Johannesburg's Proxy Prince
Issue 25— Key Developments Across Brunei, Indonesia, and Malaysia
Editor’s Note
by Haniva Sekar Deanty, Lead Editor - Maritime Crescent Desk
The region’s political architecture is undergoing simultaneous stress and recalibration.
This week, Hree P. Samudra examines Indonesia’s post-2024 political settlement, where President Prabowo Subianto’s reorientation of national priorities has fundamentally altered Jakarta’s developmental narrative.
In Brunei, Wira Gregory looks at the country’s strategic outreach to Central Europe and how it points to Hungary’s widening engagement with Southeast Asia, as well as Brunei’s pursuit of new avenues for international cooperation.
Finally, Edrina highlights Malaysia’s role as a crisis mediator during the 2025 Thailand–Cambodia border escalation, leveraging its stewardship to stabilise regional flashpoints without abandoning principles of non-interference.
This week closes the Maritime Crescent’s November issues and offers a panoramic view of Southeast Asia at a moment of shifting alignments: where domestic political transformations, cross-regional diplomacy, and conflict management intersect to shape the emerging strategic landscape.
Indonesia 🇮🇩
Can One Vice President Bridge Two Indonesias?
by Hree Putri Samudra, in Jakarta
On November 20, 2025, Indonesia’s political elite performed an institutional confession. While Jokowi delivered closing remarks at the Bloomberg New Economy Forum in Singapore on digital infrastructure and QRIS fintech integration, VP Gibran boarded a plane to South Africa representing Indonesia at the G20 Summit because Prabowo refused to attend. This wasn’t a scheduling conflict. It signaled that Jakarta now operates under a different set of priorities.
The Suharto naming on November 10 explains those priorities. When Prabowo designated the authoritarian strongman a national hero, he wasn’t performing nostalgia. He made a civilizational declaration: Indonesia’s future security architecture would rest on military-first prioritization and historical authorization from autocratic legitimacy, not democratic consensus. This inverted Jokowi’s infrastructure-first model. A president who rehabilitates an authoritarian legacy cannot credibly lead in multilateral democratic forums. Gibran went to the G20 by necessity.
From 2014 to 2024 Jokowi pursued an infrastructure thesis: lay the foundation, then enable economic sophistication. He completed 190 National Strategic Projects and launched QRIS. But the model showed limits. Infrastructure spending was supposed to drive 7 percent growth, yet GDP averaged about 5 percent. In 2024, voters chose Prabowo.
Prabowo overturned Jokowi’s framework. The 2026 budget shows defense spending jumping 37 percent to Rp335.3 trillion, reaching parity with his free meals program. Within Jakarta’s fiscal ceiling every rupiah for arms comes at the expense of roads and fiber. On November 13 he flew to Australia to sign a Treaty on Common Security. Four days later, Indonesia signed an ISR cooperation agreement with Japan, integrating radar infrastructure into Western security networks. These commitments reorient Indonesia toward the US-Japan-Australia nexus as ASEAN centrality is under pressure from Indo-Pacific great power competition.
At the G20, Gibran emphasized economic justice for the Global South and food security. Absent were references to QRIS or digital infrastructure. Bilateral meetings focused on agricultural cooperation with Ethiopia and Angola, not fintech scaling. This signals that Prabowo’s development frame has shifted from Jokowi’s digital-first thesis to a security-and-agriculture-first model, with Gibran delivering the diplomatic messaging during the G20 meeting.
His G20 appearance wasn’t his decision; Prabowo sent him. He continues to oversee programs like the Health Sandbox and AI innovation because they predate Prabowo. He has zero autonomous power base. He cannot challenge Prabowo. He cannot independently champion Jokowi’s intellectual framework. He articulates Prabowo’s frame. He waits.
The bifurcation holds only if growth stays acceptable. If Q2 2026 investment realization falls below 70 percent while defense spending expands, regional governments stop funding toll roads, private investors pull back from digital infrastructure, fintech startups slow hiring, FDI contracts. Meanwhile, defense procurement accelerates.
While Vietnam 2015-2020 shows the counterexample: military modernization and digital economy simultaneously, Indonesia’s fragmented elite structure lacks this capacity. By late 2027 and into 2028, Indonesia’s fiscal window closes. Defense spending heads toward 2.5 percent of GDP and infrastructure investment stalls. Either Gibran articulates a coherent synthesis by Q2 2026, or Indonesia fractures through fiscal mathematics.
Hree serves as Project Associate for Asia and the Pacific at the Global Network of Women Peacebuilders (GNWP), where she leads multi-country initiatives integrating Women, Peace and Security (WPS), and Youth, Peace and Security (YPS) frameworks into security policies across ASEAN and South Asia. She is also a Non-Resident Fellow at the University of Glasgow’s Atomic Anxiety in the New Nuclear Age program. Previously, she served as Chair of the Humanitarian Disarmament and Inclusive Governance Working Group at the British American Security Information Council (BASIC), advocating for more accountable and inclusive nuclear policy frameworks.
Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳
Another Chapter in ASEAN-European Relations
by Wira Gregory Ejau, in Bandar Seri Begawan
His Majesty Sultan Haji Hassanal Bolkiah’s recent state visit to Hungary marked a historic milestone: the first time Brunei’s monarch has set foot in the Central European nation. The visit, held at the Sándor Palace in Budapest, was celebrated with full ceremonial honors and underscored the growing importance of Southeast Asia in Hungary’s foreign policy outlook.
During the inaugural occasion, Hungary chose to confer upon the Sultan the Grand Cross of the Order of Merit, accompanied by the Chain and Golden Radiant Star. The bestowing of such a prestigious award certainly signals Hungary’s intent to elevate and maintain long-term ties with Brunei, embedding a partnership for the foreseeable future.
The heart of the visit also involved the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding on Bilateral Consultations, a mechanism designed to institutionalize dialogue between the two governments. This MoU provides a structured platform for regular exchanges of views on issues of mutual interest, ranging from economic cooperation to education and cultural diplomacy.
With senior figures such as the Minister of Finance and Economy II accompanying the delegation, the visit was designed with substance in mind. By engaging at the ministerial level, Brunei positions itself as an active participant in Hungary’s expanding engagement with Southeast Asia, ensuring that discussions move beyond ceremony into concrete avenues of cooperation.
Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán framed the visit as an opportunity to “explore new opportunities for cooperation”, a phrase that reflects Budapest’s broader ambition to widen its diplomatic reach beyond the European Union. For Hungary, cultivating ties with Brunei is less about bilateral trade volume and more about positioning itself within ASEAN’s fast‑moving networks, where even smaller states can serve as entry points to regional dialogue.
Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó’s remark that “it is worth keeping an eye on Southeast Asia” adds a strategic dimension: Hungary is not only acknowledging the region’s economic dynamism but also its growing role in global governance. Brunei’s participation offers Budapest a practical link into ASEAN’s consensus‑driven mechanisms, where Hungary can test its ability to translate bilateral goodwill into multilateral influence.
While Brunei’s economy is heavily reliant on hydrocarbons, its leadership has consistently sought to broaden international partnerships. Hungary, with its expertise in education, technology, and renewable energy, presents potential avenues for cooperation. Educational exchanges, in particular, could serve as a bridge between the two societies, fostering people‑to‑people ties that underpin durable diplomacy.
Brunei’s inaugural state visit to Hungary marks a deliberate step toward knitting ASEAN and Europe more closely together. The signing of the MoU on bilateral consultations, the conferral of Hungary’s highest state honor on the Sultan and the emphasis on Southeast Asia’s strategic importance all point to a relationship designed to endure. For Hungary, the visit reflects a conscious pivot toward ASEAN as a region of opportunity and influence; for Brunei, it signals a readiness to broaden its diplomatic horizons and embed itself within new networks of cooperation.
Gregory is an MSc candidate in Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He works as a freelance writer specializing in international history, conflict, and counterterrorism, with experience in academia, investigative journalism, and voluntary uniformed service. He currently provides research assistance with the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) under their Southeast Asian Security and Defence Internship Programme and conducts investigations on regional security and transnational crime for a confidential company.
Malaysia 🇲🇾
Malaysia’s Essential Role in Easing Thai-Cambodia Tensions
by Edrina Lisa Ozaidi, in WP Kuala Lumpur
The Thailand-Cambodian conflict has been a recurring problem of regional stability in Southeast Asia. A recent border flare-up around July 2025 has prompted Malaysia to take a step forward to mediate a good neighbourhood role that does not limit diplomatic ties. Under the leadership of Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, Kuala Lumpur made a swift move as a neutral and essential facilitator, not as an upper-hand authoritative figure.
Malaysia’s approach has been defined by quiet diplomacy and trust-building, rather than high-stakes public pressure. When the conflict arose, compounded by the tragic loss of lives and displacement of thousands along the disputed border, ASEAN’s formal mechanisms, like the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation’s High Council, often proved too slow or politically complicated to activate. It was in this vacuum that Malaysia, leveraging its role as the ASEAN Chair, offered a vital, impartial space for dialogue.
The goal was clear: secure an immediate and unconditional ceasefire. Anwar personally engaged with the leaders of both nations, bridging the deep-seated mutual suspicion that made direct talks difficult. The fruit of this labour was the Kuala Lumpur Peace Accord, which was a crucial agreement signed on the sidelines of the 47th ASEAN Summit, witnessed by Malaysian and international actors.
This success, however, was not without its critics. Certain quarters in Thailand accused Malaysia of “meddling” or “interference” in a sovereign matter. This narrative, often fueled by domestic political currents, was firmly rebutted by the Malaysian government. As both Anwar and officials clarified, Malaysia’s role was purely one of coordination and facilitation, with the terms of peace being entirely determined by Bangkok and Phnom Penh themselves.
Ultimately, Malaysia’s intervention underscores a critical principle: the importance of ASEAN centrality. While the bloc often struggles to present a united front, the willingness of a member state to use its good offices to prevent a regional conflict is invaluable. Malaysia’s firm yet diplomatic hand ensured that a localised dispute did not spiral out of control, reaffirming its commitment to regional peace and stability.
Edrina is a communications professional with a background in international relations. She holds a degree from the University of Nottingham Malaysia and has worked across public relations and social media for organizations in the development, education, and corporate sectors. Her work focuses on crafting narratives around regional affairs and strengthening media engagement across Southeast Asia.
Editorial Deadline 23/11/2025 11:59 PM (UTC +8)
