by Karen Ysabelle R. David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk

More than a month into the war in Iran, the countries of the Pacific Corridor are still grappling with the blowback of a distant conflict. For the small city-state of Singapore, there is little it can do about the closure of the Strait of Hormuz aside from diplomatic overtures. Just like most of the rest of the world, it is locked in a stalemate by a war it did not ask for and one that it has no stakes in.

The repercussions of the war are being felt not just by states. In the Philippines, ordinary Filipinos are buckling under the strain, as round after round of fuel price hikes have led to higher transportation costs that are beginning to spill over to the cost of everything else. In response, the Philippine government has turned to stopgap measures to try and alleviate the problem.

Meanwhile, in Vietnam, a look at the start of a new regulatory era for its property sector. Can new laws put into place succeed in turning a long-languishing sector into an economic driver for the country?

Singapore 🇸🇬

Singapore’s Navigation of the Strait

by Nurul Aini, in Singapore

When a disruption happens someplace far away from the nation, there are two possible responses: 1) to dismiss such events as beyond our domain of concern and relegate it to yet another event in foreign affairs; or 2) to care but only to the extent of their practical implications on our daily lives. The latter is an understandable reaction, especially for many who are trying to survive with the high cost of living while juggling daily responsibilities. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz tests the awareness, principles, and adaptability of a small nation like Singapore to a changing world order.

In a statement made by Prime Minister Lawrence Wong on 19 March 2026 regarding the Middle East conflict, he reiterates that a break in international law, which may be perceived as an abstract issue, could signal grave tangible implications for small states, as countries become more inclined to use force as a means to gain rather than through peaceful engagements.

Additionally, in a doorstop interview in Japan, Wong spoke about navigating through historical sensitivities in the name of diplomacy, as he hopes that Japan can, “clearly articulate its position on these issues and put to rest these outstanding historical issues.” He explained that Singapore-Japan relations are part of maximizing strategic space, all while emphasizing ASEAN centrality with “an open and inclusive regional architecture with ASEAN at the center, while we in ASEAN engage with all the major powers,” thus making for “a stabler and more inclusive architecture that will maximize our chances for peace and shared prosperity.”

Lawrence Anderson, a former Singapore diplomat, foregrounds the importance of recalibration, where increased cooperation with regional and extra-regional partners become significant to “strengthen global commitment to international law and respect for rules,” diversifying such relationships beyond being purely for economic means.

The practicality in Singapore’s approach remains as it closely monitors the situation while providing help to relevant businesses and individuals affected. The U-Save and Service & Conservancy Charges (S&CC) rebate outlined in Budget 2026 is set to be rolled out in April, which will offset expenses for utilities for lower- and middle-income households. The effectiveness of its impact remains to be seen as the closure of the Strait continues. Community Development Council (CDC) voucher handouts, which can be spent in supermarkets and shops involved in the scheme, will be given in June 2026 instead of the original planned disbursement in January 2027. Businesses will receive an increase in Corporate Income Tax rebate to 50%. As of 7 April 2026, government assistance that includes a SGD200 increase in the Cost of Living Payment payout and additional help for eligible platform workers adds another SGD1 billion to what was announced during the recent Budget.

Additionally, according to the chief executive of the Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore (MPA), Mr Ang Wee Keong, the closure of the Strait is an opportunity for Singapore to explore cleaner maritime fuel. Yet, Singapore is not excluded from lingering worries in other domains such as disruptions to food supply chains and fuel reserves. While the war may initially feel distant, the effects on Singapore are gradually felt through daily ‘small’ disruptions, where adjustments to policies and budgets become necessary, inevitably propelling us to be concerned and aware about global politics.


Aini is currently pursuing a master’s degree in English literature at Nanyang Technological University. She has experience working in youth groups, contributing to the planning and management of outreach activities.

Support Us

The Philippines 🇵🇭

Fueling Hardship

by Arianne De Guzman, in Bulacan

As the Holy Week concluded, Filipino motorists, commuters, and Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) braced for another round of fuel price hikes, with gasoline, diesel, and kerosene prices rising again last 7 April 2026, marking the 13th consecutive week of price increases for gasoline and the 15th for diesel and kerosene.

The Philippines, the first country to declare a state of national energy emergency and one of the most oil-dependent economies in the Southeast Asia region, is heavily reliant on imported oil, sourcing 98% of its supply from the Persian Gulf. This dependence leaves the country susceptible not only to the ripple effects of the United States (US) and Israel’s war on Iran but also to the challenges caused by its negligible domestic production.

Beyond this broad outlook, risks and issues also became a daily calculation for many Filipinos. In the transportation sector, one of the largest consumers of oil products, jeepney drivers are among the most immediately affected. Mr. Romeo Esmenda, a jeepney driver in Quezon City, shared that prior to the US and Israel’s bombing of Iran, he often spent around PHP3,000 (US$49.91) while still earning PHP1,500 (US$24.96) in profit. Currently, filling his jeepney tank costs PHP6,000 (US$99.83), yet his profit has decreased to just PHP300 (US$4.99).

They are not alone.

Mr. Mike Olea, a Filipino who owns a small, family-owned food shop, also shared that the prices of cooking gas, meat, and other key ingredients have increased sharply in recent weeks, prompting him to rethink his spending and business strategy. He added that his food shop relies on an 11-kilogram cylinder of cooking gas every week; however, the 30% increase has induced significant pressure on his business expenses. Mr. Olea revisited raising menu prices and reducing meat and vegetable servings, as he observed fewer customers visiting due to rising living costs.

Commuters, too, are feeling the impact.

Ms. Emma Almadrones reported higher spending on transportation costs, often taking extra rides or seeking alternative ways to get to work, stating that some jeepney drivers are now making fewer trips than usual or have completely stopped operating. With food prices also increasing, she prefers to bring lunch to work and walk home instead of waiting for a ride.

In response, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. signed an executive order (EO) activating the Unified Package for Livelihoods, Industry, Food, and Transport (UPLIFT), a program focused on providing fuel subsidies, commuter assistance, and expanding public transportation services. Sonny Africa, an economist and Executive Director of IBON Foundation, stated that his policies are contingent on existing government funds, raising doubts whether it will be sufficient if prices continue to rise. President Marcos also signed Republic Act No. 12316, allowing the suspension or reduction of fuel excise taxes, which is expected to take effect this April. Senator Panfilo “Ping” Lacson noted that the Philippine government could lose around PHP200 billion in revenues, with a potential recommendation to suspend the value-added tax (VAT), which could reach over PHP320 billion.

For many Filipinos, the oil crisis illustrated how global economic events intersect with local realities. It also highlights the importance of human-centered policies, not just market stabilization, to sustain livelihoods and strengthen communities. While recent diplomatic efforts alleviate the oil crisis, community resilience and support for vulnerable sectors remain central to how the Philippines weathers the ongoing crisis.


Arianne has experience in policy research at De La Salle University’s Jesse M. Robredo Institute of Governance, where she contributed to projects on systemic reform. She earned a degree in Political Science from Colegio de San Juan de Letran. Currently, she works in government relations, specializing in advocacy strategy, legislative monitoring, and stakeholder engagement. Beyond her professional work, she is actively involved in youth development and grassroots initiatives through the Rotaract Club of Santa Maria.

Vietnam 🇻🇳

The Laws of the Land

by Tri Vo, in Ho Chi Minh City

As the first quarter of 2026 comes to an end, the release of comprehensive market reports by major international consultancies provides the most definitive look yet at Vietnam’s property sector operating under a fully modernized legal framework. The set of regulations — comprising the revised Housing Law, the Real Estate Business Law, and the Land Law 2024 — officially took effect in August 2024, aiming to resolve years of legal ambiguities. Now, more than eighteen months into this new regulatory era, Q1 data reveal that the market has transitioned from a long period of paralysis into a time of relatively sustainable growth. But this time is different. Vietnam’s real estate sector is not experiencing a speculation frenzy; instead, macroeconomic conditions and stringent new compliance standards are reshaping the landscape to favor well-capitalized developers with high legal compliance.

A central catalyst for this structural shift is the overhaul of land valuation. The new Land Law abolished the rigid, state-mandated land price framework, requiring provincial authorities to implement market-aligned land prices starting from 1 January 2026. While this transition increases the financial obligations for developers, it effectively de-risks the sector for foreign institutional investors by establishing a predictable, market-driven mechanism for land acquisition and compensation.

The practical effects of this legislative environment are reflected in regional absorption rates. In Hanoi, apartment prices have continued to rise alongside robust sales volumes, with market activity overwhelmingly dominated by large-scale, integrated mega-projects from established developers. Conversely, Ho Chi Minh City has a slower trajectory, dominated by new supply constraints but steady price appreciation, now driven (in the suburban areas) by resilient owner-occupier demand rather than just speculative flipping.

Beyond the residential segment, the commercial and industrial real estate segments remain the indisputable engines of the market. This resilience is underpinned by Vietnam’s broader macroeconomic stability, highlighted by an impressive inflow of foreign direct investments of over US$38 billion in the previous year. Industrial park owners, in particular, are capitalizing on the new legal provisions that allow for more flexible rental arrangements. Indeed, such regulations allow for easier subleasing to multinational manufacturing tenants seeking to rapidly set up operations in the country.

Ultimately, the Q1 2026 property data signals a maturation of the Vietnamese real estate market. This is done by flushing out less-qualified actors, leaving a consolidated arena of larger players capable of navigating the higher compliance costs. As the government aggressively pursues its ambitious double-digit economic growth mandate for the year, a legally transparent and structurally sound real estate market has transformed from a systemic vulnerability into a stabilized pillar of Vietnam’s long-term economic expansion.


Tri has experience in management consulting and strategy, having worked with institutions such as the UNDP, The Asia Group, and ARC Group. He has provided strategic, legal, and operational insights to clients in sectors including manufacturing, energy, and technology. He holds both academic and professional experience related to Southeast and East Asia, with a focus on regional development and policy.

Editorial Deadline 07/04/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Siu Tzyy Wei, Lead Editor - Maritime Crescent Desk

This week, the region finds itself walking down narrow paths - thin lines where choices, truths and vulnerabilities converge, where the weight of uncertainty becomes heavier to bear by the day.

In Indonesia, Hree P. Samudra turns to Lebanon, where conflict clouds the very act of knowing. The fog room of war becomes a space for distortion, raising questions about how humanitarian aid and nuclear governance can function when institutions built to preserve peace struggle to grasp the full picture.

In Malaysia, Edrina Lisa traces the government’s careful steps along the energy tightrope. While oil wealth cushions national revenue, subsidies strain the budget. The balancing act between fiscal responsibility and social protection reveals how volatility abroad is felt at home, forcing Kuala Lumpur to rethink the foundations of resilience.

Over in Brunei, Syimah Johari reflects on the fragile space between prosperity and precarity. In the quiet margins where households navigate vulnerability with little fanfare, socio-economic divides and resilience spreads their roots in silence - consequences that require immediate tending to.

From tightropes to contested truths and fragile divides, this week at the Maritime Crescent reminds us that the region’s story is traced in delicate crossings - where balance is tenuous, where clarity is elusive, and where the future is forged by the quiet endurance of walking narrow paths.

Indonesia 🇮🇩

What Lebanon Tells Us About the Limits of Knowing

by Hree Putri Samudra, in Jakarta

On 29th and 30th March 2026, three Indonesian peacekeepers serving with the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) were killed in southern Lebanon - one by a projectile at a UNIFIL base, two more in a roadside blast. Indonesia condemned the attacks. Israel denied responsibility and blamed Hezbollah. The Security Council held an emergency session. But UNIFIL itself said something nobody wanted repeated: the origin of both explosions was unknown.

Rather than a temporary oversight, the current limitations of the system are arguably a matter of structural design. UNIFIL’s Board of Inquiry lacks subpoena power, operates without intelligence-sharing and defaults to confidentiality, seen in the aftermath of the 2016 Juba attacks. In an attempt to refrain from accusation, UNIFIL’s workflow is designed to deliberately maintain process, momentum and perhaps, even decorum. Yet, reality has moved beyond simple monitoring. After Iran’s Supreme Leader was assassinated on 28 February and March 2 strikes on Hezbollah, southern Lebanon became an active warzone. With 1,300 dead and 1.2 million displaced, the scale of the IDF operations makes attribution impossible. Attribution requires firing logs and surveillance, data controlled by belligerents. In the wider picture, such information gatekept only strengthens a deliberate epistemic wall by the day. Because the parties involved are the ones likely responsible, they have no incentive to share. UNIFIL now has 7,505 remaining peacekeepers, down from 10,500 last year, occupying 50 fixed, and publicised positions. The outcome is predictable patrol routes that endanger its workforce - a risk to tackle before UNIFIL’s mandate expires on 31 December 2026. However, with the IDF pushing for a buffer zone toward the Litani River and Hezbollah fight to stop it, UNIFIL’s is falling further behind from its capacity to serve when and where it matters most.

Indonesia contributes 755 personnel to UNIFIL and plans up to 5,000 troops to Gaza - a clear bid to be seen as a global security actor. But that bid rests on assumptions Lebanon has now exposed. Indonesia’s representative at the Security Council demanded a “direct UN investigation, not merely Israeli excuses.” That investigation would use the same Board of Inquiry whose structural limits have just been described. Indonesia is demanding answers from a system that cannot produce them.

This problem extends beyond peacekeeping. The 11th Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) opens in New York on 27 April. The NPT relies on compliance verified through International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections. But the IAEA, like UNIFIL, operates on consent. In June 2025, after strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, the IAEA withdrew all inspectors from Iran. Three of the last four review conferences failed to reach consensus. The architecture of verification collapses at the moment it is needed most.

From southern Lebanon to nuclear governance, the pattern is identical. International institutions are asked to verify what the parties involved have every incentive to conceal. Indonesia should ask not only who killed its soldiers, but how peacekeepers can be protected in systems built to avoid accountability.


Hree is a Policy Fellow at the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network (APLN) where she leads research and policy interventions on Indo-Pacific nuclear security and AI governance. She previously served as a Research Fellow at the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) and has managed multi-country security portfolios across all 10 ASEAN member states. Her work examines the intersection of emerging technologies, strategic stability, and the evolution of regional security architectures. She specializes in institutional risk assessment and the application of open-source intelligence (OSINT) for strategic monitoring. Her current research focuses on how technological shifts such as AI and advanced verification tools reshape escalation dynamics and multilateral cooperation in a multipolar world.

Support Us

Malaysia 🇲🇾

Walking the Energy Tightrope

by Edrina Lisa Ozaidi, in WP Kuala Lumpur

Malaysia is one of the few countries in the region that exports oil, but how is it faring amidst the global crisis?

As the global energy market faces oil-related turbulence driven by geopolitical tensions in the Middle East and Eastern Europe, Malaysia finds itself alongside many other nations at the same crossroads of the energy crisis.

Malaysia’s position as an oil exporter has long been seen as a strength. However, the domestic fiscal burden of maintaining fuel subsidies has forced quite a shift in how it navigates the oil crisis of the mid 2020s.

The fiscal tightrope

High global crude prices are a double-edged sword. They may cushion national revenue through Petronas dividends and petroleum taxes, but they also simultaneously inflate the government subsidy bill.

Previously, Malaysia relied on blanket subsidies to shield consumers, but the Ministry of Finance has identified it as unsustainable on the federal budget for the long term.

To navigate this, the government has transitioned toward targeted subsidy rationalization, most notably through the Budi Madani initiative, which redirects aid to the bottom 40% (B40) and middle 40% (M40) income groups.

Furthermore, the government has also activated the Special Task Force on Energy and Subsidy Management, composed of experts from the financial ministry, economic ministry and the national bank, all working to sustain the nation’s target subsidy rationalisation goals.

Decoupling from the dollar and global shock

Another key part of Malaysia’s navigation strategy involves reducing ‘weaponised interdependence’ in energy trade. By promoting Regional Payment Connectivity, Bank Negara Malaysia is enabling the settlement of energy-related transactions in local currencies. This reduces the exchange rate shock that occurs when the US Dollar spikes alongside oil prices, providing a technical shield for the Ringgit and local businesses.

The Special Task Force has estimated that with the current “targeted” approach, Malaysia’s fiscal buffers are robust enough to sustain global oil prices at $100–$110 per barrel for at least the next 18 to 24 months without requiring a drastic cut to development spending.

This “runway” provides the government with the necessary breathing room to further diversify the economy before a potential long-term global energy shift.

The Transition as a Shield

Thirdly, Malaysia is also navigating the crisis by accelerating its National Energy Transition Roadmap (NETR). Investment through hydrogen, carbon capture, and solar energy helps the state attempt to “future-proof” the economy against the inevitable volatility of fossil fuels.

This strategy treats the current oil crisis not just as a financial hurdle, but as a catalyst to solidify Malaysia’s position as a regional leader in green technology.

But is it enough?

Malaysia’s navigation of the current oil crisis is defined by a shift from passive protectionism to active structural reform.

Backed by a 24-month fiscal safety net and the oversight of a dedicated Task Force, Kuala Lumpur is ensuring that the nation remains resilient even as the global energy landscape remains fractured and unpredictable.

But to answer the question, only time will tell.


Edrina is a communications professional with a background in international relations. She holds a degree from the University of Nottingham Malaysia and has worked across public relations and social media for organizations in the development, education, and corporate sectors. Her work focuses on crafting narratives around regional affairs and strengthening media engagement across Southeast Asia.

Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳

Walking in the Shadows of Prosperity

by Syimah Johari, in Bandar Seri Begawan

On the surface, Brunei is often associated with stability and comfort, need is not always immediately visible. As a country whose image is created based on its generous social welfare and abundance of oil and natural gas, it is easy to assume that the entire population lives with little to no socioeconomic constraints. As such, it is important to break such a facade - although it does not affect most of the population, poverty still exists. At the Legislative Council last year, those classified as poor by the government fall under relative rather than absolute poverty, meaning they are able to meet basic needs but may remain financially vulnerable. As a result, poverty in the sultanate remains a largely translucent issue - present but watered down, a social blind spot.

With a relatively decent image of the state of poverty retained, public awareness of the issue remains limited, even though need is not absent. This narrow perception overlooks a significant group within society: individuals and households who, while not classified as poor, continue to face socio-economic challenges. In line with the Zero Poverty 2035 target, the government has introduced subsidies and support programs to help maintain stability for households in need. However, what further narrows down the public understanding of who are considered “in need” is the eligibility criteria that determines the access to such programs.

Rather than a standardised poverty threshold, eligibility for social support in Brunei is determined using measures like the Minimum Cost of Basic Needs (KMKA), which reflects the typical household expenditure. Individuals who fall below this threshold are considered in need, and may receive assistance through programs like the Monthly Welfare Assistance (BKB), zakat (obligatory, annual religious charity in Islam), or other government, private sector and NGO initiatives.

Yet despite what seems like a whole-of-society effort to alleviate the socioeconomic challenges faced by many of these individuals and households, poverty is a deeper issue than what meets the eye. While NGOs like Society for Community Outreach and Training (SCOT) and Hand4HandBN provide essential support like donation drives and grassroot efforts at creating self-employment opportunities for its beneficiaries, significant gaps remain. These interventions often address immediate material needs, yet they struggle to reach underlying socioeconomic vulnerabilities - such as social stigma, limited upward mobility and rising living pressures - that persist beneath the surface.

Recognising such needs in its quieter forms is essential. Doing so allows for a more complete understanding of society and ensures that support is seen not merely as a welfare mechanism, but as part of a nuanced social landscape. By acknowledging the existence of households that live between stability and struggle, society can develop a deeper appreciation for the diversity of experiences that shape Brunei today.


Syimah is a graduate of King’s College London with a BA in International Relations. With a strong focus on diplomacy, regional cooperation, and development policy, she is passionate about contributing to meaningful change through public service. Currently, she is involved in poverty alleviation work through a local NGO.

Editorial Deadline 04/04/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk

Across the Mekong Belt, the first quarter of 2026 brought a phase of political change that showed how, in Southeast Asia, the faces at the top rarely change — they simply rearrange themselves or find new titles. This week's issue follows that logic across four countries, where power is passed, repackaged, or quietly entrenched by the same hands that have always held it.

In Laos, a cabinet of familiar faces returns with familiar promises, and familiar shortfalls. The numbers — inflation, debt, fuel prices — tell a story the new term's targets quietly ignore: ambition might be restated, but the mechanisms to deliver it are not. In Myanmar, the junta offers its most theatrical shuffle yet: Min Aung Hlaing trades a uniform for a presidential title, handing his gun to a loyalist: the deck stays the same, only the hands have moved.

Meanwhile, in Thailand, a single MP's intervention threatens to sink a Clean Air Bill that citizens fought hard to put on the table — a reminder that reform, even when it reaches parliament, is never safe. Cambodia, alone this week, offers something closer to genuine disruption: a sweeping crackdown on online fraud networks, an arrest of real consequence, and a cyber law with teeth. Whether the ambition outlasts the deadline remains to be seen.

Lao PDR 🇱🇦

Familiar Faces, Unfinished Business: Laos’ Cabinet Returns

by Thongsavanh Souvannasane, in Vientiane

When Prime Minister Sonexay Siphandone was sworn in for a second term to lead the 10th Government Cabinet of Laos on March 31st, there was little surprise in the room.

Most of the 17-member cabinet are returning faces, and Sonexay himself is a known quantity. But continuity in leadership is only a virtue if the previous term is delivered. On several fronts, the record invites scrutiny.

The most immediate pressure arrived with brutal timing.

Just three days before the inauguration, a crisis erupted in the Middle East, triggering a fuel shortage that sent prices spiraling. In barely five weeks, diesel costs leapt from 19,970 kip (USD 0.91) per liter to 51,360 kip (USD 2.33), a 157% increase hitting households and businesses hard.

Yet the crisis exposes a deeper question: why, after years in office, has Laos still not built the reserves or supply chain diversification to cushion exactly this kind of shock? For a landlocked nation with well-documented import vulnerabilities, that absence looks less like bad luck than policy failure.

Inflation tells a similarly uncomfortable story.

The government has pledged to keep price growth below five percent annually over the next five years. Yet the first quarter of 2026 already averaged seven percent, before the fuel shock fully fed through.

Last year’s full-year rate of 7.7% should have sounded the alarm.

That the government enters its new term with the same target but no visible new mechanism to achieve it raises legitimate questions about whether this is genuine commitment or optimistic arithmetic.

At the inaugural session, President Thongloun Sisoulith urged the cabinet to resolve fuel shortages, stabilize the Kip, reform state-owned enterprises, and repair what he himself described as “paralyzed” roads. The list reads less like a forward agenda and more like an acknowledgement of unfinished business from the previous term.

The longer-term numbers offer some relief. Debt has fallen from a COVID-era peak of around 130% of GDP to roughly 90%, with projections pointing toward 65% by 2030.

Growth targets of 6% annually, anchored by hydropower, the Laos-China Railway corridor, and tourism recovery, are ambitious but not implausible. Yet the the International Monetary Fund (IMF) warns that persistent debt and inflation risk undermining inclusive development, and at 90% of GDP, debt servicing continues to crowd out spending on health, education, and rural infrastructure.

Then there is the question.

Sonexay and his sister Viengthong Siphandone, newly appointed Vice President, are children of Khamtai Siphandone, the former President and party patriarch who passed away in April 2025. With two siblings now holding the country’s top executive positions, the Siphandone family’s grip on Lao governance has never been tighter.

Whether that represents continuity of capable leadership or a dynasty consolidating its hold, just months after the patriarch’s passing, is a question Lao political observers will be asking, carefully, for some time.

Laos has a plan for the next five years. The problem is that it had one for the last five years too.


Thongsavanh is a journalist from Laos with a background in English-language media. He graduated from the Lao-American Institute with a Diploma of the Arts in English and contributes to independent news platforms. His reporting focuses on environmental issues, socio-economic development, and geopolitics.

Myanmar 🇲🇲

A New Face at the Top, the Same Fist Below

by Moe Thiri Myat

A significant leadership shift has unfolded in Myanmar this week, signaling changes within the military junta. The junta is not giving up power but just rearranging it. Senior General Min Aung Hlaing resigned his role as a commander-in-chief, instead moving into the presidential process. At the same time, General Ye Win Oo took over the control of the armed forces, ending days of speculation over who would lead the military at this critical moment of the country.

The shift did not occur without warning. Before the 81st Armed Forces Day, Deputy Commander-in-Chief Soe Win publicly signaled that a military leadership reshuffle would follow on Thursday, March 26. In his remarks, he said the military would continue its procedural enforcement regardless of who held senior posts. He also said that “The Tatmataw takes precedence over any individual.”

Attention then turned to who would become the next commander-in-chief. Many believed it would be Soe Win himself to step up as Min Aung Hlaing’s successor. Instead, the role was entrusted to Ye Win Oo, a close loyalist of Min Aung Hlaing and the first former military intelligence chief to become the head of armed forces.

Looking back at Ye Win Oo’s background, he had a close relationship with Min Aung Hlaing for years, rising through the ranks once Min Aung Hlaing assumed the role of commander-in-chief in 2011. He then served as a chief of military intelligence, consolidating his position within the military regime after the 2021 coup. His appointment was announced the very same day Min Aung Hlaing was formally nominated in the process to select Myanmar’s next president. This maneuver thus placed one of Min Aung Hlaing’s closest allies in charge of the military right as the former military leader approaches a transition towards civilian leadership.

This change has drawn reaction beyond Myanmar as well. On April 1st, the ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights, a regional network of lawmakers, warned against recognizing Min Aung Hlaing’s presidency. The group said a new title should not be treated as a break from the system that has ruled the country since the coup, noting that international recognition could normalize the same military order, just under a formal civilian structure.

These changes come at an important moment in Myanmar’s post-coup political landscape. A new president is expected, a new commander-in-chief is already in place, and the military has framed this shift as a part of its planned roadmap. But the leadership changes have also kept attention on how power is being passed, who remains in control, and how the region will respond to the new government structure.


Moe Thiri Myat is a senior at Parami University. Majoring in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics (PPE). Interested in analyzing emerging sociopolitical situations and developments, through her work as a Myanmar correspondent at The ASEAN Frontier she aims to explore how sociopolitical developments across Southeast Asia shape and are shaped by the situation in Myanmar.

Support Us

Thailand 🇹🇭

Bhumjaithai Loads Its Gun on the Clean Air Bill

by Natamon Aumphin, in Bangkok

Earlier in April, the public unleashed backlash on social media after Supachai Jaisamut, a Bhumjaithai-list MP, addressed the house over the Clean Air Bill, suggesting that the Senate reject it amid the grave situation of PM2.5 in the Northern region of Thailand.

In the morning of April 2nd, the MP was invited to clarify the situation on channel News Workers’ Off-Screen Chat (กรรมกรข่าว), a news channel led by Sorayut Suthassanachinda, a prominent news presenter. The channel allows invited guests to speak freely, heart-to-heart with him.

In response to the public outrage sparked by his attitude towards the bill, the MP said that he agreed with the majority of the clauses, noting however that there are some confusing parts in the draft that should be revised. According to Jaisamut, the biggest issue is the enforcement power of the bill, as some parts are overlapping with the existing law, including industrial-related legislation that has already been widely implemented in other governmental units. In this context, rejecting the bill, rewriting it and resubmitting it would be the most appropriate and fastest solution compared to establishing a new subcommittee to consider the bill at this stage of revision.

Pattarapong Leelaphat, an MP from the People’s Party, the opposition party behind the bill, responded with worry, questioning why the Bhumjaithai didn’t point out the issue during the committee meeting last year, of which he was also among the attendees. Moreover, the Bhumjaithai was also among the parties that overwhelmingly voted for the bill in the former parliament term last year.

Moving forward, the question is how the parliament will decide the future of the bill and whether other actors, such as the civil society, will be consulted before the decision of this citizen-initiated legislation. These questions will also send signals about the incentives and intention of the current government over the health of citizens as PM2.5 worsens yearly, coupled with grievances from the energy crisis and soaring commodity prices.

Importantly, it might also be difficult in the broader context among ASEAN countries to cooperate to solve this regional pollution in the future if the bill were to be rejected, as there is no guarantee that the house will vote to pass the draft once again.


Natamon has served as a rapporteur at the Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS Thailand). She has also worked as a research assistant on diplomatic issues in Southeast Asia. Her work focuses on how domestic politics shape foreign policy in the region. She holds a degree in international relations and has experience in policy analysis, event reporting, and regional research.

Cambodia 🇰🇭

Cambodia's New Cyber Law Claims Its First Victim

by Chandara Samban, in Kandal

Cambodia has taken bold steps to eliminate online scams by the end of April 2026, passing a new law on cyber and technology-based fraud, launching a nationwide campaign to dismantle scam networks, and pursuing key figures involved. Most recently, authorities arrested the owner of Huione Pay Bank, the close ally of Chen Zhi.

On April 1st, Chinese and Cambodian authorities announced the arrest of Li Xiong, former chairman of the Huione Group, in a joint operation investigating money laundering linked to Huione Pay Bank. The bank reportedly processed an estimated USD 4 billion in money-laundering action between 2021 and 2025, before the National Bank of Cambodia revoked its license in March 2025. The case is also linked to the Prince Group and fraud kingpin Chen Zhi, who was arrested and extradited to China about 2 months ago.

Li Xiong’s arrest has drawn significant international attention, as he is considered a key figure in Southeast Asia’s online fraud networks, which have affected victims globally in recent years. Governments in the US, UK, and Europe have taken targeted actions in response. According to blockchain analytics firm Elliptic, the bank handled approximately USD 8 billion in cryptocurrency transactions and facilitated over USD 300 million in laundering activities linked to the North Korean Government.

Earlier in April, the Cambodian government passed a new Cyber Law specifically targeting online fraud. The Senate approved the law on April 4. Justice Minister Keut Rith stated in a press conference that the law aims to strengthen enforcement against online fraud, particularly by clearly defining and targeting scam operations, which were previously not well addressed under existing legislation.

Under the new cyber law, leaders of online scam networks can face prison sentences ranging from 5 to 20 years, depending on the severity of the offense. Crimes involving human trafficking, coercion, or money laundering may result in harsher penalties, including life imprisonment for masterminds.

Chhay Sinarith, head of the Secretariat of the Commission for Combating Online Scams, emphasized that dismantling online fraud networks is a complex task requiring international cooperation. He noted that Cambodia is working closely with global partners, including the US FBI, INTERPOL, Chinese authorities, and South Korean agencies operating in Cambodia. Many of the criminal networks involve foreign nationals from multiple countries who have established operations within Cambodia.

In the 9 months leading up to early April, Cambodia arrested 750 individuals and repatriated 11,000 foreign nationals. Overall, the broader campaign has resulted in more than 10,000 arrests and the deportation of approximately 80,000 foreigners from 78 nationalities. Common forms of crime include romance scams, investment scams, phishing, and recruitment fraud. The government has pledged to eliminate all online scam operations in the country by the end of April 2026.

In response, LICADHO operations director, Am Sam Ath, who has closely monitored the issue, acknowledged the government’s recent efforts to combat online fraud, which has long harmed Cambodia’s economy and international reputation. However, he expressed concern that the timeline may be too ambitious for a challenge that requires sustained coordination and oversight. He stated, “This crackdown must be strictly enforced, transparent, and applied equally before the law. Corruption must be eliminated without exception. On behalf of civil society, we support and encourage the authorities and the Royal Government to take decisive action against online fraud.” He noted that while the government’s intensified efforts appear promising, their success will ultimately depend on transparency, fairness, and consistent implementation.

The crackdown on online fraud presents a significant test for Cambodia as it seeks to restore its international image and rebuild trust with global partners. While the government has set an ambitious deadline of April 2026, achieving this goal will require advanced technological capabilities and sustained collaboration with international experts, including major global powers.


Chandara is a freelance journalist with a focus on foreign affairs, security issues, and ASEAN affairs. He also serves as a Junior Counterterrorism Intelligence Analyst.

Editorial Deadline 04/04/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Karen Ysabelle R. David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk

This week, we see warning signs and systemic issues with ticking deadlines across the countries of the Pacific Corridor. In Singapore: a looming baby crisis, as the city-state’s total fertility rate plunges to a record low. Despite the government’s best efforts, in a city-state notorious for its high cost of living and fast-paced environment, reversing the trend is set to be an uphill battle.

In the Philippines, the global oil crisis has led to the declaration of a national energy emergency. In a country heavily dependent on imported oil, the crisis has exposed exactly how precarious its situation is, with fears of shortages and price spikes spreading like wildfire through the general populace.

And in Vietnam, the recent National Assembly and People’s Council elections have brought to light the state’s suppression of dissent. With Tô Lâm widely expected to be elected President, there may be no better time than the present to question and push back against the country’s one-party system.

Singapore 🇸🇬

Why are Singaporeans Having Fewer Babies?

by Jennifer Hui En Tan, in Singapore

On 26 February 2026, during Singapore’s 2026 annual budget debate, Deputy Prime Minister Gan Kim Yong raised his concern with Singapore’s total fertility rate (TFR) hitting a record low of 0.87 in 2025. To fight the low birth rate, the government expects to take in between 25,000 to 30,000 new citizens a year over the next five years. Since then, the topic of conversation has been one of the hottest topics in Singapore’s social media scene. So, why are Singaporeans having fewer babies?

Despite Singapore’s incentives for larger families by increasing paid parental leave, child care subsidies, and large family schemes, these fail to tackle the systematic and structural issue behind the country’s falling birth rate. While public sentiment among Singaporeans on social media forums highlights the cost of living, housing, and time as the key deterrent, Singapore’s situation is part of a broader global decline in TFRs. For many citizens, cost remains the most pressing concern, as Singapore is widely regarded as one of the world’s most expensive cities, and housing adds to that pressure. Approximately 77% of Singaporeans live in public housing, and for many young couples, the most realistic route would be to apply for BTO (Build to Order) houses, which come with a typical waiting period of around two to four years, if not longer. Newer BTO flats are frequently criticized for their shrinking sizes, which many feel are not conducive to raising more than one or two children. Time and work cultures further exacerbate the problem. Singapore’s high-pressure work and fast-paced environment leads to many opting out from having children due to the lack of time and flexibility to be meaningfully present in their children’s lives.

A declining fertility rate is not unique to Singapore; rather, it has been an ongoing global issue shaped by broader cultural and mindset shifts. Even with Singapore’s efforts so far, the fact is that children require significant parental time and emotional presence, something that institutional childcare alone is unable to provide. Globally, the TFR has been declining as a result of a combination of socioeconomic, cultural, and technological transformation, which has reshaped family structures and reproductive behavior. As countries develop and the socioeconomic situation gets better overall, higher levels of education lead to greater labor force participation, delayed marriages, and postponed childbearing.

The global decline in TFR has significant implications for ASEAN, as many member states are already experiencing demographic pressure similar to advanced economies. Countries such as Thailand and Malaysia have seen their TFRs fall to 1.22 and 1.55, respectively. Though the TFR rates are not as severe as Singapore, it signals a demographic shift which threatens to reshape the region’s economic landscape.

Singapore’s record low fertility rate ultimately reflects not just local challenges but a broader global demographic shift driven by structural, economic, and cultural changes. While government incentives help, they cannot reverse deeper societal trends such as rising costs, delayed marriages, and shifting lifestyle priorities. As neighboring ASEAN states face similar patterns, the region must prepare for the long-term implications on labor, growth, and social stability. Addressing the fertility crisis will require not only policy adjustments, but also a fundamental rethinking of how societies support families and redefine the balance between work, life, and parenthood.


Jennifer is a final-year International Relations student at the Singapore Institute of Management, where she focuses on political engagement, diplomacy, and community governance. She is an active volunteer in her constituency, working closely with residents to understand local concerns, facilitate dialogue, and support community initiatives.

Support Us

The Philippines 🇵🇭

State of Emergency and Its Wider Meaning

by Glenn Vincent N. Boquilon, in Angeles City

On Tuesday evening, 24 March 2026, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. declared a state of national energy emergency, the first country in the world to do so. Beyond a domestic policy move, this can be viewed as a response to the growing crisis outside the Philippines. Tensions between the United States and Iran in the Middle East are beginning to affect countries that rely on imported energy. Additionally, oil companies in the Philippines have implemented a double-digit increase in fuel prices, pushing them to record highs. The government’s decision reflects concerns over fuel supply, rising prices, and the wider impact of global instability.

The Philippines depends heavily on imported oil. When conflict disrupts supply routes or pushes prices higher, the country becomes vulnerable. If left misgoverned, crippling effects can trickle down to various industries and communities. Recent developments in the Middle East have raised fears of shortages and price spikes, pushing the government to act quickly. By declaring a national energy emergency, authorities can respond faster and manage resources more closely.

In this case, the state of emergency allows the government to secure fuel supplies, monitor distribution, and prevent hoarding or price manipulation. Officials have also set up a crisis committee to track the situation and make sure basic needs such as fuel, food, and medicine remain available.

The effects of the Middle East conflict go beyond fuel prices. Geopolitical dynamics like this show how quickly global tensions can shape local decisions. For countries like the Philippines and many across the world, even distant conflicts can create real risks. In this regard, this makes early action and contingency plans important within bodies of government. The declaration of a state of emergency is not just reacting to external circumstances, but preparing for internal challenges that could potentially get worse.

This approach is not unique during times of crisis. In the last couple of years, several countries in Asia have used emergency powers in response to global or external pressures. During the COVID-19 pandemic, governments introduced emergency measures to control the spread of the virus and keep systems running. In other cases, states used similar powers to respond to economic shocks or regional tensions. Each situation is different, but the need for quick action is the same.

Across Southeast Asia, this creates a shared challenge. Governments must respond quickly, but they must also avoid overusing their authority. While emergency powers can help manage crises, they also need to be presented with clear limitations. In any nation, accountability is important to maintain public trust. For observers, this moment highlights how connected the world has become. Consequently, a conflict in one region can affect energy, prices, and policy in another. Governments now have to prepare for risks that come from beyond their borders. In this regard, emergency measures are becoming tools for both response and prevention.

As tensions continue in the Middle East, attention will also remain on how these emergency powers are used in the Philippines. People will watch how long they stay in place and the initiatives that emerge from it. A balance must be found between national security measures and the extended reach of power. In the end, the real test is not just how governments respond to a crisis, but how they return to normal once it passes. In an uncertain and changing global environment, governments must ensure that power is properly regulated, proportionate, and exercised in accordance with the rule of law.


Glenn holds a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from the University of Santo Tomas. His experience spans governance programs, policy development, and political research, having worked with the Ateneo School of Government and WR Numero Research on projects focused on electoral reform, public opinion, and regional development. He also helped coordinate the drafting of the Bangsamoro Local Government Code and supported the Academy of Multiparty Democracy.

Vietnam 🇻🇳

Vietnam Cracks Down on Dissent Amid National Elections

by Sean Huy Vu

On 15 March, over 78 million people in Vietnam voted for candidates to the People’s Committees and National Assembly, an event that happens only once every five years. According to Vietnam Today, 68.6% of the candidates for the National Assembly (612 individuals) are running for the first time, 21.8% (188 candidates) are from ethnic minorities, and 45.4% (392 candidates) are women. Across 34 provinces, voters choose members for a total of 2,554 municipal or provincial seats, and 72,613 commune or ward seats.

A week later, the election results for the National Assembly were revealed, with Lê Minh Hưng winning 99.87% of the vote — higher than any delegate — and Tô Lâm receiving 98.66%. While Lê, a member of the Vietnamese Communist Party’s Central Committee, is speculated by the public and experts to become the next prime minister, Tô is anticipated to be elected president by the forthcoming National Assembly.

The integrity of the elections, however, have been called into question by observers. Although Vietnamese citizens are not legally required to participate in elections, the Party — through its various civil society groups and institutions — strongly encourages voting as a civil obligation. As a Marxist-Leninist state, the Communist Party is the sole legal political party in the country, and although candidates are permitted to run as independents, forming opposition parties is strictly illegal and can invoke grave consequences.

The independence of the national legislature has appeared increasingly dubious to experts. In the past year alone, a record number of Party Central Committee resolutions were institutionalized into law by the National Assembly, with little time for examination or debate around policies. This has led Duke University Political Science Professor Edmund Malesky to conclude, “The separation [of powers] between the executive and the legislature, like in other countries, is not clear [in Vietnam].”

In its pursuit of regime survival, the Vietnamese Party-State has suppressed dissent during the election season. Just two days before the national elections, independent journalist and blogger Lê Anh Hưng was arrested in Hanoi for “making, storing, disseminating or propagating information, documents, and items against the state.” Several individuals have also been fined between US$285 and US$570 for allegedly spreading “off-topic and untrue” information about the elections. In none of these cases did authorities provide specific details regarding the cause for their arrests or penalties. Lê, however, has been imprisoned before for his analysis and outspoken criticism of corruption in Vietnam, garnering himself popularity on social media.

Despite Vietnam’s growing and more empowered middle class, there is little to no opposition to the one-party system. Without critical feedback, the country will face more delays in achieving its development goals, and given the increasing centralization of power under Tô Lâm, political freedoms are unlikely to expand in the near future.


Sean is a scholar of East Asian history, culture, and international relations, with current research at Georgetown University examining working-class labor and human trafficking in the region. His broader interests include the social psychology of religion and identity politics. Sean previously taught modern Korean history at the University of California, Irvine, where he completed his B.A. in History, and later taught English in Ho Chi Minh City while studying Vietnamese language and culture. His writing has been published by UC Irvine, Johns Hopkins University, and Foreign Analysis.

Editorial Deadline 31/03/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Siu Tzyy Wei, Lead Editor - Maritime Crescent Desk

This week, flames flicker across the region, sometimes celebratory, sometimes destructive, sometimes provocative, but always revealing a deeper story beneath the embers.

In Brunei, Hari Raya fireworks blaze against the night, as Maryam Zulaidi reflects on the festive season’s power to bring not only families together, but also strengthen diplomatic ties with regional counterparts.

Across Malaysia, fiery words in parliament face the prospect of new restraints, as the government studies proposed guidelines to curb issues surrounding the “3R” - race, religion and royalty among Members of Parliament. Sydney Gan delves into the National Harmony Act, and whether policing parliamentary debate is a solution to preserving unity without hindering accountability.

In Indonesia, the government is straining to shield households from the shock of surging oil prices by pouring trillions into subsidies as the crisis at the Strait of Hormuz threatens to push crude oil costs even higher. Here, Rayhan Jasin examines how Jakarta’s consideration of a nationwide work-from-home mandate could ease fuel demand and fiscal pressure, while also reshaping business practices and exposing new vulnerabilities.

From fireworks to debates, the Maritime Crescent reminds us that flames never burn in isolation. Rather, they leave embers that illuminate deeper significance - showing how celebration, provocation and crisis all glow within the same firelight of the region’s story.

Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳

When Hari Raya Becomes Common Table

by Maryam Zulaidi

Eid-al-fitr is the celebration that marks the end of the holy month of Ramadan and the beginning of the new Islamic month of Syawwal. More popularly known as Hari Raya Aidilfitri, Malay Muslims in Brunei uniquely observe Hari Raya for up to 30 days, a cultural practice which differs from other Muslim communities around the world. During Hari Raya, celebrants visit homes of their relatives and friends and spend quality time together, strengthening and reaffirming familial and communal bonds through traditional food and games. That being said, these practices are not exclusively limited to the Muslim communities of the three nations. Rather, it is a season of celebration that transcends the social construction of cultural boundaries — it is a warm welcome for all to join regardless of background, race, and even faith. In the bigger picture, Hari Raya can be seen as the cushion that supports diplomatic relations between Brunei and its counterparts who share the same cultural practices.

For nearly fourteen years, it has become a routine for a Singaporean minister, accompanied by his/her delegations to pay a friendly visit to Brunei during this joyous event. In the course of this festivity, Singaporean dignitaries are invited to Hari Raya events such as open houses hosted by Bruneian Cabinet ministers and members alike as well as the Singaporean High Commission in Brunei. It is through events like these, informal discussions regarding cooperation between the two states unravel. The exchange of Hari Raya greetings between Brunei and Singaporean state officials goes beyond formality; it depicts and reflects the depth and knitness of bilateral ties between the two countries. Gradually, trust between state officials became established not only at the bilateral level but also through personal and bureaucratic goodwill.

Even the COVID-19 pandemic did not halt this tradition between the two nations. In an era where physical contact and travel was impossible, this custom was not only retained but modified into a goodwill phone call conveyed by then Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong to the Sultan of Brunei.

During the Hari Raya celebrations of 2024, Brunei-Singapore ties were strengthened when both countries celebrated forty years of diplomatic relations, notably commemorated by a courtesy call with His Royal Highness Prince Haji Al-Muhtadee Billah ibni Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah,the Crown Prince and Senior Minister at the Prime Minister’s Office in Brunei. In 2025, Osman at the Singaporean High Commission’s Hari Raya open house expressed that the “relationship between Brunei and Singapore is built on sincerity from all levels of society”.

This year, the bilateral traditions remain steadfast. Singapore’s Acting Minister-in-charge of Muslim Affairs and Senior Minister of State at the Ministry of Home Affairs, Dr Muhammad Faishal Ibrahim and his spouse, who not only stayed in Brunei three days during the festive celebrations, also graced an exchange of souvenirs with Brunei’s Minister of Religious Affairs, Dato Paduka Seri Setia Ustaz Awang Haji Badaruddin.

As Brunei and Singapore have demonstrated, Eid in this corner of the world does more than mark the end of the holy month of Ramadhan. It celebrates the renewal of ties – between families, communities, and states. Beyond celebration, Eid is a home within cultural diplomacy, nowhere more visibly seen than in the ties between the two Southeast Asian nations.


Maryam is a first-year International Relations and Politics student at the University of Sheffield, with an academic focus on Southeast Asia—particularly Maritime Southeast Asia—and the Middle East. She aspires to a career in diplomacy and academia and is committed to fostering international dialogue and advancing scholarly engagement with global issues. Beyond her academic work, she pursues creative interests and voluntary initiatives that broaden her perspectives on public service.

Support Us

Malaysia 🇲🇾

Muted Voices, Fragile Balance

by Sydney Gan, in Kuala Lumpur

On 30 March, the National Unity Ministry announced that it is developing guidelines for Members of Parliament (MPs) to restrict discussion of sensitive issues relating to race, religion, and royalty (the ‘3Rs’) during Dewan Rakyat debates. Deputy Minister R. Yuneswaran acknowledged that parliamentarians are protected by immunity in the Dewan, but argued that further safeguards are needed to ensure discussions are conducted “responsibly” without provoking public discord. This apparent move to constrain parliamentary speech raises serious questions about constitutional accountability and the separation of powers, with potential implications for policymaking in Malaysia’s regulatory landscape.

What does it mean when policies are empowered to muzzle their own makers? At its core, this issue goes back to the principle of separation of powers: that the legislative (Parliament), executive (Cabinet), and judicial (courts) branches must remain distinct to prevent the concentration of authority. The Legislature’s role is to scrutinise and challenge the executive, reflecting the democratic will of the people. In Malaysia, however, this balance is already structurally compromised, as the Cabinet is drawn from Parliament itself. Any further limitation - particularly one that restricts MPs from raising or debating contentious issues - risks eroding Parliament’s most fundamental function as a check and balance on executive power.

This concern is closely tied to the rationale behind parliamentary immunity, which was enshrined at the founding of the system. This privilege is not granted on an individualistic level, but to ensure that elected representatives can articulate the interests, concerns, and dissent of their constituents without fear. Yet immunity has also been misused, as seen at least 43 instances recorded in Pusat Komas’s Malaysia Racism Report 2025, thus raising the question of how to balance protection with accountability.

In this context, it is apparent that broad restrictions on debates involving the 3Rs risk undermining the supposed duty of the elected representatives. At the same time, the issue cannot be viewed in isolation from the realities of parliamentary discourse. More than ever, there is a need to highlight the necessary implementation of appropriate safeguards - in the form of training, re-education, and consolidated public pressure in condemning hateful speech. Instead of a blanket ban, this debate also taps into the age-old balancing act between hate speech with the right to expression - the former is the unfortunate but inevitable byproduct of the latter and must be dealt with by systematic procedures in place that does not undermine the freedom of expression.

Presently, Malaysia is on the cusp of introducing the National Harmony Act, first proposed by the Human Rights Commission of Malaysia. The Act envisions the creation of a National Harmony Commission to act as a neutral third-party in managing racial and religious tensions. Its eventual design and implementation could significantly shape how sensitive issues are addressed both within and beyond Parliament, with far-reaching implications for the country’s democracy.


Sydney holds a Bachelor of Laws from King’s College London, where she focused on Human Rights Law, Criminology, and Public & Administrative Law. She is an Analyst at Asia Group Advisors, providing policy analysis and strategic guidance across the tech, sustainability, and gaming sectors in Southeast Asia. Prior to joining AGA, she worked in the social development sector in London, contributing to the Ukraine Judicial Training Programme through research on war crimes adjudication and the development of a legal training curriculum with high court magistrates.

Indonesia 🇮🇩

Mitigating Oil Price Shock to Indonesia’s State Coffers

by Muhammad Rayhansyah Jasin

A month since the US-Israeli joint attack against Iran has brought oil price, measured by the international benchmark of Brent crude, jumped more than 70% to $115. Many market participants have started to internalize the risk of a “higher-for-longer” oil shock that could see crude futures go as high as $200 per barrel. Tehran’s swift response to blockade the Strait of Hormuz by launching missiles against all unauthorized ships is effectively choking off a fifth of oil global supply, equivalent to 20 million barrels, stoking fuel-induced inflationary shocks all around Europe and Southeast Asia.

ASEAN governments have been absorbing the shocks differently, from letting gasoline prices go up such as in Cambodia, Laos, Singapore, and the Philippines, slashing budget subsidies for fuel expenses like in Malaysia and Thailand, or instead relying further to fiscal measurements in keeping stable rates as in Indonesia. To keep gasoline prices unchanged for the past month, the Indonesia government is predicted to add more than Rp 100 Trillions (~$60 Billions) of subsidies if global oil price continues to hover above $80 per barrel, risking increased budget deficits to state coffers. The 2026 State Budget states that for every $1 increase in average global oil price, state income will rise around Rp 3.5 Trillions (~$200 Million) yet it will also incur Rp 10.3 Trillions (~$650 Million) additional spending, thus widening existing deficits. Investor’s trust towards the government’s fiscal handling is also being tested as the national bond market yield is nearing 7%.

In a bid to mitigate further oil surge by reducing overall demand, the government passed a national mandate to allow workers to a one-day work-from-home (WFH) scheme every week starting from April 1. The Minister of Finance, Purbaya Yudhi Sadewa, reasoned that similar policies had been implemented before and not only that WFH could reduce 20% of potential demand, this policy would also help workers reduce commuting cost and direct dispensable income for other needs. Another demand-side restriction of maximum purchase volume of 50 litres/day for every personal vehicle unit is also put in place. Business actors have voiced concerns that such demand-side policies could slow economic activities especially for the transportation sector, notably ride-hailing services and mobility-linked industries, while also reducing potential revenue of Micro, Small and Medium (MSE) enterprises such as food stalls and catering vendors as they rely heavily on high foot traffic surrounding office areas.

Oil shocks can serve as blessing-in-disguise particularly for the electric vehicle (EV) market as it gives reliable alternatives of transportation. Yet, as the Indonesian automotive industry recorded lower sales in 2025 compared to 2024 figures, prolonged oil surge could entice customers to wait out purchasing new cars and damage demand further. Recently, President Prabowo Subianto has touted his grand idea to fasten the EV transition to better insulate consumers from future oil shocks as his administration is preparing to launch up to 55 megawatts of new electricity plants. Yet as this process would take at least years to materialize, perhaps a more immediate solution is for the government to enlarge oil storage capacity so that short-term shortages can be mitigated more than just 20-25 days. Ultimately, this Iranian War-induced oil shock provides yet another lesson for governments everywhere to ground national policies on informed, multiple-scenario-based guesses, instead of looking for easy wayouts based on political hunches and hollow rhetorics.


Rayhan is pursuing an Erasmus Mundus Joint Master’s Degree in Public Policy at Central European University and the Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals. He holds a Bachelor of Social Sciences in International Relations and Political Economy from Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University. His current research focuses on the socio-economic impacts of Indonesia’s nickel mining industry on local communities and national development.

Editorial Deadline 28/03/2025 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk

This week’s issue of the Mekong Belt captures a region moving in two directions at once: barriers harden in some places, while new corridors begin to open in others.

In Myanmar, a revised passport act will likely strengthen the state’s grip on citizens abroad, turning mobility itself into a controlled corridor and putting yet another brick in the junta’s surveillance project. Thailand, meanwhile, keeps running into the same barrier: more than a month of rising oil prices linked to the Middle East conflict continues to squeeze an already stretched economy, narrowing fiscal space and forcing difficult trade-offs.

Yet elsewhere, new routes are being sketched. Laos is advancing plans for a railway to the Vietnamese coast — its first direct corridor to the sea — though questions remain about debt risks and whether communities along the route will truly benefit. Cambodia, meanwhile, is attempting to clear institutional bottlenecks by trimming overlapping government structures and expanding digital governance, a cautious effort to make the state move more efficiently.

Myanmar 🇲🇲

Junta’s Updated Passport Act Frustrates People Living Overseas

by Mozart

Myanmar’s junta has enacted a new passport law, abrogating a previous legislation which had been active for over a century. This new framework reveals the junta’s rush to run a total surveillance state, restricting freedom of movement and digitalizing its people’s identity and legal information. The legislation requires a mandatory submission of unique identification cards which include biometric data and all personal information, causing anxiety of many people working and living overseas who do not possess the documents required to renew their passports.

Signed by junta leader Min Aung Hlaing on March 17, 2026, the new Myanmar Passport Law (NDSC Law No. 19/2026) contains 8 chapters and 47 sections, officially terminating the Myanmar Passport Act of 1920. As the law aims to mandate all current passports paperwork to be updated as e-passports by the upcoming year, every new passport application or renewing passports will now compulsorily need to provide digital unique identification number (UID) that include biometric data such as fingerprints and facial recognition.

While upgrading traditional passport to new digital ones may seem in line with international procedure, the real reason behind could be more than simple digitalization. In fact, although the legislation frames its intentions as to safeguard national security and prevent the fraud and unauthorized use of passports, critics see this as junta’s strategic move to suppress and restrict any potential opposition movement.

The law also creates a 10-member Issuance Board for scrutinizing passport applications, chaired by the Deputy Minister of Home Affairs, a key ministry under military control. Article 6 grants the Board full authority to examine all passport-related activities to cancel existing passports and blacklist applicants if notified by “relevant ministries.” Article 29 also allows the Board to refuse to issue the passport if the applicant is considered “likely to threaten national security or the interests of the State,” something that legal experts consider as “vague” and giving officials the arbitrary right to abuse their power against any person.

This particularly frustrates people living overseas and activists, the main participants of Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), requiring them to re-enter the country if their passport expires in order to obtain the UID necessary for the renewal process, creating a tailored surveillance control. Moreover, the legislation also sparks fears among migrant workers in Thailand who hold “Passports for Job” (PJ), as their status is being stamped as “Passport for Thailand Only,” further restricting their freedom of movement.

In this context, the new e-passport system is likely to create difficulties for overseas workers needing to go back to renew passports, causing additional travel expenses. Legal experts argue that this tightening legal framework is unconstitutional under Article 335, which states that: “Every citizen shall have the right to settle and reside in any place within the Republic of the Union of Myanmar according to law.”

Since the 2021 coup, the junta has been cancelling, revoking and terminating the passports and citizenship status of high-profile opponents and parallel government figures including artists and activists. In this context, this updated system is likely to create a more enhanced mechanism for monitoring movements and traveling of citizens, especially young people who are willing to flee the country amid worsening political, safety concerns and socioeconomic challenges. Although the law outlines the legal procedure for appealing the decision for individuals who are denied a passport or have their passport cancelled, the ultimate power of the Board would likely reinforce corruption in an already fragile bureaucratic mechanism.

Ultimately, this new passport act serves as a digital roundup designed to cement the junta’s surveillance state, transforming a basic right to travel into a privilege controlled by a military seeking to trap its critics within a collapsing nation.


Mozart is a research assistant at Mosaic Myanmar and is currently pursuing a Bachelor of Arts in Liberal Arts and Sciences at Parami University. His academic and professional interests span community development, minority issues, and social impact research. He has held roles including service-learning intern, student mentor, and operations coordinator for local initiatives, supporting project management, monitoring and evaluation, and education programs in Myanmar.

Thailand 🇹🇭

Thailand’s Already-Stretched Economy Hit Hard by War

by Satid Sootipunya, in Bangkok

One month into the conflict between the United States and Iran, Thailand, like other oil-reliant nations, has been severely hit by energy supply shocks. Still, Thailand has been the most vulnerable nation among its neighbouring nations due to its 90% reliance on imported energy, especially from the Middle East through the Strait of Hormuz.

After burning billions of already-stretched public finances each week from the Oil Fuel Fund, the Thai government has stepped back its week-long oil subsidy. The administration has increased diesel prices by 6 baht per liter on 26 March after the Oil Fuel Fund could not sustainably subsidize diesel prices due to high deficits.

Diesel is considered the backbone of the Thai economy, ranging from transportation to agriculture and industry. Increasing diesel prices could inevitably drive goods prices across the board, which means higher inflation for Thailand.

SCB EIC, a research arm of Thailand’s SCB Bank, estimates that the annualized inflation for 2026 will reach 3.2%, while Gross Domestic Product (GDP) will shrink by 0.4% from the previous estimate to just 1.4% due to the ongoing conflicts in the Middle East.

Don Nakornthap, Assistant Governor for Monetary Policy at the Bank of Thailand (BOT), said in a statement released on March 25th that inflation will return to the target range of 1–3% in 2026 due to the developments in the Middle East. Previously, the BOT had estimated that inflation would return to the 1–3% range only in 2027 after Thailand decade-long experience of low inflation.

Besides oil prices, electricity prices will be severely affected by the developments in the Middle East. Approximately 60% of electricity in Thailand is produced from Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), which is mainly imported from Qatar. Currently, LNG facilities in the country are adversely affected by disruptions during the war. Therefore, with the shutdown of the Strait of Hormuz, the shortage in LNG supply will drive up the cost of electricity in Thailand, especially in May–August bills.

Tourism, Thailand’s main economic engine, is also being hit hard by the ongoing conflict. Natreeya Taweewong, Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Tourism and Sports, said on March 25th that Thailand could lose up to three million tourists if the war continues for six consecutive months, which could drag the country’s revenue down by 150 billion baht (USD 4.6 billion). While the government has set a tourist target of 35 million in 2026, the developments in the Middle East could bring the numbers down to the level of 2023, when only 23 million tourists visited the Kingdom.

To mitigate the impact, some luxury hotels in Thailand have reduced prices by 50–70% to lure local tourists, a flashback to the situation during COVID-19, when Thailand saw no inbound tourists.

Thailand’s Minister of Energy Auttapol Rerkpiboon launched, on March 28th, six measures to mitigate the situation during a press briefing, including the suspension of exports, inspection of oil stock levels at depots and among traders, and supervision of refineries to increase diesel production, as well as relaxing stock-counting rules to increase reserve volumes, issuing ministerial regulations to disclose prices and stock levels at all refineries and storage facilities, and increasing the blending ratio of biofuels in refined oil.

When asked if the oil reserves are sufficient to support the country and its people during the Songkran Festival, a major public holiday in Thailand, Auttapol stated that the reserves can sustain the nation for 107 days.

To ensure the country has enough supply for people and industries, Sihasak Phuangketkeow, Minister of Foreign Affairs, said at the same press briefing that Thailand also plans to buy more oil from other nations, including Brazil, Azerbaijan, and Nigeria.


Satid is a multimedia economic journalist and news anchor who covers macroeconomic trends, Thailand’s fiscal policy, and key regional developments for Bangkok Biz. A Journalism graduate from Thammasat University, he has reported on major issues such as the US–China trade tensions, the Myanmar crisis, and global corporate stories, drawing on prior newsroom experience at The Momentum, the Bangkok Post, AFP, and Varasarn Press. His work blends economic analysis, foreign affairs, and digital storytelling, with a strong focus on making complex financial and political topics accessible to Thai audiences.

Support Us

Lao PDR 🇱🇦

Laos Is Building a Railway to the Sea, but for Whom?

by Thipphavanh Virakhom, in Vientiane

Laos has never had a coastline. For a small, landlocked country in the heart of Southeast Asia, getting goods to the ocean has thus always meant going through someone else’s land — slower, costlier, and on someone else’s terms.

That could soon change. In March 2026, the Lao government asked its National Assembly to approve a USD 1.3 billion railway running 562 kilometres from Vientiane to Vung Ang Port in Vietnam, the country’s first direct path to the sea. Construction is planned to start in 2026, with trains running by 2030, built together by a Lao state company and Vietnam’s Deo Ca Group.

If connected to the existing Laos-China Railway, trade could flow all the way from southern China to the Vietnamese coast passing through Laos turning a small country into a regional crossroads. That is a real and exciting possibility.

But Laos is building this railway while already carrying heavy debt. The country is still rated by the IMF and World Bank as being in debt distress. Things are slowly getting better, inflation dropped from 26% in mid-2024 to around 4% by late 2025, and public debt fell to about 82% of GDP, but the IMF still warns that Laos remains fragile and risks are not over yet. Adding a billion-dollar project on top of that needs honest, open answers about who is paying, how, and what happens if things go wrong.

The bigger question is about people, not money. The Laos-China Railway, finished a few years ago, shows what can go wrong when communities are left out. Compensation proceedings for land taken during that project are still ongoing as of March 2026. At least 371 families still have not been fully paid, not because help was refused, but because the government’s offered price was far below what families say their land and homes were actually worth. Over 100 families refused to move at all, saying the new land given to them had no access to their farms.

Large infrastructure projects across the region have shown that the benefits do not always reach everyone equally, and that communities closest to the construction are not always the ones who gain the most. As Laos moves forward, development experience from across Southeast Asia suggests that early and open community engagement, fair and transparent land compensation processes, and clear channels for people to ask questions and raise concerns are not just good practice, they are what separates infrastructure that uplifts from infrastructure that simply passes through.

A railway to the sea could open real doors for Laos. But only if the people along the tracks, farmers, villagers, ethnic communities, are assuredly informed what is coming, genuinely consulted, and fairly treated. Infrastructure that leaves the most vulnerable behind is not development. It is just construction. The tracks are being planned. The most important decisions about who benefits may still be ahead.


Thipphavanh holds a bachelor’s degree in international affairs. She is a governance and development professional specialising in rule of law, access to justice, and gender equality in Lao PDR. Her work focuses on strengthening justice sector institutions, advancing people-centred governance, and promoting gender-responsive systems. With extensive experience in project coordination, monitoring and evaluation, stakeholder engagement, and strategic communications, she has collaborated closely with national institutions and international partners to support inclusive and sustainable development.

Cambodia 🇰🇭

Cambodia’s Administrative Reform Advances, but Structural Questions Remain

by Sokna Thea, in Phnom Penh

Cambodia is pressing ahead with public administration reform as the government seeks to improve efficiency, reduce duplication, and strengthen performance-based management under its Seventh Mandate. The latest official and reputable reporting shows that the reform is still framed around “strengthening rather than expanding,” with Prime Minister Hun Manet saying ministries should review their structures, roles, and responsibilities to avoid overlap.

The scale of Cambodia’s bureaucracy remains significant. The country had 232,034 civil servants as of January 2025, including 96,969 women. Of these, 54,585 worked at the national level, while 177,449 were employed at the subnational level. This large administrative base helps explain why the government continues to prioritize reform, particularly as it seeks to improve service delivery and administrative responsiveness.

Beyond structural adjustments, the government has also emphasised operational efficiency. In March 2025, the prime minister called for a review of organizational frameworks, improved deployment of officials, and simplification of procedures. He noted that Cambodia currently offers more than 3,000 public services, many of which still require overlapping documentation, highlighting persistent inefficiencies faced by citizens and businesses.

More recent developments suggest a continued shift toward digital governance. In February 2026, the Ministry of Interior launched an online complaint portal, allowing citizens to report grievances and misconduct through a centralized system. Meanwhile, the Financial Management Information System (FMIS) continues to expand, reporting over 1.3 million transactions and more than 3,800 users as of early 2026. These tools aim to reduce paperwork and speed up service delivery.

Cambodia’s reform reflects a broader regional trend, but with a more cautious approach. Vietnam has moved more aggressively by merging ministries and cutting layers, though this carries risks of oversized structures. Malaysia focuses on gradual reform through mandate reviews and task forces to reduce overlap. Singapore’s public service is widely described as lean and highly digitalized, with government reforms focusing on shared platforms, process efficiency, and reducing duplication rather than large-scale structural cuts. Against this backdrop, Cambodia’s recent removal of 3 general departments and 26 directorates across 12 ministries is a measured step, focusing on internal streamlining rather than large-scale consolidation.

Critics, however, continue to argue that Cambodia’s problem is deeper than a few structural adjustments. They say overlapping mandates, slow decision-making, and weak accountability still affect the system, so simply reshuffling offices may not be enough. That concern remains relevant because the government’s own public messaging suggests it prefers incremental restructuring over drastic mergers or reducing the number of ministries.

The key question remains whether these reforms will change underlying incentives within the system. Without stronger accountability mechanisms and clearer distribution of authority, experts warn that inefficiencies may persist even after structural changes.

For now, Cambodia appears to be taking a gradual approach, combining administrative restructuring with digitalization and procedural reform. Whether this strategy will lead to a more effective and responsive state will depend on how far the government is willing to go in simplifying mandates, reducing duplication, and linking performance to measurable outcomes.


Sokna has a background in International Affairs and Business & Commercial Law. He’s currently a Senior Project Coordinator at the Ministry of Economy and Finance of Cambodia, working on the Financial Management Information System (FMIS) Project. His professional focus is driven by entrepreneurship, business development, and financial technology, with a particular interest in how private-sector innovation drives Cambodia’s economic growth.

Editorial Deadline 28/03/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Karen Ysabelle R. David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk

Worldwide, the growing global oil crisis continues to dominate headlines. But for the Philippines, amid a dizzying week that has also been rife with espionage concerns and an ongoing maritime dispute in what it calls the West Philippine Sea, the fuel shock is just one of multiple crises laying siege to the country.

Vietnam, too, is facing the twin threats of the oil crisis and rising costs that are quickly becoming familiar the world over. In the face of American unreliability, Hanoi is adopting a dual-track strategy that has seen it engage in a diplomatic flurry of activity.

And for many, Singapore remains a haven, no matter what happens in the rest of the world. With its enduring reputation for economic opportunity and stability, the city-state continues to act as a beacon for foreigners, both in Southeast Asia and beyond.

The Philippines 🇵🇭

The Philippines’ Two-Front Security Squeeze

by Eduardo G. Fajermo Jr., in Angeles City

A fuel surge, driven by widening international conflict, is not just hitting Filipino wallets. It is also tightening the operating space for a country that must patrol contested waters while shoring up vulnerabilities at home. This week’s headlines show the Philippines confronting a two-front challenge at once: alleged foreign-linked information leaks inside government networks and rising maritime pressure in the West Philippine Sea (WPS), a term used by the Philippines to assert its sovereign claims in contested waters.

The “inside” front: Recruitment, proxies, and near real-time leaks

A report this month detailed how a Filipino civilian admitted to transmitting sensitive information to a foreign handler, including operational details on missions in the WPS. According to the civilian’s account, access was gained by compromising the device of a friend in the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), and communications evolved from messaging apps to a method concealed inside a “Tetris” gaming application.

The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) has framed this as part of what it calls a “growing global intelligence trend,” describing recruitment methods that target young professionals online and seek operational advantage by learning adversaries’ plans and capabilities. The National Security Council, for its part, has tried to calibrate public alarm, acknowledging that some leaked information was sensitive but saying it did not pose a “serious threat” to national security, while emphasizing the need for vigilance among government employees facing suspicious “job offers.”

Security now is not only about ships and aircraft. It is also about people, access, and routine practices. The state can invest in radars and patrol assets, but still lose the advantage if mission schedules, vessel deployment details, or personnel data leak through informal channels.

The “waters” front: Flares over Mischief Reef and intensified presence

While agencies move to seal internal vulnerabilities, events at sea are simultaneously raising the temperature. On 20 March, Chinese forces were reported to have fired flares near a PCG aircraft during a maritime domain awareness flight over the Kalayaan Island Group, with the plane operating near Mischief Reef (Panganiban Reef). The same report noted additional monitoring of Chinese maritime militia vessels near Escoda Shoal and the continuing strategic weight of Philippine-held outposts such as Pag-asa Island. There were also reported PCG concerns about Chinese “clearing operations” at Bajo de Masinloc (Scarborough Shoal), which the Coast Guard said were meant to intimidate Filipino fishermen and reinforce Beijing’s presence.

Fuel shock meets security operations

The fuel crisis is now spilling into government decisions and military routines. The AFP has publicly said it is implementing energy conservation measures to address rising prices, while stressing that essential security operations will continue, including activities tied to the WPS. That constraint shows why today’s security environment is not only a sovereignty issue. It is also a logistics issue.

Even as fuel costs rise, joint exercises and alliance operations are expanding. Around 1,000 Japanese troops are expected to participate in this year’s Balikatan exercises, part of deepening security ties amid regional uncertainty.

Why ASEAN should pay attention

The Philippines’ two-front squeeze should be read as a warning for the rest of ASEAN: in contested environments, external pressure often arrives through both the sea lane and the inbox. The outcome will depend not only on diplomatic statements, but on whether states can harden internal protocols, protect sensitive operations, and sustain patrols even when global fuel markets turn security into an expensive discipline.


Eduardo is a faculty member at Holy Angel University, where he teaches courses on Philippine history and contemporary global issues. He is currently pursuing a Master’s degree in Political Science at the University of Santo Tomas, with a research focus on disaster governance, environmental politics, and the urban poor in the Philippines.

Support Us

Vietnam 🇻🇳

The Scramble for Energy Diplomacy and Security

by Hang Nguyen, in Ho Chi Minh City

The convergence of 2025 trade war tariffs and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz amid ongoing Middle Eastern conflicts reveals the United States’ continued capacity to shape global economic outcomes, despite an increasingly inward-looking and state-centric policy orientation. The Strait of Hormuz carries on average 20% of global crude oil trade, with 90% of shipments heading for Asia. For Southeast Asia’s rapidly expanding digital and industrial frontier sectors, the insufficient domestic resources and limited extraction capacity leaves the region structurally vulnerable to disruptions at vital chokepoints.

The diminishing supply of oil and the accompanying exponential surge in costs imposes a financial strain on businesses and consumers navigating the risk of inflation and necessities like daily transport. The collapse of shipping traffic in the Strait of Hormuz signals the accelerating shift toward multi-vector energy diplomacy, revealing how middle powers — such as Vietnam — adapt. As confidence in America’s sphere of influence erodes proportionally to the Trump’s administration’s volatile and conflict-prone foreign policy, Hanoi has adopted a dual-track strategy in response that combines external energy diplomacy with internal market stabilization.

On the diplomatic front, Hanoi political leaders have responded proactively by engaging in diplomatic phone calls with global world leaders, sending official letters, and meeting with foreign ambassadors in Vietnam. On 17 March, Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh received a diplomatic visit from the Ambassador of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to Vietnam, Mr. Bader Abdullah Almatroosh, subsequent to a diplomatic phone call with the UAE President. The Prime Minister reiterated the bilateral Comprehensive Partnership and Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) to discuss the securitization of a stable supply of crude oil and natural gas imports, upgrading to a Strategic Comprehensive Partnership, accelerating Vietnam–Gulf Cooperation Council Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations, and investment cooperation. Earlier, on 16 March, Prime Minister Pham Minh held a phone call with Angolan President João Manuel Gonçalves Lourenço to request for additional supplies of oil and gas, grounded in over 50 years of diplomatic relations and partnership. Hanoi also voiced the need to accelerate the implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on oil and gas cooperation.

On the domestic front, Hanoi prepares to impose countermeasures to combat against the implications of the prolonged closure of the vital oil waterway. In approximately three weeks post the initial missile strike in the Middle East, oil and petroleum prices have experienced a 27–40% fluctuating increase, directly hurting the pockets of everyday consumers. On 18 March, the Hanoi Department of Construction issued Document No. 5556/SXD-KTXD to contain the impact of oil price fluctuations on critical infrastructure and construction projects through measures and guidelines. While this exemplifies administrative actions to deter or minimize negative impact, Vietnam’s positionality cannot endure long-term repercussions of the Middle Eastern war. The current crisis underscores the urgency of accelerating structural reforms in the domestic energy sector, including investment in renewable energy, enhancement of refining capacity, and reduction of fossil fuel dependency. Without such long-term adjustments, external diversification risks becoming a reactive rather than transformative strategy.


Hang is a young researcher with academic experience in Vietnam and the United States. She has previously worked in public relations at the U.S. Consulate General in Ho Chi Minh City and the YSEALI Academy. Her research focuses on ASEAN centrality in the evolving Asia-Pacific landscape, with particular attention to Vietnam’s approach to trade, regional cooperation, and political economy in the face of external power dynamics and global volatility.

Singapore 🇸🇬

Why Singapore Feels Like Home for Some Foreigners

by Ryan

In a recent Straits Times article, Korea-born finance executive Andrew Lim described how Singapore became more than just another overseas posting. Having previously lived in Hong Kong, Beijing, and Dubai, he said what stood out was not only Singapore’s role as a business hub, but also the warmth of daily life: lunches at hawker centers, festive gatherings with colleagues, and a workplace culture that felt open and community-oriented. After relocating in 2019, he eventually felt ready to bring his wife to Singapore and plan for the long term. His story helps explain why, for many foreigners, Singapore is not just a place to work, but a place to build a life.

Singapore’s appeal is not difficult to understand. It offers what many global cities struggle to balance: economic opportunity, personal safety, political stability, and everyday efficiency. Official figures show that Singapore had 6.11 million people as of end-June 2025, including 1.91 million non-residents, while the Ministry of Manpower reported a total foreign workforce of 1.64 million at the end of 2025. This reflects how deeply foreign talent is woven into the country’s economy. For many professionals, Singapore is attractive because it is orderly, well-connected, and internationally minded, all while remaining close to the rest of Asia. The quality of infrastructure, ease of commuting, and sense of security all strengthen its appeal, especially for those considering more than a short-term posting.

There is also a softer reason some foreigners stay: Singapore can be relatively easy to settle into. Andrew’s experience suggests that belonging is often built through small, repeated social moments, rather than dramatic gestures. In a multicultural society where English is widely spoken and social norms are easier for newcomers to navigate, foreigners may find it simpler to adjust than in places where language or cultural barriers are more rigid. For those raising families, Singapore’s emphasis on safety, order, and social cohesion can make it feel like a practical long-term base rather than a temporary expatriate stop.

Yet Singapore is not somewhere everyone chooses to remain. The same city that attracts global talent can also wear people down. Cost is one of the clearest reasons. Although the property market cooled somewhat at the end of 2025, private residential rents still rose 1.9% across the year, while 3.3% private home prices has increased. For foreigners without access to subsidized public housing, rent can be one of the biggest pressures on daily life. Over time, even a strong salary may not fully offset the cost of housing, schooling, childcare, and other essentials, particularly for expatriates with families.

Work status also shapes whether someone stays or leaves. Singapore remains open to foreign professionals, but access is selective. Employment Pass candidates must meet salary thresholds and, in most cases, pass the COMPASS points framework. These rules are meant to ensure foreign professionals complement the local workforce, but they also make Singapore a harder place to remain in if one’s job situation changes. For some, that uncertainty, combined with demanding work culture, limited space, and distance from home, makes leaving the more sensible choice.

A broader ASEAN lens helps put Singapore’s appeal into perspective. Andrew’s decision to build a future here reflects a wider regional pattern. Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand remain major destinations for foreigners, while countries such as Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar are still more commonly seen as labor-sending economies. Some foreigners may choose Malaysia or Thailand over Singapore for lifestyle reasons, longer-term residency options, or retirement planning. Even so, for many people across ASEAN seeking work, stability, and upward mobility, Singapore continues to exert the strongest pull.


Ryan is a final-year finance student at the Singapore University of Social Sciences (SUSS) with experience across venture capital, venture debt, and business development. He also holds a diploma in Law and Management from Temasek Polytechnic. His interests lie in how emerging technologies and economic trends shape business ecosystems and regional development in Asia.

Editorial Deadline 24/03/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Haniva Sekar Deanty, Lead Editor - Maritime Crescent Desk

Whether it’s children and online harms, frauds and the ever-growing links to trafficking and abuse, or even national interests in trade; policies that are designed to protect are increasingly confronted by structural constraints.

This week, Maritime Crescent’s Rayhan Prabu looks at Indonesia’s sweeping social media restrictions on minors. By any measure, this is a bold gamble, but policies like this don’t exist in a vacuum.

Transnational fraud rarely makes headlines the way traditional security issues do, but its impact is becoming harder to ignore. Brunei’s Wira Gregory invites us to have a closer look, as the state participated in a forum to tackle a problem that no country can handle alone.

Malaysia’s decision to call its trade agreement with the United States “null and void” adds another layer of uncertainty to a deal that was already under scrutiny, as reported by Muhammad Aiman. In arrangements like this, the line between economics and strategy is rarely clear, and unfortunately, rarely simple.

Policy today feels increasingly reactive. Jump too late, and you hit the obstacle. Jump too early, and you lose momentum. Governments are doing what they can to stay ahead, whether regulating digital spaces, coordinating against fraud, or recalibrating trade ties. But as the game speeds up, it becomes harder to rely on instinct alone. At some point, survival is no longer just about leaping over the cacti, but about knowing where they’ll appear next.

Indonesia 🇮🇩

The Kids Aren't Online

by Rayhan Prabu Kusumo, in Jakarta

On March 28, 2026, Indonesia began deactivating social media accounts belonging to children under 16. The platforms in the first wave are YouTube, TikTok, Facebook, Instagram, Threads, X, Bigo Live, and Roblox. The legal basis is the Minister of Communications and Digital Affairs Regulation No, 9 of 2026, the technical implementing regulation of the Government Regulation No. 17 of 2025 on the Governance of Electronic Systems in Child Protection (PP TUNAS), signed by President Prabowo Subianto a year earlier.

The regulation covers an estimated 70 million Indonesian children under 16, which is fourteen times the number affected when Australia introduced a comparable ban in December 2025. Indonesia is not following a trend so much as setting one, becoming what the government describes as the first non-Western country to implement age-based platform restrictions at this scale.

The case for acting was not hard to make. Nearly half of Indonesian internet users are children. A 2022 national survey found that roughly 35 percent of Indonesian teenagers (more than 15 million) had experienced a mental health issue, with cyberbullying and harmful content named as contributing factors. Government health screenings of around 7 million children in 2025 also found nearly 10 percent showing symptoms of depression and anxiety.

None of that makes the ban wrong. However, it does make the questions around it harder to ignore.

The platforms being restricted are also where young users learn and participate in civic life. A blanket prohibition does not distinguish between the algorithm that harms children and the one that helps them. Protection without a substitute is only half a policy.

Then there is enforcement. For a generation that grew up navigating VPNs in one of the world’s most notoriously restrictive internet environments among democracies, rerouting around a government block is second nature. Age verification is only as strong as platform compliance and parental awareness, both of which are historically uneven across Indonesia’s vast geography.

And if the workarounds work, the outcome could be worse than the problem. Pushing children off regulated platforms does not necessarily make them safer, as it could simply redirect them toward corners of the internet that are less visible and less moderated.

While nobody is arguing that Indonesian children were fine the way things were, a regulation that tells millions of children they cannot access the digital world does not automatically build a better one for them to eventually enter.

What needs to follow is harder than signing a regulation: a national digital literacy program embedded in schools, accessible offline spaces for children in urban areas where the internet has long substituted, parents who are equipped to do more than confiscate a phone, and an answer to what happens to the children who comply, wait, and grow up having never been taught what to do when the door finally opens — because without that, what the government calls protection may end up looking a lot like abandonment.


Rayhan has a background in government affairs and public policy, with experience across government institutions and advisory firms. His work focuses on the intersection of geopolitics, policy, and risk, with expertise in advocacy, regulatory analysis, and stakeholder engagement. He holds a degree in Government from Universitas Padjadjaran, and has completed an exchange at Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Spain, focusing on global politics and sustainability.

Support Us

Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳

Small State, Global Stakes

by Wira Gregory Ejau, in Bandar Seri Begawan

The Vienna International Centre, more accustomed to hosting nuclear non-proliferation debates, served as the address for a different kind of arms race on 16–17 March 2026. At the inaugural Global Fraud Summit, co-organised by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and INTERPOL, ministers and senior officials from across the world gathered to confront what has quietly become one of the most destabilising non-traditional security threats of the decade: transnational fraud.

Led by Deputy Minister (Security and Law) at the Prime Minister’s Office, Datuk Seri Paduka Sufian Sabtu, Brunei’s participation and rare-placed visibility at the High-Level Roundtable on the Global Fraud Response Mechanism carries diplomatic weight that warrants closer reading. Online fraud losses in East and Southeast Asia now exceed US$40 billion annually, according to Thailand’s Foreign Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow, who also attended the Vienna summit. The scam-industrial complex (mostly having been concentrated in Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos over the years) has evolved far beyond petty cybercrime. It is now interlocked with human trafficking, forced labour, and money laundering, operated by transnational criminal networks that deliberately exploit jurisdictional gaps and governance failures across the region.

Brunei, geographically insulated and domestically stable relative to its mainland Southeast Asian neighbours, is not peripheral to this crisis in the sense that proximity is no longer a meaningful buffer in an era of digital fraud. The statement delivered by Datuk Seri Paduka Sufian at Vienna acknowledged that online scams are rising across the region and outlined Brunei’s domestic response: a “Whole-of-Nation” and “Whole-of-Government” framework, anchored by an Anti-Scam Helpline and sustained public outreach campaigns.

What makes this moment noteworthy is less the policy inventory and more the positioning. Thailand’s foreign minister, speaking at the same summit, argued that existing frameworks under UNODC, INTERPOL, and ASEAN are structurally sufficient and that the challenge lies in making them operate “with unity and coherence.” Brunei’s seat at that table, however modest in delegation size, is precisely the kind of consistent participation that shapes how multilateral norms are written and who they bind.

Small states across ASEAN frequently leverage multilateral norm-setting forums to compensate for limited unilateral enforcement capacity while also protecting their financial and reputational standing in global markets. Brunei’s presence ensures that its interests and domestic policy choices are embedded in the coordination mechanisms that will follow.

The Vienna summit will not resolve the structural drivers of ASEAN’s scam crisis: certain civil war that enables criminal networks, governance deficits in border zones, and the persistent exploitation of weak inter-agency cooperation. What it can do is thicken the web of obligations, intelligence-sharing norms, and multilateral accountability that is crucially necessary to combating transnational fraud networks that are becoming increasingly difficult to navigate. A small state can exercise meaningful influence in international security governance when it shows up consistently, engages substantively, and aligns its domestic architecture with the direction of global policy.


Gregory is an MSc candidate in Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He works as a freelance writer specializing in international history, conflict, and counterterrorism, with experience in academia, investigative journalism, and voluntary uniformed service.

Malaysia 🇲🇾

Deal in Limbo

by Muhammad Aiman Bin Roszaimi, in Cyberjaya

Malaysia’s recent declaration that its trade agreement with the United States is “null and void” has introduced significant uncertainty into an already controversial bilateral arrangement. The move follows a United States court ruling that challenged the legal basis of certain tariffs imposed under the agreement, raising questions about the deal’s enforceability and future.

The Malaysia–US trade agreement, concluded during former President Donald Trump’s visit to Kuala Lumpur in 2025, was designed to deepen economic ties between the two countries. Under the framework, Malaysia agreed to reduce or remove tariffs on selected American goods and expand market access, while the United States maintained a baseline tariff of around 19% on many Malaysian exports, albeit with exemptions for certain products.

The deal reportedly included cooperation on strategic sectors such as rare earth minerals and industrial supply chains, reflecting Washington’s broader effort to strengthen economic ties in Southeast Asia. However, it was never a conventional free trade agreement. Rather, it was a politically driven arrangement shaped by the US tariff regime and geopolitical considerations.

From the outset, the agreement faced strong criticism within Malaysia. Analysts, opposition figures and civil society groups argued that the deal was asymmetrical and potentially undermined national sovereignty. The agreement contained provisions requiring Malaysia to align with US economic restrictions or sanctions against third countries. Critics warned that such clauses could limit Malaysia’s long-standing neutral foreign policy and effectively force it to take sides in major power rivalries, particularly between the US and China.

These elements led some observers to describe the deal as not purely economic but strategic in nature, embedding geopolitical conditions into trade relations.

Despite this backlash, the Malaysian government defended the agreement as a pragmatic decision. The deal is understood through the lens of a hedging strategy. By engaging economically with the US while maintaining ties with other major partners such as China, Malaysia sought to diversify its economic relationships and avoid overdependence on any single power.

But recent confusion stems from a US court ruling that reportedly invalidated the legal basis for certain tariffs underpinning the agreement. In response, a Malaysian minister declared that the trade pact is effectively “null and void,” as its core provisions are no longer legally enforceable.

While parts of the agreement may no longer be operative, it is unclear whether the entire framework has collapsed or whether both sides will renegotiate terms. Trade agreements of this nature often contain flexibility clauses, and both governments may seek to preserve elements that remain mutually beneficial.


Aiman is a PhD candidate in Security and Strategic Analysis at the National University of Malaysia. His research focuses on Malaysia’s space policy, ASEAN regional security, and the strategic implications of emerging technologies. His work explores how Malaysia’s defense policy and strategic culture shape its approach to outer space.

Editorial Deadline 21/03/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk

Like all delicate systems, political crises do not always arrive with a single breaking point. Sometimes, they are the result of a slower controlled process where the system keeps running, but with less and less behind it, similar to an engine running low on fuel. This week’s issue of the Mekong Belt traces how both material and political systems across the region are being stretched to their limits.

In Laos, the shock of global oil disruptions has exposed just how thin the country’s buffers really are, with fuel shortages reshaping everyday life from transport to education, and raising deeper questions about long-standing structural fragilities. Meanwhile, in Myanmar, the convening of the Upper House shows a system running low on genuine representation, as parliamentary procedures continue while the composition of the legislature makes clear that power remains tightly controlled.

Thailand, meanwhile, is attempting a structural reset of its own. The proposed separation of tourism and sports reflects a broader ambition to rethink how the country positions itself globally. Yet questions remain over whether institutional redesign alone can overcome deeper constraints, from infrastructure gaps to political trade-offs. Finally, in Cambodia, efforts to expand agricultural trade routes through Laos highlight a more outward-facing response. By diversifying export corridors and strengthening regional linkages, Phnom Penh is seeking to build resilience in a shifting economic landscape — even as existing dependencies remain difficult to replace.

Lao PDR 🇱🇦

Pumps Running Dry

by Thongsavanh Souvannasane, in Vientiane

With schools cut to three days, civil servants sent home, and hundreds of people queueing at empty pumps, the Middle East conflict has triggered the most severe energy emergency landlocked Laos has faced since 2022, shuttering over 1,000 fuel stations and sending prices soaring over 50 per cent.

Along Vientiane’s roads, moto-taxi drivers queue for hours at the few stations still open, only to find the pumps run dry before they reach the front. The crisis was born thousands of kilometers away, but made far worse by a structural vulnerability Vientiane has long failed to address.

Coordinated US-Israeli strikes on Tehran in late February threatened the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly a fifth of the world’s oil passes. For Laos, which imports over 97% of its fuel from Thailand, the shockwave was immediate. When Bangkok briefly suspended all fuel exports, panic buying emptied stations across the capital within hours.

Bangkok, however, granted Laos an exemption alongside Myanmar, and an emergency 12-million-liter shipment followed, but when fuel arrived, it vanished within a day.

The numbers tell the story.

In just one week, fuel prices nearly doubled. By 20 March, a liter of premium gasoline costs LAK 41,210 (USD 1.93), up from around USD 1 a month ago. Global Petrol Prices recorded Laos’ premium gasoline as the second-highest price increase in the world that week. Of 2,538 stations nationwide, 1,061 have shuttered. Price gouging has followed scarcity, with inspectors in Champasak Province finding stations selling fuel well above official rates, resulting in fines.

What began as an economic shock has quickly reshaped everyday life.

Fuel excise taxes were cut, civil servants shifted to remote work or rotating schedules, and on 20 March came the most striking measure: college and university students will attend just three days a week, a signal that the crisis has moved well beyond the pump and into the classroom.

Vientiane launched a mobile fuel service, and amid the disruption, the capital’s Bus Rapid Transit network began its second two-month free trial on 10 March, a timely lifeline for commuters, and a second chance for a service whose first trial failed to gain traction.

On the diplomatic front, the news has been cautiously reassuring.

Thai Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul on 19 March reassured Laos that exports will continue, reduced by 25 per cent to 5.29 million liters per day, citing mutual energy dependencies, as Laos supplies a significant share of Thailand’s electricity.

Relief is also arriving from the east: on 20 March, Vietnam is set to commit 50 million liters and offered to facilitate imports through its territory, opening a new supply corridor.

Yet the crisis echoes 2022’s foreign currency shortages, same structural failure, different triggers. No strategic reserves, no supply diversification. Thailand’s exports are diplomacy, not policy; Vietnam’s offer is welcome, but reactive.

Until Vientiane builds genuine energy resilience, every global shock will find Laos equally exposed.


Thongsavanh is a journalist from Laos with a background in English-language media. He graduated from the Lao-American Institute with a Diploma of the Arts in English and contributes to independent news platforms. His reporting focuses on environmental issues, socio-economic development, and geopolitics.

Myanmar 🇲🇲

Procedural Democracy Masks Continued Control of Juntas as the Upper House Convenes

by Myat Moe Kywe

The First Regular Session of the Third Amyotha Hluttaw (Upper House) convened on March 18 at the parliamentary complex in Nay Pyi Taw, according to junta-run Global New Light of Myanmar. Daw Dwe Bu, a 64-year-old ethnic Kachin politician and the only woman among the 16 members of the military-led State Administration Council (SAC), was appointed to chair the opening session until a formal Speaker was elected.

Daw Dwe Bu has long-standing ties to Myanmar’s military and political establishment. She previously served as vice chair of the Kachin State People’s Party and as a member of parliament under President Thein Sein’s semi-civilian government (2011–2015). A former Supreme Court attorney, she also participated in the military-organized National Convention that drafted the 2008 Constitution. Her political trajectory has consistently aligned with the military’s leadership.

Following her interim role, Lieutenant General U Aung Lin Dwe, secretary of the SAC, was nominated and confirmed as Speaker of the Upper House. He contested a seat in Mandalay Region under the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) in the December–January elections. His appointment reflects a broader strategy: ahead of the polls, at least six senior regime officials and around 30 current or former military officers were reportedly transferred into the USDP to contest seats under its banner.

According to the Union Election Commission, the USDP secured more than 72% of seats across both the Amyotha Hluttaw and the Pyithu Hluttaw. Combined with the 25 percent of parliamentary seats constitutionally reserved for the military, this arrangement effectively guarantees continued junta dominance—despite elections not being held in several conflict-affected regions.

Jeng Phang Naw Htaung, representing Kachin State Constituency 2, was elected Deputy Speaker. Also a member of the SAC and former Minister for Ethnic Affairs, he has been listed under international sanctions. Nonetheless, his loyalty to Senior General Min Aung Hlaing has secured him a prominent role within the legislature.

Observers note that the newly convened Hluttaw is overwhelmingly composed of junta appointees, military affiliates, and loyalists. Analysts therefore expect the body to function less as an arena for legislative debate and oversight, and more as an extension of the military’s governing apparatus.

As the Third Amyotha Hluttaw begins its term, its structure points to continuity rather than change. While parliamentary procedures project a veneer of democratic governance, real power remains firmly consolidated in the hands of the military, leaving little space for dissent or meaningful reform in the near term.


Myat is a senior undergraduate student majoring in Politics, Philosophy, and Economics. She has interned at The Asia Foundation in Washington, D.C., and she has also worked as a summer research assistant at the Centre for Policy and Innovation (CRPI), gaining experience in research and analysis. Her work focuses on civic engagement, gender, youth leadership, and community development.

Support Us

Thailand 🇹🇭

The Soft Power Pivot and Ministerial Divorce

by Paranut Juntree, in Bangkok

In March 2026, the Bhumjaithai-led administration signaled a radical departure from traditional bureaucracy by announcing a plan to split the Ministry of Tourism and Sports (MoTS) and merge tourism with the Ministry of Culture. This “structural divorce” aims to resolve a long-standing critique: the administrative friction between two fundamentally different industries. By merging Tourism with the Ministry of Culture and spinning off Sports into a standalone identity, the government seeks to pivot Thailand from a high-volume destination to a high-value global brand.

The 2002 Mandate created the MoTS under the now-outdated logic that sports are merely magnets for international arrivals to drive GDP of the country. In reality, these are incompatible engines almost since the beginning. For a tourism-driven country, tourism functions as a high-velocity “sprint,” driven by seasonal marketing and volatile global demands. In contrast, Sports is a technical “marathon” requiring multi-year training cycles, talent pipelines, and consistent investment in sports science and infrastructure.

Historically, tourism’s immediate impact on GDP has dictated the agenda of the ministry. This prioritization gap forced Sports to compete for capacity, relegating it to a secondary marketing tool rather than a professional industry. This has stifled athletic growth, as focus remained on the quantity of spectators in a sports event rather than the quality of infrastructure.

Within the MoTS, resources have traditionally been cannibalized by tourism. While the Sports Department utilised the National Sports Development Fund (NSDF) under the Sports Authority of Thailand (SAT), this proved insufficient for comprehensive development. Under the MoTS model, Sports was expected to support tourism with limited funding and manpower. Consequently, the budget poured into tourism marketing, leaving sports development reliant on private funding.

As a standalone entity, a Ministry of Sports would benefit from specialized ministerial management no longer overshadowed by tourism. However, it remains a matter of debate whether the Ministry of Sports will secure the dedicated fiscal budget necessary for manpower and technical advancement or it will be merged with other ministries.

The merger of Tourism and Culture in the tourism management sense, creates a “one-stop” strategy for a culture-led model. By consolidating these portfolios and ministerial styles, Thailand can move beyond simple headcount metrics and instead leverage more of its cultural assets to drive higher spending per capita. This unified approach allows the state to synchronize its tourism direction with its soft power ambitions, effectively translating abstract cultural influence into tangible economic yield.

Critically, some argue this merger is a political maneuver to satisfy coalition partners with more ministerial seats, though proponents argue the merger of Tourism and Cultural actually prevents seat inflation by reducing at least one ministerial seat. Critics also suggest merging Tourism with Transportation, mirroring Japan’s logistical model. This highlights a significant risk: can Thailand’s aging infrastructure realistically sustain a high-value cultural pivot? Without the high-speed trains and seamless multi-modal hubs seen in peer nations, there is a danger that poor logistical accessibility will prevent travelers from reaching the very cultural assets the government seeks to promote in the first place.


Paranut has a background in advocacy, with experience in policy research, communications, and civic engagement across both the NGO and government sectors. As Thailand’s Youth Delegate to the United Nations, he represented Thai youth in global dialogues on migration, education, and human rights, championing inclusive policymaking. He holds a degree in political science with a specialization in international relations.

Cambodia 🇰🇭

Cambodia Expands Agricultural Trade Routes Through Laos

by Malai Yatt, in Phnom Penh

Cambodia’s agricultural sector continues to serve as a cornerstone of the national economy, contributing 16.1% to GDP in 2025. The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (MAFF) is now seeking to streamline trade routes through Laos to improve access to the Chinese market in 2026.

Speaking at MAFF’s 2025 Annual Summary on March 19, Minister Dith Tina acknowledged that while the agricultural sector has not matched the level of economic participation seen in other major sectors, it remains a key driver of exports and national growth.

“This sector has demonstrated resilience and steady growth, playing a crucial role in ensuring food security, creating jobs, and supporting economic development despite global and regional challenges,” he said. “We will continue to improve farmers’ livelihoods and promote sustainable economic growth.”

In 2025, the sector recorded an annual growth rate of 1.2%, bringing its total value to over USD 8.3 billion. According to MAFF, agricultural exports reached nearly USD 6.5 billion—an increase of more than USD 320 million compared to 2024—with the crop subsector accounting for the largest share at over USD 5.6 billion.

Cambodia produced more than 15 million tonnes of rice during the year, generating a surplus of over 9 million tonnes, with nearly 950,000 tonnes exported. Dith Tina expressed confidence that further gains could be achieved, particularly through efforts to facilitate smoother and more efficient transport of agricultural products to China via Laos.

A key step in this direction was taken on January 25, when MAFF signed an agreement with Laos on the transit of agricultural goods. The deal is expected to open new overland export routes to the Chinese market in the near future.

“This is an important step to expand and strengthen cooperation between the Cambodian and Lao agricultural sectors,” the minister said, adding that the partnership could extend to other areas such as fertilizer supply, forestry, and potentially mining.

With Cambodia’s border with Thailand still facing disruptions, Ky Sereyvath, an economics researcher at the Royal Academy of Cambodia, noted that Laos could serve as a transit hub for Cambodian agricultural exports to third markets.

However, he cautioned that while Laos may help facilitate trade flows, its market size remains limited and cannot replace Thailand’s role as a major trading partner.

Overall, Cambodia’s strategy reflects a broader effort to diversify export routes and reduce dependency on any single corridor. By strengthening overland links through Laos, the government aims to reinforce the resilience of an agricultural sector that already contributes more than USD 8.3 billion to the national economy.


Malai is a reporter at Kiripost, where she has worked for over two years, driven by a strong commitment to amplifying the voices of underserved communities. Her reporting focuses on economic and foreign affairs.

Editorial Deadline 21/03/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Karen Ysabelle R. David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk

Throughout history, there have been shots heard round the world, ones that began world-altering wars. Now, as gunshots echo from the Middle East and reverberate globally, only time will tell if this conflict will be similarly momentous. But as early as now, export-dependent Vietnam is feeling these echoes acutely. Can its economic fundamentals and ambitions withstand surging logistics costs and rising fuel prices?

From Singapore, updates on a government fully in control and on top of its game: the passage of the city-state’s highest budget to date; debates on tobacco control; and swift actions to maintain racial and religious harmony.

Meanwhile, over in the Philippines, the Vice President’s impeachment saga takes a new and sexist turn, thanks to a Congressman’s remarks during a hearing. The episode, happening as it did during International Women’s Month, raises broader questions about the limits of parliamentary immunity, and how easily it can lead to impunity.

Vietnam 🇻🇳

Guns, Ships, and Growth: Vietnam’s Geoeconomic Stress Test in 2026

by Tri Vo, in Ho Chi Minh City

With the dawn of 2026 came geopolitical tremors emanating from the Middle East, sending shockwaves directly into Southeast Asia’s manufacturing hubs. Escalating regional conflicts have severely compromised the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz, the latter of which is the artery through which roughly 20% of global crude oil shipments flow, forcing international shipping lines into confusion and apprehension. For Vietnam, a heavily export-dependent economy, the roaring guns 3,000 miles away reverberate deeply throughout the country’s supply chain.

According to reports from early March, businesses in Ho Chi Minh City are already bearing the brunt of surging logistics costs as vessels are forced to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope. The mathematics, as a result, are punishing for manufacturers. Forgoing the Suez Canal adds up to four weeks of transit time, effectively reducing global shipping capacity and stranding empty containers. Consequently, Vietnamese exporters are experiencing severe delays and sharp increases in freight surcharges, threatening to erode profit margins during peak seasons later in the year. Logistics firms warn that war-risk surcharges alone could climb by US$200 to US$500 per container. Thus, exporters are now caught between paying more elevated premium rates to secure vessel space or risking contract cancellations from buyers in European and North American markets.

Beyond immediate logistics, the more serious macroeconomic threat lies in input inflation. With global crude oil prices rising sharply in response to Middle Eastern volatility, Vietnam’s vulnerability as a net importer of petroleum products is further highlighted. Higher fuel prices then cascade rapidly through the economy, inflating the cost of domestic transport, electricity generation, and manufacturing input as well as other goods, given that the Consumer Price Index can increase by 3.6%, 4.1%, or up to 4.6% in the worst case.

This worst-case projection directly threatens the State Bank of Vietnam (SBV)’s mandate, which sets a target of keeping average inflation at around 4.5% for the year. If sustained energy shocks push transportation and raw material costs higher, defending this very threshold will put policymakers into an unenviable bind. Specifically, the SBV and the Ministry of Finance now face a delicate balancing act between fiscal stimulus (including the rollout of high public investment and tax support, including a 2% VAT cut through the end of the year) to boost economic growth to achieve the ambitious double-digit economic growth target of 10%. At the same time, these institutions are also mandated to maintain macroeconomic stability and keep inflation in check.

Ultimately, the Middle Eastern upheaval is a harsh stress test for Vietnam’s 2026 economic ambitions. While the country’s economic fundamentals remain highly competitive, the current crisis highlights the hidden costs of deep global integration. To sustain momentum, policymakers and logistics firms must rapidly develop strategic buffers, ranging from nearshoring vital inputs to securing long-term freight contracts, to insulate the national energy supply chain by diversifying energy sources to mitigate risk exposure. The experience and outcomes of Vietnam’s economic journey in 2026 can prove useful for ASEAN as a whole, as the bloc is also in a similar bind at this very moment.


Tri has experience in management consulting and strategy, having worked with institutions such as the UNDP, The Asia Group, and ARC Group. He has provided strategic, legal, and operational insights to clients in sectors including manufacturing, energy, and technology. He holds both academic and professional experience related to Southeast and East Asia, with a focus on regional development and policy.

Support Us

Singapore 🇸🇬

Disciplining, Restricting, and Banning the Singapore Way

by Nurul Aini, in Singapore

On 6 March 2026, the Members of Parliament (MPs) of Singapore were reminded of their responsibility as politicians governing the country. Rounding up this year’s budget of SGD 200 billion — the city-state’s highest budget to date — the Speaker of Parliament, Mr Seah Kian Peng, emphasized the importance of clear and succinct messages in shaping the understanding of the public of how policies will shape their lives. Peng reminded them to “keep our eyes on the horizon that is the Singaporean people.”

When it comes to national wellbeing, Parliament has also been debating the possibility of banning flavored tobacco, which, according to Minister of State of Health Rahayu Mahzam, increases the risk of addiction among the youth. Singapore had previously imposed a 20% tax on tobacco products on 12 February 2026 — the additional tax is projected to generate about SGD 150 million in additional revenue. Parents like Estelle Low welcome the move as a necessary act of constructing inaccessibility for the benefit of public health while also hoping, through her personal recount of her son’s experience, that this move will spark reflection in smokers on the potential harmful effects of children exposed to toxic chemicals in cigarettes. Others like Manu Bhaskaran, a veteran economist and partner at research and advisory firm Centennial Asia Advisors, question the effect that this will have on smuggled tobacco products and higher cost of living.

While banning and restricting seem to be Singapore’s mode of advancing behavioral policy, there are on-the-ground approaches to encourage smokers to voluntarily quit smoking. When it comes to tobacco control, Singapore ranked second after Thailand in 2025, with four other countries — Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam — banning e-cigarettes and heated tobacco products.

In other news, on 8 March 2026, the Singapore government issued a disabling direction to Meta to restrict the circulation of a video of a man stepping on the Qur’an in a public bus in Singapore. The Singaporean man had previously been convicted under Section 17F(4) of the Maintenance of Religious Harmony Act 1990, jailed in July 2025, and then released in December 2025. He was also found to show signs of being mentally unwell. The Minister of Law, K. Shanmugam, highlighted that while the man is currently overseas, he will be questioned by the police when he returns.

The recirculation of the video, however, followed a similar case in Malaysia that happened on 22 February 2026. This case involved a Malaysian student stepping on the Qur’an and who had then posted it on the social media platform Threads. Subsequently, the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commissions (MCMC) debunked the video as unrelated to the Malaysian man, and highlighted that Singapore’s case was an old one. The Malaysian man is currently under trial for his offenses. This episode of desecrating a religious text, and the swift action by both governments to condemn any intentional acts of inciting religious sensitivities, detain offenders, and work in tandem to debunk further misunderstandings demonstrate the two countries’ commitment to ensuring that racial and religious harmony are maintained within and across borders, and that misunderstandings or fake news do not escalate.


Aini is currently pursuing a master’s degree in English literature at Nanyang Technological University. She has experience working in youth groups, contributing to the planning and management of outreach activities.

The Philippines 🇵🇭

Immunity and Impunity

by Arianne De Guzman, in Bulacan

This March, just as the Philippines celebrates International Women’s Month, Quezon City Representative Bong Suntay recounted the following anecdote about a Filipina celebrity during a House Committee on Justice hearing on Vice President Sara Duterte’s impeachment complaint:

“You know, once when I was in Shangri-La, I saw Anne Curtis. She is really beautiful. You know, a desire inside me welled up. I felt the heat, and I just imagined what could happen. But of course, that is only my imagination. But I think I cannot be charged for what I was able to imagine.”

The House of Representatives (HoR) ordered him to appear before the Committee on Ethics over his remarks, in addition to complaints filed to the Office of the Ombudsman, citing potential violation of the Safe Spaces Act, the Magna Carta of Women, and the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. The Philippine Commission on Women (PCW) warned that Rep. Suntay’s remark risks reinforcing the culture of harassment and disrespect toward women, noting that his institutional authority as a public official gives him significant influence over societal norms.

Rep. Suntay’s legal counsel, Atty. Ferdinand Topacio, argued that any complaint or potential charges are “constitutionally baseless,” emphasizing that such remarks are protected by the 1987 Constitution.

This issue exposes a fundamental constitutional paradox. Despite the enactment of the Safe Spaces Act to curb gender-based sexual harassment and penalize sexist or misogynistic remarks both in public and professional settings, Article VI, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution grants members of the Congress a speech-and-debate privilege, protecting them from being questioned or held liable for statements made during proceedings. This privilege is intended to ensure legislative independence and prevent intimidation through litigation or criminal suits. However, the same privilege risks enabling the Congress to vindicate themselves regardless of violation of other laws.

Far Eastern University and Ateneo Law Professor Mel Sta. Maria has clarified that parliamentary immunity cannot be used to excuse sexist or harassing language, especially in cases where it has no connection to the legislative purpose at hand. He also asserted that the privilege covers legitimate legislative speech, but not irrelevant personal commentary that violates other laws.

Rep. Suntay’s desire is immaterial to the issue of an impeachment complaint. Immunity should not override the dignity of a person and violate the right to privacy, especially if the person is not a party to the legislative proceedings. A broad interpretation of immunity could create a zone of impunity where public officials can harass individuals without accountability. On the other hand, interpreting it too literally could impede the independence of legislative deliberation. The balance between these extremes remains unsettled.

When laws that protect dignity and equality cannot be enforced within legislative spaces, attaining accountability can be limited to ethical complaint mechanisms and public scrutiny. Balancing constitutional protections with modern gender norms means clearly defining the limits of immunity while ensuring that institutions uphold respect for human dignity.


Arianne has worked in legal research at the Philippines Department of Justice and in policy research at De La Salle University’s Jesse M. Robredo Institute of Governance, supporting projects on systemic reform. She holds a degree in Political Science from Colegio de San Juan de Letran and is pursuing a master’s in Sociology at the University of the Philippines Diliman. She is also involved in youth development and grassroots advocacy through the Rotaract Club of Santa Maria.

Editorial Deadline 17/03/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Haniva Sekar Deanty, Lead Editor - Maritime Crescent Desk

On this week’s issue of the Maritime Crescent, Indonesia’s move to Siaga 1 projects urgency, however, Hree P. Samudra questions whether the country’s defence architecture can actually withstand sustained external pressure.

Edrina, in Malaysia, assesses the country’s contribution may pivot to energy security in a moment of geopolitical strain, but sometimes even resilience has its limits.

Meanwhile in Brunei, Syimah Johari reflects on the small state’s water infrastructure, where recurring disruptions reveal more than isolated technical failures.

Systems are often only predictable when pushed beyond routine. Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei are all operating in that in-between space. Not quite a crisis, but it is not stability either. It is one thing to speak of readiness. It is another to sustain it. In moments like these, you do not get to rest easy.

Indonesia 🇮🇩

A Middle Power Without the Architecture

by Hree Putri Samudra, in Jakarta

On March 1, Indonesia’s military commander issued Siaga 1, the highest peacetime alert level, in response to the widening Middle East war. The signal was meant to project resolve. But it inadvertently surfaced a harder question, one Jakarta has been avoiding for years. If a serious geopolitical shock hits, is Indonesia’s defense infrastructure actually capable of absorbing it? The honest answer, based on the military’s own disclosures, is probably not.

Indonesia sits astride four of the most consequential maritime chokepoints on earth. The Straits of Malacca, Sunda, Lombok, and Makassar together carry roughly a quarter of global seaborne trade. In any major disruption, whether a Hormuz closure, a Taiwan contingency, or sustained conflict radiating from the Persian Gulf, these waterways become strategic pressure points. Indonesia does not simply border them. It bears responsibility for their security. Yet the gap between that obligation and the capacity to meet it is striking.

In April 2025, Navy Chief of Staff Admiral Muhammad Ali told parliament that only about 60% of warships were operationally ready, meanwhile maritime patrol aircraft readiness stood at just 23.7%, leaving most grounded. The navy also carries roughly $191 million in unpaid fuel bills to Pertamina, undermining its ability to sustain patrols and enforce sovereignty. More alarming, Admiral Ali acknowledged that the navy lacks meaningful underwater surveillance—no seabed sensor or hydroacoustic monitoring—leaving Indonesia with limited ability to detect submarines transiting its archipelagic sea lanes under UNCLOS. Plans for a SOSUS-like network remain largely conceptual, with timelines stretching to 2044.

This has practical implications. The Australian Strategic Policy Institute argues that in a Taiwan contingency, Indonesia’s neutrality would depend entirely on persistent surveillance, the ability to detect and attribute military activity moving through its waters. Without that, neutrality becomes “declaratory rather than operational”, as gaps from short patrol cycles and intermittent coverage can be exploited.

Meanwhile, the broader modernization picture offers little comfort. The Minimum Essential Force targets expired in 2024 with the fleet still below planned strength. The navy’s expansion to five fleet commands will stretch an already thin force thinner. A recent War on the Rocks analysis warned that Indonesia “risks creating an increasingly modern fleet whose true potential remains unproven and strategic value remains underexploited”.

None of this, however, is irreversible as the corrective path is identifiable. Three shifts would fundamentally change the picture. First, Indonesia should accelerate undersea domain awareness through partnerships like the Quad’s support offer rather than waiting for a 2044 indigenous solution. Second, Jakarta needs to resolve the structural funding mismatch between the navy’s geographic mandate and its operational budget. Third, maritime patrol aircraft recapitalization should be treated not as a procurement wish list but as a national security emergency.

Indonesia’s political class speaks of sovereignty and strategic autonomy as though the words themselves were load-bearing. They are not. What bears the load is the capacity to surveil, to sustain, and to enforce. On each count, the gap between Indonesia’s ambition and its operational reality remains wide. Strategic environments do not wait for procurement cycles to finish.


Hree serves as Project Associate for Asia and the Pacific at the Global Network of Women Peacebuilders (GNWP), where she leads multi-country initiatives integrating Women, Peace and Security (WPS), and Youth, Peace and Security (YPS) frameworks into security policies across ASEAN and South Asia. She is also a Non-Resident Fellow at the University of Glasgow’s Atomic Anxiety in the New Nuclear Age program. Previously, she served as Chair of the Humanitarian Disarmament and Inclusive Governance Working Group at the British American Security Information Council (BASIC), advocating for more accountable and inclusive nuclear policy frameworks.

Support Us

Malaysia 🇲🇾

Navigating the Fuel and Uncertainties from the Middle East Crisis

by Edrina Lisa Ozaidi, in WP Kuala Lumpur

When the United States and Israel launched coordinated strikes on Iran on February 28, the first casualty was not a military target; it was the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s subsequent closure of the strait on March 2 effectively shut the throat through which a fifth of the world’s oil and liquefied natural gas normally flows. Panic buying erupted across the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam almost immediately. Malaysia, however, occupied an unusual position.

Unlike most of its ASEAN neighbours, Malaysia is a net oil and gas exporter. The country’s electricity grid draws 40 to 45 percent of its energy needs from natural gas, most of it sourced domestically from Kerteh and the Malaysia - Thailand Joint Development Area; supply chains that do not pass through the Strait of Hormuz. This structural insulation explains why Deputy Prime Minister Fadillah Yusof could state, on March 15, that domestic gas and power supplies remain stable and sufficient despite the ongoing West Asian conflict.

Yet stability today does not mean immunity tomorrow. The government has acknowledged that petroleum product supplies are sufficient until at least May 2026, and the Automatic Fuel Adjustment rate is projected to stay in rebate mode until April. But PETRA has also warned that if tensions persist and global fuel prices continue to climb, that position may change in subsequent months. Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim has been candid that existing fuel subsidies can be maintained for “one or two months”, framing the current calm as a bridge, not a destination.

The deeper tension is one of weaponised interdependence. A country that is a net exporter can still be economically damaged by a conflict it did not start and cannot end. Higher oil prices may boost Petronas revenues, but they also raise production costs for Malaysia’s export markets in the US, Europe, and China which then soften external demand for electronics and manufactured goods. War-risk insurance premiums and surging tanker charter rates compound the friction across a trade-dependent economy that exceeded RM3 trillion in total trade in 2025.

The crisis has, perhaps usefully, accelerated a conversation Malaysia was already having with itself. Economy Minister Akmal Nasrullah has pointed to the National Energy Transition Roadmap, targeting net-zero by 2050 as the structural answer. Domestically generated solar and hydropower are immune to Strait of Hormuz closures and geopolitical pressure by definition. Every unit of renewable capacity built is, in effect, a hedge against the next crisis in West Asia.

For now, Malaysia manages from a position of relative strength. The harder question where the upcoming National Economic Action Council meeting will begin to address is whether this moment of managed stability becomes the catalyst for the deeper structural shifts the country needs. In an era where energy is increasingly wielded as leverage, self-sufficiency may be the most durable foreign policy Malaysia can pursue.


Edrina is a communications professional with a background in international relations. She holds a degree from the University of Nottingham Malaysia and has worked across public relations and social media for organizations in the development, education, and corporate sectors. Her work focuses on crafting narratives around regional affairs and strengthening media engagement across Southeast Asia.

Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳

Brunei’s Water Infrastructure Under Strain

by Syimah Johari, in Bandar Seri Begawan

Brunei has recently faced recurring water supply disruptions. Earlier this year alone, there were two to three water disruptions caused by damages to mainline piping. One severe incident occurred when the main pipes in Kampong Batang Mitus burst following a landslide. The Public Works Department (JKR) announced urgent pipe repairs, resulting in water outages lasting several days. During this time, residents were forced to seek alternatives to access water, with some temporarily checking into hotels in unaffected areas while others moved in with relatives. Hospitals, schools and businesses activated their contingency plans.

On 6 March, JKR reported that pipe repairs along the Muara-Tutong highway would also disrupt nearby water supplies. While such announcements are often framed as routine infrastructure updates, the frequency of these incidents raises a broader question: why do these disruptions escalate so quickly, and how can water infrastructure be made more resilient?

The country’s main water supply relies on major transmission pipelines that carry water from treatment plants to large populations. These infrastructures are particularly vulnerable to environmental conditions such as weather and terrain. During the northeast monsoon, periods of intense rainfall increase the risk of flooding and landslides. When pipelines are damaged, the impact can extend across districts due to the centralised nature of the system.

In response to such incidents, authorities typically issue public notifications and deploy repair teams to restore damaged infrastructure. However, adverse weather can complicate repairs and delay the restoration of supply. As part of contingency plans, JKR has mobilised water deliveries to critical facilities and deployed blue water tanks at several locations for public access. While these emergency measures provided short-term relief, they are often limited in scale and cannot fully substitute a continuous piped water supply. Some areas continue to experience recovery periods even after repairs, highlighting the structural vulnerabilities of the system.

These disruptions are not new to the country. Many of Brunei’s water infrastructure systems date back to the 1980s and 1990s, and incidents of theft involving wiring, cables, and pumps further exacerbate the problem. In response, the country has focused on strengthening monitoring and improving maintenance of water infrastructure.

Following the recent Legislative Council Meeting held on 14 March, it was also announced that under the 12th National Development Plan, there are plans to upgrade aging water infrastructure and improve facilities to support both households and future industrial development. Such investments are expected to strengthen the long-term resilience of Brunei’s water supply system.

Even with these investments, the recent disruptions show how deeply water access affects everyday life. For many residents, outages are not just a temporary inconvenience but the need to rearrange daily routines, seek alternative places to stay, or search for available water supplies. As infrastructure continues to age and weather conditions become more unpredictable, building a more resilient system will be increasingly important. Ensuring a stable or reliable water supply will not only support households and businesses, but also provide communities with the certainty that essential services can continue without prolonged disruption.


Syimah is a graduate of King’s College London with a BA in International Relations. With a strong focus on diplomacy, regional cooperation, and development policy, she is passionate about contributing to meaningful change through public service. Currently, she is involved in poverty alleviation work through a local NGO.

Editorial Deadline 14/03/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk

A conflict centered thousands of miles away — in the volatile triangle between Iran, Israel, and their respective allies — is making itself felt in Cambodian gas stations, Thai cargo routes, and ASEAN meeting rooms. As its consequences suddenly become a real concern for ordinary people in Southeast Asia, this week’s issue of the Mekong Belt captures a region increasingly caught between internal and external pressures.

In Cambodia, citizens and government alike are grappling with the immediacy of dwindling fuel reserves and rising costs, with no domestic production to fall back on. In Bangkok, Thailand has pushed ASEAN to respond as a bloc — an effort as much about demonstrating regional cohesion as solving an energy equation that has no easy answers.

Internally, the pressures are no less urgent. In Vientiane, a city trying to relaunch a public transit system that failed once already, the margin for error has never felt thinner. And in Myanmar, the junta is using the cover of taxation to roll out a sweeping phone registration system — another step in its quiet construction of a total surveillance state, tightening its grip on its own people even as the region around it burns.

Cambodia 🇰🇭

Cambodia Faces Energy Concerns Amid Middle East War

by Chandara Samban, in Kandal

The Middle East conflict, stemming from escalating tensions between Iran and the Israel-US alliance, has entered its third week since late February. The crisis has created widespread instability across the region, with nearly ten countries reportedly targeted by missile and drone attacks. France, Germany, and the United Kingdom have also become involved, further escalating the situation.

Among the most pressing consequences is a growing global energy crisis. The Strait of Hormuz — a critical oil transportation corridor — has been temporarily closed by Iranian forces since the conflict’s opening phase. Countries dependent on oil imports are now facing severe supply disruptions. In Cambodia, citizens have grown increasingly anxious over rising fuel prices, given the country’s limited reserves and uncertain supply outlook.

Oil prices have surged to approximately US$119 per barrel, the highest level since 2022. Cambodians are already feeling the impact, with regular gasoline climbing to around US$1.30 per liter and diesel reaching US$1.54.

Minister of Mines and Energy Keo Rattanak has echoed public concern, warning that Cambodia’s current oil reserves could only last until April without new imports. The ministries of Mines and Energy and Commerce have pledged to coordinate a response in line with the Prime Minister’s directives. As of March 13, around 2,000 gas stations had temporarily closed due to fuel shortages. Authorities have prohibited stations from withholding stock in anticipation of higher prices.

According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), the Strait of Hormuz accounts for nearly 20% of global oil supply — and roughly 90% of oil destined for Asia. Any disruption to this route carries serious consequences for the broader Asian economy, where Cambodia’s dependence on imported fuel leaves it particularly exposed.

In response, some Cambodians have proposed practical alternatives: greater use of public transportation, a shift toward electric vehicles, or simply walking shorter distances where feasible.

Economist Hong Vannak of the Royal Academy of Cambodia told The ASEAN Frontier that while the situation raises legitimate energy security concerns, it is unlikely to trigger a severe economic crisis. “Oil transported through the Strait of Hormuz accounts for around 20% of global supply, which means alternative supply channels may still be available,” he said, adding that OPEC members and other major players would likely seek solutions, with Russian oil a potential option if U.S. sanctions were eased.

Vannak noted that the government has taken steps to monitor and regulate fuel prices, while some private institutions have introduced temporary measures such as remote work policies. He also recommended expanding the use of solar and electric energy — and, looking further ahead, urged the government to attract investors to establish a domestic oil refinery, which would significantly strengthen Cambodia’s long-term energy security.


Chandara is a freelance journalist with a focus on foreign affairs, security issues, and ASEAN affairs. He also serves as a Junior Counterterrorism Intelligence Analyst.

Thailand 🇹🇭

ASEAN Foreign Ministers Hold Special Meeting to Address Middle East Crisis

by Natamon Aumphin, in Bangkok

On March 13, 2026, ASEAN foreign ministers convened a special online meeting to address the escalating situation in the Middle East. Initiated by Thailand, the meeting was called by Foreign Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow to push for de-escalation and to coordinate a regional response to the resulting energy crisis.

The meeting came just two days after a Thai cargo ship, the Mayuree Naree, was attacked by Iranian forces while passing through the Strait of Hormuz. Twenty crew members were successfully evacuated by Oman, while three remain awaiting rescue. Sihasak invited the Iranian ambassador to explain the incident and commended Oman for its swift response. Nevertheless, he stressed that ASEAN must address the situation collectively.

As a tightly integrated regional supply chain, the bloc has been directly affected by the attack — most acutely through surging oil and energy prices. Some member states have already implemented preliminary measures, such as mandating work-from-home arrangements for government staff to conserve energy. However, ministers acknowledged that longer-term strategies are urgently needed.

While ASEAN lacks the leverage to directly influence the conflict, Sihasak emphasized that a unified call for peace and dialogue remains essential to demonstrating regional resilience. On immediate humanitarian priorities, he praised Singapore for offering seats on evacuation flights to ASEAN nationals stranded in the Middle East.

Discussions also touched on the possibility of oil-sharing arrangements among member states — an unprecedented proposal that Sihasak acknowledged would be difficult to implement, given that only a few ASEAN members produce oil, largely for domestic consumption. Despite the obstacles, he affirmed that the bloc must explore every available option to ease the burden on its members.

The meeting further advanced the ASEAN Power Grid initiative, which aims to connect regional electricity networks as a structural solution for long-term energy resilience. Though still in development, the initiative has gained new urgency in light of the current crisis.

With supply chains under pressure and fuel prices rising across the region, this meeting signals that ASEAN is determined to respond as a bloc — even where its direct influence remains limited.


Natamon has served as a rapporteur at the Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS Thailand). She has also worked as a research assistant on diplomatic issues in Southeast Asia. Her work focuses on how domestic politics shape foreign policy in the region. She holds a degree in international relations and has experience in policy analysis, event reporting, and regional research.

Support Us

Myanmar 🇲🇲

Myanmar Junta's Phone Registration System Raises Surveillance Fears

by Mozart

Myanmar’s military junta has launched a compulsory phone registration system requiring users to register their devices in the Central Equipment Identity Register (CEIR) by submitting their handset’s International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) number. The move has raised serious concerns about the junta’s expanding digital surveillance capabilities.

Announced on March 5, 2026, and coming into force on April 1, the system mandates that every active phone be registered to verify it has “paid tax.” Failure to comply will result in loss of network access and fines for reinstatement. The junta’s Ministry of Information claims the measure aims to prevent stolen, counterfeit, or non-compliant devices from operating on mobile networks, citing Section 389 of the 2008 Constitution: the citizen’s duty to pay taxes as prescribed by law.

However, observers believe the real reason behind the measure goes far beyond taxation.

IT specialists warn that the system’s real purpose is to tighten surveillance over resistance forces and activists. Once a device is entered into the CEIR portal, its IMEI data is automatically collected. Should a handset be flagged for links to resistance activity, authorities can block both the SIM card and the IMEI number, rendering the entire device permanently unusable.

The threat is compounded by Myanmar’s existing SIM card registration system, which already requires users to submit their national identity card number and name. Combined with CEIR, the two systems would give the junta an unprecedented tool to map users’ movements and activity — even with location services disabled — while also identifying the specific device model being used. Analysts warn that arresting a single member of a resistance network could expose the contacts and movements of an entire group.

The comparison with other countries that operate CEIR systems — including the United Kingdom, India, and Pakistan — is telling. Those countries use CEIR primarily to make lost or stolen phones trackable globally. Myanmar’s system, by contrast, is linked to SIM-based identity registration and is not connected to any international CEIR protocol, making its surveillance intent difficult to disguise.

This is not the junta’s first move in this direction. Since the 2021 coup, military authorities have used telecom registration data to track and arrest targeted activists, and have introduced laws restricting VPN usage. In recent months, the junta has also expanded identity cross-checks against criminal records at checkpoints, hotels, and ticketing counters — with significant assistance from China. The new CEIR system, analysts note, would likely be impossible to implement without Chinese technical support, further highlighting the junta’s deepening reliance on Beijing.

With mandatory registration framed as a tax obligation, Myanmar’s junta is quietly assembling the infrastructure of a total surveillance state — one phone registration at a time.


Mozart is a research assistant at Mosaic Myanmar and is currently pursuing a Bachelor of Arts in Liberal Arts and Sciences at Parami University. His academic and professional interests span community development, minority issues, and social impact research. He has held roles including service-learning intern, student mentor, and operations coordinator for local initiatives, supporting project management, monitoring and evaluation, and education programs in Myanmar.

Lao PDR 🇱🇦

Vientiane’s BRT Gets a Second Chance, But Has Anything Really Changed?

by Thongsavanh Souvannasane, in Vientiane

The capital’s troubled Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) system relaunches with free rides and fresh promises. Skeptics are asking whether fixes go deep enough.

Vientiane’s BRT system returned to the streets on 10 March, offering free rides as it begins a two-month trial running until 9 May. For a project that collapsed within weeks of its first launch, the fanfare was notably muted, and the questions notably loud.

The relaunch, confirmed by the Vientiane Capital Public Works and Transport Department, connects Dongdok at the National University of Laos to Talat Sao (Morning Market) across 19 stations. Buses will run daily from 6:00 AM to 10:00 PM, with peak-hour frequency of every six to seven minutes. Normal fares kick in from 10 May.

On paper, it is a reasonable service. In practice, Vientiane has been here before.

The BRT’s first launch in November 2025 unraveled within weeks. Curb-separated bus lanes proved dangerous on the capital’s narrow roads, inexperienced drivers struggled in mixed traffic, and dispatch systems failed during rush hours. Authorities suspended operations in December and ordered a full redesign, a damaging concession for a USD 100 million project backed by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), European Investment Bank, and other international donors.

The most visible fix this time is the replacement of physical curbs with painted lane markings. All non-BRT vehicles are now banned from the corridor between 6:00 AM and 10:00 PM, with fines for violations and full repair liability for anyone damaging BRT infrastructure.

The rules are firmer. But rules were not what broke the first trial.

The operational questions remain stubbornly open. Have drivers received meaningful additional training, or were staffing issues simply left unaddressed? Is the dispatch system that buckled under rush-hour load actually fixed, or patched? Authorities have offered detailed schedules and enforcement provisions while staying largely silent on what specifically went wrong internally and what was done to correct it.

The stakes are too high for vagueness. In January 206, the ADB warned that extended delays risked pulling donor funding entirely.

Officials are projecting confidence, pointing to the planned extension connecting the BRT to the Laos-China Railway station as evidence of the system’s long-term ambitions. But ambition was never the problem. Execution was.

Vientiane’s residents, who welcomed the BRT’s first launch with genuine optimism, are being asked to believe in it again. Free rides will help. But trust, once lost to a bus that couldn’t navigate its own lane, is considerably harder to win back.


Thongsavanh is a journalist from Laos with a background in English-language media. He graduated from the Lao-American Institute with a Diploma of the Arts in English and contributes to independent news platforms. His reporting focuses on environmental issues, socio-economic development, and geopolitics.

Editorial Deadline 14/03/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Karen Ysabelle R. David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk

For the past week, the countries of Southeast Asia have watched the turmoil engulfing the Middle East with bated breath. Beyond the blaring headlines filled with oil price hikes and geopolitical posturing, Southeast Asian migrant workers are caught in the crossfire, thousands of miles away from home.

For the Philippines, a country known for its Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs), many of whom are in the Middle East, the situation is especially poignant: the deteriorating situation saw the death of a Filipina caregiver in Israel on the very first day of the conflict. For Vietnam, the estimated 10,000 Vietnamese workers in the region are a quiet cause for concern for the government, but its focus as of now, as is the case for most countries, is on the energy conundrum currently rippling through the world. Singapore is in the same situation: seemingly bleak prospects with regard to oil and energy, alongside concern for its citizens, as it arranges the speedy repatriation of Singaporeans stuck in a suddenly turbulent region.

As we watch the governments of Southeast Asia engage in diplomatic feats and impose energy-saving measures, it is clear that a distance of a thousand miles means nothing when war breaks out.

The Philippines 🇵🇭

War Abroad and Workers at Risk

by Glenn Vincent N. Boquilon, in Angeles City

Rising tensions in the Middle East have raised concerns regarding the safety of Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs) in the region. According to migration data, there are at least 2 million Filipinos in the Middle East, with a huge number employed in Gulf countries like the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. This makes it one of the regions with the largest concentration of Filipinos outside of the Philippines. As things continue to escalate, the safety of these migrant workers have quickly become an urgent national concern. Recent reports — including the death of a Filipina, Mary Anne Velazquez de Vera, who was caught in the violence in Israel — have renewed calls for stronger protection measures and faster government response.

For the Philippines, OFWs are vital actors in securing economic stability. Annually, their demographic sends billions of US dollars in remittances that support their families back home. This brings in a steady flow of income that sustains their daily needs. However, situations like this put them at great risk. Regions that experience political instability extend the consequences to the people residing in the area. This exposes them to threats concerning their personal safety, employment, mobility, and more. When violence breaks out, any government has a responsibility to safeguard its people regardless of wherever they may be in the world.

One of the key measures that the government can use is repatriation. If violence and insecurity are present in an area, authorities can arrange for Filipino citizens to return home safely. As of writing, the Philippine government has assisted with the return of more than 299 Filipinos, spanning across multiple flights from the region. Additionally, the report says that fewer than 2,000 have registered for repatriation. Many more Filipinos are expected to arrive in the coming days as embassies and consulates monitor developments in the affected region. In this regard, close coordination with local authorities is pivotal in ensuring that Filipino workers receive timely updates and guidance. Some of the agencies heading this call are from the Department of Migrant Workers and the Department of Foreign Affairs.

The situation also affects other Southeast Asian workers in the Middle East. Countries such as Indonesia, Vietnam, and Thailand also send large numbers of workers to the region. For many ASEAN countries, overseas employment is an important source of income for families and national economies. When conflict happens, the risks faced by migrant workers become a shared concern across the region. International organizations such as the International Organization for Migration and the International Labour Organization have long called for stronger protections, clearer communication, and better coordination during emergencies to support migrant workers abroad.

As war and instability continue to escalate in the Middle East, governments across Southeast Asia are reminded of the importance of protecting their citizens abroad. Diplomatic coordination, clear communication, and timely assistance will remain key in ensuring that migrant workers stay safe during periods of uncertainty.


Glenn holds a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from the University of Santo Tomas. His experience spans governance programs, policy development, and political research, having worked with the Ateneo School of Government and WR Numero Research on projects focused on electoral reform, public opinion, and regional development. He also helped coordinate the drafting of the Bangsamoro Local Government Code and supported the Academy of Multiparty Democracy.

Support Us

Vietnam 🇻🇳

Vietnam’s Energy Conundrum and Overseas Workers’ Woes

by Sean Huy Vu

Like the rest of Asia, Vietnam is facing a conundrum with regard to its gasoline and diesel reserves amid the United States and Israel’s war on Iran. Since the conflict began, much of the discussion has revolved around Tehran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz, a critical shipping lane which delivers about 20 million barrels of oil a day from the Middle East to refineries around the world. By doing so, the Iranian government hopes to internationalize the war and provoke the global community into pressuring the United States and Israel to stop their airstrikes.

After the Strait’s closure, Vietnam’s Ministry of Trade and Industry created Plan 1081 on 7 March to ensure a stable supply of essential goods, such as oil and gas, to maintain the government’s target of 10% GDP growth for 2026. The plan’s framework focuses on: (1) ensuring “energy security and supply of petroleum products;” (2) strengthening the supervision and regulation of the supply and demand of essential goods amid the rising costs of logistics and transportation; and (3) strengthening “early warning and flexible response in the supply chain.” Beyond this broad list of aspirations, the Ministry did not give details at the time as to what steps it would implement to achieve these goals. On 10 March, the government promulgated Decree Number 72, which temporarily reduces the import tax on petroleum products and raw materials for petroleum production until 30 April in order to stabilize gas prices. The reduction specifically targets unleaded motor gasoline, fuel oils, and aircraft engine fuels, among other petrochemicals.

Current government measures, however, may not be enough to withstand what could potentially be several months of conflict. Vietnam imports 87% of its oil from the Persian Gulf region, and is estimated to possess only about 20 days worth of emergency reserves. Some of its liquefied natural gas is exported to landlocked Laos, which is even more dependent on petroleum imports. Already, the central government has recommended that businesses work remotely as much as possible, and for citizens to carpool or take public transportation. On the ground, long queues have formed at gas stations in major cities and the price of petroleum has nearly doubled in some areas.

Recently, Prime Minister Pham Minh Trinh also spoke with his Kuwaiti counterpart over the phone to discuss bilateral cooperation amid the Middle East’s current geopolitical tensions. In addition to food and energy security, Prime Minister Pham expressed his concern over the welfare of Vietnamese workers in Kuwait. There are an estimated 10,000 Vietnamese workers in the region, the majority of which are in Saudi Arabia, and the remainder in the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, and others. “In previous conflicts,” writes the Vietnamese state-run Người Lao Động, “there have been instances of workers being abandoned by their employers, receiving delayed wages, or having their identification documents withheld.” One can only hope that this will not be the case for this conflict.


Sean is a scholar of East Asian history, culture, and international relations, with current research at Georgetown University examining working-class labor and human trafficking in the region. His broader interests include the social psychology of religion and identity politics. Sean previously taught modern Korean history at the University of California, Irvine, where he completed his B.A. in History, and later taught English in Ho Chi Minh City while studying Vietnamese language and culture. His writing has been published by UC Irvine, Johns Hopkins University, and Foreign Analysis.

Singapore 🇸🇬

The Impact of the Middle East Conflict on ASEAN Energy Prices

by Nurul Aini, in Singapore

The Strait of Hormuz is one of the most important chokepoints in the world, supplying about 20% of oil and liquified natural gas (LNG) flow globally, with 84–89% of oil supplied to Asia. A disrupted Strait of Hormuz means that countries like Singapore that are 100% reliant on imported crude, and that also serves as a refining and trading hub for ASEAN countries, may see a decrease in oil exports and a spike in fuel prices for transport, aviation, and electricity. Cambodia, heavily reliant on imported fuels from other Southeast Asian countries, can potentially see a higher degree of stress on their systems if exporting countries reduce their petroleum exportations. On 10 March (Tuesday), Singapore’s fuel prices in petrol stations such as Shell and Caltex rose from SGD 3.05 to SGD 3.35 for its 95-octane petrol. Similarly, the 98-octane petrol spiked up to SGD 3.87. Within the same period of time, oil market prices fluctuated from nearly US$120 before dipping to US$90, following United States President Donald Trump’s announcement that the war will end.

Malaysia is also concerned about oil prices, especially with regard to its Budi95 petrol subsidy which provides Malaysians with a RM 1.99 fuel subsidy. Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim has vowed to ensure that the subsidy can continue for Malaysians, while at the same time calling for a ceasefire. He has previously mentioned that the subsidy will be able to hold out for about 1–2 months. Abdelaziz Albogdady, a market research and fintech strategy manager at FXEM, highlighted that the crude imports could negate the gains from higher fuel prices and strain the country’s subsidy system. Meanwhile, the Philippines sources 96% of oil from the Persian Gulf, while Vietnam and Thailand buy roughly 87% to 74% respectively. Governments in Thailand and the Philippines have already ordered their public officials to use less air conditioning and to reduce travel.

Additionally, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates are two of the biggest exporters of LNG globally, with ASEAN having a share of roughly 15–25%. Pang Lu Ming, a senior gas and LNG analyst at Rystad Energy, suggested that economies reliant on energy imports will see energy price inflation. Domestically, in Singapore, household electricity tariffs and gas bills may increase. It depends on ASEAN governments now to advance the ASEAN Power Grid agenda to strengthen energy connectivity across the region.

Although prospects on energy and oil may currently seem bleak, other issues such as travel disruptions have seen a glimmer of hope in operational procedures. The Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) evacuated more than 200 Singaporeans who had requested assistance via the A330 Multi-Role Tanker Transport from Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. A second evacuation procedure is scheduled for 12 March 2026. ASEAN leaders have also been vocal against the war, calling for maximum restraint and to resolve any differences through dialogue and diplomacy.


Aini is currently pursuing a master’s degree in English literature at Nanyang Technological University. She has experience working in youth groups, contributing to the planning and management of outreach activities.

Editorial Deadline 10/03/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Haniva Sekar Deanty, Lead Editor - Maritime Crescent Desk

In Malaysia, Sydney Gan looks at how the collapse of a constitutional amendment aimed at limiting the Prime Minister’s tenure has reignited concerns over parliamentary absenteeism and political coordination within the unity government.

In Indonesia, Rayhan Jasin examines how a negative credit outlook raises questions about fiscal discipline and the sustainability of expansive economic ambitions.

Meanwhile, our guest contributor for this week assesses Brunei’s response to the escalating conflict in the Gulf, illustrating the delicate balancing act smaller states must perform as geopolitical tensions intensify.

This week’s Maritime Crescent may bring different developments in different areas, but they reveal the fine margins on which governance, economic confidence and regional stability often rest. The stakes hinge on small shifts that carry outsized consequences. It is probably worth remembering that sometimes warnings can be subtle.

Malaysia 🇲🇾

Malaysia’s Parlimentarian Attendance Problem

by Sydney Gan, in Kuala Lumpur

The Constitution (Amendment) Bill 2026, which was set to cap the Prime Minister’s tenure at 10 years, failed to pass during its Second Reading by two votes short of the 3/4 majority. 32 MPS were absent on that day, while another 44 failed to vote. On the government’s side, eight parliamentarians were absent during voting on the Bill.

The failure to enact this high-profile amendment is a reputational and politically charged blow to Anwar’s administration. Considering that it is a non-partisan issue that would have effortlessly underscored Anwar’s image-building as a responsible global leader and, at the same time, delivered a strong message against unchecked executive power, this constitutional amendment should have been an easy win on all accounts. However, now met with hugely publicized failure, this once sure-thing now risks jeopardizing Anwar’s on-the-ground sentiment and raises pressing questions about the cohesion of his unity government, as his second-term campaigning is expected to lift off at the latest by 2027.

Significantly, this case study goes to the heart of a larger problem plaguing Malaysian politics - chronic absenteeism in Parliament. In December 2025, the New Straits Times published a scathing analysis of attendance during the year’s Dewan Rakyat sittings, exposing absurdly high absences among senior parliamentarians, including former defence minister Datuk Seri Hishammuddin Hussein, who missed the most sittings with 69 absences. The exposé stirred considerable uproar in the media, and though it had previously been acknowledged by Parliament Speaker Tan Sri Johari Abdul, he firmly stated that no compulsory attendance would be instituted, emphasizing the onus on Members of Parliament (MPs).

Since the Bill has been deferred to the next Parliament sitting, absent Parliamentarians are beginning to come forward with their reasons for non-attendance, ranging from sickness to traffic congestion. Julau MP Larry Sng called out the Government Backbenchers Club (BBC) for its last-minute voting notice, noting that the Bill’s failure was due to a “lack of unified leadership and coordination”. However, an MP’s attendance at Parliament has not been without incentive - each Parliamentarian is entitled to RM400 of Parliamentary session allowance per day, which, for 78-day sittings like in 2025, could amount to RM31,200. Not to mention that attendance is the most basic mandate for an elected local representative - persistent absenteeism silences affected constituents’ voices from the larger fabric of democracy and sends a problematic message about leaders’ weakening public duty. Prof Datuk Dr Sivamurugan Pandian of Universiti Sains Malaysia notes the “quiet crisis” for democracy, linking Parliamentary absenteeism to waning parliamentary legitimacy.

This is not a one-time issue but a public trust matter that transcends government administrations. TRANSPARENCY International Malaysia (TI-M) called for stronger measures, including the publication of daily attendance records and the designation of key votes that require publicly available written reasons for absence. Drawing on other regions, such as Ghana’s automatic seat vacation after 15 absences or Iran’s mandatory public absence announcements, Malaysia must take a bold step towards democratic accountability.


Sydney holds a Bachelor of Laws from King’s College London, where she focused on Human Rights Law, Criminology, and Public & Administrative Law. She is an Analyst at Asia Group Advisors, providing policy analysis and strategic guidance across the tech, sustainability, and gaming sectors in Southeast Asia. Prior to joining AGA, she worked in the social development sector in London, contributing to the Ukraine Judicial Training Programme through research on war crimes adjudication and the development of a legal training curriculum with high court magistrates.

Support Us

Indonesia 🇮🇩

Indonesia’s Downgraded Credit Rating Debacle

by Muhammad Rayhansyah Jasin

Another downgrade, another blow to Indonesia’s credit rating credibility. On May 4, Fitch ratings updated its outlook assessment on Indonesia’s long-term sovereign bond from Stable to Negative despite maintaining the Rupiah-denominated treasuries at BBB. The move came just weeks after Moody’s first downgraded the IDR bond prospect to Negative following the $120 Billion rout on Indonesian Stock Exchange due to transparency issues flagged by index provider MSCI. S&P Global has also warned Indonesian officials that sustained pressure of interest payments going beyond 15% of total government revenue would result in the downgrading of Indonesia’s credit rating.

Both Fitch and Moody’s assessments cited policy uncertainty over President Prabowo Subianto’s aggressive spending spree, in hopes to achieve 8% annual growth, that has caused more than Rp 135 trillion of public budget shortfall between January and February 2026, a whopping 300% increase from the same period last year. The assessments also singled out the ‘free nutritious meal’ program’s impact on the national budget, amounted to 1.3% of GDP for 2025-2029, as a potential drive to the legally-mandated 3% fiscal deficit ceiling. Fitch also forecasted government’s tax revenue to remain dismal at 13.3% of GDP, half of the average BBB countries’ of 25.5%, amidst slow mobilization of alternative resource income, permanent diversion of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) dividend to the sovereign wealth fund of Danantara, and minimum tax compliance by businesses.

The timing of this reporting also came at the worst of times, as global oil price has been surging to $114, up 24% from $70 on February 27, following the start of the Iranian conflict. Recent analysis made by the economic think tank INDEF suggested that oil price beyond $100 could widen Indonesia’s budget deficit to more than 4% of GDP although Finance Minister Purbaya Yudhi Sadewa has stated willingness to consider cuts to the free meal program if sky-high price persisted throughout 2026.

If no improvements are made within the next 12-24 months following this Negative outlook update, Indonesia’s credit rating may risk being downgraded to BB+, stripping the country of its investment grade label, and potentially pushing the already weakened IDR value beyond 17,000 per USD. Although Bank Indonesia still maintains reserves equivalent to $154.6 billion (January 2026), persistent shock to oil price, shipping cost, and logistics could still worsen Indonesia’s ability to absorb impact to its vulnerable middle class. Recent reporting by Kompas shows the rise of job hopping and job hugging phenomenon has pushed more than 3.5 million college graduates to take informal jobs in 2024.

Now the ball is in Prabowo’s and his cabinet’s court — whether they choose to act swiftly and push through economic reforms, or remain mired in denial by citing the “strong fundamentals of Indonesia’s economy,” their decision will shape the development trajectory of more than 290 million people.


Rayhan is pursuing an Erasmus Mundus Joint Master’s Degree in Public Policy at Central European University and the Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals. He holds a Bachelor of Social Sciences in International Relations and Political Economy from Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University. His current research focuses on the socio-economic impacts of Indonesia’s nickel mining industry on local communities and national development.

Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳

Brunei’s Response Amidst The Geopolitical Unrest

by Catherine

On 28 February 2026, Iran was met with attacks from the State of Israel and the USA following the unsuccessful nuclear negotiations. As a response, Iran aimed missiles on US bases in the Gulf region. Attacks and retaliation from both parties have escalated and affected all nations bordering the Persian Gulf, which have led to thousands of casualties in the region.

As the unrest continues to persist, Brunei is observing it closely and taking precautionary measures. On 1 March 2026, Brunei condemned aggressions against the Islamic Republic of Iran. Brunei positioned itself as an active diplomatic interlocutor during the bilateral meeting between Brunei’s Second Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dato Erywan Yusof and Russian Foreign Minister, Sergey Lavrov as both ministers reaffirmed their adherence to international law and the UN Charter. Lavrov declared that it is “imperative to categorically and resolutely call for an immediate cessation of hostilities from all sides” while Dato Errywan Yusof expressed his distress that this war had occurred during the sacred observances of Ramadan, Lent and the Jewish festival of Purim.

As of 7 March, there has yet to be an official statement published by the Bruneian government against Iran’s retaliations. Although a report from QNA published on 5 March stated that Dato Erywan Yusof made a private call to Sultan Al Muraikhi, Qatar’s Minister of State for Foreign Affairs stating Brunei’s denunciation of Iranian attacks on sovereign territories. He subsequently also held calls with Prince Faisal bin Farhan and Dr Mohammad Mustafa, Foreign Ministers of Saudi Arabia and Palestine respectively.

Swift and calculated decisions have been made by the government. Through press releases issued on 3rd March, Brunei reaffirms that no citizen has registered their presence in Iran. However, there is no exact data on how many Bruneians that reside in the region. They also mentioned the closure of the Embassy of Brunei in Iran until further notice as members of the embassy have been safely evacuated from Tehran. The Brunei diplomatic mission to Iran will continue operations at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Brunei.

Additionally, the government advises citizens to postpone travels to the Middle East and strongly discourages anyone to visit the region until stability is reached. To ensure further safety and well-being, they also urge Bruneians in affected nations to register with Brunei Missions Abroad if they have not yet done so. Furthermore, the Royal Brunei Airlines have made appropriate flight cancellations for destinations headed off and to London, Dubai and Jeddah within the affected period. Flights into and out of London that usually transit in Dubai are now made direct.

Brunei’s stance also reflects a wider regional concern, whereby Malaysia, Indonesia and other member countries feel the escalated economic and social costs as a result of this on-going conflict. Members of ASEAN have issued a joint Foreign Ministers’ statement urging for an immediate ceasefire and for all sides to resolve the issue through diplomacy.


Catherine is an external contributor at TAF.

Editorial Deadline 07/03/2025 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk

Energy shocks rarely stay confined to the places where they begin. As conflict around Iran disrupts shipping through the Strait of Hormuz—a corridor that normally carries about one-fifth of global oil supplies—the consequences are already rippling far beyond the Middle East, leaking into Southeast Asia.

In Myanmar, the crisis is unfolding in a fragile political landscape. The junta’s odd–even driving restrictions aim to ration scarce fuel supplies, but they also highlight the growing tension between emergency economic management and mounting public frustration. In Laos, the challenge is more structural. With limited fiscal space and heavy debt burdens, spikes in global fuel prices translate quickly into higher domestic costs and renewed pressure on an already fragile economic recovery. For Thailand, rising prices are testing the resilience of a system heavily dependent on imported energy. Policymakers are increasingly forced to lean on strategic reserves and short-term interventions to cushion the shock.

Meanwhile, Cambodia is confronting a different kind of regional spillover. Its expanding crackdown on scam compounds and drug networks is reshaping the country’s security landscape while testing how far cross-border cooperation can keep pace as criminal networks shift across the Mekong.

Myanmar 🇲🇲

Global Oil Shock Hits Fragile Myanmar

by Myat Moe Kywe

Myanmar’s military authorities have introduced a nationwide odd–even driving restriction in response to a worsening fuel crisis triggered by disruptions in global oil supply following coordinated United States–Israel strikes on Iran.

After the attacks, Iran announced the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints, through which roughly 20% of global oil supply passes. The disruption sent oil prices surging and strained supply chains across many import-dependent economies, including Myanmar.

Myanmar imports roughly 90% of its fuel, according to 2024 estimates, making the country particularly vulnerable to global energy shocks. Years of political instability and economic disruption following the 2021 military coup have already weakened the country’s energy system.

In response, the military government announced that private vehicles will only be allowed to operate on specific days depending on their license plate numbers. The rule, which took effect on March 7, allows vehicles with even-numbered plates to drive on even-numbered dates, while vehicles with odd-numbered plates may operate on odd-numbered days.

The Ministry of Information stated that the measure is intended to conserve fuel and stabilize the domestic market. Officials noted that similar rationing systems have been used in other countries during periods of severe energy shortages.

Authorities warned that violators could face legal action, although official penalties have not yet been confirmed. Reports circulating among the public suggest fines of approximately 20,000 kyats and up to one month in detention.

Despite the government’s justification, the policy has been widely mocked by the public, reflecting broader frustration with the military’s economic management since the coup.

The announcement has also fueled speculation about a potential surge in electric vehicle purchases. Electric cars and motorcycles are exempt from the restrictions and can be used daily. Reports from Mandalay suggest EV dealerships have seen a spike in demand.

Critics argue that the exemption may benefit businesses linked to the family of junta leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. His son, Aung Pyae Sone, reportedly has stakes in companies importing Chinese BYD electric vehicles, while his daughter, Khin Thiri Thet Mon, is linked to firms importing MG electric cars and operating charging stations.

However, the high cost of EVs, limited charging infrastructure, and frequent electricity shortages mean the transition remains out of reach for most citizens.

As the global energy shock ripples through Myanmar’s already fragile economy, the burden is likely to fall unevenly—hitting ordinary households hardest while creating new opportunities for well-connected elites.


Myat is a senior undergraduate student majoring in Politics, Philosophy, and Economics. She has interned at The Asia Foundation in Washington, D.C., and she has also worked as a summer research assistant at the Centre for Policy and Innovation (CRPI), gaining experience in research and analysis. Her work focuses on civic engagement, gender, youth leadership, and community development.

Lao PDR 🇱🇦

Laos Can’t Catch a Break

by Thipphavanh Virakhom, in Vientiane

Laos was already in a tough spot financially. Then a war thousands of kilometers away made things worse.

On March 6, fuel prices in Laos surged, with diesel jumping by LAK 7,380 per litre—one of the sharpest single-day increases the country has ever recorded. For context, typical price changes range between LAK 80 and 300 per litre. This spike was roughly 25 times larger.

The trigger was escalating conflict in the Middle East. After strikes killed Iran’s Supreme Leader, retaliatory attacks followed and global oil markets reacted with panic. The Strait of Hormuz—a narrow chokepoint carrying roughly one-fifth of the world’s daily oil supply—came under threat. When that route appears unstable, prices spike worldwide. In Laos, the impact arrives almost immediately.

Why so fast? Because Laos imports 97% of its fuel from Thailand, amounting to USD 1.22 billion last year alone. There is almost no buffer between global oil prices and what consumers pay at the pump in Vientiane. As a result, the government has very limited capacity to shield households from sudden price shocks.

This exposes a deeper structural problem. Laos is already burdened by heavy debt. The IMF has repeatedly warned that the country’s debt levels are unsustainable, and a comprehensive restructuring remains underway.

The government now faces a familiar dilemma: subsidize fuel prices to protect households and sink further into debt, or allow prices to rise and risk inflation eroding already strained family budgets. As one economist summarized it bluntly: “Which negative do you want?”

The Middle East conflict thus may be “very impactful on the global economy,” but for a small, landlocked, heavily indebted country, “impactful” hits differently. Larger economies can borrow, subsidize, or absorb the impact. Laos cannot.

The timing is particularly unfortunate. The country just came out of a major Party Congress in January, is preparing to graduate from Least Developed Country status in November, and remains in the middle of a debt restructuring process. Each milestone requires political focus and financial stability.

An external shock like this threatens all three at once.

Laos did not cause this crisis. But it may be among the countries that feel its consequences the most.


Thipphavanh holds a bachelor’s degree in international affairs. She is a governance and development professional specialising in rule of law, access to justice, and gender equality in Lao PDR. Her work focuses on strengthening justice sector institutions, advancing people-centred governance, and promoting gender-responsive systems. With extensive experience in project coordination, monitoring and evaluation, stakeholder engagement, and strategic communications, she has collaborated closely with national institutions and international partners to support inclusive and sustainable development.

Support Us

Thailand 🇹🇭

Why Thailand Faces Rising Risks from Oil Price Surge Amid US–Iran Tensions

by Satid Sootipunya, in Bangkok

The escalating tensions between the United States and Iran have pushed global oil prices sharply higher, reaching, as of March 8, USD 90–93 per barrel according to WTI and Brent respectively. The primary driver of the surge is the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, a maritime chokepoint through which more than 20% of the world’s crude oil supply passes.

According to a report by Bank of America Global Research, Thailand is the most vulnerable country among its Asian peers due to its heavy reliance on imported oil, which accounts for nearly 6% of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP). More than 58% of Thailand’s oil imports come from the Middle East, particularly the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Kuwait.

A separate report by Nomura also identifies Thailand as one of the biggest losers from the current oil-price shock due to its high level of import dependence. The analysis estimates that every 10% increase in oil prices could widen Thailand’s current account deficit by roughly 0.5% of GDP.

However, Deputy Prime Minister and Transport Minister Phiphat Ratchakitprakarn has sought to reassure the public, stating that Thailand currently holds strategic reserves sufficient for more than 90 days—even in a scenario where oil imports from the Middle East are completely disrupted.

To mitigate potential shortages, Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Ekniti Nitithanpraphas has introduced three urgent measures. These include temporarily restricting exports to certain countries, with exceptions for Laos and Myanmar; increasing the oil reserve requirement for retailers from 1–1.5% to 3% starting in April; and requiring gas stations not to hoard supplies while limiting the volume of fuel individuals can purchase.


Satid is a multimedia economic journalist and news anchor who covers macroeconomic trends, Thailand’s fiscal policy, and key regional developments for Bangkok Biz. A Journalism graduate from Thammasat University, he has reported on major issues such as the US–China trade tensions, the Myanmar crisis, and global corporate stories, drawing on prior newsroom experience at The Momentum, the Bangkok Post, AFP, and Varasarn Press. His work blends economic analysis, foreign affairs, and digital storytelling, with a strong focus on making complex financial and political topics accessible to Thai audiences.

Cambodia 🇰🇭

Cambodia’s Scam Crackdown Tests The Region’s Collective Resilience

by Sokna Thea, in Phnom Penh

Cambodia has launched an intensive crackdown on transnational cybercrime and narcotics networks, shutting down more than 200 sites and prompting the departure of roughly 240,000 foreign nationals. While authorities aim to eliminate these syndicates by April 2026 to restore investor confidence, international observers warn that rapid closures may leave thousands of trafficked victims without support.

According to Cambodia’s Ministry of Interior, the campaign against technology-enabled fraud has significantly altered the country’s demographic and security landscape. Interior Minister Sar Sokha confirmed that more than 210,000 foreign nationals left the country voluntarily during the operation, which intensified in early 2026. An additional 30,000 individuals were arrested and deported.

The scale of the crackdown is considerable. As of late February 2026, authorities had closed 113 licensed casinos and 136 suspected illegal facilities believed to be used as bases for online scam operations. The effort comes after years of international scrutiny over the rise of autonomous scam compounds in Sihanoukville and border regions.

Parallel efforts have targeted drug trafficking. The National Authority for Combating Drugs (NACD) reported that security forces handled 10,743 drug-related cases in 2025, leading to 27,884 arrests.

Although the quantity of finished narcotics seized declined, authorities confiscated a record 42.8 tonnes of chemical precursors. Experts believe this reflects a shift toward domestic drug manufacturing within the Golden Triangle supply chain, prompting Cambodian authorities to focus more heavily on intercepting raw materials before they reach industrial-scale laboratories.

Human rights organizations, however, have identified gaps in the current strategy. Rapid closures often fail to distinguish between perpetrators and victims of trafficking who were coerced into participating in scam operations.

Observers also warn that the departure of 240,000 foreigners could produce economic side effects. Former scam hubs may face declining real estate demand and reduced commercial activity as local businesses lose a large—if illicit—consumer base.

As Cambodia aggressively dismantles these networks, there is significant concern regarding the “balloon effect,” where criminal syndicates may relocate to less-monitored countries in the region. Cambodia’s success or failure serves as a critical bellwether for regional security cooperation and the collective effort to protect ASEAN citizens from the growing epidemic of cross-border human trafficking and cyber-slavery.

Authorities argue the measures are necessary to restore national sovereignty and rebuild investor confidence. The April 2026 deadline will serve as a key benchmark for whether Cambodia can transition from a hub of transnational crime to a more secure destination for legitimate foreign investment.


Sokna has a background in International Affairs and Business & Commercial Law. He’s currently a Senior Project Coordinator at the Ministry of Economy and Finance of Cambodia, working on the Financial Management Information System (FMIS) Project. His professional focus is driven by entrepreneurship, business development, and financial technology, with a particular interest in how private-sector innovation drives Cambodia’s economic growth.

Editorial Deadline 07/03/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Karen Ysabelle R. David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk

Barely three months in, 2026 is already proving to be a year for the history books. But Philippine Vice President Sara Duterte has already set her sights further beyond, as she announced her intent to run for the next Philippine presidential elections in 2028. Faced with multiple impeachment complaints and a father under trial in The Hague, Duterte has calculated that an early declaration could help solve the complicated political equation confronting her and perhaps propel her to the highest post in the land.

In Singapore, a different sort of complication, as a report alleged the involvement of two Singapore passport holders in the conflict in Gaza. Given the city-state’s strict commitment to neutrality abroad and harmony at home, its Ministry of Home Affairs has consistently reiterated its stance that Singaporean citizens are forbidden from fighting in foreign wars.

And in Vietnam, its booming e-commerce industry brings with it a whole host of complications. Will the Vietnamese government be able to rise to the occasion and meet the moment, perhaps with ASEAN as its guide, or will it stumble in the global race for digitalization?

The Philippines 🇵🇭

Sara Duterte’s 2028 Bid and the Politics of Pressure

by Eduardo G. Fajermo Jr., in Angeles City

Vice President Sara Duterte’s announcement that she intends to run for president in 2028 arrived unusually early, but not in a vacuum. It comes as she faces multiple impeachment complaints in the House of Representatives and as the Duterte camp navigates renewed political and legal pressures linked to the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the broader unraveling of the Marcos–Duterte alliance.

Civil society critics see the timing as a narrative move. Prof. David Michael San Juan, convener of the Taumbayan Ayaw sa Magnanakaw at Abusado Network Alliance (The People’s Network Opposing Thieves and Abusive Officials), said Duterte’s early declaration is meant to “set the narrative” and portray herself as the victim, especially as scrutiny continues over her Office’s use of confidential funds and the impeachment complaints filed against her. Duterte herself has leaned into this framing in public remarks, casting political developments as targeted attacks rather than routine oversight.

Political analysts, however, suggest the declaration is less about elections than about coalition survival. Cleve Arguelles, president of Manila-based polling firm WR Numero, told This Week in Asia that the timing appears designed to steady Duterte’s faction and sharpen political lines amid setbacks. “The timing is more about reassuring her allies and stabilizing her faction given the political challenges facing them,” Arguelles said. He pointed to a convergence of pressures — ICC-related uncertainty affecting key Duterte allies, impeachment threats against Duterte, and broader coalition instability — that could incentivize defections if the bloc appears directionless.

Declaring early changes that equation. Arguelles argued that projecting a presidential run tells loyalists to hold the line and signals to fence-sitters that Duterte remains a credible center of gravity. It also sends a message to lawmakers weighing their positions in an impeachment context: Duterte’s return to power is no longer hypothetical, but a live political possibility. Arguelles said making her candidacy explicit signals that “the threat of her return to power” is more “imminent and credible,” which could shape congressional calculations even if the formal process is supposed to be insulated from electoral politics.

Not everyone agrees that her declaration should matter inside Congress. Rep. Terry Ridon has insisted Duterte’s 2028 plans are “irrelevant” to the House’s handling of the impeachment complaints, a reminder that impeachment is meant to proceed on constitutional grounds rather than political forecasting. Yet the tension between what impeachment is in principle and how it functions in practice is precisely what Duterte’s early announcement exposes. In systems driven by coalition discipline, accountability often competes with survival.

Her declaration may also reshape the broader field. Arguelles noted a “growing incentive” for pro-Marcos and opposition forces to cooperate, even if full unity remains difficult given deep historical and ideological divisions. An “anyone-but-Sara” alignment is conceivable, he said, but even limited coordination could complicate Duterte’s path to victory. In other words, Duterte’s move is not only about her own storyline. It forces other blocs to decide whether to compete separately, coordinate selectively, or consolidate earlier than they had planned.

For observers across ASEAN, this illustrates how accountability politics increasingly operates on two tracks at once: constitutional procedure and narrative power. Duterte’s announcement does not determine whether impeachment succeeds, but it does reframe the incentives around it. The deeper question is whether institutions meant to check power can still move cleanly when political actors preempt scrutiny by turning it into campaign fuel years in advance.


Eduardo is a faculty member at Holy Angel University, where he teaches courses on Philippine history and contemporary global issues. He is currently pursuing a Master’s degree in Political Science at the University of Santo Tomas, with a research focus on disaster governance, environmental politics, and the urban poor in the Philippines.

Support Us

Singapore 🇸🇬

Singapore Draws a Firm Line on Citizens Fighting Overseas

by Ryan

In a statement issued on 19 February 2026, Singapore’s Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) said that it is aware of an overseas report alleging that two Singapore passport holders fought as part of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) during the Gaza conflict, but has “no substantiated information” to verify the claims. The ministry was responding to The Straits Times after the allegations surfaced in a British investigative report citing Israeli military data obtained through an Israeli freedom of information request.

The Straits Times report noted that the underlying dataset describes IDF personnel who held Israeli citizenship alongside at least one other nationality as of March 2025. The foreign report suggested two Singapore passport holders appeared in the data, but did not provide details on their roles or length of service. This gap matters because the existence of a name in a nationality dataset does not, on its own, establish what an individual did, where they were deployed, or whether they were involved in combat operations. The citizenship dimension adds another reason the government has avoided speculation. Singapore does not allow dual citizenship for adults. In practice, this makes questions about foreign military service inseparable from questions about nationality status, which authorities typically address only after verification.

While the claims remain unverified, Singapore’s response fits a broader pattern: maintain a neutral diplomatic posture on the conflict itself, while enforcing strict domestic red lines against citizens taking up arms in overseas wars. On 23 February 2026, Coordinating Minister for National Security K Shanmugam stressed that Singapore “extends humanitarian help abroad where possible,” but does not allow citizens to participate in violence overseas “for any side,” including conflicts linked to Gaza. He framed this as essential to protecting racial and religious harmony at home, and to preventing external conflicts from being imported into Singapore’s social fabric.

Singapore has also publicly anchored this position in multilateral diplomacy. At the United Nations General Assembly emergency session in October 2023, Singapore stated its support for the Palestinian people’s right to a homeland and Israel’s right to live within secure borders, calling on leaders on both sides to exercise restraint and pursue the difficult steps required for a two-state outcome. This framing is deliberately even-handed: it recognizes core claims on both sides, avoids endorsing military objectives, and prioritizes international law and long-term political resolution.

The question is not unique to Singapore. CNA reported that the same IDF-linked data indicated nearly 200 Southeast Asians were enlisted in Israel’s military as of March 2025, including 111 Filipinos, 71 Thais, four Vietnamese, two Singaporeans, and one Indonesian. Across Southeast Asia, legal treatment varies: some jurisdictions allow dual citizenship or do not criminalize foreign military service in general circumstances, while others restrict dual nationality and may require government permission for service in foreign armed forces.

Against this backdrop, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has announced multiple tranches of humanitarian support for civilians in Gaza and reiterated calls for unimpeded aid delivery, alongside support for a negotiated two-state solution. To maintain its neutrality, Singapore has consistently framed its response to the Israel–Hamas war around humanitarian assistance and diplomacy, rather than participation in combat.


Ryan is a final-year finance student at the Singapore University of Social Sciences (SUSS) with experience across venture capital, venture debt, and business development. He also holds a diploma in Law and Management from Temasek Polytechnic. His interests lie in how emerging technologies and economic trends shape business ecosystems and regional development in Asia.

Vietnam 🇻🇳

A New Chapter for E-Commerce

by Hang Nguyen, in Ho Chi Minh City

Due to the global race for digitalization, along with a surge in demand caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, e-commerce industries in Vietnam have experienced expansive growth within the last half decade. Shopee, TikTok Shop, Lazada, and Tiki dominate the country’s e-commercial landscape, with nearly 60% of the population — of various ages, genders, and geographical demographics — accessing these platforms to purchase goods. Vietnam’s e-commerce sector has recorded substantial growth and demonstrated robust performance: market value reached US$25 billion (20% growth) in 2024, ranking third in Southeast Asia, while entering the list of Top 5 economies leading in e-commerce growth in 2022.

The Vietnam E-commerce and Digital Economy Agency (VEDEA), under the Ministry of Industry and Trade (MoIT), recognizes the instrumental role of this industry in national and economic development, but simultaneously acknowledges that the accelerating pace of growth has presented opportunities as well as revealed many complications. E-commercial regulations have been anchored by only two government decrees: Decree No. 52/2013/ND-CP dated 16 May 2013, and the subsequently supplementing Decree No. 85/2021/ND-CP dated 25 September 2021. These documents lacked sufficient legal capacity, whereas Vietnam e-commerce markets were in need of control to ensure stable maturity. On 10 December 2025, the National Assembly voted to pass the Law on E-commerce, consisting of seven chapters and 41 articles to become effective on 1 July 2026.

The law acts as a “shield” in Vietnam’s transition from “rapid growth” toward “quality growth”, circumventing evident issues in Vietnam’s digital environment. Mr. Hoang Quang Phong, Vice Chairman of the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VCCI), highlighted the concerns regarding smuggling, trade fraud, and the online sale of counterfeit, fake and low-quality products. Dishonest e-commercial activities destroy customer trust, harm legitimate businesses, and expose consumers to health risks and meticulous digital scams. In 2025, VEDEA reported banning the operation of 13,700 violating shops on e-commerce platforms for counterfeit, banned, or untraceable products.

The Law on E-commerce introduces transparency into the legal framework, by unprecedentedly classifying four types of platforms with corresponding legal responsibilities: direct business e-commerce platforms; intermediary e-commerce platforms; social networks operating in e-commerce; and joint e-commerce platforms. The law imposes the obligation for e-commerce platforms to disclose ownership, data protection policies, the rights and obligations of parties, and algorithm criteria for product display; all sellers’ identity must be electronically verified. New provisions have also been established to fill the legal gaps existing with livestream sales and affiliate marketing, an emerging and rising domain, such as the prohibition of misleading product information by live streamers. The safety nets enacted by the law promises Vietnam’s economic track towards green, circular, and sustainable development.

However, considerations towards online vendors’ rights should also be discussed. The frequent additions of fees and regulations with shorter implementation deadlines strain sellers’ capacity and spike the competitive market. Mindful market growth must warrant the survivability of e-commercial businesses rather than favoritism towards consumers. Southeast Asia and ASEAN can provide valuable models, markets, and resources for Hanoi to enhance its national model for e-commerce, including the ASEAN Agreement on Electronic Commerce (2019), the ASEAN Digital Integration Framework (DIF), and the ASEAN Coordinating Committee on Electronic Commerce (ACCEC), among others.


Hang is a young researcher with academic experience in Vietnam and the United States. She has previously worked in public relations at the U.S. Consulate General in Ho Chi Minh City and the YSEALI Academy. Her research focuses on ASEAN centrality in the evolving Asia-Pacific landscape, with particular attention to Vietnam’s approach to trade, regional cooperation, and political economy in the face of external power dynamics and global volatility.

Editorial Deadline 03/03/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Haniva Sekar Deanty, Lead Editor - Maritime Crescent Desk

This week, Muhammad Aiman examines Malaysia’s response to the killing of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and the broader US-Israel-Iran escalation. Situating Malaysia within the country’s hedging strategy, our correspondent argues that Malaysia’s diplomacy reflects the continuity of balancing moral positioning and pragmatic restraint.

Wira Gregory then takes us to Borneo’s diplomacy of energy interdependence within the Sarawak-Brunei electricity export. The consolidation of a Borneo-centric energy corridor reflects ASEAN’s resilience, infrastructure security and economic diversification.

This week, we also look at Indonesia’s increasing state control over productive assets. Through cases spanning palm oil, mining even down to minimarket licensing, Rayhan Prabu argues that these measures form a coherent governing ideology rather than an isolated intervention. If ASEAN’s largest economy is raising investor alarm, what does that signal for the region’s vision of “common growth”?

Malaysia 🇲🇾

A Call for Restraint and Peace

by Muhammad Aiman Bin Roszaimi, in Cyberjaya

Malaysia has taken a firm and principled stance in response to the recent escalation of conflict in the Middle East, particularly following the United States and Israel’s military strikes on Iran that resulted in the reported death of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The situation has quickly heightened regional tensions and sparked global concern, prompting Malaysia’s government to issue strong condemnations and call urgently for an immediate ceasefire and diplomatic engagement.

Prime Minister Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim has been at the forefront of Malaysia’s response. In an unequivocal statement, he “unreservedly” condemned the killing of Supreme Leader Khamenei, warning that such a deliberate targeting of a head of state sets a dangerous precedent and undermines the norms of international order. Anwar cautioned that this act could push the Middle East into a period of sustained instability with unpredictable consequences for global peace.

Extending his condolences to the Iranian government and people, the Prime Minister also urged Iran to exercise restraint and called on all parties involved including the United States, Israel, and Iran itself to step back from further escalation. He highlighted that the crisis cannot be resolved through force but rather requires dialogue and diplomacy.

Malaysia’s strong condemnation of recent developments in the Middle East reflects not only an immediate diplomatic reaction, but also a patterned foreign policy behaviour consistent with its long-standing strategic posture. At the official level, Malaysia’s actions fall into several identifiable categories.

First, there is normative diplomatic condemnation. Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim publicly denounced the killing and urged de-escalation, framing Malaysia’s position within the principles of sovereignty, non-intervention and humanitarian protection. Such statements reaffirm Malaysia’s consistent support for peaceful conflict resolution and multilateral diplomacy.

Second, Malaysia’s response constitutes symbolic diplomatic positioning. By condemning the act while simultaneously calling for restraint rather than explicitly aligning with any military bloc, Malaysia avoids direct entanglement in the strategic rivalry shaping the Middle East. This allows the country to signal solidarity with affected Muslim-majority states without committing to confrontational policies that could damage broader diplomatic or economic interests.

Third, Malaysia’s reaction can be categorised as multilateral advocacy. The emphasis on ceasefire and international law indicates a preference for resolution through institutions such as the United Nations. This reflects Malaysia’s historical reliance on international institutions to amplify the voice of middle powers and smaller states in global crises.

Malaysia’s response is neither passive nor confrontational.

It represents calibrated diplomacy, condemning what it perceives as violations of international norms while avoiding strategic overcommitment. Malaysia’s condemnation of the latest Middle Eastern escalation should not be read merely as an emotional or ideological reaction. Rather, it reflects a consistent hedging strategy designed to preserve autonomy, maintain diversified relationships and project moral legitimacy in international affairs while minimising strategic risk.


Aiman is a PhD candidate in Security and Strategic Analysis at the National University of Malaysia. His research focuses on Malaysia’s space policy, ASEAN regional security, and the strategic implications of emerging technologies. His work explores how Malaysia’s defense policy and strategic culture shape its approach to outer space.

Support Us

Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳

Powering Borneo

by Wira Gregory Ejau, in Bandar Seri Begawan

Sarawak’s plan to export electricity to Brunei by early next year represents the emergence of subnational diplomacy in ASEAN, where resource-rich states like Sarawak are shaping regional energy and security trajectories. Brunei’s engagement with Sarawak’s grid reflects a recalibration of intra-Borneo relations with implications for ASEAN’s collective resilience.

Sarawak has already begun exporting electricity to Sabah and Kalimantan. Extending this network to Brunei embeds the Sultanate within the Borneo-centric energy corridor, of which it is very much a part of. For Brunei, whose economy remains heavily reliant on hydrocarbons, electricity imports diversify its energy mix and reduce exposure to volatility in global oil and gas markets. For Sarawak, the exports consolidate its ambition to become ASEAN’s energy supplier, positioning the state as a pivotal actor in regional energy diplomacy.

Energy flows create dependencies that influence national security calculations. Hence, the strategic bilateral link of Brunei’s reliance on Sarawak’s grid will require new assessments of infrastructure protection and contingency planning along the lines of cross-border coordination. In Southeast Asia, where critical infrastructure is increasingly viewed through a security lens, the Brunei–Sarawak connection exemplifies how energy diplomacy intersects with defence considerations as the reliability of Sarawak’s exports may potentially become part of Brunei’s broader risk calculus.

The planned expansion of Sarawak’s exports to the Philippines and Singapore situates Brunei–Sarawak cooperation within a wider ASEAN framework. Brunei’s participation in this network elevates its role from a small hydrocarbon exporter to a connector state in regional energy transition. This shift matters for ASEAN’s security community, whereby interdependence in energy can reinforce stability by embedding states in shared infrastructure. However, this also raises questions about vulnerability to disruption.

Brunei’s engagement with hydrogen projects could catalyze domestic debates about technological innovation and economic diversification. As it stands, energy cooperation has the potential to shape future expectations of modernisation and employment. Brunei’s youth, in particular, may view participation in hydrogen and renewable projects as a pathway to future-oriented industries.

The Brunei–Sarawak electricity link is best read as a functional step in deepening intra-Borneo cooperation. It ties Brunei into Sarawak’s expanding energy corridor and introduces new considerations for infrastructure reliability and cross-border coordination. The significance lies less in sweeping geopolitical claims than in the operational adjustments that both sides will need to make–from regulatory harmonization to contingency planning.


Gregory is an MSc candidate in Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He works as a freelance writer specializing in international history, conflict, and counterterrorism, with experience in academia, investigative journalism, and voluntary uniformed service. He currently provides research assistance with the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) under their Southeast Asian Security and Defence Internship Programme and conducts investigations on regional security and transnational crime for a confidential company.

Indonesia 🇮🇩

Common Growth, Captured Growth

by Rayhan Prabu Kusumo, in Jakarta

Indonesia’s Minister of Villages wants to stop issuing new licenses for chain minimarkets. Existing stores can stay, but no new ones. In their place, the government is building Red and White Village Cooperatives, which are state-backed village cooperatives whose profits flow partly into government coffers. The minimarket chains are just the newest entry on a growing list of private enterprises the state has decided to crowd out.

Over the past year, the Prabowo administration has assembled a governing philosophy built on the premise that private enterprise is inherently extractive and that the state, by stepping in, serves the public interest. The Forest Area Enforcement Taskforce seized over four million hectares of plantations and transferred them to Agrinas Palma, a previously obscure state-owned enterprise which is now the world’s largest palm oil company by area.

The Martabe gold mine had its license revoked before being walked back to ‘under investigation’ after international investors raised alarms. Perminas, a newly created state-owned enterprise designed to do for mining what Agrinas did for palm oil, is still waiting at the other end of that investigation. In Morowali, the IMIP airport controversy gave the defense establishment a platform to assert dominance over a private industrial enclave. Together they describe a pattern.

This is not ad hoc policymaking. The pattern shows that it is a coherent, if unspoken, ideology taking shape across sectors. The ideology that private capital is inherently suspect, that the state is the rightful custodian of productive assets, and that concentrating economic control under politically managed entities constitutes justice.

This assumption deserves scrutiny. Each replacement institution shares the same structural feature: political dependence. None operates with independent governance, separate funding streams, or accountability to the people they claim to serve. “Reform” is doing heavy lifting to describe what is functionally a transfer of economic power from private actors to entities that political elites can staff and exploit.

The cost runs deeper than the headline numbers, though those are damning enough on their own. MSCI’s warning that Indonesia could be downgraded from emerging to frontier market status wiped $80 billion off the Jakarta Composite in two days. Moody’s followed by revising the sovereign outlook to negative, citing weakening policy predictability.

The less visible damage matters more. When profitable private sectors are treated as territory to reclaim, the signal to capital is unambiguous: contracts are conditional, and success invites displacement. The state is methodically destroying the incentive to build anything it might later want to take. No cooperative or state-owned enterprises has ever replicated what that incentive produces, because efficiency under competitive pressure, capital deployment disciplined by the risk of loss, and growth that compounds without a committee directing it are things only the market generates on its own.

Indonesia accounts for roughly 40 percent of ASEAN’s GDP. If this is what ‘common growth’ looks like, its largest economy is not growing the pie but shrinking it, and handing the knife to the people who decided it needed cutting.


Rayhan has a background in government affairs and public policy, with experience across government institutions and advisory firms. His work focuses on the intersection of geopolitics, policy, and risk, with expertise in advocacy, regulatory analysis, and stakeholder engagement. He holds a degree in Government from Universitas Padjadjaran, and has completed an exchange at Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Spain, focusing on global politics and sustainability.

Editorial Deadline 28/02/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk

Political change is rarely defined by events alone: timing often determines their impact. In this week’s issue of the Mekong Belt, we examine a region where politics is unfolding not only under pressure, but also against the clock. In Thailand, a 150-day tariff window imposed by Washington has turned trade policy into a race against time: the caretaker government, constitutionally unable to sign binding agreements, must now secure a full mandate to act before the clock runs out. In Myanmar, timing is just as critical. Following widely criticized elections and plans to convene a new parliament, regional diplomacy is quietly shifting. As Thailand’s new government is positioning itself as a bridge, the question is not only whether Myanmar re-enters ASEAN processes, but when — and on whose terms. Cambodia, too, is navigating its own diplomatic timing: as Phnom Penh balances ties between Ukraine and Russia while managing tensions with Thailand, its leadership is carefully calibrating messages abroad and signals at home. Finally, in Laos the clock looks different but no less urgent: a waste crisis decades in the making is only now being addressed after a $37.85 million World Bank intervention — raising questions about how long governance failures can persist before action becomes unavoidable.

Thailand 🇹🇭

The 15% Illusion: Thailand’s High-Stakes Gamble in the New US Trade Order

by Paranut Juntree, in Bangkok

On February 20, 2026, the global trade landscape shifted dramatically when the US Supreme Court ruled 6–3 in Learning Resources v. Trump, stripping the White House of its authority to impose “Reciprocal Tariffs” through executive discretion. While the decision briefly reset tariffs to a 10% baseline, the Trump administration responded within 24 hours by invoking Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974, imposing a temporary 15% flat-rate tariff.

For Thailand, this “reset” is a double-edged sword. While Finance Minister Ekniti Nitithanprapas and other officials have framed the reduction from the previous 19% rate as a win, this could quickly become a strategic trap.

Section 122 triggers a 150-day countdown to expiration, effectively freezing Thailand’s room to maneuver. The situation highlights a widening gap between Bangkok and more agile ASEAN economies. While many view the 15% rate as relief, Associate Professor Dr. Aat Pisanwanich argues that Thailand is uniquely vulnerable due to domestic political paralysis.

Currently “stuck” in caretaker status, the government is constitutionally barred from signing binding international agreements. High-stakes trade negotiations are therefore stalled at the precise moment regional competitors are accelerating. Indonesia and Vietnam have moved decisively to secure improved trade terms with the United States. Indonesia, for example, recently obtained “Trusted Partner” status after finalizing a reciprocal framework with Washington.

Thailand, lacking a fully mandated government, remains stuck at the 15% baseline — and still subject to stacked sectoral duties, including the additional 50% tariffs on steel and aluminum under Section 232.

Beyond the baseline rate, Washington continues to press several specific demands. These include livestock certification standards, where the United States is pushing Thailand to accept meat approved by the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS), arguing that Thailand’s ban on ractopamine is non-science-based. On intellectual property, Thailand has pledged to address patent backlogs and digital copyright enforcement, but no final agreement has been reached on the scope and stringency of reforms.

Compared with Indonesia and Vietnam, Thailand lacks diplomatic momentum and has yet to resolve several outstanding issues. This uncertainty risks reinforcing investor caution. When tariff exposure and regulatory standards remain unsettled, capital may shift toward more stable and decisive regional peers.

In this context, the 15% rate is not a relief: it is a 150-day clock.

The central question is whether Thailand can exit caretaker status and seat a government with a full mandate before the window closes. Can a new administration move quickly enough to meet US demands — from supply chain transparency to regulatory reforms — or will the countdown expire with Thailand still trapped in political limbo?

If Bangkok fails to act before the deadline, the “15% illusion” may become less a temporary reprieve and more the prelude to deeper investment flight and supply chain diversion to more agile ASEAN neighbors.


Paranut has a background in advocacy, with experience in policy research, communications, and civic engagement across both the NGO and government sectors. As Thailand’s Youth Delegate to the United Nations, he represented Thai youth in global dialogues on migration, education, and human rights, championing inclusive policymaking. He holds a degree in political science with a specialization in international relations.

Myanmar 🇲🇲

Thailand Quietly Moves to Bring Myanmar Back into ASEAN

by Mozart

Thailand’s new caretaker government is trying to establish itself as a “bridge” between Myanmar junta and the rest of ASEAN members, testing how much the region is willing to move from isolation toward quiet re-engagement amid war, displacement and accountability in Myanmar.

In recent weeks, Thailand’s foreign minister has described Bangkok’s role as a “bridge” to pull Myanmar back into ASEAN after meeting with the junta’s counterpart in Phuket. The Minister argued that three years of limited engagement have failed to contain conflict and refugee flows, and that neighbours should now deal with the reality on the ground to manage shared borders, trade and security. Framed as a pragmatic approach for crisis management, this outreach marks a visible shift from the previous government’s more careful alignment with ASEAN’s five-point consensus. This is the first time a re-intergation approach has been proposed since ASEAN excluded junta representatives from regional meetings following the 2021 coup.

However, some critics warn that this approach will risk the region by normalizing military rule while Myanmar’s domestic legitimacy is at its lowest.

After rushing through widely criticized elections, the junta is preparing to convene a new parliament. At the same time, as the fighting escalates in Karenni, Shan and Rakhine, more civilians are crossing the Thai border. In this context, human rights groups and regional parliamentarians argue that engaging with junta representatives without clear conditions would undermine the call for dialogue with oppositions and ethnic armed organizations, and may weaken the credibility of current international justice efforts. Although the foreign minister of Thailand stated that they have no comment on the unsurprising results of the junta-held elections, the question to be asked is whether this attempt to re-engage with junta officials is violating the ASEAN’ five-points consensus, and whether is move actually takes into account the will of Myanmar people.

Interestingly, Thailand’s stance comes out in contrast with that of another regional actor. As 2026 ASEAN Chair, the Philippines has signaled that an “inclusive” approach that engages both the junta authorities and other opponents should be prioritized, positioning itself as a convener rather than an endorser of reintegration. Timor-Leste, by contrast, made an explicit stance against the Myanmar by initiating war-crimes proceedings against junta leaders through its own courts, using the junta as a test for regional accountability norms. This prompted the response of the junta, which warned to completely leave its office from the country. Together, these moves underscore a fragmented ASEAN response: with one member offering a bridge back to the group, another pushing for legal accountability, and others notably still cautious about any shift from limited engagement.

Ultimately, whether Thailand’s bridge-building attempt paves the way for a mediated resolution of Myanmar’s crisis or merely offers the junta’ smoother participation back on the regional forums will depend on how firmly other ASEAN members stand concrete steps on violence, dialogue and accountability.


Mozart is a research assistant at Mosaic Myanmar and is currently pursuing a Bachelor of Arts in Liberal Arts and Sciences at Parami University. His academic and professional interests span community development, minority issues, and social impact research. He has held roles including service-learning intern, student mentor, and operations coordinator for local initiatives, supporting project management, monitoring and evaluation, and education programs in Myanmar.

Support Us

Cambodia 🇰🇭

Cambodia Balances Ties with Ukraine and Russia Amid Ongoing Conflict

by Malai Yatt, in Phnom Penh

Cambodia continues to navigate a delicate “balancing act” in its foreign policy, maintaining strong historical ties with Russia while deepening strategic cooperation with Ukraine.

President Volodymyr Zelenskyy thanked Cambodian Senate President Hun Sen for supporting Ukraine’s sovereignty and backing UN peace resolutions. According to Zelenskyy’s official website, during their conversation the two leaders discussed further strengthening bilateral cooperation between Ukraine and Cambodia.

“The partnership is developing, and last year trade turnover between the countries amounted to USD 61.2 million — 35% more than in 2024. Work is also ongoing to establish the Intergovernmental Commission on Economic and Trade Cooperation,” the statement said. Zelenskyy also invited Hun Sen to visit Ukraine.

Hun Sen noted that during the meeting, both sides updated each other on their respective national situations and discussed cooperation in various sectors of mutual benefit, including preparations for the 35th anniversary (1992–2027) of diplomatic relations between the two countries next year.

Him Rotha, Deputy Director of the Cambodian Centre for Regional Studies, told The ASEAN Frontier that the conversation between Hun Sen and Zelenskyy aimed to reaffirm the importance of bilateral ties and explore further opportunities for cooperation.

At a time when both countries face key challenges — Russia’s war in Ukraine and the ongoing Cambodia–Thailand border tensions — the two sides are likely to emphasize the importance of a rules-based international order, particularly the peaceful settlement of disputes and the principle of non-use of force, he said.

“This is part of the diplomatic interaction between two countries seeking to mobilize diplomatic support for one another. With this engagement, I do not think it would significantly harm Cambodia’s overall relations with Russia,” Rotha added.

While Cambodia and Russia differ in their positions on the war in Ukraine, bilateral cooperation continues in areas of mutual interest, as is common among Southeast Asian states. Cambodia and Russia, he noted, still seek practical avenues of cooperation, including in sectors such as defense procurement.

The 69th anniversary of Cambodia’s diplomatic relations with Russia was marked on May 13, 2025. In this context, Rotha emphasized that for small states like Cambodia, striking a balance between principled diplomacy and pragmatic engagement remains essential.

In an era of global transition, he added, Cambodia should continue upholding the principles of multilateralism and a rules-based international order, while also expanding space for national development. This way, Cambodia’s balanced approach allows it to support international norms of sovereignty while preserving long-standing and practical bilateral interests.


Malai is a reporter at Kiripost, where she has worked for over two years, driven by a strong commitment to amplifying the voices of underserved communities. Her reporting focuses on economic and foreign affairs.

Lao PDR 🇱🇦

Laos and Its Waste Problem: A Crisis Hidden in Plain Sight

by Thongsavanh Souvannasane, in Vientiane

Every day, Laos produces 6,900 tonnes of household waste. Less than half of it is ever collected. The rest is burned, dumped into rivers, buried in backyards, or left to pile up along roadsides, and for years, almost nobody in power did anything about it.

Walk through any provincial town outside Vientiane and the picture is stark. Plastic bags cling to riverbanks. Smoke rises from backyard fires where families burn whatever the collection truck, if one exists at all, never came to take away. In rural communities, open dumping is not an act of carelessness.

It is the only option available. The state built no alternative.

Even in the capital, the situation is hard to defend. Vientiane accounts for roughly 15% of the country’s daily waste output, yet formal collection services reach fewer than half its residents. Landfills are operating beyond capacity, built to insufficient standards and filling up ahead of schedule. What cannot be contained overflows, into the soil, into waterways, and into the air.

The consequences are measurable in the atmosphere.

Open burning, combined with agricultural fires and vehicle emissions, has driven PM2.5 levels to alarming highs. In late February, southern provinces including Attapeu, Champasak, and Salavan recorded AQI readings between 150 and 200, the “starting to affect health” range, while Vientiane Capital registered between 119 and 147.

This is not a natural disaster. It is a failure of governance and community behavior, decades in the making. Regulations exist but enforcement has been chronically weak.

Municipal budgets have never matched the scale of the problem. Communities have been left to cope the only way they can, by burning, burying, and dumping in ways that make the crisis worse.

It took a USD 37.85 million World Bank (WB) intervention to bring the issue to the forefront.

On 23 February, the Lao government and WB launched the Lao PDR Pollution and Waste Management Project, committing USD 37.85 million to expand waste collection in Vientiane Capital from 44% to 70%, reaching an estimated 645,000 residents, while upgrading landfills and rolling out composting and recycling systems. Local authorities have also announced a nationwide ban on outdoor burning during the dry season, armed with stronger enforcement powers. Notably, they have made this announcement before.

The targets are welcome. But uncomfortable questions remain. Why has it taken foreign funding for the state to commit to serving more than half its own capital’s residents? And what guarantee exists that this project will not follow the same pattern as previous initiatives, well-launched, well-photographed, and quietly underfunded once international attention moves on?

The country needs a state that treats waste management not as a donor-driven project, but as a fundamental obligation to its own people.

For now, the fires keep burning. And so does the question of who let it get this far.


Thongsavanh is a journalist from Laos with a background in English-language media. He graduated from the Lao-American Institute with a Diploma of the Arts in English and contributes to independent news platforms. His reporting focuses on environmental issues, socio-economic development, and geopolitics.

Editorial Deadline 28/02/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Karen Ysabelle R. David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk

What is the price of peace? This week in the Pacific Corridor, we take a look at now-familiar issues as the three countries of the region grapple with this question.

For Vietnam, peace may very well be calculated in monetary terms, as it joins the United States-led pay-to-play Board of Peace while simultaneously activating its free trade agreement with the United Arab Emirates. Through its hedging strategy, can Vietnam carve out some peace for itself in a world order in constant flux?

Similarly, for Singapore, the price of its peace of mind and economic survival may also be measured in dollars, as the city-state pushes for AI through its 2026 budget. Should it succeed in becoming the region’s preeminent AI hub, will it rest assured in its technological dominance?

And for the Philippines, peace for a divided country may come at the cost of a highly-publicized trial. What factors led to the rise of former President and criminal populist Rodrigo Duterte, and will the results of a trial by the International Criminal Court help to heal a country half a world away?

Vietnam 🇻🇳

From Gaza to Dubai

by Tri Vo, in Ho Chi Minh City

Party General Secretary To Lam’s visit to Washington, D.C., in the middle of Vietnam’s most important holiday, transcended the par-for-the-course state visit and marked a definitive pivot in Hanoi’s foreign policy. Vietnam attended the inaugural meeting of the Gaza Board of Peace (BoP) from 18 to 20 February as a founding member state, at the invitation of US President Donald Trump. Meanwhile, back in Southeast Asia, the United Arab Emirates–Vietnam Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) officially entered into force on 3 February.

These two seemingly unrelated events are pieces of the larger strategic puzzle that Hanoi is assembling to both mitigate commercial friction vis-à-vis the US and simultaneously open new opportunities in the Middle East, serving as an insurance policy against the US risk.

First and foremost, for the BoP, the diplomatic dividends of joining are indeed substantial. Acceptance of the invitation reinforces the substance of the Vietnam-US Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and demonstrates Hanoi’s proactive willingness to engage in global high-level problem-solving. Simultaneously, Vietnam successfully maintains its non-aligned credibility by anchoring its participation strictly under the coverage of UN frameworks, advocating for the widely accepted two-state solution. This dual approach is the clearest manifestation of Hanoi’s “bamboo diplomacy,” maintaining diplomatic maneuvering space while also accommodating superpower initiatives that suit Hanoi’s strategic interests.

Economically, the Board represents a massive multilateral undertaking. With Vietnam affirming its readiness to contribute to the recovery process, especially in critical infrastructure, the country’s construction, telecommunications, and logistics enterprises could find unprecedented opportunities when involved in such efforts. More than that, Vietnam’s presence on the Board of Peace will also improve Hanoi’s position within the Trump administration, thereby somewhat diverting US pressure stemming from Vietnam’s huge trade surplus, a matter of great concern to the White House at the moment.

However, if Vietnam’s participation in the BoP is an attempt to remain on the good side of the Trump administration amid heightened trade pressure while bolstering Hanoi’s presence in the Middle East, the CEPA presents another opening into the region; at the same time, it helps to diversify Vietnam’s commercial activities away from an increasingly mercurial US.

Even standing against the loftiness of the BoP joining, the activation of the UAE–Vietnam CEPA this month is a landmark achievement in its own right. As Vietnam’s first free trade agreement with an Arab nation, the deal is highly ambitious, committing the UAE to phasing out tariffs on 99% of Vietnam’s exports. The agreement will also open the door to the larger Middle East and North Africa market while bringing high-quality Middle Eastern capital into Vietnam, as CEPA specifically targets foreign direct investment in renewable energy, logistics, and advanced manufacturing, moving beyond transactional trade.

As global trade remains subject to the vicissitudes of geopolitics, Vietnam’s dual-track strategy is becoming a masterclass in geo-economic hedging. By both improving its standing with Washington and opening a potential corridor into the Middle East, Hanoi is building the resilience necessary to sustain its ambitious economic growth targets in an increasingly unpredictable world.


Tri has experience in management consulting and strategy, having worked with institutions such as the UNDP, The Asia Group, and ARC Group. He has provided strategic, legal, and operational insights to clients in sectors including manufacturing, energy, and technology. He holds both academic and professional experience related to Southeast and East Asia, with a focus on regional development and policy.

Support Us

Singapore 🇸🇬

Singapore’s 2026 Budget Sees Significant Push for AI

by Nurul Aini, in Singapore

When announcing the country’s economic budget on 12 February 2026, the Prime Minister of Singapore and Minister of Finance Lawrence Wong proclaimed that “AI is a powerful tool but it is still a tool. It must serve our national interest and our people. We will define how AI is used and developed in Singapore.” While AI is often framed as innovation, Singapore’s policy treats it as both a matter of sovereignty and economic survival, grounded in a pragmatic, whole-of-society approach where individual adaptability is as crucial as state investment.

This policy is set to encompass four areas: advanced manufacturing, connectivity, finance, and healthcare, all of which are key areas of Singapore’s economy and its public welfare. To set this moving forward, a National AI Council, chaired by the PM himself, will be established to carry out ‘AI missions’ by providing direction for strategy. In addition, co-working spaces will be made available for the AI community, alongside a larger AI park to be developed in one-north, building on the previous “Lorong AI” initiative. This space aims to bring together founders, practitioners, innovators, and researchers to collaborate and develop practical AI solutions.

Law and accounting will be among the first to see the impact of the AI drive, with workflow becoming more streamlined, especially in tasks involving the production of case notes, generating written submissions, summarizing or reviewing documents, and dealing with structured data and regulatory frameworks. This essentially aims to redirect lawyers to “higher-value work such as strategy, structuring, negotiations, and dispute resolution,” while AI is made to assist accountants in document reviews, compliance checks, financial analysis, and reporting. When it comes to interested individual learners, six months of free access to premium AI tools will be given to those taking selected courses.

In a post that has an underlying tone of both hopefulness and anxiety, a commenter pointed out that the nation’s AI approach could be a slight deviation from Singapore’s less cautious approach, where this is the remaking of an entire economy in “an AI present.” Additionally, there are unresolved concerns regarding copyright infringement, environmental impact, and the malicious use of AI. Meanwhile, others, such as Singapore Management University Assistant Professor Goh, have highlighted the potential resistance companies may face from frontline staff if AI becomes too burdensome to learn and use.

Apart from Singapore, Malaysia also launched a national AI office in 2024 aimed at managing policies and regulatory frameworks. With a US$2.2 billion investment by Microsoft, it is set to enhance cybersecurity and create jobs. In 2025, Thailand established a National AI Committee with the same ambition of becoming a regional AI hub in Southeast Asia. As Southeast Asian countries move forward in adopting concrete AI frameworks and government-backed guidelines, issues of digital sovereignty and data protection are becoming increasingly critical. With its growing role as a hub for data centers and semiconductors, the region is well-positioned to shape global conversations on the ethical use of AI.


Aini is currently pursuing a master’s degree in English literature at Nanyang Technological University. She has experience working in youth groups, contributing to the planning and management of outreach activities.

The Philippines 🇵🇭

The Anatomy of Duterte’s Criminal Populism

by Arianne De Guzman, in Bulacan

On 20 February 2026, the International Criminal Court (ICC) confirmed that it granted former President Rodrigo Duterte’s request to skip the 23 February confirmation hearing, waiving his right to be present, as he faces charges of crimes against humanity in connection with his war on drugs campaign. Through a letter, Duterte continued to dispute the ICC’s jurisdiction while maintaining his claim that he has cognitive impairment.

This pre-trial proceeding is decisive: it is where the ICC prosecutors will determine whether Duterte’s case will proceed to a full trial. While the courtroom is in The Hague, the real answer lies at home.

Duterte and his war on drugs campaign continues to have widespread public support despite the numerous reports of human rights violations. Undeniably, he won the 2016 elections with 16,601,997 votes. His rise to power and strong base of support were a byproduct of anger, fear, anxiety, and dissatisfaction.

Prior to Duterte’s presidency, the Philippines ranked 70th out of 113 countries in the World Justice Project (WJP) Rule of Law Index, which measures a country’s adherence to the rule of law. Filipinos were infuriated by the weak legal system – slow courts, flawed prosecution, and high level of crime rates. Widespread dissatisfaction with former President Benigno Aquino III, who preceded Duterte, was also recorded, driven by high levels of poverty and inequality, the dominance of oligarchs, and the failure to address corruption in the government.

Political sociologist Nicole Curato argued that Duterte’s popularity was fueled by the politics of anxiety – which refers to the resentment of the Filipino middle class toward elites and frustration with ineffective institutions, inducing a desire for his “strongman” image.

Duterte transformed this politics of anxiety into a politics of hope. Filipinos longed for discipline and punishment, and he took the opportunity to position himself as the punisher, reinforcing the dichotomy between “the people” and the “dangerous other.” Curato notes that penal populism is behind this logic — a political strategy in which a politician advocates harsher criminal punishment and uses collective emotions to gain popularity and votes.

This practice did not originate in 2016. Former President and convicted plunderer Joseph Estrada’s 1998 “pro-masa” [pro-masses] campaign also relied on emotional identification with Filipinos and used anti-elite rhetoric. Using the “Erap para sa mahirap” [Erap for the poor] slogan, he reinforced the dichotomy between “the people” and the “corrupt elite,” harnessing the rampant socio-economic frustration caused by the liberalization policies of former Presidents Corazon Aquino and Fidel Ramos, which were perceived to solely benefit the wealthy. Estrada leveraged this discontent, along with his educational background as an expelled high school student and college dropout to cultivate his “maka-masa” [pro-people] image and portray himself as representative of the poor.

The pattern is clear: criminal populists thrive because they embody the will of ordinary citizens against entrenched power structures. However, with the ICC now in play, Duterte’s rhetoric has become inverted: the man who cast himself as the punisher finds himself facing punishment.

The Philippines’ vulnerability to criminal populism stems from recurring political habits and institutional failures, which legitimize punitive governance even at the cost of human rights and accountability. If weak institutions and the lack of clear policies continue to persist, criminal populists like Duterte and Estrada will continue to attract support. Duterte’s ICC arrest calls for reflection, not just on his war on drugs campaign, but also on the political culture that allowed it to happen.


Arianne has worked in legal research at the Philippines Department of Justice and in policy research at De La Salle University’s Jesse M. Robredo Institute of Governance, supporting projects on systemic reform. She holds a degree in Political Science from Colegio de San Juan de Letran and is pursuing a master’s in Sociology at the University of the Philippines Diliman. She is also involved in youth development and grassroots advocacy through the Rotaract Club of Santa Maria.

Editorial Deadline 24/02/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Haniva Sekar Deanty, Lead Editor - Maritime Crescent Desk

This week opens with Hree P. Samudra’s article on Jakarta’s participation in the Board of Peace and its simultaneous pursuit of a reciprocal trade agreement with Washington reflect a delicate balancing act between strategic alignment and domestic legitimacy.

This week, Brunei also celebrates its 42nd National Day, with Syimah Johari reflecting on how the meaning of unity has evolved from political consolidation in 1984 to a contemporary framework tied to continuity, stability and the ambitions of Brunei Vision 2035.

This week, Edrina Lisa also looks at the discussion of Malaysia’s recent decision to open primary school registration to six-year-olds, a policy shift that has prompted wide public conversation, outlining the government’s rationale and the concerns raised by the public.

Indonesia 🇮🇩

BoP, Gaza, and the New Golden Age

by Hree Putri Samudra, in Jakarta

When Washington and Jakarta describe the same week in February, they are not telling the same story. In Washington, the focus is a reciprocal trade agreement that, in the words of the White House, “ushers in a NEW GOLDEN AGE of the ever growing U.S. Indonesian Alliance,” presented as a boost to economic security. In Jakarta’s domestic narrative, the headline is the Board of Peace, sold as a pragmatic instrument to help Palestine and accompanied by repeated assurances that Indonesia will leave if the forum fails to benefit the Palestinian cause. Seen together, the trade deal and the Board of Peace are not separate episodes but a single experiment in realigning Indonesia closer to Washington while maintaining a fragile domestic legitimacy built on Palestine.

The Median social media survey matters because it captures the politically attentive audience that most actively polices government legitimacy. It surveyed 1,200 users between 10 and 14 February with follow-up verification. A majority oppose joining the Board of Peace, worry that it could weaken Indonesia’s defence on Palestine, and reject the one‑billion‑dollar fee, Yet 55.7 percent still trust the government to support Palestine from within the board, while 40.8 percent favour reconsideration rather than immediate withdrawal. Together, these findings describe a conditional mandate rather than a blank cheque.

In Robert Putnam’s terms, leaders play a two‑level game: they bargain with foreign counterparts while managing audience costs at home. Median’s numbers point to a specific kind of trust that looks more like identity‑based confidence than enthusiasm for any single policy, rooted in Indonesia’s constitutional rejection of colonialism, its repeated refusal to normalise relations with Israel absent Palestinian statehood, and a long record of pro‑Palestine diplomacy. That assumption functions as a trust discount. In the language of the audience‑costs literature, this creates room for Prabowo to stand next to Trump as an alliance partner without immediately triggering reputational punishment, so long as the visible script on Palestine remains intact.

This is where the trade deal and BoP reinforce each other. The “New Golden Age” agreement does more than cut tariffs; it narrows Jakarta’s room to openly disagree with Washington. The Council of Trade and Investment becomes a gatekeeper for disputes, steering frictions into bilateral asymmetry that favours the U.S., with attempts to use economic pressure over Gaza would be filtered through institutions designed to preserve trade stability, not defend Palestine. BoP then becomes the first arena in which that alliance discipline is tested on an issue where Indonesian identity points one way and American preferences point another. As elites and firms grow dependent on the deal’s benefits, the promise that Jakarta could simply leave BoP if it fails Palestine becomes harder to sustain.

Trust discounts can expire. Many already describejoining the BoP as a foreign-policy misstep, embracing alliance language that breaks decades of strategic ambiguity. Two trajectories are possible: deepening integration with U.S.-led supply chains, while the BoP delivers little benefit to the Palestinians. At that point, the government will discover that it has not only moved Indonesia closer to Washington. It has also spent down the moral capital on Palestine that once made such a move politically survivable.


Hree serves as Project Associate for Asia and the Pacific at the Global Network of Women Peacebuilders (GNWP), where she leads multi-country initiatives integrating Women, Peace and Security (WPS), and Youth, Peace and Security (YPS) frameworks into security policies across ASEAN and South Asia. She is also a Non-Resident Fellow at the University of Glasgow’s Atomic Anxiety in the New Nuclear Age program. Previously, she served as Chair of the Humanitarian Disarmament and Inclusive Governance Working Group at the British American Security Information Council (BASIC), advocating for more accountable and inclusive nuclear policy frameworks.

Support Us

Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳

Brunei’s 42nd National Day Marks Unity and Continuity

by Syimah Johari, in Bandar Seri Begawan

Brunei attained full independence on 1 January 1984, marking the conclusion of a long-standing protectorate arrangement with the British. The nation formally commemorated its independence on 23 February that same year. National Day in Brunei is therefore not only a remembrance of sovereignty, but an annual recalibration of national priorities.

Each year, a theme accompanies the celebration. More than a slogan, it reflects the priorities of a particular chapter in Brunei’s journey. This year’s slogan is Bersatu Mencapai Cita Negara, (in translation, United in Achieving The Nation’s Aspirations), aligning with the country’s long-term national goals and inviting reflection on the evolving meaning of unity.

Before independence, Brunei had been a British protectorate state from 1888, a period that included the disruption of Japanese occupation during the Second World War. While internal governance remained under the Sultanate, Britain oversaw defence and foreign affairs. The path to full sovereignty was formalised through the 1979 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, which set the framework for independence in 1984.

At that time, unity carried a clear political function. It signified the consolidation of sovereignty, the assumption of full control over defence and external relations, and the preservation of stability in the post-war decades. Unity was closely tied to the formation of a cohesive national identity as Brunei entered a new phase of self-governance.

Today, the idea of unity is situated differently. It is framed less around political consolidation, but rather through continuity – the shared responsibility to maintain stability and continuity, in line with the Brunei Vision 2035. Within the broader horizon of Brunei Vision 2035, which envisions a well-educated population, high quality of life, and a dynamic economy, unity can be understood as the shared commitment that underpins long-term aspirations. It is expressed not only in national celebration, but in everyday contribution: in education, civic responsibility, and intergenerational continuity.

As Brunei marks its 42nd National Day, the theme of unity serves as a reminder that while the challenges of 1984 and 2026 differ, the principle of shared direction remains constant. National Day, in this sense, is not only a commemoration of independence, but a reflection on how a nation continues to move forward together.


Syimah is a graduate of King’s College London with a BA in International Relations. With a strong focus on diplomacy, regional cooperation, and development policy, she is passionate about contributing to meaningful change through public service. Currently, she is involved in poverty alleviation work through a local NGO.

Malaysia 🇲🇾

The Pedagogical Debate over Malaysia’s Six-Year-Old Primary Entry

by Edrina Lisa Ozaidi, in WP Kuala Lumpur

Recently, the Malaysian Ministry of Education released a statement of the government’s decision to open primary school registration to six-years-olds, representing a big shift in the national uncertain education architecture. The policy targets to synchronise Malaysia with international norms, local academics and child development experts, but publics are questioning whether the nation’s six-years-olds are truly prepared for the rigours of Primary One.

Advocates for the earlier entry age defend that the biological “window of opportunity” for foundational literacy and numeracy is at its peak between the ages five and seven. Some argue that with a structured early exposure and supportive environment, the ministry aims to recalibrate the imbalance often seen in the transition from the unstructured and different models used in private preschool to formal primary education. Local analysts also suggest that the shift could improve the efficiency of the national human capital. Another point of defence states that by starting at six, the move allows students from all backgrounds to develop equally, providing other less fortunate opportunities to reduce the financial burden from having to pay for private preschool fees.

However, the policy has already met with significant pushback from local educators and received mixed reaction from the public. An analyst points out that the “ready for school” threshold is never universal. Critics argue that pushing young children into a desk-bound, assessment-heavy environment bears the risk of early education burnout.

The concern is not limited to age, but the nature of the Primary One curriculum. While Malaysia practices in-class assessment, which may or may not be limited to just academics, the syllabus remains heavily dependent on rote learning and extensive written work, alongside strong expectations to perform well in co-curricular activities. By doing so, the nation risks alienating children who have not yet developed the necessary fine motor skills or executive functions.

Analysts and locals are also pointing to the relative age effect. Under this policy, a child born in December starting at age six will be nearly a year younger than their January-born peers. At age 7, a 12-month gap represents roughly 14% of the child’s total life experience, which can denote a difference in brain development and impulse control. Additionally, experts expressed the sanctity of play-based learning, noting that six years old students’ learning should primarily be around play-based learning.

While the ministry maintains the early registration as flexible, the community insists that the burden of proof still relies on the school system. The public encourages Primary One’s educational framework to act as a bridge requiring various support rather than just a sprint year, ensuring that the education approach is holistic for young learners to benefit from the system.


Edrina is a communications professional with a background in international relations. She holds a degree from the University of Nottingham Malaysia and has worked across public relations and social media for organizations in the development, education, and corporate sectors. Her work focuses on crafting narratives around regional affairs and strengthening media engagement across Southeast Asia.

Editorial Deadline 21/02/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)