Hanoi’s High-Stakes Hedging
Issue 28 — Key Developments Across the Philippines, Singapore, and Vietnam
Editor’s Note
by Karen Ysabelle R. David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk
No matter the year, geopolitics is a game of high stakes. But as 2025 ends with an unreliable United States and an ascendant China, the countries of Southeast Asia have to strategize for their survival in an increasingly uncertain world. In Vietnam, the Prime Minister’s back-to-back meetings with a Russian energy CEO and high-level government officials in late November is a sign of Hanoi’s willingness to engage with a belligerent Moscow as part of its hedging strategy.
Singapore also focuses on its bilateral ties in this week’s issue, as it establishes consulates in the Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak. Like Vietnam, Singapore is using its bilateral ties as a way to fulfill a strategy, although the city-state’s is one with a different goal: that of enhancing its connectivity with the rest of ASEAN.
But in the Philippines, the hectic Christmas season has led to more domestic concerns. With the holiday rush nearing its peak, the issues inherent in Metro Manila’s Transport Network Vehicle Service (TNVS) system have once again been brought to the forefront, exposing yet another transportation problem in a city already famous for its traffic and congestion.
Vietnam 🇻🇳
Hedging the Eagle, Embracing the Bear
by Tri Vo, in Ho Chi Minh City
While Western capitals remain fixated on the war in Ukraine, a quiet but pivotal geopolitical maneuver is unfolding in Hanoi. From 29 November to 5 December 2025, Andrey Yatskin, First Deputy Speaker of the Russian Federation Council, led a high-level delegation to Vietnam. His visit, following closely on the heels of a critical meeting between Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh and the CEO of Russian energy giant Zarubezhneft, signals the staying power of bilateral ties despite Russia’s strained relations with the EU and the US, Vietnam’s vital economic partners. Yet, such paradoxical engagement is the means by which Hanoi can create diplomatic maneuvering room in so turbulent a time.
The timing of such diplomatic engagements is far from coincidental. The return of Donald Trump to the White House has fundamentally altered the strategic calculus in Southeast Asia. With the new US administration threatening a 20% baseline tariff on Vietnamese goods to address a US$111 billion trade deficit in the first 10 months of 2025 alone, in addition to the US constantly shifting positions with long-standing allies in Europe and Asia, this belies Washington’s increasingly fickle diplomatic posture instead of being a stable “comprehensive strategic partner.” Hanoi is cognizant of the fact that firmly aligning with the US can heighten the abandonment risk that it is loath to find itself in. In this context, Russia reemerges not as a relic of the Cold War, but as an indispensable pillar of Vietnam’s national security and diplomacy.
This strategy is a textbook manifestation of Major Power Balancing, specifically the variant known in International Relations theory as “strategic hedging.” Unlike simple balancing, which implies aligning with one power to block another, hedging allows a middle power like Vietnam to cultivate a diversified portfolio of diplomatic partners to mitigate the risk of putting too many eggs in certain baskets. By reinforcing its “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership” with Moscow, Hanoi ensures it possesses a contingency strategic guarantor to balance between an unreliable Washington, a flagging EU, and an increasingly assertive Beijing.
Nowhere is this hedging more visible than in the energy sector. The 27 November meeting between Zarubezhneft CEO Sergei Kudryashov and Prime Minister Chinh clearly demonstrated the importance of oil and gas in the two countries’ bilateral ties. Vietnam is actively encouraging Russian state energy firms to expand their operations in contested waters in the South China Sea, viewing Russian oil operations as a geopolitical shield. In Hanoi’s calculation, Beijing is less likely to pose challenges to the assets of its vital strategic partner, Moscow, than those of Western energy majors.
In the era of Trump 2.0, Vietnam’s continued engagement with Russia provides a case in point for its ASEAN peers on the importance and viability of engaging with sometimes diametrically opposing global power nodes to ensure the ability to hedge against drastic alterations of the global diplomatic environment.
Tri has experience in management consulting and strategy, having worked with institutions such as the UNDP, The Asia Group, and ARC Group. He has provided strategic, legal, and operational insights to clients in sectors including manufacturing, energy, and technology. He holds both academic and professional experience related to Southeast and East Asia, with a focus on regional development and policy.
Singapore 🇸🇬
Singapore-Malaysia Relations Continued
by Nurul Aini, in Singapore
As the Johor-Singapore Special Economic Zone (JS-SEZ) ramps up with plans for improved frameworks for bilateral cooperation, Singapore is set to open consulates in Sabah and Sarawak, in a move that can be characterized as an act of sub-national diplomacy as the nation establishes direct relations with local state leadership. The joint statement made on 4 December 2025 during the 12th Singapore-Malaysia Leaders’ Retreat is significant in affirming Singapore’s multilateral approach that now spans individual local states. Contrary to the belief that Singapore is meddling with Malaysia’s politics, this move can alternatively be seen as the country’s attempt at working with the strengths of Sabah and Sarawak, especially in areas that are pragmatically beneficial to Singapore, similar to its strategic relationship with Johor Bahru and Kuala Lumpur without overstepping federal leadership.
As Malaysia formally agrees to Singapore’s proposal for the consulates, this Singapore-East Malaysia relationship is intended to deepen people-to-people ties, increase trade flows and investments, and provide consular services to Singaporeans there. According to Dr. Phar Kim Beng, a professor of ASEAN studies at the International Islamic University of Malaysia, this diplomatic relationship will provide Singapore with long-term access to Sabah and Sarawak’s strategic sectors, such as energy, food security, rare earth elements, and ecotourism. He also argued that, “extending this cooperation into Borneo strengthened ASEAN’s cohesion at a time when the region is preparing for transformative chairmanships under Malaysia in 2025 and the Philippines in 2026.” In September 2025, Deputy State Secretary (Operations) of the Sarawak State Government, Datu Hii Chang Kee, characterized Singapore as a hub for global trade, innovation, finance, and connectivity; thus, establishing a relationship with the city-state means expanding opportunities for ideas, investments, and opportunities for Sarawak. Additionally, the construction of undersea power cables to supply electricity from Sarawak to Singapore will begin by 2026, suggested by Sarawak’s Premier Abang Johari Oping as advancing the ASEAN power grid vision. Negotiations are currently underway to iron out the roles each country will play in this project, with Abang Johari noting the project as “going on the right path.”
Apart from these agreements, Singapore is also expanding its regional connectivity through tourism diplomacy, such as by reinstating flights from Changi Airport to cities with a strong cultural presence — like Kota Bharu in Kelantan, Malaysia, after a halt during the COVID-19 pandemic — and expanding direct flights to popular locations, like the coastal cities of Nha Trang and Da Nang in Vietnam. By the end of 2026, the Johor Bahru-Singapore Rapid Transit System (RTS) is expected to open, with trains expecting to carry 10,000 people per hour in each direction. With Singapore enhancing its relations with its Southeast Asian neighbors, it sets the rhythm for ASEAN connectivity in the coming years.
Aini is currently pursuing a master’s degree in English literature at Nanyang Technological University. She has experience working in youth groups, contributing to the planning and management of outreach activities.
The Philippines 🇵🇭
Fines and Flaws in TNVS Operations
by Arianne De Guzman, in Bulacan
On 11 December 2025, the Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) released Memorandum Circular No. 2025-055, which penalizes Transport Network Vehicle Service (TNVS) drivers who cancel accepted bookings with unjustifiable reasons. Such violations are classified as a “refusal to convey passengers” under Section IV.2 of Joint Administrative Order 2014-01 of the Department of Transportation (DOTr).
For passengers, this regulatory response addresses a persistent and well-documented issue, especially during this holiday season. According to LTFRB Chairman Atty. Vigor D. Mendoza II, commuters’ complaints about sudden cancellations spike during peak hours and in areas with heavy traffic, often leaving them stranded with limited alternatives. In an urban transport system characterized by congestion and a non-people-centered transport system, the cancellation system can impose both tangible and intangible economic and social costs for workers, students, and micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs) that rely on predictable mobility.
At the same time, it reveals systemic weaknesses within the TNVS model. Research from the International Labour Organization (ILO) shows that app-based drivers are closely managed by algorithmic management systems that tightly control fares, incentives, and work allocation, which also often transfer business risk to drivers themselves. Under this model, cancellations are rarely driven by indiscipline; instead, they are caused by structural pressures such as low net fares, long pickup distances, or worsening traffic conditions, allowing the algorithm to take immediate decisions for surge fees that are financially unviable after acceptance.
The LTFRB acknowledges valid grounds for cancellation, such as passenger safety concerns during national calamities, car maintenance issues, or problematic passenger behavior. However, they overlook the structural and recurring factors that trigger cancellations in practice. Such a regulatory response remains complaint-driven, focusing on penalizing drivers rather than examining the platform design of the transport network companies.
Companies are mandated to submit monthly cancellation reports and discipline drivers for violations, but they are not completely held accountable for fare structures and the implications of algorithmic management, leaving drivers to selectively accept bookings.
The LTFRB’s response originates from public utility regulation: once a booking is accepted, the service obligation must be fulfilled. However, an effective regulatory response must look into how structural factors influence behavior. Without reforms in pricing transparency and platform accountability, such penalties remain mere reactive measures rather than sustainable solutions that benefit both the drivers as workers and passengers.
Protecting passenger rights and safeguarding driver welfare go hand in hand. The LTFRB memorandum circular remains crucial as a decisive step toward accountability, but its long-term effectiveness relies on whether regulation evolves to address systemic imbalances that place drivers and passengers at odds within the flawed system. Ultimately, a holistic approach — one that balances enforcement with structural reforms, such as revisiting fare policies and algorithmic transparency — is essential to ensuring a reliable and sustainable TNVS ecosystem.
Arianne has worked in legal research at the Philippines Department of Justice and in policy research at De La Salle University’s Jesse M. Robredo Institute of Governance, supporting projects on systemic reform. She holds a degree in Political Science from Colegio de San Juan de Letran and is pursuing a master’s in Sociology at the University of the Philippines Diliman. She is also involved in youth development and grassroots advocacy through the Rotaract Club of Santa Maria.
Editorial Deadline 16/12/2025 11:59 PM (UTC +8)
