Editor’s Note
by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk
Everything set in motion — a policy, a permit, a signature, a price shock — eventually arrives somewhere downstream, whether or not anyone's ready to answer for it. This took place quite literally in Laos, where unauthorized iron ore mining forced regulators to suspend operations on the Nam Song River in Vang Vieng. This is the second pollution case in six weeks, and a reminder that most mining permits get approved exactly where monitoring resources are thinnest. Meanwhile, in Myanmar, five years of violence, blocked envoys, and stalled dialogue have flowed directly from the 2021 Five-Point Consensus that junta leader Min Aung Hlaing signed and then broke — and now, with Myanmar barred from ASEAN summits, he's calling the arrival of that bill "discrimination." In Cambodia, a USD 250 million ADB emergency loan aims to shield over a million low-income households from a fuel-price shock tied to the Middle East conflict, even as the borrowing adds to debt Phnom Penh will carry into its 2029 graduation from Least Developed Country status. Finally, in Thailand, the baht is squeezed between a current account deficit widened by that same energy price spike and investors borrowing cheap baht to chase higher yields elsewhere.
Lao PDR 🇱🇦
Mining, Monitoring, and the Rivers Laos Depends On
by Thipphavanh Virakhom, in Vientiane
Six weeks after the Xe Don River made headlines, Laos is facing a second pollution case, this time in a town whose economy depends on its river. On July 24, the Ministry of Industry and Commerce ordered Daochalearn Mineral Processing to suspend iron ore operations after inspections linked the company to pollution in the Nam Song River in Vang Vieng. The company had been mining without official authorisation, a violation of Laos’s Mineral Law.
Vang Vieng’s tourism economy runs on the Nam Song. Roughly 1,500 local households belong to a cooperative built around river-based tourism, including tubing and kayaking, part of the eco-adventure model the town rebuilt itself around after 2012. At its peak the town drew well over 150,000 visitors a year. Unauthorised discharge into that river threatens the income of a community that spent over a decade rebuilding its economy around the river being clean. The stakes are just as direct upstream. Fishing communities along the Xe Don lost a source of food and income when 460 kilograms of dead fish were reported in April, as detailed in earlier reporting on the Xe Don case. Environmental analysis of the region’s mining boom published by Mongabay warns that toxic runoff, particularly arsenic, poses a long-term threat because it bioaccumulates over time, with lasting impacts on fisheries and food security, harm that continues long after the news coverage ends.
A capacity problem, not a case by case failure. Laos’s Law on Minerals, first passed as Law No. 04/NA and revised in 2017 under National Assembly Resolution No. 603/NA, decentralises permitting. Provincial governors approve smaller concessions, while larger ones require central government approval. Of nearly 1,000 mining companies operating nationwide, 671 hold permits issued by provincial authorities, compared with 297 issued centrally, according to figures cited in New Security Beat’s reporting on rare earth mining in Laos. Most approvals happen where monitoring resources are thinnest. A 2026 comparative legal study of Laos’s environmental impact assessment system, which has been in place since the 1999 Environmental Protection Law, found that inadequate enforcement, minimal public participation, and restricted institutional capacity diminish the effectiveness of its EIA system. This points to a structural gap rather than an isolated failure.
What would change the pattern? Independent environmental analysis of the sector points to specific, adoptable standards. These include secondary containment, geomembrane liners, leak detection systems, secure toxic waste storage, and regular monitoring, along with zero-discharge policies and cleaner extraction methods such as bioleaching. These are measurable conditions that any level of government could write into permits and enforce. Just as important is closing the gap between when harm occurs and when affected communities are heard. In both the Xe Don and Vang Vieng cases, it was local reporting from fishers, residents, and tour operators that surfaced the problem before formal inspection did. Empowering and strengthening that role under the system with better accessible and inclusive grievance channels and community-level water testing would help catch problems early and give affected households a stake in the outcome.
The Xe Don case had a fuller recovery record. Water quality returned within national standards at 11 sites by early May, and legal action followed under Decree No. 389/PM on Environmental Impact Assessment, as reported in the original Xe Don coverage. Vang Vieng’s case remains open, with a suspension order and rehabilitation instructions but no published water testing results or compensation plan so far. A resolved case should mean independently verified water quality and a livelihoods recovery plan for the households whose income depends on the river, not simply a suspension notice.
Thipphavanh holds a bachelor’s degree in international affairs. She is a governance and development professional specialising in rule of law, access to justice, and gender equality in Lao PDR. Her work focuses on strengthening justice sector institutions, advancing people-centred governance, and promoting gender-responsive systems. With extensive experience in project coordination, monitoring and evaluation, stakeholder engagement, and strategic communications, she has collaborated closely with national institutions and international partners to support inclusive and sustainable development.
Myanmar 🇲🇲
Myanmar’s Failed President Criticizes ASEAN
by Ley Hlaing
Myanmar’s newly elected president and former junta leader Min Aung Hlaing recently criticized ASEAN’s ongoing approach toward his administration. Analysts could view this sharp remark as a reaction to his government’s continuing diplomatic isolation and severe domestic challenges across multiple sectors.
On the last day of his disappointing 100-Day Plan, the junta president made a speech at the parliament in Nay Pyi Taw, including serious criticism of ASEAN’s decision on Myanmar. He remarked that ASEAN is discriminating against Myanmar, mentioning the Five Point Consensus of ASEAN as being not a “collective” decision on Myanmar’s situation but rather just a statement issued when the ASEAN Chair was held by Brunei. However, Min Aung Hlaing omitted the part where he showed up himself at the meeting on April 24, 2021 and signed the Consensus consisting of these points: 1) immediate cessation of violence in Myanmar, 2) launching constructive dialogue, 3) appointing ASEAN Special Envoy, 4) giving humanitarian assistance, 5) sending delegation to visit.
Looking back at the consensus points, the military government has not only failed to implement the agreement they signed, but also repeatedly violated them. The first point encouraged to uphold the immediate halt of all violence in Myanmar since the three months after the coup. But after ousting the civilian government over five years, the violence in Myanmar has been unprecedented and perpetuated by the state such as bombing the schools, religious buildings, IDP camps and killing thousands of innocent civilians and other escalating situations including political repression, media crackdowns, surveillance, overnight household inspections, forced military recruitment, and restrictions on movement. The second point also did not align with the transformed administration, as dialogue has been rathe selective and peace talks are mainly brokered by China without inclusivity. The junta also failed to respect the last three points, continuing its operations and refusing to let ASEAN special envoys meet with detained political figures like Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. Despite the initial agreements, the situation has evolved to the point that ASEAN currently bars Myanmar’s high-level political leaders from attending subsequent summits, inviting only “non-political” representatives instead.
Immediately after he came back from the summit in Indonesia, military controlled media have subsequently restated that the agreement was made without his consent and they will only consider implementing the provisions after ensuring stability within the country and when the country’s domestic priorities are aligned with them. The consideration has taken for the junta half a decade of period to stabilize their oppressive rule before implementing the provisions.
In mid July, Myanmar’s nominally elected legislature, the Pyidaungsu Hlutta, echoed the same by claiming ASEAN “undermines Myanmar’s equal status within the organization, interferes in the country’s internal affairs, and no longer corresponds to current political realities.” Furthermore, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has issued a statement that upholds this very same view on July 23, 2026. On the day of address in front of 900 representatives and officials, the junta president affirmed their voices as the reaction of their failed administration and 100-Day plan. Analysts note that although Thailand is advocating Myanmar’s representation re-entry back in ASEAN, the Five-Point Consensus remains the bloc’s primary framework for addressing Myanmar’s political crisis. However, there are voices claiming that the Consensus is not strong enough to ensure the accountability of the Myanmar military.
Myanmar’s relationship with ASEAN has come full circle, with the junta facing isolation similar to the challenges preceding its 1997 entry. Despite the regime’s rejection of the Five-Point Consensus and claims of discrimination, ASEAN maintains that re-entry depends on halting violence and honoring the 2021 agreement.
Ley Hlaing is a former Political Science student from the University of Yangon, Myanmar. Currently, he is pursuing his BA at Parami University with a major in Philosophy, Politics and Economics. His academic and professional interests span community development, literature, minority issues, and social impact research. Having held roles as Research Assistant, Student Mentor, and Facilitator for local initiatives, he has constantly supported project management in literature and education programs in Myanmar.
Cambodia 🇰🇭
ADB Approves Emergency Loan for Cambodia as Middle East Conflict Drives Fuel Costs
by Sokna Thea, in Phnom Penh
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Cambodian government signed a $250 million emergency loan on Friday to cushion the kingdom’s economy against surging global fuel and food prices driven by the Middle East conflict. The financing backs Cambodia’s new Rapid Intervention for Stabilization of the Economy (RISE) Program which is the first initiative executed under the ADB’s revised emergency support policy. Cambodian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economy and Finance Aun Pornmoniroth and ADB Country Director Yasmin Siddiqi formally executed the agreement in Phnom Penh. ADB stated in an official press release that the loan will fund temporary, targeted fiscal measures to protect planned social spending in the 2026 national budget.
Under the RISE initiative, the emergency package targets direct assistance to more than 1 million low-income households registered under the government’s IDPoor system, including at least 350,000 families headed by women. Assistance spans direct cash transfers, temporary debt relief, and subsidies for rural agricultural inputs to help families cope with rising living costs. Beyond immediate relief, the program promotes cleaner energy by offering financial incentives for electric vehicles and green technologies to small transport operators, helping reduce future reliance on imported fuel.
The USD 250 million ADB commitment anchors a broader co-financing coalition, with up to USD 250 million from the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and USD 188 million from the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) remaining under proposal. If fully finalized, total resources for the RISE program would reach USD 688 million. ADB officials noted that the package forms part of a broader USD 450 million regional emergency response across Asia-Pacific, which also includes USD 200 million in policy-based lending to assist Sri Lanka.
Independent analysts and multilateral lenders warn that the fuel-price shock threatens to reverse recent poverty reduction gains. In its latest economic update, the World Bank cautioned that a 60% jump in oil prices could push up to 1.1 million Cambodians below the poverty line as transportation and production costs ripple through the economy. Because Cambodia imports 100% of its refined fuel, domestic pump prices have climbed roughly 30% for gasoline, 87% for diesel, and 70% for LPG since March. Although the government cut fuel import duties to blunt the impact, ADB officials say those steps will only partially offset global price spikes.
Economists caution that while concessional borrowing grants vital fiscal breathing room, it increases Cambodia’s external debt load as Phnom Penh prepares to graduate from Least Developed Country (LDC) status by 2029. LDC graduation will eventually phase out many special trade privileges and highly concessional borrowing terms, tightening future financing conditions. To minimize short-term debt strain, the loan carries a 30-year maturity with a low interest rate of approximately 0.75%, giving the government space to keep vulnerable households afloat while maintaining essential public services.
Sokna has a background in International Affairs and Business & Commercial Law. He’s currently a Senior Project Coordinator at the Ministry of Economy and Finance of Cambodia, working on the Financial Management Information System (FMIS) Project. His professional focus is driven by entrepreneurship, business development, and financial technology, with a particular interest in how private-sector innovation drives Cambodia’s economic growth.
Thailand 🇹🇭
The Baht Under Pressure
by Satid Sootipunya, in Bangkok
The baht is facing pressure from a widening current account deficit and carry trades as investors shift funds to higher-yielding markets, despite an overall strengthening trend.
Thailand’s current account deficit reached USD 17.7 billion in the three months ended June, after a USD 1.4 billion surplus in the first three months of 2026, Bank of Thailand spokesperson Chayawadee Chai-anant said at a press briefing last week.
The quarterly deficit was driven by rising imports of crude oil due to higher energy prices, imports for the electronics sector following the data center investment boom, and surging gold imports, along with a wider deficit in net services, income and transfers due to dividend payments, she added.
The current account deficit is one of the factors weakening the baht as demand for foreign currencies has outpaced demand for the domestic currency. Over the past six months through July 24, the baht has weakened about 8.5%, according to Bloomberg’s Thai baht index.
Besides volatile oil prices, another factor suppressing the baht is the potential for carry trades involving the baht against currencies from other economies, Wachirawat Banchuen, Senior Financial Markets Strategist at Siam Commercial Bank (SCB), said during an interview with local media outlet The Standard Wealth.
The Bank of Thailand (BOT) held its key monetary policy rate at 1% at its latest board meeting, leaving Thailand’s interest rate among the lowest in the world. This encourages investors to borrow baht at low interest rates and invest in higher-yielding markets, such as Latin American and other emerging Asian economies, Wachirawat said.
He added that although Thailand has seen 4 billion baht of capital inflows into the Thai stock market in July, around 2 billion baht has flowed out of the bond market, especially short-term bonds held by foreign investors. This reflects currency speculation during periods of baht weakness.
However, when measuring the baht against its 15 main trading partners via the Nominal Effective Exchange Rate, the baht is projected to appreciate by 1.3%, reaching an index level of 120.8, up from 119.0 last year.
Specifically, the baht is expected to gain against the Japanese yen, Indonesian rupiah, Vietnamese dong, South Korean won, and U.S. dollar, while softening against the Hong Kong dollar, New Taiwan dollar, pound sterling, Singapore dollar, and euro.
Satid is a multimedia economic journalist and news anchor who covers macroeconomic trends, Thailand’s fiscal policy, and key regional developments for Bangkok Biz. A Journalism graduate from Thammasat University, he has reported on major issues such as the US–China trade tensions, the Myanmar crisis, and global corporate stories, drawing on prior newsroom experience at The Momentum, the Bangkok Post, AFP, and Varasarn Press. His work blends economic analysis, foreign affairs, and digital storytelling, with a strong focus on making complex financial and political topics accessible to Thai audiences.
Editorial Deadline 01/08/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)
