A Crack in the Doctrine
Issue 37 — Key Developments Across Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand
Editor’s Note
by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk
This issue of The Mekong Belt highlights what may be an emerging crack in the doctrine at the heart of Southeast Asia’s regional order. For decades, ASEAN’s commitment to non-interference has defined both its cohesion and its limits. Today, that principle is being tested on different fronts.
As Timor-Leste allows its courts to examine alleged crimes committed in Myanmar, ASEAN’s long-standing doctrine of non-interference faces an uncomfortable test. While the Five-Point Consensus stalls, legal mechanisms are quietly stepping in where diplomacy has struggled. In Cambodia, Hun Manet’s used the debut ofTrump’s Board of Peace to internationalize tensions with Thailand and engaging Western media directly, Phnom Penh is both appealing beyond the region and subtly reshaping how sovereignty disputes are framed — less as internal matters to be managed quietly, and more as issues warranting global visibility.
Elsewhere, institutional scrutiny takes different forms. In Thailand, controversy surrounding the Social Security Office has reignited debate over transparency in a mandatory public fund. And in Laos, macroeconomic recovery masks a deeper divide between headline growth and rural reality.
Myanmar 🇲🇲
Timor-Leste Puts ASEAN’s Doctrine on Trial
by Myat Moe Kywe
As the International Court of Justice resumed hearings on January 12 in the Rohingya genocide case filed by The Gambia against Myanmar, a significant legal development has unfolded in Southeast Asia, adding a new dimension to regional responses to the Myanmar crisis.
Timor-Leste, ASEAN’s newest member state, has allowed its judiciary to examine criminal complaints submitted by the Chin Human Rights Organization (CHRO). The filings reportedly concern allegations against Myanmar’s military junta, including Min Aung Hlaing, for committing war crimes and crimes against humanity. The case is being considered under the principle of universal jurisdiction—a legal doctrine that permits national courts to prosecute grave international crimes regardless of where they were committed.
Universal jurisdiction has rarely been invoked within ASEAN, a regional bloc traditionally guided by strict adherence to national sovereignty and the principle of non-interference since its founding in 1967. Salai Za Uk, Executive Director of CHRO, welcomed the development, stating that he and his colleagues “look forward to working with the Timorese authorities, as well as civil society groups in Timor-Leste, on pursuing justice for the Chin people and all people in Myanmar.”
In response, Myanmar’s military-controlled state media, Global New Light of Myanmar, expressed disappointment over the President of Timor-Leste receiving CHRO representatives, describing the organization as unlawful. Diplomatic tensions escalated further on February 13, when Myanmar’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs expelled Mr. Elisio do Rosario de Sousa, Chargé d’Affaires ad interim of the Timor-Leste Embassy in Yangon. He was instructed to leave the country no later than February 20 under Article 9 of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
In a public statement, Myanmar’s junta-led Foreign Ministry accused Timor-Leste of violating fundamental principles enshrined in the ASEAN Charter, particularly Articles 2(2)(a), 2(2)(e), and 2(2)(k), which emphasize respect for sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of member states. In response, Jose Teixeira of the Timorese law firm Da Silva Teixeira & Associados Lda stressed that “the rule of law is a priority issue for Timor-Leste.” He added, “We firmly reject any outside interference, particularly from the Myanmar junta, in Timor-Leste’s court system.”
In a press release issued last week, Timor-Leste condemned the expulsion of its chargé d’affaires and reaffirmed its commitment to democratic principles. Aligning its position with those of ASEAN and the United Nations, Dili reiterated its support for efforts to restore democratic order in Myanmar. The statement expressed solidarity with the Myanmar people and urged the military authorities to respect human rights and pursue a peaceful and constructive resolution to the crisis.
Timor-Leste’s approach to Myanmar’s crisis has been consistent in recent years. Diplomatic tensions were already evident in 2023, when Myanmar’s military authorities expelled a Timorese diplomat following engagement with Myanmar’s opposition National Unity Government.
Now formally integrated into ASEAN as of last October, Timor-Leste’s position presents a notable shift within the bloc’s diplomatic landscape. ASEAN has long struggled to forge a unified and effective response to Myanmar’s political and humanitarian crisis.
As ICJ proceedings on the Rohingya case continue in The Hague, the parallel legal steps taken in Dili may signal a broader reconsideration of accountability mechanisms in the region. They also raise renewed questions about ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus, which has yet to produce tangible results. The development serves as a reminder that ASEAN may need more effective mechanisms to address the crisis—one that affects not only the people of Myanmar, but also the bloc’s credibility, cohesion, and stability.
Myat is a senior undergraduate student majoring in Politics, Philosophy, and Economics. She has interned at The Asia Foundation in Washington, D.C., and she has also worked as a summer research assistant at the Centre for Policy and Innovation (CRPI), gaining experience in research and analysis. Her work focuses on civic engagement, gender, youth leadership, and community development.
Cambodia 🇰🇭
Hun Manet Steps Onto the International Stage
by Chandara Samban, in Kandal
Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet led Cambodia’s delegation to the first meeting of U.S. President Donald Trump’s “Board of Peace” in Washington, using the occasion to make his first major appearance in international media. On the sidelines, Hun Manet gave interviews to Reuters and Fox News, marking his first major engagement with international press as prime minister.
During these interviews, Hun Manet accused Thailand of violating Cambodian sovereignty and breaching the Kuala Lumpur Peace Agreement signed in July 2025. The agreement was concluded with Malaysia serving as ASEAN Chair and the United States acting as a witness. According to Hun Manet, Thai troops advanced further into disputed territory than previously acknowledged, preventing Cambodian families from returning to their homes and undermining bilateral commitments.
Thailand rejected the accusations. A spokesperson for the Thai Ministry of National Defense argued that the areas in question historically belonged to Thailand and had been used to shelter Cambodian refugees during the Khmer Rouge period. According to Bangkok, current residents have remained there without legal status.
Since tensions escalated, Hun Manet’s government has described its approach as “Quiet But Not Silent” — a strategy framed as deliberate restraint rather than passivity. Public communication during most of the standoff was handled by government spokespersons and the Ministry of National Defense, while the prime minister himself avoided direct comment. As domestic expectations for leadership statements grew, the government continued to invoke the phrase to signal ongoing diplomacy behind the scenes.
In this context, Hun Manet’s Washington visit marked a shift. By addressing the dispute through international media, he effectively internationalized the issue and signaled a willingness to frame the border tensions within broader diplomatic and legal contexts.
Beyond the border dispute, Hun Manet emphasized Cambodia–U.S. cooperation in tackling online scam operations and rejected perceptions that Cambodia is exclusively aligned with China. He presented his government as pursuing a more balanced foreign policy, maintaining ties with Beijing while strengthening engagement with Western partners.
Regarding this diplomatic outreach, Jean-François Tain, Minister Delegate attached to Prime Minister Hun Manet, described the move as a reaffirmation of Cambodia’s commitment to multilateralism and peace. He stated that it also sent a message to Thailand that Cambodia seeks peaceful solutions and international legal mechanisms to resolve border disputes, while urging Bangkok to return to negotiations.
Geopolitical analyst Seng Vanly interpreted Hun Manet’s diplomatic engagement as an effort to demonstrate to the international community that his government is legitimate, responsible, and politically mature. By participating in Trump’s Board of Peace initiative and appearing in major international media, Hun Manet signaled his administration’s capacity to engage with both domestic and global issues.
Vanly argued that Hun Manet is capitalizing on a rare opportunity to enter the international spotlight by aligning with Trump’s circle at a time when many countries have chosen not to participate. This, he suggested, enhances Cambodia’s visibility and may help build trust within segments of the U.S. political establishment.
He further advised that Cambodia continue to internationalize the Cambodia–Thailand border issue through global media and diplomatic forums, reframing it as a regional security concern. At the same time, he urged the government to address internal political challenges — including reopening political space, revitalizing civil society and independent media, releasing opposition figures, and intensifying efforts against online crime — to help restore both domestic and international confidence in the administration.
Chandara is a freelance journalist with a focus on foreign affairs, security issues, and ASEAN affairs. He also serves as a Junior Counterterrorism Intelligence Analyst.
Thailand 🇹🇭
Accountability in Thailand’s Welfare State
by Natamon Aumphin, in Bangkok
Thailand’s Social Security Office (SSO) has once again come under public scrutiny following allegations of mismanagement of the Social Security Fund (SSF). The controversy intensified after Ratchanok Srinok, a Bangkok MP from the People’s Party, released details from the SSO’s budgeting plans highlighting questionable spending practices.
Among the expenditures cited there was a 2.2 million baht (approximately USD 70,600) budget allocation for overseas trips by SSO officials. Reports revealed that a recent six-day trip to Japan for 10 officials included first-class airfare and five-star accommodation. Another budget item showed 35 million baht allocated for professional suits for SSO staff. The disclosures sparked widespread criticism on social media, particularly among insured citizens concerned about the handling of their contributions. Public frustration deepened after SSO Plus—the platform used by insured persons to claim benefits—malfunctioned for several days.
The SSF, administered under the Ministry of Labor, is designed to provide financial protection to formal-sector workers in cases of unemployment, illness, pregnancy, disability, or death. By law, employers must register their employees with the SSO and contribute to the fund. Each month, employees and employers each contribute 5 percent of the employee’s salary, based on a salary cap currently set at 15,000 baht (with plans to increase to 23,000 baht by 2032). While the government makes partial contributions, the fund is primarily financed by workers and employers.
Participation in the SSF is mandatory. Employers who fail to register workers or make contributions face fines of up to 20,000 baht, imprisonment, or both. Given this compulsory structure, critics argue that the SSO has a heightened responsibility to ensure transparency and accountability. Many insured workers have pointed out the contrast between the bureaucratic complexity of claiming benefits and the apparent ease with which officials authorize internal spending.
Adding to the controversy, the SSO board has opened a public hearing—running until February 14—on proposed structural reforms aimed at improving efficiency. However, the draft plan would reduce the number of representatives from insured workers and employees, who currently hold seven seats each. Critics warn that this could weaken citizen representation and diminish oversight over fund management.
Despite public calls for greater accountability, Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul has distanced the government from direct responsibility, claiming that the SSO does not fall under direct executive management. During the election campaign, concerns over the SSF were dismissed by government figures as politically motivated attacks from the opposition rather than urgent governance issues.
For many contributors, however, the controversy raises a deeper question: if participation in the fund is mandatory, should transparency and public oversight not be equally non-negotiable?
Natamon has served as a rapporteur at the Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS Thailand). She has also worked as a research assistant on diplomatic issues in Southeast Asia. Her work focuses on how domestic politics shape foreign policy in the region. She holds a degree in international relations and has experience in policy analysis, event reporting, and regional research.
Lao PDR 🇱🇦
Economic Rebound in Laos: Who Is Benefiting and Who Is Left Behind?
by Thipphavanh Virakhom, in Vientiane
Laos is turning a corner. After four turbulent years marked by currency collapse, runaway inflation, and mounting debt, the economy recorded 4.8% GDP growth in 2025, according to the Lao Statistics Bureau—outpacing earlier projections from the World Bank (4.2%) and the IMF (3.5–4.5%). The kip has stabilized, inflation has fallen from a peak of 31% in 2023 to around 4% by October 2025, and foreign exchange reserves have risen to between USD 2.6 and 2.8 billion. On the surface, the recovery appears solid. Yet beneath these headline figures, the gains are unevenly distributed, with implications not only for Laos but for ASEAN as a whole.
The primary beneficiaries of the rebound are concentrated in capital-intensive and export-oriented sectors. Electricity exports, hydropower expansion, mining, logistics, and a revived tourism industry—recording nearly 4.6 million arrivals in 2025—have driven most of the growth. The Laos–China Railway, now in its fourth year of operation, has further boosted cross-border freight and strengthened Laos’s position as a transit economy within the Greater Mekong Subregion. Urban businesses, logistics operators, special economic zone investors, and state-linked enterprises have seen the most visible gains. GDP per capita is projected to reach USD 2,238 in 2026, and Laos remains on track to graduate from Least Developed Country (LDC) status that same year, a milestone the World Bank attributes to “shrewd reforms and stronger fiscal management.”
However, the recovery looks markedly different outside Vientiane. Rural poverty remains close to 24%, compared to 7% in urban areas, according to the Asian Development Bank. The Gini Index rose from 35 in 2007 to 38.8 in 2018, the most recent national data available, and research published in March 2025 warns that inequality could worsen further without a more inclusive growth model. As of 2023, approximately 16.87% of Lao households—over 208,000 families—remained below the poverty line, and 30% of villages had yet to escape poverty. Informal workers, who make up the majority of the labor force, and subsistence farmers have seen limited direct benefit from hydropower revenues or railway expansion. According to the ILO, half of Laos’s children still lack adequate access to education, healthcare, and basic services.
Laos’s recovery also carries regional implications. China accounts for roughly 25% of Lao exports and 60% of foreign direct investment inflows, creating significant exposure. A slowdown in Chinese demand could quickly reverse recent gains, with spillover effects for regional supply chains and ASEAN’s connectivity ambitions. Meanwhile, public debt—estimated at around 99% of GDP—limits fiscal space for investment in social services and rural infrastructure, which are essential for broad-based growth. ASEAN partners, particularly Thailand and Vietnam as key trading and tourism counterparts, have a stake in whether Laos’s rebound proves sustainable.
The IMF has noted that deeper regional integration within ASEAN—through improved logistics, digital connectivity, and trade facilitation—offers Laos its most credible medium-term opportunity. However, this potential depends on structural reforms that extend beyond enclave industries. With LDC graduation in 2026 likely to reduce development assistance and trade preferences, the urgency of diversifying and broadening the economic base is growing.
The rebound is real. The question for 2026 is whether it will extend beyond growth statistics to reach rural communities, informal workers, and households still waiting for tangible change.
Thipphavanh holds a bachelor’s degree in international affairs. She is a governance and development professional specialising in rule of law, access to justice, and gender equality in Lao PDR. Her work focuses on strengthening justice sector institutions, advancing people-centred governance, and promoting gender-responsive systems. With extensive experience in project coordination, monitoring and evaluation, stakeholder engagement, and strategic communications, she has collaborated closely with national institutions and international partners to support inclusive and sustainable development.
Editorial Deadline 21/02/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)
