Editor’s Note
by Karen Ysabelle R. David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk
In early September, parts of the Pacific Corridor woke up to dark skies overhead: it was transboundary haze, long the bane of ASEAN environmental cooperation. This year, as it faced deteriorating air quality, it was again Singapore’s turn to grapple with the question: why is this particular regional problem so difficult to solve?
The haze has become a recurring issue. And as the climate emergency becomes ever more urgent, more and more extreme weather phenomena will keep crossing national borders. Almost a year since the article was first published, we take a look back at the typhoons that deluged parts of Vietnam in September and October 2025 — how much has really changed since then?
But for the Philippines, there may be clear skies ahead: in a historic milestone, the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao held its first-ever parliamentary elections. This is only just the latest step in the region’s decades-long peace process, but for now, the forecast is of cautious optimism.
Singapore 🇸🇬
Singapore Haze Returns: Why Does a Regional Problem Remain so Difficult to Solve?
by Jennifer Hui En Tan, in Singapore
Singapore has experienced a deterioration in air quality since early September, with haze affecting parts of the island. On 4 September, the 24-hour Pollutant Standards Index (PSI) reached 101 in the central region, entering the “Unhealthy” range for the first time since 8 October 2023. The National Environment Agency (NEA) has linked the current haze conditions to moderate to dense smoke plumes from fires in Southern and Central Sumatra and parts of Kalimantan. With prevailing winds blowing from the southeast and south, smoke has drifted toward Singapore and neighboring states.
The immediate source of the current haze is smoke from land and forest fires in Indonesia. During periods of dry weather, fires in parts of Sumatra and Kalimantan can produce significant amounts of smoke. The geography of the region means that this smoke does not necessarily remain within the area where the fire occurs. This makes haze a regional environmental issue, rather than one that can be managed entirely within the borders of a single country.
Singapore works with the ASEAN Specialized Meteorological Center, which monitors hotspots, smoke plumes, weather conditions, and regional haze, providing information that helps countries assess the development and movement of fires and smoke across Southeast Asia. The current episode illustrates the difficulty of addressing environmental problems when the causes and effects cross national boundaries.
ASEAN has established a regional legal and institutional framework for addressing transboundary haze. The ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution (AATHP)

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was signed in 2002 and provides cooperation on monitoring, prevention, preparedness, national and joint emergency response, and scientific research. ASEAN has also established procedures for countries to share information and coordinate emergency responses when fires become severe enough to cause transboundary haze. However, individual countries remain responsible for preventing and controlling their own territories. This means that while ASEAN provides mechanisms for monitoring and regional coordination, effective prevention and response still depend largely on national action.
For Singapore, this means that managing haze involves more than responding when air quality deteriorates. Regional monitoring, early warning, prevention, and cooperation between ASEAN member states remain important in reducing the likelihood and severity of future haze episodes.
Singapore’s latest haze episode highlights the progress and limitation of ASEAN regional response. While mechanisms provide a framework for monitoring and emergency coordination, preventing transboundary haze ultimately depends on action within individual countries. As weather conditions become increasingly challenging, sustained regional cooperation and stronger prevention efforts will remain essential to reducing the impact of haze on Singapore and its neighbors.
Jennifer is a final-year International Relations student at the Singapore Institute of Management, where she focuses on political engagement, diplomacy, and community governance. She is an active volunteer in her constituency, working closely with residents to understand local concerns, facilitate dialogue, and support community initiatives.

Vietnam 🇻🇳
The Climate Emergency in Vietnam
by Hang Nguyen, in Ho Chi Minh City
Note: This article was first published in Issue 19 of the Pacific Corridor newsletter on 17 October 2025.
Late September and early October saw Vietnam battered by a rapid succession of flash floods, landslides, vigorous rainstorms, and violent winds delivered by Typhoon Bualoi (Typhoon No. 10) and Typhoon Matmo (Typhoon No. 11). Extreme weather events hit the northern and central provinces annually; however, local residents and businesses still continue to be inundated with damages to their livelihoods and infrastructure. The lack of efficient climate change resilience further exacerbates civilian distress, signaling a call for urgency for the national government and regional institutions to ramp up natural disaster capacity-building and mitigation initiatives.
As of 11 October, preliminary statistics have reported catastrophic losses: 238 dead or missing, 367 injured, 258,000 private residences severely damaged, 500,000 hectares of agricultural rice fields destroyed, and automobile damages racking up to VND 76 million (US$3 million). Roads, schools, banks, health services, and other public infrastructure have suspended operations. The total economic loss is currently estimated to be tens of trillions VND (several billion US$), a burden to be placed on the Vietnamese government, taxpayers, and businesses.
Viewed from a more humanitarian perspective, the aftermath of flooding has devastated civilian normalcy in the afflicted regions. People have reported losing their entire life savings, properties, and important paperwork such as the “Pink Book” (Certificate of Land Use Rights) in the current calamities; livestock displaced; inability to contact family; no running water or electricity; and left to hopelessly wait for rescue forces. This is particularly the case in the agriculture-predominant regions of the Mekong Delta and of the central coasts, leaving the agricultural backbone of the nation critically incapacitated. Videos have surfaced on online platforms, portraying the cruelty of these historic typhoons and the despair of affected families.
In a swift response to the crisis, the government has mobilized military and security forces for emergency relief within hours after the incident. Notably, Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh issued Decision No. 2221/QD-TTg to allocate aid from the 2025 central budget contingency fund worth VND 140 billion (US$5.6 million) for recovery and rebuilding in four northern provinces. Agencies and individuals have also participated in disaster relief efforts by donating and volunteering. While these expeditious short-term responses are well-coordinated and demonstrate solidarity amongst the Vietnamese people, the reliance on reactive measures rather than sustainable preventive frameworks will persist to disrupt civilian life on a frequent basis.
Vietnam’s recent calamities reflect the broader pattern of climate vulnerability across Southeast Asia, exposing the need for more extensive regional disaster mitigation and response mechanisms. Given that neighboring countries such as the Philippines also recently contended with the tropical cyclone Matmo, this presents an incentive to conduct data sharing and cross-border collaboration. The similar extreme weather phenomena that occurred across Southeast Asia reveals the shared exposure and susceptibility to environmental degradation. Ultimately, as climate risks transcend national borders, the coordination of ASEAN’s approach would facilitate more efficient capacity-building and would be indispensable to safeguarding livelihoods across the region.
Hang is a young researcher with academic experience in Vietnam and the United States. She has previously worked in public relations at the U.S. Consulate General in Ho Chi Minh City and the YSEALI Academy. Her research focuses on ASEAN centrality in the evolving Asia-Pacific landscape, with particular attention to Vietnam’s approach to trade, regional cooperation, and political economy in the face of external power dynamics and global volatility.
The Philippines 🇵🇭
From Peace Agreement to Political Institution
by Glenn Vincent N. Boquilon, in Angeles City
On 14 September 2026, the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) held its first-ever regular parliamentary elections. Over 2.4 million registered voters took part, choosing the people who will sit in the region’s first elected parliament.
This vote matters for more than just picking new leaders. It marks the region’s move away from an appointed, transitional government and toward one that is chosen directly by the people. Since the BARMM was created, the Bangsamoro Transition Authority has run things on an interim basis. In this situation, the parliament will answer to voters instead of being appointed.
The election is also a milestone in Mindanao’s decades-long peace process. BARMM exists because of the 2014 peace deal between the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, which aims to end armed conflict and give the Bangsamoro people real self-governance. Voters in the region later approved the Bangsamoro Organic Law in a 2019 plebiscite, paving the way for the region as it exists today.
What makes this election unique is BARMM’s system of government. Unlike the rest of the country, which follows a presidential system, BARMM uses a parliamentary one. It is the only region in the country to do so. Its 80-member parliament is made up of party representatives, district representatives, and sectoral representatives. Parliament members will then choose the region’s chief minister from among themselves.
This setup encourages political parties and coalitions to cooperate to form a working government. How well they collaborate after the election may matter just as much as who actually won seats.
Turnout was strong, with Commission on Elections reporting that over 80% of registered voters cast ballots, higher than expected. Most polling went smoothly, although there were some reports of election-related violence in a few areas. The high turnout is a good sign of public engagement, but the security incidents are a reminder that challenges remain.
Beyond the Philippines, BARMM’s experience offers a case study for other parts of Southeast Asia dealing with questions of autonomy and regional representation. It showcases how a peace agreement can eventually evolve into a functioning electoral system.
Ultimately, this election is not the endpoint for Bangsamoro’s peace process. This is just the next phase of it. In this regard, the real test now is whether the newly elected parliament can build trust, stay stable, and actually deliver results for the people it represents.
Glenn holds a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from the University of Santo Tomas. His experience spans governance programs, policy development, and political research, having worked with the Ateneo School of Government and WR Numero Research on projects focused on electoral reform, public opinion, and regional development. He also helped coordinate the drafting of the Bangsamoro Local Government Code and supported the Academy of Multiparty Democracy.
Editorial Deadline 15/09/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)



