Corruption, Influence, and Connectivity in a Region on the Move
Issue 12 — Key Developments Across the Philippines, Singapore, and Vietnam
Editor’s Note
by Nabil Haskanbancha, in Bangkok
Across ASEAN, infrastructure and interdependence tell stories far deeper than budgets or blueprints. Vietnam has begun to redefine its place in the region, shifting from aid recipient to donor. By gifting parliaments and scholarships rather than competing dollar-for-dollar with Beijing, it has crafted a sophisticated, asymmetric model of statecraft–one that signals rising influence. Meanwhile, In Bulacan, flood control projects meant to safeguard lives have instead exposed the corrosive intersection of politics, corruption, and disaster management. Ghost projects, missing walls, and misallocated billions leave farmers and families vulnerable–reminding us that infrastructure is never neutral but laden with power. In Singapore and Malaysia, the story is one of movement: millions crossing borders for work, leisure, and culture. From Johor Bahru holidays to new transit links and economic zones, connectivity both embodies and strengthens bilateral ties.
Vietnam 🇻🇳
The Giver's Gambit
by Tri Vo, in Ho Chi Minh City
The recent Vietnamese campaign to send financial aid to Cuba has upended historical narratives of the country as more of an aid receiver than giver. This very development has also shed light on Vietnam’s very capacity to engage in an effective aid strategy within ASEAN itself.
By the late 20th century, Vietnam had emerged from five decades of conflict with an economy tattered by the endless demands of war. As a result, the country became dependent on foreign aid as an economic lifeline, first from the Soviet bloc from the 1950s to 1980s, and later from Western nations and international development institutions from the 1980s onwards. Today, however, this narrative is being increasingly reversed. Vietnam, now a dynamic economy with one of the world’s most impressive growth rates, has transitioned from being solely a beneficiary of global development programs to a benefactor in its own right, extending Official Development Assistance (ODA) to its neighbours. More than an economic milestone, this transformation reflects the use of a new foreign policy instrument to expand the country’s diplomatic influence, thereby signalling Vietnam's ascension as an important regional power.
Vietnam's ODA program, while small in scale compared to giants such as Japan, the EU, China, or the US, is strategically focused on neighbouring countries like Laos and Cambodia. This assistance is carefully crafted to expand diplomatic influence and foster a more favourable regional political and economic environment. At the same time, it reflects Vietnam’s concerns about being outflanked by an increasingly assertive China should it falter in its engagement with both neighbours.
The nature of Vietnam’s aid in Laos and Cambodia has focused on tangible, high-impact, and sometimes highly symbolic projects. In Laos, the most prominent example is the new National Assembly building in Vientiane, valued at US$111 million. This project is a powerful symbol of bilateral political ties, as it places Vietnam at the very heart of Laos’s political life. In Cambodia, Vietnam has provided thousands of annual scholarships to create a powerful network of professionals and future decision-makers well-disposed to Vietnam’s positions and interests.
Vietnam's aid strategy can be best described as “asymmetric.” Rather than trying to match with China’s economic power dollar-for-dollar, Vietnam utilises its inherent advantages over its neighbours: geographic proximity and historical, political, as well as personal ties with the current governments, all forged through the crucible of conflicts in the 1960s and 1970s. Instead of outbidding China for a multi-billion-dollar railway project, something beyond its financial capacity, Vietnam chooses to gift a parliament building, thereby investing in political and symbolic capital.
This pragmatic approach enables Vietnam to exert influence at a fraction of the cost of direct competition. Overall, it represents a sophisticated and potent aid model suited to middle-power statecraft that could be emulated by other rising economies of ASEAN or even beyond.
Tri has experience in management consulting and strategy, having worked with institutions such as the UNDP, The Asia Group, and ARC Group. He has provided strategic, legal, and operational insights to clients in sectors including manufacturing, energy, and technology. He holds both academic and professional experience related to Southeast and East Asia, with a focus on regional development and policy.
The Philippines 🇵🇭
Who Benefits and Who Suffers in Bulacan’s Flood Control Projects?
by Arianne De Guzman, in Bulacan
Bulacan has recently drawn scrutiny over the Department of Public Works and Highways’ (DPWH) flood control program, due to allegations of ‘ghost projects’, despite receiving the largest budget in Central Luzon.
On August 20, 2025, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. conducted a surprise inspection of a river wall project in Barangay Piel, Baliuag, Bulacan. This project, amounting to ₱55 million, was discovered to be marked as “completed”, despite there being no indication that construction had even begun. Documents submitted by the DPWH also included receipts for the project. Reports further revealed that this is not the sole case of a ghost project found in Bulacan.
According to the Sumbong sa Pangulo [Report to the President] website launched by the Philippine Government, a flood mitigation structure in Barangay San Augustin, Hagonoy, Bulacan, worth ₱77 million, was scheduled for completion on July 3, 2023. However, the ABS-CBN News team that visited the location for verification found that no flood control measures have been constructed. The Barangay Chairperson of San Agustin and the Municipal Engineer of Hagonoy have also reported that they were unaware of the project's existence, noting that neither a DPWH official nor a contractor had informed them.
Flood control projects demonstrate that engineering is not merely about constructing concrete floodwalls, but rather a demonstration of power. Meanwhile, disasters are not exclusively natural; they are socially organized–decisions about who benefits and who suffers, and are engineered through contracts and corruption. Evidently, prominent contractors involved have been flagged, such as Wawao Builders Corporation and SYMS Construction. From 2022 to 2025, Wawao Builders was awarded flood control projects worth ₱4.2 billion, while SYMS received ₱931.2 million. Citing these anomalies and the President’s call for accountability, the Commission on Audit (COA) has issued an order to conduct an immediate audit for fraud in all flood control projects in Bulacan.
The stakes are high. In late July, successive southwest monsoons and tropical cyclones–including Crising, Dante and Emong–caused severe flooding that affected more than 19,000 residents. In Calumpit, three people died from drowning and electrocution, while agricultural losses were estimated at ₱56 million, with an additional ₱436,000 in livestock losses. As one of the country’s leading rice-producing provinces, Bulacan’s flooding has implications for national food supply and rural livelihoods. As scholars such as Ashly Carse and Joshua Lewis, who study the political ecology of infrastructure, have explained, projects like flood control are not just technical ventures, but also political ones, as they embed power relations. Such projects create path-dependent arrangements that shape social and economic priorities in favor of urban elites, which are not often aligned with the needs of marginalized communities.
Flood control projects extend beyond the Philippine borders, as they can potentially impact regional trade, food security, and migration. ASEAN member states are bound not only by their membership in a regional organization but also by shared waters and trade routes. If Bulacan continues to suffer from severe flooding, disruptions in rice supply chains, declines in labor productivity, and damaged roads, the entire domestic economy could be undermined, something which would have an effect on the the broader ASEAN Economy as well.
Moving forward, it is imperative for both the Philippines and ASEAN neighbors to initiate substantive reforms in disaster infrastructure planning, budgeting, and transparency mechanisms. Such reforms are essential not only to ensure accountability but also to assess their wider implications for regional resilience.
Arianne has worked in legal research at the Philippines Department of Justice and in policy research at De La Salle University’s Jesse M. Robredo Institute of Governance, supporting projects on systemic reform. She holds a degree in Political Science from Colegio de San Juan de Letran and is pursuing a master’s in Sociology at the University of the Philippines Diliman. She is also involved in youth development and grassroots advocacy through the Rotaract Club of Santa Maria.
Singapore 🇸🇬
Nothing Beats a JB Holiday: Singapore-Malaysia Relations
by Nurul Aini, in Singapore
The New Straits Times reports that an estimated 300,000 to 400,000 Malaysians are employed in Singapore. On TikTok, the #RunSGD hashtag has been making rounds, with Malaysian commuters posting their experience of bracing through the morning and evening rush at immigration checkpoints to and from Singapore. The same hashtag also suggests how some Malaysians seek to capitalise on the exchange rate that now stands at 1SGD=3.274RM. At the same time, Malaysia’s Tourism, Arts and Culture Minister Tiong King Sing reports that 10,288,256 tourists from Singapore visited Malaysia from January to June 2025, marking a 22.5% increase compared to the same period in 2024. This figure also accounts for repeat visits. The majority of these visitors travelled to Johor Bahru, drawn by shopping and leisure opportunities while also taking advantage of the favourable exchange rate. Apart from these, the strong SG-Malaysia bilateral ties can also be seen in recent festivals and diplomatic visits.
The Malaysia Fest 2025 was held at the Singapore Expo from 31 July to 3 August. With the tagline “We Bring Malaysia To You,” this festival promoted food, clothing and household essentials brands from the country. Tourism Malaysia also set up booths to publicise travel packages. More prominently, the presence of Malaysian celebrities at this festival suggests cultural familiarity between the two nations facilitated by the entertainment industry. Such festivals also allow lesser known brands to test the receptiveness of their products in the Singapore market.
Yet, according to David Ocón, an Assistant Professor at Singapore Management University’s School of Social Sciences, arts and cultural festivals within the ASEAN region are not only a means of expanding economic interests but also recall the fundamental concept of cultural cooperation that “can penetrate political barriers, diminish tensions, break down barriers, destroy stereotypes and build connections.” This festival, then, may also facilitate exposure to each other’s cultural nuances despite perceived language and racial similarities.
From July 30 to August 1, Johor’s Chief Minister Dato’ Onn Hafiz visited Singapore as the 82nd recipient of the Lee Kuan Yew Exchange Fellowship. This visit yielded promising discussions on issues such as tackling illegal delivery and passenger services and advancing the Johor-Singapore Special Economic Zone (JS-SEZ). Dato’ Onn floated the idea of a regulatory sandbox to enable safeguarded clinical trials within the JS-SEZ to improve public health, as well as the establishment of a Free Trade Zone in the area.
The JS-SEZ has already made a great start. In April 2025, Singapore established a Joint Project Office to facilitate the cross-border expansion of local businesses. Deputy Prime Minister Gan Kim Yong described the initiative as a strategic response to rising protectionist policies and tariffs in the US.
Furthermore, the Rapid Transit System (RTS) Link connecting Woodlands North in Singapore to Bukit Chagar in Malaysia is also expected to ease traffic congestion and provide smooth cross-border movement. Dato’ Onn has also proposed a second RTS link to strengthen connectivity. These efforts highlight the potential for deeper bilateral cooperation, with wider implications for ASEAN economic and cultural integration.
Aini is currently pursuing a master’s degree in English literature at Nanyang Technological University. She has experience working in youth groups, contributing to the planning and management of outreach activities.
Editorial Deadline 26/08/2025 11:59 PM (UTC +8)
