by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk

A school structure, a flood response, a trade transition, and a growth model: this week's stories are really about the same question asked four different ways: who gets left behind when a system is tested? In Laos, the government's plan to shift from a 5+4+3 to a 6+3+3 school structure raises a harder question than scheduling: whether restructuring alone can close the gap between a child in Vientiane and one in a remote village, when regional test data already show Lao students lagging and gains concentrated among those already ahead. In Myanmar, monsoon floods displaced 220,000 people in Sagaing — and instead of activating a relief system, the junta blocked volunteer rescue teams, threatened aid workers with terrorism charges, and funneled help only to areas under its control, repeating a pattern of weaponized disaster response it has run since Cyclone Nargis in 2008. In Cambodia, LDC graduation is meant to mark the country's economic coming-of-age, but an ILO-backed study warns it could put 11% of employment at risk, concentrated among informal, self-employed, and low-skilled workers — the very people the country's social protection system is least equipped to catch. And in Thailand, the slowest growth of any major Southeast Asian economy this quarter showed how quickly consumption subsidies get overwhelmed once energy costs start eating into household spending.

Lao PDR 🇱🇦

Can Better Systems Mean Better Learning for Every Child?

by Souriya Bounpaseuth, in Vientiane

As Laos prepares to open the 2026–2027 school year, its education system is entering a period of significant change. But while much attention is being placed on the planned shift to a new 6+3+3 school structure, the bigger question is whether structural reform can translate into something more fundamental as it is better learning for every child.

Under the planned reform, Laos will move from the current 5+4+3 structure to six years of primary education, three years of lower secondary and three years of upper secondary education. The new structure is scheduled for broader implementation from the 2028–2029 academic year, meaning the coming school year marks an important preparation phase rather than the immediate start of the new system.

During the 2024–2025 academic year, the Ministry of Education and Sports reported progress in curriculum development, teacher support and education management. More than 4,000 volunteer teachers had their status addressed, while a new teacher salary structure with improved base pay and allowances was introduced in January 2026. The government has also identified reducing multi-grade classrooms, strengthening teacher education institutions and expanding ethnic boarding schools as priorities for more inclusive access to education.

Recent initiatives are also increasingly focused on what happens inside classrooms. In July, Laos and Japan launched the next phase of their primary mathematics education partnership, which will revise Grades 4–6 textbooks and teachers’ guides, strengthen teacher professional development and establish school-based continuous professional development across 35 districts.

The SEA-PLM 2024 assessment, the most recent comparable regional assessment of Grade 5 learning, shows a mixed picture. Across participating Southeast Asian education systems, mathematics outcomes improved between 2019 and 2024, but reading showed little overall progress, while gains were concentrated more among higher-performing students. Lao PDR remained below the regional average, with significant numbers of children performing at the lower proficiency levels.

Importantly, Laos is already using these findings to shape reform. At the national launch in March 2026, education authorities and partners identified curriculum improvement, teacher development, learning materials and more child-centred teaching as areas requiring action, with particular attention to disadvantaged and remote communities.

The challenge, then, is no longer simply designing a new education structure. It is connecting structure, teachers, curriculum, learning materials, financing and support for disadvantaged children into one functioning system.

As Laos moves towards 6+3+3, the ultimate measure of success may not be whether the reform is implemented on schedule, but whether a child in a remote village has the same opportunity to learn, progress and succeed as a child in Vientiane.

Can 6+3+3 become more than a change in the number of years children spend in each level of school and become a strategy that finally closes the gap between access and quality?

Myanmar 🇲🇲

Junta Troops Block Humanitarian Aid For Flood Victims

by Ley Hlaing

Myanmar is experiencing an increasing rise in water level and flood in the plain and delta regions. As the incident continued, the country’s junta, once again, has blocked the aid for livelihood relief for the victims affected by the flood, mirroring the same pattern of blockage and weaponization of humanitarian aid during the cyclones that happened in 2008 and 2023.

In August 2026, severe monsoon rains have once again triggered a catastrophic humanitarian crisis in Myanmar, with rising water levels submerging the country’s plain and delta regions like Sagaing and Irrawaddy. Heavy rainfall forced authorities to release massive volumes of water from the Thaphanseik Dam, causing the Mu River to overflow and inundate more than 200 villages across the Sagaing Region. Over 220,000 people have been affected, with at least 15 deaths reported as of August 10, many of whom were already internally displaced by ongoing military conflicts and are now experiencing a second disaster. Yet, instead of facilitating emergency relief, the military junta has actively blocked, harassed, and turned back local volunteer rescue teams and civil society aid groups at military checkpoints, including the Sagaing Yadanabon Bridge and Sagaing Hnapauk checkposts.

This blockade is a highly coordinated effort to weaponise humanitarian aid against the civilian population in resistance strongholds. Local administrators and police chiefs in Shwebo have threatened that anyone attempting to deliver flood relief to these areas will be prosecuted for supporting terrorism, warning that their homes and properties will be seized. In a stark display of selective relief, the junta has heavily publicised its aid efforts in regions under its firm control, such as Irrawaddy, while completely ignoring the crisis in Sagaing. Instead, the military has continued to conduct airstrikes on flood-hit Sagaing townships, while selectively airlifting food and medicine via helicopters strictly to villages controlled by its allied Pyu Saw Htee militias.

The junta’s actions mirror a dark, recurring historical pattern of using natural disasters to maintain political control at the cost of civilian lives. During Cyclone Nargis in May 2008, which devastated the Irrawaddy Delta and killed 140,000 people, the military regime deliberately blocked international humanitarian relief for weeks. Instead, the regime benefitted completing a referendum for their 2008 Constitution, while the country was in turmoil. Out of fear that Western powers would use the disaster as a pretext to overthrow their rule, the generals rejected lifesaving assistance from US, British, and French navy ships and helicopters, while army officials confiscated overseas relief supplies and sold them in local markets.

This weaponisation of disaster relief was repeated during Cyclone Mocha in May 2023. After the storm left millions of survivors in urgent need of aid, the junta suspended travel authorizations for international humanitarian organizations and demanded that all domestic distribution of supplies be handed over to military authorities, transforming a natural disaster into a man-made catastrophe. This pattern of gatekeeping was visible yet again during the March 2025 earthquake and the floods of Typhoon Yagi in late 2024, where the regime consistently chose to let its citizens suffer rather than risk losing absolute authority. Today, as telephone and internet lines remain cut in Sagaing, local volunteer groups are left to navigate rising waters, lack of food, and increasing medical emergencies entirely on their own.

Ley Hlaing is a former Political Science student from the University of Yangon, Myanmar. Currently, he is pursuing his BA at Parami University with a major in Philosophy, Politics and Economics. His academic and professional interests span community development, literature, minority issues, and social impact research. Having held roles as Research Assistant, Student Mentor, and Facilitator for local initiatives, he has constantly supported project management in literature and education programs in Myanmar.

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Cambodia 🇰🇭

Cambodia’s LDC Graduation Could Put 11% of Employment at Risk

by Sokna Thea, in Phnom Penh

Cambodia’s planned graduation from Least Developed Country (LDC) status in 2029 is a major development milestone, but it could also expose a large share of the workforce to pressure from higher trade costs and weaker export demand.

A June 2026 policy brief from Cambodia’s Ministry of Labour and Vocational Training and the International Labour Organization estimates that around 11% of employment could be affected under a full trade-loss scenario. The figure represents jobs at risk, not confirmed layoffs. The study notes that the impact could also appear through reduced working hours, slower hiring, temporary suspensions, lower earnings and weaker self-employment income.

The risk extends well beyond garment factories. The study finds the largest employment impacts in textiles, clothing and footwear, wholesale and retail trade, rice, fruits and nuts, vegetables and roots, and other agriculture-related activities. Transport and other supporting services could also feel the effects as weaker export demand reduces production, intermediate demand and household spending.

The profile of affected workers is particularly important. Informal workers account for 68% of affected employment, while self-employed workers make up 52%. Women account for 53% and low-skilled workers 86%. These groups are generally less protected against sudden income or job losses, making the transition a labour-market issue as much as a trade-policy issue.

The modelling also shows that the severity of the impact depends on how much of the trade shock is absorbed or mitigated. Under the study’s full-impact scenario, affected employment falls by about 11%. A targeted mitigation scenario brings the figure down to about 7%, while a lower-impact scenario reduces it to around 3%. The authors stress, however, that targeted support cannot fully prevent spillovers across the wider economy.

The trade exposure is significant. UN Trade and Development estimates that Cambodia could lose about 16.4% of its total exports if LDC-related trade preferences are lost after graduation. Its simulation puts the potential export loss at about USD 5.9 billion, based on 2023 trade data. Cambodia is particularly exposed to preference erosion because 80.5% of its exports in the simulation were directed to the 25 preference-granting economies covered by the analysis.

The European Union is one of the key markets to watch. Cambodia continues to benefit from the EU’s Everything But Arms (EBA) scheme, but only partially, after the EU withdrew some of its tariff preferences in 2020. EU data show that goods trade with Cambodia reached EUR 7.3 billion in 2025, with textiles and clothing accounting for 72% of EU imports from Cambodia.

The question for Cambodia is therefore not simply whether it will graduate from LDC status, but how it manages the transition. The Ministry-ILO study calls for stronger worker skills and social protection, support for firms to upgrade and comply with new trade requirements, deeper domestic value chains, and greater export diversification. Graduation is a sign of progress. But without a smooth transition, the gains from that progress could come with a significant cost for workers who have the fewest buffers.

Sokna has a background in International Affairs and Business & Commercial Law. He’s currently a Senior Project Coordinator at the Ministry of Economy and Finance of Cambodia, working on the Financial Management Information System (FMIS) Project. His professional focus is driven by entrepreneurship, business development, and financial technology, with a particular interest in how private-sector innovation drives Cambodia’s economic growth.

Thailand 🇹🇭

Thailand Scores Weakest ASEAN Growth at 1.9% as Energy Costs Bite

by Satid Sootipunya, in Bangkok

Thailand scored the weakest growth rate among six Southeast Asian economies in the second quarter as higher energy prices curbed household spending, offsetting the government’s consumption subsidy.

Thailand’s economy expanded 1.9% in the second quarter from a year earlier, slowing sharply from 2.8% in the first quarter, according to data released by the National Economic and Social Development Council on Monday.

The pace exceeded the 1.8% median estimate in a Bloomberg survey of economists, which ranged from 1.1% to 2.8%.

Quarterly, gross domestic product contracted 0.2%, compared with a revised 0.6% expansion in the previous quarter, the data showed.

Higher energy prices stemming from the conflict in the Middle East weighed on private consumption, offsetting stronger investment and government stimulus.

The reading left Thailand with the slowest growth among the six Southeast Asian economies, according to the council. Vietnam expanded 8.4% from a year earlier, followed by Malaysia at 6%, Singapore at 5.9%, Indonesia at 5.3%, the Philippines at 2.3%, and Thailand at 1.9%.

The figures are consistent with the latest releases from each country’s statistics agency, which reported growth of 5.9% in Singapore, 6% in Malaysia, 5.29% in Indonesia, and 2.3% in the Philippines over the same period.

The baht held its gains following the release, with the dollar falling 0.1% to 33.1 baht.

The second quarter was expected to mark the trough of the economic cycle, with a recovery beginning in the third quarter as Middle East tensions ease and stimulus measures take effect, Bank of Thailand spokesperson Chayawadee Chai-Anant said in late July.

The council projects full-year growth of 2% to 2.5%, driven by investment. Bloomberg’s consensus estimate stands at 1.9%.

The central bank held its benchmark one-day repurchase rate at 1%, the lowest since September 2022, at its June 24 meeting, with all seven Monetary Policy Committee members voting unanimously to keep the rate unchanged.


Satid is a multimedia economic journalist and news anchor who covers macroeconomic trends, Thailand’s fiscal policy, and key regional developments for Bangkok Biz. A Journalism graduate from Thammasat University, he has reported on major issues such as the US–China trade tensions, the Myanmar crisis, and global corporate stories, drawing on prior newsroom experience at The Momentum, the Bangkok Post, AFP, and Varasarn Press. His work blends economic analysis, foreign affairs, and digital storytelling, with a strong focus on making complex financial and political topics accessible to Thai audiences.

Editorial Deadline 22/08/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Karen Ysabelle R. David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk

In this week’s newsletter, we see the governments of the Pacific Corridor gamble and bet on promises and policies. The die is cast and all bets are off: let the chips fall where they may.

In Vietnam, the government has bargained the historic Hải Vân Pass in exchange for the development of international standard “resort city” Làng Vân. Will the weight of centuries of history withstand the grand promises of profits and jobs?

In Singapore, the government is placing its bet on everyday workplace culture driving up the country’s declining total fertility rate. Will decades of pro-natalist policy finally win when workplace norms change?

And in the Philippines, the government has gambled that the implementation of the 15% Global Minimum Tax could strengthen tax collection from multinational enterprises. Will years of tax reform finally culminate in a balance between attracting foreign investment and protecting government revenues?

Vietnam 🇻🇳

The Green Price of Vietnam's Growth Bargain

by Sophia

For decades, Đèo Hải Vân — the “Ocean Cloud Pass” separating Đà Nẵng from Huế — stood as a historical natural artifact and national pride of Vietnam. It was a strategic chokepoint once fought over by empires, and up until recently, a scenic view found on locals’ and foreigners’ bucket lists. Yet lately, a third identity has crowded in alongside the other two: Hải Vân is becoming real estate.

Since mid-2025, Vingroup’s Vinpearl has been building Làng Vân, a resort and urban complex covering 512 hectares at the foot of the pass, backed by nearly VND 44 trillion (or roughly US$1.7 billion) in investment. According to an environmental impact assessment that circulated online this summer, forest land has fallen to approximately 79% of the site. When aerial photos comparing the slopes before and after clearing began spreading on social media outlets in July, the reaction was fast and visceral. Phrases like phá rừng (meaning “deforestation”) and tanh bành (roughly “torn to pieces”) started trending, alongside images of rockslides onto the North–South railway that critics tied directly to the earthworks.

The government’s case for the project is not unfamiliar: this industrial development is necessary for national economic prosperity in the long term. Land that was hard to reach and generating little economic value gets converted into tax revenue, jobs, and tourism infrastructure. City officials point to more than 3,400 housing units already cleared for sale and over VND 12 trillion in projected contributions to Đà Nẵng’s budget. Vingroup describes it as an international standard “resort city” finally putting a long-stalled 2016 land grant to use. That is what trade development economics has always proposed: taking a landscape’s unpriced ecological value and converting it into a priced economic one in the hopes of jobs, revenue, and economic value to compensate for the environmental loss. Vietnam has made this same bargain at Phú Quốc, at Bãi Cháy, and along plenty of other coastlines.

Such grand projects receive national media reporting with numbers and profits, but rarely do they show the ecological trade-off, deforestation photos, or address public dissatisfaction regarding the lack of transparency. The general lack of national media coverage decreases the awareness of the locals and the general public, as sharper reporting has come mostly from diaspora outlets that many readers inside the country cannot easily access. As the greenery is plowed into bare land, the increasing risk of vulnerability to natural disasters and storms that annually hit the central region and strip locals of their means of livelihood is inevitably left unaddressed by national authorities or corporate representatives. The environmental concern of a project this size is not being addressed adequately, nor is the misalignment with the national commitment made at COP26 toward Vietnam’s net-zero emissions target by 2050.

The cultural dimension should not be ignored. In August, archaeologists excavating at Nam Chơn station and Chơn Sảng fort uncovered ramparts, gatehouses, and close to a thousand artifacts spanning the Trần, Chăm, and Nguyễn periods. Đà Nẵng’s heritage authority is now moving to list both sites for protection.

Đèo Hải Vân has outlasted dynasties and wars, but it may not outlast this decade of development. What is being cleared at its base is not just forestland; it is a buffer against landslides and storms that Đà Nẵng has long relied on, now being cut down for private profit. Is it economic progress or a bet that a coastline’s safety margin can be sold off without consequence?


Sophia is an external TAF contributor.

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Singapore 🇸🇬

Singapore Bets on Workplace Culture to Drive TFR

by Ryan

Singapore’s Marriage and Parenthood Reset Workgroup has spent the months since its April launch listening to citizens describe, in granular and often frustrated detail, why marrying and raising children in the city-state feels harder than it should. Speaking on 15 August at the Pasir Ris-Changi National Day Dinner, Minister in the Prime Minister’s Office Indranee Rajah, who chairs the nine-member interagency group, said that consensus had already emerged around a specific cluster of concerns: the cost of raising children, the need for time with family, caregiving arrangements, and housing. Rather than wait for the workgroup’s full report, due in early 2027, Indranee said interim recommendations would be announced by Prime Minister Lawrence Wong at the National Day Rally on 23 August, so as not to, in her words, lose time addressing an issue made more urgent by Singapore’s total fertility rate, which fell to a fresh low of 0.87 in 2025.

What distinguishes this exercise from Singapore’s decades of prior pro-natalist policy — which has leaned heavily on cash incentives, tax rebates, and subsidized fertility treatment since the 1980s — is its explicit focus on workplace culture as a lever alongside financial support. Indranee told reporters on the sidelines of the event that workplace norms were consistently on people’s minds during the workgroup’s consultations, and that officials are chasing a “win-win solution,” balancing employer and employee interests. That, she said, depends on “progressive, enlightened employers” and, crucially, on capable human resources professionals who can translate policy into practice rather than merely administer it on paper. Parents who spoke to The Straits Times ahead of the National Day Rally described wanting more childcare leave allocated per child, subsidies extended to medical bills and enrichment expenses, reduced stigma attached to taking maternity leave, and stronger mental health support in the early years of parenting. Indranee also confirmed that the government is revisiting the costs of raising children and access to affordable infant and child care, building on remarks Wong made in his National Day message on 8 August.

Notably, Indranee was careful to frame policy as necessary but insufficient on its own. She pointed instead to the cumulative weight of everyday gestures — an understanding employer who builds a family-friendly culture, a line supervisor willing to grant flexibility, or simply a friend who checks in — as forces that shape whether Singaporeans feel supported enough to start families in the first place.

The urgency is not abstract, nor is it uniquely Singaporean. Thailand’s fertility rate has converged with Singapore’s own, while Malaysia’s fell to 1.6 in 2022, its lowest in fifty years, driven by a steep drop among its ethnic Chinese population. Vietnam has followed a similar downward path despite remaining a comparatively young country on paper, with nearly 30% of its population projected to be sixty or older by 2050. The Philippines has also fallen below the replacement threshold and faces the same pressures of urbanization, rising living costs, and delayed marriage that have already reshaped fertility elsewhere in the region.

Across the region, it is workplaces, more than parliaments, that will likely determine whether policy actually changes behavior, whether that means a manager approving flexible hours without hesitation, an HR department building a genuine return-to-work pathway rather than a checkbox leave policy, or an employer treating a caregiving pause as ordinary rather than exceptional. In an environment where Singapore’s neighbors are only a decade or two behind its fertility curve, that shift in everyday workplace culture, more than any single subsidy, may prove to be the most transferable lesson of all.


Ryan is a final-year finance student at the Singapore University of Social Sciences (SUSS) with experience across venture capital, venture debt, and business development. He also holds a diploma in Law and Management from Temasek Polytechnic. His interests lie in how emerging technologies and economic trends shape business ecosystems and regional development in Asia.

The Philippines 🇵🇭

Global Minimum Tax (GMT) Could Reshape Philippine Tax Incentives for Multinational Enterprises (MNEs)

by Arianne De Guzman, in Bulacan

The Philippines is moving toward the implementation of the 15% Global Minimum Tax (GMT) as tax collections are projected to increase by 9% annually until 2028, according to the Department of Finance (DOF) on Monday, 17 August. While the country aligns its tax system with the international rules, the Marcos administration will need to balance attracting investments through tax incentives with protecting government tax revenues.

Since November 2023, the Philippines has been a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)/G20 Inclusive Framework on Base-Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS). One of its key initiatives is the GMT under the Two-Pillar Solution. Under this framework, the Global Anti-Base Erosion (GloBE) Rules generally apply to large multinational enterprises (MNEs) with annual revenues of at least EUR750 million in at least two of the last four years. The rules establish a 15% effective tax rate (ETR) on a jurisdictional basis.

This does not mean that all Philippine companies will suddenly pay a 15% tax. Instead, when an in-scope MNE’s jurisdictional ETR falls below the 15% after under the GloBE rules, an additional “top-up tax” may be imposed

Open

to bring the rate closer to 15%. For the country, this could strengthen tax collection by limiting the ability of MNEs to reduce their ETR through tax incentives and other mechanisms.

This creates a policy trade-off. Higher tax revenues could strengthen government finances, but making incentives less valuable could affect the Philippines’ ability to attract foreign investment. Conversely, maintaining incentives without assessing their economic returns could limit potential revenue gains.

The CREATE MORE Act provides

Open

one possible direction through its Enhanced Deductions Regime (EDR). Under the EDR, registered business enterprises are subject to a 20% corporate income tax on income from registered activities while receiving additional deductions for qualified expenses. Compared with other incentives that significantly reduce the ETR, the EDR supports business activity while keeping the ETR above the 15% minimum.

The proposed Qualified Domestic Minimum Top-up Tax (QDMTT) could also allow the Philippines to collect the applicable top-up tax domestically, instead of allowing another jurisdiction to collect it under the GloBE rules. As of July 2026, the DOF convened an interagency technical working group (TWG), with 5 sub-technical groups, to lead the drafting of legislation and prepare the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) systems. The Marcos administration targets implementation to begin on 1 January 2027, with tax collection expected in 2028. Since the legislation has yet to be enacted, the treatment of existing Philippine tax incentives remains an important area to monitor.

Large MNEs should assess whether the GMT could reduce the value of their existing Philippine tax incentives and quantify any potential top-up tax. They should also track policy developments on how incentives can be structured to continue supporting investment while remaining compliant with the GMT.

The DOF and investment promotion agencies, such as the Board of Investments (BOI) and the Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA), should provide clear guidance and outlook on how the GMT will interact with existing tax incentives and whether these incentives will remain effective until their expiration. The Marcos administration should also assess GMT-compatible incentives, including expenditure-based and investment-linked incentives, to preserve the Philippines’ ability to attract MNEs without simply reducing their ETR below 15%.

The GMT is shifting the focus of tax incentives from tax savings toward investment-driven incentives. Tax incentives may still be a key consideration, but GMT implementation may focus on rewarding activities that create economic value in the Philippines.


Arianne has experience in policy research at De La Salle University’s Jesse M. Robredo Institute of Governance, where she contributed to projects on systemic reform. She earned a degree in Political Science from Colegio de San Juan de Letran. Currently, she works in government relations, specializing in advocacy strategy, legislative monitoring, and stakeholder engagement. Beyond her professional work, she is actively involved in youth development and grassroots initiatives through the Rotaract Club of Santa Maria.

Editorial Deadline 18/08/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Siu Tzyy Wei, Lead Editor - Maritime Crescent Desk

Direction is the first thing to go missing.

This week, Indonesia’s navy drifts into a drill it never meant to send a message with. Malaysia’s skies fill with smoke that started somewhere else. Brunei’s enforcers chase a drug trade moving faster than the frameworks meant to hold it. Three different waters, one shared problem: knowing which way is forward when the horizon won’t stay still.

What the horizon continues to waver, the hands holding the compass has to hold.

Indonesia 🇮🇩

Adrift

by Simon

On the morning of August 12, an Indonesian warship drew alongside a Chinese guided-missile frigate in the waters east of Taiwan and ran through a set of maneuvers. It was the first time China had exercised with a foreign navy there. Within hours, Taiwan called the drill dangerous and Washington called it destabilising. Jakarta said it was just a routine drill on the way home from Russia. In one morning, a country long known for its diplomacy had ended up on the wrong side of almost everyone.

To see why that matters, it is important to be reminded that Indonesia’s bebas-aktif doctrine - independent and active - meant that Indonesia belonged to no minilateral blocs; its weight in the region was therefore diplomatic and never military. Indonesia helped found ASEAN, helped broker an end to the war in Cambodia, and helped win the archipelagic principle that lets an archipelago hold together as a single state. That was the currency, to be trusted by every side because it was owned by none.

A foreign navy alongside China’s own on the east of Taiwan, reads as exactly the kind of image Beijing has sought elsewhere in the strait: proof, of a kind, that another country accepts a presence in waters it does not fully control. That is why Taiwan and Washington reacted, and why the routine framing did not hold. The ship was returning from an exercise with Russia and stopped to drill with China as a passing courtesy, the kind of call that looks routine at the point it is made and consequential only in hindsight. A state built on non-alignment can survive being read the wrong way once. What it cannot afford is for that reading to become a habit.

Indonesia’s own veteran diplomats and strategic think tanks have been warning of this for months. The picture they draw is consistent. A diplomacy that has turned reactive and personal, run by impulse and built around the President rather than the professionals who once conducted it, with a foreign minister widely seen as a presidential loyalist with no diplomatic background who is barely visible in the job he holds. ASEAN, the platform Indonesia’s influence was built on, is left to idle while Jakarta prefers deals struck one capital at a time. The patient institution-building has given way to something narrower and more defensive. And the drill is that shift at sea, which is motion without direction.

In fairness, a Taiwanese official said navies run exercises with all kinds of partners, and therefore a country that guards its independence owes Washington no explanation for talking to anyone. as much, that navies do this routinely. The complaint is not that Indonesia dealt with China, but that it did so without appearing to decide anything, and let its flag serve a message it would never have chosen to send. A generation ago, Indonesia wrote the rules other states followed in these waters. Today, it followed someone else’s.


Simon is an external contributor for The ASEAN Frontier.

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Malaysia 🇲🇾

The Return of Haze

by Muhammad Aiman Bin Roszaimi, in Cyberjaya

The haze has returned to Southeast Asia. Once again, Malaysia is breathing air polluted by fires that do not necessarily begin within its own borders. What makes the current episode particularly concerning is its timing, as Southeast Asia is entering a period of stronger El Niño conditions, potentially fuelling a dry and hot environment in which land and forest fires can spread rapidly.

Malaysia has already begun feeling the effects. In mid-August, several locations recorded unhealthy Air Pollutant Index (API) readings, with Sarawak among the worst affected. Samarahan, Serian and Kuching recorded particularly high readings, while unhealthy conditions were also reported in parts of Selangor, Kuala Lumpur and Putrajaya. The haze has been attributed largely to land and forest fires, particularly in neighbouring Indonesia.

The underlying problem, however, is more complicated than simply blaming “forest fires”. Land clearing and agricultural practices, including the use of fire, remain important drivers. Peatlands make the situation particularly difficult because drained peat can burn for extended periods and produce large quantities of smoke. El Niño does not create these fires, but it creates the conditions that allow them to start more easily, spread faster and become harder to extinguish.

The consequences extend well beyond poor visibility and into public health, disruption of livelihood from education to aviation and tourism. Malaysia experienced this in 2015 where almost 7,000 schools were closed as air pollution reached hazardous levels.

The problem is arguably regional by nature. Haze does not respect national borders, while the authority to prevent fires largely remains national. This has long been one of ASEAN’s most difficult environmental governance challenges.

ASEAN has responded through the 2002 ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution (AATHP), a framework for prevention, monitoring and cooperation. More recently, ASEAN established the Sub-Regional Ministerial Steering Committee and has been working towards operationalising the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Transboundary Haze Pollution Control. At its 27th meeting on July 2026, ASEAN members reaffirmed their commitment to the AATHP and supported initiatives on sustainable peatland and haze-free land management.

Yet the recurrent haze suggests that regional cooperation still has a gap between coordination and implementation. ASEAN can monitor hotspots, share information and coordinate assistance, but the most important interventions such as land management, enforcement against illegal burning and protection of peatlands still remain dependent on individual states.

Malaysia therefore needs to approach haze as more than an annual environmental emergency. Strengthening domestic fire prevention, satellite and hotspot monitoring, public health preparedness and coordination between federal and state authorities will be essential. At the ASEAN level, Kuala Lumpur should push for stronger joint monitoring, sustainable peatland management and financing mechanisms that make prevention economically viable.

The challenge is ultimately political as much as environmental.

ASEAN has spent decades developing mechanisms to manage transboundary haze. The question now is whether those mechanisms can prevent the next crisis rather than simply manage its consequences. If haze continues to return whenever El Niño arrives, Southeast Asia still lacks a genuinely regional solution.


Aiman is a PhD candidate in Security and Strategic Analysis at the National University of Malaysia. His research focuses on Malaysia’s space policy, ASEAN regional security, and the strategic implications of emerging technologies. His work explores how Malaysia’s defense policy and strategic culture shape its approach to outer space.

Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳

ASEAN's Drug Framework at the 47th ASOD

by Wira Gregory Ejau, in Bandar Seri Begawan

Between August 4 and 6, Brunei participated in the 47th ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting on Drug Matters (ASOD), held virtually under Thailand’s chairmanship. The delegation, led by Narcotics Control Bureau Director Datuk Paduka Mohd Zalani Ismail, joined senior officials from all ten ASEAN member states and Dialogue Partners to exchange views on the region’s drug situation and shape the next phase of cooperative policy, with the meeting’s most significant output being the launch of the ASEAN Drug Monitoring Report 2026.

The report’s findings demonstrate a sharp deterioration in progress, as UNODC data released in June confirmed that methamphetamine seizures in East and Southeast Asia reached 349 tons in 2025, which was a 48% increase over the previous year’s already-record figure, and more than five times the quantity seized a decade ago. Ketamine seizures simultaneously reached 52.5 tons, at an 185% increase from 2024. As it stands, these fluctuations are indicative of a regional drug market that has expanded faster than the enforcement architecture assembled to contain it.

The structural driver is Myanmar’s ongoing civil conflict, which has created conditions in Shan State under which industrial-scale methamphetamine production has expanded largely unchecked since 2021. The state that is the primary source of the regional drug crisis is simultaneously one in which ASEAN’s non-interference principle has constrained meaningful collective action. This places ASOD in an analytically uncomfortable position, whereby a cooperative policy forum whose central challenge is faced with a governance collapse that cooperative policy will find difficulty in resolving. Working group outcomes, treatment standards and preventive education represent genuine regional work, but it operates downstream of a production dynamic that must be addressed at source.

The current ASEAN Work Plan on Securing Communities Against Illicit Drugs ran from 2016 to 2025, and its Final Review is now underway, with meetings like these shaping the terms that define the bloc’s drug cooperation architecture for the next decade. The question now is whether said framework is specific to the synthetic drug surge and the maritime trafficking corridors that increasingly carry it, or to largely reproduce the assumptions of its predecessor.

As a small maritime border state with strict domestic enforcement, Brunei’s Narcotics Control Bureau sits within the Prime Minister’s Office and operates under a legal framework that maintains zero tolerance on drug offences. Characteristic of a transit risk state rather than a production or consumption centre of significant scale, Brunei’s contribution to ASOD is procedural and normative, with consistent participation, data contribution to the monitoring system, and sustained institutional presence. Flagged as a priority at the 47th ASOD, the preparation for the October ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Drug Matters will be the next indicator of how the bloc intends to respond to a regional drug situation that its existing tools have so far been unable to reverse.


Gregory is an MSc candidate in Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He works as a freelance writer specializing in international history, conflict, and counterterrorism, with experience in academia, investigative journalism, and voluntary uniformed service. He currently provides research assistance with the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) under their Southeast Asian Security and Defence Internship Programme and conducts investigations on regional security and transnational crime for a confidential company.

Editorial Deadline 15/08/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk

Every one of this week's stories comes with an official version, but also with harder questions sitting just outside it. In Laos, police detained 261 people in a single raid on the Thatluang Lake Special Economic Zone, pushing 2026's cybercrime arrests past 5,000, yet the government still hasn't said who owns the buildings these networks operate from or named a single financier. In Myanmar, Bangkok gave former junta leader Min Aung Hlaing a red-carpet welcome and signed a river-pollution agreement that civil society groups warn treats the symptom while ignoring who's mining the rivers in the first place. Meanwhile, in Thailand, Bangkok's push to fast-track a free trade deal with the Eurasian Economic Union is framed as pragmatic diversification, though it leaves open how far the country can lean toward Moscow without straining the Western partnerships it's courting at the same time. And in Cambodia, officials touted 90,000 new jobs and record investment as proof of durable growth, with barely a mention of the Middle East-driven cost pressures already straining the households those jobs are meant to support.

Lao PDR 🇱🇦

Arrests Climb, Masterminds Still at Large

by Thongsavanh Souvannasane, in Vientiane

Lao police detained 261 suspects in a single raid on the Thatluang Lake Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in Vientiane on 8 August, the largest haul yet in a crackdown that has swept up more than 5,000 people so far in 2026.

The scale of the arrests raises a question authorities have yet to answer: who actually owns the buildings these networks operate from?

The zone itself sits on a 365-hectare concession the Lao government granted to Shanghai Wanfeng Real Estate Co., Ltd. in 2011, under a 99-year lease running through 2110.

Officers seized thousands of computers and 2,355 mobile phones at the site alone. Chinese nationals made up the largest share of suspects at 153, followed by Vietnamese, Thai, and smaller groups of Taiwanese, Malaysian, South Korean, and Myanmar nationals.

Police say the investigation continues into the operation’s organizers. So far, none have been named.

The raid follows a similar pattern set on 1 August, when six coordinated strikes across Sikhottabong and Hatsayfong districts netted 63 suspects, and in July, when a raid on the ST Vegas complex in Hatsayfong detained 589 people, most of them Thai nationals later deported through the First Lao-Thai Friendship Bridge.

Prime Minister Sonexay Siphandone told the National Assembly in early July that cybercrime-related arrests had already topped 4,400 for the first half of the year, with nearly 1,000 in June alone.

Numbers since then push the total well past 5,000, based on Lao Ministry of Public Security figures reported through August.

Each raid follows a similar script: rented houses or hotel complexes, seized devices, foreign suspects deported or handed to their home governments, and property owners left unnamed in official statements.

That pattern extends beyond this crackdown.

Regional monitors have documented how scam compounds across the Mekong region routinely operate inside buildings leased from local business interests who face no public scrutiny, even as the workers found inside, some of them trafficking victims rather than willing operators, are processed and sent home.

Lao authorities have not said whether any property owner or financier faces charges in connection with the Thatluang Lake raid, the ST Vegas raid, or the string of others that preceded them this year.

Whether the raids mark a genuine dismantling of Laos’ scam economy, or a rotating cast of low-level arrests that leaves the financial architecture intact, depends on a detail the government has yet to disclose: who is being prosecuted, and who is simply being deported.

Thongsavanh is a journalist from Laos with a background in English-language media. He graduated from the Lao-American Institute with a Diploma of the Arts in English and contributes to independent news platforms. His reporting focuses on environmental issues, socio-economic development, and geopolitics.

Myanmar 🇲🇲

Thailand’s Engagement with Myanmar Junta Raises Questions Over ASEAN Centrality

by Myat Moe Kywe

Thailand welcomed Myanmar’s newly branded president and former military coup leader, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, with a red-carpet reception during his official visit on August 6–7, drawing backlash from civil society groups in both Myanmar and Thailand.

According to National Thailand, Foreign Affairs Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow said Thailand’s foreign policy toward Myanmar is guided primarily by a commitment to ASEAN unity and practical regional stability. Yet bilateral discussions during the visit rarely focused on ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus or the ongoing civil war in Myanmar.

Instead, the talks placed significant emphasis on strengthening cross-border commerce, with the two countries seeking to accelerate bilateral trade toward a target of US$12 billion. Thailand and Myanmar also planned to convene a Joint Trade Commission meeting between their commerce ministers.

The two governments additionally signed four separate agreements, including one concerning cross-border river pollution management. Thai communities and civil society groups have been raising concerns over transboundary river pollution linked to mining activities in Myanmar, particularly rare-earth mining, with contaminated waterways flowing into northern Thailand. The pollution has been a growing concern for communities that depend on the rivers for their livelihoods and daily lives.

However, Thailand’s Cabinet approved the Terms of Reference (TOR) for a Joint Working Group on Water Quality Management in Border and Transboundary Rivers with Myanmar’s regime has been widely criticized among civil society and environmental watchdogs in Thailand.

The ETOs Watch Coalition, a network of civil society organisations monitoring transboundary investments and human rights violations in the region, argued that while international environmental cooperation is necessary, it must address the root causes of pollution, protect public rights and operate transparently. Without these safeguards, they warned, such cooperation could create “a false sense of progress” while legitimising Myanmar’s military regime.

The visit carries broader diplomatic significance as Myanmar’s military-backed administration seeks to consolidate legitimacy following elections widely described by critics as a “sham election.” Thailand’s willingness to engage directly with Min Aung Hlaing therefore raises questions about how other ASEAN member states may respond, particularly those that have remained cautious about direct engagement with the junta.

Thailand’s approach also presents a test for ASEAN centrality. While Bangkok frames its engagement as necessary for regional stability and ASEAN unity, the limited attention given to the bloc’s Five-Point Consensus and Myanmar’s ongoing conflict highlights a tension between pragmatic bilateral engagement and ASEAN’s collective response to the crisis.

Whether Thailand’s approach becomes a precedent for wider ASEAN engagement with Myanmar’s military-backed government remains a question for the bloc and for the credibility of ASEAN’s role in addressing the region’s most persistent political crisis.


Myat is a B.A. graduate in Politics, Philosophy, and Economics. She has interned at The Asia Foundation in Washington, D.C., and she has also worked as a summer research assistant at the Centre for Policy and Innovation (CRPI), gaining experience in research and analysis. Her work focuses on civic engagement, gender, youth leadership, and community development.

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Thailand 🇹🇭

Why Thailand Is Fast-Tracking Trade with Eurasia

by Paranut Juntree, in Bangkok

In a clear signal of Thailand’s evolving foreign policy, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Sihasak Phuangketkeow led a high-level delegation to Moscow from 12th to 15th August 2026 to accelerate formal negotiations for a Free Trade Agreement with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). Meeting with Eurasian Economic Commission Board Chairman Bakytzhan Sagintaev and senior Russian officials, Thailand sought to break a decade of exploratory dialogue and shift into formal technical trade preparations. As global protectionism mounts and traditional trade negotiations stall, Thailand’s Eurasian push highlights that the country is leveraging pragmatism to secure new markets, safeguard supply chains, and maintain strategic autonomy.

The EAEU, comprising Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia, represents an integrated market of over 180 million consumers. Thailand first expressed intent to negotiate an EAEU FTA in 2015, following Vietnam’s landmark deal. However, institutional inertia, shifting domestic priorities, and post-2022 Western geopolitical sanctions slowed bilateral momentum to a crawl. The Thai Foreign Minister visit, following preparatory groundwork in Kazakhstan in June 2026, signals that private-sector demand is now driving diplomatic urgency to formalize institutional access with the Eurasian bloc. With bilateral trade with the EAEU surpassing USD2 billion, both sides intend to reactivate joint economic working mechanisms while technical feasibility studies are underway.

This re-engagement arrives at a pivotal structural moment for Thailand. Securing traditional Western trade deals remains fraught. Bilateral negotiations with the United States face asymmetric pressures, where Washington pushes for non-tariff concessions and strict rules-of-origin audits while maintaining baseline reciprocal tariffs. Meanwhile, negotiations for a Thai-EU FTA face hurdles over complex environmental mandates, like CBAM, strict intellectual property provisions, and open government procurement demands that risk burdening domestic businesses. Advancing EAEU negotiations now allows Thailand to construct a crucial buffer against these protectionist and high-compliance barriers elsewhere. Furthermore, with only Vietnam and Singapore holding operational EAEU agreements in ASEAN, Thai exporters, particularly in food processing, rubber, and auto parts, face compelling incentives to secure comparable access to our regional peers.

The economic horizon with EAEU presents high-yield opportunities alongside tangible operational friction. An FTA promises tariff reductions on Thai agricultural and industrial goods while securing direct access to Eurasian raw materials, fertilizer, and energy inputs. Reciprocal tourism also remains significant, driven by millions of Eurasian visitors. However, commercial execution may face steep hurdles in navigating secondary Western sanctions on financial networks that complicates cross-border payment settlements, while rigid sanitary inspections continue to delay agricultural clearance.

Ultimately, Thailand’s Eurasian maneuver is not an ideological shift away from traditional partners, but a calculated execution of diversification and non-aligned economic pragmatism. By building institutional bridges with the EAEU while simultaneously pursuing OECD accession and EU trade arrangements, Thailand reinforces its historical diplomatic strength by remaining flexible, multi-vectored, and open for business across competing global blocs.


Paranut has a background in advocacy, with experience in policy research, communications, and civic engagement across both the NGO and government sectors. As Thailand’s Youth Delegate to the United Nations, he represented Thai youth in global dialogues on migration, education, and human rights, championing inclusive policymaking. He holds a degree in political science with a specialization in international relations.

Cambodia 🇰🇭

Cambodia’s Industrial Sector Expands

by Malai Yatt, in Phnom Penh

Driven by strong investor confidence, Cambodia’s expanding industrial landscape continues to generate tens of thousands of vital new employment opportunities.

The number of factories in Cambodia increased by 845. Sun Mesa, spokesperson for the Ministry of Labor and Vocational Training, said on August 5, 2026, that during the first six months of 2026, the number of factories increased from 46,649 to 47,494, which is a notable growth and has created over 90,000 new job opportunities for citizens.

He also added that most of this growth occurred in the industrial sector, especially in the garment, sewing, footwear, and travel goods and bag production industries, where the number of factories increased from 2,725 to 2,890.

He confirmed that “More than 90,000 new jobs created in the first half of 2026 are clear evidence that Cambodia is continuing to create job opportunities for its citizens and strengthen the foundation for sustainable economic growth.”

Cambodia can still attract investment, increase the number of factories, and create new jobs continuously because investors trust its peace, political stability, pro-investment policies, and skilled workforce.

According to the Council for the Development of Cambodia (CDC), Cambodia approved 226 investment projects, with a total investment capital of approximately $4.7 billion, creating around 160,000 jobs.

In a recent interview with Bloomberg, Sun Chanthol, Vice Chairman of the Council for the Development of Cambodia (CDC), declared “Now, if we look at the numbers in 2024, we approved 414 projects worth $6.9 billion. In 2025, we approved 630 projects worth $10 billion.”

He hopes to be able to attract more investment from now until the end of 2026. But having said that, the war in the Middle East also has some impact on our investment, not only in Cambodia but in the whole in the world in the whole world.

“But having said that, our investment law does not discriminate against any investor. We encourage every investor to consider investing in Cambodia because of our pro-business government, our young, dynamic workforce, and our infrastructure”, he added.

In conclusion, with competitive investment policies, growing infrastructure, and strong political stability, Cambodia remains well-positioned to maintain its economic momentum and attract global capital despite broader international economic uncertainties.

Malai is a reporter at Kiripost, where she has worked for more than three years, driven by a strong commitment to amplifying the voices of underserved communities. Her reporting focuses on economic and foreign affairs.

Editorial Deadline 15/08/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Karen Ysabelle R. David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk

Across the Pacific Corridor this week, the age-old conflict between man and nature continues to play out in one of the world’s most climate-vulnerable regions. In the Philippines, monsoon rains have seen cities and provinces in much of the island of Luzon submerged in floods over the past week; meanwhile, in Singapore, the planned development of Maju Forest to make way for yet more housing has led to a public outcry and debates over the limits of development.

Over in Vietnam, Hanoi is confronting a problem of a different kind, as its lofty growth ambitions rest on rickety funding founded on the backs of overtaxed commercial banks. Similarly, in Timor-Leste, this year’s Pride March — which the country has celebrated for nearly a decade — has also run into issues with funding, in the wake of United States President Donald Trump’s budget cuts that have sent shockwaves through the LGBTQIA+ community all the way in Dili.

Whether ripples and shockwaves are the result of problems natural or man-made, it is the ordinary people of these four countries that are the first to pay the price.

The Philippines 🇵🇭

“Nature, Forgive Us”: Floods, Deaths, and the Price of Neglect

by Eduardo G. Fajermo Jr., in Angeles City

“Kalikasan, pasensya ka na sa mga tao.”

Nature, forgive us for what people have done.

That was the painful line attributed to 52-year-old June Lelis as he looked at tons of garbage swept into the Redemptorist Water Channel in Parañaque City. It was more than grief over trash. It sounded like a national confession: the floods now swallowing homes, roads, farms, churches, and schools are not caused by rain alone.

Across Luzon, the southwest monsoon enhanced by Tropical Cyclones Luis and Maymay turned another week of rain into another map of loss. The Office of Civil Defense said 19 people were reported killed and 15 others injured, with the province of Benguet recording the highest number of fatalities at 12, including landslide deaths in Baguio City, La Trinidad, and Atok.

Evacuations and flooding spanned several areas across the island of Luzon, from Quezon City, Marikina, Las Piñas, Parañaque, Manila, and Malabon in the National Capital Region, to the provinces of Bulacan, Batangas, Nueva Ecija, Pangasinan, Pampanga, and Zambales. In Calumpit, floodwaters reached chest-deep level and nearly rose to the roofs of houses; in Pampanga, churches in San Fernando were flooded; in Zambales, raging water and lahar damaged a bridge and forced more than 2,600 residents to evacuate.

The damage also entered classrooms and farms. The Department of Education said more than 6.5 million learners were affected by class suspensions, with 3,924 classrooms reported damaged. The Department of Agriculture earlier placed losses at PHP135.3 million, affecting 4,516 hectares and 6,010 farmers.

This is why “resilience” now feels too convenient. Filipinos are praised for surviving, but survival should not excuse weak preparation. A family that evacuates every rainy season is not proof that the system works. It is proof that the system keeps asking ordinary people to absorb failure.

This is why public anger over questionable spending matters, even if it should not consume the whole disaster story. On 11 August, reports on the confidential funds trial of the Office of the Vice President included testimony that tree planting and Christmas parties were allegedly listed among confidential expenses, while reported witnesses testified in a separate graft trial over alleged problems involving PHP455 million worth of ice-making machines.

No single peso can be said to have stopped one landslide. But every peso wasted is a peso unavailable for drainage, rescue boats, slope protection, evacuation centers, and early warnings.

In a country of storms, disaster preparedness is not charity after the flood. It is governance before the rain. When the state fails, the cost is not only counted in damaged roads, ruined crops, and submerged homes. It is counted in the names added to the dead.


Eduardo is a Political Science graduate and MA Political Science candidate at the University of Santo Tomas, researching democracy, disaster governance, and inclusive policy in the Global South. He is a former faculty member at Holy Angel University, where he taught Philippine history and contemporary global issues. He also worked with a senator in the Guam Legislature, contributing to policy research and legislative analysis.

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Singapore 🇸🇬

Housing vs. Nature vs. Heritage — Will Singaporeans Eventually Have a Choice?

by Nurul Aini, in Singapore

Hailed as a “City in Nature,” Singapore consistently has to navigate and balance between nature and the development of housing for its people. On 10 July 2026, the plan to remove two-thirds of Maju Forest — one of the few forested areas in Singapore — to make way for more housing was announced. Meanwhile, Gillman Barracks, a significant space for arts and lifestyle, has also been planned as a potential residential space for both private and public housing.

Upon announcement, citizens responded with mixed reactions. There were, however, strong opinions against the development of Maju Forest, such as through petitions calling for development to be directed to brownfield sites, and for the full environmental study of the space to be published. The petition highlights critically endangered species, such as the Sunda Pangolin and straw-headed bulbul, and recalled various forests that were lost as a result of housing development. To date, the petition has garnered over 43,000 signatures. Up until 6 August 2026, the Housing and Development Board (HDB) also accepted public feedback via an online portal.

Residents who live in the area stressed the relationship between living near a forest and how it has shaped the community’s character, sharing how differently children play and grow when in close proximity to greenery. Various social media posts also emerged, such as one by user @ckw.ada which questions whether Singapore’s approach of urban tree planting in place of mature forests will only worsen the urban heat island effects. Walks through the forest are also organized in the spirit of allowing citizens to appreciate the trail and understand what we can potentially lose as a result of rapid development, while users like @4one.sg bring viewers into the forest while educating them on the species found within.

Additionally, this issue was also intensely debated in Parliament. Workers’ Party MP Kenneth Tiong questioned why alternative sites with low-density populations cannot be used to develop more housing, as well as the role of ministries, such as the Ministry of Sustainability and Environment (MSE), in advocating for the forest. Meanwhile, the People’s Action Party (PAP) MP Alvin Tan stressed that the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) is part of an ongoing consultation process. The EIA is meant to be a systematic development process used by the government through agencies like the Urban Redevelopment Authority and the National Parks Board (NParks) to assess the impact of proposed development on the biophysical, social, and environmental makeup of the space. On a separate occasion, via a Facebook post, the Minister for Sustainability and the Environment, Grace Fu, highlighted that the MSE does not have a mandate on land use and planning and wrote about the hard trade-offs that Singapore sometimes must consider.

Gillman Barracks also underwent the Heritage Impact Assessment (HIA), with some infrastructures marked as high significance or exceptional. The development of this site has similarly gained traction amongst Singaporeans concerned with losing heritage sites.

Singapore is hailed as a modern city that harnesses technology and infrastructure for its progress. Yet, this episode on the Maju Forest does not necessarily show that Singaporeans resist development, but that they are not willing to partake in what could potentially be a sacrifice of their mental wellbeing and an alteration to a grounded lifestyle in the name of modern progress.


Aini is currently pursuing a master’s degree in English literature at Nanyang Technological University. She has experience working in youth groups, contributing to the planning and management of outreach activities.

Vietnam 🇻🇳

Beyond the Banks

by Tri Vo, in Ho Chi Minh City

Vietnam’s economy is running at a breakneck pace, having recorded a lofty GDP expansion of 8.18% in the first half of 2026, outpacing its ASEAN peers. However, beneath the surface of this macroeconomic triumph lies a profound structural vulnerability: that of an overstretched capital distribution system. To sustain the government’s ambitious double-digit growth mandate and propel Vietnam to the rank of high-income nations by 2045, total social investment demand is projected to escalate to a staggering US$1.46 trillion for the 2026–2030 period, nearly three times the country’s 2025 nominal GDP of US$530 billion. Such tremendous capital demands have prompted the critical questions of not just how to deploy but also how to source capital.

Both the Vietnamese public and private sectors have relied mostly on commercial banks to fund their economic expansion in the form of infrastructural financing. Yet, this dependency has now reached a critical threshold, as by the end of 2026’s first half, the economy’s total outstanding credit across the banking system had already exceeded US$795.5 billion. Such a high degree of leverage has posed a systemic bottleneck for continuing capital-raising efforts. Adding to this issue, liquidity pressure is intensifying across the banking sector, as seen in the rising deposit rates that are pushing borrowing costs higher, forcing banks to transition toward more selective lending. The situation has become serious enough to warrant repeated instructions from the State Bank of Vietnam to the banking sector to keep borrowing costs affordable to safeguard growth.

As banks tighten their belts, alternative funding channels are experiencing a notable spurt of life. The corporate bond market staged a remarkable comeback in the second quarter of 2026, with private placements surging ninefold from the previous quarter to over US$8.14 billion. However, such a liquidity injection is heavily skewed toward real estate. In fact, while commercial banks’ bond issuance year-by-year declined by nearly half, the real estate sector saw a fourfold increase in the same period. This development shows that alternative capital channels are being mostly directed toward the construction and real estate sectors, not the value-added manufacturing that can help boost Vietnam’s innovation, one of the goals of Vietnam’s economic ambitions.

To release the pressure valve for the banking sector, the state itself is injecting liquidity on a large scale through public infrastructure spending. By the end of July 2026, the Ministry of Finance reported the disbursement of approximately US$16.3 billion in public capital. While this represents 41.9% of 2026’s target and a notable year-on-year improvement, the pace remains uneven across sectors. Five ministries and several localities have disbursed less than 10% of their allocated funds, implying a certain degree of bottleneck in either bureaucratic matters or securing/initiating projects.

Ultimately, the path to a high-income economy cannot be paved solely with the wherewithals from the domestic commercial banking sector or the bond market, but also from external sources. Indeed, the construction of the International Financial Center in the economic hub of Ho Chi Minh City is a stark reminder of Vietnam’s seriousness in attracting foreign capital. That, along with upgrades in governance standards, the inclusion of diverse classes of assets in the market, and many other fledgling endeavors, will help pave the way toward a robust capital market capable of buttressing the country’s growth ambitions. Vietnam’s success will serve as a valuable lesson for developing ASEAN peers on graduating from an immature market dominated by traditional financial channels to one that is more interconnected with the wider world.


Tri has experience in management consulting and strategy, having worked with institutions such as the UNDP, The Asia Group, and ARC Group. He has provided strategic, legal, and operational insights to clients in sectors including manufacturing, energy, and technology. He holds both academic and professional experience related to Southeast and East Asia, with a focus on regional development and policy.

Timor-Leste 🇹🇱

The Pride Month for “Courage” to Collectivehood

by Amandina Maria Helena da Silva, in Dili

For almost one decade, Timor-Leste has celebrated Pride Month every year. It was first celebrated in June 2017 and was publicly supported by the previous Prime Minister Rui Maria de Araujo. The event drew support from international agencies, NGOs, and embassies — but that has changed over the last two years.

Since US President Donald Trump issued a statement about only recognizing two genders and cut the budget to support the LGBTQIA+ community across the world, Timor-Leste was heavily affected. This resulted in institutions that were previously active and fully funded the Pride March event, such as The Asia Foundation and the US Embassy in Timor-Leste, not fully supporting the empowerment of minority organizations like CODIVA Foundation and Arcoiris Timor-Leste due to the withdrawal of all funds that support LGBTQIA+ organizations. When hope fades, collective struggle grows stronger.

This year, there is a limitation of funding, but the state, through Head of State President Ramos Horta; relevant institutions; CSOs; social movements; and people continue to support minority groups through the Pride March, with the theme “Courage” — courage for a long life fighting for minority groups and humanity. This event was officially opened by the President of the Republic, who also affirmed that everyone deserves to live and love openly and honestly. The President reiterated his constitutional duty to protect the dignity of all citizens, fostering a society rooted in mutual respect and the absence of fear.

Besides that, RTTL News reported that the founder of Timor-Leste Pride, Natalino Ornai, stated that the event already has a lot of visibility, and many know about Pride March to support the LGBTQIA+ community, but in reality the minority community still faces a lot of discrimination. In some examples documented by Diligente, Domingos Pires, known as “Pildo,” expressed that she “was always alone and cried silently” due to years of suffering caused by bullying and discrimination. Meanwhile, Mário (fictitious name), a transgender man, spent years in silence, fearing the reaction of his family and society.

The stories of Pildo and Mário show that, despite some progress in raising awareness on human rights, many LGBTQIA+ people continue to face insults, humiliation, exclusion, rejection, and physical and psychological abuse. Clearly, there is a need to unite, not only for minority groups, but for women, the youth, and people in general.

Symbolism is not justice — minority communities need a state that moves beyond recognition to confront inequality, protect rights, and deliver meaningful change.


Amandina is a human rights advocate working with Asia Justice and Rights Timor-Leste on the Interim Reparation to Women Survivors project. She previously worked with UNDP Timor-Leste’s Accelerator Lab and has contributed to human rights and health initiatives through several youth and civil society organisations. Her interests lie in justice, youth empowerment, and community-based social change in Timor-Leste.

Editorial Deadline 11/08/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Siu Tzyy Wei, Lead Editor - Maritime Crescent Desk

The next turn rarely arrives without warning.

In Brunei, the spotlight on Visit Brunei 2027 raises a question of what comes after the year ends. In Indonesia, the discovery of firearms at a South Jakarta school unsettles assumptions about where insecurity can take root. In Malaysia, El Niño puts resilience to the test as a changing climate demands more than preparation for the familiar.

The region is moving forward, but not always along a predictable path. What comes next depends on whether institutions can recognise the turn before they are forced to take it.

This week’s issue is for the road ahead.

Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳

Turning Attention Into Opportunity?

by Syimah Johari, in Bandar Seri Begawan

As one of the world’s major tourism regions, Southeast Asia has long attracted massive numbers of visitors for various reasons. Recently, Brunei introduced Visit Brunei Year 2027 (VBY2027), in conjunction with the Diamond Jubilee of His Majesty. This initiative provides an opportunity for Brunei to position itself in the regional tourism spotlight. But in a region already crowded with established tourism destinations, what can Brunei offer that makes travellers choose to visit, and more importantly, return?

VBY2027 is set to be a year-long celebration, with six themed festivals covering areas such as culture, heritage, nature and the creative community. Promotional campaigns for initiative have already begun, with more than 50 events planned throughout 2027. From cultural celebrations to nature-based experiences, the year-long programme aims to showcase different aspects of what Brunei has to offer.

Within the region, neighbouring countries offer a wide range of attractions, from Thailand’s scenic beaches and active nightlife to Singapore’s well-established tourism industry and Malaysia’s cultural, food and nature experiences. While these destinations have their own appeal, Brunei offers something quieter and more distinct, with its pristine rainforests, Islamic heritage and tranquility. The VBY2027 celebrations also provide an added attraction, coinciding with His Majesty’s Diamond Jubilee that brings together royal celebrations, cultural activities and local festivities. Despite Brunei’s relative smallness, it can offer visitors the opportunity to experience a side of Southeast Asia that is more intimate, while also taking part in a significant moment in the country’s history. Rather than competing with its neighbours by offering more, Brunei could instead use its smaller scale to offer visitors a slower-paced and more personal experience, centred around its nature, culture and heritage.

However, uniqueness does not necessarily guarantee that tourists will come. While VBY2027 indeed provides an opportunity to attract more visitors, its success should not only be measured by the number of tourists arriving in Brunei. This is where coordination across different parts of government becomes important, as improvements in areas such as transport, accommodation, tourism activities and visitor services are often needed to strengthen the overall experience. More importantly, the benefits of tourism should extend beyond 2027, creating opportunities for local businesses, young people and communities to take part in the tourism industry. If VBY2027 only creates a temporary increase in visitors, its impact may be short-lived. The challenge for Brunei is therefore to turn the attention from 2027 into something that lasts beyond celebrations.

With Visit Brunei 2027 bringing together celebrations, culture, nature and local experiences, the year presents Brunei with an opportunity to showcase what makes the country unique within Southeast Asia. Beyond the celebrations, VBY2027 could also encourage greater interest in Brunei as a destination and create opportunities for the local tourism industry to grow.


Syimah is a graduate of King’s College London with a BA in International Relations. With a strong focus on diplomacy, regional cooperation, and development policy, she is passionate about contributing to meaningful change through public service. Currently, she is involved in poverty alleviation work through a local NGO.

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Indonesia 🇮🇩

Do Not Enter

by Gemala Asyura, in Pekanbaru

On July 10th 2026, a private school in Pondok Pinang, Kebayoran Lama, South Jakarta discovered hundreds of weapons inside an old, unused room. Initially used for student activities, the discovery ignited a police investigation that uncovered 996 total items found - 776 air revolvers, 215 air pistols, and 4 air rifles, all chambered in 4.5mm caliber bullets. The sole genuine firearm was a Franchi SPAS-15, a 12-gauge shotgun, which investigators traced to a man who died in 2020.

Later on, in early August, the police found more items such as long barreled weapons, ranging from short barreled weapons to ammunition making equipment; and a number of items suspected to be related to narcotics and pornographic CDs, including two joints of marijuana, a plastic bag suspected to contain methamphetamine, a bong, a glass pipe, lighters, and about 30 pornographic CDs. The school was appalled to find numerous items that had been apparently sitting in the school environment for years.

After further investigation, lawyers representing the former chairman of the school claimed that the weapons were licensed airsoft guns belonging to a company named PT Lokta Karya Perbakin (The All Indonesia Shooting and Hunting Sports Association), legally used to support the school’s extracurricular shooting program, specifically for national and regional sporting events. He says that the person who came up with the idea of having shooting extracurricular activities at school is Jenderal Suryo, he was a member of the school foundation’s board of trustees, but since has died. However, the foundation’s own legal counsel says longtime teachers have denied the school ever ran such a program, casting doubt on that explanation.

What started this discovery is a dispute between the foundation’s former chairman (IWD) and the school. In 2013, IWD allegedly embezzled school funds to purchase some land, all for it to be revealed that the land certificate was registered under his wife’s name. The school brought this matter to court after IWD was suspended in April 2026. The school was only able to access the locked room after the former chairman was removed from the premises. Investigations remains ongoing, as several rooms remain locked — the school believes IWD took the keys with him, necessitating police assistance to gain entry. Among the rooms yet to be searched is one described as resembling a bunker.

Beyond individual details, this points to a flawed governance model where private school foundations can operate with almost no external checks, and where weapons permits are granted without any follow up on how they’re actually stored or used. Moving forward, this raises real questions about whether yayasan(foundation)-run schools require mandatory, independent audits, whether weapons licenses should require periodic re-verification rather than one time approval, and whether single person control over sensitive spaces should even be allowed in institutions responsible for children. How the ongoing investigation and IWD’s case play out could set a precedent for how seriously these gaps get taken next time.


Gemala holds a degree in International Relations, with a focus on contemporary global issues. In addition to her years of undergraduate study, she has hands-on experience in early childhood education, having worked in both teaching and teaching assistant roles. She now pursues journalism as a practical extension of her academic background, with a focus and scope centered on ASEAN regional dynamics and social issues.

Malaysia 🇲🇾

El Niño’s Litmus Test

by Edrina Lisa Ozaidi, in WP Kuala Lumpur

The prolonged El Niño phenomenon puts Malaysia against a double blow caused by the shift in climate pressure. The phenomenon was forecasted to last until early 2027 and converge with a surge in regional transboundary haze.

Together, these environmental hazards threaten public health, strain local water reserves, and put the nation’s disaster management systems on high alert.

The Malaysian Meteorological Department recently projected below-average rainfall across parts of Peninsular Malaysia, Sarawak and Sabah, rapidly escalating the threat of localised drought.

In response, the Department of Irrigation and Drainage (DID) has deployed 606 portable emergency pumps nationwide designed to be mobilised within 24 hours to critical agricultural granaries, falling river basins, and depleting water treatment plants.

The pressure extends directly to the nation’s food security and agricultural sectors. Prolonged dry spells and drought cause vital paddy field and commercial crop yields to choke, forcing agricultural ministries to closely monitor 56 major state dams via advanced telemetry portals.

The goal remains clear; to carefully balance domestic tap water needs with agricultural irrigation demands, ensuring that a dry season does not morph into an economic or humanitarian shortage.

Adding to the parched conditions, persistent southern and south-western winds have carried smoke across international borders, triggering a sharp decline in regional air quality.

Multiple areas in Sarawak — including Serian, Semarahan, Kuching and Sri Aman have plunged into unhealthy Air Pollutant Index (API) readings, crossing the 150 threshold and severely restricting outdoor activities. The spikes in hot spots across the neighbouring regions have prompted state environmental boards to react aggressively by stepping up neighbourhood patrols and activating localised haze operation rooms to penalise industrial or agricultural land clearing.

Yet, domestic enforcement can only do so much against wind-borne pollution, highlighting the frustrating limitations of national borders in the face of cross-border environmental degradation.

As Malaysia navigates this dual crisis of water scarcity and poor air quality, the margin of error is shrinking. The government’s pivot toward proactive infrastructure deployment—such as real-time river basin monitoring systems and pre-positioned pumps—shows a welcome evolution in disaster preparedness compared to past decades.

However, these emergency responses remain fundamentally stopgaps against a larger structural threat. If El Niño persists as predicted, Malaysia will need to transition rapidly from emergency containment to deep structural adaptations in water conservation, agricultural zoning, and regional environmental diplomacy. For an administration striving to secure sustainable economic growth and protect vulnerable populations, safeguarding the nation’s environmental lifelines has never been more urgent.

Edrina is a communications professional with a background in international relations. She holds a degree from the University of Nottingham Malaysia and has worked across public relations and social media for organizations in the development, education, and corporate sectors. Her work focuses on crafting narratives around regional affairs and strengthening media engagement across Southeast Asia.

Editorial Deadline 08/08/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk

This week, visibility took several forms across the region, but it rarely came with freedom attached. In Myanmar, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi was seen by an independent observer for the first time in years when the ICRC confirmed her wellbeing on 3 August, a rare proof-of-life moment that still left international calls for her unconditional release as urgent as ever. However, just across the border, the man responsible for her detention was the one being welcomed: Thai Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul hosted Min Aung Hlaing's first official visit since his disputed installation as Myanmar's prime minister, a bet on economic recalibration that human rights groups say legitimizes a regime under ICC indictment. Meanwhile, in Cambodia, newly confirmed US Ambassador Christopher Anderson pledged deeper security cooperation and raised human rights concerns in the same breath, leaving it to be seen which one Washington actually prioritizes in practice. And in Laos, ambitious new trade targets with Vietnam put Vientiane further into the regional spotlight, even as its widening ties with both Hanoi and Beijing show a country still working out how much independence it can afford while courting two much larger neighbors.

Myanmar 🇲🇲

Daw Aung San Suu Kyi Back in Focus

by Moe Thiri Myat

International attention to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s detention had been growing for months before she was seen by an outside representative this week. In April, her son Kim Aris helped launch a “Proof of Life” campaign, calling for independent confirmation of her health and whereabouts. In May, ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights backed the campaign and called for her unconditional release and independent access.

The issue soon became part of ASEAN’s diplomatic engagement with Myanmar. ASEAN Special Envoy and Philippine Foreign Secretary Ma. Theresa Lazaro sought access to Daw Aung San Suu Kyi as ASEAN increased contacts with Myanmar’s government and other political and armed actors. During a 12 July meeting with Myanmar Foreign Minister Tin Maung Swe, ASEAN was told that she was in good health and would be looked after. Thailand later supported direct access so those assurances could be independently verified.

The request came while Lazaro was pursuing wider consultations on Myanmar. On 13 July, she and Thai Foreign Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow met representatives of ethnic armed organisations and the military-established National Solidarity and Peacemaking Negotiation Committee to discuss an “inclusive national political dialogue.” Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, however, remained outside these engagements, and Lazaro was not granted a meeting with her. The contacts continued through the following weeks.

These diplomatic efforts also coincided with the final weeks of President Min Aung Hlaing’s 100-day peace initiative, which set 31 July as the deadline for armed groups to join discussions. The period ended with several major resistance organisations still outside the government-led process. On the same day, Min Aung Hlaing used his 31 July parliamentary address to criticise ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus and outline the government’s priorities after the 100-day period.

Three days later, on 3 August, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi met Arnaud de Baecque, the Myanmar representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross. The ICRC meeting included a private conversation conducted under the organisation’s procedures for visiting detainees. Photographs released by Myanmar authorities showed the 81-year-old former State Counsellor standing and meeting the delegation. The images provided rare independent confirmation of her condition after years in which reliable information about her health and detention had remained limited.

The visit quickly drew attention from her family, campaigners, governments, and regional organisations. Kim Aris welcomed the confirmation that his mother had been seen by an independent international organisation, while continuing to call for her release. The ICRC did not disclose details of the private conversation, in line with its confidential approach to detention visits, but the meeting marked a rare moment of outside access to one of Myanmar’s most prominent political prisoners.

The visit did not end international calls concerning her detention. On 7 August, the United States and ASEAN Chair again called for the unconditional release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and other political prisoners. The week therefore closed with independent humanitarian access finally taking place, while wider demands for her release, political prisoner releases, and continued international attention remained firmly in place.


Moe Thiri Myat is a senior at Parami University. Majoring in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics (PPE). Interested in analyzing emerging sociopolitical situations and developments, through her work as a Myanmar correspondent at The ASEAN Frontier she aims to explore how sociopolitical developments across Southeast Asia shape and are shaped by the situation in Myanmar.

Thailand 🇹🇭

Min Aung Hlaing Visits Thailand Sparking Protests Among Human Rights Groups

by Natamon Aumphin, in Bangkok

On August 6-7, 2026, Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul welcomed former Myanmar military junta leader Min Aung Hlaing on his first official visit after being declared the prime minister of Myanmar despite accusations of a rigged election. Under the framework of calibrated reengagement, the Thai prime minister aimed to reconnect with Myanmar after Naypidaw’s stalled effort to implement the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus. Although Myanmar is barred from engaging in the ASEAN Summit, Thailand’s prime minister believes that engaging with a neighbor that shares a border over 2,400 km is a necessity, despite criticism that Bangkok’s action is legitimizing the former military chief. The criticism is evident among human rights defenders as death tolls from the civil war in Myanmar reach over 100,000 people and due to the arrest warrant of the junta from the International Criminal Court (ICC).

Min Aung Hlaing’s visit to Bangkok has implications for Thailand on two levels. Firstly, realigning relationships with Myanmar entails economic benefits for both sides. In fact, Thailand was among Myanmar’s top foreign investors half a decade ago, ranging from petroleum to manufacturing, finance, hospitality, logistics, and wellness. Nonetheless, the invested capital has decreases due to the civil war. The resurgence of interest in investing in Myanmar was, hence, reflected in the Thailand-Myanmar Business Forum 2026, where more than 700 business-related representatives attended. For Thailand, this presents a new opportunity to amplify economic exchange with Myanmar and increase trade surplus after a massive decline in Cambodia-Thailand border trade. From gaining almost a hundred billion supplies in 2024 to gaining none in 2026.

Secondly, it sends signals about Thailand’s direction on the global stage. Some scholars argued that Thailand is associated with external and internal risk due to recalibrating the bilateral relationship with Myanmar. Sihasak Phuangketkeow, the Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, affirmed to the public that Thailand’s decision is to unify ASEAN, reintegrate Myanmar, and increase opportunities in the region while assisting Myanmar toward peace and stability. Nonetheless, it is unclear how Thailand will approach Myanmar on this matter as Myanmar has recently criticized the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus.

The skepticism in Myanmar’s commitment led to negative responses from civil society. In fact, some of the Myanmar residing in Thailand were seen to gather in front of the United Nations ESCAP Headquarters in Bangkok, discouraging the Thai government from legitimizing Min Aung Hlaing for fear of human rights violations. Another instance is when a member of parliament shouted “For Peace! For Humanity!” after being denied access to submit a petition to the House of Senate. These instances reflected concerns of the public toward human rights violation records of Min Aung Hlaing, which could not be ignored. Therefore, although Thailand and Myanmar share over 2,400 km of border, there needs to be a balance between recalibrating, constructive engagement, and a roadmap to regional peace.


Natamon has served as a rapporteur at the Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS Thailand). She has also worked as a research assistant on diplomatic issues in Southeast Asia. Her work focuses on how domestic politics shape foreign policy in the region. She holds a degree in international relations and has experience in policy analysis, event reporting, and regional research.

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Cambodia 🇰🇭

Christopher Anderson Confirmed by US Senate as Ambassador to Cambodia

by Chandara Samban, in Kandal

The US Senate confirmed Christopher Anderson as the next US ambassador to Cambodia on August 7, 2026, filling a post vacant since Patrick Murphy’s term ended in May 2024 under the Biden administration. Anderson, a career diplomat with 17 years of experience in foreign affairs and national security, has named cracking down on online scams his top priority. Analysts expect the confirmation to bring unprecedented US-Cambodia security cooperation, though some have raised concerns about an increased security focus given Cambodia’s mounting challenges: the world’s largest online scam industry, a border dispute with Thailand, and strained ties with Beijing.

Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in July, Anderson said he would draw on his diplomatic and national security background to strengthen bilateral ties on both the economic and security fronts. He called the scam crackdown a serious international security issue and stressed the importance of deepening trade ties — the US accounts for roughly 40% of Cambodia’s exports — alongside expanded military cooperation. He described it as a rare bright spot in Phnom Penh-Washington relations, crediting the Trump administration’s renewed attention to Hun Manet’s government. On human rights, he said: “The United States also remains concerned about human rights in Cambodia — including politically motivated trials and the suppression of free expression and assembly. I will press the Cambodian government to meet its obligations to its own citizens, clearly and consistently.”

Thong Mengdavid, deputy director of the China-ASEAN Studies Centre, called the appointment a positive signal of Washington’s strategic focus on Phnom Penh — particularly building the Cambodian army and police’s capacity to fight online scams. “The two countries will focus on cooperation in solving practical problems and pursuing common interests, especially strengthening the ability to prevent cross-border crimes, cybersecurity, intelligence-sharing, and identifying criminals,” he said, noting cybersecurity remains sensitive for Washington given the toll scams have taken on the US economy. Despite Cambodia’s ties with China, he said, the US still values the relationship and hopes to launch a joint legal study group for intelligence-sharing and technical assistance as a foundation for mutual trust.

Geopolitical analyst Seng Vanly said the appointment signals a more security-driven US foreign policy, marking “a turning point toward pragmatic engagement,” with the scam fight a growing area of cooperation — one that could ease tensions if successful, or fuel new friction if not. “The dispatch of a national security expert to Cambodia, in the context of geopolitical competition between the US and China, clearly shows that Washington views Cambodia through the security lens of the Indo-Pacific region,” he said, adding that the move signals US resolve to counter Chinese influence in the region.

William Piekos, an analyst at the Congressional Research Service, said past strain stemmed from Cambodia’s human rights record, restrictions on political space, and its ties with China — but predicted the Trump administration will deepen engagement through military cooperation and development aid. Relations last soured around 2017, after Cambodia dissolved the opposition Cambodia National Rescue Party and accused Washington of backing an effort to unseat Hun Sen’s government.


Chandara is a freelance journalist with a focus on foreign affairs, security issues, and ASEAN affairs. He also serves as a Junior Counterterrorism Intelligence Analyst.

Lao PDR 🇱🇦

Laos–Vietnam Trade Target Highlights Balancing Act in ASEAN

by Phonethida Sitthixay, in Vientiane

Laos and Vietnam have agreed to raise their bilateral trade value to USD 4 billion in 2026, with a longer‑term goal of USD 10 billion by 2030, underscoring the growing importance of their economic partnership.

Trade between the two neighbors reached USD 1.3 billion in the first half of 2026, driven by electricity exports, gold, and potassium chloride, while imports from Vietnam included diesel fuel, vehicles, and chemicals. Energy cooperation is expanding rapidly, with Vietnam approving electricity imports from 47 Lao projects totaling more than 8,260 MW.

China remains Laos’ largest trading partner and investor, with a USD 20 billion trade target by 2030 supported by the China–Laos Railway and customs modernization. Unlike Vietnam’s annual milestone, China’s target reflects a long‑term horizon, highlighting Laos’ dual strategy: immediate growth with ASEAN partners and strategic alignment with Beijing.

Connectivity projects reinforce this balancing act. The Vientiane–Hanoi expressway and Vientiane–Vung Ang railway are expected to reduce logistics costs and strengthen Laos’ role as a transit hub. Together with the China–Laos Railway, these corridors position Laos as a connector between its two largest neighbors and the wider ASEAN market.

Beyond Vietnam and China, Laos has also set trade targets with other ASEAN partners such as USD 11 billion with Thailand by 2027 and USD 700 million with Cambodia by 2030. These figures reflect Vientiane’s ambition to diversify and embed itself more deeply in regional supply chains, turning its landlocked geography into an advantage.

Laos’ trade goals are not just about numbers, they are about positioning itself at the heart of ASEAN’s connectivity drive. By linking Chinese supply chains with Vietnamese and Thai markets, Laos could become the small state that quietly shapes the region’s economic future.


Phonethida Sitthixay holds a Bachelor of Arts in International Relations from the National University of Laos. She is currently a Senior Project Coordinator at AIF Group, where she works on government-led initiatives to modernize financial integration across public sector systems in Laos. She has experience in sustainable development policy, diplomacy, and economic reporting, having worked with the Global Green Growth Institute and The Laotian Times. Her interests focus on Laos’s diplomacy, regional integration, and its evolving role beyond ASEAN.

Editorial Deadline 08/08/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Karen Ysabelle R. David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk

Southeast Asia is a region of staggering linguistic diversity. The multicultural city-state of Singapore is no exception; but with the growing influence from Mainland China driving up Mandarin’s economic value across the region, is it any wonder that a hierarchy of languages has emerged?

Over in Vietnam, China also enters the conversation, but only as a point of comparison: like its larger neighbor, Vietnam’s property bubble threatens to burst. With the cost of homes rising astronomically, the government is betting on social housing to fill in the gaps.

And in the Philippines, the President’s recent State of the Nation Address was an opportunity to look back on the administration’s achievements and priorities over the past year. But behind the flashy work of national politics are epistemic communities: a network of experts involved in the less glamorous nitty-gritty of governance.

Singapore 🇸🇬

The Future of Mother Tongue in Singapore

by Jennifer Hui En Tan, in Singapore

While the Ministry of Education’s (MOE) decision to expand mother tongue elective programs beginning in 2027 appears to reaffirm Singapore’s longstanding commitment to bilingualism, the policy also arrives at a moment when the value and visibility of languages are increasingly being shaped by forces beyond the classroom. Across Singapore and the wider Southeast Asian region, migration, investments, and shifting economic relationships are changing how languages are used in everyday life, raising questions about whether education policy can continue to anchor multilingualism in an increasingly market-driven linguistic landscape.

From 2027, MOE will widen access to the Tamil Language Elective Program at both the secondary and junior college level, building on the two-year program currently offered in selected secondary schools. The Chinese Language Elective Program at the junior college level is set for a parallel expansion, and the MOE is also broadening the Malay Special Program, which lets students with a mother tongue other than Malay pick it up as a third language. These initiatives deepen opportunities for students to engage with the literature, history, and cultural traditions of Singapore’s official mother tongue languages beyond conversational proficiency.

Yet language does not evolve solely through educational policy. Increasingly, it is also being shaped by economic incentives and demographic change. The growing presence of Mainland Chinese business owners and residents has visibly increased Mandarin’s footprint in commercial spaces. Unlike classroom instruction, this expansion is driven by market demand. As businesses adapt to serve Chinese consumers and investors, Mandarin acquires an economic value that extends beyond its role as one of Singapore’s official mother tongue languages.

This creates an important distinction. Singapore’s multilingualism has historically rested on the principle that Mandarin Chinese, Malay, and Tamil should enjoy equal institutional recognition. Yet if one language becomes increasingly associated with commercial opportunity while others remain primarily tied to cultural identity, public perception of their relative value shifts. In this context, the MOE’s expansion of Tamil and Malay electives can be read as a response to this asymmetry and an attempt to keep institutional investment from lagging too far behind market-driven visibility.

Singapore’s experience also reflects a wider regional trend. Across ASEAN, governments are navigating the growing influence of English as the global language of commerce, while also responding to Mandarin’s expanding economic reach through trade, investment, and migration. In Malaysia, the constitutional primacy of Bahasa Malaysia coexists with rising enrollment in Chinese medium education and sustained demand for Mandarin, fueled by both the country’s ethnic Chinese community and deepening economic ties with China. In the Philippines, English remains dominant in business and higher education, yet Mandarin instruction has expanded through universities, language centers, and commercial demand linked to Chinese investment and tourism. In both cases, market forces increasingly shape language acquisition alongside national education policies.

The expansion of mother tongue elective programs therefore represents more than a curriculum update, and reflects an effort to ensure that cultural heritage, national identity, and linguistic diversity remain protected, even as regional economic integration and demographic change alter the languages people encounter in everyday life.

As ASEAN becomes more economically integrated and Chinese influence continues to grow across the region, language policy is likely to become an increasingly important tool of nation-building rather than simply education. Singapore’s latest reforms suggest that preserving multilingualism in the twenty-first century is no longer just about teaching languages, but is about ensuring that market forces do not become the sole arbiters of which languages carry social, cultural, and economic significance.


Jennifer is a final-year International Relations student at the Singapore Institute of Management, where she focuses on political engagement, diplomacy, and community governance. She is an active volunteer in her constituency, working closely with residents to understand local concerns, facilitate dialogue, and support community initiatives.

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Vietnam 🇻🇳

Challenges in Vietnam's Property Market

by Sean Huy Vu

The People’s Committee of Hanoi recently announced that it had accepted a list of 54 new social housing projects for the current fiscal year. The developments are part of the municipal government’s larger plan to construct a minimum of 120,000 apartment units between 2026 and 2030, as city residents struggle to find affordable commercial housing.

For years, Vietnam has enjoyed a boom in its property market. This is due to increasing foreign direct investment in the country, as foreign companies build factories and subsidiaries in the Southeast Asian nation to reduce labor costs and secure their supply chains through diversification. The new service and manufacturing jobs have attracted rapid urbanization and population growth in Vietnam’s key cities, such as Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City, Hai Phong, and Ninh Binh.

Vietnam’s property market, however, has also been fueled by speculation. Both foreign and domestic buyers have purchased new apartments for rent, thereby decreasing inventory and creating rising demand through panic buying and increasing prices. Many developers prefer to market toward affluent buyers to generate higher profits and cover land and development costs. Social housing and mid-range housing, by contrast, require greater approval time and regulations, thereby yielding lower profit margins.

As of 2026, the average Vietnamese home in major cities cost nearly US$300,000, over thirty times higher than the average annual income per capita of US$4,970 in 2025. There now exists an imbalance between a demand for affordable housing and a high supply of premium units. In addition to relatively low incomes, low trust in financial institutions and high interest rates for mortgages — currently ranging between 12% and 14% — are also pricing out families.

Several young urban families have opted to rent rather than purchase. One man and his wife, interviewed by The Investor, saved US$38,000 for over eight years to buy a US$132,000 apartment. However, financing the remaining US$54,000 through a mortgage proved infeasible, given that the couple would have had to spend their entire monthly income of US$1,330 on the monthly principal and interest payments.

The central government has recognized the social implications of unaffordable housing. Without accessible apartments, workers, doctors, students, and teachers will have a harder time providing their skills and services to growing cities, thereby affecting Vietnam’s target of 10% annual GDP growth.

The government has pledged to construct a million new rental social housing units by 2030, with some being provided to soldiers, civil servants, and industrial workers on a complementary basis.

At its current trajectory, Vietnam risks experiencing a property bubble burst, just as China did not too long ago. Like their Chinese counterparts, Vietnamese borrowers can service their mortgages well before construction actually begins on a project, creating a potential redundancy in real estate. Although Vietnam’s population is still growing, unlike China’s, it is already projected to become an “aged society” as early as 2036. With potentially fewer buyers in the near future, Vietnam’s government and real estate sector will have to prepare accordingly.


Sean is a scholar of East Asian history, culture, and international relations, with current research at Georgetown University examining working-class labor and human trafficking in the region. His broader interests include the social psychology of religion and identity politics. Sean previously taught modern Korean history at the University of California, Irvine, where he completed his B.A. in History, and later taught English in Ho Chi Minh City while studying Vietnamese language and culture. His writing has been published by UC Irvine, Johns Hopkins University, and Foreign Analysis.

The Philippines 🇵🇭

SONA and the Influence of Epistemic Communities

by Glenn Vincent N. Boquilon, in Angeles City

Every year, the State of the Nation Address (SONA) becomes a major moment in Philippine politics. Held last 27 July 2026 at the Batasang Pambansa in Quezon City, the SONA served as the President’s platform to present the country’s priorities and direction. Much of the public attention focuses on the President’s message and the actions his administration plans to pursue.

However, behind many government decisions are people who do not always appear in the spotlight. They are researchers, scientists, academics, and technical specialists who help leaders navigate complex problems and design better policies. Individuals in the fields of Political Science and International Relations refer to these groups as epistemic communities: a network of experts who share knowledge and provide guidance on issues that require specialized understanding. These groups do not replace elected leaders, but they do influence how governments respond to a myriad of challenges.

This is evident in the priorities discussed during President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s State of the Nation Address. Several areas highlighted in the speech depend heavily on consultation with groups that possess technical prowess. One example is the government’s push for digital transformation and integration of artificial intelligence. Building a digital economy requires more than adopting new technologies. It involves understanding data protection, cybersecurity, digital infrastructure, and how these tools can improve public services. Researchers, technology experts, and academic institutions play an important role in helping governments make informed decisions.

The same applies to food insecurity. Improving agriculture is not only about increasing production. It requires knowledge about climate conditions, farming practices, supply chains, and changing economic conditions. Agricultural researchers help translate these challenges into policies that can benefit their communities. Another notable domain is disaster resilience. Here, expert knowledge is an essential factor. As one of the most disaster-prone countries globally, the Philippines relies on experts to understand risk and develop better preparedness strategies.

The growing importance of experts is not unique to the Philippines. Within Southeast Asia, governments are increasingly working with knowledge communities to combat national challenges. Singapore has built strong partnerships between government agencies, universities, and research institutions to support innovation and public policy. Additionally, Malaysia has strengthened cooperation between government and technical experts as it expands its digital economy. Furthermore, Vietnam has also relied on research and technical planning as it continues its economic transformation.

The rise of epistemic communities does not mean experts should replace our elected leaders. Conversely, it highlights the need for stronger partnerships between political leadership and specialized knowledge. For the Philippines, this is an important lesson, as many national challenges require solutions that go beyond one administration. The success of government is not measured only by the promises made in a speech, but by the expertise and institutions that turn those promises into results. As Southeast Asia faces more complex challenges, the countries that succeed will be those that know how to combine leadership with knowledge.


Glenn holds a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from the University of Santo Tomas. His experience spans governance programs, policy development, and political research, having worked with the Ateneo School of Government and WR Numero Research on projects focused on electoral reform, public opinion, and regional development. He also helped coordinate the drafting of the Bangsamoro Local Government Code and supported the Academy of Multiparty Democracy.

Editorial Deadline 04/08/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by by Siu Tzyy Wei, Lead Editor - Maritime Crescent Desk

Across the Maritime Crescent, the question of who belongs is rarely asked out loud.

In Malaysia, it lives in the algorithm that finds the disillusioned before anyone else does. In Indonesia, it places itself at the gates of a run club that was never meant for the people living just outside of it. In Brunei, financial literacy lies at the expense of social acceptance.

The region is developing faster than its social contracts can keep up with. The gaps that open in that acceleration are never neutral - they serve some, while leaving others standing at the door.

This week’s issue is for the uninvited.

Malaysia 🇲🇾

Wolves in the Server

by Sydney Gan, in Kuala Lumpur

Malaysia’s Ministry of Defence is eyeing the formation of a new Cyber Force dedicated to preventing cyberthreats, including online extremist recruitment. Although radicalization is not a new nor novel problem in Malaysia, it has only intensified since the introduction of online platforms. Out of the numerous 2024 terrorism-related arrests in Malaysia, 54% were recorded to be involved in supporting Islamic State (ISIS) members through social media and messaging applications, with Facebook being the hotspot for such recruitment, and Telegram, TikTok, and Instagram close behind. Radical online communities are now emerging even in dedicated children’s gaming spaces, such as Minecraft and Roblox.

The most significant risk lies within the online communications features available in both gaming and social media platforms, which have mutually exacerbated the threat of radicalization and extremist recruitment in each other’s digital communities. For example, with communications more difficult to monitor in gaming servers, hostile actors are given the opportunity to ‘platform-hop’ with their victim to an even more remote, encrypted second digital location. This provides the perpetrator free rein to exploit and influence as they please. Vice versa, social media sentiment and its cultivation of incel culture are also shaping online gameplay, fostering an enabling environment for radical perpetrators to take advantage of vulnerable victims with weak identity controls.

Policy-wise, Malaysia is taking great strides to address this problem - most notably in the under-16 social media ban enforced in June 2026. The introduction of the Online Safety Act 2025, as well as the Cybercrimes Bill 2026, clearly indicates regulatory appetite to curb online harms, with punitive measures in place to incentivize strengthened safety features in online platforms. However, a much broader approach should be taken to digital safety, focused not only on prohibition, but also on instating long-term changes to ensure digital citizens are insulated from the ever-evolving risks posed by fast-developing online platforms.

This calls for a child-centered solution, putting the onus of safety-by-design onto digital platforms to ensure children’s interests are prioritized from the conception of their digital function. UNICEF Malaysia points out that this child-first approach must also be adopted by regulators when considering the drafting of online protection and artificial intelligence legislation, and that children risk getting left behind in the rapid advancement of technology if their well-being is not being formally safeguarded. As an investment in digital safety, cybergroups are also urging the government to complement the implementation of online safety regulation with comprehensive digital education for children and parents, equipping users with a holistic understanding of online risks so as to avoid threats to radicalization and further harms.

As cyberthreats continue to evolve and hostile actors grow increasingly evasive, regulations and parental safeguards are the last bastions of protection for children’s online wellbeing. Suggestions of complete social media or platform bans for underage users are an unenforceable reality - governments must pivot to build digital literacy from the ground up to ensure a more intuitive and thoughtful cyberspace for all, including children, to occupy.


Sydney holds a Bachelor of Laws from King’s College London, where she focused on Human Rights Law, Criminology, and Public & Administrative Law. She is an Analyst at Asia Group Advisors, providing policy analysis and strategic guidance across the tech, sustainability, and gaming sectors in Southeast Asia. Prior to joining AGA, she worked in the social development sector in London, contributing to the Ukraine Judicial Training Programme through research on war crimes adjudication and the development of a legal training curriculum with high court magistrates.

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Indonesia 🇮🇩

Not Your Doormat

by Muhammad Rayhansyah Jasin

Bali’s tourism industry was rocked by allegations of racial discrimination occurred by an international running club organized by two Dutch nationals in the Canggu region. A viral Thread post uploaded on July 20 detailed an incident of an Indonesian woman being denied entry to participate in a “Silent Disco” themed event by the so-called ‘Entourage Run’ club despite her German boyfriend’s request being approved.

The woman detailed that some Indonesians told her that they could join the event after they were admitted to the group chat; however she said that none of them had their phone numbers starting with the local Indonesian code of +62. Another Indonesian got her approval twice after being rejected by the same club yet she was still blocked off from joining the Whatsapp group chat. The instance gained wider attention when a Balinese senator with a major online presence, highlighted it on her posts and filed formal complaints to the immigration office.

Indonesia’s Immigration Director-General, Hendarsam Marantoko, acted swiftly calling that there should be “no state within a state” while imposing a re-entry ban to the two Dutch organizers who had fled to Singapore following the public backlash. Entourage then released an online statement on July 25 claiming that “there was bias which incorrectly rejected (some) numbers of +62” and hence erred the approval system for the Whatsapp groups and non-running events.

British social media influencer “Joshberlari’ stated that Entourage Bali is not a one-off incident as exclusive foreign-owned clubs have been operating freely on public roads and infrastructures for far too long. The Governor of Bali, I Wayan Koster, has since declared that there are no-longer any foreign clubs excluding Indonesians operating on the island with later findings of a so-called “Russian Village”, an exclusive residential community, to have ceased to exist. Koster later refuted the claim of exclusionary treatments against Indonesians with Entourage claiming that up to 25% of its participants were Indonesians. Koster also insisted that “the situation in Bali is good and conducive”, encouraging people to come and check the island themselves rather than relying on baseless social media rumors. He also stated that no running clubs are forbidden to operate so long they do not disturb local order and daily activities.

Foreigners living in Canggu and in other parts of Bali’s expatriate-dominated areas have long observed disrespectful customs such as driving motorcycles wearing inappropriate clothes–sometimes even going shirtless–possessing no driving license, and modifying engines to have loud noises. Many of these erratic behaviors go unpunished as local authorities have pushed for a “digital nomad” visa system to boost Bali’s growing economy. Such instances of discrimination fueled by racism and colorism have been plagueing the “Thousand Gods” island perpetrated not only by foreigners, but also locals prioritizing services for white tourists over domestic Indonesian visitors. An Indonesian tourist recalled an interaction where local street vendors belittled her interest in buying handmade crafts assuming that she would not be able to afford them.

Today, Indonesia’s household tourist destination still suffers from symptoms of mass tourism, making Bali’s local livelihoods more expensive and invasive to communal lands. The existence of exclusive foreign clubs only adds insult to Balinese already injured hospitality.


Rayhan is pursuing an Erasmus Mundus Joint Master’s Degree in Public Policy at Central European University and the Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals. He holds a Bachelor of Social Sciences in International Relations and Political Economy from Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University. His current research focuses on the socio-economic impacts of Indonesia’s nickel mining industry on local communities and national development.

Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳

Informed, Yet Indebted

by Maryam Zulaidi

Roughly 30-40% of Bruneians exhibit inadequate financial literacy. The same research also found that Bruneians significantly need improvements in financial knowledge and behaviour through the Financial Literacy Index (FLI). Highlighting that Brunei averaged 66.5 on the FLI, the score remains insufficient for the 2023 OECD threshold of at least 70 points.

In 2021, it was reported that the National Financial Literacy Council aims to bridge the government sector and the private financial sector under a shared mandate. Educational roadshows are among the frameworks created to help foster literacy from as early as primary school. This simplifies complicated explanations, while showing institutional commitment to actively create change for the nation. However, awareness does not necessarily translate into the disposition to act on it.

Most citizens are aware that Brunei’s era of generous public benefits and subsidised living has receded. However, this awareness of a changing economy does not automatically produce changed habits. The information that data cannot accurately represent nor explain is that some will respond by maintaining a lifestyle that is no longer comfortably supported by their financial reality - a behavior familiar to Brunei. Conspicuous consumption is a response to social visibility; in a small society where reputation is revered, spending signals stability, whether or not it’s actually there. The advanced digital environment revolving around trends, instant gratification, and the incentive to spend ahead of one’s means only intensifies this phenomenon. It is social pressures and expectations that are doing much of the heavy lifting, a reality educational campaigns struggle to shift.

Furthermore, consequences compounding quietly are revolving credit card debt, loans, social costs extending to families. Banks flourish from this design while households remain in debt. Yet, as of March 2026, Brunei’s household debt stood at 15.5% of GDP, well below its peak of 19.4% in 2016. While figuratively low, statistics should be interpreted with caution. Brunei’s GDP is driven by oil and gas, making the debt ratio appear lower than it seems. The result also leaves out informal borrowing from family and friends, which the 2015 survey found was common. As a result, the headline number understates the financial pressure facing many households rather than showing that household debt is not a concern.

That being said, the literacy gap is narrowing, slowly, through sustained institutional effort. The lifestyle gap, however, is complicated because it depends on social norms that promote overspending. Closing this gap requires more effort than campaigns and roadshows - it requires changing what financial prudence means socially. The two challenges may look similar at first glance, but call for different solutions in practice.


Maryam is a first-year International Relations and Politics student at the University of Sheffield, with an academic focus on Southeast Asia—particularly Maritime Southeast Asia—and the Middle East. She aspires to a career in diplomacy and academia and is committed to fostering international dialogue and advancing scholarly engagement with global issues. Beyond her academic work, she pursues creative interests and voluntary initiatives that broaden her perspectives on public service.

Editorial Deadline 01/08/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk

Everything set in motion — a policy, a permit, a signature, a price shock — eventually arrives somewhere downstream, whether or not anyone's ready to answer for it. This took place quite literally in Laos, where unauthorized iron ore mining forced regulators to suspend operations on the Nam Song River in Vang Vieng. This is the second pollution case in six weeks, and a reminder that most mining permits get approved exactly where monitoring resources are thinnest. Meanwhile, in Myanmar, five years of violence, blocked envoys, and stalled dialogue have flowed directly from the 2021 Five-Point Consensus that junta leader Min Aung Hlaing signed and then broke — and now, with Myanmar barred from ASEAN summits, he's calling the arrival of that bill "discrimination." In Cambodia, a USD 250 million ADB emergency loan aims to shield over a million low-income households from a fuel-price shock tied to the Middle East conflict, even as the borrowing adds to debt Phnom Penh will carry into its 2029 graduation from Least Developed Country status. Finally, in Thailand, the baht is squeezed between a current account deficit widened by that same energy price spike and investors borrowing cheap baht to chase higher yields elsewhere.

Lao PDR 🇱🇦

Mining, Monitoring, and the Rivers Laos Depends On

by Souriya Bounpaseuth, in Vientiane

Six weeks after the Xe Don River made headlines, Laos is facing a second pollution case, this time in a town whose economy depends on its river. On July 24, the Ministry of Industry and Commerce ordered Daochalearn Mineral Processing to suspend iron ore operations after inspections linked the company to pollution in the Nam Song River in Vang Vieng. The company had been mining without official authorisation, a violation of Laos’s Mineral Law.

Vang Vieng’s tourism economy runs on the Nam Song. Roughly 1,500 local households belong to a cooperative built around river-based tourism, including tubing and kayaking, part of the eco-adventure model the town rebuilt itself around after 2012. At its peak the town drew well over 150,000 visitors a year. Unauthorised discharge into that river threatens the income of a community that spent over a decade rebuilding its economy around the river being clean. The stakes are just as direct upstream. Fishing communities along the Xe Don lost a source of food and income when 460 kilograms of dead fish were reported in April, as detailed in earlier reporting on the Xe Don case. Environmental analysis of the region’s mining boom published by Mongabay warns that toxic runoff, particularly arsenic, poses a long-term threat because it bioaccumulates over time, with lasting impacts on fisheries and food security, harm that continues long after the news coverage ends.

A capacity problem, not a case by case failure. Laos’s Law on Minerals, first passed as Law No. 04/NA and revised in 2017 under National Assembly Resolution No. 603/NA, decentralises permitting. Provincial governors approve smaller concessions, while larger ones require central government approval. Of nearly 1,000 mining companies operating nationwide, 671 hold permits issued by provincial authorities, compared with 297 issued centrally, according to figures cited in New Security Beat’s reporting on rare earth mining in Laos. Most approvals happen where monitoring resources are thinnest. A 2026 comparative legal study of Laos’s environmental impact assessment system, which has been in place since the 1999 Environmental Protection Law, found that inadequate enforcement, minimal public participation, and restricted institutional capacity diminish the effectiveness of its EIA system. This points to a structural gap rather than an isolated failure.

What would change the pattern? Independent environmental analysis of the sector points to specific, adoptable standards. These include secondary containment, geomembrane liners, leak detection systems, secure toxic waste storage, and regular monitoring, along with zero-discharge policies and cleaner extraction methods such as bioleaching. These are measurable conditions that any level of government could write into permits and enforce. Just as important is closing the gap between when harm occurs and when affected communities are heard. In both the Xe Don and Vang Vieng cases, it was local reporting from fishers, residents, and tour operators that surfaced the problem before formal inspection did. Empowering and strengthening that role under the system with better accessible and inclusive grievance channels and community-level water testing would help catch problems early and give affected households a stake in the outcome.

With recovery in progress, authorities have ordered Daochalearn to restore affected land and waterways and to work with local officials in Vang Vieng and Longcheang on rehabilitation, with further legal action and penalties possible under instructions from the Prime Minister’s Office if the company continues operating without authorisation. This mirrors the response to the Xe Don case, where water quality returned within national standards at 11 sites by early May under Decree No. 389/PM on EIA. Publishing verified water-testing.

Myanmar 🇲🇲

Myanmar’s Failed President Criticizes ASEAN

by Ley Hlaing

Myanmar’s newly elected president and former junta leader Min Aung Hlaing recently criticized ASEAN’s ongoing approach toward his administration. Analysts could view this sharp remark as a reaction to his government’s continuing diplomatic isolation and severe domestic challenges across multiple sectors.

On the last day of his disappointing 100-Day Plan, the junta president made a speech at the parliament in Nay Pyi Taw, including serious criticism of ASEAN’s decision on Myanmar. He remarked that ASEAN is discriminating against Myanmar, mentioning the Five Point Consensus of ASEAN as being not a “collective” decision on Myanmar’s situation but rather just a statement issued when the ASEAN Chair was held by Brunei. However, Min Aung Hlaing omitted the part where he showed up himself at the meeting on April 24, 2021 and signed the Consensus consisting of these points: 1) immediate cessation of violence in Myanmar, 2) launching constructive dialogue, 3) appointing ASEAN Special Envoy, 4) giving humanitarian assistance, 5) sending delegation to visit.

Looking back at the consensus points, the military government has not only failed to implement the agreement they signed, but also repeatedly violated them. The first point encouraged to uphold the immediate halt of all violence in Myanmar since the three months after the coup. But after ousting the civilian government over five years, the violence in Myanmar has been unprecedented and perpetuated by the state such as bombing the schools, religious buildings, IDP camps and killing thousands of innocent civilians and other escalating situations including political repression, media crackdowns, surveillance, overnight household inspections, forced military recruitment, and restrictions on movement. The second point also did not align with the transformed administration, as dialogue has been rathe selective and peace talks are mainly brokered by China without inclusivity. The junta also failed to respect the last three points, continuing its operations and refusing to let ASEAN special envoys meet with detained political figures like Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. Despite the initial agreements, the situation has evolved to the point that ASEAN currently bars Myanmar’s high-level political leaders from attending subsequent summits, inviting only “non-political” representatives instead.

Immediately after he came back from the summit in Indonesia, military controlled media have subsequently restated that the agreement was made without his consent and they will only consider implementing the provisions after ensuring stability within the country and when the country’s domestic priorities are aligned with them. The consideration has taken for the junta half a decade of period to stabilize their oppressive rule before implementing the provisions.

In mid July, Myanmar’s nominally elected legislature, the Pyidaungsu Hlutta, echoed the same by claiming ASEAN “undermines Myanmar’s equal status within the organization, interferes in the country’s internal affairs, and no longer corresponds to current political realities.” Furthermore, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has issued a statement that upholds this very same view on July 23, 2026. On the day of address in front of 900 representatives and officials, the junta president affirmed their voices as the reaction of their failed administration and 100-Day plan. Analysts note that although Thailand is advocating Myanmar’s representation re-entry back in ASEAN, the Five-Point Consensus remains the bloc’s primary framework for addressing Myanmar’s political crisis. However, there are voices claiming that the Consensus is not strong enough to ensure the accountability of the Myanmar military.

Myanmar’s relationship with ASEAN has come full circle, with the junta facing isolation similar to the challenges preceding its 1997 entry. Despite the regime’s rejection of the Five-Point Consensus and claims of discrimination, ASEAN maintains that re-entry depends on halting violence and honoring the 2021 agreement.

Ley Hlaing is a former Political Science student from the University of Yangon, Myanmar. Currently, he is pursuing his BA at Parami University with a major in Philosophy, Politics and Economics. His academic and professional interests span community development, literature, minority issues, and social impact research. Having held roles as Research Assistant, Student Mentor, and Facilitator for local initiatives, he has constantly supported project management in literature and education programs in Myanmar.

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Cambodia 🇰🇭

ADB Approves Emergency Loan for Cambodia as Middle East Conflict Drives Fuel Costs

by Sokna Thea, in Phnom Penh

The Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Cambodian government signed a $250 million emergency loan on Friday to cushion the kingdom’s economy against surging global fuel and food prices driven by the Middle East conflict. The financing backs Cambodia’s new Rapid Intervention for Stabilization of the Economy (RISE) Program which is the first initiative executed under the ADB’s revised emergency support policy. Cambodian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economy and Finance Aun Pornmoniroth and ADB Country Director Yasmin Siddiqi formally executed the agreement in Phnom Penh. ADB stated in an official press release that the loan will fund temporary, targeted fiscal measures to protect planned social spending in the 2026 national budget.

Under the RISE initiative, the emergency package targets direct assistance to more than 1 million low-income households registered under the government’s IDPoor system, including at least 350,000 families headed by women. Assistance spans direct cash transfers, temporary debt relief, and subsidies for rural agricultural inputs to help families cope with rising living costs. Beyond immediate relief, the program promotes cleaner energy by offering financial incentives for electric vehicles and green technologies to small transport operators, helping reduce future reliance on imported fuel.

The USD 250 million ADB commitment anchors a broader co-financing coalition, with up to USD 250 million from the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and USD 188 million from the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) remaining under proposal. If fully finalized, total resources for the RISE program would reach USD 688 million. ADB officials noted that the package forms part of a broader USD 450 million regional emergency response across Asia-Pacific, which also includes USD 200 million in policy-based lending to assist Sri Lanka.

Independent analysts and multilateral lenders warn that the fuel-price shock threatens to reverse recent poverty reduction gains. In its latest economic update, the World Bank cautioned that a 60% jump in oil prices could push up to 1.1 million Cambodians below the poverty line as transportation and production costs ripple through the economy. Because Cambodia imports 100% of its refined fuel, domestic pump prices have climbed roughly 30% for gasoline, 87% for diesel, and 70% for LPG since March. Although the government cut fuel import duties to blunt the impact, ADB officials say those steps will only partially offset global price spikes.

Economists caution that while concessional borrowing grants vital fiscal breathing room, it increases Cambodia’s external debt load as Phnom Penh prepares to graduate from Least Developed Country (LDC) status by 2029. LDC graduation will eventually phase out many special trade privileges and highly concessional borrowing terms, tightening future financing conditions. To minimize short-term debt strain, the loan carries a 30-year maturity with a low interest rate of approximately 0.75%, giving the government space to keep vulnerable households afloat while maintaining essential public services.

Sokna has a background in International Affairs and Business & Commercial Law. He’s currently a Senior Project Coordinator at the Ministry of Economy and Finance of Cambodia, working on the Financial Management Information System (FMIS) Project. His professional focus is driven by entrepreneurship, business development, and financial technology, with a particular interest in how private-sector innovation drives Cambodia’s economic growth.

Thailand 🇹🇭

The Baht Under Pressure

by Satid Sootipunya, in Bangkok

The baht is facing pressure from a widening current account deficit and carry trades as investors shift funds to higher-yielding markets, despite an overall strengthening trend.

Thailand’s current account deficit reached USD 17.7 billion in the three months ended June, after a USD 1.4 billion surplus in the first three months of 2026, Bank of Thailand spokesperson Chayawadee Chai-anant said at a press briefing last week.

The quarterly deficit was driven by rising imports of crude oil due to higher energy prices, imports for the electronics sector following the data center investment boom, and surging gold imports, along with a wider deficit in net services, income and transfers due to dividend payments, she added.

The current account deficit is one of the factors weakening the baht as demand for foreign currencies has outpaced demand for the domestic currency. Over the past six months through July 24, the baht has weakened about 8.5%, according to Bloomberg’s Thai baht index.

Besides volatile oil prices, another factor suppressing the baht is the potential for carry trades involving the baht against currencies from other economies, Wachirawat Banchuen, Senior Financial Markets Strategist at Siam Commercial Bank (SCB), said during an interview with local media outlet The Standard Wealth.

The Bank of Thailand (BOT) held its key monetary policy rate at 1% at its latest board meeting, leaving Thailand’s interest rate among the lowest in the world. This encourages investors to borrow baht at low interest rates and invest in higher-yielding markets, such as Latin American and other emerging Asian economies, Wachirawat said.

He added that although Thailand has seen 4 billion baht of capital inflows into the Thai stock market in July, around 2 billion baht has flowed out of the bond market, especially short-term bonds held by foreign investors. This reflects currency speculation during periods of baht weakness.

However, when measuring the baht against its 15 main trading partners via the Nominal Effective Exchange Rate, the baht is projected to appreciate by 1.3%, reaching an index level of 120.8, up from 119.0 last year.

Specifically, the baht is expected to gain against the Japanese yen, Indonesian rupiah, Vietnamese dong, South Korean won, and U.S. dollar, while softening against the Hong Kong dollar, New Taiwan dollar, pound sterling, Singapore dollar, and euro.


Satid is a multimedia economic journalist and news anchor who covers macroeconomic trends, Thailand’s fiscal policy, and key regional developments for Bangkok Biz. A Journalism graduate from Thammasat University, he has reported on major issues such as the US–China trade tensions, the Myanmar crisis, and global corporate stories, drawing on prior newsroom experience at The Momentum, the Bangkok Post, AFP, and Varasarn Press. His work blends economic analysis, foreign affairs, and digital storytelling, with a strong focus on making complex financial and political topics accessible to Thai audiences.

Editorial Deadline 01/08/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Karen Ysabelle R. David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk

Another week, another development in the world of AI. The global data center boom has reached Vietnam, but with a twist: Hanoi hopes its digital infrastructure surge can be powered by green energy, in defiance of the energy-intensive pattern found in the region’s other data center hubs. Can the country’s high-tech high hopes become a success story for Southeast Asia?

In Singapore, a different sort of regional pattern rears its head. As more and more Southeast Asians retreat from marriage, a declining marriage rate couples with a rise in the rate of divorces by mutual agreement in the city-state.

Over in the Philippines, a proposed anti-false information bill just hurdled third and final reading at the House of Representatives. But what sounds good on paper merits taking a closer look: who is this bill actually meant to target?

Vietnam 🇻🇳

Vietnam's Data Center Boom Goes Green

by Hang Nguyen, in Ho Chi Minh City

Vietnam is in the middle of a digital infrastructure surge, and the story unfolding behind the scenes is as much about power and sustainability as it is about servers and cloud contracts.

For years, Vietnam trailed regional data center hubs like Singapore and Malaysia. That is changing fast. Rising cloud adoption, a young and highly connected population, and surging demand for AI computing have turned the country into one of Southeast Asia’s most closely watched digital infrastructure markets. Domestic telecom giants — such as Viettel, VNPT, and FPT — are racing to expand capacity, while international players, including Microsoft and G42, are exploring large-scale projects, with several developments targeted for Ho Chi Minh City through 2027.

New regulation is accelerating the shift. A government initiative issued in late 2025 moved Vietnam’s digital infrastructure strategy from a state-led model toward one driven by private investment, removing caps on foreign ownership for data center service providers. Meanwhile, a personal data protection law taking effect in 2026 requires certain categories of Vietnamese user data to be stored domestically, a rule likely to push more international companies to build or lease local capacity rather than route data through neighboring countries.

All of this growth collides with an old problem: data centers are enormous consumers of electricity, and Vietnam’s grid still relies heavily on coal and hydropower. That tension is precisely what is pushing the “green data center” concept from a marketing term into a genuine engineering priority.

A green data center aims to minimize environmental impact through efficient cooling, renewable power sourcing, smarter workload management, and infrastructure designed to reduce waste heat and water use. Vietnam’s revised national power development plan lays out a path toward carbon neutrality by 2050, targeting renewables making up roughly a third of the energy mix by 2030 and a much larger share by mid-century. New policy frameworks are also beginning to allow direct power-purchase arrangements, letting renewable energy generators sell electricity straight to large users like data center operators rather than only through the state grid.

Viettel’s new high-tech data center complex in Ho Chi Minh City, which broke ground in 2025, illustrates the direction the industry is heading. Positioned as the country’s first hyperscale facility, it has been designed with energy efficiency features intended to support heavy AI workloads without a proportional spike in emissions. Industry analysts expect Vietnam’s green data center market to keep growing at a rapid pace over the next several years, driven by tightening environmental regulation, corporate sustainability commitments, and the sheer cost savings that efficient facilities offer over time.

Challenges remain substantial. Grid capacity in key industrial areas is under strain, land approvals can be slow, and the renewable energy supply needed to make “green” claims credible is still being built out. But the direction is unmistakable: Vietnam is trying to become a regional data center hub without repeating the energy-intensive patterns seen elsewhere. Whether it can scale hyperscale-level computing power while genuinely decarbonizing its grid may become one of the defining infrastructure stories in Southeast Asia over the next decade.


Hang is a young researcher with academic experience in Vietnam and the United States. She has previously worked in public relations at the U.S. Consulate General in Ho Chi Minh City and the YSEALI Academy. Her research focuses on ASEAN centrality in the evolving Asia-Pacific landscape, with particular attention to Vietnam’s approach to trade, regional cooperation, and political economy in the face of external power dynamics and global volatility.

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Singapore 🇸🇬

Singapore's Marriage Slump Meets a Quieter Kind of Divorce

by Ryan

Singapore recorded 24,688 marriages in 2025, a 6.2% drop from the previous year and the lowest tally since 2016 outside of the pandemic disruption, according to the Department of Statistics’ latest report on marriages and divorces. It is the third consecutive annual decline since weddings peaked at 29,389 in 2022, when couples who had postponed ceremonies during COVID-19 finally caught up. Divorces and annulments also fell slightly, to 7,242, but the more revealing shift is in how couples are ending marriages rather than how many are doing so. Divorce by mutual agreement, introduced as an additional ground for civil divorce in July 2024, accounted for 21.5% of husband-filed and 17.3% of wife-filed cases in 2025, even as “unreasonable behavior” remained the single most cited reason overall.

That shift echoes a sentiment increasingly heard in Singaporean households and reflected in recent Straits Times reporting on couples who describe their split not as a failure, but as a managed, amicable transition. The mutual agreement provision was designed precisely for this cohort. Before the reform, couples without evidence of fault had to either accuse one another of unreasonable behavior, an often adversarial process that family lawyers and the Association of Women for Action and Research had long criticized, or wait out a three-to-four-year separation period. The new pathway lets couples cite shared responsibility, such as differing parenting philosophies, without assigning blame, shortening a process that previously extended emotional and financial strain over years.

Behind the legal change sits a demographic one. Couples are marrying later, at a median age of 31.1 for grooms and 29.6 for brides, and divorcing later too, with median marriage duration at dissolution rising to 11.5 years from 10.0 in 2015. Older, longer-married couples are more likely to have children, shared property, and overlapping social circles, all of which raise the practical cost of an adversarial split and the incentive to manage it civilly. Singapore’s own family ministry has noted that couples married five to nine years remain the single largest group filing for divorce, a stage when children are often young enough that co-parenting considerations dominate. Rising female workforce participation and financial independence have also reduced the economic entanglement that once made fault-based blame the only route to a fair settlement, while broader destigmatization of divorce, visible in more open public discussion of amicable splits, has made couples less anxious about how the process reflects on them.

The demographic backdrop makes the reform more consequential than a procedural tweak. General marriage rates have fallen across nearly every age bracket for men and among those under 35 for women. Singapore’s approach, treating the legal exit from marriage as something that can be humane rather than punitive, is as much social policy as family law.

The pattern is not confined to the city-state. Malaysia recorded roughly 190,000 marriages in 2024, still below its pre-pandemic norm, while Thailand posts one of the region’s higher divorce rates alongside a well-documented decline in weddings among its youth. The OECD’s recent Asia-Pacific social indicators report frames these shifts within a broader regional retreat from marriage tied to rising education, urbanization, and delayed family formation. What distinguishes Singapore is its willingness to legislate for graceful exits rather than treat divorce reform as an afterthought.


Ryan is a final-year finance student at the Singapore University of Social Sciences (SUSS) with experience across venture capital, venture debt, and business development. He also holds a diploma in Law and Management from Temasek Polytechnic. His interests lie in how emerging technologies and economic trends shape business ecosystems and regional development in Asia.

The Philippines 🇵🇭

Fighting Disinformation or Regulating Speech?

by Arianne De Guzman, in Bulacan

On 22 July 2026, the House of Representatives (HoR) approved on third and final reading House Bill No. 9465, also known as the proposed Digital Media Anti-False Information Act, led by House Speaker Faustino “Bojie” G. Dy III.

The measure has a counterpart bill in the Senate, which, as of 25 July 2026, remains pending at the committee level. It is also listed as a priority measure under the Legislative-Executive Development Advisory Council (LEDAC) agenda, and was filed in response to the perils of deliberate disinformation campaigns that are aimed at eroding public trust and weakening democratic institutions.

The measure would mandate the regulation of social media platforms by requiring them to undergo annual independent audits, publicly disclose political advertisements, and work collaboratively with education agencies to institutionalize media literacy. However, there are concerns over how the proposed legislation could threaten freedom of expression and could be weaponized to silence journalists, government critics, and Filipino citizens.

In a joint statement, 55 media organizations and several independent journalists described the bill as a “wrong response to a real problem,” arguing that it places greater emphasis on regulating individual expression and expanding government authority over free speech than on addressing the political economy of influence operations and technological systems that create, amplify, and profit from coordinated information manipulation. Sigla Research Center, a think tank that studies disinformation, echoed these concerns, noting that the measure only targets low-level disinformation-for-hire workers while going easy on those who orchestrate disinformation campaigns, such as financiers, troll farms, political consultancies, and coordinated influence networks.

Sigla also warned that it would give the Philippine executive branch broad powers to order content takedowns and issue accreditations without sufficient court oversight through the Digital Media Integrity Council (DMIC), a body composed largely of government agencies and operating with limited judicial oversight, which could affect legitimate political speech and create a chilling effect on journalism and public discourse.

The 55 media organizations also noted that there are already existing laws in place to address such “harmful acts” associated with deception, particularly remedies for libel, fraud, election offenses, and cybercrime-related offenses. They urged Congress to examine whether these existing laws are effectively implemented.

Taken together, the criticism reveals that the central weakness of the Digital Media Anti-False Information Act lies not in its recognition of disinformation as a public concern, but in who is the target of regulation. Overall, this legislative initiative reflects a content-centered approach that may be easier to enforce but less effective in dismantling the underlying infrastructure of organized disinformation.


Arianne has experience in policy research at De La Salle University’s Jesse M. Robredo Institute of Governance, where she contributed to projects on systemic reform. She earned a degree in Political Science from Colegio de San Juan de Letran. Currently, she works in government relations, specializing in advocacy strategy, legislative monitoring, and stakeholder engagement. Beyond her professional work, she is actively involved in youth development and grassroots initiatives through the Rotaract Club of Santa Maria.

Editorial Deadline 28/07/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Siu Tzyy Wei, Lead Editor - Maritime Crescent Desk

Three stories, moving in different directions and calculations.

In Brunei, a new door opened quietly: formal diplomatic ties with Bhutan, another small kingdom adding a name to its map of friends and allies. In Indonesia, Prabowo swore in the leaders of a new state university, while calling his critics traitors in a colonial-era phrase. In Malaysia, a single deportation case spoke volumes on where the country still stands.

Together, they are all deciding what to open, what to guard and what to protect.

Indonesia 🇮🇩

Loyalty, By Degree

by Rayhan Prabu Kusumo, in Jakarta

Within two days, President Prabowo Subianto made two moves that seemed unrelated. On July 22, he swore in the leaders of a new state university built to groom the country’s future officials. The following evening, on the anniversary of a political party, he told the room that some Indonesians serve foreign masters the way collaborators once served the Dutch, now dressed as reporters, analysts, and NGO workers. Two moments, one project.

The thread between them was a phrase: londo ireng, black Dutchman. In colonial times, it named the native who took the colonizer’s side against his own people, and carrying the full weight of the word traitor. Aimed at journalists and civil-society groups, it recasts criticism as disloyalty and the critic as a foreign asset, a charge Prabowo pressed by asking “who pays for their electricity.” Coming from the highest office, the phrase signals to officials and supporters that surveillance and prosecution of these people are now fair game.

The university is the quieter half of the story. Universitas Republik Indonesia is modelled on France’s old École nationale d’administration, the school that trained the French governing class for decades. It exists to form future civil servants and state-company chiefs, shaping their skills, character and way of thinking. The irony seems lost on its planners: France abandoned that model in 2021 precisely because it produced a narrow, uniform elite, and replaced it with the Institut national du service public, a model that is built to widen the sociopolitical pipeline.

Set side by side, the two moves point the same way: both treat independent thought as a problem to manage. The people Prabowo named have spent his term documenting what this column has tracked - unsustainable expensive programs, a weakening economy, and the creeping militarization. Campuses have been the engine of nearly every protest against the leader, despite being silenced before. The New Order reordered university life to kill student politics, and it held for a generation. The instinct to still the places where dissent forms is not new here. It is being exercised again, more gently, but in broad daylight.

There is a fair case on the other side. Leaders everywhere complain about the press, legitimacy of foreign funding towards advocacy, and whether Indonesia can reasonably want a competent school for its officials. None of that is authoritarian by itself. The danger is in the combination and the source. When the head of state calls critics traitors, and the next elite is trained in an institution built to form loyalty, the room for dissent narrows, regardless of the intent.

By the president’s own definition, the reporter who filed this week’s uncomfortable story is a londo ireng. But so is the economist, the NGO clerk, and whoever wrote this. When the word for critique and traitor collapses into one, a government has long stopped answering its critics and instead, started counting them.


Rayhan has a background in government affairs and public policy, with experience across government institutions and advisory firms. His work focuses on the intersection of geopolitics, policy, and risk, with expertise in advocacy, regulatory analysis, and stakeholder engagement. He holds a degree in Government from Universitas Padjadjaran, and has completed an exchange at Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Spain, focusing on global politics and sustainability.

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Malaysia 🇲🇾

Standing Strong

by Muhammad Aiman Bin Roszaimi, in Cyberjaya

Malaysia’s recent decision to deport any Israeli citizen found within its borders has once again placed the country at the centre of international attention. After the deportation of a US-Israeli citizen, the US. State Department summoned the Malaysian ambassador for an explanation of its policy.

While the episode appears to be a diplomatic surprise, it has been Malaysia’s long standing foreign policy. Therefore, understanding why Malaysia maintains this position requires examining its historical, diplomatic and domestic foundations.

Malaysia has never established diplomatic relations with Israel since gaining independence. Successive governments have consistently refused to recognise Israel until a just resolution to the Palestinian issue is achieved - a position consistent across four different administrations.

The immediate trigger for the latest controversy was an investigation into the Network School community in Johor, where allegations emerged that Israelis were participating using foreign passports, albeit with valid travel documents. As authorities required the individual to leave the country, Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim declared that any Israeli citizen identified in Malaysia would likewise be deported.

From Kuala Lumpur’s perspective, this is fundamentally an immigration and sovereignty issue. Foreign Minister Mohamad Hasan emphasised that Malaysia immigration policy does not recognise Israel and therefore does not permit Israeli nationals to remain in the country. The government has reiterated that this is not a newly introduced measure but a longwithstanding policy.

Beyond legal and diplomatic considerations, Malaysia’s position is also shaped by its foreign policy identity. The Palestinian cause has become one of the country’s most enduring international commitments, seen across its voting behaviour at the United Nations, humanitarian assistance, and diplomatic statements. For Malaysia and its leaders, support for Palestine is presented as a matter of international law, anti-colonial solidarity and the protection of civilian populations.

Domestic politics further reinforce this stance. Public sympathy for Palestine remains exceptionally strong across Malaysia’s multiethnic society, making any significant shift towards recognising Israel politically difficult. Rather than representing a partisan position, support for Palestine has evolved into a bipartisan consensus that transcends changes in government, giving policymakers considerable domestic legitimacy on international grounds.

However, United States’ criticism has prompted Congress members to call for a review of US-Malaysia bilateral security cooperation and military training programmes, illustrating how regional policies on Israel can increasingly affect broader strategic relationships, particularly as geopolitical competition intensifies. But for Kuala Lumpur, the decision to bar Israeli citizens is about more than immigration enforcement.

Whether this stance will become increasingly costly amid changing geopolitical dynamics remains uncertain. However, Malaysia appears prepared to absorb those diplomatic costs rather than alter one of the most consistent pillars of its foreign policy.


Aiman is a PhD candidate in Security and Strategic Analysis at the National University of Malaysia. His research focuses on Malaysia’s space policy, ASEAN regional security, and the strategic implications of emerging technologies. His work explores how Malaysia’s defense policy and strategic culture shape its approach to outer space.

Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳

Establishment of Brunei-Bhutan Diplomatic Relations

by Wira Gregory Ejau, in Bandar Seri Begawan

On July 13, the governments of Brunei Darussalam and the Kingdom of Bhutan signed a Joint Communiqué establishing formal diplomatic relations through their respective Permanent Representatives to the United Nations in New York.

Bhutan is one of the most diplomatically selective sovereign states in the world. With the establishment of relations with Brunei, it now maintains formal ties with 61 countries and the European Union, which is roughly 30% of UN member states. More notably, it has no diplomatic relations with the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, or China, which are permanent members of the UN Security Council. These constraints are rooted in Bhutan’s longstanding commitment to preserving sovereignty and avoiding entanglement in great-power competition. Within this framework, the decision to formalise relations with a given state carries weight that it would not in a more expansive diplomatic network.

The communiqué itself offers a shared foundation of deep respect for the institution of the Monarchy. Diplomatic instruments rarely invoke constitutional arrangements as common values, and both Brunei and Bhutan are absolute monarchies with governing frameworks centred on royal authority. Whether this constitutes a genuine normative alignment or diplomatic courtesy is a distinction that is worth observing in the long run.

The symmetries between the two states are especially that of size, such as navigating the pressures of substantially larger neighbours, especially as Bhutan attempts to navigate between India and an unresolved border dispute with China with which it has no formal relations. Both have pursued cautious, selective foreign policies that prioritise sovereignty preservation over the accumulation of partnerships, and have, in different ways, used multilateral forums such as ASEAN for Brunei, SAARC and BIMSTEC for Bhutan as the primary architecture of their international engagement rather than bilateral treaty networks.

Bhutan has been accelerating its Southeast Asian diplomatic engagement in recent years, driven in part by the Gelephu Mindfulness City project. It is an ambitious special economic zone designed to attract investment and reposition Bhutan’s economic geography toward Southeast Asia. Singapore has been the most visible partner in this process; formalising relations with Brunei extends that Southeast Asian thread further, and opens a direct diplomatic channel between an ASEAN member and a SAARC and BIMSTEC state that has, until now, engaged Southeast Asia primarily through third-party capitals.


Gregory is an MSc candidate in Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He works as a freelance writer specializing in international history, conflict, and counterterrorism, with experience in academia, investigative journalism, and voluntary uniformed service. He currently provides research assistance with the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) under their Southeast Asian Security and Defence Internship Programme and conducts investigations on regional security and transnational crime for a confidential company.

Editorial Deadline 27/07/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk

This week in the Mekong Belt, stories share a quieter question underneath the headlines: what gets left out when governments announce a win. In Laos, the Luang Prabang Mekong dam has passed 72% completion, but officials still haven't disclosed the UNESCO heritage impact assessment they agreed to conduct, even as 7,000 people are resettled and sediment flows are altered downstream. In Cambodia, a new 10% US tariff over unresolved forced-labor enforcement is being framed by officials as a negotiating win because it undercut competitors' rates, a reading that says little about whether the underlying labor practices have actually changed. Meanwhile, in Thailand, Bangkok's "calibrated re-engagement" with Myanmar's junta is being sold as pragmatic regional leadership, but it leaves an unmanaged displacement crisis at the Thai border largely unaddressed. And in Myanmar, while the regime talks of peace processes and stability, a new report documents 148 political prisoners who died from medical neglect since the 2021 coup, a toll that rarely factors into the official narrative at all.

Lao PDR 🇱🇦

Progress on the Dam, Silence on the Heritage Risk

by Thongsavanh Souvannasane, in Vientiane

Workers have pushed the USD 5 billion Luang Prabang Mekong Hydropower Project past 72% completion, Lao and Thai officials announced after a joint site visit on 18 July.

The milestone raises a question officials have yet to answer: what happens to Luang Prabang’s UNESCO World Heritage status once the dam starts turning its turbines?

Lao Minister of Industry and Commerce Malaithong Kommasith and Thai Minister of Energy Ekaniti Promphan inspected the site straddling Chomphet and Pak Ou districts, 25 kilometers from the historic town.

Officials insisted studies and lessons from the Xayabouly dam, Laos’ first Mekong mainstream dam, had resolved concerns over the project’s impact on the World Heritage site.

Thai companies hold the overwhelming stake: CK Power owns 50 %, Gulf Hydropower 20 %, and CH. Karnchang and TTW Public Company 10 % each, for 90 % Thai ownership. Laos’ PT Sole holds the remaining 10 %, leaving the host country a minority share in a dam it will absorb the resettlement and heritage risks for.

UNESCO tells a more cautious story.

It first raised concerns in March 2020, after Laos notified it of the project, and in March 2023 issued a report urging Laos to protect the town’s heritage sites and regulate nearby tourism development. UNESCO also triggered a Heritage Impact Assessment that Laos agreed to undertake, one whose outcome authorities have not disclosed, leaving the question of whether officials are declaring victory prematurely.

As a run-of-river project, the dam keeps water flowing constantly, but it will also trap sediment that has long nourished riverbank farming and fishing downstream, a cost rarely mentioned alongside turbines and megawatts.

Many villages across Chomphet, Hongsa, and Nga districts in Luang Prabang, Xayabouly, and Oudomxay provinces, home to roughly 7,000 people, are already being resettled for the dam, designed to produce 1,460 megawatts once complete in 2030.

Officials call the resettlement compliant with policy, though how communities assess that trade-off remains unexamined.

The dam fits a larger pattern.

Laos’ electricity capacity grew from 9.4 gigawatts in 2020 to 12.3 gigawatts in 2025, and is expected to nearly triple to 30 gigawatts by 2035, with hydropower still supplying roughly 80% of capacity, an expansion showing little sign of slowing.

The dam also rises as Luang Prabang’s tourism economy booms. Arrivals climbed roughly 52 % year-on-year in 2025, reaching 3.5 million, up from 2.3 million. Authorities credit the surge partly to the Laos-China Railway, which has cut travel time between Vientiane and Luang Prabang and opened a direct route for Chinese tourists from Laos’ northern border, turning an arduous road trip into hours.

That contradiction sits at the project’s heart: Laos markets Luang Prabang’s preserved townscape to record numbers of visitors while building a majority foreign-owned dam upstream that heritage authorities have not confirmed is safe for that townscape.

Whether hydropower earnings and heritage tourism can coexist may depend less on engineering than on how transparently Laos shares an assessment it has yet to make public.

Thongsavanh is a journalist from Laos with a background in English-language media. He graduated from the Lao-American Institute with a Diploma of the Arts in English and contributes to independent news platforms. His reporting focuses on environmental issues, socio-economic development, and geopolitics.

Cambodia 🇰🇭

US Imposes 10% Tariff on Cambodian Goods Over Forced Labor

by Malai Yatt, in Phnom Penh

Following a Section 301 trade investigation, the United States will hit Cambodian exports with a 10% tariff after determining Phnom Penh failed to effectively enforce forced labor import prohibitions.

On July 23, the United States Trade Representative (USTR) declared a new 10% duty on goods imported from Cambodia and 59 other nations, which some Asian nations also included. They include Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and Japan, for their failure to enact and uphold an import ban on forced labor.

USTR confirmed that “Certain products of Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, and more that would encourage these economies to fulfill commitments regarding forced labor import prohibitions or to encourage these economies to enact and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition”

Speaking in a recent interview, Cham Ninul, the Minister of Commerce in Cambodia, confirmed that by taking steps across three ministries to stop forced labor goods from entering the country, Cambodia successfully kept its tariff under 19 %.

“Cambodia is on the negotiating path for a quota system with the US as well, alongside a few other trading partners like Bangladesh, Indonesia, and Malaysia, for specifically sourcing raw materials for garments from the US and to be processed and reimported into the US quota-free and duty-free,” she said.

Based on the latest report by the General Department of Customs and Excise, Cambodia exported more than USD 7 billion worth of goods to the US in the first half of 2026, a 29.8% increase over the previous year.

According to USTR Ambassador Jamieson Greer, President Trump acknowledges that forced labor has persisted in international supply chains despite decades of moral persuasion. It’s long overdue for our trade partners to follow the United States’ strict enforcement of a nearly century-old ban on the importation of forced labor.

“Today’s action will begin to correct what is both a human rights abuse and a distortive trade practice to improve the welfare of workers everywhere. I am encouraged by the trading partners who have moved quickly to adopt forced labor import prohibitions, and look forward to ensuring their effective enforcement.”, he added.

Continuing to the deal, after receiving export tariff pressure, Sun Chanthul, Deputy Prime Minister and First Vice President of the Council for the Development, confirmed, “I would probably range close to the 9% because we want the USTR to have the rate in the same lending zone as our competitors in ASEAN and that is a commitment,” he said

In response to the new tariff evolution, Chanthul said the Cambodia first to zero out all tariffs for imports from the US to Cambodia, as part of a commitment that both countries have agreed on a certain commitment, for instance, on environmental law.

To sum up, despite new 10 % US forced-labor duties, Cambodia aims to protect its growing export trade through strategic quota negotiations.

Malai is a reporter at Kiripost, where she has worked for more than three years, driven by a strong commitment to amplifying the voices of underserved communities. Her reporting focuses on economic and foreign affairs.

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Thailand 🇹🇭

Decoding Bangkok’s “Calibrated Re-Engagement” with Myanmar

by Paranut Juntree, in Bangkok

Two weeks after Bangkok hosted historic informal consultations, the full diplomatic implications of ASEAN’s “calibrated re-engagement” are coming into focus. Far from a routine press briefing, the high-level meeting co-led by Thai Foreign Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow and Philippine Foreign Secretary Ma. Theresa Lazaro represents a deliberate assertion of the Thai foreign policy agency on ASEAN’s Myanmar issue. For Thailand, managing relations with Myanmar is not an abstract normative exercise, like for many other ASEAN member states, but an urgent frontline security and economic imperative. By steering ASEAN toward a conditional, “two-way street” re-engagement tied to the Five-Point Consensus, Thailand is transforming its geographic vulnerability into proactive leadership, placing its strategic interests at the center of ASEAN’s diplomatic playbook.

Following Myanmar’s February 2021 military coup, ASEAN adopted a policy of institutional distancing, barring non-political junta representatives from high-level summits. Yet Thailand, sharing a 2,400-kilometer border, faced immediate security and economic fallout that rendered complete isolation impossible. While distant member states could afford a principled stance, Thailand wrestled with cross-border shelling, trade stalls, environmental haze, cross-border pollution and rampant scam syndicates operating along the porous frontier. Subsequently, Thailand’s approach evolved through distinct phases: (1) quiet bilateral engagement, hosting informal Track-1.5 (shuffling between diplomatic governmental officials and non-governmental stakeholders), (2) launching a Thai-led humanitarian corridor near Tak-Myawaddy. By 2026, Thailand recognized that maintaining a diplomatic freeze only prolonged deadlock, necessitating an active bridge-building role between Myanmar and ASEAN.

The July 2026 informal gathering in Bangkok, marking the first in-person engagement between ASEAN foreign ministers and Myanmar’s military-appointed foreign minister since the coup, formalized this strategic transition. By pairing Thailand’s frontline necessity with the Philippines’s institutional authority as ASEAN Chair, the initiative seeks to break a five-year stalemate to combat scam networks and revive border trade. However, broader geopolitical realities loom large. Given Myanmar’s deep structural ties with China, a genuine democratic transition remains highly improbable. Beijing views Myanmar as an irreplaceable strategic gateway to the Indian Ocean via the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, preferring a “manageable” government in Napyidaw to safeguard its maritime ambitions and interests. Recognizing this backing, Thailand’s re-engagement acknowledges that isolation cannot force regime change in Myanmar.

Yet, the most critical flaw in “calibrated re-engagement” remains the disconnect between top-down statecraft and ground-level humanitarian realities. As Thailand navigates great-power dynamics, an unmanaged human displacement crisis deepens. Since Naypydaw activated its forced conscription law in 2024, thousands of draft-evaders, youth, and conflict affected civilians, combined with many others since the coup, have crossed into the Thai border. Thailand remains non-signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention, leaving these populations legally precarious and vulnerable to exploitation. If Thailand wishes to claim true regional leadership, its diplomatic pragmatism at the negotiating table must be matched by a humane domestic protection policy. Without addressing post-coup displacement, Thailand risks managing diplomatic symptoms while ignoring the human fallout.


Paranut has a background in advocacy, with experience in policy research, communications, and civic engagement across both the NGO and government sectors. As Thailand’s Youth Delegate to the United Nations, he represented Thai youth in global dialogues on migration, education, and human rights, championing inclusive policymaking. He holds a degree in political science with a specialization in international relations.

Myanmar 🇲🇲

Medical Neglect Behind Bars

by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor

New data from the Political Prisoners Network Myanmar (PPNM), a group that monitors conditions inside the country’s detention system, shows that at least 148 political prisoners have died since the 2021 coup because they simply weren’t given adequate medical care, according to the group’s latest report.

The deaths span 32 facilities across the country, recorded from July 2021 through May 2026. PPNM says the deaths trace back to a familiar set of failures: treatment delayed past the point it could help, chronic shortages of basic medicine, and prison authorities dragging their feet on transferring seriously ill detainees to outside hospitals. The grim irony, per the group, is that many of these deaths were preventable. People came in with conditions doctors could have managed or cured, and died only because they couldn’t get timely access to care.

Two prisons account for nearly half the toll on their own: Insein Prison in Yangon (34.5%) and Obo Prison in Mandalay (12.8%). PPNM’s data shows men make up 86% of the dead, women 13%, with one recorded case involving an LGBT detainee. The victims range from minors to the elderly, though most were working-age men — the demographic most likely to have been swept up in the junta’s mass arrests since 2021.

This 148 figure is actually a subset of a bigger number. In a June 1 anniversary report, PPNM said it has documented 282 total political prisoner deaths in custody over its three years of tracking: the 148 medical-neglect cases, 75 deaths from what it calls unlawful killings by junta personnel and prison staff, and 59 deaths tied to the earthquake that hit Myanmar in March 2026. Laid out that way, medical neglect isn’t a side issue — it’s the single largest driver of death in the system, ahead of both direct violence and a natural disaster.

None of this is new, unfortunately. Rights groups have long documented medical neglect as a leading killer of Myanmar’s political detainees. The case of Zaw Myint Maung, a senior NLD official who died in 2024 after being released only once his leukemia had turned terminal, is the pattern in miniature: care withheld until it’s too late to matter, then a release that functions less as mercy than as damage control for the prison authorities.

The scale of the underlying detention system is worth sitting with. Human rights groups estimate tens of thousands of people have been jailed since the 2021 coup on charges as vague as incitement or defamation, or simply for belonging to a banned organization. The Assistance Association for Political Prisoners puts current detainee numbers in the tens of thousands, though the count shifts as courts keep processing new arrests.

PPNM says the pattern reflects deliberate policy rather than isolated failures, arguing that "time restrictions" imposed on medical referrals function as a de facto denial of care. The group has called for international pressure on prison authorities to allow timely outside treatment, warning that the death toll will continue to climb without independent oversight of conditions inside Myanmar's prison system.


Mattia has a background in international politics with a regional specialization in Asian affairs. He has served as a Junior Analyst for the Asia/Oceania desk at the Istituto Analisi Relazioni Internazionali (IARI), where he focuses on conflict dynamics, maritime security, and strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific. His work reflects a strong interest in security studies and regional geopolitics, with a particular focus on Myanmar’s political crisis, ethnic dynamics, and its implications for regional stability.

Editorial Deadline 25/07/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Karen Ysabelle R. David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk

In the glitzy planned metropolis of New Clark City in the Philippines, a United States-led AI hub is set to rise: this is the controversial and paradoxical Pax Silica. On one hand, there are the grand and heady promises of jobs and investments and progress; on the other, there are the locals’ anxieties about the project’s impact on water, power, and land. Will New Clark City become the next Silicon Valley or will it be branded as government folly?

Meanwhile, updates from the other countries of the Pacific Corridor this week: Singapore reaches out to countries closer to home as its Prime Minister visits Indonesia and Timor-Leste. But the latter’s government is concerned with domestic issues, as a proposal to introduce a criminal defamation law generates controversy among the Timorese public. And in Vietnam, a new decree changes the game for renewable energy industry players in the country.

The Philippines 🇵🇭

Price of Becoming “Silicon Valley”: Pax Silica in the Philippines

by Eduardo G. Fajermo Jr., in Angeles City

The Philippines wants New Clark City to become more than a planned metropolis. Under the United States-led Pax Silica initiative, it is being positioned as a future hub for artificial intelligence (AI), semiconductors, critical minerals, and advanced manufacturing. The promises are significant: jobs, investments, supply-chain security, and a chance for the country to move from being a peripheral participant in global technology to a more active player in the industries shaping the next century.

But the question now being asked in Pampanga and Tarlac is no less significant: at what local cost?

The Bases Conversion and Development Authority has identified a 4,000-acre site in New Clark City for the proposed Pax Silica Coordination Office, which is meant to connect technology firms, research institutions, and government agencies in building an AI and high-value manufacturing ecosystem.

Finance Secretary Frederick Go said joining Pax Silica would help ensure that the country’s mineral resources and strategic location are not merely supporting global industries “from the margins,” but are used to build future industries. US Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs Jacob Helberg described the project as building “manufacturing ecosystems of the next century,” while BCDA President Joshua Bingcang said it could create quality jobs and increase local enterprise participation in the innovation economy.

That is the optimistic version: Pax Silica as a second chance at industrialization. For decades, the Philippines has watched neighbors deepen their manufacturing base while it leaned heavily on services, remittances, and consumption. If New Clark City can host higher-value production linked to AI, semiconductors, and advanced supply chains, the project could help correct an old economic weakness.

Yet the political economy of Pax Silica is not only about ambition. It is also about trust.

Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr. has rejected claims that the project is war-driven, calling it a resilience and industrialization initiative rather than a military imposition. He said Pax Silica is a manufacturing and high-technology endeavor meant to stabilize critical-material supply chains and place the Philippines inside the global manufacturing cycle. That clarification matters because the project is arriving in a region already shaped by US–China competition, South China Sea tensions, and the Philippines’ closer security alignment with Washington.

Still, telling the public that Pax Silica is “not war” does not fully answer the more immediate civilian fear: water, electricity, land, and control. Teodoro has also said the Pax Silica project will not threaten water supply, a concern that has grown as discussions around AI hubs and data centers have entered local public debate. For residents already familiar with water interruptions, heat, power costs, and uneven public utilities, “Silicon Valley” can sound less like national progress and more like another elite development whose burdens are local while its gains are abstract.

The promise of Pax Silica is real. So are the anxieties around it. If managed well, it could help move the Philippines up the technology value chain and give Central Luzon a stronger industrial future. If managed poorly, it could become another symbol of development imposed from above, celebrated in boardrooms, questioned in households, and paid for through local resource strain.

The question, then, is not simply whether New Clark City can become the Philippines’ Silicon Valley. The harder question is whether it can become one without making nearby communities feel like collateral damage. If Pax Silica is truly about resilience, then resilience must begin with the people who will live beside it.


Eduardo is a Political Science graduate and MA Political Science candidate at the University of Santo Tomas, researching democracy, disaster governance, and inclusive policy in the Global South. He is a former faculty member at Holy Angel University, where he taught Philippine history and contemporary global issues. He also worked with a senator in the Guam Legislature, contributing to policy research and legislative analysis.

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Singapore 🇸🇬

Singapore Deepens Relations with Timor-Leste and Indonesia

by Nurul Aini, in Singapore

As Singapore navigates complex relations with Russia, it is simultaneously deepening its relationship with Timor-Leste. The visit by Singapore’s Prime Minister Lawrence Wong from 2 to 3 July 2026 to Dili is the first of its kind by a Singaporean head of government. As Singapore has been actively supporting Timor-Leste in their ascension toward ASEAN membership, this visit shifts the partnership from pre-ASEAN membership assistance to post-membership partnership by developing bilateral cooperation, especially in areas where both countries are strong. It also explores other possibilities with the aim of reciprocally strengthening each other’s capacity.

The signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on the Establishment of Bilateral Consultations between PM Wong and with Timorese Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão provides a formalized framework for the broadening of this relationship. From the second half of 2027, Timor-Leste will be designated as an approved Non-Traditional Source (NTS) country, which opens up work opportunities in Singapore’s selected sectors, such as the construction, marine, process, manufacturing, and services sectors. Another project that is intended to turn into an agreement is the collaboration between Singapore’s National University Hospital (NUH) and the Ministry of Health of Timor-Leste, which is projected to run for five years beginning in July.

PM Wong also encouraged Singaporeans to explore business and investment opportunities in Timor-Leste, stressing the need for these businesses to see the potential in the country’s “young and youthful population.” This comes as Timor-Leste seeks to diversify beyond its oil and gas industries into tourism, hospitality, infrastructure, and renewable energy. Beyond a simply transactional relationship, PM Wong also emphasized the need for businesses to tap into this emerging market to learn the local cultures and norms of the Timorese people, and to enter the space with humility through acknowledging that Singaporean businesses need to learn from the Timorese as much as Timorese do from Singaporeans.

At its core, this expanding relationship between two countries still emphasizes ASEAN Centrality, as it functions through institutional strengthening, capacity-building, and regional stability. Following the enhanced Singapore–Timor-Leste ASEAN Readiness Support Package (eSTARS), Singapore will provide more ASEAN-related programs that will support officials in Dili to assist the country through its goal of ASEAN Chairmanship in 2029. This includes tailored workshops and attachments by these officials to Singapore’s ASEAN Chairmanship. This bilateral cooperation demonstrates an instance of small-state diplomacy where Singapore positions itself more as a development partner and a bridge to ASEAN rather than as a dominant regional power.

Following the visit to Timor-Leste, PM Wong and his delegation of five ministers then visited Jakarta, Indonesia as part of the second Singapore–Indonesia Leaders’ Retreat at the invitation of President Prabowo Subianto. A few MOUs were signed, spanning carbon credits collaboration, environmental cooperation, digital cooperation, and more. This signifies the continuation of Singapore and Indonesia’s strong relationship. Eventually, Singapore’s continuous outreach to its ASEAN counterpart signifies a shift in emphasis where, as Defense Minister Chan Chun Sing mentioned during the Shangri-La Dialogue, “We are not pro-US or anti-US. We are not pro-China or anti-China. We are pro-ASEAN.”


Aini is currently pursuing a master’s degree in English literature at Nanyang Technological University. She has experience working in youth groups, contributing to the planning and management of outreach activities.

Timor-Leste 🇹🇱

The Return of Criminal Defamation Law: Concealing Structural Problems and Protecting Political Elites

by Amandina Maria Helena da Silva, in Dili

For the second time around, the government of Timor-Leste is proposing the introduction of the criminal defamation law. According to state-run news agency Tatoli, the National Parliament has set an agenda next week to begin discussing in the general phase the draft law on the seventh amendment to the Criminal Code on Criminalizing Defamation and Insult.

The proposal raised concerns among the Timorese public — among them civil society organizations, journalists, activists, and social movements — who believe that the law could affect freedom of expression and media freedom in the country. This includes silencing the people when injustice occurs and when political elites engage in various unjust practices.

According to legal expert Armindo Moniz, this law will only create discrimination in society and protect political elites. He also stressed that this law is unnecessary: it is more important to create laws that combat social problems that society faces, force corrupt officials to account for their acts, combat nepotism, and provide protection for freedom of expression in public space.

This year, the National Parliament is the proponent of this bill, which continues to talk about criminalizing defamation. In response, the non-governmental organization La’o Hamutuk affirmed rejecting the criminalization of all defamation due to the proposal that threatens freedom of expression and justice for vulnerable people. According to the organization, “We need laws that protect the rights of all, not penalize criticism or lack of access to information. Our position is that the remedy must be proportionate, civil, reparative and compatible with freedom of expression, not prison sentences that can create an intimidating effect on journalists, activists, whistleblowers, academics, affected communities and citizens.”

Besides that, the President of the Timor-Leste Journalists Association (AJTL), Zevonia Vieira, stated that this draft law may kill press freedom in Timor-Leste — there is an article that states that journalists who write or cover “suspicious” news may be charged with defamation. Coverage related to the authorities that may be taken as an insult and defamation can result in a journalist going to court, where they may be sentenced to two to three years in prison.

Through the draft law on the seventh amendment to the Criminal Code on Criminalizing Defamation and Insult proposed by parliament, the president of Timor-Leste José Ramos Horta declared that he will use his power to veto this bill to defend freedom of expression, which is an important pillar of democracy.

We can only hope that this is not merely political rhetoric, but a call to continue to promote and protect human rights that are the fundamental rights of the people.


Amandina is a human rights advocate working with Asia Justice and Rights Timor-Leste on the Interim Reparation to Women Survivors project. She previously worked with UNDP Timor-Leste’s Accelerator Lab and has contributed to human rights and health initiatives through several youth and civil society organisations. Her interests lie in justice, youth empowerment, and community-based social change in Timor-Leste.

Vietnam 🇻🇳

Grid to Grind

by Tri Vo, in Ho Chi Minh City

In a massive policy breakthrough for industry players, the Vietnamese government has officially widened the legal pathways for off-grid renewable energy. Beginning in June 2026, Decree 243/2026/ND-CP officially took effect, fundamentally altering the economics of power decentralization. The headline impact of this decree is a massive lift on the sales cap for excess electricity generated by self-produced, self-consumed rooftop solar systems, more than doubling the allowable percentage from 20% to 50% of total power generated.

Before this adjustment, factories installing vast rooftop solar panel systems were heavily curtailed by rigid regulations. If their panels produced more energy than the factory could immediately consume, especially on a Sunday or a holiday, the excess power was lost altogether. By allowing up to 50% of that surplus to be sold, and even waiving the cap entirely throughout 2030, should local power grids have sufficient capacity to absorb such surplus in a safe manner, the government has effectively provided a financial and energy lifeline for many businesses as a result.

This regulatory green light is expected to trigger a flush of corporate power purchase agreement (PPA) signings throughout Q3 and into Q4 of 2026 and even further into the future, with the direct PPA framework (as enacted through Decree 80/2024/ND-CP) now allowing large electricity consumers to bypass the state utility company EVN as the sole intermediary and to purchase electricity from private wire connections of non-state generators. These legal provisions, as a whole, have afforded industrial parks the opportunities to rapidly transform into localized microgrids, cutting down the red tape and power outages inherent in the total reliance on the national grid for many companies within. Businesses can now proactively invest in rooftop solar combined with Battery Energy Storage Systems, safe in the knowledge that excess capacity can be monetized rather than wasted.

From a macroeconomic perspective, decentralizing energy production is an urgent necessity. With the government aggressively pursuing a double-digit GDP growth ambition for the 2026–2030 period with a long-term goal to propel Vietnam into the ranks of high-income nations by 2045, power generation capacity is under extreme pressure as a result. By incentivizing the private sector to build and monetize its own capacity, Vietnam is effectively crowdsourcing the entire grid’s expansion, preserving the integrity of the national energy system from further strain, while reducing the immediate need for massive state investments in new power generation and allowing the government to reroute cash into other capital-intensive infrastructure projects.

Ultimately, lifting the 50% cap is not just an environmental policy but also an industrial retention as well as a financial strategy. The recent solar energy directives prove that Hanoi is willing to step out of the way and let the private market power contribute its fair share to the country’s growth ambition. The successful outcome of the policy will act as a stark reminder for most ASEAN peers about the viability and necessity of moving away from the single-buyer model into something far more sustainable.


Tri has experience in management consulting and strategy, having worked with institutions such as the UNDP, The Asia Group, and ARC Group. He has provided strategic, legal, and operational insights to clients in sectors including manufacturing, energy, and technology. He holds both academic and professional experience related to Southeast and East Asia, with a focus on regional development and policy.

Editorial Deadline 20/07/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Siu Tzyy Wei, Lead Editor - Maritime Crescent Desk

Every decision to open a door is also a decision to close another.

This week, that balance plays out across Southeast Asia in three very different ways. Brunei looks outward, strengthening diplomatic ties with Singapore. Indonesia turns the key on the long-awaited Masela Block, unlocking new opportunities in its energy sector. Meanwhile, Malaysia makes clear that not all access is welcome, tightening enforcement against illegal e-waste imports and signalling that its ports are no longer open to the world’s toxic leftovers.

Together, these stories reveal a common thread: sovereignty is not only about protecting borders; it is about choosing what, and who, crosses them. Whether through diplomacy, development, or regulation, governments are increasingly exercising that choice with greater intention.

The question, then, is not simply whether access is granted, but on whose terms.

Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳

The Quiet Importance of Diplomacy in Brunei-Singapore Relations

by Syimah Johari, in Bandar Seri Begawan

In conjunction with His Majesty’s 80th birthday, the Senior Minister Lee Hsien Loong of Singapore paid a visit to Brunei alongside Mrs. Lee, and Minister of State for Home Affairs and Social and Family Development, Goh Pei Ming. During this visit, they attended the royal guard of honour parade, the investiture ceremony as well as the royal banquet, as part of official birthday celebrations. They also had the opportunity to meet with members of the royal family and Bruneian ministers. While the visit formed part of the celebrations, it also reflected the longstanding relationship between Brunei and Singapore.

Official visits like this reflect the ceremonial side of diplomacy. While people often associate diplomacy with treaty signings or formal negotiations, relationships between countries are also strengthened through regular high-level engagements. These quieter aspects of diplomacy reinforce mutual trust, provide opportunities for dialogue and help sustain bilateral ties long after agreements have been signed.

This raises the question: why do high-level visits matter? Diplomacy extends beyond formal negotiations, as maintaining relationships between states also requires consistent engagement. Official state visits and attendance at national celebrations demonstrate mutual respect and goodwill between countries. They provide opportunities for leaders to exchange perspectives and discuss bilateral and regional issues. Within ASEAN, where personal relationships and regular engagement among leaders remain an important aspect of diplomacy, such visits continue to play a valuable role in sustaining partnerships.

This is particularly evident in the longstanding relationship between Brunei and Singapore, that is built upon decades of cooperation across multiple areas, including defence, economic ties, education and regional affairs. Defence cooperation remains one of the foundations of the relationship, with both countries maintaining military training and exchanges that reflect the level of trust between them. Economic ties have also remained a key pillar of the relationship, supported by strong trade and investment links, as well as arrangements such as the currency interchangeability agreement that symbolises the close economic connection between both countries. Beyond government-to-government relations, education and capacity-building initiatives, including scholarships and youth exchange programmes, have strengthened people-to-people ties. As active members of ASEAN, Brunei and Singapore also continue to work together on shared regional priorities. Maintaining these areas of cooperation requires consistent dialogue and engagement at the leadership level. High-level visits therefore serve as important platforms for both countries to exchange perspectives on bilateral and regional issues, reinforcing the foundations of their longstanding partnership.

While official visits may appear ceremonial on the surface, they represent a quieter but equally important aspect of diplomacy. The strength of Brunei and Singapore’s relationship has been built not only through formal agreements, but also through continued engagement, mutual respect and the willingness to maintain dialogue over time. As regional challenges continue to evolve, these longstanding partnerships remain important in ensuring cooperation and stability within ASEAN.


Syimah is a graduate of King’s College London with a BA in International Relations. With a strong focus on diplomacy, regional cooperation, and development policy, she is passionate about contributing to meaningful change through public service. Currently, she is involved in poverty alleviation work through a local NGO.

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Indonesia 🇮🇩

Liquid Gas Blossoms over Abadi Masela Block

by Muhammad Rayhansyah Jasin

One of Indonesia’s largest gas fields finally broke ground on July 16 after President Prabowo Subianto approved the development of a liquid natural gas (LNG) facility in Abadi Masela Block, around 180 kilometers off the coast of the Tanimbar Islands municipality in Maluku Province. The Abadi Masela National Strategic Project is projected to produce up to 9.5 million tons of LNG and 35,000 barrels of condensate per day by 2030 with 60% of its capacity allocated for domestic demand coming from the State Electric Company (PLN), the Pertamina Gas National company (PGN), and the Indonesia Fertilizer Corp. (Pupuk Indonesia). This 21 billion USD investment is expected to generate returns north of 37 billion USD as direct income to its three major share holders, INPEX, Malaysian oil company Petronas, and Indonesia’s Pertamina Hulu Energi Masela holding 65, 20, and 15 percent respectively, while also contributing to state coffers through tax collections of around 6.4 billion USD. An additional 1 billion USD investment is also directed to build Carbon-Capture and Storage (CCS) facilities within the complex. The Minister for Energy and Mineral Resources, Bahlil Lahadalia, also claimed that this project could absorb more than 12,000 construction workers with 800 to 1,000 permanent staff once operation has started running.

The implementation of the Abadi Masela project had been stranded for 28 years, since former President BJ Habibie signed agreements with the Japanese-based INPEX Corporation to be the block’s main operator in 1998, over disputes whether to develop the field through onshore or offshore facilities. The unresolved debates also pushed the legacy Dutch oil company Shell to drop from the project in 2023, citing the government’s shift to prioritize onshore facilities over offshore gas production, with its 35% stake of the project transferred to Petronas and Pertamina. The Prabowo Administration has been spearheading the implementation of this project with the finalization of its Front-End Engineering Design (FEED) in September 2025 and the environmental impact study (AMDAL) in February 2026. Construction is slated to take 3 years with official production demanded to begin before the 2029 General Election in harnessing this 6,97 trillion cube feet gas reserves.

INPEX’s CEO, Takayuki Ueda branded the Abadi Masela Block Project as a symbol of close cooperation between Japan and Indonesia to strengthen the energy supply chain between both countries and usher in a leap in Indonesia’s sustainability commitment. Although pundits have warned that future operations must be scrutinized, the strategic location of the block being close to the tip of Australia’s EEZ–around 400 km north of Darwin–would also bring more attention and tighten security measures around Indonesia’s ocean territory. That said, the Abadi Masela Block Project serves as yet another example of Prabowo’s bombastic infrastructure project in his attempt to reach energy independence. Strict enforcement measures and heightened public scrutiny must be ensured so that all expected returns benefit the state budget with their impacts truly materializing in more affordable and accessible energy and power supply for ordinary Indonesians.


Rayhan is pursuing an Erasmus Mundus Joint Master’s Degree in Public Policy at Central European University and the Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals. He holds a Bachelor of Social Sciences in International Relations and Political Economy from Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University. His current research focuses on the socio-economic impacts of Indonesia’s nickel mining industry on local communities and national development.

Malaysia 🇲🇾

Port of No Return

by Edrina Lisa Ozaidi, in WP Kuala Lumpur

Malaysia’s enforcement in tackling e-waste through a ban was made effective recently.

For years, Malaysia found itself trapped on the receiving end of a dirty global trade, serving as a primary dumping ground for the developed world’s discarded electronics, but recently, the landscape has made a shift.

Following the implementation of an obsolete ban on electrical and electronic waste (e-waste) imports under the Customs (Import Prohibition) Order, the nation has drawn a hard line in the sand—transforming its port into frontline defences against environmental exploitation.

Enforcing a blanket ban against sophisticated smuggling syndicates is an uphill battle. Global e-waste brokers — frequently routing shipments from major ports in the US and Europe—- have long relied on deceptive paperwork, routine misdeclaring hazardous electronics as copper scrap, aluminium flakes or industrial metals.

The ingenuity of these syndicates was vividly laid bare at Port Klang, where a container officially declared as carrying “tin ore” suddenly caught fire.

Subsequent inspection by the Border Control and Protection Agency (AKPS) and the Department of Environment (DOE) revealed that the 17-tonne shipment was 100% prohibited e-waste.

It was a stark reminder of the hidden environmental and safety hazards slipping past conventional surveillance.

To counter these tactics, Malaysia mobilised an aggressive inter-agency response. Under the banner of Op Green Shield, a specialised joint task force comprising the AKPS, Customs, and environmental regulators has ramped up intelligence-led, nearly daily inspections of high-risk cargo.

The result underscores both the scale of the illicit trade and the government’s resolve. Hundreds of containers have been flagged, and thousands of metric tones of illegal e-waste have been systematically intercepted and ordered for re-export back to their countries of origin.

Authorities have also targeted uncooperative shipping liners with stern warnings and temporary license freezes, signalling that complicity in the toxic trade will carry severe commercial costs.

Beyond border security, this hardline stance is reshaping Malaysia’s domestic recycling economy. Local legitimate recyclers and green advocates have welcomed the policy, noting that cutting off the influx of cheap, unregulated foreign waste forces have welcomed the policy noting that cutting off the influx of cheap, unregulated foreign waste forces the industry to turn inward.

Instead of processing mountains of external toxic debris, the focus is shifting toward managing and extracting value from the domestic e-waste stream safely and sustainably.

Malaysia’s message to global brokers is unequivocal: the era of cheap, easy dumping is hopefully over. Through regulatory reform and continuous aggressive enforcement, Malaysia has finally strengthened its move to protect its land, air and communities from becoming the cost-free collateral of the digital age.


Edrina is a communications professional with a background in international relations. She holds a degree from the University of Nottingham Malaysia and has worked across public relations and social media for organizations in the development, education, and corporate sectors. Her work focuses on crafting narratives around regional affairs and strengthening media engagement across Southeast Asia.

Editorial Deadline 18/07/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk

This week across the Mekong Belt, governments and institutions found themselves having to decide — explicitly or implicitly — who belongs in the room, who counts as a partner, and who gets left to deal with the consequences of the side they've chosen. In Myanmar, ASEAN’s special envoy met junta-linked negotiators and ethnic armed groups in Thailand, but left the National Unity Government out of the main talks, undercutting the bloc’s claim to an “inclusive” political dialogue. In Cambodia, Taiwan cut the country from its Guanhong visa facilitation program, citing Phnom Penh’s continued backing of the one-China policy and its silence on Beijing’s reunification rhetoric. Meanwhile, in Thailand, Japan is stepping up cooperation on the arsenic-contaminated Kok River, a crisis linked to Chinese-run mining in Myanmar, filling a gap left by the Chinese Embassy’s largely unanswered calls for accountability. And in Laos, a quieter kind of alignment is underway: the government is expanding its digital tax framework to catch tech giants like Microsoft and Netflix, joining a growing bloc of ASEAN states choosing to bring the digital economy inside the reach of the state.

Myanmar 🇲🇲

An Empty Chair at ASEAN’s “Inclusive” Myanmar Dialogue

by Moe Thiri Myat

ASEAN says it wants an inclusive political dialogue on Myanmar. Yet when its special envoy began meeting the country’s different political and armed actors this week, one of the most important seats was left empty.

On 13 July, ASEAN Special Envoy and Philippine Foreign Secretary Ma. Theresa Lazaro travelled to Thailand with Thai Foreign Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow. Together, they met representatives of several ethnic armed organisations and the military-established National Solidarity and Peacemaking Negotiation Committee. The discussions were presented as an attempt to explore an “inclusive national political dialogue” and revive ASEAN’s stalled response to the Myanmar crisis.

The outreach appeared broad. The military-backed authorities were engaged. Ethnic armed organisations were consulted. ASEAN foreign ministers had also held their first face-to-face meeting since the 2021 coup with Myanmar’s military-backed foreign minister.

But the National Unity Government (NUG) was not invited to the main in-person discussions. That absence immediately exposed the contradiction at the centre of ASEAN’s initiative. The NUG is not a marginal stakeholder waiting to be added later. It remains one of the principal political forces opposing military rule and is connected to resistance structures operating across the country. NUG’s Foreign Minister Zin Mar Aung therefore questioned whether the meetings were intended to advance ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus or support the military-backed government’s separate 100-day peace plan.

The envoy later held a brief online discussion with NUG representatives. According to an NUG official, however, no significant issue was raised. The call allowed ASEAN to say that it had contacted the NUG, but it did not provide the same access given to actors invited into the room.That difference is more than diplomatic protocol. The first participants can frame the problem, influence the agenda and shape what ASEAN later presents as possible dialogue. Those consulted afterwards are left responding to a process they did not help design.

Ethnic opposition groups have also warned that the meetings should not be treated as the beginning of formal negotiations. They argue that dialogue cannot move forward while civilians remain under attack, political prisoners remain detained and humanitarian access remains restricted.

The danger, then, is not simply that the NUG missed one meeting. It is that ASEAN may be constructing an apparently inclusive process around unequal levels of political access. Such engagement could strengthen the legitimacy of military-backed institutions without producing meaningful concessions.

Ultimately, ASEAN’s credibility will not be measured by how many actors appear on its consultation list. It will depend on who is invited early enough to shape the process, whose demands become part of the agenda and whether “inclusive dialogue” means genuine political participation or merely contacting excluded actors after the important conversations have already begun.


Moe Thiri Myat is a senior at Parami University. Majoring in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics (PPE). Interested in analyzing emerging sociopolitical situations and developments, through her work as a Myanmar correspondent at The ASEAN Frontier she aims to explore how sociopolitical developments across Southeast Asia shape and are shaped by the situation in Myanmar.

Cambodia 🇰🇭

Taiwan Drops Cambodia From Visa Facilitation Program Amid Rising Political Friction

by Chandara Samban, in Kandal

Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced on July 17, 2026 that it is removing Cambodia from its Guanhong visa facilitation program, effective mid-July. The program had allowed Cambodian travelers to enter Taiwan without going through the standard visa application process since 2018.

Taiwan said the decision reflects Cambodia’s failure to reciprocate its goodwill, pointing specifically to Phnom Penh’s continued support for the one-China policy, which recognizes Taiwan as part of China. Taipei argues that this stance undermines its sovereignty and autonomy. Concerns over Cambodia’s ties to online scam networks also factored into the decision. While cutting Cambodia from the program, Taiwan expanded visa facilitation for other countries in the region, including Thailand and India.

Cambodia has not issued an official government response. However, Chann Ratana, spokesperson for Cambodia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, told TAF on July 18 that Cambodia respects the one-China policy and considers Taiwan part of China. “Cambodia does not need to sit down and talk with Taiwan,” he said. “Whatever decision Taiwan makes is Taiwan’s own business.”

Tensions between Taipei and Phnom Penh have simmered for years over Cambodia’s stance on Taiwan’s status. In 2024, Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a strongly worded letter to Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet after he expressed support for China’s reunification efforts during a meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi.

Despite the political rift, economic ties between the two remain significant. Bilateral trade reached more than USD 739 million in 2025, an increase of nearly 3% from 2024. Taiwan says it has invested USD 1.255 billion in Cambodia between 1993 and 2025, concentrated in textiles and garments, wood processing, and land development.

Geopolitical analyst Seng Vanly called the move a notable shift in Taipei’s foreign policy and security posture. He said it will complicate travel for Cambodian citizens, including businesspeople, students, investors, and workers, by making the visa process more costly and time-consuming.

“The relationship between Cambodia and Taiwan is becoming increasingly tense and is experiencing growing political friction,” Seng Vanly said. “This rift stems from their different geopolitical positions, with Cambodia maintaining a firm stance on the one-China policy.”

He added that while Cambodia and Taiwan lack formal diplomatic relations, Taiwan remains an important economic partner through its investments in the garment, footwear, and textile sectors since the 1990s. Still, he argued Cambodia should avoid direct negotiations with Taipei to prevent friction with Beijing, suggesting business associations or private-sector channels as an alternative for informal discussions.

Kin Phea, director of the Institute of International Relations at the Royal Academy of Cambodia, said the move is unlikely to affect formal Cambodia-Taiwan relations, since the two sides have never had diplomatic ties. He said the impact will fall mainly on Cambodian citizens traveling to Taiwan for tourism, medical treatment, or business, given that relations have traditionally been people-to-people rather than state-to-state. He encouraged Cambodians planning to travel to Taiwan to comply with the standard visa requirements going forward.


Chandara is a freelance journalist with a focus on foreign affairs, security issues, and ASEAN affairs. He also serves as a Junior Counterterrorism Intelligence Analyst.

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Thailand 🇹🇭

Japan Takes Initiative to Resolve Toxic Contamination in Kok River

by Natamon Aumphin, in Bangkok

Earlier this month, the Embassy of Japan, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), and representatives from the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) in Thailand met with the Pollution Control Department of Thailand to discuss conserving and monitoring water quality in Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai provinces, as well as building a network to protect the Mekong River, which is the heart of the Northern people. The collaboration, initiated by Japan, comes with a short-term and long-term plan to resolve Mekong contamination.

Although Japan is not directly affected by the contamination in the Mekong River, the nation is stepping in to assist Thailand and neighboring countries, which reflects its willingness to step up to resolve regional issues. The initiatives include technical knowledge exchange and capacity building for local communities and governmental entities to monitor the arsenic levels in the river, installing systems to reduce arsenic to ensure water supply safety, and building Mekong River experts through the Third Country Training Program (TCTP). The tangible efforts were seen earlier this week as the Japanese agencies and the Pollution Control Department conducted a joint site visit to strengthen cooperation.

The collaboration with the Japanese agencies was the latest effort to resolve the contamination issue in the Kok River, where toxins such as arsenic were found last year. The toxins found in the Kok River were suspected to originate from rare earth mining activities in Shan State, Myanmar, linked to Chinese companies, according to an investigation by ThaiPBS. Although there has been ongoing advocacy from civil society to demand accountability and tangible cooperation from the Chinese Embassy in Chiang Mai, no proper response has been observed yet. In fact, the situation between civil society and the Chinese Embassy has worsened due to passive response from the embassy in Chiang Mai.

Moreover, despite peaceful demonstrations to raise awareness and call for tighter regulations for Chinese mining companies in Myanmar, the protesters were faced with police authorities preventing them from entering the Chinese Embassy’s proximity. Two activists were injured, with one being hospitalized. From the public perspective, this action contradicts the Chinese Embassy’s post on its Facebook page stating that consultation and collaboration are welcomed. Therefore, to the public, Japan’s efforts were widely welcomed, reflected in positive sentiments on social media compared to those regarding the Chinese Embassy.

This is not the first attempt at being involved in the Mekong River. Japan has shown consistent commitment to resolving toxic contamination in the Mekong river, in collaboration with Myanmar, Laos, and Thailand. The willingness of Japan in this matter can be seen from two folds. Firstly, Japan experienced mercury toxins in water supplies in the 1950s, resulting in Minamata disease, a dire threat to the livelihood of local residents and aquatic animals in the area. This prompted Japan to build expertise in toxin contamination management. Hence, as Thailand is facing a similar issue, Japan’s willingness to exchange technical knowledge is seen as generous and welcome from the Thai people’s perspective.

Second, on a regional level, this collaboration reflects Japan’s commitment to strengthening its relations with the Mekong River nations. Through mutual benefits, Japan could offer a solution to a complex issue in the region involving many actors, which serves as a way to maintain Japan’s presence in the region after its economic decline. This reflects that Japan is still an active player in Southeast Asia, although in a different role compared to that of the 1950s. As regional competition is on the rise, Japan could be the third player to offer alternatives to Southeast Asian countries when it comes to US-China regional competition.


Natamon has served as a rapporteur at the Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS Thailand). She has also worked as a research assistant on diplomatic issues in Southeast Asia. Her work focuses on how domestic politics shape foreign policy in the region. She holds a degree in international relations and has experience in policy analysis, event reporting, and regional research.

Lao PDR 🇱🇦

Laos Expands Digital Tax Collection as Online Economy Grows

by Phonethida Sitthixay, in Vientiane

As more economic activity moves online, governments are increasingly looking for ways to tax digital services provided across borders. Laos is beginning to see results from its own efforts.

Since registering international digital service providers under its digital taxation framework in late 2024, Laos has collected approximately USD 12 million in tax revenue, according to information presented during the First Extraordinary Session of the 10th National Assembly. The amount was generated through the registration of major technology companies, including Microsoft, Facebook, YouTube, and Netflix.

The collection is part of a broader tax modernization drive led by the Ministry of Finance. At the center of these reforms is the Tax Revenue Information System (TaxRIS), which now covers more than 195,000 businesses. According to the ministry, collections processed through the system have increased by 251% compared with the period before its introduction, representing an average annual increase of more than 20 percent. TaxRIS currently operates in Vientiane Capital and is expected to be expanded nationwide.

In addition, digital tools have also transformed the way the government collects revenue. Today, 95 percent of state revenue is collected through banks and electronic payment channels, while cash collections account for just 5 percent of total revenue.

The rise of digital taxation comes as governments worldwide seek to ensure that online platforms, streaming services, digital advertisers, and other technology firms contribute to public finances in the markets where they generate income.

Laos joins a growing number of ASEAN countries that have introduced taxes on digital and cross-border online services. Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Vietnam, and the Philippines have all adopted various approaches, ranging from VAT and GST mechanisms to broader tax frameworks for foreign digital businesses.

For Laos, the USD 12 million collected is relatively modest, but it highlights a wider effort to modernize tax administration and bring more of the digital economy into the formal tax system. As the government continues expanding digital revenue platforms nationwide, the focus will be on improving compliance, broadening the tax base, and keeping pace with a rapidly changing economy.


Phonethida Sitthixay holds a Bachelor of Arts in International Relations from the National University of Laos. She is currently a Senior Project Coordinator at AIF Group, where she works on government-led initiatives to modernize financial integration across public sector systems in Laos. She has experience in sustainable development policy, diplomacy, and economic reporting, having worked with the Global Green Growth Institute and The Laotian Times. Her interests focus on Laos’s diplomacy, regional integration, and its evolving role beyond ASEAN.

Editorial Deadline 18/07/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Karen Ysabelle R. David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk

The vibrant and busy streets of Dili, the capital of Timor-Leste, can often be dangerous. Road traffic crashes continue to be a public safety hazard in the country, with the problem being particularly acute in the capital city. For Southeast Asia’s youngest state and ASEAN’s newest member, its road safety journey has only just begun as it seeks to transform its driving culture and its young people seek solutions.

Across the rest of the Pacific Corridor, young people are also facing other challenges: in Singapore, they are getting married less, owing to a perfect storm of domestic factors and broader regional demographic challenges. In the Philippines, the rise of AI is opening up a new divide in education, infiltrating schools before regulatory mechanisms can even be put securely into place.

And from Vietnam, an AI-related reminder from the start of the year: Hanoi’s movers and shakers optimistically dubbed AI as the new “core engine” for urban governance. Five months since this article was first published, is there truth behind the optimism?

Timor-Leste 🇹🇱

Timor-Leste’s Road Safety Journey Is Just Beginning

by Lucreicha Jane

Road traffic crashes continue to be one of the most pressing public safety challenges in Timor-Leste. In an exclusive interview with The ASEAN Frontier, the Polícia Nacional Timor-Leste (PNTL), Comando Geral, Direção de Trânsito e Segurança Rodoviária reported that between 1 January and 31 May 2026, 818 road traffic crashes were recorded across the country’s 13 municipalities. These incidents resulted in 46 deaths, 139 serious injuries, and 543 minor injuries. Dili alone accounted for 490 crashes, with 11 fatalities, 57 serious injuries, and 444 minor injuries, making it the municipality with the highest number of recorded traffic crashes during the reporting period. Behind every statistic is a person: a student on the way to school, a parent returning home from work, or a young person riding a motorcycle to meet friends. These figures remind us that road traffic crashes are not merely transportation issues; they are public health, social, and development challenges that affect families and communities across the country. As the number of vehicles continues to grow, particularly motorcycles, Timor-Leste faces increasing pressure to strengthen road safety through better infrastructure, stronger law enforcement, public education, and responsible road user behavior. Preventing road crashes requires more than enforcing traffic laws. It also requires building a culture where wearing helmets properly, respecting speed limits, avoiding distracted driving, and protecting vulnerable road users become everyday habits.

Despite these challenges, 2026 also marks an encouraging milestone for Timor-Leste’s road safety journey. From 1–5 July 2026, Timor-Leste participated for the first time in the Youth United for Road Safety program, organized through the ASEAN Secretariat. Three youth representatives from Timor-Leste joined young leaders from across Southeast Asia in Bangkok to exchange experiences, discuss road safety challenges, and develop practical recommendations for improving road safety in their respective countries. For Timor-Leste, this participation represents more than attendance at an international forum. It reflects the country’s growing commitment to involving young people in shaping road safety solutions. Throughout the program, participants discussed common challenges shared across ASEAN, explored successful initiatives implemented in neighboring countries, and worked together to formulate youth-driven recommendations that can contribute to safer roads throughout the region.

Young people bring valuable perspectives because they are among the most frequent road users. They understand the daily realities of commuting, the influence of social media on driving behavior, and the importance of creating campaigns that resonate with younger generations. Their voices can help bridge the gap between policy discussions and community action. Road safety is a shared responsibility. Government institutions, law enforcement agencies, schools, civil society organizations, families, and communities all have important roles to play. At the same time, every individual decision — whether wearing a helmet correctly, following traffic regulations, or choosing not to speed — can help prevent injuries and save lives. Timor-Leste’s participation in the Youth United for Road Safety program marks an important first step toward stronger regional collaboration. By learning from neighboring ASEAN countries while sharing its own experiences, Timor-Leste is beginning to build a stronger foundation for a safer road environment. The journey toward safer roads will require continued commitment, cooperation, and innovation, but every conversation, every partnership, and every responsible action brings the country one step closer to ensuring that every journey ends safely.


Lucreicha Jane is an International Relations undergraduate at the Universidade Nacional Timor Lorosa'e (UNTL), with interests in international law, governance, and youth leadership. She previously served as General Secretary of the JCI Timor-Leste Local Chapter Dili Women Entrepreneurs (2024–2025) and as Executive Vice President of the Student Council at UNTL's Faculty of Social Sciences and Politics.

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Singapore 🇸🇬

Why Fewer Singaporeans Are Saying “I Do”

by Jennifer Hui En Tan, in Singapore

Marriage has long been treated as a cornerstone of adulthood in Singapore, embedded within its own bureaucratic architecture with priority housing queues, family benefits, and parenthood incentives. The latest figures from the Ministry of Social and Family Development (MSF) land as more than a statistical footnote. According to MSF’s Family Trends Report 2026, marriages fell for a third consecutive year in 2025, with a 6.2% drop from 2024 and the lowest count in nearly a decade besides 2020.

The decline is often attributed to changing priorities among younger Singaporeans, who now prioritize careers and personal freedom over settling down. Though there is some truth to this, several demographers cited in recent coverage suggested that marriage decisions are shaped by economic and institutional conditions, not preference alone.

Institute of Policy Studies (IPS) Principal Research Fellow Mathew Mathews explains that the decline in marriage continuity depends on whether young Singaporeans see marriage and family formation as both achievable and attractive, noting that many still see marriage as attractive but may not feel ready for it. Furthermore, he noted the long-term social shift, with the younger generation taking more time to search for the right partner, leading to a higher median age at first marriage.

Women’s educational attainment has also reshaped traditional marriage patterns. Greater access to higher education and stronger labor force participation have reduced the economic necessity of early marriage, giving women greater autonomy. At the same time, expectations surrounding dual-income households have risen while caregiving responsibilities remain unevenly distributed, making marriage and parenthood appear more demanding than previous generations experienced.

These shifts carry consequences beyond individual households. As Singapore grapples with an ageing population, the shrinking workforce and rising dependency ratio are now core issues in Singapore’s politics. Demographer Jean Yeung has noted that because the marriage rate is the primary predictor of local birth rates, fewer unions will almost certainly mean fewer children. The shift touches the family support system directly, with the number of seniors living alone more than doubling in the past decade.

Despite policies aimed at encouraging fertility, most existing support only kicks in after marriage rather than making marriage itself more attainable. Broader directions being floated include reducing work-life imbalance, easing housing accessibility for young adults, and even potential matchmaking services. Mathews has flagged the newly convened Marriage and Parenthood Reset Workgroup as timely, aimed at workplace norms, housing transitions, and the pressures young adults associate with marriage.

Singapore’s experience may also foreshadow demographic challenges emerging across Southeast Asia. Thailand officially became a “fully aged society” in 2024, with people aged 60 and above accounting for more than one-fifth of its population, while recording fewer than half a million births for the first time. Thai policymakers have similarly linked delayed marriage and declining fertility to rising living costs and economic uncertainty. Indonesia is witnessing a comparable shift. Its 2025 Intercensal Population survey found that the average age of first marriage for women increased from 23.1 years in 2015 to 25.1 years in 2025, with the most pronounced changes occurring in Jakarta and other highly urbanized regions where female education and workforce participation have expanded rapidly.

These trends reflect a broader ASEAN shift driven by urbanization, higher education, and economic pressures. As demographic challenges grow, governments must find ways to support marriage and family formation without forcing young people to choose between financial security and parenthood.


Jennifer is a final-year International Relations student at the Singapore Institute of Management, where she focuses on political engagement, diplomacy, and community governance. She is an active volunteer in her constituency, working closely with residents to understand local concerns, facilitate dialogue, and support community initiatives.

The Philippines 🇵🇭

The Next Digital Divide Is Access to Artificial Intelligence

by Glenn Vincent N. Boquilon, in Angeles City

For a long time, one of the biggest challenges in education was the digital divide.

In those days, the difference was simple. The divide meant that some schools had access to computers, the internet, and digital tools, while others did not. But as technology continues to evolve rapidly, a new gap may be emerging. This challenge is no longer only about who has internet access. It may soon be about who has access to artificial intelligence (AI).

AI is becoming part of how education systems operate. Around the world, schools are exploring how AI can support teachers, improve decision-making, and better support learners. Despite that, access to these tools remains disparate. Countries that can adopt AI responsibly may gain an advantage, while others risk being left behind.

This challenge is becoming more relevant in Southeast Asia. The region has made some progress in digital transformation, but differences remain between countries and communities. Some education systems have stronger digital infrastructure and research capabilities, while others continue to face challenges in connectivity and resources. As AI becomes more common, these differences could create a new form of inequality.

The Philippines is beginning to explore how AI can address long-standing education challenges. Through the Education Center for AI Research (ECAIR), AI is being developed for practical use in schools. Projects such as SIGLA use AI-assisted screening to identify learners who may need nutrition interventions. SIBOL explores how data and AI can help optimize new library hub investments. Other projects, such as LIGTAS, use technology to support school disaster preparedness and risk assessment.

These initiatives show that AI does not have to replace teachers or existing traditional systems. Alternatively, it can become a tool that helps education administrators make better decisions and respond faster to challenges. The value of AI is not only in the technology itself, but in how it is applied to real-world problems.

Nonetheless, access to AI is not only a question of technology. It is also a question of governance. As more governments adopt AI systems, they must consider how data is collected, how decisions are made, and how people are protected. Without proper safeguards, AI could create new risks, especially when used in areas involving children and public services.

Across Southeast Asia, many countries are starting to develop policies and frameworks to guide responsible AI use. Singapore introduced its Model AI Governance Framework to promote safe and trustworthy AI adoption. Other countries, including Malaysia and Indonesia, have also released national AI strategies focused on innovation and responsible development. At the regional level, ASEAN adopted the ASEAN Guide on AI Governance and Ethics to encourage cooperation among member states.

These initiatives highlight an important reality. The future of AI will not only depend on who develops the most advanced technology. It will also depend on who can use it responsibly. For education systems, this means ensuring that AI further supports teachers, protects learner well-being, and improves access to quality education.

The first digital divide was about access to the internet. The next may be about access to AI. Addressing this gap will require more than technology. It will require strong governance, regional cooperation, and a commitment to ensuring that AI serves learners across Southeast Asia.


Glenn holds a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from the University of Santo Tomas. His experience spans governance programs, policy development, and political research, having worked with the Ateneo School of Government and WR Numero Research on projects focused on electoral reform, public opinion, and regional development. He also helped coordinate the drafting of the Bangsamoro Local Government Code and supported the Academy of Multiparty Democracy.

Vietnam 🇻🇳

From Volume to Value

by Tri Vo, in Ho Chi Minh City

Note: This article was first published in Issue 31 of the Pacific Corridor newsletter.

The end of 2025 also signified the end of the beginning of a period of incredible changes in Vietnam. Under the direction of To Lam, the General Secretary of the Communist Party, Hanoi has articulated a vision for a distinct “Era of Rise,” signaling a departure from the more cautious approach of administrations past and toward a more aggressive expansion agenda. This new spirit was reflected in the recent GDP growth target of at least 10% for 2026 approved by the National Assembly, a figure that far exceeds the forecasts of international financial institutions like the International Monetary Fund.

The preliminary economic data of Vietnam in 2025 confirms that the rationale for this ambitious target is not without foundation. Indeed, the economy was on track to close 2025 with growth exceeding 8%, driven by a manufacturing sector that expanded by 9.5%. Crucially, total export turnover is projected to hit a record US$470 billion, marking a 16% increase year-on-year despite the global trade tumults in 2025, the most notable of which is the major rise in US tariff rates — one of, if not the largest, export markets for Vietnam.

However, the “Era of Rise” sees growth not merely as the expansion in volume but also as a progression in the quality of it. Recent debates have centered on escapingthe processing trap, i.e., the reliance on the low-rung, low-value assembly for foreign direct investment firms as an engine for growth.

The first few signs that signal this shift could be seen in the agricultural and forestry sectors. On 22 December, the Vietnam Administration of Forestry officially launched the “Vietnam Wood” certification mark. As noted by industry leaders at the launch, this is a critical step to standardizing quality and to securing firmer footing in markets that place a high emphasis on quality as well as environmental and social responsibility, like the EU, rather than competing solely on the basis of price competitiveness.

Simultaneously, the technology sector is pivoting from “outsourcing” to “solution generation.” At the Vietnam-Asia Smart City Summit 2025 held in Hanoi on 23 December, the focus shifted entirely to artificial intelligence (AI) as the new “core engine” for urban governance. Policymakers and tech giants discussed deploying AI not just as a supporting tool for efficiency, but to solve critical governmental and operational bottlenecks that threaten to stifle major urban centers, Vietnam’s economic engines, and by extension, the lofty 10% growth target for 2026.

Yet, while the macroeconomic indicators for 2025 are robust, the success of the “Era of Rise” in 2026 and beyond will depend almost entirely on further “institutional breakthroughs” within the Vietnamese state to further accommodate and buttress the ambitious growth target. As such, 2026 will likely see further reforms in the administrative and fiscal fields on a scale similar to those seen in 2025 to cement the momentum gained as of now. Such reforms might engender some initial disruptions, but if the past is prologue, they, like those in 2025, will be the propellant with which Vietnam can move up in a world of increasing disruptions, where what has worked as of now will prove inadequate in the face of upheaval.


Tri has experience in management consulting and strategy, having worked with institutions such as the UNDP, The Asia Group, and ARC Group. He has provided strategic, legal, and operational insights to clients in sectors including manufacturing, energy, and technology. He holds both academic and professional experience related to Southeast and East Asia, with a focus on regional development and policy.

Editorial Deadline 14/07/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by by Siu Tzyy Wei, Lead Editor - Maritime Crescent Desk

Some threads fray quietly long before the fabric gives way.

In Johor, voters tested the seams of Malaysia’s political coalitions ahead of a general election still to come. In Brunei, a wage gap wide enough to send jobseekers into Australia’s fruit fields is pulling at a labour system already stretched thin. In Indonesia, prosecutors, police and now soldiers are yanking at the same thread of corruption enforcement, each pulling to protect their own.

None of these threads have snapped yet, but pull on enough of them, and the pattern starts to come undone.

Malaysia 🇲🇾

The Johor Test

by Sydney Gan, in Kuala Lumpur

Barisan Nasional (BN) has officially won the Johor state election held on 11 July 2026, securing a total of 48 out of 56 seats to form a simple majority state government. This victory boosts BN as a strong contender in the upcoming state and federal elections, while increasing pressure on Pakatan Harapan (PH) to rebuild its urban, non-Malay support, as BN’s Malay-coalition power aggregates.

While BN was naturally expected to win, with Johor deemed its birthplace, the scale of victory is significant. Johor serves as an important litmus test of whether BN could rebuild its political power to what it once was. The results have strengthened BN’s bargaining position within the federal government and provided political momentum for BN ahead of the Negeri Sembilan elections. It also demonstrates the Malay voter base as its traditional stronghold, with high turnout in BN-dominated areas, and a continued confidence in BN’s results-oriented leadership in the state, especially with Onn Hafiz on the helm as Menteri Besar.

Opposition coalition Perikatan Nasional (PN) failed to retain the three seats it won in 2022, with BN reclaiming Bukit Kepong, Maharani and Endau. The result suggests that the fallout between Bersatu and Parti Islam Se-Malaysia (PAS) has pushed a significant share of Malay support back towards BN. This was reinforced by PAS’s call for its supporters to back BN in constituencies where PN was not contesting. The outcome strengthens the narrative of Malay-majority consolidation, which poses one of the most significant long-term threats to Anwar Ibrahim’s coalition government. Similar political arrangements between BN and PAS may emerge in future state and federal elections.

Pakatan Harapan (PH) managed to retain several core Chinese strongholds, including Bentayan, Skudai, Penggaram, Mengkibol and Senai. It also retained Malay seat representation through Amanah in Simpang Jeram and PKR in Puteri Wangsa. However, PH has demonstrated weakness in securing mixed constituencies, as non-Malay confidence in parties such as Democratic Action Party (DAP) visibly wanes. This was compounded by lower turnout in minority-heavy seats such as Perling, Tangkak and Bekok, where participation fell below 60%. The result follows PH’s setback in Sabah, where it failed to win any seats despite previously holding six. Although Bersama failed to secure sufficient support and all its candidates lost their deposits, PH has accused the party of splitting the opposition vote in constituencies such as Perling and Bukit Batu. Bersama’s presence may therefore have indirectly strengthened BN by fragmenting anti-BN support – a trend that may be noted across upcoming state pollings as well.

The stability of the federal unity government will depend on the ability of Ahmad Zahid Hamidi and Anwar Ibrahim to separate state-level competition from federal cooperation. Zahid has reaffirmed BN’s commitment to the unity government, but BN’s stronger political position may lead it to demand greater power at the federal level. The Negeri Sembilan election, expected on 1 August, will be the next major test. Unlike Johor, Negeri Sembilan is jointly governed by PH and BN, with PH holding the leading position.


Sydney holds a Bachelor of Laws from King’s College London, where she focused on Human Rights Law, Criminology, and Public & Administrative Law. She is an Analyst at Asia Group Advisors, providing policy analysis and strategic guidance across the tech, sustainability, and gaming sectors in Southeast Asia. Prior to joining AGA, she worked in the social development sector in London, contributing to the Ukraine Judicial Training Programme through research on war crimes adjudication and the development of a legal training curriculum with high court magistrates.

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Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳

The Fine Print Comes Due

by Maryam Zulaidi

The lack of career advancements, job opportunities and vacancies among Bruneians has left many frustrated especially amid the rising cost of living. Indiscriminately between pursuers of higher education and those without a degree, such a reality has pushed many to migrate overseas in search of opportunities to better their standard of living, and for some, to send back remittances to their families at home. On the surface, this brain drain might seem harmless.

Given Brunei’s relatively high proportion of educated citizens, one may assume these emigrants are taking up professional or tertiary-sector roles abroad. However, that is simply not the case. According to accounts circulating in Bruneian online communities, many are instead opting to do manual labour; fruit picking in Australia being a popular choice. With an estimated earning of approximately AUD1,200 per week, individuals can accumulate a total of AUD5,000 per month - and reportedly untaxed, since the work is undeclared. This contrasts the minimum wage a civil servant earns per month in Brunei, which is BND500 (roughly AUD560), therefore appealing to local jobseekers. It is important to note that these figures are solely anecdotal, sourced to personal testimony rather than official data, but the pattern described is consistent enough across accounts to be worth taking seriously.

The Bruneian passport grants easy, low-friction entry to Australia via the ETA Subclass 601, where a visitor is permitted to stay for no longer than 3 months. Additionally, Brunei also qualifies for the Frequent Traveller stream of the standard visitor visa Subclass 600, which extends up to 10 years of multi-entry access also capped at 3 months per stay. Both visa types strictly mention the prohibition of business visitors to work or offer services to another individual, enterprise or organisation. From the same community thread, this isn’t a one-off overstay pattern but rather, a cycle. An increasing number of people work through the three-month visa window, fly home once it lapses, temporarily stay in Brunei, then return to Australia and then repeat.

Constant violations of the Australian Immigration Laws prompts visas to be cancelled under Section 116 of the Migration Act 1958. Thus, it will only make the visa process for ordinary Bruneian travellers — including students, graduates and families going on holiday — more tedious. If this work is normalised in the Bruneian society, genuine travellers are to bear the costs of a problem they take no part in as well as a possible strain to the bilateral relations. Yet not everyone in these communities is untroubled by the practice, pushback against those who encourage it suggests even Bruneians abroad know the loophole won’t hold.


Maryam is a first-year International Relations and Politics student at the University of Sheffield, with an academic focus on Southeast Asia—particularly Maritime Southeast Asia—and the Middle East. She aspires to a career in diplomacy and academia and is committed to fostering international dialogue and advancing scholarly engagement with global issues. Beyond her academic work, she pursues creative interests and voluntary initiatives that broaden her perspectives on public service.

Indonesia 🇮🇩

Romance of the Three Kingdoms

by Rayhan Prabu Kusumo, in Jakarta

On the night of July 8, soldiers with long rifles took up posts at the gate of a house in Kebayoran Baru, Jakarta belonging to Febrie Adriansyah, the Deputy Attorney General for Special Crimes. Forty kilometres away, at a second house he owns in Bogor, police were pulling seventy-four kilograms of gold and foreign cash worth 476 billion rupiah from a safe behind a wall. A week earlier, his office had named an active police general a suspect in the school-meals graft case.

Indonesia does not run one anti-corruption effort. The police, the prosecutors, and the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) can each pursue graft, and no clear rule decides who handles whom. For years the KPK was the strongest. After its powers were cut back in 2019, the prosecutors’ special-crimes unit became the aggressive arm, taking apart case after case, while the police kept theirs too.

When one of these bodies moves on the other’s people, the other can move back, because nothing above them settles the order. This is not new. A decade ago the KPK and the police fought openly, the small agency against the big one, and the public called it “the gecko against the crocodile.”

When the enforcers fight each other, enforcement itself becomes the weapon, and that is the damage. Every move against corruption can now be read two ways at once, as a genuine case or as a reply to one, and the public has no way to separate them. Most are probably both, which is precisely the problem, because the ambiguity never resolves.

The sequence teaches every official the same lesson, that the way to blunt an investigation is to open one of your own. A corruption case stops turning on evidence and starts turning on which institution moves first, and which has the heavier force behind it. The people who ought to fear these agencies are the corrupt. Instead the agencies fear each other.

For the ordinary citizen, the turf war itself is not the real worry. The state’s instruments of force, the police, the prosecutors, and now the army, no longer stand neutral above the citizen. Each answers to its own interest, and each can aim coercive power at the others. The promise of law is that it falls the same on everyone, enforced by a state that sits outside the quarrel. When the enforcers are themselves the quarrel, that promise thins, because which case is chased and which is buried starts to depend on alliances no outsider can see.

And when soldiers become one of the parties, the line drawn in 1998 - where the military stays out of civilian affairs - is being redrawn quietly. When the next big case disappears, the question will be whether it lacked evidence or protected the wrong people. In the old story, the three kingdoms fought until the country was exhausted, and a fourth power inherited the ruins. Today, the kingdoms here are still fighting, and the ruins would be inherited by ordinary Indonesians.


Rayhan has a background in government affairs and public policy, with experience across government institutions and advisory firms. His work focuses on the intersection of geopolitics, policy, and risk, with expertise in advocacy, regulatory analysis, and stakeholder engagement. He holds a degree in Government from Universitas Padjadjaran, and has completed an exchange at Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Spain, focusing on global politics and sustainability.

Editorial Deadline 11/07/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk

When budgets are tight, what a government chooses to fund says as much as what it cuts. In Myanmar, the junta is bankrolling a USD 1.5 million royal epic amid economic hardship, and critics say the real cost is history rewritten to flatter the military. In Cambodia, a record USD 6 billion microfinance portfolio is masking a debt crisis, one made sharper by displacement from last year's border conflict with Thailand. Laos, meanwhile, has just made poverty reduction its top national priority — a bold pledge from a government the IMF already rates as being in debt distress. And in Thailand, officials are moving to overhaul civil servant healthcare benefits, the latest attempt to rein in a budget where welfare spending now eats up nearly 38% of the total. Four countries, one question running underneath: when the money doesn't stretch far enough, who decides what gets funded — and who pays for what doesn't?

Myanmar 🇲🇲

Behind Myanmar’s Big Budget Konbaung Dynasty Film

by Ley Hlaing

Myanmar’s entertainment world has been currently divided over a massive new film project about the Konbaung Dynasty, which was the country’s last royal family. While the project is being marketed as a source of national pride, many critics believe it is a high-priced propaganda tool designed to serve the military junta’s narrative.

Officially announced during a media launch on 2 June 2026, the production is a five-part series that has been in the planning stages for about two years, although the creators say the dream for the film started fifteen years ago. The production team aims to release the first film in 2027. To support this large project, they are building a permanent 20-acre studio near Mandalay and Pyin Oo Lwin that is designed to look like a historic town where tourists can eventually visit.

The financial data behind this film is staggering for Myanmar’s current economy, with a total budget estimated between 8 and 10 billion kyats, which is roughly 1.5 million US dollars. To show the supposed glory of the old empire, the film will use real gold and genuine jewels for the royal costumes. Producers are also using advanced technology like Computer Generated Imagery and Artificial Intelligence to recreate historical battles and palace scenes on a scale never seen before in local cinema. Surprisingly, the film also features a massive cast, including nearly 100 famous stars and a total of over 600 male actors and more than 30 lead female roles. Well-known actors such as Nine Nine, Nay Toe, and Myint Myat have been cast in major roles as kings and historical heroes.

Beneath the surface of this big-budget project, there are deep concerns about the “propaganda machine” running the film. One of the main companies involved is the Shwe Mann Empire, which is led by Wai Min Maung. He is known to be a close associate of Khin Thiri Thet Mon, who is the daughter of the junta chief Min Aung Hlaing. Because she was a co-founder of a previous film company that is now under international sanctions, many people see this new project as a way to bypass boycotts and move military money into the arts. Critics argue that spending billions of kyats on a state-sponsored film during a time of extreme economic hardship and inflation is a calculated attempt to distract the public with a version of history that favors the military.

The film’s focus on a “Great Burmese Empire” is being called a tool for “Burmanization,” which promotes a history that puts one ethnic group at the center while ignoring or insulting others. A major point of anger is the casting of Nay Toe, a famous actor from the Rakhine ethnic group, as King Bodawpaya. Historically, King Bodawpaya is remembered for his brutal conquest of the Rakhine Kingdom and the theft of the sacred Mahamuni Buddha image and set it in Mandalay. Using a Rakhine actor to play the very king who oppressed his own people is seen by many as a shameless insult to Rakhine culture and a deliberate attempt to mock ethnic history. Ultimately, observers warn that this film is less about historical truth and more about rebranding the military’s image through expensive fiction.

Ley Hlaing is a former Political Science student from the University of Yangon, Myanmar. Currently, he is pursuing his BA at Parami University with a major in Philosophy, Politics and Economics. His academic and professional interests span community development, literature, minority issues, and social impact research. Having held roles as Research Assistant, Student Mentor, and Facilitator for local initiatives, he has constantly supported project management in literature and education programs in Myanmar.

Cambodia 🇰🇭

Cambodia Microfinance Portfolio Surpasses USD 6 Billion Amid Debt Risks and Border Fallout

by Sokna Thea, in Phnom Penh

Cambodia’s microfinance sector reached a historic milestone in 2025, with the total outstanding loan portfolio hitting USD 6 billion, up more than 15 percent from the year before. Deposits at the country’s four licensed Microfinance Deposit-Taking Institutions (MDIs) climbed 17.6 % to USD 2.99 billion. The sector served 1.53 million active borrowers and 2.21 million depositors through 950 offices and 22,531 staff.

Women accounted for 61 % of active borrowers and 63 percent of depositors, underlining the sector’s role in financial inclusion. Riel-denominated loans reached USD 1.4 billion, or 23.3 % of the total portfolio, while riel savings hit USD 393 million, reflecting steady public trust in the national currency.

But the headline growth masks serious household stress. Non-performing loans across Cambodia’s financial system rose to USD 4.7 billion, or 8.1 % of total loans, by June 2025, the highest level in years. A study commissioned by the Cambodia Microfinance Association itself found that 15 % of Cambodian borrowers spend more than 70 % of their monthly income on debt repayments. Cambodia already holds the highest microcredit debt per capita in the world.

These pressures sit inside a weakening economy. The IMF and World Bank both revised Cambodia’s 2025 GDP growth estimate down to 4.8 %, from 6 % in 2024, citing export volatility, slowing remittances, and weaker domestic demand. Average inflation rose to 2.7 %, up from 0.8 % the prior year. The IMF projects a further slowdown to 4.0 % in 2026.

A major shock came from the border conflict with Thailand, which erupted in May 2025, escalated in July and again in December, and displaced more than 500,000 people on both sides. A ceasefire was signed on 27 December 2025 and holds as of mid-2026, though sporadic incidents continue. The conflict disrupted trade and tourism in border provinces, triggered a mass return of Cambodian migrant workers from Thailand, and slashed remittance inflows that many rural households depend on.

The government introduced targeted social assistance for displaced civilians and appointed a working group to restore damaged infrastructure. The Ministry of Economy and Finance ramped up vocational training and job placement for returning workers. The National Bank of Cambodia directed financial institutions to waive fees, penalties, and interest payments for displaced civilians and defer principal repayments in conflict zones. With NPLs already at record highs and households squeezed between debt and lost income, the IMF urged the government to phase out loan forbearance and strengthen oversight of distressed assets before vulnerabilities deepen further.

Sokna has a background in International Affairs and Business & Commercial Law. He’s currently a Senior Project Coordinator at the Ministry of Economy and Finance of Cambodia, working on the Financial Management Information System (FMIS) Project. His professional focus is driven by entrepreneurship, business development, and financial technology, with a particular interest in how private-sector innovation drives Cambodia’s economic growth.

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Lao PDR 🇱🇦

Poverty Reduction as National Agenda

by Thipphavanh Virakhom, in Vientiane

Laos’ National Assembly adopted a National Agenda on Rural Development and Poverty Reduction for 2027–2030 on 8 July 2026, making poverty reduction the government’s top development priority and targeting 100,000 families lifted out of poverty, with the national rate falling from 14.78 percent to 8 percent. Reading alongside the fiscal and administrative picture around it, the agenda raises questions worth tracking closely over the next four years, not because the goal is unreasonable but because of what achieving it would actually require.

Why does this matter now? Laos adopts the agenda at a moment when its public finances are unusually constrained. The IMF-World Bank Debt Sustainability Analysis released with the 2025 Article IV Consultation assesses Laos as being in external and overall debt distress, with an unsustainable rating reflecting large, protracted breaches of solvency and liquidity thresholds and continued reliance on debt service deferrals. Poverty reduction agendas of this scale typically depend on expanded public spending on health, education, water, and roads; precisely the categories competing against debt service for a limited budget envelope. The agenda’s call for increased domestic and international investment is therefore not a routine planning phrase; it is the central variable that determines whether the 2030 target is reachable at all.

What stage is this at now? The agenda has cleared its highest legislative hurdle, but adoption is a starting point rather than an operational plan. What typically follows in this kind of framework is a set of implementing decrees, budget line allocations tied to specific ministries and provinces, and coordination mechanisms between central agencies and the district and village authorities expected to deliver services locally. None of that machinery has been detailed publicly yet, which means the more meaningful test of the agenda’s seriousness will come in how the 2027 budget cycle actually funds it, not in the target figure itself.

What is beyond the target? Three questions stand out. First, the agenda pairs poverty reduction with “permanent settlement” of rural communities to reduce unplanned migration, while separate labour data shows continuing outmigration to Thailand driven by limited local livelihoods; whether settlement incentives can outweigh that pull is an open empirical question, not a given. Second, the 2025 assessment’s core diagnosis — unstable incomes and dependence on assistance — describes conditions that have persisted across previous planning cycles, so the agenda’s four-year horizon is short relative to the structural nature of the problem it names. Third, an 8 percent poverty rate is only as meaningful as the data system producing it; whether results will be disaggregated by ethnicity, gender, and geography — will determine whether declining averages reflect broad-based improvement or an uneven one.

What would it take? Taken together, these point to what would actually need to happen for the target to be met: a credible medium-term financing strategy that reconciles debt service with new social spending, an operational rollout with clear budget lines by early 2027, and a monitoring system granular enough to show where the remaining 8 percent lives, not just how many families cross the line on paper.


Thipphavanh holds a bachelor’s degree in international affairs. She is a governance and development professional specialising in rule of law, access to justice, and gender equality in Lao PDR. Her work focuses on strengthening justice sector institutions, advancing people-centred governance, and promoting gender-responsive systems. With extensive experience in project coordination, monitoring and evaluation, stakeholder engagement, and strategic communications, she has collaborated closely with national institutions and international partners to support inclusive and sustainable development.

Thailand 🇹🇭

Thailand to Revamp Government Healthcare Perks Amid Stretched Budget

by Satid Sootipunya, in Bangkok

The Thai government is planning to restructure its healthcare benefits for government officials due to the country’s already-stretched public finances.

Deputy Prime Minister Pakorn Nilprapunt last week ordered government stakeholders to urgently study replacing the current direct-reimbursement welfare system for civil servants with a private health insurance one to reduce healthcare-related expenses, following the country’s prolonged budget shortfalls.

For the draft 2027 annual budget, public sector welfare is set to reach 1.4 trillion baht (around USD 42.06 billion), accounting for 37.9% of the total annual budget. Meanwhile, research and development (R&D) spending is set to drop by 72 billion baht (USD 2.16 billion), marking an 8.4% decrease from the previous year.

Besides the standard personnel budget, there are an additional 572.620 billion baht in hidden expenses for civil servants. According to a report from local media outlet Krungthep Turakij, this includes: Healthcare Benefits (94.200 billion baht), Financial Assistance/Welfare (4.670 billion baht), Pensions and Retiring Allowances (389.090 billion baht), Salary Raises and Degree Adjustments (13.000 billion baht), Permanent Wage Earner Contributions (260 million baht), Civil Servant Reserves, Contributions, and Compensations (71.400 billion baht), and Local Government Personnel Expenses (10.2638 billion baht).

For decades, the Thai government has continuously run budget deficits at approx. 3–4% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Roughly 70% of the total government expenditure falls into a hard-to-reduce category, according to research conducted by Thailand’s fiscal policy expert Athiphat Muthitacharoen. A major part of this rigid expenditure is public sector personnel expenses.

Thailand’s Finance Minister Ekniti Nitithanprapas has consistently emphasized the government’s mission since taking office to create responsible state spending and lower the country’s severe fiscal deficits. These deficits have been Thailand’s main economic problem for decades, especially under the relatively low economic growth of the past ten years.

Despite that, S&P Global Ratings recently affirmed Thailand’s sovereign credit rating at BBB+ with a stable economic outlook, noting confidence in the country’s economic fundamentals, reduced external tensions, and clear government policy pathways.


Satid is a multimedia economic journalist and news anchor who covers macroeconomic trends, Thailand’s fiscal policy, and key regional developments for Bangkok Biz. A Journalism graduate from Thammasat University, he has reported on major issues such as the US–China trade tensions, the Myanmar crisis, and global corporate stories, drawing on prior newsroom experience at The Momentum, the Bangkok Post, AFP, and Varasarn Press. His work blends economic analysis, foreign affairs, and digital storytelling, with a strong focus on making complex financial and political topics accessible to Thai audiences.

Editorial Deadline 11/07/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

by Karen Ysabelle R. David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk

With the world still reeling from the Iran war-induced global energy crisis, few countries have been as affected as the energy insecure Philippines. Fortunately for Manila, it has friends in high places: the World Bank just recently approved a US$1.02-billion loan to support the country’s energy transition. The question now: can it make the most of this windfall?

Meanwhile, Singapore last week just launched its Online Safety Commission to address the frustration of victims of harmful online activity. Once again, the city-state finds itself on the cutting edge of a digital frontier. One can only hope that the rest of Southeast Asia follows suit.

This new development in Singapore’s online landscape leads us to look back on how Vietnam is faring in the global race for digitalization. Just like the former, the latter is dealing with the risks that come with a world that is more digitally connected than ever before, as its e-commerce industry enters a booming new chapter.

The Philippines 🇵🇭

The World Bank’s US$1.02-Billion Bet on Philippine Energy

by Arianne De Guzman, in Bulacan

On 30 June 2026, the World Bank reportedly approved the Second Energy Transition and Climate Resilience Development Policy Loan (DPL), amounting to US$1.02-billion, for the Philippines to support the country’s clean energy deployment, invigorate electricity markets, and improve water management. While this indicates a vote of confidence in the country’s push for affordable electricity and better water services for the Filipinos, is the Philippines prepared to make the most of it?

The timing is significant. The Philippines remains behind in its shift to cleaner energy. According to the Energy Transition Index (ETI) 2026 published by the World Economic Forum, the country ranked 86th out of 120 countries, scoring 52.3 out of 100 — below the global average of 57.3. The report cited challenges in the country’s energy system, sustainability, and the affordability of electricity — issues that continue to burden Filipino households and businesses.

As the Philippines remains dependent on imported fossil fuels and has been exposed to volatile global fuel prices stemming from the geopolitical tensions in the Middle East, President Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. has declared a national energy emergency until March 2027. Since the costs of the fuel account for a significant portion of electricity generation, its spikes in global prices are also reflected in Filipinos’ electricity bills.

It is precisely these challenges that the World Bank financing seeks to address. The loan will support key initiatives, including the operationalization of the Renewable Energy Market integration of electric vehicle charging into utility planning, and the launch of the first-ever offshore wind auction, targeting 3.3 gigawatts of contracted capacity by 2030. The World Bank projects that this offshore wind program could mobilize US$7-billion in private investment, which could generate employment opportunities across construction, engineering, and energy services.

However, financing alone cannot guarantee lower electricity prices. Despite the US$20-million being provided as a grant, the US$1-billion comes as a loan that must be repaid. The investment will pay off if the Philippine government can fully implement the planned initiatives on time. Otherwise, delays, possible cost overruns, and weak implementation could increase the country’s debt without even resolving the rising costs of electricity and improving the Philippines’ energy transition readiness.

The urgent need to modernize the country’s energy sector has become evident. The Philippines recently emerged as one of the top spenders on solar panels since the Iran war began. This surge does not stem solely from the rising electricity prices, but also from the country’s enormous renewable energy potential due to its geographic location and archipelagic structure. With abundant solar, wind, and geothermal resources, the Philippines has natural advantages necessary for a more resilient and diversified energy system. Ultimately, the success of the World Bank’s US$1.02-billion financing package will not be measured by the amount provided, but by the reforms it enables.


Arianne has experience in policy research at De La Salle University’s Jesse M. Robredo Institute of Governance, where she contributed to projects on systemic reform. She earned a degree in Political Science from Colegio de San Juan de Letran. Currently, she works in government relations, specializing in advocacy strategy, legislative monitoring, and stakeholder engagement. Beyond her professional work, she is actively involved in youth development and grassroots initiatives through the Rotaract Club of Santa Maria.

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Singapore 🇸🇬

Singapore's New Online Safety Commission Signals a Shift From Moderation to Enforcement

by Ryan

On 29 June, the Online Safety Commission (OSC) began operations in Singapore, giving the city-state a dedicated statutory agency with the power to compel platforms, group administrators, and individual users to act on harmful online content, rather than merely asking them to. The commission provides victims of online harms in Singapore a dedicated and easily accessible avenue to seek timely redress, and its launch coincided with the coming into force of statutory tort provisions under the Online Safety (Relief and Accountability) Act (OSRAA), which was passed in Parliament on 5 November 2025. The timing matters as much as the substance: Singapore has spent years building a patchwork of online harms legislation, from the Protection from Harassment Act in 2014 to the Online Criminal Harms Act in 2023, but this is the first instance of a regulator built specifically to move faster than the platforms it oversees.

The Commission’s initial mandate is narrow by design. In its first phase of operations, the OSC will support victims affected by five of the most prevalent and severe online harms: online harassment, including online sexual harassment; doxxing; online stalking; intimate image abuse; and image-based child abuse. Eight further categories, including deepfake abuse and online impersonation, are expected to follow at a later stage.

What makes the OSC notable is less the harm that it targets than the accountability structure underneath it. The commission was set up in response to the frustrations of victims of harmful online activity with the slow responses by online platforms, as the OSC has legal authority to compel platforms and group administrators to act quickly. That frustration was not abstract: officials cited platform response times that routinely stretched beyond four days.

The broader significance lies in what this does to the region’s regulatory center of gravity. Singapore’s framework is particularly significant because it demonstrates how Asian jurisdictions are developing independent online governance regimes that may diverge from both the American free speech approach and the European Union’s Digital Services Act model. Elsewhere in ASEAN, the response to platform-driven harm remains fragmented and largely reactive: Malaysia’s own commentators have pointed to Singapore’s Online Criminal Harms Act as a starting point while arguing that a broader, rights-based legal approach would help ASEAN move toward a unified framework for governing AI-enabled abuse. As deepfakes, non-consensual synthetic imagery, and cross-border scam networks increasingly ignore national boundaries, Singapore’s willingness to legislate direct, enforceable duties onto platforms gives the rest of Southeast Asia a live template.

Whether ASEAN member states follow that template individually or attempt something closer to regional coordination will say a great deal about how seriously the bloc intends to treat platform accountability as a shared governance problem. In a region where harmful content moves across borders faster than any single national regulator can chase it, the Commission’s real innovation may not be its enforcement powers at all, but the admission that speed, not scope, is now the measure of a functioning digital state.


Ryan is a final-year finance student at the Singapore University of Social Sciences (SUSS) with experience across venture capital, venture debt, and business development. He also holds a diploma in Law and Management from Temasek Polytechnic. His interests lie in how emerging technologies and economic trends shape business ecosystems and regional development in Asia.

Vietnam 🇻🇳

A New Chapter for E-Commerce

by Hang Nguyen, in Ho Chi Minh City

Due to the global race for digitalization, along with a surge in demand caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, e-commerce industries in Vietnam have experienced expansive growth within the last half decade. Shopee, TikTok Shop, Lazada, and Tiki dominate the country’s e-commercial landscape, with nearly 60% of the population — of various ages, genders, and geographical demographics — accessing these platforms to purchase goods. Vietnam’s e-commerce sector has recorded substantial growth and demonstrated robust performance: market value reached US$25 billion (20% growth) in 2024, ranking third in Southeast Asia, while entering the list of Top 5 economies leading in e-commerce growth in 2022.

The Vietnam E-commerce and Digital Economy Agency (VEDEA), under the Ministry of Industry and Trade (MoIT), recognizes the instrumental role of this industry in national and economic development, but simultaneously acknowledges that the accelerating pace of growth has presented opportunities as well as revealed many complications. E-commercial regulations have been anchored by only two government decrees: Decree No. 52/2013/ND-CP dated 16 May 2013, and the subsequently supplementing Decree No. 85/2021/ND-CP dated 25 September 2021. These documents lacked sufficient legal capacity, whereas Vietnam e-commerce markets were in need of control to ensure stable maturity. On 10 December 2025, the National Assembly voted to pass the Law on E-commerce, consisting of seven chapters and 41 articles to become effective on 1 July 2026.

The law acts as a “shield” in Vietnam’s transition from “rapid growth” toward “quality growth”, circumventing evident issues in Vietnam’s digital environment. Mr. Hoang Quang Phong, Vice Chairman of the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VCCI), highlighted the concerns regarding smuggling, trade fraud, and the online sale of counterfeit, fake and low-quality products. Dishonest e-commercial activities destroy customer trust, harm legitimate businesses, and expose consumers to health risks and meticulous digital scams. In 2025, VEDEA reported banning the operation of 13,700 violating shops on e-commerce platforms for counterfeit, banned, or untraceable products.

The Law on E-commerce introduces transparency into the legal framework, by unprecedentedly classifying four types of platforms with corresponding legal responsibilities: direct business e-commerce platforms; intermediary e-commerce platforms; social networks operating in e-commerce; and joint e-commerce platforms. The law imposes the obligation for e-commerce platforms to disclose ownership, data protection policies, the rights and obligations of parties, and algorithm criteria for product display; all sellers’ identity must be electronically verified. New provisions have also been established to fill the legal gaps existing with livestream sales and affiliate marketing, an emerging and rising domain, such as the prohibition of misleading product information by live streamers. The safety nets enacted by the law promises Vietnam’s economic track towards green, circular, and sustainable development.

However, considerations towards online vendors’ rights should also be discussed. The frequent additions of fees and regulations with shorter implementation deadlines strain sellers’ capacity and spike the competitive market. Mindful market growth must warrant the survivability of e-commercial businesses rather than favoritism towards consumers. Southeast Asia and ASEAN can provide valuable models, markets, and resources for Hanoi to enhance its national model for e-commerce, including the ASEAN Agreement on Electronic Commerce (2019), the ASEAN Digital Integration Framework (DIF), and the ASEAN Coordinating Committee on Electronic Commerce (ACCEC), among others.


Hang is a young researcher with academic experience in Vietnam and the United States. She has previously worked in public relations at the U.S. Consulate General in Ho Chi Minh City and the YSEALI Academy. Her research focuses on ASEAN centrality in the evolving Asia-Pacific landscape, with particular attention to Vietnam’s approach to trade, regional cooperation, and political economy in the face of external power dynamics and global volatility.

Editorial Deadline 07/07/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)