Complacent Democracy

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by Muhammad Rayhansyah Jasin, TAF Correspondent for Indonesia

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Professor Muhtadi, Dr. Warburton, and Dr. Gammon (2025), in their article about Indonesian youth democratic behaviour, opine that the contemporary generation is unaware of the threats to foundations of democracy: “...while Indonesia’s post-reformasi generation share democratic values, they appear unalert to present and potential threats to that democracy.”

As a part of that post-reformasi generation, I am disturbed by the sobering realization that a significant portion of young people in Indonesia do not feel affected by politics, and thus pay no attention to the ongoing democratic struggle. However, this situation does not happen in a vacuum as democratic and civic education has been largely ignored in the national education system. Muhtadi et al (2025) described that Indonesia’s youth political preferences display a form of complacent democracy, where satisfaction of the Gen Z cohort towards the state of democracy is significantly higher and grows faster than other generations. Indonesian Gen Z is defined as those who were born after the 1998 Reformasi period, and grew up under the political climate of democratic elections. This positive perception is in stark contrast with the worsening quality of Indonesia’s democracy, measured by the Freedom House (2024), the BTI Transformation Index (2025), and the Economist Intelligence Unit (2024). Degradation of the democratic principles also coincided with the decline in the Corruption Perception Index, from 40 in 2019 to 34 in 2023 (Transparency International, 2025). Both phenomena happened during the second five-year term of former President Joko Widodo, with numerous literature labeling this period as the moment in history where Indonesia’s democracy backslid (Petlach & Říčanová, 2025; Fossati, 2024; Mietzner, 2024).

Muhtadi and his peers presented the paradox of the Indonesian post-reformasi generation being more lenient and tolerative to democratic struggle unlike contemporary literature describing the historical roles of Pemuda, the Indonesian phrase for youth aged 15 - 30, in Indonesia’s national resistance. Pemuda has been understood as a core element in both the Indonesian independence movement and reform waves in the late 1960s. This is in response to President Soekarno’s failing regime due to the 1965 Coup resulting in hyperinflation periods, and in the 1998-1999 Reformasi movement that brought President Soeharto’s 32-year dictatorship to an end. Such strong civil responsibility displayed by Pemuda also corresponds to the ‘Life-Cycle’ theory which contends that younger people exhibit more progressive values and risk-taking actions, as responsible duties are still limited to individuals, compared to older generations that are more risk-averse and prefer maintaining status quo (Dalton, 1977). On the contrary, the Cohort theory argues that inter-generational value and norm changes happen as a reflection of specific historical, cultural, economic, and social experience in different periods by different changes (Inglehart, 2000).

Although all generational cohorts: Interwars (born between 1918 - 1943), Baby Boomers (1944 - 1964), Generation X (1965 - 1980), Millennials (1981 - 1996), and Gen Z (post-reformasi generation) showed a parallel increase of democratic satisfaction with age in accordance with the ‘Life-Cycle’ theory. Muhtadi and his team found that Gen Z’s democratic satisfaction, in their 20s, was the highest compared to other cohorts, giving credit to the ‘Cohort’ theory. Gen Z’s democratic satisfaction steadily grew from 66% in the beginning of Jokowi’s first-term in 2014, to 73% by 2022, the highest among all generations. This democratic leniency by Indonesia’s post-reformasi generation also correlates significantly with the fact that 71% of Gen Z voted for Prabowo’s candidacy and thus became his biggest supporters (Muhtadi & Muslim, 2024).

When asked about their reasons to vote for Prabowo, surprisingly Gen Z respondents had a positive image of him independent of their satisfaction towards Jokowi. Particularly, Gen Z who ‘strongly agree’ to the idea of a strong leader that is willing to bypass the parliament in getting things done are 80% more likely to vote for Prabowo, who is generally seen as a tough leader himself. At the same time, among Gen Z who confirms Prabowo’s gemoy image, the campaign branding strategy to paint Prabowo as a ‘relatable and accessible’ cuddly-grandpa, is very likely to vote for him with an almost 1-to-1 positive correlation. Ironically, this post-reformasi generation is also more likely to be skeptical of Prabowo’s involvement in the mass kidnapping of activists in the lead up to the 1997-1998 Reformasi Movement.

Unsurprisingly, Prabowo’s ascendency to Indonesia’s position of power is eerily similar to what also happened with President Ferdinand Marcos, Jr.’s (colloquially known as ‘Bong-Bong’) victory in the 2022 Philippines General Election. Just like Indonesia’s post-reformasi generation never having lived under Prabowo’s ex father in-law’s dictatorship, Filipino Gen Z never got to live through the atrocities committed by Bong-Bong’s father and the former President Ferdinand Marcos, during his martial rule. Yet, the findings of Muhtadi et al. (2025) and Dulay et al. (2023) present a different picture- that young people in both countries have grown fond of Prabowo and Marcos Jr. due to their personal affinities and social media campaigns. Furthermore, Dulay et al (2023) also found that voters of Bong-Bong are more likely to have a positive image of Marcos Sr’s. martial rule- some even called it the Philippines’ golden period. Respondents who perceived such were measured to be five times more likely to support Bong-Bong while also approved of his predecessor’s (former President Rodrigo Duterte) time in the office despite democratic backsliding being persistent during this period (Kasuya et al, 2022).

Southeast Asia has seen multiple arising and downfall of both benevolent dictators, such as Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore, Hassanal Bolkiah in Brunei, and Mahathir Mohammad in Malaysia, and authoritarian rulers, like Suharto in Indonesia, Marcos Sr. in the Philippines, and Pol Pot in Cambodia. Such affinities to dictator rulers can be correlated with the increase in birth rate in those countries post World-War as observed by Hannes Weber (2012) where he found significant negative connections between high proportion of young men to democratic instability and emergence of dictatorship. However what differentiates these leaders of the past with contemporary leaders is that, currently in many of these countries they are voted in by their public through free and fair democratic processes. Yet, without significant oversight from civil societies, especially through critical scrutiny by the youth, regular elections will become much less effective and transformed into a periodical ritual with no meaningful change of power in the governments. The fact that complacent democracy characteristics are observed in both Indonesia and the Philippines, two of the biggest democracies in Asia, means ASEAN might regress to a period of self-elected strongmen.

Democratic backsliding not only threatens the integrity of law and protection against minorities, it would also make countries more prone to poor governance conduct due to lack of meritocratic recruitment which leads to damaging economic downturns for all countries. Most of the strongmen in the past mentioned here were removed from power during periods of economic crisis and mega-corruption scandals.

Nevertheless, when collective awareness grows and organized youth movements take place, Gen Z has proven to be a very important catalyst in ushering new reforms. The successful regime change that took place in Nepal and Bangladesh, spurred by public distrust against corrupt leaderships and failure to deliver an inclusive development agenda, were primarily led and initiated by Gen Z (Mohan, 2025; Kabir, 2025; Ellis-Petersen & Pokharel, 2025). Although marred by multiple tragedies and riots that led to destruction of many public buildings, Gen Z in both countries still managed to show what youth activism could bring about, given the right circumstances. Post-Reformasi generation in Indonesia might be less aware of the democratic erosion in the lead up to the 2024 General Elections. Yet, so many people were also caught off-guard with Jokowi’s 180-degree heel turn as an autocratic ruler and his illiberal legacy (Lamb & Teresia, 2024). Only time will tell whether the youth of the future could regain their critical perspective on Indonesia’s democracy to prevent further slides towards dictatorship and affinity for strongmen of the past.

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Edited by Nishiha Jasper David, Frontier Analysis Editor

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