Against the Clock
Issue 38 — Key Developments Across Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand
Editor’s Note
by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk
Political change is rarely defined by events alone: timing often determines their impact. In this week’s issue of the Mekong Belt, we examine a region where politics is unfolding not only under pressure, but also against the clock. In Thailand, a 150-day tariff window imposed by Washington has turned trade policy into a race against time: the caretaker government, constitutionally unable to sign binding agreements, must now secure a full mandate to act before the clock runs out. In Myanmar, timing is just as critical. Following widely criticized elections and plans to convene a new parliament, regional diplomacy is quietly shifting. As Thailand’s new government is positioning itself as a bridge, the question is not only whether Myanmar re-enters ASEAN processes, but when — and on whose terms. Cambodia, too, is navigating its own diplomatic timing: as Phnom Penh balances ties between Ukraine and Russia while managing tensions with Thailand, its leadership is carefully calibrating messages abroad and signals at home. Finally, in Laos the clock looks different but no less urgent: a waste crisis decades in the making is only now being addressed after a $37.85 million World Bank intervention — raising questions about how long governance failures can persist before action becomes unavoidable.
Thailand 🇹🇭
The 15% Illusion: Thailand’s High-Stakes Gamble in the New US Trade Order
by Paranut Juntree, in Bangkok
On February 20, 2026, the global trade landscape shifted dramatically when the US Supreme Court ruled 6–3 in Learning Resources v. Trump, stripping the White House of its authority to impose “Reciprocal Tariffs” through executive discretion. While the decision briefly reset tariffs to a 10% baseline, the Trump administration responded within 24 hours by invoking Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974, imposing a temporary 15% flat-rate tariff.
For Thailand, this “reset” is a double-edged sword. While Finance Minister Ekniti Nitithanprapas and other officials have framed the reduction from the previous 19% rate as a win, this could quickly become a strategic trap.
Section 122 triggers a 150-day countdown to expiration, effectively freezing Thailand’s room to maneuver. The situation highlights a widening gap between Bangkok and more agile ASEAN economies. While many view the 15% rate as relief, Associate Professor Dr. Aat Pisanwanich argues that Thailand is uniquely vulnerable due to domestic political paralysis.
Currently “stuck” in caretaker status, the government is constitutionally barred from signing binding international agreements. High-stakes trade negotiations are therefore stalled at the precise moment regional competitors are accelerating. Indonesia and Vietnam have moved decisively to secure improved trade terms with the United States. Indonesia, for example, recently obtained “Trusted Partner” status after finalizing a reciprocal framework with Washington.
Thailand, lacking a fully mandated government, remains stuck at the 15% baseline — and still subject to stacked sectoral duties, including the additional 50% tariffs on steel and aluminum under Section 232.
Beyond the baseline rate, Washington continues to press several specific demands. These include livestock certification standards, where the United States is pushing Thailand to accept meat approved by the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS), arguing that Thailand’s ban on ractopamine is non-science-based. On intellectual property, Thailand has pledged to address patent backlogs and digital copyright enforcement, but no final agreement has been reached on the scope and stringency of reforms.
Compared with Indonesia and Vietnam, Thailand lacks diplomatic momentum and has yet to resolve several outstanding issues. This uncertainty risks reinforcing investor caution. When tariff exposure and regulatory standards remain unsettled, capital may shift toward more stable and decisive regional peers.
In this context, the 15% rate is not a relief: it is a 150-day clock.
The central question is whether Thailand can exit caretaker status and seat a government with a full mandate before the window closes. Can a new administration move quickly enough to meet US demands — from supply chain transparency to regulatory reforms — or will the countdown expire with Thailand still trapped in political limbo?
If Bangkok fails to act before the deadline, the “15% illusion” may become less a temporary reprieve and more the prelude to deeper investment flight and supply chain diversion to more agile ASEAN neighbors.
Paranut has a background in advocacy, with experience in policy research, communications, and civic engagement across both the NGO and government sectors. As Thailand’s Youth Delegate to the United Nations, he represented Thai youth in global dialogues on migration, education, and human rights, championing inclusive policymaking. He holds a degree in political science with a specialization in international relations.
Myanmar 🇲🇲
Thailand Quietly Moves to Bring Myanmar Back into ASEAN
by Mozart
Thailand’s new caretaker government is trying to establish itself as a “bridge” between Myanmar junta and the rest of ASEAN members, testing how much the region is willing to move from isolation toward quiet re-engagement amid war, displacement and accountability in Myanmar.
In recent weeks, Thailand’s foreign minister has described Bangkok’s role as a “bridge” to pull Myanmar back into ASEAN after meeting with the junta’s counterpart in Phuket. The Minister argued that three years of limited engagement have failed to contain conflict and refugee flows, and that neighbours should now deal with the reality on the ground to manage shared borders, trade and security. Framed as a pragmatic approach for crisis management, this outreach marks a visible shift from the previous government’s more careful alignment with ASEAN’s five-point consensus. This is the first time a re-intergation approach has been proposed since ASEAN excluded junta representatives from regional meetings following the 2021 coup.
However, some critics warn that this approach will risk the region by normalizing military rule while Myanmar’s domestic legitimacy is at its lowest.
After rushing through widely criticized elections, the junta is preparing to convene a new parliament. At the same time, as the fighting escalates in Karenni, Shan and Rakhine, more civilians are crossing the Thai border. In this context, human rights groups and regional parliamentarians argue that engaging with junta representatives without clear conditions would undermine the call for dialogue with oppositions and ethnic armed organizations, and may weaken the credibility of current international justice efforts. Although the foreign minister of Thailand stated that they have no comment on the unsurprising results of the junta-held elections, the question to be asked is whether this attempt to re-engage with junta officials is violating the ASEAN’ five-points consensus, and whether is move actually takes into account the will of Myanmar people.
Interestingly, Thailand’s stance comes out in contrast with that of another regional actor. As 2026 ASEAN Chair, the Philippines has signaled that an “inclusive” approach that engages both the junta authorities and other opponents should be prioritized, positioning itself as a convener rather than an endorser of reintegration. Timor-Leste, by contrast, made an explicit stance against the Myanmar by initiating war-crimes proceedings against junta leaders through its own courts, using the junta as a test for regional accountability norms. This prompted the response of the junta, which warned to completely leave its office from the country. Together, these moves underscore a fragmented ASEAN response: with one member offering a bridge back to the group, another pushing for legal accountability, and others notably still cautious about any shift from limited engagement.
Ultimately, whether Thailand’s bridge-building attempt paves the way for a mediated resolution of Myanmar’s crisis or merely offers the junta’ smoother participation back on the regional forums will depend on how firmly other ASEAN members stand concrete steps on violence, dialogue and accountability.
Mozart is a research assistant at Mosaic Myanmar and is currently pursuing a Bachelor of Arts in Liberal Arts and Sciences at Parami University. His academic and professional interests span community development, minority issues, and social impact research. He has held roles including service-learning intern, student mentor, and operations coordinator for local initiatives, supporting project management, monitoring and evaluation, and education programs in Myanmar.
Cambodia 🇰🇭
Cambodia Balances Ties with Ukraine and Russia Amid Ongoing Conflict
by Malai Yatt, in Phnom Penh
Cambodia continues to navigate a delicate “balancing act” in its foreign policy, maintaining strong historical ties with Russia while deepening strategic cooperation with Ukraine.
President Volodymyr Zelenskyy thanked Cambodian Senate President Hun Sen for supporting Ukraine’s sovereignty and backing UN peace resolutions. According to Zelenskyy’s official website, during their conversation the two leaders discussed further strengthening bilateral cooperation between Ukraine and Cambodia.
“The partnership is developing, and last year trade turnover between the countries amounted to USD 61.2 million — 35% more than in 2024. Work is also ongoing to establish the Intergovernmental Commission on Economic and Trade Cooperation,” the statement said. Zelenskyy also invited Hun Sen to visit Ukraine.
Hun Sen noted that during the meeting, both sides updated each other on their respective national situations and discussed cooperation in various sectors of mutual benefit, including preparations for the 35th anniversary (1992–2027) of diplomatic relations between the two countries next year.
Him Rotha, Deputy Director of the Cambodian Centre for Regional Studies, told The ASEAN Frontier that the conversation between Hun Sen and Zelenskyy aimed to reaffirm the importance of bilateral ties and explore further opportunities for cooperation.
At a time when both countries face key challenges — Russia’s war in Ukraine and the ongoing Cambodia–Thailand border tensions — the two sides are likely to emphasize the importance of a rules-based international order, particularly the peaceful settlement of disputes and the principle of non-use of force, he said.
“This is part of the diplomatic interaction between two countries seeking to mobilize diplomatic support for one another. With this engagement, I do not think it would significantly harm Cambodia’s overall relations with Russia,” Rotha added.
While Cambodia and Russia differ in their positions on the war in Ukraine, bilateral cooperation continues in areas of mutual interest, as is common among Southeast Asian states. Cambodia and Russia, he noted, still seek practical avenues of cooperation, including in sectors such as defense procurement.
The 69th anniversary of Cambodia’s diplomatic relations with Russia was marked on May 13, 2025. In this context, Rotha emphasized that for small states like Cambodia, striking a balance between principled diplomacy and pragmatic engagement remains essential.
In an era of global transition, he added, Cambodia should continue upholding the principles of multilateralism and a rules-based international order, while also expanding space for national development. This way, Cambodia’s balanced approach allows it to support international norms of sovereignty while preserving long-standing and practical bilateral interests.
Malai is a reporter at Kiripost, where she has worked for over two years, driven by a strong commitment to amplifying the voices of underserved communities. Her reporting focuses on economic and foreign affairs.
Lao PDR 🇱🇦
Laos and Its Waste Problem: A Crisis Hidden in Plain Sight
by Thongsavanh Souvannasane, in Vientiane
Every day, Laos produces 6,900 tonnes of household waste. Less than half of it is ever collected. The rest is burned, dumped into rivers, buried in backyards, or left to pile up along roadsides, and for years, almost nobody in power did anything about it.
Walk through any provincial town outside Vientiane and the picture is stark. Plastic bags cling to riverbanks. Smoke rises from backyard fires where families burn whatever the collection truck, if one exists at all, never came to take away. In rural communities, open dumping is not an act of carelessness.
It is the only option available. The state built no alternative.
Even in the capital, the situation is hard to defend. Vientiane accounts for roughly 15% of the country’s daily waste output, yet formal collection services reach fewer than half its residents. Landfills are operating beyond capacity, built to insufficient standards and filling up ahead of schedule. What cannot be contained overflows, into the soil, into waterways, and into the air.
The consequences are measurable in the atmosphere.
Open burning, combined with agricultural fires and vehicle emissions, has driven PM2.5 levels to alarming highs. In late February, southern provinces including Attapeu, Champasak, and Salavan recorded AQI readings between 150 and 200, the “starting to affect health” range, while Vientiane Capital registered between 119 and 147.
This is not a natural disaster. It is a failure of governance and community behavior, decades in the making. Regulations exist but enforcement has been chronically weak.
Municipal budgets have never matched the scale of the problem. Communities have been left to cope the only way they can, by burning, burying, and dumping in ways that make the crisis worse.
It took a USD 37.85 million World Bank (WB) intervention to bring the issue to the forefront.
On 23 February, the Lao government and WB launched the Lao PDR Pollution and Waste Management Project, committing USD 37.85 million to expand waste collection in Vientiane Capital from 44% to 70%, reaching an estimated 645,000 residents, while upgrading landfills and rolling out composting and recycling systems. Local authorities have also announced a nationwide ban on outdoor burning during the dry season, armed with stronger enforcement powers. Notably, they have made this announcement before.
The targets are welcome. But uncomfortable questions remain. Why has it taken foreign funding for the state to commit to serving more than half its own capital’s residents? And what guarantee exists that this project will not follow the same pattern as previous initiatives, well-launched, well-photographed, and quietly underfunded once international attention moves on?
The country needs a state that treats waste management not as a donor-driven project, but as a fundamental obligation to its own people.
For now, the fires keep burning. And so does the question of who let it get this far.
Thongsavanh is a journalist from Laos with a background in English-language media. He graduated from the Lao-American Institute with a Diploma of the Arts in English and contributes to independent news platforms. His reporting focuses on environmental issues, socio-economic development, and geopolitics.
Editorial Deadline 28/02/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)
