization serves as an immediate trigger for removal. The regulation concentrates final removal authority directly within the Ministry of Interior without providing standard judicial appeal rights. As a result, human rights NGOs may lack the legal standing to appeal deportation orders for recognized refugees or asylum-seekers in Thailand. Furthermore, courts and prison authorities are mandated to notify the Ministry immediately upon issuing fines or suspended sentences to foreign nationals. For refugees working informally to survive or caught up in routine urban sweeps, minor administrative infractions now directly feed them into a rapid deportation pipeline.

This structural vulnerability is further compounded by the ineffectiveness of domestic protection frameworks. The Royal Thai Government introduced the National Screening Mechanism (NSM), back in 2020, to evaluate claims for “Protected Person” status, conceptually parallel to UNHCR’s Refugee Status Determination (RSD). However, the NSM remains largely ineffective for urban refugees and asylum-seekers in its current stage. Because the mechanism operates under the Immigration Bureau without legal immunity for overstayers, applying for protection creates a dangerous Catch-22: initiating or undergoing NSM screening frequently exposes applicants to arbitrary arrest or requires them to be detained in the Immigration Detention Center (IDC) prior to receiving status determination. Furthermore, the text of the new Deportation Regulation fails to clarify whether individuals holding Protected Person status under the NSM are explicitly exempt from deportation.

The central peril for refugees and asylum-seekers under the new regulation is refoulement, the forced return of individuals to countries where they face persecution, torture, or death. While Clause 8 of the text permits an alternative third-country transfer if return poses a severe risk, the procedural requirements render it nearly impossible. The request must be processed diplomatically within just seven days of the deportation order, require written consent, and be fully funded by the requesting entity. For a refugee or asylum-seeker trapped inside an IDC, organizing international diplomatic intervention within a single week is a near-impossible barrier.

Thailand’s 2023 Act on Prevention and Suppression of Torture and Enforced Disappearance, fulfilling legal duties under the UN Convention Against Torture (UNCAT), explicitly prohibits returning individuals to harm. Yet, the new regulation fails to integrate systematic human-rights risk assessments into its fast-track removal process. Even before the regulation took effect, there were numerous instances of deportations or attempted deportations of individuals at risk of such harm. Without targeted protection screening, the regulation risks turning routine immigration enforcement into a systematic forced returns, exposing vulnerable refugees to catastrophic risk.

To uphold the country’s non-refoulement obligations, the Thai government should establish clear legal mechanisms to safeguard recognized refugees and active asylum-seekers from fast-track deportation. Guaranteeing an automatic stay of removal for individuals registered with UNHCR would ensure domestic enforcement aligns with human rights standards without compromising public safety.


Paranut has a background in advocacy, with experience in policy research, communications, and civic engagement across both the NGO and government sectors. As Thailand’s Youth Delegate to the United Nations, he represented Thai youth in global dialogues on migration, education, and human rights, championing inclusive policymaking. He holds a degree in political science with a specialization in international relations.

Editorial Deadline 12/09/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Haniva Sekar Deanty, Managing Editor - TAF

This week’s Pacific Corridor issue looks at markets where outcomes increasingly depend on how well two sides respond to one another.

In Singapore, the final quarter of 2026 will test whether major new housing launches can still draw strong demand as buyers become more selective, placing greater pressure on developers to get pricing, location and timing right.

In Ho Chi Minh City, a rise in business suspensions and dissolutions points to mounting pressure on smaller firms, even as new enterprises continue to enter the market and officials maintain confidence in the city’s broader growth outlook.

Meanwhile, we revisit the Philippines as it prepares for the 15% Global Minimum Tax, where the government faces its own balancing act: protecting tax revenues while ensuring that investment incentives remain competitive under a changing international tax regime.

Whether between developers and buyers, businesses and market conditions, or taxation and investment, neither side of the equation operates alone. Sometimes, it really does take two to tango.

Singapore 🇸🇬

Singapore's Q4 Launch Wave Will Show Whether Demand Survived the Cooldown

by Ryan

Singapore’s private housing market is about to face its most consequential test of the year. Thomson Reserve, a 1,268-unit development jointly built by UOL Group, Singapore Land Group and CapitaLand Development on the former Thomson View site in District 20, opens its sales preview on October 3, with a public launch expected roughly two weeks later (Thomson Reserve). Around the same time, City Developments Limited is preparing to bring the 570-unit Lucerne Grand to market at Lakeside Drive, beside Jurong Lake Gardens (Jamus Property). Together with a cluster of smaller projects, these launches will determine whether developers can still generate strong turnout after a year in which momentum has clearly cooled.

The headline numbers explain why so much attention rides on the fourth quarter. Developers sold 4,885 new private homes, excluding executive condominiums, in the first seven months of 2026, an 11.6% decline from 5,527 units over the same period last year. But the number of units launched fell even further, down 28.7% to 4,516 from 6,334, which means the sales dip reflects a thinner launch calendar more than a genuine retreat in appetite. The sales-to-launch ratio actually climbed to roughly 1.08, above the five-year average of 1.05 and the first reading past 1.0 for a January-to-July period since 2022.

What has shifted is buyer behavior at the point of sale. Launch-weekend take-up rates averaged just under 55% for projects launched in July, well below the 70%+ norm of recent years. July itself illustrated the split: Dunearn House in the Core Central Region and Lentor Gardens Residences in the suburbs both opened to respectable but unspectacular results, selling 56% and 54% of their units respectively over opening weekend. Prices, meanwhile, are still climbing, just more slowly. The Urban Redevelopment Authority’s private residential price index rose 0.5% quarter on quarter in the second quarter, down from 0.9% in the first, bringing the first-half gain to 1.4% against 1.8% a year earlier.

None of this points to a market in distress. Singapore’s government has kept the Additional Buyer’s Stamp Duty, loan-to-value limits and total debt servicing ratio unchanged since April 2023, even as it has pushed Government Land Sales supply to 9,320 confirmed units for 2026, more than 50% above the past decade’s annual average. That combination, tight demand-side rules alongside generous new supply, has produced a soft landing: prices are still rising, but launches are no longer guaranteed to clear regardless of price or location.

That distinction, between a market that rewards everything and one that rewards the right things, is becoming the defining feature of real estate cycles across Southeast Asia. Malaysia’s revival rests on affordability and policy support, Indonesia’s on demographic breadth, Thailand’s on ease of foreign ownership, while Singapore increasingly competes on institutional discipline and supply transparency. As each market moves past its own version of easy, broad-based growth, it is the developers who study their buyers rather than the cycle, and the buyers who study the unit rather than the headline, who will still be standing when the tide goes out.


Ryan is a final-year finance student at the Singapore University of Social Sciences (SUSS) with experience across venture capital, venture debt, and business development. He also holds a diploma in Law and Management from Temasek Polytechnic. His interests lie in how emerging technologies and economic trends shape business ecosystems and regional development in Asia.

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Vietnam 🇻🇳

Ho Chi Minh City's Revolving Door

by Hang Nguyen, in Ho Chi Minh City

Ho Chi Minh City’s economy is exhibiting a notable structural pattern in 2026: a growing imbalance between the rate at which businesses enter the market and the rate at which they leave it. In the first eight months, more than 43,000 enterprises exited the city’s market, representing a 24.4 percent increase over the same period last year. Of this total, 9,703 enterprises completed formal dissolution procedures, a 164 percent increase, while a further 33,390 enterprises suspended operations on a temporary basis.

By comparison, 38,253 new enterprises registered over the same period, while a further 13,582 businesses resumed operations. Nguyen Khac Hoang, Head of the Municipal Statistics Office, characterized the current entry-to-exit ratio as approximately 10 to 8, a figure that compares unfavorably with the national ratio of roughly 10 to 6.

Several underlying factors appear to account for this trend. Pham Binh An, Deputy Director of the Ho Chi Minh City Institute for Development Studies, attributed the difficulty primarily to small and medium-sized enterprises, citing a shortage of new orders, weakening consumer demand, elevated logistics costs, and constrained access to capital. Although interest rates have eased in accordance with government directives, they remain comparatively burdensome for smaller firms. Limited capacity to accommodate digital and green transformation requirements has further compounded these pressures.

A separate administrative factor also warrants consideration. Officials have indicated that a substantial share of the increase in formal dissolutions stems from a nationwide campaign, led by the Ministry of Finance, to clean up long-dormant tax identification records. Many of the enterprises now completing dissolution procedures had, in practice, ceased operations years earlier without formally closing their tax files. As authorities have accelerated review of these dormant accounts, a considerable backlog is now being processed, inflating the reported dissolution figures without necessarily reflecting a deterioration in current business conditions.

This administrative explanation, however, accounts for only part of the pattern observed. The 33,390 enterprises that suspended operations, an increase of 7.82 percent, more plausibly reflect present-day cost and demand pressures rather than the resolution of historical administrative backlogs. This assessment is further supported by export growth of 7.8 percent in Ho Chi Minh City, which trailed the national growth rate of 22.8 percent, alongside industrial production growth that likewise lagged the nationwide figure. Taken together, these indicators suggest that the exit trend reflects genuine strain on the private sector’s smaller and less capitalized enterprises, rather than statistical artifact alone.

Municipal authorities maintain that the trend does not jeopardize the city’s double-digit growth target for the year, pointing to offsetting indicators such as a 167 percent increase in foreign direct investment and budget revenue that has exceeded projections. At the same time, officials have proposed measures to simplify dissolution procedures and offset the costs associated with formally exiting the market, an implicit acknowledgment that the process of closing a business remains administratively burdensome in its own right.

Overall, the available evidence points to a pattern of elevated business turnover rather than outright contraction. New enterprises continue to enter the market at a steady pace, but a growing proportion of existing firms, particularly smaller enterprises with limited financial reserves, are electing to suspend or discontinue operations in the face of sustained cost pressure, tightened credit conditions, and uncertain demand.


Hang is a young researcher with academic experience in Vietnam and the United States. She has previously worked in public relations at the U.S. Consulate General in Ho Chi Minh City and the YSEALI Academy. Her research focuses on ASEAN centrality in the evolving Asia-Pacific landscape, with particular attention to Vietnam’s approach to trade, regional cooperation, and political economy in the face of external power dynamics and global volatility.

The Philippines 🇵🇭

Global Minimum Tax (GMT) Could Reshape Philippine Tax Incentives for Multinational Enterprises (MNEs)

by Arianne De Guzman, in Bulacan

The Philippines is moving toward the implementation of the 15% Global Minimum Tax (GMT) as tax collections are projected to increase by 9% annually until 2028, according to the Department of Finance (DOF) on Monday, 17 August. While the country aligns its tax system with the international rules, the Marcos administration will need to balance attracting investments through tax incentives with protecting government tax revenues.

Since November 2023, the Philippines has been a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)/G20 Inclusive Framework on Base-Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS). One of its key initiatives is the GMT under the Two-Pillar Solution. Under this framework, the Global Anti-Base Erosion (GloBE) Rules generally apply to large multinational enterprises (MNEs) with annual revenues of at least EUR750 million in at least two of the last four years. The rules establish a 15% effective tax rate (ETR) on a jurisdictional basis.

This does not mean that all Philippine companies will suddenly pay a 15% tax. Instead, when an in-scope MNE’s jurisdictional ETR falls below the 15% after under the GloBE rules, an additional “top-up tax” may be imposed to bring the rate closer to 15%. For the country, this could strengthen tax collection by limiting the ability of MNEs to reduce their ETR through tax incentives and other mechanisms.

This creates a policy trade-off. Higher tax revenues could strengthen government finances, but making incentives less valuable could affect the Philippines’ ability to attract foreign investment. Conversely, maintaining incentives without assessing their economic returns could limit potential revenue gains.

The CREATE MORE Act provides one possible direction through its Enhanced Deductions Regime (EDR). Under the EDR, registered business enterprises are subject to a 20% corporate income tax on income from registered activities while receiving additional deductions for qualified expenses. Compared with other incentives that significantly reduce the ETR, the EDR supports business activity while keeping the ETR above the 15% minimum.

The proposed Qualified Domestic Minimum Top-up Tax (QDMTT) could also allow the Philippines to collect the applicable top-up tax domestically, instead of allowing another jurisdiction to collect it under the GloBE rules. As of July 2026, the DOF convened an interagency technical working group (TWG), with 5 sub-technical groups, to lead the drafting of legislation and prepare the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) systems. The Marcos administration targets implementation to begin on 1 January 2027, with tax collection expected in 2028. Since the legislation has yet to be enacted, the treatment of existing Philippine tax incentives remains an important area to monitor.

Large MNEs should assess whether the GMT could reduce the value of their existing Philippine tax incentives and quantify any potential top-up tax. They should also track policy developments on how incentives can be structured to continue supporting investment while remaining compliant with the GMT.

The DOF and investment promotion agencies, such as the Board of Investments (BOI) and the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA), should provide clear guidance and outlook on how the GMT will interact with existing tax incentives and whether these incentives will remain effective until their expiration. The Marcos administration should also assess GMT-compatible incentives, including expenditure-based and investment-linked incentives, to preserve the Philippines’ ability to attract MNEs without simply reducing their ETR below 15%.

The GMT is shifting the focus of tax incentives from tax savings toward investment-driven incentives. Tax incentives may still be a key consideration, but GMT implementation may focus on rewarding activities that create economic value in the Philippines.


Arianne has experience in policy research at De La Salle University’s Jesse M. Robredo Institute of Governance, where she contributed to projects on systemic reform. She earned a degree in Political Science from Colegio de San Juan de Letran. Currently, she works in government relations, specializing in advocacy strategy, legislative monitoring, and stakeholder engagement. Beyond her professional work, she is actively involved in youth development and grassroots initiatives through the Rotaract Club of Santa Maria.

Editorial Deadline 07/09/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Siu Tzyy Wei, Lead Editor - Maritime Crescent Desk

Power is easiest to understand when you can see who holds it.

This week, Brunei strengthens the capabilities that could see it take on a greater role in regional disaster relief. Indonesia, meanwhile, moves closer to giving the state a power anti-corruption reformers have wanted for decades: the ability to seize assets without first securing a conviction. Malaysia, meanwhile, finds itself at the centre of another contest over power: whether attracting the infrastructure behind the AI race is enough to give it a stake in the technology itself.

Three different kinds of power, three very different questions about what happens when it is put to use.

Because the question is never just who has the power. It is who gets to hold it, and what keeps them from holding it too tightly.

Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳

Brunei, PACAF, and Interoperability in the Right Domain

by Wira Gregory Ejau, in Bandar Seri Begawan

From August 25 to September 5, US Pacific Air Forces and the Royal Brunei Air Force conducted PACIFIC ANGEL 26-1, a joint search and rescue exercise staged at Rimba Air Base in Bandar Seri Begawan. The exercise covered overland and overwater personnel and equipment airdrops, aeromedical operations, cargo handling, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief response.

While Brunei’s armed forces are small, well-funded relative to the state’s size, and professionally capable, its forces are not necessarily configured for high-intensity combat roles alongside a major power. In the development of its operational toolkit for regional emergency contingencies, PACIFIC ANGEL develops durable and arguably more immediately useful interoperability in the domain where Brunei’s military can realistically contribute to regional operations. Southeast Asia is among the world’s most disaster-prone regions, with its exposure to typhoons, earthquakes, and flooding across a maritime geography where rapid aerial response is not an enhancement but a necessity. A Royal Brunei Air Force capable of integrating seamlessly into PACAF-led HA/DR operations is a force multiplier that extends well beyond what Brunei’s own assets could achieve independently.

PACIFIC ANGEL follows Pahlawan Warrior 26, which officially concluded on the 20th of August at Tutong Camp, where a US Army and Oklahoma National Guard exercise with the Royal Brunei Land Forces covered jungle warfare, land navigation, medical evacuation, and unmanned aircraft systems. Before that, US Pacific Air Forces conducted air domain awareness training with the Royal Brunei Armed Forces in January, and a US Air Force MQ-9 Reaper was deployed to Brunei in May. The cumulative picture across 2026 of bilateral military relationship develops a consistent pattern and depth across air, land, and SAR domains simultaneously.

For a small state, interoperability with the dominant regional military power is a form of presence within a security architecture that the smaller state would be unable to sustain through its own resources alone. This embeds the Royal Brunei Armed Forces more firmly into the potential for future operational and planning frameworks of US Pacific Command, establishing Brunei as a reliable and integrated partner in its regional posture.

What the concentrated exercise calendar of 2026 ultimately suggests is that the Brunei-US military relationship is deepening, and that the domain in which Brunei is investing most visibly is precisely the one where its contribution to regional security is most credible and most sustainable.


Gregory is an MSc candidate in Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He works as a freelance writer specializing in international history, conflict, and counterterrorism, with experience in academia, investigative journalism, and voluntary uniformed service. He currently provides research assistance with the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) under their Southeast Asian Security and Defence Internship Programme and conducts investigations on regional security and transnational crime for a confidential company.

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Indonesia 🇮🇩

Careful What You Wish For

by Rayhan Prabu Kusumo, in Jakarta

On August 27, a crowd gathered outside the parliament in Jakarta. Many had come from Pati, a regency five hundred kilometres away. By the end of the afternoon they succeeded in pressuring leaders to sign a letter promising to pass the Asset Forfeiture Bill by the fifteenth of December, and pledging to resign if they failed. A street protest that ends in a signed promise and a resignation pledge is not how these things usually go here.

This demand is old and, on the surface, entirely reasonable. For decades, anti-corruption reformers have asked for a law that lets the state take back stolen wealth, and for just as long, governments have found reasons not to pass it. The bill would let prosecutors and law enforcement seize assets tied to a crime, in some cases without waiting for the owner to be convicted. Countries serious about corruption have tools like this. Indonesia, which claws back only a fraction of what is stolen from it, plainly needs one.

The trouble is that the feature which makes the law powerful is the one that makes it dangerous. Seizing a person’s property before proving them guilty reverses the order a legal system usually runs in. The burden falls on the owner to show the money is clean, and the constitution’s protection of property and of innocence begins to bend.

Take Tom Lembong, prosecuted in a sugar-import case and then pardoned by presidential decree, an enforcement machine switched on and off by politics. Now picture that machine able to freeze your house while it decides. Members of the House writing the bill admit fearing it themselves, that it could become a tool to attack opponents. Others argue that money laundering may be quietly kept out of its reach, which would leave it fearsome to the weak and toothless against the strong.

Now, as this brief once probed, Indonesia’s anti-corruption enforcement is split among rival forces that investigate one another. A legal way to take the assets of whoever the stronger side calls guilty is the tool those two conditions were waiting for. Others have walked this road. The United States built civil forfeiture to break drug empires and ended up with police taking ordinary people’s cars and cash on suspicion alone, a practice its own critics came to call policing for profit. A power sold against kingpins rarely stays aimed at kingpins. And the tidy revival of this bill, the out-of-town crowd, the signed letter, the neat deadline, sits strangely beside how the real protests were met, the ones smeared as foreign-funded.

Nevertheless, it is not wrong for pro-reformists to want this bill passed. Corruption bleeds the country, recovery of stolen money is shamefully slow, and safeguards can be written into any text. The safeguard that matters most doesn’t live in text, but in weak institutions that need strength and integrity to rightfully wield the law. A law like this is only as safe as the people who control it.


Rayhan has a background in government affairs and public policy, with experience across government institutions and advisory firms. His work focuses on the intersection of geopolitics, policy, and risk, with expertise in advocacy, regulatory analysis, and stakeholder engagement. He holds a degree in Government from Universitas Padjadjaran, and has completed an exchange at Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Spain, focusing on global politics and sustainability.

Malaysia 🇲🇾

Hosting the AI Race

by Muhammad Aiman Bin Roszaimi, in Cyberjaya

Malaysia is becoming one of Southeast Asia’s most important destinations for artificial intelligence infrastructure. But as billions of ringgit flow into data centres, is Malaysia building its own technological power, or simply becoming the infrastructure that powers someone else’s?

Australia-based Firmus signed a multi-year agreement with OpenAI to provide computing capacity from two Malaysian data centres. The deal makes OpenAI an anchor customer and will see Nvidia’s next-generation Vera Rubin processors deployed across Firmus’ Asia-Pacific operations. Reuters describes Malaysia as Southeast Asia’s fastest-growing data-centre market, although the expansion is increasingly drawing scrutiny over electricity and water consumption.

On the surface, this is exactly the kind of investment Malaysia wants. Data centres bring foreign capital, construction, digital infrastructure, skilled employment, and connections to the global AI economy. They strengthen Malaysia’s position between Singapore and other emerging regional hubs while giving the country a larger role in the infrastructure behind the next generation of AI.

But infrastructure is not the same thing as technological ownership.

Malaysia is reportedly considering Huawei’s Ascend 910C chips for a RM2 billion sovereign AI initiative aimed at giving the country greater control over sensitive national data. The project would be operated through Telekom Malaysia, according to people familiar with the matter, although the government has not publicly confirmed that Huawei has been selected.

This is where Malaysia’s AI strategy becomes strategically interesting. First, how can Malaysia capture more value from the global AI boom? Second, how can Malaysia prevent critical national data and computing capabilities from becoming excessively dependent on foreign technology providers? These are not necessarily the same problem.

A country can host the world’s largest AI companies while remaining dependent on foreign chips, cloud platforms, software ecosystems, and intellectual property. The servers may sit in Malaysia, the electricity may come from Malaysia, and the buildings may be constructed by Malaysian companies. Yet the most valuable technological layers can still belong elsewhere.

This is also why the current debate over Huawei should not be reduced to a simple “China versus America” question. For Malaysia, the deeper issue is “strategic dependence”.

Choosing one foreign technology ecosystem over another does not automatically produce technological sovereignty. It may simply change the source of dependency. True technological sovereignty requires Malaysia to develop capabilities to design, adapt, secure, and eventually own critical technologies rather than merely procure them.

Therefore, the danger is not that Malaysia attracts too much AI investment, but that Malaysia succeeds at attracting AI infrastructure without succeeding at moving up the technological value chain.

Malaysia does not need to become self-sufficient in every layer of the AI ecosystem. That would be unrealistic. But it does need to identify which dependencies are acceptable and which capabilities are too strategically important to outsource indefinitely.

The real test of Malaysia’s AI ambition, therefore, is not whether OpenAI, Nvidia, Huawei, or other technology giants choose Malaysia.

It is what Malaysia becomes because they do. That distinction matters beyond Malaysia, too.


Aiman is a PhD candidate in Security and Strategic Analysis at the National University of Malaysia. His research focuses on Malaysia’s space policy, ASEAN regional security, and the strategic implications of emerging technologies. His work explores how Malaysia’s defense policy and strategic culture shape its approach to outer space.

Editorial Deadline 05/09/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk

While some threats arrive suddenly in the region, others have been sitting in the ground, or building in the atmosphere, for decades. In Laos, the Third Review Conference of the Convention on Cluster Munitions opens in Vientiane this month in a country still living with the consequences of the largest bombing campaign per capita in history — timing made sharper by Norwegian People's Aid's decision to turn down USD 40 million in US funding rather than accept new restrictions, shrinking an already thin field of deminers as casualties keep climbing. In Thailand, Bangkok is fighting a newer threat, rolling out over 300 Heat Escape Rooms to protect residents from extreme heat, a model now being adapted in Iloilo City, Philippines, as urban heat resilience becomes a regional necessity. And in Cambodia, Phnom Penh unveiled a USD 1.2 billion economic package to shield vulnerable households and small businesses from Middle East-driven inflation and slowing growth, part of Prime Minister Hun Manet's broader argument that economic resilience is itself a form of national defense.

Lao PDR 🇱🇦

Laos to Host Cluster Bomb Treaty Review Amid Donor Retreat

by Thongsavanh Souvannasane, in Vientiane

Laos will host the Third Review Conference of the Convention on Cluster Munitions in Vientiane from 14 to 18 September, gathering states parties in the country hit hardest by unexploded bombs anywhere in the world.

Lao Foreign Minister Thongsavanh Phomvihane will preside over the meeting, which opens days after one of the country’s longest-serving demining partners announced it was scaling back its work here.

On 3 September, Norwegian People’s Aid said it was turning down roughly NOK 400 million, about USD 40 million, in US State Department funding.

The department’s new terms would have barred the group from working on abortion, gender equality, and diversity, not just in US-funded projects but across all of its operations. NPA said it would cut around 1,700 jobs worldwide and scale down work in Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Iraq.

NPA is one of only six groups clearing bombs in Laos: the national UXO Lao and the Lao army’s Unit 58, plus four international NGOs, NPA, the HALO Trust, MAG, and Humanity & Inclusion.

NPA has been active in Laos’ southern provinces, Salavanh, Champasak, Attapeu, and Sekong, since 1997, and has also carried out work in the country’s northern region. Its pullback shrinks an already small field.

Laos remains the most heavily bombed country per capita in history.

Between 1964 and 1973, US forces dropped 2.5 million tons of ordnance, including cluster bombs that scattered hundreds of smaller submunitions on impact. Roughly 30 percent failed to explode. An estimated 22,000 Lao citizens have been killed or injured since, and the danger has not gone away: officials recorded 15 accidents in 2025, causing 25 casualties, including six deaths.

The economic damage runs deep too. Laos is still a lower-middle-income country and one of the world’s Least Developed Countries, a status it is due to leave in November 2026.

According to UNDP, 42 of the 46 poorest districts in Laos are contaminated with unexploded bombs, cutting off farmland and raising costs in areas that can least afford it.

The US is not Laos’ only donor. Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, the UK, Canada, and the European Union have all funded clearance work in recent years, often through UNDP. Some US funding also continues: on 26 August, Lao and MAG officials signed a new agreement adding USD 15 million for clearance in Xieng Khouang province through 2027.

As of 2024, Washington remained Laos’ single largest donor, having given nearly USD 400 million since 1995.

Still, NPA’s exit adds to a pattern that began with the Trump administration’s dismantling of USAID in 2025. A USD 30 million disability and survivor-support program, USAID Okard, lost 80 percent of its staff, leaving nearly 20,000 vulnerable Lao citizens, including 176 bomb survivors, largely without help.

Laos now heads into its own conference with a mixed picture: some donors staying steady, one key partner pulling back, survivor support badly weakened, and casualties still climbing every year.

Thongsavanh is a journalist from Laos with a background in English-language media. He graduated from the Lao-American Institute with a Diploma of the Arts in English and contributes to independent news platforms. His reporting focuses on environmental issues, socio-economic development, and geopolitics.

Thailand 🇹🇭

How Bangkok’s Dialogue Exchanges Inspire Urban Heat Resilience Initiatives In The Philippines

by Natamon Aumphin, in Bangkok,

After a hazardous temperature in summer, Bangkok shared its lessons through regional dialogue to help Iloilo City in the Philippines combat urban heat and create an ASEAN network of urban heat resilience initiatives. Currently, the rising temperature has moved beyond the effects of climate change. It has become a public health risk and perpetuated inequality, affecting vulnerable groups such as the elders, children, outdoor workers, and low-income communities. Particularly, those who reside in the city may experience prolonged heat trapped in buildings and concrete roads. Because of insufficient green spaces, the heat is hard to cool off; hence, residents are prone to extreme heat, especially during the day, which makes certain groups vulnerable to health risks.

With this issue at hand, the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA) rolled out an Urban Resilience Action Plan in March, featuring Cooling Centers across the capital as an immediate measure to compete with high heat. These heat escape rooms are air-conditioned spaces where people can come and relieve heat before heading out to continue their day. So far, there are over 313 Heat Escape Rooms equipped with air conditioners, drinking water, and medical supplies, stationed around the city. These centers have gained attention among elderly people, reflected in feedback footage in the BMA official Facebook page. As a positive spillover, Bangkok’s Cooling Centers initiative prompted an ASEAN neighbor, the Philippines, to follow its footsteps through the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), United Nations.

Through ESCAP’s Regional Training Workshop on Advancing Urban Heat Resilience in Asia, organized in April 2026 in Bangkok, and the project “Enabling Urban Action to Enhance Climate Resilience in Asia,” supported by the United Kingdom’s Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office, the programs serves as a platform to connect and enable ideas exchanges between policymakers of different areas and cities. Matthew Perkins, Economic Affairs Officer, Environment and Development Division at ‌ESCAP, provided an exclusive excerpt stating that learning from BMA reinforced Iloilo City to enhance its approach toward providing heat relief to its citizens.

“Cooling hubs were not pursued instead of other heat-response measures, but rather as one immediate and practical intervention within a broader approach to urban heat resilience,” said Matthew. “The cooling hubs, therefore, offered an early opportunity to translate regional learning into practical local action while contributing to a more comprehensive response to extreme heat.” Until the present, the cooling centers in Iloilo City have served over 3,800 people who use the facility not only to cool off themselves during the extreme heat but also to seek basic medical monitoring and assistance.

One crucial key to success is localization by adapting ‌relief measures to local specifics and needs. For example, Bangkok repurposed parts of public spaces, public schools, public medical centers, and government buildings and opened a part of those spaces for public use to combat the scorching temperature. Meanwhile, Iloilo City started at a much smaller scale by building three cooling hubs and placing them in strategic locations where there is more pedestrian traffic and community activities.

These approaches reflect how each city approaches urban heat resilience differently, taking capacity, resources, and limitations into consideration. In fact, Bangkok has a budget limit and is constrained by bureaucratic processes. Hence, repurposing the existing infrastructure is the best option at the moment to deliver an immediate heat relief network to citizens. Likewise, Iloilo City started small to ensure the effectiveness of the program before expanding the measures.

Nonetheless, Matthew recognized the limitation. “Cooling hubs can provide meaningful protection to the people who use them, but a relatively small number of facilities cannot address heat exposure across an entire city.” All in all, these short-term approaches are only part of the long-term solution, ranging from building green infrastructure to enhance green innovation and ensuring public readiness, aligning with ASEAN’s roadmap for Extreme Heat Protection through Passive Cooling.


Natamon has served as a rapporteur at the Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS Thailand). She has also worked as a research assistant on diplomatic issues in Southeast Asia. Her work focuses on how domestic politics shape foreign policy in the region. She holds a degree in international relations and has experience in policy analysis, event reporting, and regional research.

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Cambodia 🇰🇭

Cambodia Unveils USD 1.2B Economic Package to Counter Global Crises

by Malai Yatt, in Phnom Penh

The Cambodian government launched a USD 1.2 billion “Comprehensive Intervention Program” to stabilize livelihoods, support vulnerable families and MSMEs, create jobs, and bolster economic resilience amid ongoing global economic and geopolitical crises.

According to the official announcement, the government planned expenditure of the budget to ensure the stability of the people’s livelihoods and strengthen the resilience of Cambodia’s economy and society in the short and medium term.

Aun Pornmoniroth, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Economy and Finance said that following the COVID-19 crisis, Cambodia continues to face the changes in the global trade regime, crackdowns on online scam operations, border issues, and particularly the crisis in the Middle East, which has driven up petroleum and gas prices and created inflationary pressures.

Despite being a small country, Cambodia maintains a clear vision and proactive approach in implementing intervention measures. As a result, Cambodia’s economy achieved 5.3 percent growth in 2025, but is projected to slow to 4.1 percent in 2026 due to the impact of the Middle East war.

It should be noted that In 2025, Cambodia’s working-age population stood at roughly 13.1 million, comprising 6.8 million women and 6.3 million men, with 7.8 million residing in rural regions and 5.3 million in urban centers, according to National Institute of Statistics’s survey.

The national labor force participation rate rose to 71.6% in 2025, a notable increase from 69.3% in 2019, with male participation at 77.7% and female participation at 65.9%. By sector, services employed the largest portion of the workforce at 43%, while industry and agriculture accounted for 29.4% and 27.6%, respectively, the survey added.

Regarding this, Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet stated that amid the global and internal challenges, Cambodia must pursue a strong economy, sufficient resources, people with stable livelihoods and strong knowledge, only then can we safeguard peace. It cannot be asked from others.

That reinforces the inseparable link between economic resilience and peace. Nations with weak economies are more vulnerable to external pressure, political, economic, or strategic, he said.

Conversely, economically strong nations possess greater autonomy in decision-making and are better equipped to defend national interests. Meanwhile,

economic strength also underpins the sustainability and modernization of defense capabilities, Improved living standards and poverty reduction, and Social stability and internal cohesion, Manet added.

In conclusion, as part of development and economic recovery, this comprehensive intervention reinforces national autonomy by supporting vulnerable households, empowering the workforce, and securing sustainable growth to safeguard peace amid global turbulence.

Malai is a reporter at Kiripost, where she has worked for more than three years, driven by a strong commitment to amplifying the voices of underserved communities. Her reporting focuses on economic and foreign affairs.

Myanmar 🇲🇲

Thailand’s Engagement with Myanmar Junta Raises Questions Over ASEAN Centrality

by Myat Moe Kywe

Thailand welcomed Myanmar’s newly branded president and former military coup leader, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, with a red-carpet reception during his official visit on August 6–7, drawing backlash from civil society groups in both Myanmar and Thailand.

According to National Thailand, Foreign Affairs Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow said Thailand’s foreign policy toward Myanmar is guided primarily by a commitment to ASEAN unity and practical regional stability. Yet bilateral discussions during the visit rarely focused on ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus or the ongoing civil war in Myanmar.

Instead, the talks placed significant emphasis on strengthening cross-border commerce, with the two countries seeking to accelerate bilateral trade toward a target of US$12 billion. Thailand and Myanmar also planned to convene a Joint Trade Commission meeting between their commerce ministers.

The two governments additionally signed four separate agreements, including one concerning cross-border river pollution management. Thai communities and civil society groups have been raising concerns over transboundary river pollution linked to mining activities in Myanmar, particularly rare-earth mining, with contaminated waterways flowing into northern Thailand. The pollution has been a growing concern for communities that depend on the rivers for their livelihoods and daily lives.

However, Thailand’s Cabinet approved the Terms of Reference (TOR) for a Joint Working Group on Water Quality Management in Border and Transboundary Rivers with Myanmar’s regime has been widely criticized among civil society and environmental watchdogs in Thailand.

The ETOs Watch Coalition, a network of civil society organisations monitoring transboundary investments and human rights violations in the region, argued that while international environmental cooperation is necessary, it must address the root causes of pollution, protect public rights and operate transparently. Without these safeguards, they warned, such cooperation could create “a false sense of progress” while legitimising Myanmar’s military regime.

The visit carries broader diplomatic significance as Myanmar’s military-backed administration seeks to consolidate legitimacy following elections widely described by critics as a “sham election.” Thailand’s willingness to engage directly with Min Aung Hlaing therefore raises questions about how other ASEAN member states may respond, particularly those that have remained cautious about direct engagement with the junta.

Thailand’s approach also presents a test for ASEAN centrality. While Bangkok frames its engagement as necessary for regional stability and ASEAN unity, the limited attention given to the bloc’s Five-Point Consensus and Myanmar’s ongoing conflict highlights a tension between pragmatic bilateral engagement and ASEAN’s collective response to the crisis.

Whether Thailand’s approach becomes a precedent for wider ASEAN engagement with Myanmar’s military-backed government remains a question for the bloc and for the credibility of ASEAN’s role in addressing the region’s most persistent political crisis.


Myat is a B.A. graduate in Politics, Philosophy, and Economics. She has interned at The Asia Foundation in Washington, D.C., and she has also worked as a summer research assistant at the Centre for Policy and Innovation (CRPI), gaining experience in research and analysis. Her work focuses on civic engagement, gender, youth leadership, and community development.

Editorial Deadline 05/08/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by the Pacific Corridor Desk

This issue looks across four Southeast Asian countries at very different questions of governance, development, and national identity. In the Philippines, the NLEX flooding exposes weaknesses in infrastructure resilience, emergency response, and accountability on one of the country’s most important transport corridors. In Singapore, Prime Minister Lawrence Wong’s 2026 National Day Rally combines multilingual appeals to national identity with new family policies, ASEAN priorities, and development plans. Vietnam’s technology boom highlights the country’s shift toward electronics and semiconductor-related manufacturing, while also raising concerns about dependence on foreign investment and limited domestic participation.

The Philippines 🇵🇭

Built for Speed, Trapped in Slow Motion: What the NLEX Fiasco Revealed

by Eduardo G. Fajermo Jr., in Angeles City

On a road built to save time, motorists paid tolls to lose nearly an entire day. After southwest monsoon rains flooded the Tulaoc section of the North Luzon Expressway (NLEX) in San Simon, Pampanga, queues stretched for approximately 10 kilometers, while some travelers remained stranded for almost 24 hours.

For readers outside the Philippines, NLEX is the principal tolled gateway from Metro Manila to Central and Northern Luzon. It connects with the Subic–Clark–Tarlac Expressway and the wider northern expressway network, serving Clark International Airport, the Subic Bay seaport, industrial zones, agricultural provinces, and Central Luzon’s growing logistics and manufacturing corridor.

The flood therefore did more than inconvenience holidaymakers. It immobilized workers, buses, delivery vehicles, and freight trucks on an artery connecting the capital with major production and distribution centers.

Truck driver Edgardo Viray said he was running out of diesel and money and had only six pieces of pandesal (small Filipino bread rolls) to share with his assistant. Elsewhere in the gridlock, chickens being transported to a factory reportedly died from the intense heat.

Public anger centered as much on bodily indignity as on travel time. One widely shared firsthand account described a 13-hour journey marked by hunger, limited phone service, and a female passenger unable to change her sanitary pad.

Cardinal Pablo Virgilio David, who said he was trapped for nearly five hours, called for an investigation by the Toll Regulatory Board and raised the possibility of collective legal action. Other motorists and politicians demanded toll refunds, reflecting a basic expectation: those paying for a premium road should receive timely warnings, competent traffic management, and meaningful assistance when the system fails.

The flooding itself was not solely an expressway problem. Pampanga Governor Lilia Pineda said water was backing up because low-lying downstream towns such as Macabebe and Masantol were already full, preventing floodwater from draining toward Manila Bay, while Public Works Secretary Vince Dizon said the sheer volume of water meant pumping alone would be insufficient.

Even MacArthur Highway, the principal alternative to NLEX, was heavily flooded and partly impassable. Motorists were consequently left with few usable diversions, exposing the lack of redundancy in one of Luzon’s most important transport corridors.

The operator has since apologized and announced additional flood-control measures, including 300-meter concrete barriers on both sides of the affected section, pumping operations, and further pavement elevation once the Tulaoc Bridge is raised. These measures may be necessary, but their timing reinforces the impression that contingency planning continues to follow disasters instead of getting ahead of them.

The episode also exposed fragmented responsibility. The private operator manages the expressway and its warnings, further pavement elevation depends on the completion of a bridge project, provincial officials point to a wider river-basin problem, and the Toll Regulatory Board is expected to enforce the concession’s service obligations.

Every institution can explain the part under its jurisdiction. Motorists, however, experienced the combined failure of the whole system.

The failure also has a significant economic dimension. During the first half of 2026, NLEX recorded an average of 352,067 vehicle entries per day, generating PHP15.77 billion in toll revenue and PHP7.46 billion in net income.

Those figures do not establish negligence, but they demonstrate the scale and commercial maturity of the concession. NLEX users are not beneficiaries of a free public service: they are customers paying a regulated operator for faster and more predictable movement.

These dispersed losses matter in a country already burdened by expensive logistics. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development estimates that logistics costs amount to approximately 27% of Philippine wholesale prices—higher than in Vietnam and Thailand—partly because of the country’s archipelagic geography but also because of transport inefficiencies.

NLEX was built to sell speed, but the flood revealed the slow machinery of fragmented governance. When motorists pay to spend an entire working day trapped, the Philippines is not merely stuck in traffic; it is paying for connectivity that disappears when it is needed most. In a country of storms, disaster preparedness is not charity after the flood.


Eduardo is a Political Science graduate and MA Political Science candidate at the University of Santo Tomas, researching democracy, disaster governance, and inclusive policy in the Global South. He is a former faculty member at Holy Angel University, where he taught Philippine history and contemporary global issues. He also worked with a senator in the Guam Legislature, contributing to policy research and legislative analysis.

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Singapore 🇸🇬

National Day Rally 2026 Showcases Bold Moves and Rhetoric by the Government

by Nurul Aini, in Singapore

As per the tradition of National Day rallies, the structure of Singapore’s Prime Minister Lawrence Wong’s 2026 speech followed an expected flow. He began first in Singapore’s national language which is the Malay Language. This is then followed by other official languages such as Mandarin and English. While he did not speak in Tamil, his rally was broadcasted through audio dubbing of his English speech by the Vasantham channel and radio Oli 96.8FM.

Unlike the then Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, PM Wong did not have a ‘magic cup’ that he drank from that would prompt a language switch. Yet, what makes this year’s rally particularly interesting was that his speeches moved beyond linguistic accommodation. As he maneuvered between the Malay, Chinese and English languages, his metalinguistic approach translated into the construction of different parts of the Singaporean identity. The ideas and policies accompanying the speech amplify the idea that these differing identities should contribute to national cohesion.

In the Malay language, he spotlighted it as part of the Singaporean identity and the language of marching instruction of the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF). He encouraged the learning of the Malay language and culture so as to improve regional relationships with immediate neighbouring countries that may prove beneficial to Singapore’s economy and its people. Almost similar to the rhetoric in Malay, his Mandarin speech promoted the use of Mandarin Chinese in households that are now increasingly monolingually English-speaking. Alluding to the recent issue of the Teochew version of Dear You that sparked debate over media regulations and restrictions, he also announced that the government will ease dialect restrictions on movies as long as Mandarin dubbed versions are available.

Switching to the English language, his speech became more policy-oriented. He announced that enhanced financial support will be given to assist more families over a longer period of time to encourage the raising of more children. Core financial mechanisms remain the same as the government utilizes existing tools such as cash gifts and Edusave grants for newborns, Child Development Account (CDA), and Post Secondary Education Account (PSEA).

Within these mechanisms, each child now will be supported with nearly $70,000 until they are 17 years old. At birth, each child will receive $10,000 regardless of birth order thus focusing on equality of birth order compared to the previous policy. New policies such as annual credits of $2000 will also be given to each child from age 1 to 16 years old with another $10,000 top up in their PSEA account at age 17.

Moreover, as Singapore is set to take over ASEAN chairmanship in 2027, PM Wong also emphasised on “ASEAN centrality and unity, deepen[ing] regional integration, and mak[ing] ASEAN a more effective single market.”

He also announced the land merger of Singapore’s outer islands. This has brought about concerns of its environmental impact on the sea. Eventually, while certain policies sound good theoretically, their effectiveness remains to be tested and deliberated.


Aini is currently pursuing a master’s degree in English literature at Nanyang Technological University. She has experience working in youth groups, contributing to the planning and management of outreach activities.

Vietnam 🇻🇳

Chance in the Chips

by Tri Vo, in Ho Chi Minh City

Vietnam’s macroeconomic profile is undergoing a rapid, structurally substantial transition. For decades, the country has relied heavily on low-value-added retail goods such as garments, footwear, and basic smartphone assembly to drive its export economy. Today, the picture has altered markedly, with advanced technology hardware, specifically computer components and AI-related infrastructure, decisively dictating the next phase of the country’s growth trajectory. With global spending on traditional retail goods cooling under the battering of high inflation, the high-tech manufacturing sector can act as the propeller keeping Vietnam relatively on track to reach its double-digit growth ambition for the rest of 2026.

The sheer scale of this transition is most manifest in the annual trade figures. In fact, Vietnam’s exports of computers, electronic products, and other relevant components are expected to surge dramatically by up to 20% in 2026, with total electronics trade turnover reaching a record US$170 billion in the first five months alone. The North American market emerges as the primary destination of this huge trade upsurge. Electronics shipments specifically to the United States dominated the export ledgers, hitting US$22.5 billion in the same five-month period and maintaining its position as Vietnam’s largest export market, but this time, for something much more technologically intensive.

This trade influx represents a calculated geoeconomic realignment on a firmer footing. As Washington and Beijing’s relations sour due to increasing geopolitical competition, multinational corporations are aggressively de-risking and diversifying their supply chains, moving production away from mainland China to avoid both the Trump administration’s punitive tariffs and national security concerns. In such a febrile milieu, Vietnam has successfully positioned itself as a viable alternative for global firms. Vietnam’s emergence is aligned with existing economic currents as technology manufacturers, despite geopolitical instability, still need to expand their production footprints, especially in semiconductor testing/packaging to head off the anticipated massive needs for AI infrastructure in the coming years.

Yet all that glitters is not gold, or, in this case, silicone; scaling this massive tech manufacturing footprint requires substantial upfront capital expenditure, resulting in severe short-term trade imbalances. In the first seven months of 2026, the broader electronics sector posted an overall trade deficit of US$12.3 billion. This was primarily driven by the computers and components sub-sector, which recorded an astonishing US$45 billion deficit as manufacturers aggressively imported chips, specialized machinery, production lines, and other raw materials. Nevertheless, belying such an alarmist appearance and rather than signaling a loss of export competitiveness, this massive outflow of capital indicates that foreign factories are actively expanding their production capacity to meet the government’s lofty double-digit economic growth aspiration for the second half of the year, targets that are now more pressing as the first half had impressive but still only single-digit growth.

As 2026 enters its final quarter, Vietnam’s technology boom remains structurally vulnerable: FDI enterprises overwhelmingly dominate the sector, leaving domestic firms peripheral and growth exposed to shifts in the business cycle. To capture lasting economic value, Vietnam must urgently develop domestic science and engineering talent and integrate local firms into advanced supply chains, offering ASEAN peers a model for moving from mere hosts of foreign investment to active participants in the 21st-century technology boom.


Tri has experience in management consulting and strategy, having worked with institutions such as the UNDP, The Asia Group, and ARC Group. He has provided strategic, legal, and operational insights to clients in sectors including manufacturing, energy, and technology. He holds both academic and professional experience related to Southeast and East Asia, with a focus on regional development and policy.

Timor-Leste 🇹🇱

Timor-Leste Celebrates 51 Years of FALINTIL

by Amandina Maria Helena da Silva, in Dili

Every year, Timor-Leste celebrates the FALINTIL (Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor) day to celebrate the struggle of the armed forces for the struggle for independence–the armed forces include the contribution of men and women fighter resistance. Nationally, this day is not recognized as a public holiday, but rather as a day of tolerance. The celebration lasts only half a day, marked mainly by the raising of the national flag to honor the heroes of the struggle and the military.

This year 20 August 2026, the government organized a ceremony to celebrate FALINITL Day on ‘Matebian’ mountain where the mountain also became a shelter for the armed forces to fight in the past conflict–through mobilizing the local residents, Veterans, ministries, government, women survivors and people.

This celebration is not only about remembering the past, but also about strengthening unity for the future. In his opening speech, Major General ‘Domingos Raul “Falur Rate Laek’ reflected on His speech that ‘In Matebian, we are not brought back to past tragedies, but learn to make peace. In this way, we leave a legacy of peace and not division to future generations’.

The following speech by the President of Timor-Les and also Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces ‘José Ramos Horta’ honored and respected all those who contributed to the struggle of Timor-Leste itself, especially those in the struggle of the armed forces. At the same time he also recognized the struggle of Women for Timor-Leste Independence.

From the above speeches, we realized that the fight from Timor-Leste Independence is about Collectiveness– not only men on the frontline to fight against the enemy but also women soldiers and women sexual violence survivors. But in popular narrative of Falentil Day is mostly people remembering men resistance leaders. The question is why are women voices missing from FALINTIL Day?


Amandina is a human rights advocate working with Asia Justice and Rights Timor-Leste on the Interim Reparation to Women Survivors project. She previously worked with UNDP Timor-Leste’s Accelerator Lab and has contributed to human rights and health initiatives through several youth and civil society organisations. Her interests lie in justice, youth empowerment, and community-based social change in Timor-Leste.

Editorial Deadline 1/09/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Haniva Sekar Deanty, Managing Editor - TAF

This week’s Maritime Crescent looks at what happens when familiar problems are treated as emergencies, even when the warning signs have long been visible.

In Indonesia, Gemala Asyura looks at recurring forest and land fires across Kalimantan and Riau have once again brought hazardous haze, school closures, and cross-border disruption. While El Niño has worsened conditions, the concentration of hotspots within corporate concessions raises a more persistent question: how long can a recurring and partly preventable crisis continue to be managed primarily through emergency response?

In Malaysia, Edrina Lisa examines strong headline growth sits uneasily alongside concerns over living costs, subsidy reforms, and an increasingly fragmented political landscape. As the country marks another year of independence, the challenge for the Madani government is not simply sustaining economic momentum, but ensuring that national progress is felt beyond the macroeconomic figures.

Meanwhile, Syimah Johari argues that Brunei’s gradual shift toward cashless payments reveals a quieter question of preparedness and accessibility. Digital options are expanding, but their uneven adoption among smaller vendors shows that technological transition depends as much on practicality and habit as it does on infrastructure.

Emergencies do not always arrive without warning. Forest fires return with the dry season, economic frustration builds beneath positive indicators, and payment systems evolve long before cash disappears from daily life.

Indonesia 🇮🇩

We Didn't Start the Fire

by Gemala Asyura, in Pekanbaru

It has not been a month since the devastating magnitude 7.7 earthquake struck Flores, East Nusa Tenggara (NTT) in August 2026 leaving 111+ dead and 110,000+ displaced. Indonesia faces another severe seasonal forest and land fires (karhutla) that have intensified through August 2026 as the dry season peaked. Karhutla refers to forest and land fires that can spread rapidly, especially during the dry season. Indonesia’s Meteorology, Climatology, and Geophysics Agency (BMKG) claimed the fires were driven by El Niño, causing the thick haze to blanket several cities, up to the point where residents in Palangka Raya admit day time feels like night time.

However, El Niño is a frequent and recurring event that is mostly predictable. By now the government is supposed to have the solution to prevent the same thing happening rather than relying on annual emergency responses to minimise the damage each time it does. The scale of this fire is massive, with people can barely see the road when they travel, schools shut down, smoke even gets indoors and the air quality in Kalimantan hits the dangerous category. The haze has become so severe that it has spread to neighboring Malaysia, forcing more than a hundred schools in Sarawak to close.

President Prabowo Subianto held a limited cabinet meeting specifically to get ahead of El Niño impacts, focusing on two things, securing national water reserves and blocking potential forest and land fires with the main target on rewetting peatlands. So far, the government deployed 30 helicopters in Kalimantan for water bombing and aerial patrols, alongside fixed-wing patrol aircraft, they also do weather modification or cloud seeding conducted in West Kalimantan to induce rainfall, contingent on suitable cloud conditions.

Greenpeace’s research found the majority of karhutla cases are linked to palm oil and pulp/paper companies clearing land by burning, meaning this isn’t purely a natural disaster that recurs on its own. This is why simply putting out the fire after it happened will not solve the problem. The government needs to come up with a long-term prevention system rather than just reactive firefighting and rewetting peatlands. There should have been precautions taken before it happened. In order to minimize the impact, the government should implement and invest in preventive measures every time the peak of the dry season is about to arrive. One may not always be able to contain a fire, but one can certainly prevent it from starting.

According to Friends of the Earth Indonesia (WALHI) the majority of hotspots in Kalimantan are located within corporate concessions. Out of a total of 34,262 hotspots, 25,524 points or roughly 74% are situated inside licensed areas. Most of them are in palm oil plantation concessions, mining concessions, and forestry utilization claimed by the Campaign Coordinator at WALHI National, in late July. This reinforces the suspicion that land and forest fires are not caused by El Niño alone, but also by illegal land burning within licensed areas.

Under Prabowo, Indonesia faced two major 2026 disasters, the Flores earthquake and El Niño-driven fires across Kalimantan and Riau leaving 200,000+ hectares burned, 10.6M + exposed to haze. His government responded with strong relief efforts, however, this response looks stronger on relief and reactive firefighting than on addressing root vulnerability. Clearing land by burning is prohibited under Article 69(1)(h) of Law No. 32/2009 on Environmental Protection and Management, but legal loopholes still permit land-clearing by fire, which is the main driver in this recurring problem. No matter how much water you pour on the roots, it won’t put out a fire caused by a completely different root problem.


Gemala holds a degree in International Relations, with a focus on contemporary global issues. In addition to her years of undergraduate study, she has hands-on experience in early childhood education, having worked in both teaching and teaching assistant roles. She now pursues journalism as a practical extension of her academic background, with a focus and scope centered on ASEAN regional dynamics and social issues.

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Malaysia 🇲🇾

Malaysia’s Paradox of Progress

by Edrina Lisa Ozaidi, in WP Kuala Lumpur

Parades are held in Putrajaya Square, and fireworks and drones light the sky since National Day eve. In the past two days, all Malaysian social media feeds are swamped with National Day wishes from brands and corporations alike. However, as Malaysia stepped into September 2026, the country found itself in a peculiar paradox.

On paper, the national macro-narrative is remarkably bold and positive: Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim highlighted in his National Day address that Malaysia’s second-quarter GDP growth surged to a robust 6.0%, trade numbers continue to rise to a high ceiling point, and international tech giants are said to have been pouring billions into Malaysia’s local semiconductor and digital infrastructure.

Yet, away from the celebrations, the socio-political pulse tells a far more complex story. The foundational question facing the nation post-Merdeka is not just about economic survival, but a test to national unity: Can Malaysia endure the persistent undertow of ethnic polarisation and fractured political realpolitik?

The most pressing friction point in Malaysian society today is the widening gap between national economic metrics and grassroots lived realities. While national coverage reported a 60% Q2 growth rate as a marked triumph for the Madani administration, another question that should be pondered is: is this small comfort for working-class families facing high living costs, new taxes, and cut subsidies, or are better solutions coming?

Political actors on both sides of the aisle have been quick to point out and weaponise this disconnect. Opposition narratives frequently frame federal economic reforms—such as targeted diesel rationalisation and tax implementation—as proof of a government out of touch with citizens.

Conversely, federal authorities argue that these bitter pills are essential to safeguard the country’s long-term financial sovereignty, while reminding citizens that Malaysia is still servicing debts linked to 1Malaysia Development Berhad (1MDB) scandal, as well as liabilities involving institutions such as Tabung Haji and Felda.

However, federal leaders also admit that navigating this tightrope, especially with the upcoming national budget, requires more than sound fiscal policy; it demands an empathetic narrative that bridges the cold logic of macroeconomic spreadsheets with the daily anxieties of the electorate.

Compounding these economic anxieties is an increasingly volatile political landscape. The mid-2026 state election cycle in Johor and Negeri Sembilan served as a harsh wake up call for the federal Unity Government. It proved that the forced collaboration between historic ideological rivals—Pakatan Harapan and Barisan Nasional—remains deeply fragile at the grassroots.

As parties recalibrate ahead of upcoming electoral battles, the competition for the center has intensified. Parties are discovering that traditional ethnic-centric politicking no longer guarantees victories, yet a purely technocratic appeal risks sounding elitist. Voters, particularly the youth, are increasingly fatigued by political posturing, shifting their gaze toward pragmatic delivery, governance, and tangible economic opportunities.

Sixty-nine years after independence, Malaysia’s greatest asset remains its multi-ethnic fabric, yet remains as the most sensitive terrain. The challenge for contemporary leadership is to ensure that the pursuit of high-tech modernisation does not leave behind rural and marginalised urban communities.

If the Madani government is to successfully navigate the remainder of its mandate, it must deliver equitable prosperity. The battle for the center cannot be won through politics and macroeconomic data alone; it will be decided in the daily lives of Malaysians who are looking for a reason to believe that the nation’s collective promise includes them.


Edrina is a communications professional with a background in international relations. She holds a degree from the University of Nottingham Malaysia and has worked across public relations and social media for organizations in the development, education, and corporate sectors. Her work focuses on crafting narratives around regional affairs and strengthening media engagement across Southeast Asia.

Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳

Could Brunei’s Markets Be the Next Cashless Frontier?

by Syimah Johari, in Bandar Seri Begawan

Imagine walking through a food festival in Brunei, spotting something you want to try, only to realise you have no cash left. You ask the vendor if they accept card or QR payments. The answer is more likely to be a bank transfer – if they accept anything other than cash at all.

As pop-up markets, food events and local vendor initiatives become increasingly common across Brunei, these small moments raise a bigger question about how we pay. Last month, a cashless payment initiative was introduced at Gadong Night Market, partly to make spending more convenient for tourists. But beyond the night market, how far has Brunei really come in becoming cashless?

Cashless payment is certainly not new here. Brunei already has options such as Pocket, BIBD’s QuickPay, Progresif’s Ding! and TAIB’s Scan-to-Pay (STP), alongside the increasingly familiar option of transferring money through local banking apps. For many, transferring money from one bank account to another has become almost second nature.

Yet the experience can feel different depending on where we shop.

Walking into a newer café, restaurant or supermarket and paying by card, QR code or another digital method is increasingly common. At a night market, warong, food festival or temporary pop-up, however, cash can still feel like the safest bet.

There are understandable reasons for this. A permanent business may have regular customers and established systems for accepting different forms of payment. A small vendor setting up a stall for only a few days may have a different calculation. Payment terminals may come with costs, while transaction fees can matter more when margins are already small. There is also the simple reliability of cash: no internet connection, device or technical issue is needed to accept it.

For customers, meanwhile, cash remains familiar. Not everyone is equally comfortable with digital payments, particularly older customers who may prefer handling physical money. Going cashless, therefore, is not simply a matter of giving businesses another payment option. It is also about making that option practical for both the person selling and the person buying.

This is what makes the Gadong initiative interesting. Although introduced partly in response to tourists’ needs, making cashless payments more accessible at a night market could have benefits that extend beyond tourism. Visitors who are used to paying digitally may be more likely to spend when they do not have to worry about finding local currency. Vendors who see that demand may have more reason to offer digital payment options.

And as those options become more common at the markets and events that Bruneians themselves frequent, they may gradually become less of a novelty and more of an everyday habit.

Perhaps Brunei does not need to become completely cashless. But if the aim is to make digital payments a normal part of everyday life, the next step may not be getting another café to accept cards. It may be making it just as easy to pay the small vendor at the night market.


Syimah is a graduate of King’s College London with a BA in International Relations. With a strong focus on diplomacy, regional cooperation, and development policy, she is passionate about contributing to meaningful change through public service. Currently, she is involved in poverty alleviation work through a local NGO.

Editorial Deadline 29/08/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk

Min Aung Hlaing traded his military uniform for a civilian suit when he was declared Myanmar's president earlier this year, and the region has spent the months since treating that costume change as an open door. This week, Vietnam walked through it: Foreign Minister Lê Hoài Trung became the first Vietnamese foreign minister to visit Nay Pyi Taw since the 2021 coup, reviving a bilateral committee dormant since 2019 and expanding cooperation into defense, telecommunications, and trade. Cambodia made its own case for partnership on a bigger stage, hosting some 130 parliamentary leaders from over 30 countries who adopted the Phnom Penh Declaration, with Hun Sen and Hun Manet positioning Cambodia as a country that no longer just attends global diplomacy but convenes it. Thailand tested the same door earlier this month, giving Min Aung Hlaing a red-carpet welcome in Bangkok that drew backlash from human rights groups even as officials framed it as pragmatic regional engagement — a visit whose fallout is still unfolding, and one we're returning to this issue. And in Laos, a reminder that not every regional story this week is about diplomacy: flooding has now hit 654 villages across 42 districts, displacing over 95,000 people and killing at least four, with officials increasingly pointing to climate change as the disasters grow more frequent than the country's development plans have accounted for.

Myanmar 🇲🇲

Vietnam Expands Bilateral Cooperation with Myanmar

by Moe Thiri Myat

Vietnamese Foreign Minister Lê Hoài Trung visited Nay Pyi Taw on 26 August, marking the first bilateral visit by a Vietnamese foreign minister to Myanmar since the 2021 military coup. During the visit, Trung and Myanmar Foreign Minister Tin Maung Swe co-chaired the 10th Vietnam–Myanmar Joint Committee for Bilateral Cooperation, reviving a mechanism that had not met since March 2019. The meeting followed the exchange of new ambassadors in July and reviewed cooperation across government, parliament, local authorities and people-to-people ties.

The visit also broadened cooperation in defence, security and technology. The two sides agreed to expand delegation exchanges, military training and young-officer exchanges, alongside cooperation in search and rescue, disaster response, bomb and mine clearance, humanitarian assistance and military medicine. Discussions also covered telecommunications, digital government and the digital economy, extending bilateral cooperation beyond traditional diplomatic and economic ties.

Economic cooperation formed another major part of the discussions. Vietnam and Myanmar agreed to work toward raising bilateral trade to US$1 billion and to convene the 11th Joint Trade Sub-Committee to address barriers including import licensing, quarantine requirements, standards and customs procedures. The two countries also discussed expanding investment and improving conditions for Vietnamese businesses operating in Myanmar. Bilateral trade stood at around US$590 million in 2025, while Vietnam had 107 valid investment projects in Myanmar with registered capital of about US$1.4 billion as of the end of June 2026. Mytel, the telecommunications joint venture involving Vietnam’s military-linked Viettel group, remains one of the most prominent examples of bilateral commercial cooperation.

The visit also carried a political dimension. During a separate meeting with Lower House Speaker and Union Solidarity and Development Party chairman Khin Yi, Trung congratulated Myanmar on what Vietnam described as the successful organisation of the general election earlier in 2026 and acknowledged the new government’s initial period in office. Trung also formally invited Min Aung Hlaing to make a goodwill visit to Vietnam. The two countries discussed supporting one another in regional and international forums, including ASEAN and the United Nations.

The visit comes while ASEAN continues to manage its relationship with Myanmar through the Five-Point Consensus. The bloc has maintained restrictions on Myanmar’s political representation at ASEAN summits and foreign ministers’ meetings, while continuing to call for progress on ending violence, facilitating humanitarian assistance and promoting inclusive dialogue. ASEAN’s latest formal review of the Five-Point Consensus reaffirmed it as the principal framework for addressing the political crisis in Myanmar.

Vietnam’s visit adds to a series of recent contacts between Myanmar and individual ASEAN members. Min Aung Hlaing has travelled to Laos and Thailand this year, while Cambodia is preparing to receive him in September. Vietnam’s invitation could create another opportunity for high-level engagement within Southeast Asia. At the same time, the agreements reached in Nay Pyi Taw extend into defence, trade, telecommunications, digital infrastructure and coordination in regional forums, giving the visit significance beyond a routine diplomatic exchange and placing it within the wider evolution of Myanmar’s relations with its ASEAN neighbours.


Moe Thiri Myat is a senior at Parami University. Majoring in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics (PPE). Interested in analyzing emerging sociopolitical situations and developments, through her work as a Myanmar correspondent at The ASEAN Frontier she aims to explore how sociopolitical developments across Southeast Asia shape and are shaped by the situation in Myanmar.

Cambodia 🇰🇭

Parliamentary Leaders From Over 30 Countries Adopt Phnom Penh Declaration

by Chandara Samban, in Kandal

Around 130 parliamentary leaders from more than 30 countries adopted the Phnom Penh Declaration at the Second Inter-Parliamentary Conference of Speakers of Parliament, hosted by Cambodia, with the aim of promoting a global order founded on international law and the Charter of the United Nations. The declaration urges countries to resolve disputes peacefully rather than through violence or armed conflict, calling on the international community to embrace peace, justice, dialogue, and multilateralism at a time of escalating global tensions not seen in decades, particularly as major powers appear increasingly divided over international norms.

In the declaration, speakers of parliament, senators, and other legislators highlighted parliamentary diplomacy as an effective mechanism for addressing global crises, preventing conflicts, breaking diplomatic deadlocks, and facilitating the peaceful resolution of disputes and wars. They also expressed deep concern over ongoing armed conflicts, rising geopolitical tensions, economic uncertainty, food and energy insecurity, disruptions to global transportation routes, and the growing threat of cybercrime. These challenges, they said, require the international community to strengthen dialogue, negotiation, cooperation, and multilateralism.

During the conference, Cambodian Senate President Hun Sen and Prime Minister Hun Manet also voiced concern over both regional and global crises, including the ongoing border dispute between Cambodia and Thailand, as well as armed conflicts in other parts of the world. They emphasized the importance of dialogue and diplomatic engagement through forums such as the ISC, which provide countries with an opportunity to exchange views and seek peaceful solutions to shared challenges.

Hun Sen called for strengthening parliamentary diplomacy and proposed establishing a global network of parliamentary mediators to help prevent conflicts at an early stage. He said such a mechanism could reinforce the multilateral system and serve as a safeguard against the use of force, unilateral actions, and protectionist policies.

Prime Minister Hun Manet likewise urged countries to resolve disputes through peaceful means and in accordance with international law. He cited Cambodia’s own approach to its ongoing maritime dispute with Thailand, stressing the country’s commitment to international legal mechanisms, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and other principles of international law.

Cambodian leaders and several analysts described the conference as a successful demonstration of Cambodia’s growing role in international diplomacy. They said the event marked Cambodia’s transformation from a country that primarily participated in international summits into one capable of hosting major global conferences and providing a platform for the international community to discuss and develop practical mechanisms to address global challenges. They cited the adoption of the Phnom Penh Declaration as one of the conference’s most significant outcomes.


Chandara is a freelance journalist with a focus on foreign affairs, security issues, and ASEAN affairs. He also serves as a Junior Counterterrorism Intelligence Analyst.

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Thailand 🇹🇭

Min Aung Hlaing Visits Thailand, Sparking Protests Among Human Rights Groups

by Natamon Aumphin, in Bangkok

On August 6-7, 2026, Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul welcomed former Myanmar military junta leader Min Aung Hlaing on his first official visit after being declared the prime minister of Myanmar despite accusations of a rigged election. Under the framework of calibrated reengagement, the Thai prime minister aimed to reconnect with Myanmar after Naypidaw’s stalled effort to implement the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus. Although Myanmar is barred from engaging in the ASEAN Summit, Thailand’s prime minister believes that engaging with a neighbor that shares a border over 2,400 km is a necessity, despite criticism that Bangkok’s action is legitimizing the former military chief. The criticism is evident among human rights defenders as death tolls from the civil war in Myanmar reach over 100,000 people and due to the arrest warrant of the junta from the International Criminal Court (ICC).

Min Aung Hlaing’s visit to Bangkok has implications for Thailand on two levels. Firstly, realigning relationships with Myanmar entails economic benefits for both sides. In fact, Thailand was among Myanmar’s top foreign investors half a decade ago, ranging from petroleum to manufacturing, finance, hospitality, logistics, and wellness. Nonetheless, the invested capital has decreases due to the civil war. The resurgence of interest in investing in Myanmar was, hence, reflected in the Thailand-Myanmar Business Forum 2026, where more than 700 business-related representatives attended. For Thailand, this presents a new opportunity to amplify economic exchange with Myanmar and increase trade surplus after a massive decline in Cambodia-Thailand border trade. From gaining almost a hundred billion supplies in 2024 to gaining none in 2026.

Secondly, it sends signals about Thailand’s direction on the global stage. Some scholars argued that Thailand is associated with external and internal risk due to recalibrating the bilateral relationship with Myanmar. Sihasak Phuangketkeow, the Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, affirmed to the public that Thailand’s decision is to unify ASEAN, reintegrate Myanmar, and increase opportunities in the region while assisting Myanmar toward peace and stability. Nonetheless, it is unclear how Thailand will approach Myanmar on this matter as Myanmar has recently criticized the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus.

The skepticism in Myanmar’s commitment led to negative responses from civil society. In fact, some of the Myanmar residing in Thailand were seen to gather in front of the United Nations ESCAP Headquarters in Bangkok, discouraging the Thai government from legitimizing Min Aung Hlaing for fear of human rights violations. Another instance is when a member of parliament shouted “For Peace! For Humanity!” after being denied access to submit a petition to the House of Senate. These instances reflected concerns of the public toward human rights violation records of Min Aung Hlaing, which could not be ignored. Therefore, although Thailand and Myanmar share over 2,400 km of border, there needs to be a balance between recalibrating, constructive engagement, and a roadmap to regional peace.


Natamon has served as a rapporteur at the Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS Thailand). She has also worked as a research assistant on diplomatic issues in Southeast Asia. Her work focuses on how domestic politics shape foreign policy in the region. She holds a degree in international relations and has experience in policy analysis, event reporting, and regional research.

Lao PDR 🇱🇦

Floods in Laos Highlight Climate Risks

by Phonethida Sitthixay, in Vientiane

In August 2026, heavy rains unleashed severe flooding across Laos, displacing thousands of families and underscoring the growing threat climate change poses to the country’s development.

In the north, Luang Namtha Province was declared a disaster zone after flash floods swept through Boten near the Laos–China border. More than 30 villages were inundated, farmland and schools destroyed, and even the local airport forced to close. Water levels on the Tha River surged to 6.58 meters, well above the flood warning threshold.

In the south, Savannakhet Province saw the Xe Champhone River rise above danger level, flooding thousands of hectares of rice fields and affecting over 2,000 households. The floods cut off eight villages, with recovery efforts underway. Meanwhile, Champasack Province reported the Mekong River rising beyond alert levels.

The worst hit was Khammouane Province, where flooding affected over 60,000 people across all 10 districts, damaging 206 villages and nearly 9,500 households. More than 15,000 hectares of rice fields were destroyed, with losses estimated at LAK 100 billion (USD 4.4 million).

Nationwide, authorities estimate 654 villages across 42 districts have been hit, leaving 95,200 people impacted and at least four dead. Prime Minister Sonexay Siphandone has ordered immediate recovery measures, including road repairs, relief supplies, and stricter monitoring of dam safety and reservoir levels.

Officials admit floods are becoming more frequent and destructive. Between 2021 and 2025, Laos recorded 376 natural disasters affecting more than one million people, according to a government review. This year’s floods have already surpassed last year’s impact, with northern provinces like Luang Namtha and Phongsaly suffering damage rarely seen before.

Experts point to climate change as a key driver. Stronger monsoons and typhoons, combined with deforestation and poor land management, are intensifying floods. Typhoon Maysak and heavy rains dumped up to 140 mm in 24 hours this month, overwhelming rivers and reservoirs.

As Laos prepares to graduate from Least Developed Country (LDC) status by the end of 2026, the floods are a stark reminder that economic growth must be matched with climate resilience.


Phonethida Sitthixay holds a Bachelor of Arts in International Relations from the National University of Laos. She is currently a Senior Project Coordinator at AIF Group, where she works on government-led initiatives to modernize financial integration across public sector systems in Laos. She has experience in sustainable development policy, diplomacy, and economic reporting, having worked with the Global Green Growth Institute and The Laotian Times. Her interests focus on Laos’s diplomacy, regional integration, and its evolving role beyond ASEAN.

Editorial Deadline 29/08/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Karen Ysabelle R. David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk

The highly globalized world that we live in today can be likened to a spider’s web: complex, interconnected, yet ultimately, fragile. In the year 1989, the term “World Wide Web” was coined to refer to the massive information system that we can access on the Internet; fast forward to 2026, and technology has moved at such a blazing speed that it has strengthened the threads that connect us — but it may also have created today’s insecure and volatile world.

In the Philippines, a proposed nationwide cable system will improve Internet connectivity across the country, but it also raises concerns about the link between infrastructure and national security. Meanwhile, Singapore’s own national security concerns have led to the formation of a semiconductor partnership with India in an effort to guard against market disruptions in an uncertain global environment. And across Vietnam, the country’s Gen Z is using the power and reach of social media networks to hold a public official accountable for a fatal car crash.

The Philippines 🇵🇭

When Connectivity Becomes a Security Issue

by Glenn Vincent N. Boquilon, in Makati City

For years, infrastructure in the Philippines has mostly been treated as a development issue. Roads connect communities. Ports move goods. Power keeps businesses running. However, as the country becomes more connected, infrastructure is taking on another role. It is also becoming a matter of national security.

A recent proposal from PLDT, Globe, and Converge shows why. The three telecommunications companies are planning a US$500 million nationwide submarine cable system. The proposed network would improve domestic Internet connectivity and link different parts of the country.

Upon first glance, this looks like a telecommunications project. However, it is much bigger than that. Submarine cables carry data and communications across countries. When these systems are damaged, the effects can reach businesses, government services, and ordinary users. For the Philippines, having more cable connections can also provide alternatives when one part of the network is disrupted.

Additionally, the proposed system could also support sensors that detect earthquakes, tsunamis, and maritime activity. This shows how infrastructure can serve civilian needs while also supporting national security. Furthermore, the government has also made it easier to maintain these systems. In July, the Bureau of Customs introduced rules allowing qualified cable-laying and repair vessels to temporarily enter the Philippines without duties and taxes, subject to certain conditions. This can help reduce delays when submarine cables need to be repaired.

In hindsight, these developments point to a wider change in how infrastructure should be viewed. Nonetheless, building a system is only one part of the job. Governments must also consider what happens when that system is damaged or disrupted. A network that cannot recover quickly can become a weakness during a crisis.

The same applies to energy facilities, ports, and transport networks. These systems keep the economy moving. A major disruption can quickly become an economic and security problem.

The issue is also becoming important across Southeast Asia. Singapore has built extensive infrastructure linking it to global markets. Indonesia is expanding connections across its large archipelago. Vietnam is investing in infrastructure as its role in regional supply chains grows.

Greater connectivity creates opportunities, but it also creates new risks. For the Philippines, the challenge is not simply to build more. It is to build infrastructure that can withstand disruption.

A submarine cable may look like a piece of technology. A port may look like a transport facility. But when these systems become essential to daily life and the economy, protecting them becomes part of protecting the country itself.


Glenn holds a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from the University of Santo Tomas. His experience spans governance programs, policy development, and political research, having worked with the Ateneo School of Government and WR Numero Research on projects focused on electoral reform, public opinion, and regional development. He also helped coordinate the drafting of the Bangsamoro Local Government Code and supported the Academy of Multiparty Democracy.

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Singapore 🇸🇬

Singapore and India’s Semiconductor Partnership: Building a More Resilient Asian Supply Chain

by Jennifer Hui En Tan, in Singapore

Semiconductors have become increasingly important to the global economy. As supply chain disruptions and technological competition push governments to strengthen their semiconductor capabilities, international partnerships have become an increasingly important part of national economic strategies. This was reflected in the 4th India–Singapore Ministerial Roundtable on 20 August 2026, where both countries discussed strengthening bilateral cooperation across several areas, including the semiconductor industry. The discussions build on the 2024 Semiconductor Ecosystem Partnership Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), which established a framework for cooperation between the two countries’ semiconductor ecosystems. For India and Singapore, the partnership is particularly significant because the two countries bring different but complementary strengths to the semiconductor supply chain.

For its part, India has been seeking to develop a stronger domestic semiconductor ecosystem and reduce its dependence on overseas supply chains. While the country has significant advantages in terms of its large domestic market, workforce, and growing technological capabilities, it also depends on a wider network of suppliers, equipment manufacturers, research institutions, logistics providers, and multinational corporations (MNCs). This is where Singapore can play an important role: the country has developed an established semiconductor ecosystem and significant experience integrating MNCs, suppliers, and supporting industries. Singapore’s position as a regional business and logistics hub also provides extensive connections to global semiconductor supply chains.

Singapore has highlighted that India’s interest extends beyond wafer fabrication and to the broader ecosystem surrounding semiconductor manufacturing. This creates a natural complementarity between the two countries, where Singapore contributes its established ecosystem and international connections, while India provides scale.

India’s growing semiconductor ambitions create opportunities for Singaporean semiconductor companies and small and medium enterprises to expand their operations. Singapore has noted that companies already operating in its semiconductor sector are exploring opportunities to bring supplies and ecosystem partners into India. As India develops its semiconductor capabilities, Singaporean companies could benefit from participating in this emerging ecosystem while gaining greater access to one of the world’s largest and fastest-growing markets. This cooperation also offers Singapore another location within its regional supply chains.This can allow companies based in the city-state to diversify their operations and build additional connections across Asia.

The partnership also reflects the changing geopolitical significance of semiconductors. They are increasingly viewed not only as an economic commodity, but also as a matter of national and strategic security.

As governments seek to reduce excessive dependence on individual suppliers or locations, diversification has become increasingly important. The Singapore–India partnership can therefore be viewed as an effort to build resilience through greater interdependence. By connecting Singapore’s established semiconductor ecosystem with India’s expanding capabilities, both countries can reduce their vulnerability to disruption in any single market.

A stronger Singapore–India semiconductor relationship could create opportunities for greater regional supply chain connectivity. Singapore could potentially serve as a bridge between India’s growing semiconductor ecosystem and companies, investors, and supply chain networks across Southeast Asia. As semiconductor supply chains become more geographically diversified, partnerships linking ASEAN with major economies such as India could help create a more resilient regional ecosystem.

The Singapore–India semiconductor partnership is ultimately about more than semiconductor manufacturing. It reflects a broader shift toward building resilient and diversified supply chains in an increasingly uncertain global environment. India’s scale and ambitions complement Singapore’s established semiconductor ecosystem and global connectivity, creating opportunities for both sides.


Jennifer is a final-year International Relations student at the Singapore Institute of Management, where she focuses on political engagement, diplomacy, and community governance. She is an active volunteer in her constituency, working closely with residents to understand local concerns, facilitate dialogue, and support community initiatives.

Vietnam 🇻🇳

Vietnam’s Gen Z Holds Official Accountable (for Traffic Fatality)

by Sean Huy Vu

In Hanoi, high school and college students have laid flowers at “Tree 55,” in commemoration of a fatal accident on 30 May last summer. “A difficult night. No miracles happened,” wrote user Đỗ Quanh Minha a week later, on 7 June. His sister Thuỳ, whom everyone in her family called Mina, had been hit by a BMW driving on the wrong side of the road, severing her leg, and “stopping her journey of discovering the world at the beautiful age of 18.” “Our family has lost a young person,” Đỗ continues. “The National High School Examination has lost a candidate.” After the flowers are laid at the “Tree of Justice,” police clean up the area and dispose of them.

At the time of the incident, only the suspect’s initials were published in state media, and no further investigation took place.

However, this summer, the Ministry of Culture ordered Vietnamese rapper MCK to revise his songs for allegedly containing “vulgar” lyrics. This incident against a popular icon provoked users to critically reexamine the fatal car crash that former National Assembly member Nguyen Sy Cuong, who is also the husband of Culture Minister Lam Thi Phuong Thanh, had potentially caused. In video footage, the Minister and her husband can be seen stepping out of their SUV after hitting Mina and her father. Rather than helping, Mr. Nguyen returned to his car while his wife fled the scene.

After weeks of silence, state media VTV attempted to settle the matter by confirming that Mr. Nguyen was, in fact, the driver of the BMW that killed Mina. Their video report, however, raised more questions due to its dubious sources. The crash occurred on 30 May, but Mr. Nguyen did not receive a toxicology report until the following day, and the report itself was not published until 4 June. The texts in the alleged documents contain misspellings of Nguyen’s name and errors with the license plate, among other details. Posts on Threads question how an allegedly sober man could drive into the wrong lane and strike a teenager.

A few days after the confirmation, Mina’s father, Đỗ Việt Hùng, appeared on state television expressing gratitude for the community’s care for his family. However, Mr. Đỗ then requested the public to stop drawing attention to the issue, stating, “It’s over already, and the problem has been resolved by the investigators very clearly. … We don’t have any complaints, doubts, or questions regarding the way investigators are resolving my family’s case.” The report went on to explain that the Đỗ family chose not to press charges since Mr. Nguyen allegedly compensated the victims for an undisclosed sum. The original post has since been removed, following online backlash doubting the authenticity of the father’s statement.

The incident reflects a larger pattern of corruption and civil society repression in Vietnam, where wealth and political connections can help elites evade responsibility. Despite state media’s efforts to avoid reporting on protests happening across Asia in recent years — from India to Nepal, Indonesia, and Thailand — Vietnam’s Gen Z has demonstrated that they are refusing to accept double standards and exploitation.


Sean is a scholar of East Asian history, culture, and international relations, with current research at Georgetown University examining working-class labor and human trafficking in the region. His broader interests include the social psychology of religion and identity politics. Sean previously taught modern Korean history at the University of California, Irvine, where he completed his B.A. in History, and later taught English in Ho Chi Minh City while studying Vietnamese language and culture. His writing has been published by UC Irvine, Johns Hopkins University, and Foreign Analysis.

Editorial Deadline 25/08/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Haniva Sekar Deanty, Managing Editor - TAF

This week’s Maritime Crescent looks at the conditions attached to choices that, on the surface, appear relatively straightforward.

In Brunei, Maryam Zulaidi revisits the region’s decades-long struggle with transboundary haze, questioning how far another appeal to the “ASEAN mechanism” can go when the economic incentives behind the fires and the absence of meaningful penalties remain largely unchanged.

In Indonesia, Amallia Utami examines mounting pressure on the country’s digital public sphere, where efforts to moderate harmful content increasingly intersect with restrictions on political expression, automated amplification, and persistent regulatory ambiguity.

Meanwhile, in Malaysia, Sydney Gan considers DAP’s decision to remain in Anwar Ibrahim’s unity government despite electoral setbacks and internal unease, with the party making clear that its continued support comes with expectations for reform.

Regional cooperation can only go so far without stronger accountability. Content moderation becomes increasingly contentious when its boundaries begin to encroach on political expression. And political loyalty becomes harder to sustain when promised reforms remain outstanding. In each case, the initial decision is only one part of the equation. What comes after may prove far more consequential.

Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳

Breathing the Same Smoke

by Maryam Zulaidi

To have lived in the Southeast Asian region means to have lived through seasons of haze coming from neighbouring countries. The people of ASEAN have been exposed to this environmental catastrophe for nearly three decades, making Bruneians no stranger to transboundary air pollution (TAP). Brunei, situated on the northern tip of Borneo, right above Indonesia’s future capital in Kalimantan, only amplifies this problem.

As of late, concerns regarding TAP have reemerged due to Kalimantan’s worsening forest fires rapidly diffusing into Sarawak, Sabah and Brunei. On August 22nd, Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim stated during the leaders summit, held in Bandar Seri Begawan, that both Malaysia and Brunei have agreed to jointly push the haze issue through the “ASEAN mechanism”. Brunei leverages this, using Malaysia’s heavier diplomatic weight within ASEAN as a cover to break from its own long-standing policy of non-interference.

This is not the first time such a statement or promise has been issued. The ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution was adopted, building on the Regional Haze Action Plan introduced in 1997. In the same year, El Niño first turned Kalimantan’s peatlands into an international health crisis - where roughly five million hectares were destroyed. Fast forward three decades, the region still finds itself in a diplomatic rinse and repeat cycle: hot weather forecasts arrive, smoke crosses borders, and a letter gets sent to the ASEAN Secretariat. The Singapore Institute of International Affairs has labelled 2026 the first ‘red’ risk year since 2023.

The uncomfortable truth is that the underlying economics of the fires haven’t changed. Land clearing through burning remains the cheapest method available to companies, and ASEAN’s haze framework has never carried real penalties. Nearly 30 years after the first action plan, it is a matter of corporations taking accountability and facing penalties, not just repeated joint statements. If successful, the cycle will be broken. And if not, Bruneians will be breathing this same story again next dry season.


Maryam is a first-year International Relations and Politics student at the University of Sheffield, with an academic focus on Southeast Asia—particularly Maritime Southeast Asia—and the Middle East. She aspires to a career in diplomacy and academia and is committed to fostering international dialogue and advancing scholarly engagement with global issues. Beyond her academic work, she pursues creative interests and voluntary initiatives that broaden her perspectives on public service.

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Indonesia 🇮🇩

The Growing Pressure on Digital Public Sphere

by Amallia Utami

Over the past five months, communication researchers and journalists in Indonesia have identified growing concerns within the country’s digital public sphere. According to a recent report by Tempo, four X users, previously posted criticisms regarding government policies and political communication, received warning notices from the platform requiring them to delete posts deemed to contain violence, hate speech, or privacy violations. Content is also liable to be taken down or have access restricted if deemed to violate platform safety standards or local laws. In its report, SAFEnet noted that from April to June 2026 was marked by practices restricting civil liberties, such as the silencing of dissent and recurring data violation.

SAFEnet verified that the Ministry of Digital Communication (Komdigi) issued requests to take down or restrict access to content addressing public issues and criticising government programmes. In 2026’s Q2, there was an increase of 37 cases involving internet access restrictions compared to the previous quarter. Meanwhile, violations of freedom of expression rose by 18 cases compared to the previous year. Protests that took place in several Indonesian cities between August and September 2025 are considered a turning point, marking the start of large-scale takedown and content removal actions by Komdigi.

A further concern lies in the information environment on social media, such as X, which appears to be manipulated by automated messaging. Monash University Indonesia identified organised re-uploads of videos and photos depicting student protests on social media, alongside centralised amplification, activities that would be impossible for human users to do on their own. For instance, certain accounts were capable of executing multiple distinct retweets within a span of less than a second, while specific accounts would also initiate and disseminate a narrative, which was then retweeted by thousands of other accounts. The narratives that emerged included claims of massive protests going unreported by the media or assertions that such stories had vanished from mainstream coverage.

The Komdigi responded differently when asked about the takedown and access restrictions. When asked by Tempo journalists, they offered no definitive answers, except asking them to wait for a response that first needed to be coordinated. The Komdigi Minister, Meutya Hafid, and the deputy minister did not respond to phone requests for confirmation. Meanwhile, when asked about access restrictions and the removal of content related to demonstrations, the minister admitted that she had never prohibited media outlets from covering them as long as they adhered to journalistic principles. She claimed that, per July 2026, almost 17,000 hoaxes were circulating on social media and urged people not to spread false information or engage in fearmongering using incorrect data.

Indonesia’s content moderation remains an ongoing dilemma due to vague legal definitions such as “negative content”. The problem is further worsened by data security vulnerabilities in government systems and a regulatory approach that lacks consultation with digital platforms and civil society. Furthermore, automated messages, especially those using AI tools, are dangerous because of the intense negative emotions they produce, such as anger and fear, by exploiting sensitive messages. This deliberate manipulation drives high engagement around deceptive content and traps the public inside ideological echo chambers. These practices will deepen polarization and erode public trust in constructive cross-perspective dialogue.

Safeguarding the digital public sphere against content manipulation is a crucial first step. The Indonesian government could update its regulatory frameworks, as current legal definitions of prohibited content stifle legitimate democratic discourse. Secondly, there is a need to enhance digital literacy, even in areas with low literacy rates, and to foster emotional intelligence among citizens.


Amallia is a media and culture graduate from the University of Glasgow with experience in journalism and creative writing. Her interests lie in democracy, media and communication, particularly how contemporary media environments shape self-censorship, misinformation, and disinformation.

Malaysia 🇲🇾

DAP’s Conditional Commitment

by Sydney Gan, in Kuala Lumpur

On 16 August, the Democratic Action Party (DAP) of Malaysia voted to remain in Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim’s MADANI unity government, despite Anwar’s coalition Pakatan Harapan’s (PH) recent state-level losses to a resurgent Barisan Nasional (BN). Consisting of five Cabinet posts, seven deputy minister positions and 40 parliamentary seats, DAP’s decision shores up Anwar’s immediate stability ahead of the General Election. Attention now shifts to Melaka, where DAP and Anwar’s party People’s Justice Party (PKR) will again contest under the PH banner against a stronger BN and new competitor Bersama.

DAP’s decision was backed by 88.2% of those voting. Supporters argued that leaving now would amount to abandoning voters and handing political advantage to rival parties, while jeopardising policy commitments already underway. Despite the landslide result, criticism has emerged over the low overall turnout, with more than 50% of DAP delegates absent from the special congress. Former member P. Ramasamy argued that the motion could have been defeated had more delegates attended, and that the low turnout may indicate internal unrest and a sign of dissatisfaction with the government.

DAP has also made clear that its support is not unconditional. The party expects Anwar to advance several institutional reforms by year-end, including separating the roles of Attorney General and Public Prosecutor, imposing a two-term limit on the prime minister, and finalising amendments to the Security Offences (Special Measures) Act (SOSMA) and the Peaceful Assembly Act. DAP remains hesitant to fully invest in the partnership without Anwar delivering on his reform agenda, as continued inaction will risk further erosion of public trust that could affect DAP’s longer-term prospects, even if it eventually separates itself from the PH coalition.

Amid political turmoil, poor state-level results, and DAP increasingly being scapegoated for broader government failings, some supporters believe that stepping down from government could re-earn goodwill for the party. Exiting the government would allow it to distance itself from unpopular decisions, rebuild a more independent political identity, and reposition itself as a stronger opposition force. However, withdrawal would also destabilise Anwar’s government and empower BN to push for an early General Election, at a time when neither PH nor DAP appears well-positioned to contest one comfortably. The decision to stay with PH is therefore the most risk-averse choice in the short run, but cannot feasibly protect DAP from the turning public sentiment in the long term.

The Melaka state election in October/November will provide the next indication of whether PH can maintain its power. Considering that BN remains the clear favourite for Melaka, currently holding 20 of the 28 seats in the State Legislative Assembly, a more realistic objective for PH is to defend support in urban constituencies rather than take control of the state government. DAP’s continued participation allows PH to enter the election as a functioning coalition rather than one in open crisis, but another weak showing would deepen questions over Anwar’s ability to rebuild support ahead of the federal election.


Sydney holds a Bachelor of Laws from King’s College London, where she focused on Human Rights Law, Criminology, and Public & Administrative Law. She is an Analyst at Asia Group Advisors, providing policy analysis and strategic guidance across the tech, sustainability, and gaming sectors in Southeast Asia. Prior to joining AGA, she worked in the social development sector in London, contributing to the Ukraine Judicial Training Programme through research on war crimes adjudication and the development of a legal training curriculum with high court magistrates.

Editorial Deadline 22/08/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk

A school structure, a flood response, a trade transition, and a growth model: this week's stories are really about the same question asked four different ways: who gets left behind when a system is tested? In Laos, the government's plan to shift from a 5+4+3 to a 6+3+3 school structure raises a harder question than scheduling: whether restructuring alone can close the gap between a child in Vientiane and one in a remote village, when regional test data already show Lao students lagging and gains concentrated among those already ahead. In Myanmar, monsoon floods displaced 220,000 people in Sagaing — and instead of activating a relief system, the junta blocked volunteer rescue teams, threatened aid workers with terrorism charges, and funneled help only to areas under its control, repeating a pattern of weaponized disaster response it has run since Cyclone Nargis in 2008. In Cambodia, LDC graduation is meant to mark the country's economic coming-of-age, but an ILO-backed study warns it could put 11% of employment at risk, concentrated among informal, self-employed, and low-skilled workers — the very people the country's social protection system is least equipped to catch. And in Thailand, the slowest growth of any major Southeast Asian economy this quarter showed how quickly consumption subsidies get overwhelmed once energy costs start eating into household spending.

Lao PDR 🇱🇦

Can Better Systems Mean Better Learning for Every Child?

by Souriya Bounpaseuth, in Vientiane

As Laos prepares to open the 2026–2027 school year, its education system is entering a period of significant change. But while much attention is being placed on the planned shift to a new 6+3+3 school structure, the bigger question is whether structural reform can translate into something more fundamental as it is better learning for every child.

Under the planned reform, Laos will move from the current 5+4+3 structure to six years of primary education, three years of lower secondary and three years of upper secondary education. The new structure is scheduled for broader implementation from the 2028–2029 academic year, meaning the coming school year marks an important preparation phase rather than the immediate start of the new system.

During the 2024–2025 academic year, the Ministry of Education and Sports reported progress in curriculum development, teacher support and education management. More than 4,000 volunteer teachers had their status addressed, while a new teacher salary structure with improved base pay and allowances was introduced in January 2026. The government has also identified reducing multi-grade classrooms, strengthening teacher education institutions and expanding ethnic boarding schools as priorities for more inclusive access to education.

Recent initiatives are also increasingly focused on what happens inside classrooms. In July, Laos and Japan launched the next phase of their primary mathematics education partnership, which will revise Grades 4–6 textbooks and teachers’ guides, strengthen teacher professional development and establish school-based continuous professional development across 35 districts.

The SEA-PLM 2024 assessment, the most recent comparable regional assessment of Grade 5 learning, shows a mixed picture. Across participating Southeast Asian education systems, mathematics outcomes improved between 2019 and 2024, but reading showed little overall progress, while gains were concentrated more among higher-performing students. Lao PDR remained below the regional average, with significant numbers of children performing at the lower proficiency levels.

Importantly, Laos is already using these findings to shape reform. At the national launch in March 2026, education authorities and partners identified curriculum improvement, teacher development, learning materials and more child-centred teaching as areas requiring action, with particular attention to disadvantaged and remote communities.

The challenge, then, is no longer simply designing a new education structure. It is connecting structure, teachers, curriculum, learning materials, financing and support for disadvantaged children into one functioning system.

As Laos moves towards 6+3+3, the ultimate measure of success may not be whether the reform is implemented on schedule, but whether a child in a remote village has the same opportunity to learn, progress and succeed as a child in Vientiane.

Can 6+3+3 become more than a change in the number of years children spend in each level of school and become a strategy that finally closes the gap between access and quality?

Myanmar 🇲🇲

Junta Troops Block Humanitarian Aid For Flood Victims

by Ley Hlaing

Myanmar is experiencing an increasing rise in water level and flood in the plain and delta regions. As the incident continued, the country’s junta, once again, has blocked the aid for livelihood relief for the victims affected by the flood, mirroring the same pattern of blockage and weaponization of humanitarian aid during the cyclones that happened in 2008 and 2023.

In August 2026, severe monsoon rains have once again triggered a catastrophic humanitarian crisis in Myanmar, with rising water levels submerging the country’s plain and delta regions like Sagaing and Irrawaddy. Heavy rainfall forced authorities to release massive volumes of water from the Thaphanseik Dam, causing the Mu River to overflow and inundate more than 200 villages across the Sagaing Region. Over 220,000 people have been affected, with at least 15 deaths reported as of August 10, many of whom were already internally displaced by ongoing military conflicts and are now experiencing a second disaster. Yet, instead of facilitating emergency relief, the military junta has actively blocked, harassed, and turned back local volunteer rescue teams and civil society aid groups at military checkpoints, including the Sagaing Yadanabon Bridge and Sagaing Hnapauk checkposts.

This blockade is a highly coordinated effort to weaponise humanitarian aid against the civilian population in resistance strongholds. Local administrators and police chiefs in Shwebo have threatened that anyone attempting to deliver flood relief to these areas will be prosecuted for supporting terrorism, warning that their homes and properties will be seized. In a stark display of selective relief, the junta has heavily publicised its aid efforts in regions under its firm control, such as Irrawaddy, while completely ignoring the crisis in Sagaing. Instead, the military has continued to conduct airstrikes on flood-hit Sagaing townships, while selectively airlifting food and medicine via helicopters strictly to villages controlled by its allied Pyu Saw Htee militias.

The junta’s actions mirror a dark, recurring historical pattern of using natural disasters to maintain political control at the cost of civilian lives. During Cyclone Nargis in May 2008, which devastated the Irrawaddy Delta and killed 140,000 people, the military regime deliberately blocked international humanitarian relief for weeks. Instead, the regime benefitted completing a referendum for their 2008 Constitution, while the country was in turmoil. Out of fear that Western powers would use the disaster as a pretext to overthrow their rule, the generals rejected lifesaving assistance from US, British, and French navy ships and helicopters, while army officials confiscated overseas relief supplies and sold them in local markets.

This weaponisation of disaster relief was repeated during Cyclone Mocha in May 2023. After the storm left millions of survivors in urgent need of aid, the junta suspended travel authorizations for international humanitarian organizations and demanded that all domestic distribution of supplies be handed over to military authorities, transforming a natural disaster into a man-made catastrophe. This pattern of gatekeeping was visible yet again during the March 2025 earthquake and the floods of Typhoon Yagi in late 2024, where the regime consistently chose to let its citizens suffer rather than risk losing absolute authority. Today, as telephone and internet lines remain cut in Sagaing, local volunteer groups are left to navigate rising waters, lack of food, and increasing medical emergencies entirely on their own.

Ley Hlaing is a former Political Science student from the University of Yangon, Myanmar. Currently, he is pursuing his BA at Parami University with a major in Philosophy, Politics and Economics. His academic and professional interests span community development, literature, minority issues, and social impact research. Having held roles as Research Assistant, Student Mentor, and Facilitator for local initiatives, he has constantly supported project management in literature and education programs in Myanmar.

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Cambodia 🇰🇭

Cambodia’s LDC Graduation Could Put 11% of Employment at Risk

by Sokna Thea, in Phnom Penh

Cambodia’s planned graduation from Least Developed Country (LDC) status in 2029 is a major development milestone, but it could also expose a large share of the workforce to pressure from higher trade costs and weaker export demand.

A June 2026 policy brief from Cambodia’s Ministry of Labour and Vocational Training and the International Labour Organization estimates that around 11% of employment could be affected under a full trade-loss scenario. The figure represents jobs at risk, not confirmed layoffs. The study notes that the impact could also appear through reduced working hours, slower hiring, temporary suspensions, lower earnings and weaker self-employment income.

The risk extends well beyond garment factories. The study finds the largest employment impacts in textiles, clothing and footwear, wholesale and retail trade, rice, fruits and nuts, vegetables and roots, and other agriculture-related activities. Transport and other supporting services could also feel the effects as weaker export demand reduces production, intermediate demand and household spending.

The profile of affected workers is particularly important. Informal workers account for 68% of affected employment, while self-employed workers make up 52%. Women account for 53% and low-skilled workers 86%. These groups are generally less protected against sudden income or job losses, making the transition a labour-market issue as much as a trade-policy issue.

The modelling also shows that the severity of the impact depends on how much of the trade shock is absorbed or mitigated. Under the study’s full-impact scenario, affected employment falls by about 11%. A targeted mitigation scenario brings the figure down to about 7%, while a lower-impact scenario reduces it to around 3%. The authors stress, however, that targeted support cannot fully prevent spillovers across the wider economy.

The trade exposure is significant. UN Trade and Development estimates that Cambodia could lose about 16.4% of its total exports if LDC-related trade preferences are lost after graduation. Its simulation puts the potential export loss at about USD 5.9 billion, based on 2023 trade data. Cambodia is particularly exposed to preference erosion because 80.5% of its exports in the simulation were directed to the 25 preference-granting economies covered by the analysis.

The European Union is one of the key markets to watch. Cambodia continues to benefit from the EU’s Everything But Arms (EBA) scheme, but only partially, after the EU withdrew some of its tariff preferences in 2020. EU data show that goods trade with Cambodia reached EUR 7.3 billion in 2025, with textiles and clothing accounting for 72% of EU imports from Cambodia.

The question for Cambodia is therefore not simply whether it will graduate from LDC status, but how it manages the transition. The Ministry-ILO study calls for stronger worker skills and social protection, support for firms to upgrade and comply with new trade requirements, deeper domestic value chains, and greater export diversification. Graduation is a sign of progress. But without a smooth transition, the gains from that progress could come with a significant cost for workers who have the fewest buffers.

Sokna has a background in International Affairs and Business & Commercial Law. He’s currently a Senior Project Coordinator at the Ministry of Economy and Finance of Cambodia, working on the Financial Management Information System (FMIS) Project. His professional focus is driven by entrepreneurship, business development, and financial technology, with a particular interest in how private-sector innovation drives Cambodia’s economic growth.

Thailand 🇹🇭

Thailand Scores Weakest ASEAN Growth at 1.9% as Energy Costs Bite

by Satid Sootipunya, in Bangkok

Thailand scored the weakest growth rate among six Southeast Asian economies in the second quarter as higher energy prices curbed household spending, offsetting the government’s consumption subsidy.

Thailand’s economy expanded 1.9% in the second quarter from a year earlier, slowing sharply from 2.8% in the first quarter, according to data released by the National Economic and Social Development Council on Monday.

The pace exceeded the 1.8% median estimate in a Bloomberg survey of economists, which ranged from 1.1% to 2.8%.

Quarterly, gross domestic product contracted 0.2%, compared with a revised 0.6% expansion in the previous quarter, the data showed.

Higher energy prices stemming from the conflict in the Middle East weighed on private consumption, offsetting stronger investment and government stimulus.

The reading left Thailand with the slowest growth among the six Southeast Asian economies, according to the council. Vietnam expanded 8.4% from a year earlier, followed by Malaysia at 6%, Singapore at 5.9%, Indonesia at 5.3%, the Philippines at 2.3%, and Thailand at 1.9%.

The figures are consistent with the latest releases from each country’s statistics agency, which reported growth of 5.9% in Singapore, 6% in Malaysia, 5.29% in Indonesia, and 2.3% in the Philippines over the same period.

The baht held its gains following the release, with the dollar falling 0.1% to 33.1 baht.

The second quarter was expected to mark the trough of the economic cycle, with a recovery beginning in the third quarter as Middle East tensions ease and stimulus measures take effect, Bank of Thailand spokesperson Chayawadee Chai-Anant said in late July.

The council projects full-year growth of 2% to 2.5%, driven by investment. Bloomberg’s consensus estimate stands at 1.9%.

The central bank held its benchmark one-day repurchase rate at 1%, the lowest since September 2022, at its June 24 meeting, with all seven Monetary Policy Committee members voting unanimously to keep the rate unchanged.


Satid is a multimedia economic journalist and news anchor who covers macroeconomic trends, Thailand’s fiscal policy, and key regional developments for Bangkok Biz. A Journalism graduate from Thammasat University, he has reported on major issues such as the US–China trade tensions, the Myanmar crisis, and global corporate stories, drawing on prior newsroom experience at The Momentum, the Bangkok Post, AFP, and Varasarn Press. His work blends economic analysis, foreign affairs, and digital storytelling, with a strong focus on making complex financial and political topics accessible to Thai audiences.

Editorial Deadline 22/08/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)