Dry Pipes and Empty Halls
Issue 41 — Key Developments Across Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand
Editor’s Note
by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk
Like all delicate systems, political crises do not always arrive with a single breaking point. Sometimes, they are the result of a slower controlled process where the system keeps running, but with less and less behind it, similar to an engine running low on fuel. This week’s issue of the Mekong Belt traces how both material and political systems across the region are being stretched to their limits.
In Laos, the shock of global oil disruptions has exposed just how thin the country’s buffers really are, with fuel shortages reshaping everyday life from transport to education, and raising deeper questions about long-standing structural fragilities. Meanwhile, in Myanmar, the convening of the Upper House shows a system running low on genuine representation, as parliamentary procedures continue while the composition of the legislature makes clear that power remains tightly controlled.
Thailand, meanwhile, is attempting a structural reset of its own. The proposed separation of tourism and sports reflects a broader ambition to rethink how the country positions itself globally. Yet questions remain over whether institutional redesign alone can overcome deeper constraints, from infrastructure gaps to political trade-offs. Finally, in Cambodia, efforts to expand agricultural trade routes through Laos highlight a more outward-facing response. By diversifying export corridors and strengthening regional linkages, Phnom Penh is seeking to build resilience in a shifting economic landscape — even as existing dependencies remain difficult to replace.
Lao PDR 🇱🇦
Pumps Running Dry
by Thongsavanh Souvannasane, in Vientiane
With schools cut to three days, civil servants sent home, and hundreds of people queueing at empty pumps, the Middle East conflict has triggered the most severe energy emergency landlocked Laos has faced since 2022, shuttering over 1,000 fuel stations and sending prices soaring over 50 per cent.
Along Vientiane’s roads, moto-taxi drivers queue for hours at the few stations still open, only to find the pumps run dry before they reach the front. The crisis was born thousands of kilometers away, but made far worse by a structural vulnerability Vientiane has long failed to address.
Coordinated US-Israeli strikes on Tehran in late February threatened the Strait of Hormuz, through which roughly a fifth of the world’s oil passes. For Laos, which imports over 97% of its fuel from Thailand, the shockwave was immediate. When Bangkok briefly suspended all fuel exports, panic buying emptied stations across the capital within hours.
Bangkok, however, granted Laos an exemption alongside Myanmar, and an emergency 12-million-liter shipment followed, but when fuel arrived, it vanished within a day.
The numbers tell the story.
In just one week, fuel prices nearly doubled. By 20 March, a liter of premium gasoline costs LAK 41,210 (USD 1.93), up from around USD 1 a month ago. Global Petrol Prices recorded Laos’ premium gasoline as the second-highest price increase in the world that week. Of 2,538 stations nationwide, 1,061 have shuttered. Price gouging has followed scarcity, with inspectors in Champasak Province finding stations selling fuel well above official rates, resulting in fines.
What began as an economic shock has quickly reshaped everyday life.
Fuel excise taxes were cut, civil servants shifted to remote work or rotating schedules, and on 20 March came the most striking measure: college and university students will attend just three days a week, a signal that the crisis has moved well beyond the pump and into the classroom.
Vientiane launched a mobile fuel service, and amid the disruption, the capital’s Bus Rapid Transit network began its second two-month free trial on 10 March, a timely lifeline for commuters, and a second chance for a service whose first trial failed to gain traction.
On the diplomatic front, the news has been cautiously reassuring.
Thai Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul on 19 March reassured Laos that exports will continue, reduced by 25 per cent to 5.29 million liters per day, citing mutual energy dependencies, as Laos supplies a significant share of Thailand’s electricity.
Relief is also arriving from the east: on 20 March, Vietnam is set to commit 50 million liters and offered to facilitate imports through its territory, opening a new supply corridor.
Yet the crisis echoes 2022’s foreign currency shortages, same structural failure, different triggers. No strategic reserves, no supply diversification. Thailand’s exports are diplomacy, not policy; Vietnam’s offer is welcome, but reactive.
Until Vientiane builds genuine energy resilience, every global shock will find Laos equally exposed.
Thongsavanh is a journalist from Laos with a background in English-language media. He graduated from the Lao-American Institute with a Diploma of the Arts in English and contributes to independent news platforms. His reporting focuses on environmental issues, socio-economic development, and geopolitics.
Myanmar 🇲🇲
Procedural Democracy Masks Continued Control of Juntas as the Upper House Convenes
by Myat Moe Kywe
The First Regular Session of the Third Amyotha Hluttaw (Upper House) convened on March 18 at the parliamentary complex in Nay Pyi Taw, according to junta-run Global New Light of Myanmar. Daw Dwe Bu, a 64-year-old ethnic Kachin politician and the only woman among the 16 members of the military-led State Administration Council (SAC), was appointed to chair the opening session until a formal Speaker was elected.
Daw Dwe Bu has long-standing ties to Myanmar’s military and political establishment. She previously served as vice chair of the Kachin State People’s Party and as a member of parliament under President Thein Sein’s semi-civilian government (2011–2015). A former Supreme Court attorney, she also participated in the military-organized National Convention that drafted the 2008 Constitution. Her political trajectory has consistently aligned with the military’s leadership.
Following her interim role, Lieutenant General U Aung Lin Dwe, secretary of the SAC, was nominated and confirmed as Speaker of the Upper House. He contested a seat in Mandalay Region under the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) in the December–January elections. His appointment reflects a broader strategy: ahead of the polls, at least six senior regime officials and around 30 current or former military officers were reportedly transferred into the USDP to contest seats under its banner.
According to the Union Election Commission, the USDP secured more than 72% of seats across both the Amyotha Hluttaw and the Pyithu Hluttaw. Combined with the 25 percent of parliamentary seats constitutionally reserved for the military, this arrangement effectively guarantees continued junta dominance—despite elections not being held in several conflict-affected regions.
Jeng Phang Naw Htaung, representing Kachin State Constituency 2, was elected Deputy Speaker. Also a member of the SAC and former Minister for Ethnic Affairs, he has been listed under international sanctions. Nonetheless, his loyalty to Senior General Min Aung Hlaing has secured him a prominent role within the legislature.
Observers note that the newly convened Hluttaw is overwhelmingly composed of junta appointees, military affiliates, and loyalists. Analysts therefore expect the body to function less as an arena for legislative debate and oversight, and more as an extension of the military’s governing apparatus.
As the Third Amyotha Hluttaw begins its term, its structure points to continuity rather than change. While parliamentary procedures project a veneer of democratic governance, real power remains firmly consolidated in the hands of the military, leaving little space for dissent or meaningful reform in the near term.
Myat is a senior undergraduate student majoring in Politics, Philosophy, and Economics. She has interned at The Asia Foundation in Washington, D.C., and she has also worked as a summer research assistant at the Centre for Policy and Innovation (CRPI), gaining experience in research and analysis. Her work focuses on civic engagement, gender, youth leadership, and community development.
Thailand 🇹🇭
The Soft Power Pivot and Ministerial Divorce
by Paranut Juntree, in Bangkok
In March 2026, the Bhumjaithai-led administration signaled a radical departure from traditional bureaucracy by announcing a plan to split the Ministry of Tourism and Sports (MoTS) and merge tourism with the Ministry of Culture. This “structural divorce” aims to resolve a long-standing critique: the administrative friction between two fundamentally different industries. By merging Tourism with the Ministry of Culture and spinning off Sports into a standalone identity, the government seeks to pivot Thailand from a high-volume destination to a high-value global brand.
The 2002 Mandate created the MoTS under the now-outdated logic that sports are merely magnets for international arrivals to drive GDP of the country. In reality, these are incompatible engines almost since the beginning. For a tourism-driven country, tourism functions as a high-velocity “sprint,” driven by seasonal marketing and volatile global demands. In contrast, Sports is a technical “marathon” requiring multi-year training cycles, talent pipelines, and consistent investment in sports science and infrastructure.
Historically, tourism’s immediate impact on GDP has dictated the agenda of the ministry. This prioritization gap forced Sports to compete for capacity, relegating it to a secondary marketing tool rather than a professional industry. This has stifled athletic growth, as focus remained on the quantity of spectators in a sports event rather than the quality of infrastructure.
Within the MoTS, resources have traditionally been cannibalized by tourism. While the Sports Department utilised the National Sports Development Fund (NSDF) under the Sports Authority of Thailand (SAT), this proved insufficient for comprehensive development. Under the MoTS model, Sports was expected to support tourism with limited funding and manpower. Consequently, the budget poured into tourism marketing, leaving sports development reliant on private funding.
As a standalone entity, a Ministry of Sports would benefit from specialized ministerial management no longer overshadowed by tourism. However, it remains a matter of debate whether the Ministry of Sports will secure the dedicated fiscal budget necessary for manpower and technical advancement or it will be merged with other ministries.
The merger of Tourism and Culture in the tourism management sense, creates a “one-stop” strategy for a culture-led model. By consolidating these portfolios and ministerial styles, Thailand can move beyond simple headcount metrics and instead leverage more of its cultural assets to drive higher spending per capita. This unified approach allows the state to synchronize its tourism direction with its soft power ambitions, effectively translating abstract cultural influence into tangible economic yield.
Critically, some argue this merger is a political maneuver to satisfy coalition partners with more ministerial seats, though proponents argue the merger of Tourism and Cultural actually prevents seat inflation by reducing at least one ministerial seat. Critics also suggest merging Tourism with Transportation, mirroring Japan’s logistical model. This highlights a significant risk: can Thailand’s aging infrastructure realistically sustain a high-value cultural pivot? Without the high-speed trains and seamless multi-modal hubs seen in peer nations, there is a danger that poor logistical accessibility will prevent travelers from reaching the very cultural assets the government seeks to promote in the first place.
Paranut has a background in advocacy, with experience in policy research, communications, and civic engagement across both the NGO and government sectors. As Thailand’s Youth Delegate to the United Nations, he represented Thai youth in global dialogues on migration, education, and human rights, championing inclusive policymaking. He holds a degree in political science with a specialization in international relations.
Cambodia 🇰🇭
Cambodia Expands Agricultural Trade Routes Through Laos
by Malai Yatt, in Phnom Penh
Cambodia’s agricultural sector continues to serve as a cornerstone of the national economy, contributing 16.1% to GDP in 2025. The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (MAFF) is now seeking to streamline trade routes through Laos to improve access to the Chinese market in 2026.
Speaking at MAFF’s 2025 Annual Summary on March 19, Minister Dith Tina acknowledged that while the agricultural sector has not matched the level of economic participation seen in other major sectors, it remains a key driver of exports and national growth.
“This sector has demonstrated resilience and steady growth, playing a crucial role in ensuring food security, creating jobs, and supporting economic development despite global and regional challenges,” he said. “We will continue to improve farmers’ livelihoods and promote sustainable economic growth.”
In 2025, the sector recorded an annual growth rate of 1.2%, bringing its total value to over USD 8.3 billion. According to MAFF, agricultural exports reached nearly USD 6.5 billion—an increase of more than USD 320 million compared to 2024—with the crop subsector accounting for the largest share at over USD 5.6 billion.
Cambodia produced more than 15 million tonnes of rice during the year, generating a surplus of over 9 million tonnes, with nearly 950,000 tonnes exported. Dith Tina expressed confidence that further gains could be achieved, particularly through efforts to facilitate smoother and more efficient transport of agricultural products to China via Laos.
A key step in this direction was taken on January 25, when MAFF signed an agreement with Laos on the transit of agricultural goods. The deal is expected to open new overland export routes to the Chinese market in the near future.
“This is an important step to expand and strengthen cooperation between the Cambodian and Lao agricultural sectors,” the minister said, adding that the partnership could extend to other areas such as fertilizer supply, forestry, and potentially mining.
With Cambodia’s border with Thailand still facing disruptions, Ky Sereyvath, an economics researcher at the Royal Academy of Cambodia, noted that Laos could serve as a transit hub for Cambodian agricultural exports to third markets.
However, he cautioned that while Laos may help facilitate trade flows, its market size remains limited and cannot replace Thailand’s role as a major trading partner.
Overall, Cambodia’s strategy reflects a broader effort to diversify export routes and reduce dependency on any single corridor. By strengthening overland links through Laos, the government aims to reinforce the resilience of an agricultural sector that already contributes more than USD 8.3 billion to the national economy.
Malai is a reporter at Kiripost, where she has worked for over two years, driven by a strong commitment to amplifying the voices of underserved communities. Her reporting focuses on economic and foreign affairs.
Editorial Deadline 21/03/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)
