Fragile Frontiers, Fragile Unity
Issue 17 — Key Developments Across Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand
Editor’s Note
by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk
This week’s stories from the Mekong Belt expose fragile foundations under mounting pressure. In Laos, the government’s new Growth Plan promises digital and tourism-driven prosperity, but debt and deep social inequalities threaten to undercut its ambitions. Meanwhile, along the Thai-Cambodian disputed border, a recent flare-up of tensions due to barbed wire clashes shows how quickly century-old disputes can dismiss hard-fought ceasefires, and how little ASEAN can do beyond firefighting. On the other side of the border, Cambodia tries to push past the latest border crisis with the opening of its mega-airport, betting that tourism will keep its economy afloat. Finally, in Myanmar, yet another postponed ASEAN mission underscores the bloc’s faltering credibility, as China’s shadow looms over any path to resolution. Ultimately, these stories reveal an ASEAN ever so under pressure, with its unity fraying just as regional challenges intensify.
Lao PDR 🇱🇦
Will the 2026-2030 Laos Growth Plan succeed?
by Thongsavanh Souvannasane, in Vientiane
The Lao government introduced the Growth Plan in mid-2025 to guide national development from 2026 to 2030. The roadmap aims to diversify the economy beyond hydropower and resource exports while also embedding Laos more firmly in ASEAN and global development agendas, targeting an average annual growth rate of at least 5%.
At its core, the strategy emphasizes debt management, investment reforms, and new economic sectors. These initiatives are central to Laos’s Digital Economy Strategy 2030. Digital activity currently contributes just 3% of GDP, but the government projects this will rise to 7% by 2030 and even 10% by 2040—a growth that will create jobs, expand opportunities for small businesses, and reduce reliance on natural resources. In this context, for young Lao graduates, digital skills could be the difference between securing meaningful work and being left behind with the emergence of new sectors.
Tourism is another pillar of the growth plan. Minister of Culture and Tourism Suansavanh Viyaket announced on 25 September that Laos aims to attract more than 43 million visitors between 2026 and 2030, including both domestic and international tourists, generating an estimated USD 13 billion in revenue. With over 3 million arrivals already this year and a target of 4.3 million by year-end, new infrastructure, attractions, and training programs are designed to professionalize the sector and spread benefits to local communities.
Yet the road ahead is steep.
Economic conditions remain fragile, with high public debt and persistent inflation straining household incomes. While improved state revenue collection and tighter monetary policy stabilized exchange rates in late 2024, growth is projected at just 3.5% in 2025. Moreover, public debt is unsustainably high at 116% of GDP, with repayment deferrals accounting for 16% of GDP, according to the World Bank’s latest update in May 2025.
Without continued relief, external repayments averaging USD 1.3 billion annually through 2027 could worsen financing pressures and foreign exchange risks, directly affecting the government’s ability to fund education, healthcare, and social protection.
Social inequalities also challenge the plan’s ambitions.
UNICEF reports that one in three girls in Laos is married before 18, with rates exceeding 50% among disadvantaged groups. Early marriage often ends education, limits economic opportunities, and increases health risks, undermining the Growth Plan’s goal of building an inclusive, skilled workforce.
Regional connectivity offers opportunity but also highlights dependency. The Laos-China Railway, launched in December 2021, has carried over 59 million passengers and 67 million tons of cargo, linking Laos to 19 countries. Daily services in Laos have grown from four to 18. While the railway expands markets for SMEs and farmers, dependence on Chinese financing underscores the need for balanced partnerships.
Ultimately, the Growth Plan’s success will be judged not only by fiscal or trade metrics but by tangible improvements in people’s lives. As long as youth find jobs, farmers withstand climate shocks, SMEs thrive, girls remain in school, and rural communities benefit from tourism and connectivity, the strategy will deliver on its promise.
Thongsavanh is a journalist from Laos with a background in English-language media. He graduated from the Lao-American Institute with a Diploma of the Arts in English and contributes to independent news platforms. His reporting focuses on environmental issues, socio-economic development, and geopolitics.
Thailand 🇹🇭
Peace at the Wire’s Edge
by Paranut Juntree, in Bangkok
On September 17, Cambodian villagers and monks tore down barbed wire erected by Thai forces along the disputed border near Ban Nong Ya Kaew, Sa Kaeo Province. What began as a protest over the alleged violation of Cambodian territory quickly escalated as Thai forces responded with rubber bullets and tear gas after the alleged massing of 200 Cambodian protesters at the wire. A few days later, Thailand announced the indefinite closure of all border checkpoints with Cambodia, hardening tensions only weeks after an ASEAN- and U.S.-brokered ceasefire. The barbed wire, intended for security, has instead become a symbol of mistrust and how fragile the July 28 ceasefire deal is.
Border disputes between Thailand and Cambodia stretch back over a century, to when France first mapped the 817-km frontier in 1907. Skirmishes have occurred along the border for years, with the July 2025 marking the most intense in years. In the wake of the July 2025 fighting, both countries convened sessions of the General Border Committee (GBC), including a Special GBC meeting on September 10 to discuss de-escalation and managing sensitive border areas.
In the weeks after the July clashes, the Thai military reinforced the frontier with barbed wire fencing in disputed areas. For weeks, there have been protests from both sides along the disputed areas. The September 17 clash occurred in territory Cambodia claims as part of Prey Chan district, Banteay Meanchey Province. The Cambodian protesters, reportedly armed with sticks and stones as they tore down the barbed wire fencing, were met with rubber bullets and tear gas from Thai forces. Thailand’s decision to seal the border indefinitely has raised economic and social concerns, as cross-border trade and daily movement remain stalled. Still, large groups of protesters continue to gather at the site.
Following the recent development, ASEAN Chair Anwar Ibrahim urged both sides to settle disputes through the Joint Border Committee and established mechanisms. While Malaysia, in quality of ASEAN Chair, did contribute to brokering the ceasefire between Thailand and Cambodia, the flare-up again highlights ASEAN’s limited ability to prevent or manage member-state conflicts. As for the clashes in July 2025, it is evident that ASEAN still lacks early warning and conflict-prevention measures, allowing tensions to grow even as the conflict was escalating.
After the 2008-2011 border crisis between Thailand and Cambodia, ASEAN deferred the dispute to bilateral mechanisms like the JBC. A similar approach has been evident following the July 2025 flare-up, where ASEAN limited its role to facilitation rather than direct intervention. This underscores ASEAN’s approach to conflict leans more towards management than transformation or prevention. The same pattern appears in other disputes, even domestic ones such as Myanmar’s civil conflict, where ASEAN remains bound by its non-interference principle.
The recurring cycle of escalation and restraint underscores a broader truth: ASEAN’s conflict management remains reactive, bound by non-interference and wary of deeper engagement. Unless the bloc rethinks its approach, its role in regional security will remain closer to firefighting than genuine peace-building.
Paranut has a background in advocacy, with experience in policy research, communications, and civic engagement across both the NGO and government sectors. As Thailand’s Youth Delegate to the United Nations, he represented Thai youth in global dialogues on migration, education, and human rights, championing inclusive policymaking. He holds a degree in political science with a specialization in international relations.
Cambodia 🇰🇭
Tourism Drive Continues Amid Disputes
by Malai Yatt, in Phnom Penh
Despite ongoing border tensions with Thailand, Cambodia’s tourism industry is projected to grow following the inauguration of the country’s newest airport, Techo International Airport (KTI), on September 9, 2025.
Located 20 km south of Phnom Penh, KTI spans 2,600 hectares, making it one of the largest airports in the world. In its first phase, it is designed to handle up to 15 million passengers annually, positioning itself as Cambodia’s primary international gateway connecting the country to the rest of the world.
According to SSCA spokesperson Sin Chansereivutha, the KTI had a successful debut, with an average of 130 flights and 15,000 total passengers daily throughout its first operative week. Being served by 28 airlines, the airport is expected to become a vital driver of Cambodia’s tourism and economic growth.
The launch comes amid strained relations with Thailand. A fatal clash at the Mom Bei border crossing on May 28, which killed Cambodian soldier Suan Roan, triggered five days of intense fighting in late July. Though a ceasefire took effect on July 28, tensions linger, and Thailand’s decision to close land borders has disrupted trade and mobility.
As reported by a local media, Thailand’s decision to close its land borders is threatening Cambodia’s goal of attracting seven million tourists by 2025, as over 56% of international visitors usually enter the country via the Thai land route. This has created significant concern for tourism-related businesses.
Air connectivity, however, is offering new momentum. At a September 12 event in Phnom Penh, Tourism Minister Huot Hak reported that Cambodia welcomed about 4 million international tourists in the first eight months of 2025. Moreover, on World Tourism Day (September 27), Prime Minister Hun Manet emphasized tourism’s role as a key economic pillar, highlighting that Cambodia remains a safe destination that provides attractive trade opportunities.
The sector had a strong year in 2024, as Cambodia attracted 6.7 million international tourists, generating USD 3.63 billion in revenue—respectively a 22.9% and 17.8% increase compared to the data from 2023. In this context, the Prime Minister remains optimistic that tourism—one of Cambodia’s four economic pillars which accounts for 9.4% of the total GDP and generates 510,000 jobs—will continue to be a top priority.
While the ceasefire remains fragile and the border closures threaten businesses dependent on the Thai land route, KTI’s successful launch provides a critical alternative. With Prime Minister Hun Manet affirming that tourism is a stable economic pillar, the new mega-airport is not just an infrastructure project, but a strategic pivot designed to ensure Cambodia remains a secure and accessible destination.
Malai is a reporter at Kiripost, where she has worked for over two years, driven by a strong commitment to amplifying the voices of underserved communities. Her reporting focuses on economic and foreign affairs.
Myanmar 🇲🇲
ASEAN’s Credibility Tested After Myanmar Election Visit Is Postponed
by Pann Ei Thwel, in Mandalay
Malaysia’s Foreign Minister, Mohamad Hasan, announced on September 18 that ASEAN’s planned trip to Myanmar to assess the current situation has been postponed to early October. Diplomats from Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines had been scheduled to meet the junta this month to discuss the country’s upcoming elections, widely criticized as a sham. Although the postponement of the visit has not been officially motivated yet, according to Myanmar-based outlet The Irrawaddy, the trip was delayed because junta leader Min Aung Hlaing was unavailable to meet the delegation.
Since the military coup in February 2021, ASEAN has sought to address the crisis through its Five-Point Consensus, which called for an end to violence and inclusive dialogue. But four years on, little progress has been made. Min Aung Hlaing has refused to comply with the agreements, prompting the organization to bar him from summits, while efforts to engage the shadow National Unity Government (NUG) have also struggled to gain traction. ASEAN’s struggle to drag the junta into dialogue is also to be attributed to the organization’s stance on having a comprehensive election instead, which, in the eyes of Min Aung Hlaing, is a signal that ASEAN is not on its side.
On top of that, the reason why Min Aung Hlaing acts loosely over ASEAN decisions is the strong presence of support from China and India for conducting the election. Beijing, in particular, sees Myanmar’s stability as essential to its economic interests, and has thus supported Min Aung Hlaing in securing control over conquered territory and building legitimacy. Chinese influence extends beyond the junta, significantly impacting ASEAN’s approach towards Myanmar’s conflict. With China becoming the most influential power in Southeast Asia, ASEAN finds it more challenging to stand united and strengthen its centrality, given that there are already internal divisions among its members regarding the civil war in Myanmar. While Thailand and Vietnam favor a unified stance on the elections, Singapore and Malaysia reject them as illegitimate, highlighting the organization’s struggle to find a common stance on Myanmar-related issues.
In this context, the postponement of ASEAN’s mission may seem like a minor delay, but it carries broader implications for the bloc’s credibility. Internal divisions among member states have only deepened the paralysis, weakening the bloc’s claim to centrality in regional security. And although analysts argue that ASEAN’s limited impact reflects its long-standing principle of non-interference, the crisis in Myanmar continues to test ASEAN’s relevance: if the bloc cannot speak with one voice or push for meaningful dialogue, it risks becoming sidelined in its own neighborhood. Conversely, by seizing this moment to forge a common approach—one that balances pressure on the junta with engagement of other stakeholders—ASEAN could begin to restore both its unity and its standing on the global stage.
Pann Ei is an undergraduate student at Parami University, majoring in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics. Following an internship with the CSIS Southeast Asia Program, she developed a strong interest in policy research, with a particular focus on politics and education. She currently works as a research assistant at the Center for Research, Policy and Innovation (CRPI), where she focuses on political institutions and regime types across Southeast Asia.
Editorial Deadline 26/09/2025 11:59 PM (UTC +8)
