From Ceasefires to Clean Air
Issue 22 — Key Developments Across Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand
Editor’s Note
by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk
Glimmers of optimism defined this week in the Mekong, as Cambodia and Thailand followed up on their joint declaration with a joint removal of heavy and destructive weapons along their border, marking a positive and sincere step towards achieving long-term peace and stability. At the same time, Thailand also celebrates the approval of the Clean Air Bill, a historic legislative success that enshrines the rights of Thai people to have access to clean air and sets Thailand on the path to becoming a regional model on environmental policies. Moving away from the two reconciliating neighbours, China’s shadow is looming over Myanmar and Laos. In Myanmar, Chinese mediation is exposing a fraught reality: Beijing’s heavy hand is reshaping ceasefire talks and territorial bargains, not as a neutral broker but as a power calibrating outcomes to its own strategic aims. And in Laos, Beijing’s money and infrastructure push is reshaping regional alliances, trying to pull Vientiane closer. However, history and geography anchor influence: despite China’s pull, Vietnam’s deep, long-running ties with Vientiane persist and offer alternative paths for a landlocked state seeking development without losing strategic autonomy.
Cambodia 🇰🇭
The Mekong’s Most Fragile Peace Takes Shape as Cambodia and Thailand Withdraw From The Border
by Malai Yatt, in Phnom Penh
The Cambodian Ministry of National Defense confirmed today that a joint, phased removal of heavy and destructive weapons with Thailand has officially begun, describing it as a positive and sincere step towards achieving long-term peace and stability.
The removal process, agreed upon by Cambodia’s Military Region 4 and the Thai 2nd Army Area, aims to ensure the full and effective implementation of the Kuala Lumpur Joint Declaration and a swift return to normalcy for both nations, according to Maly Socheata, Spokeswoman for the Ministry of National Defense of Cambodia.
Ms. Socheata confirmed that to prove their commitment to the recent Kuala Lumpur Joint Declaration, Cambodian and Thai military commands finalized a concrete, phased plan to remove heavy weapons from the border on October 31st. The first phase of this withdrawal officially began at 6:45 PM on November 1.
“The withdrawal is to be implemented simultaneously by both parties under the observation and verification of the ASEAN Observer Team (AOT). It is also important to note that the 1st phase of the removal of heavy and destructive weapons and equipment is scheduled for three weeks, from November 1 to November 21”, she clarified.
Cambodian withdrawal targets two key locations in Preah Vihear Province, Choam Kshant and Roveang, with the Thai side conducting similar moves. Cambodia trusts that sincere and effective implementation of the Kuala Lumpur agreement will ensure a swift return to normalcy for the benefit of both nations.
Following the October 31 meeting with Thai Minister of Defense Nattaphon, US Secretary of War Pete Hegseth reaffirmed the country’s plan to strengthen the alliance by boosting interoperability and defense industrial collaboration. The official also recognized the recent Kuala Lumpur Accords as a demonstration of President Trump’s commitment to ‘peace through strength.
At the same time, he posted on his platform that he also had a positive meeting with Cambodian Deputy Prime Minister Tea Seiha. A key outcome was the agreement to resume our premier bilateral military exercise.
Thai Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul, only a month into his term, also praised the US and Malaysia-supported peace deal with Cambodia as a crucial first step in mending community divisions caused by the conflict. He asserted that the terms of the agreement must be effectively implemented to ensure the security, safety, and ‘peace with dignity’ that the people deserve.”
With the withdrawal process underway under ASEAN observation and receiving direct endorsement from the relevant parties, both Cambodia and Thailand are positioned to capitalize on this diplomatic success and forge a new era of cooperation and stability.
Malai is a reporter at Kiripost, where she has worked for over two years, driven by a strong commitment to amplifying the voices of underserved communities. Her reporting focuses on economic and foreign affairs.
Thailand 🇹🇭
Thailand Passes Landmark Clean Air Bill
by Natamon Aumphin, in Bangkok
The recent adoption of the ASEAN Declaration on the Right to a Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment reflects the importance of addressing environmental concerns beyond the nation-state, urging more commitment and efforts to address this global issue. Aligning with the recent ASEAN Declaration, the Thai lower house passed the Clean Air Bill, with an overwhelming 309 votes in favour and just four abstentions. Although the bill needs to go through the Senate for further revision, the bill and its quasi-unanimous approval show Thailand’s commitment to solving air pollution that has been ongoing for many decades.
The main goal of the bill is to ensure the rights of Thai people to have access to clean air, as Thailand has been facing exposure to PM2.5, mostly due to diesel exhaustion and agricultural burning within and outside Thai borders. Although the presence of these particles is linked to economic activities, citizens bear most of the costs. As a matter of fact, chronic exposure to PM2.5 can lead to several respiratory, cardiovascular, and neurological-related health risks.
The bill was first introduced to the parliament in 2021 by the People’s Party (PP), although its origins can be traced to civil society efforts already dating back to 2019. Before the approval of its current form, the bill was presented in seven other versions by different interest groups such as civil society, political parties, and the cabinet. Each version contained a different interpretation of what the legislation and mechanisms for solving air pollution should be.
Although it took over four years for the Clean Air Bill to pass, it should be noted that the bill ultimately passed without having its crucial mechanism undermined. The emphasis of the passed bill lies upon the Polluter Pays Principle, where producers have to bear the cost of their pollution. To be enforced effectively, the Clean Air Fund will be established as a part of the bill. Despite reports indicating lobbying to remove this mechanism from the bill, the advocates insisted on keeping it as it is essential for enforcement.
The fund will serve as an essential tool for the effective implementation of the bill, as it empowers those affected to fight for justice and incentivizes companies to change their behavior. Unlike the Environmental Fund, financial resources of the new bill will come from fees imposed on polluting companies, which means the Clean Air Bill will not be constrained by limited and lengthy government budgets. This increases the chances that the bill will be enforced properly.
If executed properly, the bill can contribute greatly to national and regional environmental issues. Domestically, the Clean Air Bill aims to solve the root cause of air pollution by changing companies’ and citizens’ behavior through means like information sharing, compensation, and assistance. Regionally, Thailand could become a role model and one of the leading nations, alongside Singapore, to address exposure to PM2.5. As the issue increasingly transcends national borders, collective effort is needed to drive sustainable development and long-term growth.
Natamon has served as a rapporteur at the Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS Thailand). She has also worked as a research assistant on diplomatic issues in Southeast Asia. Her work focuses on how domestic politics shape foreign policy in the region. She holds a degree in international relations and has experience in policy analysis, event reporting, and regional research.
Myanmar 🇲🇲
China’s Pressure on TNLA Exposes Beijing’s Self-Serving Mediation
by Myat Moe Kywe
A wave of disappointment spread among observers this Wednesday as the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) announced its decision to withdraw troops from Mogok in the Mandalay Region and Momeik in northern Shan State. The decision, made during China-brokered peace talks held in Kunming, marks another loss for the resistance movement following earlier concessions by the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) in September.
The TNLA, established in 1992 as the armed wing of the Palaung State Liberation Front (PSLF), has been fighting for the liberation and self-determination of the Ta’ang people for decades. However, according to Myanmar-based media outlet The Irrawaddy, the TNLA announced a ceasefire agreement with the military regime due to increasing diplomatic facilitation under Beijing’s guidance.
Chinese mediation of peace talks between EAOs and the junta began shortly after the launch of Operation 1027, a large-scale coordinated offensive that allowed several EAOs to gain significant ground across the northeastern and western parts of the country in late 2023. For instance, the TNLA alone had captured 12 townships, including Mogok and Momeik.
However, under the newly reached agreement, the TNLA consented to withdraw its troops from these two townships, while the military regime agreed to halt its airstrikes and ground offensives. Earlier in October, the military had launched a 21-day counter-offensive to regain control of the territories it had previously lost to the TNLA. With a sham election scheduled for December 2025, the military has been accelerating its counter-offensives to reclaim lost ground, combining intensified operations, especially air attacks, with Beijing’s growing pressure on EAOs.
In fact, while the TNLA was initially reluctant to make concessions, China strengthened its grip on ethnic armed groups by closing border gates, which disrupted essential supplies such as internet access, fuel, and electricity. A China specialist interviewed by the BBC asserted that “the TNLA might have made this concession to maintain control over other territories where they have gained power de facto and that were being targeted by the junta’s recurrent airstrikes.” Therefore, the combination of these two parallel pressures—military offensives and Beijing influence—seems to have been the key driver behind the agreement.
China, which has long been claimed to adhere to the non-intervention principle in its foreign policy, has played a more explicit role since Operation 1027. A wave of adaptive pragmatism has led China to use its influence to encourage dialogue among ethnic armed groups, while providing military and financial support to the military towards the sham election. As China sees the military regime as a stabilising force, the TNLA’s territorial expansion is perceived as a potentially destabilizing act, which explains Beijing’s choice to take a more active role.
Despite the TNLA’s withdrawal from Mogok, the Mandalay section of the People Defense Forces (PDF), which is under the chain of command of the National Unity Government (NUG) Defense Ministry, publicly pledged to continue fighting against the military in cooperation with other allies to defend Mogok from being retaken. This move demonstrates that, even as the TNLA retreats, resistance forces remain committed to contesting military control. At the same time, Beijing’s role as a mediator appears to be evolving, with its recent actions aimed more at maintaining stability than at addressing Myanmar’s underlying conflict dynamics. As the military regime races to reclaim its lost territories before the contentious December election, the latest TNLA retreat and the earlier concessions by the MNDAA show that the success of Myanmar’s resistance will be determined not only on the battlefield, but also through the complex interplay of domestic dynamics and regional power politics.
Myat is a senior undergraduate student majoring in Politics, Philosophy, and Economics. She has interned at The Asia Foundation in Washington, D.C., and she has also worked as a summer research assistant at the Centre for Policy and Innovation (CRPI), gaining experience in research and analysis. Her work focuses on civic engagement, gender, youth leadership, and community development.
Lao PDR 🇱🇦
Vietnam’s Enduring Influence Amid Evolving Lao-China relations
by Chammie Lo, in Vientiane
Lao President and Party General Secretary Thongloun Sisoulith recently visited Hanoi to attend the signing ceremony of the United Nations Convention against Cybercrime (also known as “Hanoi Convention) and met Vietnamese Prime Minister Phạm Minh Chính along with other senior officials. Both sides reaffirmed the “great, special friendship and comprehensive cooperation” that has long underpinned one of the region’s closest bilateral relationships.
That said, many noted how China’s deepening footprint in Laos, with Beijing now being Laos’ largest foreign investor, is increasingly testing Vietnam’s traditional influence on Vientiane. For decades, Vietnam has been Laos’ only maritime outlet, which is crucial for a landlocked state. However, the completion of the Laos-China railway closes off Laos's move towards China, and grants Vientiane another maritime outlet. Moreover, Laos’ ambition to become the “battery of Southeast Asia,” powered by dozens of hydropower dams, has become a source of anxiety for Hanoi, which worries about the effects on water and food security downstream in the Mekong Delta.
Still, predictions that Vietnam is losing its influence are largely overstated. Laos tilting towards China must be interpreted within the context of a small, landlocked state seeking balance amid the geography and constraints of development. The intertwined historical bonding between Vientiane and Hanoi has been deeply rooted. Their relationship dates back to the 16th century, when the Vietnamese ruled Lancang. Moreover, in 1975, the Pathet Lao gained power with Hanoi’s support to establish independence, and during the Sino-Vietnamese War, Laos stood firmly on Vietnam’s side, providing crucial support to Vietnamese communist forces along the Ho Chi Minh Trail.
It is not only history, but also geography that keeps the two countries’ bond hard-wired. Laos and Vietnam share a 2,161-kilometer border, which is almost twice the length of Vietnam’s border with China. For Vietnam, the continued stability of a Vietnam-aligned Lao ruling remains strategically necessary for national security. And till now, Laos is only one of the two nations the Communist Party of Vietnam refers to an hem (brothers).
Also, the social fabric between the two states is unexpectedly dense. Ten Vietnamese and Lao provinces share ‘twinning’ arrangements, promoting exchanges across trade, education, and governance. Thousands of Lao students study abroad at Hanoi University every year, incubating new generations of politicians. Also, many Vietnamese immigrants stay in Laos for business, from Savannakhet to Vientiane. By contrast, Lao citizens’ opinion on China has grown more cautious, due to the growing concern about forced displacement, debt dependency, and economic competition.
To conclude, as Southeast Asia’s balance of power evolves, the Lao-Vietnam partnerships, rooted in geography, ideology, shared history, and social relations, remains an enduring constant in the region.
Chammie is a development professional working on sustainable finance and inclusive livelihoods in Laos. She holds a degree in Politics and Law from the University of Hong Kong and has contributed research insights to academic and community spaces on heat governance, climate migration, and emission transparency.
Editorial Deadline 31/10/2025 11:59 PM (UTC +8)
