Editor’s Note
by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk
Journalism is not only about following the spotlights, but also turning them toward the shadows. The first half of this issue steps right into those dimmer corners by examining the connection between weak governance and crime. In Myanmar, Mogok’s rubies glitter against a backdrop of accelerating extraction, shifting territorial control, and deepening community vulnerability—a reminder that resource wealth can quickly become a curse when governance collapses. Meanwhile, in Laos, an EIA investigation reveals how wildlife products made from endangered species are openly sold in Vientiane, despite international bans—an unambiguous sign of enforcement gaps and the quiet spread of transnational trafficking networks. Still, spotlights naturally fall on the diplomatic stage, and this week that stage shines bright in Cambodia and Thailand, where key appointments and high-profile visits signal offered glimpses of the region’s diplomatic trends. In Thailand, King Rama X’s historic state visit to Beijing—his first official visit to a major world power—casts a sharp light on Bangkok’s evolving balancing act between China’s embrace and Washington’s ongoing influence. And finally, Cambodia’s appointment of veteran diplomat Chem Widhya as AIPA Secretary-General signals Phnom Penh’s growing confidence in shaping ASEAN’s future from within. And
Myanmar 🇲🇲
Intensified Ruby Mining in Mogok Raises Fear Among Locals
by Myat Moe Kywe
Mogok, known as “Ruby Land” in northern Myanmar, is facing a rapid surge in mining activities triggered by recent territorial shifts. The region has long been at the center of opaque and militarized resource extraction, producing some of the world’s finest rubies. For locals who have lived through constant clashes and shifting control, intensified mining only creates additional social and environmental burdens.
For decades, Myanmar’s gemstone industry has operated under non-transparent and corrupt systems. Even before the 2021 military coup, military-affiliated conglomerates such as the Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings Limited (UMEHL) and the Myanmar Economic Corporation (MEC) dominated the sector. A 2014 report by the Natural Resource Governance Institute found that four military-linked companies held around 20% of all ruby-mining licenses.
After the coup, extraction became more loosely regulated and, in many cases, illegal, as previous mining contracts expired in 2020 under the National League for Democracy government. Global Witness estimates the official value of Myanmar’s gemstone industry at USD 346–415 million annually, though the real figure is likely far higher due to smuggling. As Western sanctions tightened on military-owned firms, the junta increasingly relied on natural resource exports and turned toward Beijing to sustain foreign currency flows. In September, the Ministry of Commerce hosted an event in China, inviting Chinese companies to accelerate gem-trade collaboration despite ongoing clashes on the ground.
These plans were disrupted in July 2024 when the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), allied with local People’s Defence Forces, seized Mogok. The TNLA quickly banned military-affiliated companies and issued new mining permits to individuals and businesses linked to its leadership, including partners from China and the Wa region, according to residents.
The TNLA’s recent withdrawal from Mogok following China-mediated talks has led operating companies to rush extraction on a larger scale before the area is handed back to the junta. Previously preserved zones, such as the golf course, are now being opened for digging. In response to residents’ concerns, TNLA has allowed locals to mine at their own expense, but under strict terms: miners may keep only 30 out of every 100 bags of gem-bearing earth, with the remaining 70 handed to Chinese companies.
Unregulated mining has contributed to environmental damage, including biodiversity loss, land degradation, water pollution, and landslides. Poor worker safety raises questions about the broader social impact. Myanmar is already one of ASEAN’s most climate-vulnerable countries, and residents fear that political instability, unchecked extraction, and foreign exploitation will cause long-term harm. Mining in previously undisturbed areas has intensified this pressure.
As Mogok faces back-and-forth shifts in territorial control, the mining situation adds another layer of uncertainty. The military continues exploiting resources to fund its offensives, while armed ethnic groups like TNLA struggle to protect local interests, leaving communities at high risk and deepening vulnerability.
Myat is a senior undergraduate student majoring in Politics, Philosophy, and Economics. She has interned at The Asia Foundation in Washington, D.C., and she has also worked as a summer research assistant at the Centre for Policy and Innovation (CRPI), gaining experience in research and analysis. Her work focuses on civic engagement, gender, youth leadership, and community development.
Lao PDR 🇱🇦
Lao’s Legal Loopholes and the Rise of a Regional Wildlife Trafficking Corridor
by Chammie Lo, in Vientiane
A recent investigation by the Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA) found that multiple shops in Vientiane openly sell medicines claiming to contain rhino horn and bear bile. Most of these outlets are concentrated in Sanjiang, the de facto Chinatown of Laos, filled with Chinese restaurants, entertainment venues, and shops catering mainly to Chinese tourists and residents.
Investigators documented products such as Angong Niuhuang Wan, a well-known traditional Chinese medicine pill often marketed as a premium remedy for fever and stroke.
Strikingly, one company had even secured permits from the Ministry of Health and displayed certificates issued by the Lao Food and Drug Department. These documents suggested that the products met official standards—despite containing ingredients sourced from prohibited species that should never have been approved.
As a party to the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), Laos is legally obligated to prohibit commercial trade in Appendix I species, including rhinos, pangolins, bears, and tigers. Yet enforcement on the ground tells a different story. After years of non-compliance, CITES recommended a full suspension of commercial trade in all CITES-listed species from Laos. Still, the thriving wildlife market has continued largely undisturbed.
Laos has become one of Southeast Asia’s most vulnerable hubs for illegal wildlife trafficking, shaped by porous borders, limited enforcement capacity, the rapid growth of Chinese tourism, and the expansion of special economic zones with minimal oversight. Many Chinese tourists arrive on pre-arranged package tours, where guides take them to designated “shopping stops” selling wildlife products—such as rhino horn, pangolin scale powder, tiger bone paste, and bear bile capsules—often at highly inflated prices.
Beyond serving as a retail hotspot, Laos also functions as a transit corridor for wildlife products bound for China, Vietnam, and online buyers. Special economic zones such as the Golden Triangle SEZ and Boten SEZ create ideal conditions for trafficking networks: operating with high autonomy and weak coordination with national law enforcement, they allow criminal actors to circulate illegal goods with relative ease. Although international scrutiny has occasionally triggered crackdowns, traders typically shift to more covert channels, leaving overall trade volumes largely unchanged.
Ultimately, while international pressure remains important, lasting progress depends on domestic awareness and genuine political commitment to enforce existing laws. Without stronger local action and recognition of the consequences of unchecked trafficking, Laos will remain a key conduit in Southeast Asia’s illicit wildlife trade
Chammie is a development professional working on sustainable finance and inclusive livelihoods in Laos. She holds a degree in Politics and Law from the University of Hong Kong and has contributed research insights to academic and community spaces on heat governance, climate migration, and emission transparency.
Thailand 🇹🇭
Shadows of the Dragon Beneath Bangkok’s Crown
by Natamon Aumphin, in Bangkok
On November 13-17, 2025, His Majesty King Maha Vajiralongkorn Phra Vajiraklaochaoyuhua (King Rama X) officially visited Beijing with Her Majesty Queen Suthida Bajrasudhabimalalakshana, his wife, to celebrate 50 years of Thailand-China relations. The trip marked the first official visit to a major country during King Rama X’s reign, underscoring the strategic importance of these ties. Although the two countries established diplomatic relations in 1975, this was the first official visit to China by a Thai sovereign, highlighting the deepening relationship between the two nations.
Thailand–China relations have evolved from distant peers in the 1970s into close partners. China now plays a central role in Thailand’s economic development, especially in trade, tourism, and automotive manufacturing. It is Thailand’s top trading partner—exporting over USD 86.03 billion worth of goods—and a major tourist source, sending more than 2.26 million visitors. China is also a leading investor in Thailand’s rapidly growing electric vehicle sector. Its presence has expanded further through large-scale infrastructure projects, particularly under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) launched in 2013. This cooperation is reflected in the recent MoU between the State Railway of Thailand (SRT), the Engineering Institute of Thailand (EIT), and the Rail Technology Research and Development Agency (RTRDA), reaffirming commitment to the Thai–China high-speed railway project.
The closeness of the two countries is also evident in relations between their leaders. During the late King Bhumibol Adulyadej’s reign, despite several invitations, it was often his daughter, Her Royal Highness Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn, who represented Thailand in Beijing. King Bhumibol’s most significant state visit was instead to Washington during the Cold War, reflecting Thailand’s alignment with the United States at the time.
Princess Sirindhorn, however, maintained strong personal ties with China, earning the title of Friendship Ambassador in 2004 and receiving the Friendship Medal from President Xi Jinping in 2019. Under King Rama X, even the passing of Queen Mother Sirikit did not delay his state visit to China—his first to a major global power—signaling a shift in diplomatic momentum. These developments illustrate how Thailand’s foreign policy balance between Beijing and Washington is evolving across people-to-people ties, economic cooperation, and security coordination.
Nonetheless, the US still plays an eminent role in the region, as shown by President Trump’s involvement in the recent ceasefire agreement between Thailand and Cambodia. POTUS pressured Thailand and Cambodia to sign a truce deal or face potential reciprocal tariffs. Although the agreement was short-lived, both countries’ swift compliance demonstrated that the U.S. remains an important actor in Southeast Asia, even as regional states grow closer to China. Perhaps this reflects, in turn, the hedging strategy Southeast Asian countries are increasingly adopting, as they are urged to balance between the two major powers to reduce the risk of being dominated by either side.
Natamon has served as a rapporteur at the Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS Thailand). She has also worked as a research assistant on diplomatic issues in Southeast Asia. Her work focuses on how domestic politics shape foreign policy in the region. She holds a degree in international relations and has experience in policy analysis, event reporting, and regional research.
Cambodia 🇰🇭
Whispers of ASEAN’s Unity as Cambodian Diplomat is Appointed to Lead AIPA
by Chandara Samban, in Kandal
Cambodian diplomat Chem Widhya, who has served nearly five decades in the foreign service, has been appointed Secretary-General of the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Assembly (AIPA) for the 2026–2028 term. The rotating post reflects Cambodia’s confidence in his capacity to represent the country and guide the regional parliamentary body. He has outlined a vision focused on strengthening ASEAN solidarity and advancing the ASEAN Community Vision 2045.
On 18 November 2025, Chem Widhya met with Dr. Kao Kim Hourn, Secretary-General of ASEAN, at the ASEAN Headquarters in Jakarta. Both sides agreed to deepen cooperation between ASEAN and AIPA, with emphasis on people-to-people relations—an essential component of the ASEAN framework. Both officials are veteran Cambodian diplomats who remain active in regional diplomacy.
Speaking to The ASEAN Frontier (TAF), Chem Widhya said he aims to enhance intra-ASEAN cooperation and regional solidarity for Southeast Asia’s shared prosperity. As Chief Administrator, he stressed his commitment to promoting the ASEAN Community Vision 2045, noting that mid-term reviews will help fine-tune implementation.
Asked whether AIPA could serve as a parliamentary diplomatic channel to address regional security issues—including the Cambodia–Thailand border dispute, the crisis in Myanmar, and the South China Sea—Chem Widhya clarified that AIPA does not engage in state diplomacy.
“AIPA is the legislative side of ASEAN, whereas ASEAN is actively engaged in state diplomacy,” he said. “Parliaments enact laws and ratify legal instruments. The legislative and the executive must work hand in hand. We aim to enhance efficiency in monitoring implementation.”
With the Philippines set to host the 47th AIPA in 2026, he said one priority will be further integrating ASEAN parliaments into global platforms such as the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) in Geneva. AIPA, he added, monitors cooperation under ASEAN’s three pillars—the Political-Security, Economic, and Socio-Cultural Communities—with particular attention to issues concerning women, youth, and children.
Chem Widhya is one of Cambodia’s most experienced diplomats. He entered diplomacy in 1980, later serving as an assistant to former Prime Minister Hun Sen and as Secretary of State at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Under the new government, he chaired the Senate’s 5th Committee on Foreign Affairs. Upon assuming the Senate presidency, Hun Sen declared parliamentary diplomacy a priority and nominated Chem Widhya as AIPA Secretary-General.
Senate spokesperson Chea Thyrith confirmed that Chem Widhya will step down from the Senate to assume the role. He said Cambodian leaders, including Samdech Techo Hun Sen, have high expectations given Chem Widhya’s experience and international standing. The nomination, he added, reflects confidence that he will perform effectively while elevating Cambodia’s profile alongside other prominent diplomats such as Dr. Kao Kim Hourn.
Chem Widhya’s appointment comes at a moment when ASEAN’s parliamentary cooperation is gaining new relevance. As AIPA seeks a stronger role in supporting regional integration and people-centered governance, his long diplomatic experience positions him to help steer the institution through a period of growing geopolitical and legislative complexity. His leadership will be an important test of how effectively ASEAN’s parliamentary arm can complement the work of its governments in the years ahead.
Chandara is a freelance journalist with a focus on foreign affairs, security issues, and ASEAN affairs. He also serves as a Junior Counterterrorism Intelligence Analyst.
Editorial Deadline 21/11/2025 11:59 PM (UTC +8)
