Editor’s Note
by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk
A school structure, a flood response, a trade transition, and a growth model: this week's stories are really about the same question asked four different ways: who gets left behind when a system is tested? In Laos, the government's plan to shift from a 5+4+3 to a 6+3+3 school structure raises a harder question than scheduling: whether restructuring alone can close the gap between a child in Vientiane and one in a remote village, when regional test data already show Lao students lagging and gains concentrated among those already ahead. In Myanmar, monsoon floods displaced 220,000 people in Sagaing — and instead of activating a relief system, the junta blocked volunteer rescue teams, threatened aid workers with terrorism charges, and funneled help only to areas under its control, repeating a pattern of weaponized disaster response it has run since Cyclone Nargis in 2008. In Cambodia, LDC graduation is meant to mark the country's economic coming-of-age, but an ILO-backed study warns it could put 11% of employment at risk, concentrated among informal, self-employed, and low-skilled workers — the very people the country's social protection system is least equipped to catch. And in Thailand, the slowest growth of any major Southeast Asian economy this quarter showed how quickly consumption subsidies get overwhelmed once energy costs start eating into household spending.
Lao PDR 🇱🇦
Can Better Systems Mean Better Learning for Every Child?
by Souriya Bounpaseuth, in Vientiane
As Laos prepares to open the 2026–2027 school year, its education system is entering a period of significant change. But while much attention is being placed on the planned shift to a new 6+3+3 school structure, the bigger question is whether structural reform can translate into something more fundamental as it is better learning for every child.
Under the planned reform, Laos will move from the current 5+4+3 structure to six years of primary education, three years of lower secondary and three years of upper secondary education. The new structure is scheduled for broader implementation from the 2028–2029 academic year, meaning the coming school year marks an important preparation phase rather than the immediate start of the new system.
During the 2024–2025 academic year, the Ministry of Education and Sports reported progress in curriculum development, teacher support and education management. More than 4,000 volunteer teachers had their status addressed, while a new teacher salary structure with improved base pay and allowances was introduced in January 2026. The government has also identified reducing multi-grade classrooms, strengthening teacher education institutions and expanding ethnic boarding schools as priorities for more inclusive access to education.
Recent initiatives are also increasingly focused on what happens inside classrooms. In July, Laos and Japan launched the next phase of their primary mathematics education partnership, which will revise Grades 4–6 textbooks and teachers’ guides, strengthen teacher professional development and establish school-based continuous professional development across 35 districts.
The SEA-PLM 2024 assessment, the most recent comparable regional assessment of Grade 5 learning, shows a mixed picture. Across participating Southeast Asian education systems, mathematics outcomes improved between 2019 and 2024, but reading showed little overall progress, while gains were concentrated more among higher-performing students. Lao PDR remained below the regional average, with significant numbers of children performing at the lower proficiency levels.
Importantly, Laos is already using these findings to shape reform. At the national launch in March 2026, education authorities and partners identified curriculum improvement, teacher development, learning materials and more child-centred teaching as areas requiring action, with particular attention to disadvantaged and remote communities.
The challenge, then, is no longer simply designing a new education structure. It is connecting structure, teachers, curriculum, learning materials, financing and support for disadvantaged children into one functioning system.
As Laos moves towards 6+3+3, the ultimate measure of success may not be whether the reform is implemented on schedule, but whether a child in a remote village has the same opportunity to learn, progress and succeed as a child in Vientiane.
Can 6+3+3 become more than a change in the number of years children spend in each level of school and become a strategy that finally closes the gap between access and quality?
Myanmar 🇲🇲
Junta Troops Block Humanitarian Aid For Flood Victims
by Ley Hlaing
Myanmar is experiencing an increasing rise in water level and flood in the plain and delta regions. As the incident continued, the country’s junta, once again, has blocked the aid for livelihood relief for the victims affected by the flood, mirroring the same pattern of blockage and weaponization of humanitarian aid during the cyclones that happened in 2008 and 2023.
In August 2026, severe monsoon rains have once again triggered a catastrophic humanitarian crisis in Myanmar, with rising water levels submerging the country’s plain and delta regions like Sagaing and Irrawaddy. Heavy rainfall forced authorities to release massive volumes of water from the Thaphanseik Dam, causing the Mu River to overflow and inundate more than 200 villages across the Sagaing Region. Over 220,000 people have been affected, with at least 15 deaths reported as of August 10, many of whom were already internally displaced by ongoing military conflicts and are now experiencing a second disaster. Yet, instead of facilitating emergency relief, the military junta has actively blocked, harassed, and turned back local volunteer rescue teams and civil society aid groups at military checkpoints, including the Sagaing Yadanabon Bridge and Sagaing Hnapauk checkposts.
This blockade is a highly coordinated effort to weaponise humanitarian aid against the civilian population in resistance strongholds. Local administrators and police chiefs in Shwebo have threatened that anyone attempting to deliver flood relief to these areas will be prosecuted for supporting terrorism, warning that their homes and properties will be seized. In a stark display of selective relief, the junta has heavily publicised its aid efforts in regions under its firm control, such as Irrawaddy, while completely ignoring the crisis in Sagaing. Instead, the military has continued to conduct airstrikes on flood-hit Sagaing townships, while selectively airlifting food and medicine via helicopters strictly to villages controlled by its allied Pyu Saw Htee militias.
The junta’s actions mirror a dark, recurring historical pattern of using natural disasters to maintain political control at the cost of civilian lives. During Cyclone Nargis in May 2008, which devastated the Irrawaddy Delta and killed 140,000 people, the military regime deliberately blocked international humanitarian relief for weeks. Instead, the regime benefitted completing a referendum for their 2008 Constitution, while the country was in turmoil. Out of fear that Western powers would use the disaster as a pretext to overthrow their rule, the generals rejected lifesaving assistance from US, British, and French navy ships and helicopters, while army officials confiscated overseas relief supplies and sold them in local markets.
This weaponisation of disaster relief was repeated during Cyclone Mocha in May 2023. After the storm left millions of survivors in urgent need of aid, the junta suspended travel authorizations for international humanitarian organizations and demanded that all domestic distribution of supplies be handed over to military authorities, transforming a natural disaster into a man-made catastrophe. This pattern of gatekeeping was visible yet again during the March 2025 earthquake and the floods of Typhoon Yagi in late 2024, where the regime consistently chose to let its citizens suffer rather than risk losing absolute authority. Today, as telephone and internet lines remain cut in Sagaing, local volunteer groups are left to navigate rising waters, lack of food, and increasing medical emergencies entirely on their own.
Ley Hlaing is a former Political Science student from the University of Yangon, Myanmar. Currently, he is pursuing his BA at Parami University with a major in Philosophy, Politics and Economics. His academic and professional interests span community development, literature, minority issues, and social impact research. Having held roles as Research Assistant, Student Mentor, and Facilitator for local initiatives, he has constantly supported project management in literature and education programs in Myanmar.
Cambodia 🇰🇭
Cambodia’s LDC Graduation Could Put 11% of Employment at Risk
by Sokna Thea, in Phnom Penh
Cambodia’s planned graduation from Least Developed Country (LDC) status in 2029 is a major development milestone, but it could also expose a large share of the workforce to pressure from higher trade costs and weaker export demand.
A June 2026 policy brief from Cambodia’s Ministry of Labour and Vocational Training and the International Labour Organization estimates that around 11% of employment could be affected under a full trade-loss scenario. The figure represents jobs at risk, not confirmed layoffs. The study notes that the impact could also appear through reduced working hours, slower hiring, temporary suspensions, lower earnings and weaker self-employment income.
The risk extends well beyond garment factories. The study finds the largest employment impacts in textiles, clothing and footwear, wholesale and retail trade, rice, fruits and nuts, vegetables and roots, and other agriculture-related activities. Transport and other supporting services could also feel the effects as weaker export demand reduces production, intermediate demand and household spending.
The profile of affected workers is particularly important. Informal workers account for 68% of affected employment, while self-employed workers make up 52%. Women account for 53% and low-skilled workers 86%. These groups are generally less protected against sudden income or job losses, making the transition a labour-market issue as much as a trade-policy issue.
The modelling also shows that the severity of the impact depends on how much of the trade shock is absorbed or mitigated. Under the study’s full-impact scenario, affected employment falls by about 11%. A targeted mitigation scenario brings the figure down to about 7%, while a lower-impact scenario reduces it to around 3%. The authors stress, however, that targeted support cannot fully prevent spillovers across the wider economy.
The trade exposure is significant. UN Trade and Development estimates that Cambodia could lose about 16.4% of its total exports if LDC-related trade preferences are lost after graduation. Its simulation puts the potential export loss at about USD 5.9 billion, based on 2023 trade data. Cambodia is particularly exposed to preference erosion because 80.5% of its exports in the simulation were directed to the 25 preference-granting economies covered by the analysis.
The European Union is one of the key markets to watch. Cambodia continues to benefit from the EU’s Everything But Arms (EBA) scheme, but only partially, after the EU withdrew some of its tariff preferences in 2020. EU data show that goods trade with Cambodia reached EUR 7.3 billion in 2025, with textiles and clothing accounting for 72% of EU imports from Cambodia.
The question for Cambodia is therefore not simply whether it will graduate from LDC status, but how it manages the transition. The Ministry-ILO study calls for stronger worker skills and social protection, support for firms to upgrade and comply with new trade requirements, deeper domestic value chains, and greater export diversification. Graduation is a sign of progress. But without a smooth transition, the gains from that progress could come with a significant cost for workers who have the fewest buffers.
Sokna has a background in International Affairs and Business & Commercial Law. He’s currently a Senior Project Coordinator at the Ministry of Economy and Finance of Cambodia, working on the Financial Management Information System (FMIS) Project. His professional focus is driven by entrepreneurship, business development, and financial technology, with a particular interest in how private-sector innovation drives Cambodia’s economic growth.
Thailand 🇹🇭
Thailand Scores Weakest ASEAN Growth at 1.9% as Energy Costs Bite
by Satid Sootipunya, in Bangkok
Thailand scored the weakest growth rate among six Southeast Asian economies in the second quarter as higher energy prices curbed household spending, offsetting the government’s consumption subsidy.
Thailand’s economy expanded 1.9% in the second quarter from a year earlier, slowing sharply from 2.8% in the first quarter, according to data released by the National Economic and Social Development Council on Monday.
The pace exceeded the 1.8% median estimate in a Bloomberg survey of economists, which ranged from 1.1% to 2.8%.
Quarterly, gross domestic product contracted 0.2%, compared with a revised 0.6% expansion in the previous quarter, the data showed.
Higher energy prices stemming from the conflict in the Middle East weighed on private consumption, offsetting stronger investment and government stimulus.
The reading left Thailand with the slowest growth among the six Southeast Asian economies, according to the council. Vietnam expanded 8.4% from a year earlier, followed by Malaysia at 6%, Singapore at 5.9%, Indonesia at 5.3%, the Philippines at 2.3%, and Thailand at 1.9%.
The figures are consistent with the latest releases from each country’s statistics agency, which reported growth of 5.9% in Singapore, 6% in Malaysia, 5.29% in Indonesia, and 2.3% in the Philippines over the same period.
The baht held its gains following the release, with the dollar falling 0.1% to 33.1 baht.
The second quarter was expected to mark the trough of the economic cycle, with a recovery beginning in the third quarter as Middle East tensions ease and stimulus measures take effect, Bank of Thailand spokesperson Chayawadee Chai-Anant said in late July.
The council projects full-year growth of 2% to 2.5%, driven by investment. Bloomberg’s consensus estimate stands at 1.9%.
The central bank held its benchmark one-day repurchase rate at 1%, the lowest since September 2022, at its June 24 meeting, with all seven Monetary Policy Committee members voting unanimously to keep the rate unchanged.
Satid is a multimedia economic journalist and news anchor who covers macroeconomic trends, Thailand’s fiscal policy, and key regional developments for Bangkok Biz. A Journalism graduate from Thammasat University, he has reported on major issues such as the US–China trade tensions, the Myanmar crisis, and global corporate stories, drawing on prior newsroom experience at The Momentum, the Bangkok Post, AFP, and Varasarn Press. His work blends economic analysis, foreign affairs, and digital storytelling, with a strong focus on making complex financial and political topics accessible to Thai audiences.
Editorial Deadline 22/08/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)
