Cards on the Table

Issue 72 — Key Developments Across Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand

Oct 26, 2026

Editor’s Note

by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk

Every government holds a few cards it would rather not play, and this week three of them reached for theirs, each for a different reason. In Myanmar, the junta played its most loaded one: after five years of silence, it let Kim Aris speak to his mother, Aung San Suu Kyi, for 20 minutes, a call critics read as a last-resort bid for legitimacy, with a clock on the table to remind everyone who controls the time. Thailand did the opposite, pulling a card back before it landed. Its proposed departure tax, meant to raise 12 billion baht a year, was shelved within weeks once tourism groups warned of 1.5 million fewer visitors, a reminder that a card played at the wrong moment can cost more than it earns. Cambodia, meanwhile, put its whole hand down, unveiling a 2026-2030 strategy for the small businesses that make up over 99% of its economy, though critics are already eyeing a $4,000 export licence and a 31-member steering committee as the cards that could beat it.

Myanmar 🇲🇲

Isolated Junta Finally Plays Suu Kyi Card: Desperate for Recognition?

by Ley Hlaing

The Myanmar regime has eventually taken out the Suu Kyi card in the game, as an attempt to reassure diplomatic survival. Despite the fact that the move is sort of replaying to the old playbook like in the 2000s, this time, the Myanmar generals seem to be out of any other card and at the same time, very desperate for the legitimacy and recognition of the international community, though analysts would argue there might be other external driving forces of this ploy.

On October 22, 2026, the younger son of Aung San Suu Kyi, Kim Aris who has been trying to contact and speaking out as “proof of life’ for his mother for so long, announced that he got to have a 20-minute call at the Burmese Embassy in London with his mother on his facebook, which has been a significant news over the week in Myanmar. For the first time in five years, the mother-son reunion for 20 minutes spread out around the world. She has been unlawfully detained since the first day of the coup in February 2021 and also has been severely isolated with the rest of the world by the Myanmar military. While this news is such a relief for her son and the people of Myanmar whose hearts that she won for years, this is, however, a strategic playcard for the military and the self proclaimed president Min Aung Hlaing whom the regime itself finally allowed this to happen with political machination and malicious intent behind it. The reason is very simple; because the Myanmar military and its new regime has been encountering serious suffocations politically, economically and diplomatically, taking out Suu Kyi play card must have been the last choice of theirs and eventually became a reality as a “political calculation”.

Actually, there have been a couple of times that the regime tried to spot Suu Kyi back on the light within only 2026, which obviously only for the sake of their interest and political profit over the move, starting from moving to the house arrest in April; allowing meeting with the representative of the Red Cross releasing press photos in August; and to recently, three days before letting her speak with her son, the spokeswoman of the regime issued a statement that they have delivered two books and two letters sent by the King Charles of England to Aung San Suu Kyi.

The incidents reveal a magnificent truth that Aung San Suu Kyi remains being the most important person in Myanmar’s political landscape, her role and existence is still significant as always and the uniformed generals are still in fear of the lady who dresses the Longgyi. Furthermore, having played out as the last card, there also emerged a serious jealousy and hatred over the 81-year-old lady by the Myanmar military community, especially Min Aung Hlaing and his allies. This can be evident with two points; first, in the released photos of Aung San Suu Kyi talking with her son, there is a clock in the table which underscores that her communication is rigidly limited, monitored, and entirely at the mercy of the military authorities.

Secondly, in the issued statement about King Charles’ gifts and letters to Suu Kyi, the regime spokeswoman, Khaing Khaing Soe, used the specific words like “အထူးအကျဉ်းသူ ဒေါ်စုကြည်” (“Special Prisoner Daw Suu Kyi”- directly translated in Burmese/English) which frustrated a significant number of Myanmar public.

Suu Kyi’s son’s efforts have finally paid off and on the phone call with his mother, he also noted she is facing some health challenges. On his facebook post, he mentioned that it is still important to see his mother totally free and a few minutes of speaking is not enough. Arguably, external factors, most notably shifting diplomatic positions from neighboring China, might heavily drive this sudden pivot. Subsequently, in April 2026, Chinese spokesperson, who rarely talked about her over the years, publicly referred to Suu Kyi as an “old friend of China,” signaling Beijing’s desire for a mediated stabilization of the country’s civil conflict, where the military continues to lose territory to ethnic armed groups.

Ironically, this is not the first time happening like this, the uniformed generals, former regime leaders like Than Shwe and the civilian transformed president Thein Sein have done the same as the last attempt after serious diplomatic isolation and loss of control. Those previous attempts have worked out for them with releasing sanctions. This is not a pity by the regime but a strategic attempt to gain profit by the military, serving as a desperate act of hostage diplomacy that the international community must firmly reject rather than reward with undeserved legitimacy.

Ley Hlaing is a former Political Science student from the University of Yangon, Myanmar. Currently, he is pursuing his BA at Parami University with a major in Philosophy, Politics and Economics. His academic and professional interests span community development, literature, minority issues, and social impact research. Having held roles as Research Assistant, Student Mentor, and Facilitator for local initiatives, he has constantly supported project management in literature and education programs in Myanmar.

Thailand 🇹🇭

Thailand Defers Planned Tourism Tax to Ease Peak-Season Concerns

by Pathom Sangwongwanich, in Bangkok

Thai Finance Minister Ekniti Nitithanprapas announced Thailand will defer the introduction of a proposed departure tax imposed on international outbound travelers to maintain tourism recovery momentum in this year’s final quarter, a move that follows citizens’ outcry and vehement pushback from tourism bodies.

“We have discussed this with the Revenue Department and decided that we probably will not proceed with it for now because we want tourism to continue moving forward,” Ekniti said. “We want to build on the positive response to the World Bank and IMF meetings. People around the world want to return, so we want to maintain this positive atmosphere.”

The Ministry of Finance previously spearheaded a proposed departure tax, also known as exit fee, to bolster long-term fiscal space and credit ratings, with a goal of generating roughly 12 billion baht annually. Under the draft law, travelers would be required to pay the tax every time they depart Thailand at a rate which would be set by a ministerial regulation, capped at 5,000 baht per trip. The initial rate was reported to be 1,000 baht for air travel, while departures by land and sea would initially be exempt. The Revenue Department, an entity under the Ministry of Finance, opened the public consultation on September 30, with comments accepted until October 29 via a government website

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The move was met with waves of pushback and criticisms from tourism bodies and local citizens, with the former warning how the tax would have potential hurdles for Thailand’s aviation and tourism hub ambitions. The proposed exit fee tax could increase the cost for tourists by 10%, potentially resulting in a 5.4% decrease in foreign tourist arrivals, or a loss of 1.5 million people, which would eventually result in a potential loss of around 75 billion baht in tourism revenue, according to the Association of Thai Travel Agents.

The Ministry of Finance’s proposed tax policy underscores the government’s urgent search for new fiscal buffers to safeguard public finances. Driven by multi-decade budget deficits and the rising costs of healthcare and social security for an aging population, new revenue streams have become essential. In June, Ekniti told parliament that the fiscal 2027 budget (October 2026 – September 2027) would reach 3.79 trillion baht. He noted that another deficit is necessary to stimulate the economy, even as opposition lawmakers expressed concern that increased borrowing and lagging revenues could push public debt beyond the 70% ceiling.

At the same time, the friction between revenue collection and tourism competitiveness highlights a delicate balancing act. Since tourism is a critical pillar of Thailand’s economy, any policy that risks dampening visitor demand warrants careful scrutiny — especially with peak travel season underway. Ultimately, the tax policy presents a difficult trade-off: higher travel costs could lead foreign tourists to choose alternative destinations or delay their trips, while the policy itself threatens to undermine broader ambitions to establish Thailand as a regional tourism and aviation hub.

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Cambodia 🇰🇭

What Is Cambodia’s National Strategy on MSME Development 2026-2030 About?

by Sokna Thea, in Phnom Penh

Cambodia launched its National Strategy on Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise (MSME) Development 2026-2030 on Oct. 22, 2026. The plan aims to strengthen local businesses, support Cambodia’s graduation from Least Developed Country (LDC) status in 2029, and help the country become a high-income economy by 2050. Its four strategic pillars aim

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to make Cambodia’s 753,670 economic establishments, more than 99% of which are MSMEs employing 2,980,569 workers, more competitive and better positioned to drive local growth and regional trade.

Across ASEAN, MSMEs account for 97.2% to 99.9% of all businesses and contribute 44.8% of regional production. In Cambodia, they contribute approximately 63% of non-agricultural GDP and employ more than 70% of the non-agricultural workforce. Yet only 0.76% of domestic SMEs export directly, generating $2.955 billion in registered export revenue, or 16.53% of national exports. To close this gap, the strategy requires foreign-invested manufacturing companies to source at least 25% of their inputs locally. It also aims to connect at least 50 domestic MSMEs directly with export-oriented foreign-invested firms as suppliers and expand MSME exports to at least 50 product categories annually by 2030.

The strategy also encourages businesses to register formally, addressing an informal economy that employs nearly 6.2 million people across 86.6% of unregistered businesses. The government is simplifying registration through the Cambodia Data Exchange (CamDX) platform and a unified Single Portal system. Registered MSMEs can access tax deductions in six priority sectors, including agro-industry, food processing, consumer goods, tourism, and IT, as well as import duty exemptions for production machinery and raw materials. By 2030, local MSMEs are also expected to supply at least 50% of domestic demand for 15 strategic products. National branding standards, including “Made in Cambodia” and “Product of Cambodia,” support efforts to replace imports with locally made goods.

To improve access to funding, the strategy brings together financial institutions and government agencies. Women account for 1,841,362 of the 2,980,569 MSME workers, or approximately 61.8%. Support measures include low-interest loans, matching grants, and provincial Women’s Development Centers. Key institutions include the SME Bank of Cambodia, the Agricultural and Rural Development Bank (ARDB), the Credit Guarantee Corporation of Cambodia (CGCC), and Khmer Enterprise (KE). The plan also promotes digital adoption through the CamInvoice electronic invoicing system and enables high-growth businesses to raise capital through listings on the SME Board of the Cambodia Securities Exchange (CSX).

However, the strategy faces practical challenges. In an August 2026 Cambodianess commentary, social enterprise owner Kurt Harrison said his business was quoted around $4,000 for an export licence, making an overseas order unprofitable. The case highlights how high export costs can block small businesses from international markets. Separately, Kiripost reported analyst Chey Tech’s warning that a 31-member steering committee involving more than 10 ministries could complicate decisions and delay reforms. These concerns raise questions about whether Cambodia can reduce export costs and bureaucratic barriers to help MSMEs grow.

Sokna has a background in International Affairs and Business & Commercial Law. He’s currently a Senior Project Coordinator at the Ministry of Economy and Finance of Cambodia, working on the Financial Management Information System (FMIS) Project. His professional focus is driven by entrepreneurship, business development, and financial technology, with a particular interest in how private-sector innovation drives Cambodia’s economic growth.

Lao PDR 🇱🇦

What Laos’ 2025 Census Means for the Region

by Souriya Bounpaseuth, in Vientiane

Laos has just released the results of its 2025 Population and Housing Census, the country’s fifth and the first collected digitally. Announced on 20 October, it estimates 7.24 million residents, after a follow-up survey added about 497,000 people to the 6.74 million initially counted.

Annual growth fell to 1.1 percent, less than half the 2.5 percent peak of 1985–1995. Births dropped from 28 to 18.1 per 1,000 people in a decade, and median age rose from 18.5 in 2005 to 27. The working-age share is now 65.0 percent, and the dependency ratio has fallen from 76.4 to 53.8. The growth is uneven. Attapeu and Xekong are expanding at close to 3 percent a year, while Champasak and Savannakhet show little growth.

UNFPA’s representative in Laos said these shifts can create economic opportunities, but that planning must estimate the investment needed in education, health, skills, employment and social protection. Census materials add that the gains depend partly on whether people find stable, adequately paid work.

Demographic change is reshaping the whole region. An ASEAN–UNFPA forum in November 2025 described rapid fertility declines, longer lives, urbanisation and rising mobility across Southeast Asia, with age structures shifting at different speeds. The ASEAN Secretary-General stressed coordinated demographic planning across the Community.

Labour mobility is where Laos’ numbers meet the region. Ministry figures show 708,751 Lao workers took jobs abroad between 2016 and 2026, 672,936 of them in Thailand. In July, Thailand’s cabinet extended work permits for about 770,000 migrant workers from Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam to ensure an adequate workforce for manufacturing and services. Lao migrant workers sent home an estimated USD 500 million in the first seven months of 2026, up 36.6 percent from a year earlier, according to the Lao Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare.

Laos’ growing working-age share is in demand both abroad and at home. In Laos, National Assembly members have raised concerns about workers leaving, citing high living costs, a weakening kip and wages that do not match expenses, and a ministry working group is assessing labour needs.

The census gives Laos a demographic opening. According to documents shared by the Lao Statistics Bureau and UNFPA, the benefits depend partly on whether people can find stable jobs and earn enough to support their families.

Editorial Deadline 24/10/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)

Moore on Southeast Asia

13h

Thank you — the Cambodia section raises the practitioner's question plainly. On your account, micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) are more than 99 per cent of Cambodia's economy — 753,670 establishments employing almost three million people — yet only 0.76 per cent of domestic small and medium enterprises export directly. The new strategy requires foreign-invested manufacturers to source at least 25 per cent of inputs locally. My question is sequencing. A business was quoted about 4,000 United States dollars for an export licence, enough to make an overseas order unprofitable. Unless that licence cost falls first, will the sourcing rule build suppliers for the domestic market while the export goal the strategy sets stays out of reach?

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