Corridors and Barriers
Issue 42 — Key Developments Across Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand
Editor’s Note
by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk
This week’s issue of the Mekong Belt captures a region moving in two directions at once: barriers harden in some places, while new corridors begin to open in others.
In Myanmar, a revised passport act will likely strengthen the state’s grip on citizens abroad, turning mobility itself into a controlled corridor and putting yet another brick in the junta’s surveillance project. Thailand, meanwhile, keeps running into the same barrier: more than a month of rising oil prices linked to the Middle East conflict continues to squeeze an already stretched economy, narrowing fiscal space and forcing difficult trade-offs.
Yet elsewhere, new routes are being sketched. Laos is advancing plans for a railway to the Vietnamese coast — its first direct corridor to the sea — though questions remain about debt risks and whether communities along the route will truly benefit. Cambodia, meanwhile, is attempting to clear institutional bottlenecks by trimming overlapping government structures and expanding digital governance, a cautious effort to make the state move more efficiently.
Myanmar 🇲🇲
Junta’s Updated Passport Act Frustrates People Living Overseas
by Myat Moe Kywe
Myanmar’s junta has enacted a new passport law, abrogating a previous legislation which had been active for over a century. This new framework reveals the junta’s rush to run a total surveillance state, restricting freedom of movement and digitalizing its people’s identity and legal information. The legislation requires a mandatory submission of unique identification cards which include biometric data and all personal information, causing anxiety of many people working and living overseas who do not possess the documents required to renew their passports.
Signed by junta leader Min Aung Hlaing on March 17, 2026, the new Myanmar Passport Law (NDSC Law No. 19/2026) contains 8 chapters and 47 sections, officially terminating the Myanmar Passport Act of 1920. As the law aims to mandate all current passports paperwork to be updated as e-passports by the upcoming year, every new passport application or renewing passports will now compulsorily need to provide digital unique identification number (UID) that include biometric data such as fingerprints and facial recognition.
While upgrading traditional passport to new digital ones may seem in line with international procedure, the real reason behind could be more than simple digitalization. In fact, although the legislation frames its intentions as to safeguard national security and prevent the fraud and unauthorized use of passports, critics see this as junta’s strategic move to suppress and restrict any potential opposition movement.
The law also creates a 10-member Insurance Board for scrutinizing passport applications, chaired by the Deputy Minister of Home Affairs, a key ministry under military control. Article 6 grants the Board full authority to examine all passport-related activities to cancel existing passports and blacklist applicants if notified by “relevant ministries.” Article 29 also allows the Board to refuse to issue the passport if the applicant is considered “likely to threaten national security or the interests of the State,” something that legal experts consider as “vague” and giving officials the arbitrary right to abuse their power against any person.
This particularly frustrates people living overseas and activists, the main participants of Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), requiring them to re-enter the country if their passport expires in order to obtain the UID necessary for the renewal process, creating a tailored surveillance control. Moreover, the legislation also sparks fears among migrant workers in Thailand who hold “Passports for Job” (PJ), as their status is being stamped as “Passport for Thailand Only,” further restricting their freedom of movement.
In this context, the new e-passport system is likely to create difficulties for overseas workers needing to go back to renew passports, causing additional travel expenses. Legal experts argue that this tightening legal framework is unconstitutional under Article 335, which states that: “Every citizen shall have the right to settle and reside in any place within the Republic of the Union of Myanmar according to law.”
Since the 2021 coup, the junta has been cancelling, revoking and terminating the passports and citizenship status of high-profile opponents and parallel government figures including artists and activists. In this context, this updated system is likely to create a more enhanced mechanism for monitoring movements and traveling of citizens, especially young people who are willing to flee the country amid worsening political, safety concerns and socioeconomic challenges. Although the law outlines the legal procedure for appealing the decision for individuals who are denied a passport or have their passport cancelled, the ultimate power of the Board would likely reinforce corruption in an already fragile bureaucratic mechanism.
Ultimately, this new passport act serves as a digital roundup designed to cement the junta’s surveillance state, transforming a basic right to travel into a privilege controlled by a military seeking to trap its critics within a collapsing nation.
Myat is a senior undergraduate student majoring in Politics, Philosophy, and Economics. She has interned at The Asia Foundation in Washington, D.C., and she has also worked as a summer research assistant at the Centre for Policy and Innovation (CRPI), gaining experience in research and analysis. Her work focuses on civic engagement, gender, youth leadership, and community development.
Thailand 🇹🇭
Thailand’s Already-Stretched Economy Hit Hard by War
by Satid Sootipunya, in Bangkok
One month into the conflict between the United States and Iran, Thailand, like other oil-reliant nations, has been severely hit by energy supply shocks. Still, Thailand has been the most vulnerable nation among its neighbouring nations due to its 90% reliance on imported energy, especially from the Middle East through the Strait of Hormuz.
After burning billions of already-stretched public finances each week from the Oil Fuel Fund, the Thai government has stepped back its week-long oil subsidy. The administration has increased diesel prices by 6 baht per liter on 26 March after the Oil Fuel Fund could not sustainably subsidize diesel prices due to high deficits.
Diesel is considered the backbone of the Thai economy, ranging from transportation to agriculture and industry. Increasing diesel prices could inevitably drive goods prices across the board, which means higher inflation for Thailand.
SCB EIC, a research arm of Thailand’s SCB Bank, estimates that the annualized inflation for 2026 will reach 3.2%, while Gross Domestic Product (GDP) will shrink by 0.4% from the previous estimate to just 1.4% due to the ongoing conflicts in the Middle East.
Don Nakornthap, Assistant Governor for Monetary Policy at the Bank of Thailand (BOT), said in a statement released on March 25th that inflation will return to the target range of 1–3% in 2026 due to the developments in the Middle East. Previously, the BOT had estimated that inflation would return to the 1–3% range only in 2027 after Thailand decade-long experience of low inflation.
Besides oil prices, electricity prices will be severely affected by the developments in the Middle East. Approximately 60% of electricity in Thailand is produced from Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG), which is mainly imported from Qatar. Currently, LNG facilities in the country are adversely affected by disruptions during the war. Therefore, with the shutdown of the Strait of Hormuz, the shortage in LNG supply will drive up the cost of electricity in Thailand, especially in May–August bills.
Tourism, Thailand’s main economic engine, is also being hit hard by the ongoing conflict. Natreeya Taweewong, Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Tourism and Sports, said on March 25th that Thailand could lose up to three million tourists if the war continues for six consecutive months, which could drag the country’s revenue down by 150 billion baht (USD 4.6 billion). While the government has set a tourist target of 35 million in 2026, the developments in the Middle East could bring the numbers down to the level of 2023, when only 23 million tourists visited the Kingdom.
To mitigate the impact, some luxury hotels in Thailand have reduced prices by 50–70% to lure local tourists, a flashback to the situation during COVID-19, when Thailand saw no inbound tourists.
Thailand’s Minister of Energy Auttapol Rerkpiboon launched, on March 28th, six measures to mitigate the situation during a press briefing, including the suspension of exports, inspection of oil stock levels at depots and among traders, and supervision of refineries to increase diesel production, as well as relaxing stock-counting rules to increase reserve volumes, issuing ministerial regulations to disclose prices and stock levels at all refineries and storage facilities, and increasing the blending ratio of biofuels in refined oil.
When asked if the oil reserves are sufficient to support the country and its people during the Songkran Festival, a major public holiday in Thailand, Auttapol stated that the reserves can sustain the nation for 107 days.
To ensure the country has enough supply for people and industries, Sihasak Phuangketkeow, Minister of Foreign Affairs, said at the same press briefing that Thailand also plans to buy more oil from other nations, including Brazil, Azerbaijan, and Nigeria.
Satid is a multimedia economic journalist and news anchor who covers macroeconomic trends, Thailand’s fiscal policy, and key regional developments for Bangkok Biz. A Journalism graduate from Thammasat University, he has reported on major issues such as the US–China trade tensions, the Myanmar crisis, and global corporate stories, drawing on prior newsroom experience at The Momentum, the Bangkok Post, AFP, and Varasarn Press. His work blends economic analysis, foreign affairs, and digital storytelling, with a strong focus on making complex financial and political topics accessible to Thai audiences.
Lao PDR 🇱🇦
Laos Is Building a Railway to the Sea, but for Whom?
by Thipphavanh Virakhom, in Vientiane
Laos has never had a coastline. For a small, landlocked country in the heart of Southeast Asia, getting goods to the ocean has thus always meant going through someone else’s land — slower, costlier, and on someone else’s terms.
That could soon change. In March 2026, the Lao government asked its National Assembly to approve a USD 1.3 billion railway running 562 kilometres from Vientiane to Vung Ang Port in Vietnam, the country’s first direct path to the sea. Construction is planned to start in 2026, with trains running by 2030, built together by a Lao state company and Vietnam’s Deo Ca Group.
If connected to the existing Laos-China Railway, trade could flow all the way from southern China to the Vietnamese coast passing through Laos turning a small country into a regional crossroads. That is a real and exciting possibility.
But Laos is building this railway while already carrying heavy debt. The country is still rated by the IMF and World Bank as being in debt distress. Things are slowly getting better, inflation dropped from 26% in mid-2024 to around 4% by late 2025, and public debt fell to about 82% of GDP, but the IMF still warns that Laos remains fragile and risks are not over yet. Adding a billion-dollar project on top of that needs honest, open answers about who is paying, how, and what happens if things go wrong.
The bigger question is about people, not money. The Laos-China Railway, finished a few years ago, shows what can go wrong when communities are left out. Compensation proceedings for land taken during that project are still ongoing as of March 2026. At least 371 families still have not been fully paid, not because help was refused, but because the government’s offered price was far below what families say their land and homes were actually worth. Over 100 families refused to move at all, saying the new land given to them had no access to their farms.
Large infrastructure projects across the region have shown that the benefits do not always reach everyone equally, and that communities closest to the construction are not always the ones who gain the most. As Laos moves forward, development experience from across Southeast Asia suggests that early and open community engagement, fair and transparent land compensation processes, and clear channels for people to ask questions and raise concerns are not just good practice, they are what separates infrastructure that uplifts from infrastructure that simply passes through.
A railway to the sea could open real doors for Laos. But only if the people along the tracks, farmers, villagers, ethnic communities, are assuredly informed what is coming, genuinely consulted, and fairly treated. Infrastructure that leaves the most vulnerable behind is not development. It is just construction. The tracks are being planned. The most important decisions about who benefits may still be ahead.
Thipphavanh holds a bachelor’s degree in international affairs. She is a governance and development professional specialising in rule of law, access to justice, and gender equality in Lao PDR. Her work focuses on strengthening justice sector institutions, advancing people-centred governance, and promoting gender-responsive systems. With extensive experience in project coordination, monitoring and evaluation, stakeholder engagement, and strategic communications, she has collaborated closely with national institutions and international partners to support inclusive and sustainable development.
Cambodia 🇰🇭
Cambodia’s Administrative Reform Advances, but Structural Questions Remain
by Sokna Thea, in Phnom Penh
Cambodia is pressing ahead with public administration reform as the government seeks to improve efficiency, reduce duplication, and strengthen performance-based management under its Seventh Mandate. The latest official and reputable reporting shows that the reform is still framed around “strengthening rather than expanding,” with Prime Minister Hun Manet saying ministries should review their structures, roles, and responsibilities to avoid overlap.
The scale of Cambodia’s bureaucracy remains significant. The country had 232,034 civil servants as of January 2025, including 96,969 women. Of these, 54,585 worked at the national level, while 177,449 were employed at the subnational level. This large administrative base helps explain why the government continues to prioritize reform, particularly as it seeks to improve service delivery and administrative responsiveness.
Beyond structural adjustments, the government has also emphasised operational efficiency. In March 2025, the prime minister called for a review of organizational frameworks, improved deployment of officials, and simplification of procedures. He noted that Cambodia currently offers more than 3,000 public services, many of which still require overlapping documentation, highlighting persistent inefficiencies faced by citizens and businesses.
More recent developments suggest a continued shift toward digital governance. In February 2026, the Ministry of Interior launched an online complaint portal, allowing citizens to report grievances and misconduct through a centralized system. Meanwhile, the Financial Management Information System (FMIS) continues to expand, reporting over 1.3 million transactions and more than 3,800 users as of early 2026. These tools aim to reduce paperwork and speed up service delivery.
Cambodia’s reform reflects a broader regional trend, but with a more cautious approach. Vietnam has moved more aggressively by merging ministries and cutting layers, though this carries risks of oversized structures. Malaysia focuses on gradual reform through mandate reviews and task forces to reduce overlap. Singapore’s public service is widely described as lean and highly digitalized, with government reforms focusing on shared platforms, process efficiency, and reducing duplication rather than large-scale structural cuts. Against this backdrop, Cambodia’s recent removal of 3 general departments and 26 directorates across 12 ministries is a measured step, focusing on internal streamlining rather than large-scale consolidation.
Critics, however, continue to argue that Cambodia’s problem is deeper than a few structural adjustments. They say overlapping mandates, slow decision-making, and weak accountability still affect the system, so simply reshuffling offices may not be enough. That concern remains relevant because the government’s own public messaging suggests it prefers incremental restructuring over drastic mergers or reducing the number of ministries.
The key question remains whether these reforms will change underlying incentives within the system. Without stronger accountability mechanisms and clearer distribution of authority, experts warn that inefficiencies may persist even after structural changes.
For now, Cambodia appears to be taking a gradual approach, combining administrative restructuring with digitalization and procedural reform. Whether this strategy will lead to a more effective and responsive state will depend on how far the government is willing to go in simplifying mandates, reducing duplication, and linking performance to measurable outcomes.
Sokna has a background in International Affairs and Business & Commercial Law. He’s currently a Senior Project Coordinator at the Ministry of Economy and Finance of Cambodia, working on the Financial Management Information System (FMIS) Project. His professional focus is driven by entrepreneurship, business development, and financial technology, with a particular interest in how private-sector innovation drives Cambodia’s economic growth.
Editorial Deadline 28/03/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)
