Follow the Money
Issue 54 — Key Developments Across Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand
Editor’s Note
by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk
This issue of the Mekong Belt follows the money — and in each case, it ends up somewhere other than where it was supposed to go. In Myanmar, FIFA sold World Cup broadcasting rights to Mytel, a telecom company jointly owned by the junta and Vietnam's Ministry of National Defence, turning every fan's data package into a transfer payment to the same army accused of killing its own citizens. In Thailand, the credit rating held and investors poured in USD 2.7 billion, but the country’s own former fiscal advisor is warning that the surplus underwriting that stability is already ending. Meanwhile, in Laos, the government is chasing tourism targets nearly four times what the last plan actually delivered, while its biggest debt risk — the state power utility — has already had to hand over 90% of its transmission grid just to keep the lights on. And in Cambodia, Hun Manet toasted 70 years of friendship with Putin over a 2% trade "growth" figure that conceals an 80% collapse in bilateral trade since 2021.
Myanmar 🇲🇲
How FIFA’s World Cup Broadcast Deal Fuels Myanmar’s Military
by Ley Hlaing
AAs FIFA World Cup 2026 begins, tensions in Myanmar have escalated following FIFA’s decision to partner with the junta-owned company Mytel, granting it exclusive broadcasting rights as the sole authorized streaming platform in the country. FIFA’s decision has been widely criticized as a human rights violation and has exposed a broader hypocrisy in the organization’s ethical standards.
On May 25, 2026, Mytel’s TV360 — the junta-controlled telecom company’s mobile digital streaming platform for entertainment — was granted the exclusive rights to broadcast all 104 World Cup matches in Myanmar. Held once every four years, the World Cup is the world’s most popular sporting event — making it all the more striking that FIFA, in awarding these rights, has not only contradicted its own Human Rights Policy but actively undermined it. Article 3 of that policy commits FIFA “to avoid causing or contributing to adverse human rights impacts through its own activities and to address and remediate such impacts when they occur.”
FIFA’s decision has faced strong criticism from human rights groups working on Myanmar, including Justice For Myanmar and Burma Campaign UK, both of which have condemned the deal and called for its immediate cancellation, arguing that Mytel is a lucrative revenue source for a brutal and illegitimate military junta. Beyond these organizations, Myanmar citizens have also voiced frustration on Facebook, calling for boycotts and pointing to alternatives such as international free streaming platforms and VPN-enabled websites as ways to avoid TV360, since revenue from the platform flows directly to a military responsible for killing its own people. The way TV360 monetizes its World Cup broadcast adds further strain on a population already under severe economic hardship: viewers are required to purchase Mytel mobile data packages, since TV360 is the only way to access FIFA matches — funneling a captive audience directly into the military-linked platform’s ecosystem and weaponizing the soft power of sport, with free access offered for only 60 of the matches.
Ironically, Mytel is itself a joint venture between Myanmar’s military conglomerate, the Myanmar Economic Corporation, and Viettel — a company controlled by Vietnam’s Ministry of National Defence, which holds a 49% stake. This reveals a broader geopolitical profiteering network among state defense entities. In response to the backlash, and citing its own policies, Meta has removed TV360’s Facebook page — a significant outcome of the boycott campaign.
According to Burma Campaign UK, Mytel has largely escaped sanctions from international bodies such as the EU. The organization points to the EU and Switzerland’s failure to sanction Mytel as a factor that contributed to FIFA’s willingness to partner with the junta’s company. While the United States did sanction Mytel in 2025, a year later the company now holds a monopoly on broadcasting the world’s most popular sporting event — one for which the U.S. itself is serving as a host country.
In granting exclusive broadcasting rights to the junta’s own company, FIFA is not only violating international human rights standards but actively normalizing military rule in Myanmar. This partnership with the Myanmar military will stand as a lasting stain on FIFA’s record.
Ley Hlaing is a former Political Science student from the University of Yangon, Myanmar. Currently, he is pursuing his BA at Parami University with a major in Philosophy, Politics and Economics. His academic and professional interests span community development, literature, minority issues, and social impact research. Having held roles as Research Assistant, Student Mentor, and Facilitator for local initiatives, he has constantly supported project management in literature and education programs in Myanmar.
Thailand 🇹🇭
Why Thailand’s Stable Credit Rating Hides a Major Economic Warning
by Satid Sootipunya, in Bangkok
Thailand’s top fiscal expert warns the country against relying heavily on its old economic competencies after maintaining its BBB+ sovereign credit rating by S&P Global Ratings.
Former fiscal consultant to Prime Minister Anutin’s administration and Thailand’s top fiscal specialist Athiphat Muthitacharoen last week posted on his personal social media account, mentioning that the main reason S&P Global Ratings kept Thailand’s BBB+ sovereign credit rating was due to the country’s economic structural strengths, including its limited external debts, high level of international reserves, and mature bond and currency markets.
“Thailand’s persistent current account surplus, on the other hand, is about to change,” said Athiphat. “The country recorded a relatively large current account deficit in March due to its heavy reliance on imported oil. And Thailand’s current account surplus era is about to end due to the permanent surge in global oil prices, as well as increased imports of factory machinery amid the data center boom.”
In order to strengthen Thailand’s economic performance productively instead of relying on old economic capacities, Athiphat suggested that the government needs to build the nation’s new economic competitiveness.
“The big challenge of the Thai economy is not only maintaining its sovereign credit rating, but also cultivating the country’s new economic competitiveness through productivity-led growth, greater competitiveness through investment, and a credible fiscal framework,” said Athiphat.
For short-term sentiment, investors have poured a net USD 2.7 billion into Thai bonds and equity markets due to Thailand’srelatively high fiscal responsibility, while roughly USD 4.2 billion of foreign investment has been withdrawn fromIndonesia amid its government’s transparency crisis.
In April, Moody’s Ratings updated Thailand’s sovereign credit outlook to positive from negative due to reduced U.S. reciprocal tariffs, strong investment momentum, and political stability, while affirming its Baa1 credit rating.
Satid is a multimedia economic journalist and news anchor who covers macroeconomic trends, Thailand’s fiscal policy, and key regional developments for Bangkok Biz. A Journalism graduate from Thammasat University, he has reported on major issues such as the US–China trade tensions, the Myanmar crisis, and global corporate stories, drawing on prior newsroom experience at The Momentum, the Bangkok Post, AFP, and Varasarn Press. His work blends economic analysis, foreign affairs, and digital storytelling, with a strong focus on making complex financial and political topics accessible to Thai audiences.
Lao PDR 🇱🇦
Tourism Growth and Fiscal Capacity in Laos
by Thipphavanh Virakhom, in Vientiane
Laos recorded 1.36 million international tourist arrivals in the first quarter of 2026 alone — an 8% increase over the same period last year, with notable growth from European, North American and Gulf markets. The government’s ambitions extend further still: 22 million visitors and USD 8 billion in tourism revenue by 2030, supported by expanding regional rail connections that position the country as a transit hub within ASEAN.
The recovery is real and worth noting. The more useful question, however, is not how many visitors arrive, but how that growth interacts with the fiscal pressures Laos faces as it approaches graduation from Least Developed Country status this November.
Some context helps frame the scale of the new target. The previous five-year plan aimed for 15 million visitors and reached roughly 5.83 million — about 39% of target. The new goal is therefore not simply an extension of recent momentum; it represents a substantially larger ambition than the sector has previously delivered, which is a reasonable basis for measured rather than unqualified optimism.
A second consideration is the relationship between tourist spending and public revenue, which are not interchangeable. Much of what visitors spend reaches hotels, guesthouses and tour operators, a significant share of it informally, while government revenue depends on what can be captured through taxation. This matters because domestic revenue collection in Laos has remained around 10–11% of GDP, among the lower rates in the region, even as debt servicing consumes close to a third of government revenue. Strengthening VAT enforcement and bringing more small tourism operators into the formal economy would likely determine how much of this growth translates into fiscal capacity rather than GDP alone.
A third factor is the infrastructure underpinning tourism growth. Public attention has often focused on the Lao-China Railway as a source of debt risk, but research suggests the larger burden lies elsewhere — primarily with Electricité du Laos, the state power utility, whose debt of roughly USD 5 billion represents close to 45% of total public debt. As part of efforts to stabilise its finances, the utility transferred a 90% stake in its transmission grid to a foreign state utility. A tourism sector aiming for substantially higher visitor numbers will depend on reliable power and transport infrastructure, the financial sustainability of which remains an evolving picture.
None of this suggests the tourism recovery is unfounded or that current strategy is misguided; expanding connectivity and diversifying source markets are reasonable long-term approaches. It does suggest that the relationship between visitor growth and fiscal sustainability deserves continued, careful observation rather than assumption. Whether tourism becomes a meaningful contributor to Laos’s broader financing needs will depend less on arrival numbers than on revenue capture and infrastructure resilience — both of which remain open, evolving questions worth following closely.
Thipphavanh holds a bachelor’s degree in international affairs. She is a governance and development professional specialising in rule of law, access to justice, and gender equality in Lao PDR. Her work focuses on strengthening justice sector institutions, advancing people-centred governance, and promoting gender-responsive systems. With extensive experience in project coordination, monitoring and evaluation, stakeholder engagement, and strategic communications, she has collaborated closely with national institutions and international partners to support inclusive and sustainable development.
Cambodia 🇰🇭
Cambodia and Russia Mark 70 Years of Diplomatic Ties at Kazan Summit
by Sokna Thea, in Phnom Penh
Prime Minister Hun Manet met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Kazan on June 19 on the sidelines of the ASEAN-Russia Commemorative Summit, using the occasion to mark the 70th anniversary of bilateral diplomatic relations, established in 1956, and to push for deeper cooperation across trade, energy, education, and security.
Hun Manet acknowledged Soviet assistance following the fall of the Pol Pot regime in 1979, including diplomatic backing, educational programmes, and infrastructure support that produced landmarks such as the Khmer-Soviet Friendship Hospital and a technical institute, and described Russia as a “longstanding and reliable partner” whose role Cambodia values regardless of shifting global alignments.
Putin, in turn, noted that the Kremlin continues to support energy, agriculture, telecommunications, and maritime infrastructure in Cambodia, and acknowledged that bilateral trade volumes had grown by roughly 2 percent. That figure, however, masks a broader slump. The Phnom Penh Post reported that Cambodia-Russia trade declined sharply from USD 239 million in 2021 to USD 55 million in 2024, a contraction widely linked to Western sanctions on Russia and Russian investors’ preference for the Chinese and Vietnamese markets.
On the economic agenda, Hun Manet requested Putin’s support for a free trade agreement between Cambodia and the Eurasian Economic Union. Putin invited Cambodian businesses to participate in the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok (September 1-4) and Russian Energy Week in Moscow in October, framing both events as entry points for expanded commercial contacts under the bilateral Intergovernmental Commission framework.
Educational ties received notable emphasis. Putin disclosed that more than 8,000 Cambodians have received higher education in Russia, that 160 students are currently enrolled, and that Russia provided 63 new scholarships in 2026. On the business side, Russian automotive group GAZ, founded in 1936, operating 15 manufacturing plants and exporting to 43 countries, expressed interest in entering Cambodia’s automotive sector after a June 18 meeting with the prime minister, though no formal commitment was made.
The bilateral talks took place within the larger ASEAN-Russia Commemorative Summit, which marked 35 years of dialogue relations and brought together leaders from all 11 ASEAN member states, including Cambodia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and Singapore. Russia and ASEAN adopted four summit documents: the Kazan Declaration, a Comprehensive Plan of Action for 2026-2030, and joint statements on energy and cultural cooperation.
The summit unfolded as G7 nations, meeting concurrently in Évian-les-Bains, France, pledged “unwavering” support for Ukraine and announced further tightening of sanctions on Russia’s oil and gas sectors. Russia’s hosting of Southeast Asian heads of government in Kazan served, in part, as a visible counter-signal to that pressure.
Cambodia’s consistent position, maintaining ties with both Western partners and Russia while avoiding formal alignment with either side, reflects its long-standing multi-vector foreign policy, which Phnom Penh frames as one of political trust and shared interest rather than geopolitical allegiance.
Sokna has a background in International Affairs and Business & Commercial Law. He’s currently a Senior Project Coordinator at the Ministry of Economy and Finance of Cambodia, working on the Financial Management Information System (FMIS) Project. His professional focus is driven by entrepreneurship, business development, and financial technology, with a particular interest in how private-sector innovation drives Cambodia’s economic growth.
Editorial Deadline 20/06/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)
