Hidden Tolls, Emerging Costs
Issue 49 — Key Developments Across Brunei, Indonesia, and Malaysia
Editor’s Note
by Siu Tzyy Wei, Lead Editor - Maritime Crescent Desk
Progress, it turns out, always comes with fine print.
This week, we look beneath the surface of stories that ask the same question: what is the true cost of development, and who is left to foot the bill when announcement fades and minutiae takes hold?
In Indonesia, Hree P. Samudra pulls back the curtain on Jakarta’s modernisation ambitions to trace what the headline budget figures conceal: currency depreciation, deferred maintenance and slow erosion of military readiness that often go unnoticed. In Brunei, Syimah Johari examines the proposed Brunei-Miri Bus Link - a welcome step towards the region’s most active cross-border corridors, but one whose promise hinges on questions of infrastructure, border capacity and whether a new but slower route can compete with long-existing commuting habits. In Malaysia, Edrina Ozaidi turns to the wards where young doctors are stretched thin by a system that asks them to bear the human cost of a healthcare structure long overdue for reform.
Together, this week’s correspondents remind us that progress rarely arrives without hidden tolls. The costs that matter seldom break the surface, but are the ones that emerge quietly, long after the cameras stop rolling.
Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳
Between Speed and Access
by Syimah Johari, in Bandar Seri Begawan
Bruneians have long travelled to Miri for short getaways, affordable shopping, and access to a wider range of services and attractions. Despite the frequency of cross-border movement, travelling to and from Miri can be inconvenient due to border procedures, transport logistics, and reliance on private vehicles. This ongoing mobility has prompted discussions surrounding the proposed Brunei-Miri Bus Link, an initiative aimed at improving cross-border connectivity by formalising an already active travel corridor. The proposed weekly airport-to-airport route is estimated to take around three hours, notably longer than travelling by private vehicle, raising questions over why a slower public transport alternative is being introduced when faster private travel options already exist.
At present, cross-border movement between Brunei and Miri is already frequent, with many travelling between the two locations on a regular basis. However, movement remains heavily reliant on private vehicles due to flexibility and convenience, making travel largely informal and demand-driven. Much of this movement is also socially and economically motivated, including travel for shopping, work, education, and leisure. With this in mind, the proposed Brunei-Miri Bus Link was introduced by Malaysia’s Deputy Tourism, Arts and Culture Minister, Chiew Choon Man, who stated that the initiative could help boost cross-border tourism between the two countries. As the proposal remains in its preliminary stages, further bilateral discussions are expected to take place.
Despite the continued reliance on private vehicles to travel between Brunei and Miri, there are underlying logistical challenges that could make the proposed bus link an attractive alternative. While travelling by car offers greater flexibility and shorter travel times, factors such as fuel costs, parking fees, vehicle security, and border delays can make cross-border travel more costly and demanding for individuals. In this sense, the proposed bus link could provide a more cost-efficient and centralised mode of transport, reducing some of the planning and logistical burdens associated with private travel.
This is particularly relevant for Bruneians who use Miri as a transit point through Miri International Airport as a more affordable international option. A 2025 study focusing primarily on Brunei visitors to Miri found that approximately 56 per cent travelled there for overseas flights. As such, a dedicated bus service could potentially improve accessibility and convenience for such travellers.
However, concerns surrounding efficiency still remain. The proposed bus journey is estimated to take around three hours- longer than travelling by private vehicle due to road limitations and possible delays at immigration checkpoints. During peak travel periods, processing larger groups of passengers places additional pressure on existing border infrastructure, affecting travel flow and waiting times. This raises broader questions about whether supporting infrastructure and border procedures are prepared to accommodate the proposed service effectively.
Ultimately, the proposed Brunei-Miri Bus Link reflects a shift towards formalising an actively evolving pattern of cross-border movement. Its effectiveness will therefore depend on how well it fits into current travel behaviour and whether it can offer a practical and accessible alternative for regular cross-border travellers.
Syimah is a graduate of King’s College London with a BA in International Relations. With a strong focus on diplomacy, regional cooperation, and development policy, she is passionate about contributing to meaningful change through public service. Currently, she is involved in poverty alleviation work through a local NGO.
Malaysia 🇲🇾
Worn to the Bone
by Edrina Lisa Ozaidi, in WP Kuala Lumpur
We have often heard about the bustling, scary scenario in the emergency department of a hospital. Teleseries or medical dramas have taught us one thing — it takes a lot of staff to run a department smoothly. The Malaysian medical sector, however, faces a major crisis of staff retention, especially among junior doctors who battle against job security and burnout.
To understand the severity of the issue, one must understand the progression of problems. Back in 2016, the lack of permanent vacancies prompted the government to introduce the 5-year contract system, where junior doctors will serve 3 years of housemanship plus 2 years of compulsory placement. For those intending to specialise, 2 more years are needed.
This has caused a two-tier workforce, doctors who are already in placement and contract doctors that face a ceiling. While the placement was meant to address oversupply of talent and budgetary constraints, it further caused disparity, significant job insecurity, and career and specialisation pathways among junior doctors.
The suppressed frustration then caused a movement where doctors staged a nationwide strike during the pandemic. Unfortunately, the solution that was prompted by the government was to open more permanent posts and grant Hadiah Latihan Persekutuan (HLP) eligibility to contract officers to mediate the current tension while the systemic flaws are not yet addressed.
By 2025 and the current year, more systemic failures become more noticeable. The government also introduced a shift system intended to replace 24-hour-on-call shifts with 18-hour shifts. However, this integrated on-call hours into the regular work week, causing doctors to lose weekdays on-call allowances, a move that was criticised by the doctors association as a pay cut in disguise.
Recently, the health director-general issued a landmark circular capping house officer hours at 60-62 hours per week and strictly prohibiting 24-hour shifts. The new mandates also mention the implementation of three flexible work shifts (morning, evening, night), without considering the number of housemen available.
The directive stipulates that in the event of a lack of medical officers, the clinical workload for evening and night shifts must be borne entirely by medical officers and specialists to ensure compliance with house officers’ rest periods.
Private doctors’ associations call out that 60 hours remain burdensome compared to the international 40-hour standard (based in UK), while calling for the government to address the systemic failures. Unlike an official cap on trainee doctors’ work hours in Malaysia’s public service, medical officers often work 33 hours on-call shifts.
Recent statistics also reveal more systemic failure, where out of 5,000 housemanship positions offered, only 529 graduates reported for duty. While fewer graduates enter the public system, the burden on existing staff increases. Despite higher on-call allowances (raised by 40% in Budget 2026) and relocation aids, doctors are leaving for the private sector or overseas for better opportunities and pay, and Malaysia needs to step up in its system to ensure the rate of doctors’ retention improves.
Edrina is a communications professional with a background in international relations. She holds a degree from the University of Nottingham Malaysia and has worked across public relations and social media for organizations in the development, education, and corporate sectors. Her work focuses on crafting narratives around regional affairs and strengthening media engagement across Southeast Asia.
Indonesia 🇮🇩
What the Budget Numbers Don’t Show
by Hree Putri Samudra, in Jakarta
Defense modernization is one of the easier things to sell in Jakarta. The announcements are familiar by now: Rafales from France, J-10s from China, PT PAL talking about unmanned submarines, another parliamentary hearing where the budget edges upward and officials speak of momentum. The ambition is real enough. What gets less attention is the part that starts after the cameras are gone. Procurement contracts do not end at signing. They arrive later as maintenance obligations, spare-parts orders, software updates, fuel bills, and invoices priced against a rupiah sitting closer to Rp17,500 than the Rp16,500 the budget was built around.
On paper, Rp187.1 trillion suggests a government still serious about defense modernization. The exchange rate complicates that story. Rafale contracts, T-50i sustainment, and billions in foreign financing behind the J-10 acquisitions are tied to currencies Indonesia does not control. The budget approved in Jakarta remains numerically intact as the rupiah weakens. At current rates, the difference runs into hundreds of millions of dollars, enough to turn maintenance, ammunition, and training from routine planning questions into budgeting problems.
This is usually where the public conversation loses track of how defense budgets actually work. When conversations revolve only on capital, what gets squeezed are the less visible elements that keep a military running. Refitting schedules stretch. Spare-parts procurement slows. Exercises get reduced because fuel and operating costs no longer match the assumptions made months earlier. Nobody announces lower sortie rates or delayed maintenance cycles. It is here that currency pressure leaves its mark - not in procurement headlines but in the quieter erosion of readiness.
Indonesia has been bearing this defence budgeting imbalance for years. Procurement and personnel absorb attention and money more easily than sustainment ever does. Maintenance, readiness, and lifecycle costs tend to sit further down the priority list until the exchange rate forces them back into view. When the rupiah is relatively stable, the system muddles through. Under sustained depreciation, the distance between what Indonesia formally owns and what the TNI can reliably operate becomes harder to ignore.
Defense is competing inside a tighter budget than the headline numbers suggest. Oil assumptions have shifted, debt servicing is heavier, and Makan Bergizi Gratis now carries Rp335 trillion, almost double the military allocation. Prabowo has defended the program and understandably so. But when some spending lines are politically difficult to touch, adjustment rarely disappears. It tends to move elsewhere, often into maintenance, training, and delayed upgrades.
The foreign policy effects are harder to measure but still worth noticing. Governments under fiscal pressure negotiate differently, especially when procurement financing narrows and economic assumptions become harder to defend. Jakarta’s commitment to large-scale US energy purchases was presented as partnership, and while there is no reason to dismiss that outright, tighter budgets usually leave less room to bargain comfortably.
Bebas dan aktif - free and active - was always a doctrine with a material premise: that Indonesia would be substantial enough, stable enough, and solvent enough that genuine independence was possible. That premise hasn’t collapsed. But it isn’t free, rather, it is getting more costly to sustain.
Hree is a Policy Fellow at the Asia-Pacific Leadership Network (APLN) where she leads research and policy interventions on Indo-Pacific nuclear security and AI governance. She previously served as a Research Fellow at the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) and has managed multi-country security portfolios across all 10 ASEAN member states. Her work examines the intersection of emerging technologies, strategic stability, and the evolution of regional security architectures. She specializes in institutional risk assessment and the application of open-source intelligence (OSINT) for strategic monitoring. Her current research focuses on how technological shifts such as AI and advanced verification tools reshape escalation dynamics and multilateral cooperation in a multipolar world.
Editorial Deadline 16/05/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)
