Choosing Sides
Issue 58 — Key Developments Across Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand
Editor’s Note
by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk
This week across the Mekong Belt, governments and institutions found themselves having to decide — explicitly or implicitly — who belongs in the room, who counts as a partner, and who gets left to deal with the consequences of the side they've chosen. In Myanmar, ASEAN’s special envoy met junta-linked negotiators and ethnic armed groups in Thailand, but left the National Unity Government out of the main talks, undercutting the bloc’s claim to an “inclusive” political dialogue. In Cambodia, Taiwan cut the country from its Guanhong visa facilitation program, citing Phnom Penh’s continued backing of the one-China policy and its silence on Beijing’s reunification rhetoric. Meanwhile, in Thailand, Japan is stepping up cooperation on the arsenic-contaminated Kok River, a crisis linked to Chinese-run mining in Myanmar, filling a gap left by the Chinese Embassy’s largely unanswered calls for accountability. And in Laos, a quieter kind of alignment is underway: the government is expanding its digital tax framework to catch tech giants like Microsoft and Netflix, joining a growing bloc of ASEAN states choosing to bring the digital economy inside the reach of the state.
Myanmar 🇲🇲
An Empty Chair at ASEAN’s “Inclusive” Myanmar Dialogue
by Moe Thiri Myat
ASEAN says it wants an inclusive political dialogue on Myanmar. Yet when its special envoy began meeting the country’s different political and armed actors this week, one of the most important seats was left empty.
On 13 July, ASEAN Special Envoy and Philippine Foreign Secretary Ma. Theresa Lazaro travelled to Thailand with Thai Foreign Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow. Together, they met representatives of several ethnic armed organisations and the military-established National Solidarity and Peacemaking Negotiation Committee. The discussions were presented as an attempt to explore an “inclusive national political dialogue” and revive ASEAN’s stalled response to the Myanmar crisis.
The outreach appeared broad. The military-backed authorities were engaged. Ethnic armed organisations were consulted. ASEAN foreign ministers had also held their first face-to-face meeting since the 2021 coup with Myanmar’s military-backed foreign minister.
But the National Unity Government (NUG) was not invited to the main in-person discussions. That absence immediately exposed the contradiction at the centre of ASEAN’s initiative. The NUG is not a marginal stakeholder waiting to be added later. It remains one of the principal political forces opposing military rule and is connected to resistance structures operating across the country. NUG’s Foreign Minister Zin Mar Aung therefore questioned whether the meetings were intended to advance ASEAN’s Five-Point Consensus or support the military-backed government’s separate 100-day peace plan.
The envoy later held a brief online discussion with NUG representatives. According to an NUG official, however, no significant issue was raised. The call allowed ASEAN to say that it had contacted the NUG, but it did not provide the same access given to actors invited into the room.That difference is more than diplomatic protocol. The first participants can frame the problem, influence the agenda and shape what ASEAN later presents as possible dialogue. Those consulted afterwards are left responding to a process they did not help design.
Ethnic opposition groups have also warned that the meetings should not be treated as the beginning of formal negotiations. They argue that dialogue cannot move forward while civilians remain under attack, political prisoners remain detained and humanitarian access remains restricted.
The danger, then, is not simply that the NUG missed one meeting. It is that ASEAN may be constructing an apparently inclusive process around unequal levels of political access. Such engagement could strengthen the legitimacy of military-backed institutions without producing meaningful concessions.
Ultimately, ASEAN’s credibility will not be measured by how many actors appear on its consultation list. It will depend on who is invited early enough to shape the process, whose demands become part of the agenda and whether “inclusive dialogue” means genuine political participation or merely contacting excluded actors after the important conversations have already begun.
Moe Thiri Myat is a senior at Parami University. Majoring in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics (PPE). Interested in analyzing emerging sociopolitical situations and developments, through her work as a Myanmar correspondent at The ASEAN Frontier she aims to explore how sociopolitical developments across Southeast Asia shape and are shaped by the situation in Myanmar.
Cambodia 🇰🇭
Taiwan Drops Cambodia From Visa Facilitation Program Amid Rising Political Friction
by Chandara Samban, in Kandal
Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced on July 17, 2026 that it is removing Cambodia from its Guanhong visa facilitation program, effective mid-July. The program had allowed Cambodian travelers to enter Taiwan without going through the standard visa application process since 2018.
Taiwan said the decision reflects Cambodia’s failure to reciprocate its goodwill, pointing specifically to Phnom Penh’s continued support for the one-China policy, which recognizes Taiwan as part of China. Taipei argues that this stance undermines its sovereignty and autonomy. Concerns over Cambodia’s ties to online scam networks also factored into the decision. While cutting Cambodia from the program, Taiwan expanded visa facilitation for other countries in the region, including Thailand and India.
Cambodia has not issued an official government response. However, Chann Ratana, spokesperson for Cambodia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, told TAF on July 18 that Cambodia respects the one-China policy and considers Taiwan part of China. “Cambodia does not need to sit down and talk with Taiwan,” he said. “Whatever decision Taiwan makes is Taiwan’s own business.”
Tensions between Taipei and Phnom Penh have simmered for years over Cambodia’s stance on Taiwan’s status. In 2024, Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent a strongly worded letter to Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Manet after he expressed support for China’s reunification efforts during a meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi.
Despite the political rift, economic ties between the two remain significant. Bilateral trade reached more than USD 739 million in 2025, an increase of nearly 3% from 2024. Taiwan says it has invested USD 1.255 billion in Cambodia between 1993 and 2025, concentrated in textiles and garments, wood processing, and land development.
Geopolitical analyst Seng Vanly called the move a notable shift in Taipei’s foreign policy and security posture. He said it will complicate travel for Cambodian citizens, including businesspeople, students, investors, and workers, by making the visa process more costly and time-consuming.
“The relationship between Cambodia and Taiwan is becoming increasingly tense and is experiencing growing political friction,” Seng Vanly said. “This rift stems from their different geopolitical positions, with Cambodia maintaining a firm stance on the one-China policy.”
He added that while Cambodia and Taiwan lack formal diplomatic relations, Taiwan remains an important economic partner through its investments in the garment, footwear, and textile sectors since the 1990s. Still, he argued Cambodia should avoid direct negotiations with Taipei to prevent friction with Beijing, suggesting business associations or private-sector channels as an alternative for informal discussions.
Kin Phea, director of the Institute of International Relations at the Royal Academy of Cambodia, said the move is unlikely to affect formal Cambodia-Taiwan relations, since the two sides have never had diplomatic ties. He said the impact will fall mainly on Cambodian citizens traveling to Taiwan for tourism, medical treatment, or business, given that relations have traditionally been people-to-people rather than state-to-state. He encouraged Cambodians planning to travel to Taiwan to comply with the standard visa requirements going forward.
Chandara is a freelance journalist with a focus on foreign affairs, security issues, and ASEAN affairs. He also serves as a Junior Counterterrorism Intelligence Analyst.
Thailand 🇹🇭
Japan Takes Initiative to Resolve Toxic Contamination in Kok River
by Natamon Aumphin, in Bangkok
Earlier this month, the Embassy of Japan, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), and representatives from the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) in Thailand met with the Pollution Control Department of Thailand to discuss conserving and monitoring water quality in Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai provinces, as well as building a network to protect the Mekong River, which is the heart of the Northern people. The collaboration, initiated by Japan, comes with a short-term and long-term plan to resolve Mekong contamination.
Although Japan is not directly affected by the contamination in the Mekong River, the nation is stepping in to assist Thailand and neighboring countries, which reflects its willingness to step up to resolve regional issues. The initiatives include technical knowledge exchange and capacity building for local communities and governmental entities to monitor the arsenic levels in the river, installing systems to reduce arsenic to ensure water supply safety, and building Mekong River experts through the Third Country Training Program (TCTP). The tangible efforts were seen earlier this week as the Japanese agencies and the Pollution Control Department conducted a joint site visit to strengthen cooperation.
The collaboration with the Japanese agencies was the latest effort to resolve the contamination issue in the Kok River, where toxins such as arsenic were found last year. The toxins found in the Kok River were suspected to originate from rare earth mining activities in Shan State, Myanmar, linked to Chinese companies, according to an investigation by ThaiPBS. Although there has been ongoing advocacy from civil society to demand accountability and tangible cooperation from the Chinese Embassy in Chiang Mai, no proper response has been observed yet. In fact, the situation between civil society and the Chinese Embassy has worsened due to passive response from the embassy in Chiang Mai.
Moreover, despite peaceful demonstrations to raise awareness and call for tighter regulations for Chinese mining companies in Myanmar, the protesters were faced with police authorities preventing them from entering the Chinese Embassy’s proximity. Two activists were injured, with one being hospitalized. From the public perspective, this action contradicts the Chinese Embassy’s post on its Facebook page stating that consultation and collaboration are welcomed. Therefore, to the public, Japan’s efforts were widely welcomed, reflected in positive sentiments on social media compared to those regarding the Chinese Embassy.
This is not the first attempt at being involved in the Mekong River. Japan has shown consistent commitment to resolving toxic contamination in the Mekong river, in collaboration with Myanmar, Laos, and Thailand. The willingness of Japan in this matter can be seen from two folds. Firstly, Japan experienced mercury toxins in water supplies in the 1950s, resulting in Minamata disease, a dire threat to the livelihood of local residents and aquatic animals in the area. This prompted Japan to build expertise in toxin contamination management. Hence, as Thailand is facing a similar issue, Japan’s willingness to exchange technical knowledge is seen as generous and welcome from the Thai people’s perspective.
Second, on a regional level, this collaboration reflects Japan’s commitment to strengthening its relations with the Mekong River nations. Through mutual benefits, Japan could offer a solution to a complex issue in the region involving many actors, which serves as a way to maintain Japan’s presence in the region after its economic decline. This reflects that Japan is still an active player in Southeast Asia, although in a different role compared to that of the 1950s. As regional competition is on the rise, Japan could be the third player to offer alternatives to Southeast Asian countries when it comes to US-China regional competition.
Natamon has served as a rapporteur at the Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS Thailand). She has also worked as a research assistant on diplomatic issues in Southeast Asia. Her work focuses on how domestic politics shape foreign policy in the region. She holds a degree in international relations and has experience in policy analysis, event reporting, and regional research.
Lao PDR 🇱🇦
Laos Expands Digital Tax Collection as Online Economy Grows
by Phonethida Sitthixay, in Vientiane
As more economic activity moves online, governments are increasingly looking for ways to tax digital services provided across borders. Laos is beginning to see results from its own efforts.
Since registering international digital service providers under its digital taxation framework in late 2024, Laos has collected approximately USD 12 million in tax revenue, according to information presented during the First Extraordinary Session of the 10th National Assembly. The amount was generated through the registration of major technology companies, including Microsoft, Facebook, YouTube, and Netflix.
The collection is part of a broader tax modernization drive led by the Ministry of Finance. At the center of these reforms is the Tax Revenue Information System (TaxRIS), which now covers more than 195,000 businesses. According to the ministry, collections processed through the system have increased by 251% compared with the period before its introduction, representing an average annual increase of more than 20 percent. TaxRIS currently operates in Vientiane Capital and is expected to be expanded nationwide.
In addition, digital tools have also transformed the way the government collects revenue. Today, 95 percent of state revenue is collected through banks and electronic payment channels, while cash collections account for just 5 percent of total revenue.
The rise of digital taxation comes as governments worldwide seek to ensure that online platforms, streaming services, digital advertisers, and other technology firms contribute to public finances in the markets where they generate income.
Laos joins a growing number of ASEAN countries that have introduced taxes on digital and cross-border online services. Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Vietnam, and the Philippines have all adopted various approaches, ranging from VAT and GST mechanisms to broader tax frameworks for foreign digital businesses.
For Laos, the USD 12 million collected is relatively modest, but it highlights a wider effort to modernize tax administration and bring more of the digital economy into the formal tax system. As the government continues expanding digital revenue platforms nationwide, the focus will be on improving compliance, broadening the tax base, and keeping pace with a rapidly changing economy.
Phonethida Sitthixay holds a Bachelor of Arts in International Relations from the National University of Laos. She is currently a Senior Project Coordinator at AIF Group, where she works on government-led initiatives to modernize financial integration across public sector systems in Laos. She has experience in sustainable development policy, diplomacy, and economic reporting, having worked with the Global Green Growth Institute and The Laotian Times. Her interests focus on Laos’s diplomacy, regional integration, and its evolving role beyond ASEAN.
Editorial Deadline 18/07/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)
