An Election Equation
Issue 38 — Key Developments Across the Philippines, Singapore, and Vietnam
Editor’s Note
by Karen Ysabelle R. David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk
Barely three months in, 2026 is already proving to be a year for the history books. But Philippine Vice President Sara Duterte has already set her sights further beyond, as she announced her intent to run for the next Philippine presidential elections in 2028. Faced with multiple impeachment complaints and a father under trial in The Hague, Duterte has calculated that an early declaration could help solve the complicated political equation confronting her and perhaps propel her to the highest post in the land.
In Singapore, a different sort of complication, as a report alleged the involvement of two Singapore passport holders in the conflict in Gaza. Given the city-state’s strict commitment to neutrality abroad and harmony at home, its Ministry of Home Affairs has consistently reiterated its stance that Singaporean citizens are forbidden from fighting in foreign wars.
And in Vietnam, its booming e-commerce industry brings with it a whole host of complications. Will the Vietnamese government be able to rise to the occasion and meet the moment, perhaps with ASEAN as its guide, or will it stumble in the global race for digitalization?
The Philippines 🇵🇭
Sara Duterte’s 2028 Bid and the Politics of Pressure
by Eduardo G. Fajermo Jr., in Angeles City
Vice President Sara Duterte’s announcement that she intends to run for president in 2028 arrived unusually early, but not in a vacuum. It comes as she faces multiple impeachment complaints in the House of Representatives and as the Duterte camp navigates renewed political and legal pressures linked to the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the broader unraveling of the Marcos–Duterte alliance.
Civil society critics see the timing as a narrative move. Prof. David Michael San Juan, convener of the Taumbayan Ayaw sa Magnanakaw at Abusado Network Alliance (The People’s Network Opposing Thieves and Abusive Officials), said Duterte’s early declaration is meant to “set the narrative” and portray herself as the victim, especially as scrutiny continues over her Office’s use of confidential funds and the impeachment complaints filed against her. Duterte herself has leaned into this framing in public remarks, casting political developments as targeted attacks rather than routine oversight.
Political analysts, however, suggest the declaration is less about elections than about coalition survival. Cleve Arguelles, president of Manila-based polling firm WR Numero, told This Week in Asia that the timing appears designed to steady Duterte’s faction and sharpen political lines amid setbacks. “The timing is more about reassuring her allies and stabilizing her faction given the political challenges facing them,” Arguelles said. He pointed to a convergence of pressures — ICC-related uncertainty affecting key Duterte allies, impeachment threats against Duterte, and broader coalition instability — that could incentivize defections if the bloc appears directionless.
Declaring early changes that equation. Arguelles argued that projecting a presidential run tells loyalists to hold the line and signals to fence-sitters that Duterte remains a credible center of gravity. It also sends a message to lawmakers weighing their positions in an impeachment context: Duterte’s return to power is no longer hypothetical, but a live political possibility. Arguelles said making her candidacy explicit signals that “the threat of her return to power” is more “imminent and credible,” which could shape congressional calculations even if the formal process is supposed to be insulated from electoral politics.
Not everyone agrees that her declaration should matter inside Congress. Rep. Terry Ridon has insisted Duterte’s 2028 plans are “irrelevant” to the House’s handling of the impeachment complaints, a reminder that impeachment is meant to proceed on constitutional grounds rather than political forecasting. Yet the tension between what impeachment is in principle and how it functions in practice is precisely what Duterte’s early announcement exposes. In systems driven by coalition discipline, accountability often competes with survival.
Her declaration may also reshape the broader field. Arguelles noted a “growing incentive” for pro-Marcos and opposition forces to cooperate, even if full unity remains difficult given deep historical and ideological divisions. An “anyone-but-Sara” alignment is conceivable, he said, but even limited coordination could complicate Duterte’s path to victory. In other words, Duterte’s move is not only about her own storyline. It forces other blocs to decide whether to compete separately, coordinate selectively, or consolidate earlier than they had planned.
For observers across ASEAN, this illustrates how accountability politics increasingly operates on two tracks at once: constitutional procedure and narrative power. Duterte’s announcement does not determine whether impeachment succeeds, but it does reframe the incentives around it. The deeper question is whether institutions meant to check power can still move cleanly when political actors preempt scrutiny by turning it into campaign fuel years in advance.
Eduardo is a faculty member at Holy Angel University, where he teaches courses on Philippine history and contemporary global issues. He is currently pursuing a Master’s degree in Political Science at the University of Santo Tomas, with a research focus on disaster governance, environmental politics, and the urban poor in the Philippines.
Singapore 🇸🇬
Singapore Draws a Firm Line on Citizens Fighting Overseas
by Ryan
In a statement issued on 19 February 2026, Singapore’s Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) said that it is aware of an overseas report alleging that two Singapore passport holders fought as part of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) during the Gaza conflict, but has “no substantiated information” to verify the claims. The ministry was responding to The Straits Times after the allegations surfaced in a British investigative report citing Israeli military data obtained through an Israeli freedom of information request.
The Straits Times report noted that the underlying dataset describes IDF personnel who held Israeli citizenship alongside at least one other nationality as of March 2025. The foreign report suggested two Singapore passport holders appeared in the data, but did not provide details on their roles or length of service. This gap matters because the existence of a name in a nationality dataset does not, on its own, establish what an individual did, where they were deployed, or whether they were involved in combat operations. The citizenship dimension adds another reason the government has avoided speculation. Singapore does not allow dual citizenship for adults. In practice, this makes questions about foreign military service inseparable from questions about nationality status, which authorities typically address only after verification.
While the claims remain unverified, Singapore’s response fits a broader pattern: maintain a neutral diplomatic posture on the conflict itself, while enforcing strict domestic red lines against citizens taking up arms in overseas wars. On 23 February 2026, Coordinating Minister for National Security K Shanmugam stressed that Singapore “extends humanitarian help abroad where possible,” but does not allow citizens to participate in violence overseas “for any side,” including conflicts linked to Gaza. He framed this as essential to protecting racial and religious harmony at home, and to preventing external conflicts from being imported into Singapore’s social fabric.
Singapore has also publicly anchored this position in multilateral diplomacy. At the United Nations General Assembly emergency session in October 2023, Singapore stated its support for the Palestinian people’s right to a homeland and Israel’s right to live within secure borders, calling on leaders on both sides to exercise restraint and pursue the difficult steps required for a two-state outcome. This framing is deliberately even-handed: it recognizes core claims on both sides, avoids endorsing military objectives, and prioritizes international law and long-term political resolution.
The question is not unique to Singapore. CNA reported that the same IDF-linked data indicated nearly 200 Southeast Asians were enlisted in Israel’s military as of March 2025, including 111 Filipinos, 71 Thais, four Vietnamese, two Singaporeans, and one Indonesian. Across Southeast Asia, legal treatment varies: some jurisdictions allow dual citizenship or do not criminalize foreign military service in general circumstances, while others restrict dual nationality and may require government permission for service in foreign armed forces.
Against this backdrop, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has announced multiple tranches of humanitarian support for civilians in Gaza and reiterated calls for unimpeded aid delivery, alongside support for a negotiated two-state solution. To maintain its neutrality, Singapore has consistently framed its response to the Israel–Hamas war around humanitarian assistance and diplomacy, rather than participation in combat.
Ryan is a final-year finance student at the Singapore University of Social Sciences (SUSS) with experience across venture capital, venture debt, and business development. He also holds a diploma in Law and Management from Temasek Polytechnic. His interests lie in how emerging technologies and economic trends shape business ecosystems and regional development in Asia.
Vietnam 🇻🇳
A New Chapter for E-Commerce
by Hang Nguyen, in Ho Chi Minh City
Due to the global race for digitalization, along with a surge in demand caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, e-commerce industries in Vietnam have experienced expansive growth within the last half decade. Shopee, TikTok Shop, Lazada, and Tiki dominate the country’s e-commercial landscape, with nearly 60% of the population — of various ages, genders, and geographical demographics — accessing these platforms to purchase goods. Vietnam’s e-commerce sector has recorded substantial growth and demonstrated robust performance: market value reached US$25 billion (20% growth) in 2024, ranking third in Southeast Asia, while entering the list of Top 5 economies leading in e-commerce growth in 2022.
The Vietnam E-commerce and Digital Economy Agency (VEDEA), under the Ministry of Industry and Trade (MoIT), recognizes the instrumental role of this industry in national and economic development, but simultaneously acknowledges that the accelerating pace of growth has presented opportunities as well as revealed many complications. E-commercial regulations have been anchored by only two government decrees: Decree No. 52/2013/ND-CP dated 16 May 2013, and the subsequently supplementing Decree No. 85/2021/ND-CP dated 25 September 2021. These documents lacked sufficient legal capacity, whereas Vietnam e-commerce markets were in need of control to ensure stable maturity. On 10 December 2025, the National Assembly voted to pass the Law on E-commerce, consisting of seven chapters and 41 articles to become effective on 1 July 2026.
The law acts as a “shield” in Vietnam’s transition from “rapid growth” toward “quality growth”, circumventing evident issues in Vietnam’s digital environment. Mr. Hoang Quang Phong, Vice Chairman of the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VCCI), highlighted the concerns regarding smuggling, trade fraud, and the online sale of counterfeit, fake and low-quality products. Dishonest e-commercial activities destroy customer trust, harm legitimate businesses, and expose consumers to health risks and meticulous digital scams. In 2025, VEDEA reported banning the operation of 13,700 violating shops on e-commerce platforms for counterfeit, banned, or untraceable products.
The Law on E-commerce introduces transparency into the legal framework, by unprecedentedly classifying four types of platforms with corresponding legal responsibilities: direct business e-commerce platforms; intermediary e-commerce platforms; social networks operating in e-commerce; and joint e-commerce platforms. The law imposes the obligation for e-commerce platforms to disclose ownership, data protection policies, the rights and obligations of parties, and algorithm criteria for product display; all sellers’ identity must be electronically verified. New provisions have also been established to fill the legal gaps existing with livestream sales and affiliate marketing, an emerging and rising domain, such as the prohibition of misleading product information by live streamers. The safety nets enacted by the law promises Vietnam’s economic track towards green, circular, and sustainable development.
However, considerations towards online vendors’ rights should also be discussed. The frequent additions of fees and regulations with shorter implementation deadlines strain sellers’ capacity and spike the competitive market. Mindful market growth must warrant the survivability of e-commercial businesses rather than favoritism towards consumers. Southeast Asia and ASEAN can provide valuable models, markets, and resources for Hanoi to enhance its national model for e-commerce, including the ASEAN Agreement on Electronic Commerce (2019), the ASEAN Digital Integration Framework (DIF), and the ASEAN Coordinating Committee on Electronic Commerce (ACCEC), among others.
Hang is a young researcher with academic experience in Vietnam and the United States. She has previously worked in public relations at the U.S. Consulate General in Ho Chi Minh City and the YSEALI Academy. Her research focuses on ASEAN centrality in the evolving Asia-Pacific landscape, with particular attention to Vietnam’s approach to trade, regional cooperation, and political economy in the face of external power dynamics and global volatility.
Editorial Deadline 03/03/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)
