Inside the Halls of Power
Issue 24 — Key Developments Across the Philippines, Singapore, and Vietnam
Editor’s Note
by Karen Ysabelle R. David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk
In Southeast Asia, power — especially political power — is a complicated thing. It can be found in diplomatic conferences and military talks behind closed doors, but also out in the open, in the complicated lives and legacies of the region’s statesmen. This week, our three new correspondents take us on a tour through the halls of power in the countries of the Pacific Corridor.
From Singapore, Jennifer Tan writes about the significance of COP30 for the city-state and for ASEAN as a bloc. Despite being held across the world in Brazil, Southeast Asia’s vulnerability to the effects of climate change means that the conference is a crucial one for Singapore and ASEAN to be involved in.
From Vietnam, Sean Vu reports on the context behind, and the implications of, a recent meeting between the United States Defense Secretary and Vietnam’s Minister of National Defense. Faced with both the past and future — the shadow of the Vietnam War and the rising threat of China — defense cooperation is at the forefront of both countries’ minds.
And from the Philippines, Glenn Vincent N. Boquilon’s piece traces the life of Juan Ponce Enrile, one of the country’s longest-serving political figures. His passing last week exposed how his lengthy and complicated legacy helped shape the state of the Philippines today and the nature of power in a country filled to the brim with political elites.
Singapore 🇸🇬
From Belém to Southeast Asia: What COP30 Means for Singapore and ASEAN
by Jennifer Hui En Tan, in Singapore
The 30th Session of the Conference of the Parties (COP30), currently held in Belém, Brazil, is an annual global climate summit organized by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Held from 10 to 21 November 2025, the main agenda of COP30 is to advance mitigation efforts against climate change by gathering member states and reviewing progress and national commitments towards limiting global warming. COP30 serves as a space for states to discuss their updated Nationally Determined Contributions for 2035 and to advance discussions on the mobilization of USD 1.3 trillion annually in climate finance. Both are critical steps to accelerate the progress towards the 1.5-degree target. Almost all 198 parties, including all ASEAN member states, are in attendance. COP30 marks a turning point for the grouping, as all member states are stepping up as a coordinated bloc in global climate negotiations. COP30 also provides Singapore with a platform to translate green leadership into regional influence and partnership.
Climate change has been a major topic of discussion among global leaders, but it is especially crucial for ASEAN member states, which collectively face some of the world’s highest exposure to rising sea levels, extreme weather, and ecosystem degradation. COP30 focuses on global adaptation and nature-based solutions, while Southeast Asian nations are home to vital rainforests, coastlines, and marine biodiversity, a reality that makes the region highly relevant to COP30’s agenda. ASEAN member states have presented a Joint Statement on Climate Change for COP30, which was endorsed by ASEAN Environment Ministers during the 18th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Environment and subsequently adopted at the 47th ASEAN Summit. The ASEAN Joint Statement on Climate Change focuses on strengthening climate finance, advancing technology transfer, and enhancing adaptation and resilience across the region. It underscores ASEAN’s collective call for fairer access to funding and support to address rising vulnerabilities such as sea level rise, heatwaves, and biodiversity loss.
For Singapore, this means playing an active role in driving sustainable development, advancing green technologies, and strengthening regional climate partnerships. In Belém, Singapore is hosting a ‘Singapore Pavilion’ to showcase their climate action, innovation, and partnerships, reinforcing its leadership role within ASEAN and the global community. This commitment aligns closely with the Singapore Green Plan 2030. Introduced in February 2021, the Singapore Green Plan 2030 is an ongoing nationwide initiative to advance the state’s national agenda towards sustainability. The Singapore Green Plan strengthens the state’s credibility by aiming for net zero emissions by 2050.
Alongside Singapore, several ASEAN countries have set up their own pavilions to share national priorities and climate solutions, though their scale and focus vary depending on resources and policy agendas. For instance, Indonesia’s pavilion highlights its ambition to become a “green bridge” through a high-integrity carbon market, while Malaysia uses its pavilion to showcase nature-based solutions and community resilience projects.
ASEAN as a bloc also introduced an ASEAN Pavilion for the first time, highlighting collective challenges, regional cooperation, and shared adaptation needs. Compared to Singapore’s innovation-driven presence, the ASEAN Pavilion focuses more on unity, resilience, and giving smaller member states a stronger voice.
The Joint Statement signifies the bloc’s growing commitment to implementing the Paris Agreement and positions ASEAN as a coordinated actor seeking equitable solutions and sustainable growth amid global climate transitions. By presenting a unified voice, the Statement also reflects ASEAN’s shift from passive participation to active regional leadership in global climate negotiations.
Jennifer is a final-year International Relations student at the Singapore Institute of Management, where she focuses on political engagement, diplomacy, and community governance. She is an active volunteer in her constituency, working closely with residents to understand local concerns, facilitate dialogue, and support community initiatives.
Vietnam 🇻🇳
United States and Vietnam Resume Defense, Legacy Talks After Months of Uncertainty
by Sean Huy Vu
On 2 November, United States Secretary (US) of Defense Pete Hegseth met his Vietnamese counterpart General Phan Van Giang in Hanoi as part of a security cooperation tour with Asian allies and partners. The meeting occurred amid trade tensions and after the former United States Agency for International Development (USAID) was closed in July, which was responsible for funding several Vietnam War legacy projects, such as dioxin remediation and removal of unexploded ordinances. War legacies are a critical issue for the Vietnamese military and the sudden suspension of these projects caused the US to appear unreliable in honoring its commitments. After months of uncertainty, Hegseth reassured Phan that the US will resume funding for legacy projects. The US Embassy further stated that both sides will improve defense cooperation through training, combating transnational crime, and enhancing maritime security, among other issues.
Hegseth’s visit is the culmination of years of on-and-off arms sales negotiations, as Vietnam has sought to reduce — though not eliminate — its procurement of Russian weapons for several years. However, what remains to be seen is the exact equipment the US intends to sell. Reuters, citing anonymous official sources, has reported that the Vietnamese plan to purchase C-130 Hercules military transport aircraft. These purchases would be significant for Vietnam’s Ministry of Public Security (MPS), who have sought to improve their lift capacity.
The US Secretary of Defense’s recent meetings with the Vietnamese Minister of National Defense (MND) in recent years are somewhat significant, since the organization is generally reluctant to engage with the US directly out of concern of offending China. The Vietnamese and Chinese MNDs, and the Central Military Commissions (CMC) of their respective Communist Parties, engage in routine joint exercises and dialogues to resolve maritime disputes. According to Zachary Abuza in his latest book The Vietnam People’s Army, it is the MPS, not the MND, who most often seeks out the US to acquire defense technology for indigenous innovation.
The MND’s willingness to openly engage with the US suggests three major shifts in Vietnamese policy. First, it implies a growing consensus within the Vietnamese government of the national security challenge China poses to the country’s sovereignty. This is noteworthy since conservative factions of the regime have tilted towards China and feared “peaceful evolution.” Second, the engagement demonstrates the growing influence of To Lam, the Party General Secretary since May 2024. Given his four decades of experience in the MPS, and chairmanship of the CMC — which controls all military policy — increased interaction with the United States is understandable. Finally, the meeting exemplifies Vietnam’s growing confidence in asserting its sovereignty and security interests, even at the risk of arousing Chinese insecurity. Since China’s global ambitions for geopolitical and economic hegemony partially require cooperation with Vietnam, Beijing is reluctant to openly criticize Hanoi’s interactions with Washington. The Hegseth-Giang meeting occurs as the Vietnamese Navy accelerates land reclamation and construction on the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, much to China’s concern.
The country’s reliance on foreign arms purchases or licensed production raises questions about the country’s preparedness in twenty-first-century warfare. Two ways the Vietnam People’s Army can overcome its limited budget and better defend its vulnerable coastline is through developing anti-ship missiles and autonomous weapons (drones). These are low-cost, high-impact weapons that can effectively complicate the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’s maritime assertiveness, and would complement Vietnam’s diplomatic hedging through security ties with the US.
Sean is a scholar of East Asian history, culture, and international relations, with current research at Georgetown University examining working-class labor and human trafficking in the region. His broader interests include the social psychology of religion and identity politics. Sean previously taught modern Korean history at the University of California, Irvine, where he completed his B.A. in History, and later taught English in Ho Chi Minh City while studying Vietnamese language and culture. His writing has been published by UC Irvine, Johns Hopkins University, and Foreign Analysis.
The Philippines 🇵🇭
Enduring Influence: How Juan Ponce Enrile Defined Philippine Political Elites
by Glenn Vincent N. Boquilon, in Angeles City
One of the Philippines’ longest-serving political figures, Juan Ponce Enrile, passed away on 13 November 2025 due to pneumonia. At 101 years old, his political career spanned over five decades, holding some of the country’s most powerful offices: Senate President, Secretary of Defense, Minister of Justice, and his latest and final post, Chief Legal Counsel of President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. While his death signals the end of a chapter, his legacy and influence continue to shape politics and governance, underscoring the expansive power of elites in Philippine democracy.
Born in 1924 as Juan Furagganan in Cagayan, he endured poverty and had to work menial jobs to support his education. However, his circumstances changed when he met and received support from his father, Alfonso Ponce Enrile, who was Cagayan’s former congressman. Finishing his degrees at renowned universities — the University of the Philippines College of Law and Harvard Law School — catapulted his career in politics and caught the attention of former President Ferdinand Marcos Sr., who was then a Senator. This highlights how elite networks shape opportunities in society and set the stage for the establishment of power structures.
As the Defense Minister for the first Marcos regime, Enrile was a key architect and enforcer behind policies that centralized power and curtailed dissent towards the government. His political maneuverings demonstrated how political elites operate to consolidate authority and decisions. His wide-ranging power during the Martial Law era became a defining moment in his career as dissent was suppressed, at the expense of civil liberties. Decades later, this controversy continues to reverberate throughout Philippine society.
He later defected during the 1986 EDSA People Power Revolution, showing his political adaptability, a skill that he has used to thrive across multiple administrations. As the 26th Senate President, he is credited with making notable legislative contributions, including the extension of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program and the passage of the Anti-Child Pornography Act in 2009.
In summary, his political career is a combination of both controversy and accomplishment, notwithstanding his cases of graft and corruption. Enrile’s history shows how political ambition endures when you have been there long enough to shape the rules of the game. In Southeast Asia, this is not an isolated case.
Juan Ponce Enrile’s passing is more than a historical footnote. It delves into the reality of the enduring power that political elites hold in the region, a type of power that allows you to navigate the political landscape unscathed and often unaccounted for. His pathway in politics shows how power can be adaptive, outlast crises, and remain firmly in place. In the end, Enrile’s life makes us wonder: how much of enduring influence is earned, and how much is simply inherited by those who master the system?
Glenn holds a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from the University of Santo Tomas. His experience spans governance programs, policy development, and political research, having worked with the Ateneo School of Government and WR Numero Research on projects focused on electoral reform, public opinion, and regional development. He also helped coordinate the drafting of the Bangsamoro Local Government Code and supported the Academy of Multiparty Democracy.
Editorial Deadline 18/11/2025 11:59 PM (UTC +8)
