Crackdowns Can't Catch Them
Issue 55 — Key Developments Across Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand
Editor’s Note
by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk
This week, the Mekong Belt gave us a masterclass in the gap between looking like you’re solving a problem and actually solving it. In Myanmar, authorities staged arrests in Muse, paraded the numbers, and called it a crackdown — all while scam compounds keep flourishing just down the road. In Laos, the government joined a new Eurasian rail corridor stretching to Estonia — but the World Bank's verdict is blunt: tracks alone don't create a hub, only the policy reforms behind them do.
Bangkok, meanwhile, handed Chadchart Sittipunt a second term and a fresh mandate — but a landslide win doesn’t unclog a drain or rewrite which agency controls the buses. The hard part of governing a megacity of 18 million was never winning the election. And in Cambodia, Hun Sen showed up Beijing to remind everyone that “ironclad friendship” is doing a lot of heavy lifting these days, even as Chinese tourists quietly start booking elsewhere — scam headlines, it turns out, are bad for business.
Myanmar 🇲🇲
Myanmar’s Scam Economy Is Adapting
by Moe Thiri Myat
Myanmar’s scam economy is not disappearing under pressure. It is changing shape. During this week, new reports exposed three parts of the same regional crisis: thousands of trafficking victims still confined in militia-controlled compounds near Myawaddy, arrests connected to online fraud and gambling in Muse, and a smaller cross-border operation uncovered inside an ordinary apartment in Mae Sot, Thailand.
The most alarming evidence comes from the Myanmar–Thailand border. The Civil Society Network for Human Trafficking Victim Assistance estimates that more than 5,300 people remain trapped at four scam-centre locations, including around 1,600 Chinese nationals and citizens from across Southeast Asia, Africa, Russia and Brazil. This comes more than a year after Thailand led a multinational effort that removed around 5,000 people from scam hubs in the Myawaddy area. The continuing confinement of thousands suggests that the earlier operation disrupted only part of the industry.
At the same time, recent arrests indicate that scam-related activity is no longer limited to large, fortified compounds. In Muse, Myanmar authorities announced the arrest of 59 people allegedly involved in online gambling, including two Chinese nationals and 57 Myanmar nationals. Seven more Chinese nationals reportedly connected to telecommunications fraud were subsequently detained in the town. Authorities presented the arrests as evidence of a continuing national crackdown, but the repeated discoveries also show that criminal operations remain active in northern Shan State.
Reports that scam groups are also establishing themselves in Yangon, Mandalay, Naypyitaw and Mawlamyine deepen this concern. There is a movement from visible border enclaves towards smaller, dispersed operations embedded in urban areas. Such relocation makes detection harder and weakens an enforcement model focused mainly on demolishing compounds, deporting foreign nationals and arresting workers at individual sites.
Beyond Myanmar, the issue reflects a wider ASEAN challenge involving human trafficking, cybercrime, migration and illicit financial flows. The people reportedly trapped near Myawaddy include citizens from Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia and countries outside Southeast Asia. Thailand has become a major transit point for rescue, repatriation and investigation, while criminal networks reportedly involve Myanmar, Thai and Chinese nationals. No single country can address the problem through domestic arrests alone.
Ultimately, the recent raids are not evidence of stronger law enforcement, revealing how adaptable the scam economy has become. They may instead reveal how quickly it is learning to survive. Large compounds remain active near the border, while smaller operations appear in towns, cities and ordinary residential buildings. What looks like the dismantling of one criminal industry may therefore be its transformation into something more dispersed, less visible and much harder to trace. The critical question is whether ASEAN governments can move beyond closing individual buildings and arresting lower-level workers to identify organisers, financial networks, recruiters and protection structures.
Moe Thiri Myat is a senior at Parami University. Majoring in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics (PPE). Interested in analyzing emerging sociopolitical situations and developments, through her work as a Myanmar correspondent at The ASEAN Frontier she aims to explore how sociopolitical developments across Southeast Asia shape and are shaped by the situation in Myanmar.
Lao PDR 🇱🇦
Laos Joins Eurasian Rail Corridor Linking ASEAN to Europe
by Phonethida Sitthixay, in Vientiane
Laos’s international railway partnership is expanding beyond Asia to Europe after officially joining Corridor 2 of the Organisation for Co-operation between Railways (OSJD) during the Ministerial Conference held from 9 to 12 June.
The corridor connects Laos with regional and Eurasian railway networks through countries including Vietnam, China, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Estonia, creating new possibilities for the cross-border movement of goods and passengers, strengthening both trade flows and regional mobility between Southeast Asia and Europe.
Together with the Laos–China Railway and the planned Laos–Vietnam Railway, the initiative supports the country’s long-term ambition of transforming itself from a landlocked nation into a land-linked regional transport hub.
However, connectivity alone does not guarantee economic transformation. The more important question is whether railway-led connectivity can help Laos become a regional logistics and industrial hub rather than simply serving as a transit corridor.
According to the World Bank, while infrastructure such as cross-border railways can significantly boost trade flows and even increase national income, these gains depend heavily on complementary reforms. In the case of Laos, improved connectivity could raise aggregate income substantially and integrate the country into regional and global supply chains, but only if supported by policies that facilitate trade, improve the business environment, and strengthen logistics capacity.
Without such measures, there is a risk that Laos will remain a transit route rather than a value-creating hub. The key lesson is that becoming “land-linked” is not just about building infrastructure, but about ensuring that connectivity is matched with institutional readiness, efficient logistics systems, and the ability to attract investment into productive sectors.
Ultimately, the number of countries connected by rail may be less important than how effectively Laos converts connectivity into sustainable economic growth and long-term national development.
Phonethida Sitthixay holds a Bachelor of Arts in International Relations from the National University of Laos. She is currently a Senior Project Coordinator at AIF Group, where she works on government-led initiatives to modernize financial integration across public sector systems in Laos. She has experience in sustainable development policy, diplomacy, and economic reporting, having worked with the Global Green Growth Institute and The Laotian Times. Her interests focus on Laos’s diplomacy, regional integration, and its evolving role beyond ASEAN.
Thailand 🇹🇭
What Does The Future Hold For Bangkok?
by Natamon Aumphin, in Bangkok
On June 28, 2026, Bangkok held its gubernatorial election, and Chadchart Sittipunt, the incumbent governor, secured a second term in what unofficial counts describe as a landslide victory. The result was widely anticipated — pre-election polling had shown him commanding majority support across all of Bangkok’s districts — but the scale of his win still cements his position as one of Southeast Asia’s most closely watched city leaders heading into his second term.
The election drew outsized attention because it signals the direction of one of the region’s most significant metropolitan economies toward continued urban reform and transparency. As of 2026, Bangkok is home to over 18 million people, of whom roughly 5.3 million are registered voters — a base large enough that Bangkok’s governance choices carry weight well beyond the city’s own borders.
That weight connects directly to the global 2030 agenda. Bangkok’s reform commitments — tackling flooding, air pollution, waste management, and corruption — mirror the broader international push to make cities more climate-resilient, economically competitive, and accountably governed. Chadchart’s first term was defined by efforts to open up city data, digitize services, and respond visibly to crises like flooding and air pollution. His second term will be measured against the same international benchmark: whether a city government can convert popular mandate into measurable, structural change before 2030, the year by which many of these global urban targets are set.
This is where the real test begins. A second term gives Chadchart more political capital, but Bangkok’s challenges are not the kind that a single governor’s office can resolve through willpower alone.
Three issues stand at the core of what comes next. First, law: much of what Bangkok needs — reorganizing public transport authorities, expanding the city’s regulatory reach over flooding and pollution — sits outside the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration’s formal powers, requiring cooperation with national agencies that don’t always move at the same pace as City Hall. Second, day-to-day livability: traffic congestion, seasonal flooding, and PM2.5 smog are not abstract policy points but daily realities that shape how 18 million residents experience the city, and incremental fixes have so far outpaced complete solutions. Third, transparency: anti-corruption commitments and open data initiatives have been central to Chadchart’s brand, but sustaining that credibility over a second term — especially as expectations rise — will require more than continuity; it will require visible follow-through.
Bangkok’s election outcome was, in the end, never really in doubt. The harder question — and the one that will actually determine whether this election matters beyond Thailand — is whether a renewed mandate translates into the kind of structural reform the 2030 global agenda demands, or whether Bangkok remains a city whose ambitions consistently outpace its institutional capacity to deliver them.
Natamon has served as a rapporteur at the Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS Thailand). She has also worked as a research assistant on diplomatic issues in Southeast Asia. Her work focuses on how domestic politics shape foreign policy in the region. She holds a degree in international relations and has experience in policy analysis, event reporting, and regional research.
Cambodia 🇰🇭
Hun Sen’s Visit to China Confirms That China’s Policy Toward Cambodia Remains Unchanged
by Chandara Samban, in Kandal
Hun Sen, Senate President and acting head of state, is visiting China at the same time King Norodom Sihamoni is there on medical leave — meaning Cambodia’s two heads of state are both currently in the country’s long-standing partner. Hun Sen’s official visit underscores the enduring friendship between the two nations and reinforces Beijing’s security presence in Phnom Penh amid the ongoing border crisis with Thailand. Though no longer Prime Minister, Hun Sen remains a central figure in the China-Cambodia relationship.
Hun Sen’s visit ran from June 25 to 27, 2026, during which he met with top Chinese leaders, including President Xi Jinping, Premier Li Qiang, and National People’s Congress Chairman Zhao Leji. According to the Senate’s statement, the trip aims to deepen the “iron-clad friendship” between the two countries and expand comprehensive cooperation.
The Cambodian side considers the visit historic, coinciding as it does with the 75th anniversary of the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP), which Hun Sen leads. He welcomed the upgrade of the strategic dialogue framework from 2+2 to 3+3 — now covering defense, foreign affairs, and interior — and reaffirmed Cambodia’s continued support for the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and China’s four global initiatives.
For his part, Xi proposed strengthening mutual trust between the two peoples and advancing the implementation of agreed development projects, particularly through deeper security cooperation.
Cambodia and China continue to align Cambodia’s five-pronged strategy with the BRI, accelerating development of the industrial-technology corridor and the fish-and-rice corridor. The two sides are also expanding cooperation in trade, artificial intelligence, clean energy, and high-speed rail, while strengthening parliamentary diplomacy and advancing their free trade agreement. Both governments emphasized the Funan Techo Canal project as a key contribution to the BRI in Cambodia.
Wu Xingyi, head of the Cambodia Studies Section at Guangxi University’s China-ASEAN Research Institute, told ChinaFocus that the visit shows China’s Cambodia policy remains unchanged, with continued focus on connectivity projects — expressways, airports, and logistics infrastructure — that strengthen supply chains. He noted that security cooperation has expanded from cracking down on online fraud to a broader stability mechanism under the 3+3 dialogue, alongside deepening people-to-people ties through tourism, youth exchanges, and Cambodia’s visa-free policy for Chinese citizens.
He added that China is reframing its relationship with Cambodia from an “ironclad friendship” to an “all-weather community with a shared future” — a model it may extend to other Southeast Asian partners — shifting from development cooperation alone toward a dual focus on development and security.
Geopolitical analyst Seng Vanly noted that Cambodia remains financially reliant on China, which in turn views Cambodia as a key regional partner. He pointed to China’s growing emphasis on cracking down on scams affecting Chinese nationals, and to declining Chinese tourism numbers tied to economic conditions and scam-related safety concerns — a trend Hun Sen is expected to address directly with Beijing.
Chandara is a freelance journalist with a focus on foreign affairs, security issues, and ASEAN affairs. He also serves as a Junior Counterterrorism Intelligence Analyst.
Editorial Deadline 27/06/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)
