A Kazan Thaw
Issue 55 — Key Developments Across the Philippines, Singapore, Timor-Leste, and Vietnam
Editor’s Note
by Karen Ysabelle R. David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk
War makes for strange bedfellows. In the case of the Iran war, with Prime Minister Lawrence Wong in Kazan for the ASEAN–Russia Commemorative Summit, Singapore has found itself thawing toward the northern giant. Can this fraught early stage — backlit by Russia’s own war with Ukraine — survive the twists and turns that characterize the international system of today, especially as Singapore takes over as ASEAN Chair next year?
Over in Hanoi, just before the end of June, the government broke ground on five urban railway lines spanning hundreds of kilometers. In its bid to chase double-digit GDP growth, will Vietnam’s multi-billion-dollar gamble pay off?
And in the Philippines, even the ongoing political noise unfolding in the highest levels of the government was drowned out by a tragedy last week: a school shooting — a rarity in the Philippines — that claimed the lives of three students. Too little, too late, the incident has led to pointing fingers and a national reckoning.
Singapore 🇸🇬
ASEAN–Russia Enmeshment and Singapore’s Role as an Intermediary
by Nurul Aini, in Singapore
After hosting May’s Shangri-La Dialogue, Singapore attended the ASEAN–Russia Commemorative Summit upon the invitation of President Vladimir Putin from 17 to 18 June 2026. While the Dialogue witnessed China’s more indirect approach to the US–China dynamics and the US vocalized a desire for stability with China through high-level diplomatic preservation, the Summit demonstrated ASEAN’s attempt at building security and economic relations, with a third major power that has been characterized as internationally isolated.
There were three deliverables: the Kazan Declaration, the Joint Statement on Cultural Cooperation, and the ASEAN-Russia Comprehensive Plan of Action, which emphasized outcomes like cultural cooperation, energy security, trade and investments, digital economies, artificial intelligence, and more. In the Joint Statement, the ASEAN Community Vision 2045 and ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community Strategic Plan were both mentioned, alongside the Russian Federation’s Basic Principles of State Cultural Policy, demonstrating that both sides value each other’s cultural sovereignty.
Additionally, Singapore’s attendance highlighted its willingness to navigate complex relations with Russia, considering its targeted sanctions on military exports and financial activities as a result of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. As the oil crisis continues, Singapore emerges as an intermediary, with a London Stock Exchange Group data showing that Russian tankers are increasingly listing Singapore as their destination in January 2026, even though these usually indicate that only ship-to-ship transfers are done at nearby waters. Other countries such as Myanmar have a higher level of dependency on Russia for oil, while Cambodia has seen trade relations decline from 2021 to 2024, with a re-direction to defense industrial cooperation instead.
The differing engagement levels between ASEAN and Russia also means that this emerging relationship cannot simply be captured by unidirectional models or a clean application of the “omni-enmeshment” concept theorized by Shedden Professor of Strategic Policy Studies at the Australian National University, Evelyn Goh. According to Goh, ASEAN’s enmeshment strategy involves engaging major powers in the region’s strategic powers individually, while using ASEAN as a platform, where its objectives differ from “imperative of strategic diversification” to “the desire to boost regional leadership” and “ambitions of transforming great powers behavior,” through building a web of network between major powers while avoiding over-dependency. Goh’s examples revolve more around the emerging security concerns post-Cold War that necessitated the retention of an incumbent hegemon and the socializing of a rising challenger.
It can still be said that ASEAN is extending its omni-enmeshment strategy to a third major power, but now under structural conditions of multipolarity and institutional competition. What makes this relationship interesting is that Russia’s relations with ASEAN are heavily concentrated in sectors such as energy and arms, which has its own set of political complications. Perhaps, within the context where Russia is still constructing its institutional stakes within ASEAN, the relations between the SEA bloc and Russia can be understood more through a push and pull dynamic. Russia has counter-enmeshment strategies in place through its BRICS-EAEU-SCO institutional framework. Analysts like Joanne Lin have highlighted Moscow’s needs for ASEAN markets, characterizing ASEAN-Russia relations as a two-way relationship rather than a one-sided tilt, while considering how ASEAN will navigate through practical cooperations with Russia while avoiding validation of its invasion of Ukraine.
As of now, the emerging relationship between ASEAN and Russia remains at its early stages. As Prime Minister Lawrence Wong emphasized during the Summit, Singapore looks forward to having ASEAN work further with Russia when the country takes over as Chair of ASEAN in 2027.
Aini is currently pursuing a master’s degree in English literature at Nanyang Technological University. She has experience working in youth groups, contributing to the planning and management of outreach activities.
Vietnam 🇻🇳
Track, TOD, and Transformation
by Tri Vo, in Ho Chi Minh City
On 22 June 2026, Hanoi officially initiated one of the most ambitious infrastructure initiatives in Vietnamese modern history. In the groundbreaking ceremony attended by the new Prime Minister Le Minh Hung, the capital commenced construction on five urban railway lines spanning more than 300 kilometers. With a preliminary price tag exceeding VND 1.3 quadrillion (roughly US$51 billion or about 10% of Vietnam’s 2025 GDP), such a mega endeavor represents a massive macroeconomic lever for a government aggressively chasing a double-digit GDP growth mandate. Unleashing billions of dollars into the domestic construction sector is, if anything, an economic sailwind for the larger economy.
The sheer scale of such a feat already appears staggering and requires the highest order of capacity. As such, Vietnam’s largest conglomerate, Vingroup — whose Vinhomes–VinSpeed joint venture is appointed as the EPC (engineering, procurement, and construction) general contractor — will be tasked with the delivery of Lines 1, 2, 8, 10, and 14 by 2030. Rather than simply tunneling beneath the existing downtown area, these routes are meant to shift commercial/residential gravity away from the highly congested urban core and toward the peripheries, relieving pressure on the capital’s center and allowing space to give the sometimes-chaotic area a facelift as part of the 100-year planning. For instance, the 81-kilometer Line 1 and 56.5-kilometer Line 2 will create high-speed corridors connecting the city center to Noi Bai International Airport in the suburbs, creating the necessary transportation convenience for families to move to the peripheries.
To finance and generate value from this massive US$51 billion gamble, Hanoi is heavily relying on the Transit-Oriented Development (TOD) model. By making sure that public transport will be followed by localized real estate development, the city plans to capture the land sales value appreciation that follows the construction and completion of rail infrastructure. Under recent policy directives, authorities are expediting land clearance and offering various incentives (like zoning, land-use certification, etc.) for developers to build high-density commercial and residential clusters adjacent to the new lines. This approach is already triggering a profound shift in real estate investment appetite, as institutional investors, such as Vinhomes, aggressively reposition their portfolios toward the suburbs like Ocean Park, anticipating the inevitable value uplift these transit hubs will bring about.
Overall, the short-term economic multiplier effect of this massive project is exactly what Hanoi needs on the economic front going into the second half of the year. Mobilizing capital for 300 kilometers of underground and elevated rail, not to mention facilities such as terminals, will require not just cash but an immense supply of construction materials and engineering labor. This massive domestic demand injection can act as a vital dose of adrenaline for the economy, which is straining under external pressure, including the current Middle Eastern conflict and rising protectionism in the US, a highly important export destination for Vietnam.
Ultimately, Hanoi’s five-line metro expansion is a high-stakes race against time. The city intends to have a fully operational 500-kilometer rail network by 2035, which means that the execution window is quite tight. However, success in this project, along with the entailing movement of people outside of the congested urban core, will present Hanoi’s ASEAN peers with a case in point on how to solve the immense pain of overcrowded urban centers straining services and livability across the region.
Tri has experience in management consulting and strategy, having worked with institutions such as the UNDP, The Asia Group, and ARC Group. He has provided strategic, legal, and operational insights to clients in sectors including manufacturing, energy, and technology. He holds both academic and professional experience related to Southeast and East Asia, with a focus on regional development and policy.
The Philippines 🇵🇭
When Children Carry Guns: Tacloban’s School Shooting and the Philippines’ Safety Reckoning
by Eduardo G. Fajermo Jr., in Angeles City
The Philippines is now confronting a question it has long treated as distant: what happens when the violence that haunts streets, online spaces, and homes enters the classroom? The 22 June school shooting at San Jose National High School in Tacloban City — where two students aged 14 and 15 allegedly opened fire, killed three students, and injured 20 others — has forced the country into a painful reckoning over guns, school security, bullying, online influence, and juvenile justice.
School shootings remain rare in the Philippines, but the Tacloban case showed how quickly rarity can become reality. The suspects used a 9mm Glock pistol and a .38-caliber revolver, with the weapons traced to a police officer relative and a security agency employee. The police recovered more than 40 shell casings, while videos circulating online showed students hiding and crying as the attack unfolded. The details matter because this was not merely a story of two minors committing violence. It was also a story of adult failure: firearms were accessible, school entry points were not secure enough, and warning signs may have gone unaddressed.
Authorities are now rethinking school safety. Civil defense officials said preparedness can no longer be limited to earthquakes and natural disasters, but must include “human-induced” and crime-related incidents. That shift is overdue: Philippine schools regularly drill students for fire and earthquake emergencies, but many are unprepared for armed violence.
The motive remains under investigation, but bullying has emerged as one possible factor. Police and officials have said the suspects may have acted out of retaliation after being bullied, while investigators are also examining online influences. In response, the government temporarily blocked the online game GoreBox, reportedly used by one suspect, while stressing the need to examine online risks to children. Yet the deeper issue is how grievance, isolation, bullying, access to firearms, and violent online spaces can converge around children who are already in distress.
The case has also revived the debate over juvenile sanctions. Under the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act, a child 15 years old or under at the time of the offense is exempt from criminal liability but must undergo an intervention program. Children above 15 but below 18 are also exempt unless they acted with discernment, meaning they understood the wrongfulness and consequences of their act. This legal framework means the 14-year-old suspect is generally handled through welfare intervention, while the legal treatment of the 15-year-old depends on age rules, discernment, and child-protection processes. The law also makes clear that exemption from criminal liability does not erase civil liability.
Public outrage is understandable. Three children are dead. Families are grieving. A community is traumatized. But lowering the age of criminal responsibility should not become a reflexive substitute for fixing the systems that failed before the first shot was fired. The question is not whether children who commit grave violence should be held accountable. They must be. The question is whether accountability stops with the child, or whether it climbs upward to the family, the firearm owner, the school, the platform, and the state.
The Tacloban shooting should not become a moral panic about “bad kids” or “bad games.” It should become a national audit of safety. Children did not only die because two classmates pulled the trigger. They died because a chain of protection broke long before the guns entered campus. In that broken chain lies the real case the Philippines must answer.
Eduardo is a Political Science graduate and MA Political Science candidate at the University of Santo Tomas, researching democracy, disaster governance, and inclusive policy in the Global South. He is a former faculty member at Holy Angel University, where he taught Philippine history and contemporary global issues. He also worked with a senator in the Guam Legislature, contributing to policy research and legislative analysis.
Editorial Deadline 30/06/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)
