Laos Leans East
Issue 16 — Key Developments Across Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand
Editor’s Note
by Nabil Haskanbancha, Editor in Chief
This week, Mekong Belt countries navigate turbulence at the crossroads of geopolitics, economics, and identity. Laos, burdened by debt and new U.S. tariffs, looks to BRICS and closer ties with Russia and China for financial lifelines and strategic cover. In Myanmar, the junta courts Beijing to offset sanctions and economic collapse, even as airstrikes at home reveal the gulf between ceremonial diplomacy and daily violence. Cambodia’s solidarity with Palestine, expressed through poetry and humanitarian aid, reflects both empathy rooted in its own history and a diplomatic stance aligned with most of ASEAN. Thailand, meanwhile, finds itself defending its reputation as the BBC’s documentary reignites stereotypes of nightlife and crime, prompting domestic calls for a more balanced portrayal of its culture and tourism.
Lao PDR 🇱🇦
Laos joins the SCO as a Dialogue Partner
by Chammie Lo, in Vientiane
At the 25th Heads-of-State meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in Tianjin, Laos was formally accepted as a Dialogue Partner, becoming the third ASEAN state to join the bloc led by China and Russia, after Cambodia and Myanmar. Shortly afterwards, Prime Minister Sonexay Siphandone confirmed that the country is reviewing the requirements for applying for membership in BRICS, a grouping that began with five members but has recently expanded to the Middle East and Africa.
These pivots to deepen its ties with the China and Russia bloc are not surprising, given a shifting global order. With the public debt crisis exceeding 100% of GDP, of which nearly half is owed to China, alongside new U.S. tariffs on Lao exports and tighter migration policies affecting its diaspora, the Lao PDR has been finding ways to maneuver the turbulence for economic opportunities, as well as security and diplomacy cover. China, as Lao’s largest investor and creditor, remains no stranger to its development, with the $US6 billion China–Laos railway standing as the most visible symbol of this dependence.
The Lao-Russia relationship has strengthened in recent years. particularly since 2018, with deepening military cooperation. Russia has supplied tanks, helicopters, and jet trainers, conducted joint drills in Laos, and even assisted with UXO clearance linked to a dual-use airport in Xiengkhuang Province. Bilateral trade also surged in 2024, fueled by discounted fuel sales and rising agricultural exports. Most notably, a high-level visit took place this year, the first in years, signaling intent to expand cooperation in energy, mining, and security.
Lao’s additional interest in BRICS can be directly linked to its economic aspirations. Firstly, the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB) provides concessional loans in local currencies, offering an attractive channel to finance infrastructure and development projects at a time when the national budget is under severe strain. Indonesia’s decision to join BRICS in 2025 was similarly motivated by hopes of securing NDB support for its new capital city. Secondly, Laos’s trade is overwhelmingly concentrated with China, Thailand, and Vietnam; deeper ties with BRICS could open doors to India, the Gulf, Africa, and other markets. As Lao plans to graduate from Least Developed Country (LDC) status, bloc membership could help renegotiate trade terms, strengthen trade corridors, and diversify exports. Thirdly, settling transactions in yuan, rupees, or rubles rather than U.S. dollars could reduce exposure to currency volatility, giving Vientiane a modest cushion against external shocks.
However, the power of BRICS remains uncertain and closely watched. Some argue that expanding membership and growing heterogeneity could weaken its institutional coherence and delivery capacity. While BRICS has set ambitious goals such as promoting de-dollarization, these initiatives may take years to materialize. Whether such aspirations will translate into tangible benefits remains to be seen.
Chammie is a development professional working on sustainable finance and inclusive livelihoods in Laos. She holds a degree in Politics and Law from the University of Hong Kong and has contributed research insights to academic and community spaces on heat governance, climate migration, and emission transparency.
Myanmar 🇲🇲
Myanmar Junta’s Diplomatic Front Clashes with Domestic Reality
by Myat Moe Kywe, in Yangon
Last Wednesday on September 17, 2025, the Prime Minister of Myanmar and Union Minister in charge of the Ministry of National Planning and Economic Development Nyo Saw attended the 22nd China-ASEAN Expo and Business and Investment Summit in Nanning. A former lieutenant general and member of the State Security and Peace Commission headed by the coup leader Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, Nyo Saw used the occasion to call on Chinese business leaders to explore further investment opportunities in Myanmar. According to junta-controlled media, discussions included potential new markets for ruby and sapphire exports.
The visit follows closely after Min Aung Hlaing’s first officially recognized visit to Tianjin at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit and China’s 80th anniversary commemorations of the end of World War II, signaling a new phase of high-profile engagement between Beijing and the Myanmar junta. Observers say that the renewed diplomatic ties underscore China’s policy shift toward openly recognizing the junta, moving beyond the cautious foreign policy it adopted toward Myanmar after the 2021 coup. During the meeting with Nyo Saw, Chinese Vice President Han Zheng highlighted Beijing’s commitment towards “maintaining national stability, sovereignty and independence, and steadily advancing its domestic political agenda.”
Analysts suggest the shift from ambiguous diplomacy to open endorsement reflects Beijing’s attempt to safeguard its strategic and economic interests. Rising clashes along the China–Myanmar border between the junta and ethnic armed groups, including pro-democracy forces, have threatened Chinese mega-projects and cross-border trade. Despite escalating conflict in areas where China’s Myanmar Economic Corridor projects are concentrated, the junta continues to promote the resumption of stalled initiatives such as the Myitsone Dam, the Kyaukphyu Deep-Sea Port, the China–Myanmar oil and gas pipelines, and the Muse–Mandalay–Kyaukphyu Railway, which is designed to provide China’s Yunnan Province with direct access to the Indian Ocean.
Myanmar’s economy has been in freefall since the 2021 coup, battered by international sanctions, conflict, and the regime’s mismanagement. The World Bank’s Myanmar Economic Monitor projects inflation to reach 34.1 percent in 2025. With foreign investment drying up, the cash-strapped regime views closer economic ties with China as one of the few viable avenues for survival. Apart from economic benefits, the regime’s strengthened ties with Beijing serve as a crucial tool for projecting political legitimacy and attempting to ease diplomatic isolation and Western sanctions following the coup. Spokesperson Zaw Min Tun claimed the recent high-level visits highlight “growing international recognition” of the regime as it prepares to stage elections later this year.
Yet beyond ceremonial diplomacy, conditions on the ground remain dire. Airstrikes and heavy bombardments continue across conflict zones, with last week’s junta-planned attacks on two private schools in Rakhine State killing several high school students. The gap between diplomatic engagement abroad and escalating violence at home underscores the junta’s contradictions: seeking legitimacy through pageantry while simultaneously waging military offensives to suppress resistance.
Myat is a senior undergraduate student majoring in Politics, Philosophy, and Economics. She has interned at The Asia Foundation in Washington, D.C., and she she has also worked as a summer research assistant at the Centre for Policy and Innovation (CRPI), gaining experience in research and analysis. Her work focuses on civic engagement, gender, youth leadership, and community development.
Cambodia 🇰🇭
Gaza’s Struggle, Cambodia’s Streets
by Chandara Samban, in Kandal
In recent days, demonstrations in support of the state of Palestine and a permanent peace in Gaza have taken place across the globe, including in several European countries and even Israel, calling for an end to Israeli military operations in the Gaza Strip. Major nations such as France, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia are also reportedly preparing to recognize the State of Palestine.
In Cambodia, the Cambodia Palestine Solidarity community recently organized a program titled “Pals of Palestine: Rhythm and Rhyme for Palestine” on September 18, 2025, in Phnom Penh. The event brought together volunteer artists, Cambodian and foreign poets, and members of the public to raise funds for Palestinians affected by the war in Gaza. Participants recited poetry and performed music in dedication to the victims and to call for peace in the region.
Aziz Yehya, a Palestinian living and working in Cambodia who initiated the program, told The ASEAN Frontier that he and his colleagues created the fund to help save innocent civilians in Gaza. “The funds we raise will buy food and essential supplies for people in the Gaza Strip,” he explained. “Cambodia’s own history of mass violence under the Khmer Rouge deepens our empathy. We know the pain of massacre and never want to see it repeated. We hope the Palestinian people will see the light of hope.”
Eat Sophea, Permanent Secretary of State at Cambodia’s Foreign Ministry, told The ASEAN Frontier that she supports such humanitarian activities, which carry no political agenda, as a way to ease the suffering of innocent Palestinians and others affected by the conflict.
Cambodia, along with eight other ASEAN members, has officially recognized the State of Palestine. At the 79th UN General Assembly in 2024, Sok Chenda Sophea, then Cambodia’s foreign minister, reaffirmed support for a two-state solution, endorsed Palestine’s bid for full UN membership, and condemned all “acts of terrorism” in Gaza. Cambodia has consistently urged both Israeli and Palestinian leaders to negotiate and renounce violence, a stance it has maintained since 2010, when former foreign minister Hor Namhong raised the issue at the UN. Eat Sophea also emphasized that recognizing Palestine does not compromise Cambodia’s constitutional commitment to neutrality, noting that the decision aligns with UN General Assembly resolutions.
Thong Mengdavid, Deputy Director of the China–ASEAN Studies Center, also voiced support for humanitarian initiatives like those of the Cambodia–Palestine Solidarity group. He noted that Cambodia has long called for an end to armed conflict and supports the creation of a permanent Palestinian state while providing humanitarian aid.
Regarding Cambodia’s bilateral relations with Israel, Thong said that recognition of Palestine is unlikely to have a significant impact. Ties with Israel remain limited, centered mostly on cultural exchanges and student programs, with minimal economic or political engagement. He encouraged the Cambodian government to maintain solidarity with other nations in pursuing mechanisms for lasting peace in Gaza through the establishment of a Palestinian state and continued humanitarian assistance.
Since October 2023, more than 60,000 Palestinians have been killed and over 160,000 injured in Israeli airstrikes on Gaza, which Israel says target Hamas. A recent United Nations commission of inquiry has accused Israel of committing genocide against Palestinians in the territory.
Chandara is a freelance journalist with a focus on foreign affairs, security issues, and ASEAN affairs. He also serves as a Junior Counterterrorism Intelligence Analyst.
Thailand 🇹🇭
Backlash Erupts Over BBC’s ‘Dark Side of Thai Tourism’ Documentary
by Natamon Aumphin, in Bangkok
The recent BBC documentary series Thailand: The Dark Side of Paradise has sparked criticism of biased coverage. Hosted by former Love Island contestant Zara McDermott, the documentary saw her visiting Thailand’s most popular sites, including Pattaya, Phuket, and Koh Phangan, where she interviewed several foreigners who have lived in Thailand and shared content about their experience on social media. The show set out to uncover Thailand’s hidden underworld of crime, sex tourism, and drugs, aimed at engaging young viewers in the UK.
Nonetheless, the series attracted backlash on social media from both Thais and foreigners living in Thailand, who criticized the reporting as unfair. Several foreigners shared that they feel safer walking at night on the streets of Thailand than in their home country. Some also pointed out that flaws exist in every single country around the world. Others argued that despite these flaws, it is up to individuals themselves to avoid the very few existing high-risk areas. Critics also highlighted the documentary’s one-sided portrayal, noting that it focused almost entirely on negative aspects while ignoring Thailand’s vibrant culture, cuisine, and people. Many Thai viewers also felt that the show selectively presented narratives that fit its script, rather than offering a balanced perspective.
Among other criticisms, some argued that the documentary is embedded with colonial perceptions and full of prejudice and racism, citing its heavily scripted content and lack of local perspectives or journalistic professionalism. Much of the dialogue focused on foreigners, coming to Thailand in search of a fantasy lifestyle of wild parties and red-light districts. Yet, when questions were raised about the vulnerability of those working in such environments, the guest collaborators failed to provide a response.
Responding to the allegations, Thanet Supornsahasrungsi, who works as an authority at the Association of the Chonburi Tourism Federation, said that there is a plethora of mechanisms in place for ensuring the safety of tourists, tackling fraud, and promoting creative activities suitable for all generations in, among others, Pattaya. Despite its infamous association with tourism and nightlife, he said the city has transformed into an international destination. Authorities have also worked on proper zoning of red-light districts and regulating cannabis stores to safeguard space for families, leisure travelers, and cultural tourists who visit Thailand for broader experiences.
The tourism sector contributed roughly 12% of Thailand’s GDP in 2022, reflecting its importance to the Thai economy. As a result, Thai authorities have made continuous efforts to keep the country attractive to both domestic and international travelers through subsidy schemes, visa exemptions, public relations campaigns, and regulatory measures.
Natamon has served as a rapporteur at the Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS Thailand). She has also worked as a research assistant on diplomatic issues in Southeast Asia. Her work focuses on how domestic politics shape foreign policy in the region. She holds a degree in international relations and has experience in policy analysis, event reporting, and regional research.
Editorial Deadline 19/09/2025 11:59 PM (UTC +8)
