A Shake-up in Singapore
Issue 32 — Key Developments Across the Philippines, Singapore, and Vietnam
Editor’s Note
by Karen Ysabelle R. David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk
In this week’s issue of the Pacific Corridor: Singapore is shaken up by its Prime Minister’s decision to remove the title of Leader of the Opposition from a Member of Parliament. With the post still currently vacant, the move has sparked widespread debates on political standards and parliamentary integrity across the city-state.
In Vietnam, a long-running issue: China’s persistent reclamation efforts in the South China Sea continues to come into conflict against Vietnam’s sovereignty and territorial claims. Yet with China’s economic and technological might, Hanoi has no choice but to walk a tightrope in its bilateral relations with its northern neighbor.
But the Philippines this week presents a more positive picture, away from political debates and territorial disputes. Quezon City’s “Right to Care” framework — more than just a healthcare initiative that seeks to be more inclusive by widening the definition of “kin” in medical emergencies — is also a small reminder of hope and progress in the highly polarized world of today.
Singapore 🇸🇬
Singapore PM Removes Pritam Singh as Leader of the Opposition After Parliament Vote
by Ryan
On 15 January 2026, Prime Minister Lawrence Wong removed Workers’ Party (WP) chief Pritam Singh from the post of Leader of the Opposition (LO), saying it was “no longer tenable” for him to continue, following his criminal convictions and Parliament’s view that he was unsuitable for the role. The decision took effect immediately and came a day after Members of Parliament (MP) backed a motion expressing regret over Singh’s conduct and stating it rendered him unfit to remain LO.
In his letter to WP’s Central Executive Committee, Wong invited the party to nominate another elected MP to fill the LO position. He added that the nominee should not have been “implicated” in the earlier findings of Parliament’s Committee of Privileges (COP), and should meet the standards expected of an office that receives additional resourcing and support. The LO role includes privileges such as the right of first response in debates, longer speaking time, an office, additional staff support, and higher allowances, as well as confidential government briefings on national issues.
The move is tied to a long-running controversy stemming from former WP MP Raeesah Khan’s admission that she lied in Parliament in 2021. Singh was convicted on two counts of lying to the COP about his handling of the matter, and a subsequent appeal was dismissed, leaving the conviction standing. While the fines imposed did not disqualify him from holding his elected seat, the government and Parliament argued that the LO role carries a separate set of expectations due to its formal standing and added privileges.
The episode has also revived debate over whether the LO position should be institutionalized in law. Analysts interviewed by local media noted that, because the appointment is currently discretionary, the duties and privileges of the office are not fully defined in the Constitution or standing orders. They argued that clearer rules could reduce ambiguity, strengthen parliamentary scrutiny, and make the role less dependent on executive decision-making.
Public reaction has been mixed. In online discussions, some Singaporeans framed the removal as a matter of standards and parliamentary integrity, while others questioned whether the process appeared overly political, or focused on whether the LO role should be more independent from the executive. Several commenters also debated WP’s next move, with some urging the party to nominate a replacement to retain institutional resources for opposition work, and others suggesting WP should resist to highlight perceived structural flaws in how the role is defined. These views reflect a slice of public sentiment rather than a representative sample.
Regionally, the episode highlights how Southeast Asian systems structure (or do not structure) opposition leadership. Malaysia, for example, provides for additional remuneration in its legislation for an MP designated as LO. In the Philippines, a presidential system, the lower house instead has a formally recognized Minority Leader chosen by the minority bloc, reflecting a different model of opposition coordination. Singapore’s move underscores two features that regional observers often associate with the city-state: strong emphasis on institutional integrity and rule-of-law messaging, alongside a political architecture where key parliamentary roles remain shaped by convention and executive designation rather than statute.
Ryan is a final-year finance student at the Singapore University of Social Sciences (SUSS) with experience across venture capital, venture debt, and business development. He also holds a diploma in Law and Management from Temasek Polytechnic. His interests lie in how emerging technologies and economic trends shape business ecosystems and regional development in Asia.
Vietnam 🇻🇳
Vietnam’s Hedging Strategy Vs. China’s Reclamation
by Hang Nguyen, in Ho Chi Minh City
“All foreign activities in the Hoang Sa (Paracel) Islands conducted without Viet Nam’s permission are entirely illegal and of no validity, and Viet Nam resolutely opposes them,” said Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Pham Thu Hang on 9 January 2026. Vietnam’s delayed official statement addressed China’s newest civilian infrastructure opened for business on Woody Islands, also called Yongxing Island by China and Taiwan and Phú Lâm Island by Vietnam, in late December of 2025.
The 6,000-square-meter Sanchan City Commercial Center located in the Parcels archipelago effectively bolsters Chinese civilian presence in the disputed South China Sea. This implied the succession of strategic efforts led by Beijing to normalize sovereignty in the contested maritime region, following the construction of a hardware store and hot pot restaurant in 2023. China’s extensive and intensive reclamation agenda — artificial island-building on reefs, the construction of civilian infrastructure and military facilities — attempts to establish the disputed waters into areas of de facto control. These actions create challenges for Vietnam’s sovereign rights in the Parcel Islands, further intensifying contention over maritime features.
The South China Sea disputes persist in being a delicate issue for Vietnam’s bilateral relations with its geographically and historically close northern neighbor. China’s robust economy and technological advancement has and continues to present many attractive opportunities for Vietnam’s economic development, trade, transportation infrastructure, and scientific innovation. In other words, maintaining diplomatic relations with China is tricky, yet indispensable for Vietnam, as demonstrated by the high-level visit by the General Secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee and President of China Xi Jinping to Ha Noi in April 2025. On this occasion, both parties published a joint statement to reaffirm and deepen Vietnam and China’s Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, signaling the necessity for continued cooperation. China-ASEAN trade amounted to US$980 billion and US$1 trillion in 2024 and 2025, respectively, with Vietnam accounting for one-quarter.
Vietnam’s foreign political stance towards China is characterized as balancing competition and cooperation, referred to as “hedging.” Within this strategic security agenda, Ha Noi leaders strive to establish a harmonious relationship with China in pursuit of economic benefits and regime security, while also preventing China’s rising power against Vietnam’s sovereignty and maintaining the United States’ support. However, within the past few years, scholars have recognized Vietnam’s shift towards “matching” China’s “energy” by also launching more assertive reclamation efforts and, similarly, establishing military presence through island-building initiatives. Vietnam evidently does not intend to relinquish sovereignty in the South China Sea, despite its larger neighbor.
Philippines’ 2026 chairmanship of ASEAN anticipates more substantial forward movement towards finalizing the Code of Conduct, yet ASEAN’s autonomy from great power politics remains uncertain. As the Philippine’s long-standing military alliance with the United States and vocal condemnation of China’s grey zone politics are evident in political discourse, fellow South China Sea claimants — including Vietnam — must adjust their maritime foreign policy according to the foreshadowing turbulence.
Hang is a young researcher with academic experience in Vietnam and the United States. She has previously worked in public relations at the U.S. Consulate General in Ho Chi Minh City and the YSEALI Academy. Her research focuses on ASEAN centrality in the evolving Asia-Pacific landscape, with particular attention to Vietnam’s approach to trade, regional cooperation, and political economy in the face of external power dynamics and global volatility.
The Philippines 🇵🇭
Why the Philippines’ “Right to Care” Matters
by Eduardo G. Fajermo Jr., in Angeles City
In the high-stakes environment of a hospital emergency room, time is the only currency that matters. Yet for many ASEAN countries, medical crises are often complicated by a legal hurdle that has nothing to do with medicine: the rigid definition of “kin.”
The Philippines is currently challenging this status quo through a pioneering “Right to Care” framework. Initially piloted in Quezon City in June 2023, the initiative allows adults to designate a “trusted proxy” via a city-issued card, granting them the authority to make urgent medical decisions and access health information when a patient is incapacitated. This system uses a notarized Special Power of Attorney (SPA) accessible via a QR code, providing a practical solution to a bureaucratic nightmare that often leaves non-traditional families or unmarried partners helpless at the bedside.
While the Philippines remains a deeply traditional society — with 78.8% of the population identifying as Roman Catholic in the 2020 Census — the “traditional” nuclear family is no longer the sole reality. Data from the 2022 National Demographic and Health Survey shows that cohabitation among women aged 15–49 has risen to roughly 19%, meaning millions of couples lack the legal standing of marriage during a medical crisis. This is further complicated by the scale of labor migration; with approximately 2.16 million Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs) abroad as of 2023, many households rely on non-spousal caregivers or extended kin who might be barred from making life-saving decisions under strict legal interpretations.
The Philippine push, represented at the national level by legislation such as House Bill No. 11005 and House Bill No. 7068, mirrors a broader, albeit uneven, shift across the ASEAN region. Governments are increasingly grappling with how to protect diverse unions without necessarily upending social conservatism. In June 2024, Thailand made history as the first ASEAN nation to approve marriage equality in early 2025. Meanwhile, Singapore opted for a more incremental path in late 2022 by repealing Section 377A to decriminalize intimacy between men while simultaneously amending its Constitution to protect the traditional definition of marriage.
The Philippine “Right to Care” model offers a distinct “middle way” by focusing on functional rights. It ensures that unmarried partners, elderly citizens living with friends, or LGBTQ+ individuals gain the same emergency decision-making access as legally married spouses without triggering the polarizing “culture wars” that often stall legislative progress.
As the Philippines prepares to chair ASEAN in 2026, this policy offers a “people-centered” blueprint for the bloc. By institutionalizing a national proxy system, Manila can demonstrate how to uphold human dignity and patient autonomy through administrative clarity.
The Right to Care is a triumph of common sense, acknowledging that in a moment of crisis, the person holding your hand should be the one you chose, not just the one the law happens to recognize. Care is a right, not a favor.
Eduardo is a faculty member at Holy Angel University, where he teaches courses on Philippine history and contemporary global issues. He is currently pursuing a Master’s degree in Political Science at the University of Santo Tomas, with a research focus on disaster governance, environmental politics, and the urban poor in the Philippines.
Editorial Deadline 20/01/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)
Really sharp analysis on Singapore's LO removal. The discretionary nature of the role creates this weird zone where parliamentary accountability bumps up against executive power. What's interseting is how Wong framed it as standards and integrity while simultaneously highlighting that there's no actual statutory framework defining those standards. I've noticed similar patterns in other Westminster-derived systems where convention fills in for law until something breaks, then everyone scrambles to formalize it after the damage is already done.