Editor’s Note
by Siu Tzyy Wei, Lead Editor - Maritime Crescent Desk
This week, the Maritime Crescent feels just a little too similar to The Hunger Games.
On one side, a porch: Brunei and Singapore mark fifty years of diplomatic relations, like two rocking chairs that have creaked in rhythm for decades. Behind them, a forest fire audaciously blazes on, a perfect imagery of Indonesia entering its second year with Prabowo in lead. As the result of the ongoing haze crisis, Malaysia, on the other side, struggles between diplomacy and sovereignty.
Fifty years of calm takes steady upkeep, and it is worth noticing who has kept up theirs. The smoke, like the Games, doesn’t wait for volunteers.
Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳
Brunei and Singapore at Fifty: A Lasting Defence Partnership
by Wira Gregory Ejau, in Bandar Seri Begawan
On 10 October, His Majesty Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah and Prime Minister Lawrence Wong attended a joint parade at the Muara Naval Base. This marked fifty years of defence relations, featuring 256 personnel and assets from both countries’ armed forces. The anniversary commemorates a peacetime partnership forged through cooperation and resilience, and reinforced by a shared commitment to regional stability amid successive shifts in Southeast Asia’s strategic landscape.
The Royal Brunei Armed Forces (RBAF) and the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) began their formal defence relations in 1976, eight years before Brunei would resume full independence. For Brunei and Singapore, military links were always an important precursor to the diplomatic relations of the two countries. Singapore’s first Chief of Defence Force, Winston Choo, trained at the Federation Military College in Port Dickson alongside the officers who would become the RBAF’s first commander and Brunei’s first Deputy Minister of Defence.
The relationship of the two countries is sustained through its material foundations and subsequent durability. Temburong provides training space that Singapore requires, while both armed forces continue to face constraints, highlighted about a decade ago from today, when Singapore’s then Defence Minister, Ng Eng Hen, justified a new defence technology memorandum by pointing to manpower limits for both armed forces. For two of ASEAN’s smallest states, geography and demography are not problems that can be solved once and forgotten.
This year, two critical infrastructure milestones were launched: the renewal of the Sungai Buaya Bridge at Binturan, Penanjong Garrison by the respective land forces, and the inauguration of a new Underwater Demolition Range at Pantai Binturan to support the Royal Brunei Navy’s naval diving capabilities. Both air forces also launched Exercise Vanguard as a new bilateral exercise framework, adding helicopter and drone training. Together, these initiatives reflect a relationship that has expanded beyond individual services into a broader framework of interoperability. The maritime dimension is particularly significant, as naval diving capabilities that support the clearance of submerged obstacles and unexploded ordnance ensure the continued use of critical waterways. For Singapore and Brunei, maritime access is an economic necessity for both. Singapore’s fundamental dependence on open sea lanes to connect a small domestic market to the global economy mirrors Brunei’s need for reliable export of energy resources and maintenance of links beyond its narrow coastline.
Maritime access is only one expression of a broader reality. As small and highly open economies, Singapore and Brunei are both exposed to disruptions affecting energy and food security. Part of Prime Minister Wong’s visit to Brunei included the delivery of four Singapore-developed Light Fire Attack Vehicles to the Brunei Fire and Rescue Department, tailored to Brunei’s requirements. In July, both governments also undertook to explore cooperation on energy and supply-chain resilience.
As the Currency Interchangeability Agreement turns sixty in 2027, Brunei and Singapore’s defence relationship stands among some of the most developed in Southeast Asia, resting on trust built through five decades of training, exchanges and high-level engagement.
Wira holds an MSc in Strategic Studies from the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), with specialised certificates in Terrorism Studies and U.S. Foreign Policy. He works as a freelance writer specialising in history, security and international relations theory, with experience in academia, investigative journalism, and voluntary uniformed service. He currently provides research analysis and consultation on Southeast Asian geopolitics for the Security Observer.
Indonesia 🇮🇩
It Really Is That Bad
by Rayhan Prabu Kusumo, in Jakarta
For the past year, nearly every one of Maritime Crescent’s briefs about Indonesia has carried bad news. Some weeks it was the stock market falling again, or the rupiah sliding to another low. Other weeks it was a natural disaster, and then the long, slow wait for a recovery that never seemed to arrive. In between came the steady decay of public life. More officials named in corruption cases, more of politicians fighting each other, sometimes using the law enforcement as their proxies. There have now been a great many bad weeks. This month, as Prabowo Subianto marks two years in office, several of them arrived at once.
On October 15, MSCI proposed stripping Indonesia of its Emerging Market status; a day later, the Jakarta Composite fell to 11 per cent. The announcement landed on an economy that was already weak. Even before it, the Jakarta Composite had lost about 30 per cent this year, and for much of 2026 it has been the worst-performing major stock index in the world. The rupiah has repeatedly touched 18,000 to the dollar and has touched it once again. Tens of thousands people lost their jobs this year, and the president’s own labour adviser says the real number is far higher. About one in six Indonesians aged 15 to 24 who want work cannot find any, even as the headline unemployment rate sits at its lowest in three decades.
This column has written about the fires before, and the main news is that they are still burning. Smoke from Kalimantan and Sumatra has hung over Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore for weeks. Over Central Kalimantan, the air pollution index passed 4,000, more than thirteen times the hazardous level. The fuel shortage, meanwhile, has moved from the edges of the country towards its centre. It began in places far from the capital’s attention, then reached Bali, the country’s showcase to the world and the front door for much of its foreign tourism. This week it reached East Java, out of the periphery and onto the same island as the capital.
The power grid has not fared much better. On October 12, Batam and Bintan lost electricity for more than 15 hours. The state utility’s best explanation so far is that an animal may have gotten into a substation. The region has spent years selling itself as the obvious overflow site for the data centres and electronics plants that Singapore has no room for. Investors weighing that pitch now have a blackout to set against it.
The government has not produced a concrete plan for any of it. The president’s response to most problems has been to create new posts and appoint his associates to fill it. Then the problems stay where they were, if not become worse. For most of the year, Indonesians asked whether things were really that bad. Most have stopped asking. The only people who still seem unsure are the ones in charge.
Rayhan has a background in government affairs and public policy, with experience across government institutions and advisory firms. His work focuses on the intersection of geopolitics, policy, and risk, with expertise in advocacy, regulatory analysis, and stakeholder engagement. He holds a degree in Government from Universitas Padjadjaran, and has completed an exchange at Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Spain, focusing on global politics and sustainability.
Malaysia 🇲🇾
Hosting the AI Race
by Muhammad Aiman Bin Roszaimi, in Cyberjaya
Every haze crisis in Southeast Asia produces a familiar diplomatic ritual. Neighboring countries express concern, offer assistance, and call for regional cooperation. Yet in 2026, the same question persists. After more than two decades of regional cooperation, why does ASEAN still struggle to respond effectively to a crisis that crosses its borders?
Malaysia has not been inactive. Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim contacted Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto on October 8, while Kuala Lumpur offered firefighting aircraft, helicopters and personnel. Malaysia has also proposed a stronger ASEAN mechanism for addressing the crisis. However, Indonesia subsequently put offers of foreign assistance on hold, citing its capacity to manage the fires domestically. Foreign Minister Mohamad Hasan also ruled out legal action or a formal diplomatic note for now, preferring dialogue and regional cooperation.
Meanwhile, Indonesia has deployed substantial resources, yet Reuters reported that its cumulative burned area reached approximately 1.92 million hectares by the end of September. Emergency assistance alone cannot address the scale or underlying causes of the disaster. It shows that operational challenges are real.
The more fundamental obstacle is sovereignty. Indonesia controls access to its territory and determines how foreign assistance is deployed. This is a legitimate principle of international relations, but it exposes the limitations of ASEAN’s approach to shared environmental threats.
The ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution, signed in 2002, established a framework for prevention, monitoring and emergency cooperation. However, it does not grant neighboring countries an automatic right to intervene or provide ASEAN with a mechanism to compel a government to accept assistance. Non-interference helps preserve regional relationships, but it can also leave collective action dependent on national consent precisely when urgent cooperation is needed.
Therefore, Malaysia must examine its own approach. Avoiding confrontation may protect bilateral relations, but diplomacy should be measured by results, not merely by the absence of tension. If repeated engagement fails to improve access, prevention or accountability, Kuala Lumpur needs to consider what additional options are available. These may include stronger domestic measures against Malaysian-linked companies credibly implicated in overseas burning, as well as improved regional fire monitoring and information sharing.
The answer is not necessarily to threaten Indonesia with litigation or abandon ASEAN. Legal action faces evidentiary and jurisdictional obstacles, while confrontation could complicate cooperation. Instead, Malaysia should press for clearer procedures for accepting assistance, transparent reporting on fires and land concessions, joint investigations and measurable commitments to prevention.
ASEAN has spent decades building a language of regional solidarity, but the haze exposes the distance between that language and the ability to deliver collective action.
For Malaysia, the challenge is not simply to offer help. It is to ensure that diplomacy produces tangible results. When goodwill cannot clear the air, regional cooperation must become more than a promise.
Aiman is a PhD candidate in Security and Strategic Analysis at the National University of Malaysia. His research focuses on Malaysia’s space policy, ASEAN regional security, and the strategic implications of emerging technologies. His work explores how Malaysia’s defense policy and strategic culture shape its approach to outer space.
Editorial Deadline 17/10/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)
