Cambodia’s Pivot to America
Issue 34 — Key Developments Across Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand
Editor’s Note
by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk
As the new year brings fresh winds that keep shuffling the cards across the Mekong Belt, this week’s newsletter captures a region caught between ambition and accountability, where strong geopolitical currents are forcing big decisions to the surface. This is most evident in Cambodia, where Phnom Penh’s renewed courtship of Washington—from hosting a US warship to joining Trump’s Board of Peace— signals a diplomatic recalibration that raises as many strategic questions as it answers. Meanwhile, in Thailand, deadly crane collapses expose how weak regulation and opaque procurement turn infrastructure development into a recurring human tragedy, testing public trust in the state’s ability to enforce its own standards. In Laos, Vientiane’s stalled BRT project illustrates how development visions can derail without grounded planning and institutional follow-through, even with generous international backing. And at the regional level, ASEAN’s latest round of engagement on Myanmar once again highlights the bloc’s dilemma: balancing dialogue and principle while violence, displacement, and political deadlock grind on.
Cambodia 🇰🇭
Cambodia Set To Join Trump’s Board of Peace and Resume Joint Military Excercises With U.S.
by Chandara Samban, in Kandal
In early 2026, Cambodia signaled a strengthening of ties with the United States, marking a shift from previous years. This change became evident after Washington intervened in the Cambodia–Thailand conflict and co-witnessed the ceasefire. In late October 2024, the White House announced the lifting of the US arms embargo on Cambodia, expanded economic cooperation, and resumed bilateral military exercises. In late January 2026, the US warship USS Cincinnati visited Cambodia, becoming the first foreign naval vessel to dock in the country that year. Around the same time, Cambodia announced its decision to join former US President Donald Trump’s Board of Peace. Experts interpret these developments as signals of Cambodia seeking closer relations with the US during the era under Trump and Hun Manet.
The USS Cincinnati (LCS-20), weighing approximately 3,000 tons and measuring nearly 130 meters in length, arrived in Cambodia with around 100 sailors for a five-day visit from January 24 to 28, 2026. The vessel also carried a helicopter. This marked the first foreign ship to dock at the recently renovated Ream Port, which has been the subject of international speculation regarding its potential use by Chinese military forces. During the visit, the navies of both countries exchanged experiences, participated in joint sporting activities, and held events aimed at strengthening security ties and cooperation.
Admiral Samuel Paparo, Commander of the US Indo-Pacific Command, met with Hun Manet on January 26 in Phnom Penh, reiterating the US’ commitment to strengthening ties and cooperation with Cambodia. Hun Manet showed willingness to deepen cooperation with Washington, informing the US PACOM commander of Cambodia’s decision to join the Board of Peace. He stated that this decision reflects US efforts to promote global peace, including its intervention in the Cambodia–Thailand conflict, and that Cambodia sees itself as committed to building peace worldwide.
That evening, Admiral Paparo held a press conference in Sihanoukville, stating that the US aims to resume joint military exercises with Cambodia, specifically Angkor Sentinel, expected to resume in 2026 or early 2027 after being suspended since 2017, following a downturn in relations between Phnom Penh and Washington.
Following Cambodia’s decision to join the Board of Peace, public reactions were mixed. Some viewed it as an indication of Cambodia’s gradual pivot towards the US, contrasting with its usual diplomatic posture during the Hun Manet and Trump era. Others expressed concern over the reported cost of participation, estimated at US$1 billion per year. However, Hun Manet clarified that Cambodia, being a founding member, would not be required to pay contributions for the first three years.
Government Spokesperson Pen Bona stressed that Cambodia has long maintained a friendly stance towards the US, emphasizing that the country’s foreign policy is based on maintaining positive relations with all countries, without discrimination or partisanship, in line with the constitution. He clarified that strengthening ties with the US does not imply turning away from China, as Cambodia continues to maintain friendly relations and comprehensive cooperation with the US, China, and other international partners.
Regarding the decision to join Trump’s Board of Peace, Pen Bona stated that Cambodia shares goodwill in promoting global peace, an objective it has pursued for decades. He added that closer ties with the US would not undermine cooperation with China, as the new government remains committed to engaging constructively with all parties.
However, a Cambodian foreign affairs expert, close to former King Norodom Sihanouk and speaking anonymously, expressed reservations about Cambodia’s participation in Trump’s Board of Peace. He argued that, as a neutral country, Cambodia should refrain from joining the initiative, seeing little tangible benefit for the country. He described Trump as a leader who does not respect the sovereignty of other states, citing the crisis in Venezuela as an example. Nevertheless, he suggested that Trump may view Hun Manet favorably, particularly after Hun Manet reportedly recommended him for the Nobel Peace Prize.
The expert advised Cambodia to exercise caution in its diplomatic positioning, warning against repeating historical mistakes such as those made during the Lon Nol regime, which incurred debts to the United States that remain unpaid today. He also urged Cambodia not to forget Palestine’s support in helping the country build peace following its prolonged civil war, noting that Palestine was not invited to join Trump’s Board of Peace.
Chandara is a freelance journalist with a focus on foreign affairs, security issues, and ASEAN affairs. He also serves as a Junior Counterterrorism Intelligence Analyst.
Thailand 🇹🇭
Frequent Crane Accidents Reflect the Government’s Need to Increase Its Standards
by Natamon Aumphin, in Bangkok
Not even a month into 2026, over 30 lives were claimed in a crane incident in Nakhon Ratchasima province. On January 14, 2026, the crane collapsed onto an operating passenger train boarding over 195 people, resulting in 32 deaths and 66 injuries.
Although the company responsible for the construction, the Italian-Thai Development, has issued an initial compensation to families of the victims, this is not the only incident involving the company. In fact, two days later another crane collapsed in Samut Sakhon, an outskirt province of Bangkok, due to issues of crane support, claiming another 2 lives and injuring at least 5. Both incidents are not only under the concession of the same company, but also part of the China High-Speed Rail project. Their framing as mere incidents has sparked public outrage, demanding accountability and transparency, especially in the bidding concession process.
Accountability and transparency issues in public infrastructure projects have been blurry for decades. For instance, Italian-Thai Development is one of the largest construction companies that has won over 354 government projects, despite records of accidents causing grave loss. The most infamous incident is the collapse of the State Audit Office of the Kingdom of Thailand (SAO) building, which claimed 89 lives of construction workers in March last year. Although authorities claimed they would thoroughly investigate the case, PolicyWatch is skeptical about its progress, as no one has been held accountable to this day.
Nonetheless, despite frequent incidents under the company’s concession, Italian-Thai Development is not the only company involved, as many other construction firms have won government contracts and performed poorly. The issue is rooted in the structure and system of selecting contractors for each government project, particularly in regulatory gaps and oversight bodies. In fact, it is common in developed countries with strong infrastructure to establish a special committee to oversee mega construction projects to ensure public safety and due diligence. However, Thailand still has much to catch up on, as there is no such mechanism at the moment, especially one to hold contracting companies accountable. For example, there is no mechanism to hold third-party contractors if construction companies hire outsourced contractors. Moreover, during the bidding process for public projects, there is no standardized specification; each company has its own provision. Hence, scholars and experts urge the government to strictly enhance its standards and regulatory enforcement to increase public safety.
In terms of public response, citizens urged politicians to view these incidents as more than just accidents, as they could have been prevented if law enforcement had been effective. In fact, most victims in these construction incidents are workers operating on construction sites, whose lives and safety are often undervalued.
Natamon has served as a rapporteur at the Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS Thailand). She has also worked as a research assistant on diplomatic issues in Southeast Asia. Her work focuses on how domestic politics shape foreign policy in the region. She holds a degree in international relations and has experience in policy analysis, event reporting, and regional research.

Lao PDR 🇱🇦
Vientiane’s Stalled Progress on BRT System Tests Laos’ Urban Transport Ambitions
by Thongsavanh Souvannasane, in Vientiane
Vientiane’s flagship Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) system stands unfinished and indefinitely suspended, casting doubt on the capital’s sustainable urban transport ambitions. Operations began in early November 2025 with a three-month free trial during That Luang Festival but were abruptly halted a month after launch.
The USD 100 million Vientiane Sustainable Urban Transport Project, funded primarily by the Asian Development Bank alongside the European Investment Bank, Global Environment Facility, and OPEC Fund, was designed to debut Laos’ first modern BRT line. The route features 27 stops and buses equipped with Wi-Fi, CCTV, and air conditioning, infrastructure meant to transform mobility in the rapidly growing capital.
Public response was initially enthusiastic, as residents welcomed an alternative to streets increasingly congested by motorbikes and private cars. However, optimism quickly faded as critical design and operational weaknesses emerged.
The system’s curb-separated bus lanes proved unsafe and ill-suited to Vientiane’s narrow roads, restricting maneuverability and disrupting traffic flow. Inexperienced drivers struggled navigating mixed traffic, while dispatch systems failed during rush hours.
These problems revealed systemic implementation failures. Although contractors handled construction and daily operations, government authorities approved the design, procurement, and deployment despite insufficient testing in actual local conditions. Oversight failed to detect or address these issues before public launch.
Instead of alleviating congestion, incomplete infrastructure created worse bottlenecks without delivering expected benefits. In mid-December 2025, authorities ordered suspension and complete redesign, acknowledging that accountability extended beyond contractors to earlier planning, coordination, and approval stages.
Contractors are now removing problematic physical curbs, substituting painted lane markings. The system, almost complete before the trial, faces renewed completion pressure while incorporating planned extensions to the Laos-China Railway station. Officials anticipate these connections will integrate the BRT into wider regional transport networks essential for landlocked Laos’ goal of becoming a Mekong logistics hub or “land-linked” nation.
Pressure escalated on January 20 when ADB representatives demanded accelerated progress on donor-funded infrastructure, warning that extended delays could jeopardize funding. Prime Minister Sonexay Siphandone reinforced these concerns, noting that despite settled contractor payments, donor patience is wearing thin.
Donor institutions observed implementation difficulties during the trial but delayed pressing for corrective measures. Only after suspension did concerns about project effectiveness, schedules, and management intensify, raising questions whether earlier intervention might have reduced delays and redesign expenses.
The implications exceed urban convenience. As Laos pursues graduation from Least Developed Country status by 2026 while expanding hydropower and deepening Chinese rail integration, reliable urban transport has grown strategically vital.
Vientiane’s difficulties also reflect wider regional trends.
Hanoi’s BRT confronts vendor encroachment and excessive private vehicle use, while Jakarta’s system progresses despite persistent funding gaps, exposing common implementation shortfalls across ASEAN’s developing economies.
Officials now aim for redesigned trial operations in Q2 of 2026, but with ADB’s increasing pressure and rising public doubt, there is virtually no room for further mistakes. Whether Vientiane’s BRT can rebound from this setback will test not only technical solutions but the capital’s capacity to fulfill commitments.
Thongsavanh is a journalist from Laos with a background in English-language media. He graduated from the Lao-American Institute with a Diploma of the Arts in English and contributes to independent news platforms. His reporting focuses on environmental issues, socio-economic development, and geopolitics..
Myanmar 🇲🇲
Will the Philippines’ ASEAN Chairmanship Shift the Bloc’s Approach to Myanmar’s Crisis?
by Myat Moe Kywe
As ASEAN foreign ministers convened in Cebu, Philippines, to review the bloc’s priorities under the Philippines’ ASEAN chairmanship, Myanmar’s protracted crisis emerged as a central focus alongside broader regional and global concerns.
Against this backdrop, H.E. Ma. Theresa Lazaro, ASEAN Special Envoy to Myanmar, held a series of consultations on January 19–20 with Myanmar’s National Unity Government (NUG) and several ethnic armed and political organizations. The discussions focused on the ASEAN Five-Point Consensus, civilian protection, and opposition to elections organized by Myanmar’s military authorities. Participants included NUG Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr. Sai Khaing Myo Tun, representatives of the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), the Chin National Front, the Pa-O Federal Council, the National Unity Consultative Council, and multiple ethnic revolutionary organizations.
These meetings followed similar outreach conducted during Malaysia’s ASEAN chairmanship in 2025, which sought to broaden stakeholder engagement beyond Myanmar’s military authorities. During that period, opposition actors—including the NUG and ethnic resistance groups—issued a joint statement reaffirming their commitment to the Five-Point Consensus, support for democratic restoration, and rejection of military-run elections.
That position was later echoed by Malaysian Foreign Minister Mohamad Hasan, who told Parliament that ASEAN leaders agreed at their October summit not to send observers to Myanmar, citing the absence of conditions for a credible electoral process. While Myanmar’s Information Ministry subsequently claimed that some ASEAN member states, including Cambodia and Vietnam, sent observers in their individual capacities, Hasan emphasized that ASEAN as a bloc neither observed nor endorsed the elections. His remarks marked the clearest statement to date that ASEAN would not recognize the results of military-organized polls held in December 2025 and January 2026.
Despite this stance, ASEAN continues to face criticism over its handling of the Myanmar crisis. Human rights organizations and regional lawmakers argue that the Five-Point Consensus has delivered limited tangible progress, as violence, displacement, and humanitarian needs persist across much of the country.
Ahead of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting held in Cebu from January 25–29, ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights (APHR) urged ministers to place Myanmar at the center of the agenda. The group called on the Philippines to pursue a more strategic and results-oriented approach, warning against repeating what it described as the shortcomings of previous ASEAN chairmanships.
Myanmar was discussed during the ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Retreat on January 28–29. In a statement, the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs said ministers reviewed the implementation of decisions from the 47th ASEAN Summit in Malaysia and exchanged views on regional and global issues of mutual concern. Lazaro reiterated that ASEAN’s approach involves engagement with all relevant parties, confirming that her consultations included a meeting with junta leader Min Aung Hlaing during a recent visit, alongside separate discussions with opposition and resistance groups, including the NUG.
As ASEAN moves forward under the Philippines’ chairmanship, Myanmar remains one of the bloc’s most complex and sensitive challenges, with expectations tempered by persistent questions over whether renewed engagement can translate into meaningful progress on the ground.
Myat is a senior undergraduate student majoring in Politics, Philosophy, and Economics. She has interned at The Asia Foundation in Washington, D.C., and she has also worked as a summer research assistant at the Centre for Policy and Innovation (CRPI), gaining experience in research and analysis. Her work focuses on civic engagement, gender, youth leadership, and community development.
Editorial Deadline 30/01/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)




Superb regional analysis that connects dots most outlets miss. The Vientiane BRT failure is a perfect case study in how donor funded projects can skip local feasibility testing and end up creating worse problems than they solve. Worked on similiar urban transport consultign in Southeast Asia and seen this exact pattern where international specs get copy pasted without adapting to actual traffic behavior or institutional capacity.