Cambodia and Thailand Shake Hands
Issue 21 — Key Developments Across Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand
Editor’s Note
by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk
Cambodia and Thailand’s joint statement over the status of their peace talks takes the front page in this 21st issue of the Mekong Belt. The 47th ASEAN Summit served as the stage for what could be a historic milestone for the resolution of the border dispute, as representatives of both kingdoms, as well as those of Malaysia and the United States, signed a declaration that outlines 8 key points that the parties commit to respect and pursue for a lasting peace. Beyond diplomacy, policy shifts are reshaping the economic landscape. Laos has announced plans to halt electricity supply to crypto-mining operations by 2026, redirecting its energy toward renewables and consolidating its role as the region’s “battery.” In Thailand, the new government unveiled a household debt buyback program aimed at easing the financial strain on families — but without deeper structural reform, the move risks recycling debt rather than resolving it. Finally, on the political stage, Myanmar’s junta is moving forward with its election plans regardless of the disapproval from local and international observers. Authorities have pledged tighter security during the campaign and imposed steep monetary thresholds for political participation — a move likely to sideline smaller parties and silence what little opposition remains.
Cambodia 🇰🇭
Cambodia-Thailand Issue Joint Statement to Confirm Peace Ahead of Trump Visit
by Chandara Samban, in Kandal
Cambodia and Thailand issued a joint statement in Kuala Lumpur, marking the culmination of months of peace talks over their border dispute. The statement, which came in the rare presence of U.S. President Donald Trump and Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, is widely seen as a hopeful step toward achieving lasting peace after five months of tension following a five-day clash in late July, which left at least 38 people dead and displaced more than 200,000 residents. A ceasefire agreement was eventually reached on July 28, but tensions have persisted since then.
On October 26, 2025, during the 47th ASEAN Summit, Cambodia and Thailand signed a joint statement reaffirming their commitment to resolving the border dispute peacefully. The agreement, signed by representatives from Cambodia, Thailand, Malaysia (as a mediator), and the United States (as initiator of the post-ceasefire intervention), was hailed by President Trump as a “Peace Deal.” The accord is being described as a historic protocol for ASEAN and is expected to mark the beginning of lasting peace between the two countries, ending years of hostilities that have threatened regional security and stability.
The joint statement outlines eight key points: (a) upholding the July ceasefire in accordance with international law; (b) implementing agreements under the General Boundary Commission (GBC); (c) supporting the ASEAN Observer Team (AOT) mechanism; (d) withdrawing heavy weapons and military forces from the disputed border; (e) countering disinformation; (f) clearing landmines; (g) demarcating the border; and (h) working jointly to restore bilateral relations and resolve future conflicts peacefully.
Cambodia has described the joint statement as a historic milestone. Prime Minister Hun Manet expressed his gratitude to President Trump for his “special support,” and thanked Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim for his effective mediation over the past several months. The Prime Minister then reaffirmed Cambodia’s commitment to fully implementing the agreement and called on the international community to continue supporting and monitoring the peace process. He also urged Thailand to release 18 Cambodian soldiers currently detained as prisoners of war and allow them to return home.
The international community has largely welcomed the deal. European Commission Vice President Kaja Kallas called it “a milestone for peace,” affirming that the EU stands ready to support its implementation, particularly in demining efforts along the border. Japanese Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi also praised the agreement, calling it a clear step toward a sustainable ceasefire, and said Japan is prepared to provide Official Security Assistance (OSA) to support long-term peacebuilding efforts.
Thong Mengdavid, an international affairs expert affiliated with the China-ASEAN Studies Center, told The ASEAN Frontier that the joint statement represents an important step for both Cambodia and Thailand, as well as for ASEAN as a whole. He emphasized that it strengthens diplomatic trust and stability along the disputed border, while also facilitating trade and regional cooperation.
“This outcome truly reflects the principle of ‘ASEAN centrality’ and the crucial role of President Trump,” Thong said. “Without his involvement, the conflict might have continued much longer, potentially devastating Cambodia, Thailand, and ASEAN as a whole.”
He added that Trump’s participation sends a signal to the world that the United States seeks to reassert its influence in Southeast Asia, especially as China was notably absent as a witness to the agreement. “This shows a clear alignment toward ASEAN-U.S. cooperation rather than ASEAN-China,” he said, noting that while Beijing may not welcome the move, it is unlikely to oppose it directly, as stability in the border area also serves China’s interests under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
Chandara is a freelance journalist with a focus on foreign affairs, security issues, and ASEAN affairs. He also serves as a Junior Counterterrorism Intelligence Analyst.
Lao PDR 🇱🇦
Laos to End Crypto Mining by 2026 Amid Energy and Climate Concerns
by Thongsavanh Souvannasane, in Vientiane
Laos, a country often referred to as the “Battery of Southeast Asia” for its vast hydropower resources, plans to phase out cryptocurrency mining by early 2026 to secure electricity supplies and prioritize industries that generate greater long-term economic value.
According to Reuters, Lao Vice Minister of Industry and Commerce Chanthaboun Soukaloun said the government aims to redirect power from cryptocurrency operations to higher-value sectors such as artificial intelligence data centers, metal refining, and electric vehicles.
The move comes just four years after Southeast Asia’s only landlocked country legalized crypto mining during a period of electricity oversupply in 2021. When asked about the reasons behind the policy shift, Minister Chanthaboun replied that the crypto industry consumes large amounts of electricity while offering limited benefit to the economy, noting that “crypto doesn’t create value compared to supplying it to industrial or commercial consumers.”
According to the Vice Minister, electricity supplied to crypto miners has already been cut by around 70%, having gone from a peak of 500 megawatts (MW) in 2021 and 2022 to roughly 150 MW in 2025, and will be reduced to zero by early 2026. He stated that the government aims to redirect power toward more productive and sustainable uses.
Laos is facing growing challenges from droughts and irregular rainfall, which have impacted hydropower generation and prompted a review of national energy priorities. In recent years, the country has accelerated renewable energy diversification through projects such as the 600 MW Monsoon Wind Power Project, which became operative in August and is currently Southeast Asia’s largest onshore wind farm, and the Truong Son Wind Farm in Bolikhamxay Province, expected to begin operations by late 2025.
Both projects supply clean energy to Vietnam, reflecting Laos’ expanding role in regional power integration.
The crypto phaseout aligns with ASEAN’s collective transition toward renewable energy, as member states have adopted an ambitious goal to achieve 45% of power capacity from renewable sources by 2030.
Moreover, Chanthaboun told Reuters that Laos expects electricity exports to Singapore through the Lao-Thailand-Malaysia-Singapore (LTMS) Power Integration Project to resume soon, following renewed commitments among the four participating countries. He also mentioned plans to expand bilateral electricity exports to Vietnam beyond the current 8,000 MW.
While the phaseout may affect some foreign investors and mining operators, the government views it as an opportunity to attract green investment in solar, wind, and grid modernization. The policy thus marks a decisive step in aligning Laos’ hydropower-driven economy with regional sustainability standards.
Thongsavanh is a journalist from Laos with a background in English-language media. He graduated from the Lao-American Institute with a Diploma of the Arts in English and contributes to independent news platforms. His reporting focuses on environmental issues, socio-economic development, and geopolitics.
Thailand 🇹🇭
Will Thailand’s $307 Million Debt Buyback Plan Be a Lifeline or a Loop?
by Paranut Juntree, in Bangkok
Thai Finance Minister Ekniti Nitithanprapas has announced that the government will spend ฿10 billion (USD307 million) to buy back non-performing household loans (NPLs) using leftover rehabilitation funds. The program will target credit-card and both personal and auto debt, allowing borrowers to restructure their payments under lenient terms.
The main goal of the program is to “restore purchasing power” while reducing pressure on commercial banks by shifting parts of the bad-debt burden to state-backed funds. Yet, the move looks more like a short-term relief than a structural reform. With negative inflation for six consecutive months and weak consumer confidence, the measure risks masking deep cracks in the country’s economy.
Thailand’s household debt has risen to about ฿16.3 trillion (USD501 billion), amounting to roughly 88% of GDP, the 7th highest ratio globally. The roots of the problem run deep. Stagnant wages, high living costs, and limited financial literacy among citizens have forced many families to borrow simply to survive. The new debt program is promised to buy back NPLs that are over 90 days overdue, which already exceed ฿500 billion according to the Bank of Thailand.
Under the new plan, the government will purchase these loans through state funds and asset management companies (AMCs), and borrowers will be offered restructured repayment schedules, possibly with lower interest rates. However, given the small size of the funding, the plan would cover less than 2% of total NPLs. The initiative seems to be largely symbolic, raising doubts about its real economic impact.
Thailand has been here before. The 2011 Debt Moratorium introduced under Prime Minister Yinluck Shinawatra temporarily suspended loan repayments for over 500,000 small borrowers recovering from floods and global economic slowdown. The plan offered short-term breathing room during the 2011 Thailand floods, but later failed to reduce long-term indebtedness. Once payments resumed, many households defaulted again, and the total debt continued to climb. Economists regarded the program as having improved liquidity but not financial resilience.
The upcoming buyback could repeat this pattern, along with other cases of household debt restructuring in Thailand. Prior to the government change, National Institute of Development Administration (NIDA) economist Associate Professor Nadda Chansomsak argued that “buying debt is not debt relief: it only changes creditors while borrowers remain listed in the credit bureau.” In practice, this means that the majority of indebted households will remain locked out of new credit access. Without structural adjustments targeting issues such as stagnant incomes and weak financial literacy, the policy risks shifting debt rather than solving it, leaving Thailand trapped in the same loop.
The buyback comes at a politically delicate moment. With Thailand’s economy stuck in a low gear, with growth hovering around 2.5% and consecutive negative inflation, both the current government under Anutin Charnvirakul and the recently replaced administration face mounting pressure to reignite domestic spending. In this context, buyback ideas risk becoming populist tools for the next election rather than structural solutions. In this sense, the debt buyback reflects a deeper pattern in Thai fiscal policy, merely becoming a quick patch on the elephant in the room, which is Thailand’s unresolved structural debt problem.
Paranut has a background in advocacy, with experience in policy research, communications, and civic engagement across both the NGO and government sectors. As Thailand’s Youth Delegate to the United Nations, he represented Thai youth in global dialogues on migration, education, and human rights, championing inclusive policymaking. He holds a degree in political science with a specialization in international relations.
Myanmar 🇲🇲
Myanmar’s Military Tightens Grip Ahead of Election Campaign
by Pann Ei Thwel, in Mandalay
The junta-appointed Union Election Commission (UEC) announced on October 15 that the campaign period for the upcoming election will officially start on October 28 and finish on December 26. Announced amid widespread conflict and repression inside Myanmar, the announcement signals the junta’s determination to move forward with the vote regardless of the disapproval from local and international observers.
The elections will be Myanmar’s first since the military seized power in February 2021 by ousting the civilian government led by Aung San Su Kyi. With the thousands of political prisoners behind bars and the relentless killing of civilians committed by the junta throughout the military coup, analysts warn that the election will only serve to entrench military control rather than civilian rule.
As we get closer to the campaign period, the junta has stepped up repression against political dissidents who criticize the military’s choice to prioritize the election over conflict resolution. Under the new law enacted in July to safeguard the elections, those who criticize the elections in any way are punished by sentencing to jail. For instance, according to AP News, Nay Thway was sentenced to seven years in prison for posting about a robbery and criticizing the junta for prioritizing the election over public safety. Also, the regime has announced heavy police deployment to provide security for candidates during the campaign, which raises the concern of oppressing the dissidents rather than securing the candidates’ safety.
Since the announcement of the December elections, international and local organizations have condemned the plan. With the National League for Democracy (NLD) party being banned from participating in the election, as well as other pro-democracy parties and figures being severely restricted, the upcoming elections have long been viewed as neither free nor fair. The UEC has increased the maximum expenses for candidates, but also announced that parties that do not submit the expenses will be declared disqualified. According to the new announcement, the candidates competing in the election are required to register a fee of 15 million kyats, while ethnic party candidates must pay double that amount, 30 million kyats. The increase in the candidate registration fee could hinder some parties from participating in the election, while the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) enjoys financial dominance over other parties, thus further undermining the fairness of the election.
As the junta accelerates the preparation for the election, it becomes more urgent than ever for the international community to take a firm stance to prevent the regime from using the election result to further legitimize its rule, and so to perpetuate violence and marginalize the civilians’ call for democracy.
Pann Ei is an undergraduate student at Parami University, majoring in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics. Following an internship with the CSIS Southeast Asia Program, she developed a strong interest in policy research, with a particular focus on politics and education. She currently works as a research assistant at the Center for Research, Policy and Innovation (CRPI), where she focuses on political institutions and regime types across Southeast Asia.
Editorial Deadline 24/10/2025 11:59 PM (UTC +8)
