Editor’s Note
by Karen David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk
El Niño: a weather phenomenon characterized by unusually warm waters in the Pacific. Occurring every few years, this year’s iteration is projected to be a record-setting ‘super’ El Niño like no other. The Philippines is no stranger to the scorching heat and ruinous droughts brought by this phenomenon, but with dire forecasts aplenty, is the country truly ready and braced for impact?
Meanwhile, Vietnam is focused on the recent state visit of the President of Panama to Hanoi and the ensuing implications for Vietnam–Panama bilateral relations. Against the backdrop of today’s fragmented and unstable global system, Vietnam’s famed bamboo diplomacy is building bridges all the way to the other side of the world in Central America.
And this week, Singapore is abuzz with news of the increase in ministerial salaries. Implemented as a way to entice Singaporeans into public service, the move has nevertheless generated much controversy — after all, the city-state’s ministers are already the highest paid in the world.
The Philippines 🇵🇭
Is the Philippines Ready for Super El Niño?
by Eduardo G. Fajermo Jr., in Angeles City
The forecast is severe. El Niño continues to strengthen, with a more than 83% chance of strong-to-very strong conditions through January–March 2027, while international projections warn it could rank among the strongest events since 1950.
The Philippine outlook is just as stark: drought could spread to 17 areas by December, 45 by January, 78 by February, and 84 by March. The numbers give the government a timetable, not an excuse to be surprised.
University of the Philippines climate scientist Dr. Rafaela Jane Delfino called the developing event “literally off the charts.” She urged rainwater harvesting in rain-fed areas, drought-tolerant crops, early dam planning, and household conservation, while warning that destructive rain can still occur during El Niño.
The government has started moving. The El Niño task force has been reactivated, the National Food Authority was ordered to buy more palay (unmilled rice grain) and expand rice reserves, and the agriculture department is assessing major irrigation systems, updating climate-risk maps, and prepositioning seeds, fertilizer, and irrigation support.
Some measures are already visible outside Manila. In Cagayan Valley, irrigation officials are installing shallow wells and mobile solar pumps, clearing canals, rotating water deliveries, and promoting water-saving practices such as Alternate Wetting and Drying to stretch available supplies.
Regional irrigation manager Raymundo Apil also advised farmers to shift toward crops suited to the water available. These are practical steps, but the real test is whether they reach every high-risk farming area before fields dry out.
International climate health researchers also recommend early-warning systems, stronger health services, and constant review of heat, disease, and malnutrition risks. Those needs remain less visible in current national announcements.
The economic stakes are already high. A strong event could cut palay output by 700,000 metric tons, while the previous El Niño caused PHP 57.78 billion in agricultural losses.
September inflation reached 7.2%, food inflation hit 6.8%, and rice prices rose 20.3% from a year earlier. Bangko Sentral Deputy Governor Zeno Ronald Abenoja described El Niño as a slow burn shock, meaning damage can build through harvests, markets, and household budgets before becoming a declared emergency.
Climate Change Commission Executive Director Robert Borje said forecasts must become “timely decisions and concrete actions.” That requires public local dashboards showing reservoir levels, irrigation repairs, seed deliveries, insured farmers, emergency funds, heat plans, and the official responsible for each deadline.
Experts are not saying the Philippines is helpless; they are saying early warning creates responsibility. If shortages and crop failures come because interventions remained in press releases, the damage will not be natural alone: El Niño is the hazard, but unpreparedness is the disaster.
Eduardo is a Political Science graduate and MA Political Science candidate at the University of Santo Tomas, researching democracy, disaster governance, and inclusive policy in the Global South. He is a former faculty member at Holy Angel University, where he taught Philippine history and contemporary global issues. He also worked with a senator in the Guam Legislature, contributing to policy research and legislative analysis.
Vietnam 🇻🇳
Bamboo over the Canal
by Tri Vo, in Ho Chi Minh City
Vietnam’s manufacturing sector continues to generate record-breaking export volumes through late 2026, allowing Hanoi to aggressively conduct a multi-faceted economic diplomacy strategy aimed at going beyond the traditional Asian and North American markets. From October, Panamanian President José Raúl Mulino arrived in Hanoi for an official state visit — which itself is not just about the pomp and circumstance, but also a transformation in the making, especially in terms of commercial logistics between Southeast Asia and Central America.
During high-level summit talks, General Secretary and President To Lam and President Mulino agreed to elevate diplomatic and economic ties in substantial ways. The cornerstone of the summit was materialized when bilateral delegations exchanged nine foundational cooperation agreements. These pacts span a wide range of matters in critical economic and security sectors, including maritime transport, transnational crime prevention, agricultural development, customs administration, and civil aviation.
The geoeconomic justifications that drive this interregional alignment is ideal for both parties involved. Speaking to the press, President Mulino explicitly highlighted Vietnam’s industrial and export capabilities, placing Panama squarely as the gateway through which Vietnam will enter the Latin American and the Caribbean markets that remain largely untapped for Vietnamese firms. In response, Vietnamese leadership also framed Panama as an indispensable logistical node. By pairing Vietnam’s high-tech manufacturing output with Panama’s world-class maritime infrastructure (specifically the Panama Canal), its regional aviation hubs, and free trade zones, both countries are establishing what could be described as an uninterrupted economic corridor connecting Southeast Asia with the Western Hemisphere, increasing commercial exchanges amidst a milieu inimical to such activities. In doing so, it allows not just two countries but also East Asia and the Western Hemisphere a chance to prosper and thrive together.
More crucially, the partnership extends far beyond the transactional aspect of any economic engagements. During bilateral exchanges, the two governments also pledged to deepen joint research in agricultural innovation, infrastructure connectivity, and maritime shipping logistics. Furthermore, both delegations reaffirmed their commitment to maintain close coordination in combating transnational criminal activities.
With 2026 soon to fade into the past, this bilateral relationship provides a vital strategic hedge against a world rendered in increasing fragmentations. The synchronization between Hanoi’s export engine and Panama’s maritime strength creates a highly competitive commercial axis that could provide a bulwark for companies seeking safe havens in a world increasingly wont to protectionism. For trade strategists within ASEAN, the improving Vietnam–Panama relationship could serve as a viable lesson on how diplomatic diversification is no mere decoration, but a means by which a bet is hedged, a deck is reshuffled, and an economy is protected against the rising ties of instability.
Tri has experience in management consulting and strategy, having worked with institutions such as the UNDP, The Asia Group, and ARC Group. He has provided strategic, legal, and operational insights to clients in sectors including manufacturing, energy, and technology. He holds both academic and professional experience related to Southeast and East Asia, with a focus on regional development and policy.
Singapore 🇸🇬
Singapore Increases Ministerial Salaries
by Nurul Aini, in Singapore
On 15 October 2026, the allowances of Member of Parliaments (MPs), the leader of the opposition, and the non-constituency member of parliaments (NCMP) will be increased. For MPs, in particular, their monthly salary will increase from SGD13,750 to SGD18,500. For other part-time posts such as the Speaker of Parliament, the annual salary will increase to SGD900,000. Pegged to 15% of the Speaker’s salary, deputy speakers will now receive SGD135,000 annually.
The revised framework raises the annual reference salary for an entry-level MR4 minister from SGD1.1 million to SGD1.8 million, bringing the Prime Minister’s reference salary from SGD2.2 million to SGD3.6 million. Yet the government has limited the immediate adjustment for serving political officeholders to up to 9%. PM Lawrence Wong has also pledged to donate his salary increase to charity.
During parliamentary debates, this increase is discussed both as a practical consideration for those intending to serve, and as a somewhat more competitive edge against the salaries of high-earners in the private sector. Workers’ Party Pritam Singh supports the increase in MP allowance, but disagrees with the formula used to benchmark ministerial salaries. He argues for ministerial salaries to be pegged to a multiple of an MP’s salary, which is in turn derived from a public sector appointee’s salary. Currently, the allowances are based on the median annual income of the top 1,000 earners in Singapore, with a 40% discount to reflect the ethos of public service.
PM Wong highlighted that the increase aims to remove financial obstacles for those who are eager to serve. In highlighting the necessity of the salary increase, PM Wong noted that ministerial salaries have fallen behind both private sector and civil service salaries for the past 11 years. The Minister for Defense, Chan Chun Sing, argued that the increase in ministerial salary was to account for inflation.
If economic conditions were a concern in 2017 and 2023, it brings forth the question of what is different in today’s climate.
Minister Chan Chun Sing also warned that individuals whose sole drive of joining politics is money are not the candidates that the government wishes to field. The logic in this seemingly contradictory statement has gained traction among the public in online debates. Commenters in platforms such as Facebook have raised questions about personal commitments of ministers that require an increase in salary.
Meanwhile, some commenters note that the work of a minister goes beyond a 9–5 structure and involves attending to situations at odd hours, weekends engagements, and international and regional engagements. When it comes to pegging the salary to the private sector, some question whether commercial success translates or equates to exceptional political success, which includes political judgment, integrity, and intelligence.
Aini is currently pursuing a master’s degree in English literature at Nanyang Technological University. She has experience working in youth groups, contributing to the planning and management of outreach activities.
Editorial Deadline 12/10/2025 11:59 PM (UTC +8)
