A Manila–Beijing Word War
Issue 33 — Key Developments Across the Philippines, Singapore, and Vietnam
Editor’s Note
by Karen Ysabelle R. David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk
As the first month of the new year comes to a close, Manila and Beijing once again find themselves in what is, by now, all-too-familiar territory: locked in yet another round of hostilities. This time, as Glenn Vincent N. Boquilon reports, the disagreement has been confined to a war of words; but with the Philippines as ASEAN Chair this year, what can we expect next from its dispute with China over the South China Sea?
Meanwhile, Sean Vu writes about the results of Vietnam’s recently-concluded 14th National Party Congress. All eyes are once again on re-elected General Secretary Tô Lâm — who, in a rare twist, is also widely expected to become the President — and the future of the country. As the year goes on, this is another development to watch out for in the region.
Lastly, from Singapore, Jennifer Tan reports on the city-state’s phone ban in secondary schools. With social media now a staple of daily life, Singapore is one of the first countries in the region to move to safeguard its young people from social media’s negative effects. Will the rest of ASEAN follow suit?
The Philippines 🇵🇭
What’s Happening and What Comes Next in the South China Sea?
by Glenn Vincent N. Boquilon, in Angeles City
Tensions in the South China Sea have picked up again in recent weeks, with the Philippines and China exchanging sharper statements and raising concerns among regional observers. While disagreements over these waters are nothing new, the latest tensions are marked by more assertive public statements and increased diplomatic protests. In this instance, it leaves less room for quiet backchannel resolutions. This situation also continues to highlight how closely diplomacy and security are linked.
In January, the Philippine government lodged a formal protest with the Chinese Embassy in Manila after a series of public statements by Chinese officials criticized Philippine lawmakers and the actions of the Philippine Coast Guard. Manila described the exchange as unhelpful and called for a return to professional and respectful diplomatic communication. The move reflected growing frustration within the Philippine government over what it sees as increasingly aggressive rhetoric alongside continued activity at sea.
These diplomatic tensions are rooted in ongoing encounters between vessels in disputed waters. Philippine officials have repeatedly reported incidents involving Chinese Coast Guard and maritime militia ships, including dangerous maneuvers and attempts to block or interfere with Philippine resupply missions. While no major injuries have been reported recently, earlier collisions and near-misses have heightened fears that even routine patrols could spiral into something more serious.
China continues to reject the Philippines’ claims and insists its actions are lawful and defensive. Chinese officials have warned Manila against what they call provocations, while reiterating Beijing’s long-standing position on sovereignty in the area. The result is a familiar but uneasy standoff, with both sides holding firm while trying to avoid open conflict.
At the same time, diplomatic channels remain active. While no ASEAN member state has issued a direct public response to the latest round of hostilities, the bloc has consistently emphasized restraint and peaceful dialogue in managing South China Sea disputes. As the Philippines takes on a larger role within ASEAN this year, it has continued to raise the issue within the bloc while pushing forward talks with China on a proposed Code of Conduct for the South China Sea. Meetings between ASEAN and Chinese officials are expected in the coming weeks, aimed at setting clearer rules for behavior at sea and reducing the risk of confrontation.
However, progress has been slow. Discussions on a Code of Conduct have dragged on for years, with disagreements over whether it should be binding and how closely it should follow international law. Differences among ASEAN member states also make it difficult to present a united front, limiting how much pressure the bloc can collectively apply.
Going beyond diplomacy, the stakes in these waters are high. The South China Sea is a vital route for global trade and a potential source of energy resources. Continued instability affects not just governments, but businesses, investors, and supply chains across Southeast Asia.
For now, the Philippines is trying to walk a careful line. It continues to assert its claims and strengthen partnerships while keeping talks alive. At the backdrop of this is the goal of avoiding escalation. How these tensions unfold in the months ahead will shape not only relations with China, but also ASEAN’s broader ability to manage disputes in one of the world’s most contested waterways.
Glenn holds a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from the University of Santo Tomas. His experience spans governance programs, policy development, and political research, having worked with the Ateneo School of Government and WR Numero Research on projects focused on electoral reform, public opinion, and regional development. He also helped coordinate the drafting of the Bangsamoro Local Government Code and supported the Academy of Multiparty Democracy.
Vietnam 🇻🇳
The Results of the 14th National Party Congress
by Sean Huy Vu
The Communist Party of Vietnam recently concluded its 14th National Congress, electing new members to the Central Committee, Politburo, and Secretariat. Incumbents General Secretary Tô Lâm and National Assembly Chairman Trần Thanh Mẫn were re-elected unanimously by the 200-member Central Committee to the Politburo. However, Prime Minister Phạm Minh Chính and State President Lương Cường were not. The Party Charter stipulates officials must retire if they exceed 65 (Phạm and Lương are 67 and 68, respectively), although exceptional cases have been made for individuals with “extraordinary” credentials, such as 68-year-old Tô Lâm. Phạm’s and Lương’s inability to remain in the top party leadership leaves open the question of who will replace them.
Rumors are circulating that Lê Minh Hưng will succeed Phạm Minh Chính as Prime Minister. Born in 1970, Lê is the youngest member of the Politburo, of which he was re-elected to. He currently chairs the Party’s Organization Commission, a powerful body that helps the Politburo decide the appointment of officials to party positions across the country. He is also the only member of the Politburo to possess a background in economics and finance, being the former governor of the State Bank from 2016–2020. His election suggests the Party is looking for technocratic expertise to navigate the country towards 10% GDP growth for 2026, amidst a volatile global economic order.
As for the position of President, observers are increasingly confident that Tô Lâm will be able to hold it concurrently with the position of General Secretary, a rarity in Vietnamese politics. Although Phan Văn Giang, the current Minister of Defense and an army general, could succeed President Lương Cường (a former general himself), ISEAS Senior Fellow Le Hong Hiep predicts this is unlikely, arguing that the Defense Ministry would lack a suitable replacement for Phan. This, in addition to Tô Lâm’s allies in the Politburo and Central Committee, increases the probability of him becoming President.
Should Tô Lâm and Lê Minh Hưng replace Lương Cường and Phạm Minh Chính, Tô’s growth-focused agenda and pragmatic approach to management is likely to endure for the next five years. Since Tô’s ascension to power in May 2024, the National Assembly has passed 39 resolutions and 51 laws, a record for the legislature. However, under Trần Thanh Mẫn’s speakership, and Tô Lâm’s dominance in the Politburo, the National Assembly has been more responsive to institutionalizing the Party’s directives.
One concern scholars have about the Tô Lâm administration is its increasing securitization of the Party-State. As part of the General Secretary’s “streamlining revolution” last year, the National Assembly eliminated the district-level administration in Vietnam, leaving only provinces and communes. The police presence in these divisions has since increased, conducting more crackdowns against political dissent and so-called “social evils,” such as recreational drug use and sex work. As Nguyen Khac Giang recently stated, there is a “feedback deficit” in Vietnam as civil society has become more constrained in the past decade. If the government represses domestic criticism and independent discussion, society and the economy both risk losing the creativity and divergent thinking necessary for innovation and development. Only time will tell how the Party-State decides to realize its development aspirations, protect civil liberties, and maintain regime survival.
Sean is a scholar of East Asian history, culture, and international relations, with current research at Georgetown University examining working-class labor and human trafficking in the region. His broader interests include the social psychology of religion and identity politics. Sean previously taught modern Korean history at the University of California, Irvine, where he completed his B.A. in History, and later taught English in Ho Chi Minh City while studying Vietnamese language and culture. His writing has been published by UC Irvine, Johns Hopkins University, and Foreign Analysis.
Singapore 🇸🇬
How is Social Media Affecting the Youth of Singapore and ASEAN?
by Jennifer Hui En Tan, in Singapore
Amidst Australia’s social media ban for young people under the age of 16, Singapore implemented the secondary school phone ban in schools nationwide starting from 2026 onwards. Students now have to put their devices in designated phone crates from the moment they enter school premises until dismissal. This policy aims to promote healthier screen time habits and to foster a healthy learning environment that prioritizes learning and well-being for all students. The rising dependence on social media and the unrestricted access young people have to the internet has sparked global concern about the impact on the next generation.
Social media has become deeply embedded in the lives of young people, yet its accessibility raises growing concerns about the risks it poses to their well-being. With easier and often unmonitored access to online platforms, youths are increasingly exposed to harmful or inappropriate content. In 2025 alone, four in five Singaporeans reported encountering harmful material online, highlighting the scale of this issue and its potential impact on impressionable minds. Prolonged exposure to such content has been shown to worsen mental health, contributing to anxiety, poor self-esteem, and distorted perceptions of reality among teenagers. In response to these challenges, the Singaporean government is considering stronger measures to protect young users.
One proposal is to adopt policies similar to Australia’s social media ban for under-16s. According to Dr. Jean Liu, Associate Professor of Psychology at the Singapore Institute of Technology, implementing such a ban sends a clear message that society prioritizes the well- being of the next generation over commercial interests. These policies could also empower families by providing legal support to regulate their children’s digital activities more effectively.
Beyond legislation, education remains crucial. Schools can play a key role by integrating digital literacy into their programs to teach students about the psychological and physical dangers of excessive social media use. Beginning in 2026, the Ministry of Education will be intensifying education on the risks of social media through the updated Cyber Wellness curriculum and educating parents about responsible digital practices to ensure a more holistic approach to safeguarding youths.
However, it is important to acknowledge that social media is not entirely negative. The challenge, therefore, lies in striking a balance — minimizing harm while preserving the meaningful connections and sense of belonging that social media can offer. This balance is not unique to Singapore. States globally are grappling with how to protect youths while maintaining the benefits of digital connectivity.
Other ASEAN states have taken notice of Australia’s approach and begun implementing measures of their own. For example, Malaysia introduced the Online Safety Act starting January 2026, a policy similarly aimed at strengthening protection for young people by limiting their exposure to harmful online materials. Indonesia, on the other hand, introduced the PP Tunas on Child Protection in Digital Space, which requires age verification and limits on data collection and harmful content exposure for minors. Collectively, these measures signal a widening regional commitment to safeguarding youths in an increasingly complex digital environment.
Overall, the effects of social media on young people in Singapore and the wider ASEAN region show why clearer safeguards are needed. While these platforms can offer support and community, they also expose youths to risks that can affect their mental and emotional well-being. Governments must focus on finding a balance to protect the next generation without taking away the positive connections the digital world can offer.
Jennifer is a final-year International Relations student at the Singapore Institute of Management, where she focuses on political engagement, diplomacy, and community governance. She is an active volunteer in her constituency, working closely with residents to understand local concerns, facilitate dialogue, and support community initiatives.
Editorial Deadline 27/01/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)
