Leaping Over the Cacti
Issue 41 — Key Developments Across Brunei, Indonesia, and Malaysia
Editor’s Note
by Haniva Sekar Deanty, Lead Editor - Maritime Crescent Desk
Whether it’s children and online harms, frauds and the ever-growing links to trafficking and abuse, or even national interests in trade; policies that are designed to protect are increasingly confronted by structural constraints.
This week, Maritime Crescent’s Rayhan Prabu looks at Indonesia’s sweeping social media restrictions on minors. By any measure, this is a bold gamble, but policies like this don’t exist in a vacuum.
Transnational fraud rarely makes headlines the way traditional security issues do, but its impact is becoming harder to ignore. Brunei’s Wira Gregory invites us to have a closer look, as the state participated in a forum to tackle a problem that no country can handle alone.
Malaysia’s decision to call its trade agreement with the United States “null and void” adds another layer of uncertainty to a deal that was already under scrutiny, as reported by Muhammad Aiman. In arrangements like this, the line between economics and strategy is rarely clear, and unfortunately, rarely simple.
Policy today feels increasingly reactive. Jump too late, and you hit the obstacle. Jump too early, and you lose momentum. Governments are doing what they can to stay ahead, whether regulating digital spaces, coordinating against fraud, or recalibrating trade ties. But as the game speeds up, it becomes harder to rely on instinct alone. At some point, survival is no longer just about leaping over the cacti, but about knowing where they’ll appear next.
Indonesia 🇮🇩
The Kids Aren't Online
by Rayhan Prabu Kusumo, in Jakarta
On March 28, 2026, Indonesia began deactivating social media accounts belonging to children under 16. The platforms in the first wave are YouTube, TikTok, Facebook, Instagram, Threads, X, Bigo Live, and Roblox. The legal basis is the Minister of Communications and Digital Affairs Regulation No, 9 of 2026, the technical implementing regulation of the Government Regulation No. 17 of 2025 on the Governance of Electronic Systems in Child Protection (PP TUNAS), signed by President Prabowo Subianto a year earlier.
The regulation covers an estimated 70 million Indonesian children under 16, which is fourteen times the number affected when Australia introduced a comparable ban in December 2025. Indonesia is not following a trend so much as setting one, becoming what the government describes as the first non-Western country to implement age-based platform restrictions at this scale.
The case for acting was not hard to make. Nearly half of Indonesian internet users are children. A 2022 national survey found that roughly 35 percent of Indonesian teenagers (more than 15 million) had experienced a mental health issue, with cyberbullying and harmful content named as contributing factors. Government health screenings of around 7 million children in 2025 also found nearly 10 percent showing symptoms of depression and anxiety.
None of that makes the ban wrong. However, it does make the questions around it harder to ignore.
The platforms being restricted are also where young users learn and participate in civic life. A blanket prohibition does not distinguish between the algorithm that harms children and the one that helps them. Protection without a substitute is only half a policy.
Then there is enforcement. For a generation that grew up navigating VPNs in one of the world’s most notoriously restrictive internet environments among democracies, rerouting around a government block is second nature. Age verification is only as strong as platform compliance and parental awareness, both of which are historically uneven across Indonesia’s vast geography.
And if the workarounds work, the outcome could be worse than the problem. Pushing children off regulated platforms does not necessarily make them safer, as it could simply redirect them toward corners of the internet that are less visible and less moderated.
While nobody is arguing that Indonesian children were fine the way things were, a regulation that tells millions of children they cannot access the digital world does not automatically build a better one for them to eventually enter.
What needs to follow is harder than signing a regulation: a national digital literacy program embedded in schools, accessible offline spaces for children in urban areas where the internet has long substituted, parents who are equipped to do more than confiscate a phone, and an answer to what happens to the children who comply, wait, and grow up having never been taught what to do when the door finally opens — because without that, what the government calls protection may end up looking a lot like abandonment.
Rayhan has a background in government affairs and public policy, with experience across government institutions and advisory firms. His work focuses on the intersection of geopolitics, policy, and risk, with expertise in advocacy, regulatory analysis, and stakeholder engagement. He holds a degree in Government from Universitas Padjadjaran, and has completed an exchange at Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Spain, focusing on global politics and sustainability.
Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳
Small State, Global Stakes
by Wira Gregory Ejau, in Bandar Seri Begawan
The Vienna International Centre, more accustomed to hosting nuclear non-proliferation debates, served as the address for a different kind of arms race on 16–17 March 2026. At the inaugural Global Fraud Summit, co-organised by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and INTERPOL, ministers and senior officials from across the world gathered to confront what has quietly become one of the most destabilising non-traditional security threats of the decade: transnational fraud.
Led by Deputy Minister (Security and Law) at the Prime Minister’s Office, Datuk Seri Paduka Sufian Sabtu, Brunei’s participation and rare-placed visibility at the High-Level Roundtable on the Global Fraud Response Mechanism carries diplomatic weight that warrants closer reading. Online fraud losses in East and Southeast Asia now exceed US$40 billion annually, according to Thailand’s Foreign Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow, who also attended the Vienna summit. The scam-industrial complex (mostly having been concentrated in Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos over the years) has evolved far beyond petty cybercrime. It is now interlocked with human trafficking, forced labour, and money laundering, operated by transnational criminal networks that deliberately exploit jurisdictional gaps and governance failures across the region.
Brunei, geographically insulated and domestically stable relative to its mainland Southeast Asian neighbours, is not peripheral to this crisis in the sense that proximity is no longer a meaningful buffer in an era of digital fraud. The statement delivered by Datuk Seri Paduka Sufian at Vienna acknowledged that online scams are rising across the region and outlined Brunei’s domestic response: a “Whole-of-Nation” and “Whole-of-Government” framework, anchored by an Anti-Scam Helpline and sustained public outreach campaigns.
What makes this moment noteworthy is less the policy inventory and more the positioning. Thailand’s foreign minister, speaking at the same summit, argued that existing frameworks under UNODC, INTERPOL, and ASEAN are structurally sufficient and that the challenge lies in making them operate “with unity and coherence.” Brunei’s seat at that table, however modest in delegation size, is precisely the kind of consistent participation that shapes how multilateral norms are written and who they bind.
Small states across ASEAN frequently leverage multilateral norm-setting forums to compensate for limited unilateral enforcement capacity while also protecting their financial and reputational standing in global markets. Brunei’s presence ensures that its interests and domestic policy choices are embedded in the coordination mechanisms that will follow.
The Vienna summit will not resolve the structural drivers of ASEAN’s scam crisis: certain civil war that enables criminal networks, governance deficits in border zones, and the persistent exploitation of weak inter-agency cooperation. What it can do is thicken the web of obligations, intelligence-sharing norms, and multilateral accountability that is crucially necessary to combating transnational fraud networks that are becoming increasingly difficult to navigate. A small state can exercise meaningful influence in international security governance when it shows up consistently, engages substantively, and aligns its domestic architecture with the direction of global policy.
Gregory is an MSc candidate in Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He works as a freelance writer specializing in international history, conflict, and counterterrorism, with experience in academia, investigative journalism, and voluntary uniformed service. He currently provides research assistance with the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) under their Southeast Asian Security and Defence Internship Programme and conducts investigations on regional security and transnational crime for a confidential company.
Malaysia 🇲🇾
Deal in Limbo
by Muhammad Aiman Bin Roszaimi, in Cyberjaya
Malaysia’s recent declaration that its trade agreement with the United States is “null and void” has introduced significant uncertainty into an already controversial bilateral arrangement. The move follows a United States court ruling that challenged the legal basis of certain tariffs imposed under the agreement, raising questions about the deal’s enforceability and future.
The Malaysia–US trade agreement, concluded during former President Donald Trump’s visit to Kuala Lumpur in 2025, was designed to deepen economic ties between the two countries. Under the framework, Malaysia agreed to reduce or remove tariffs on selected American goods and expand market access, while the United States maintained a baseline tariff of around 19% on many Malaysian exports, albeit with exemptions for certain products.
The deal reportedly included cooperation on strategic sectors such as rare earth minerals and industrial supply chains, reflecting Washington’s broader effort to strengthen economic ties in Southeast Asia. However, it was never a conventional free trade agreement. Rather, it was a politically driven arrangement shaped by the US tariff regime and geopolitical considerations.
From the outset, the agreement faced strong criticism within Malaysia. Analysts, opposition figures and civil society groups argued that the deal was asymmetrical and potentially undermined national sovereignty. The agreement contained provisions requiring Malaysia to align with US economic restrictions or sanctions against third countries. Critics warned that such clauses could limit Malaysia’s long-standing neutral foreign policy and effectively force it to take sides in major power rivalries, particularly between the US and China.
These elements led some observers to describe the deal as not purely economic but strategic in nature, embedding geopolitical conditions into trade relations.
Despite this backlash, the Malaysian government defended the agreement as a pragmatic decision. The deal is understood through the lens of a hedging strategy. By engaging economically with the US while maintaining ties with other major partners such as China, Malaysia sought to diversify its economic relationships and avoid overdependence on any single power.
But recent confusion stems from a US court ruling that reportedly invalidated the legal basis for certain tariffs underpinning the agreement. In response, a Malaysian minister declared that the trade pact is effectively “null and void,” as its core provisions are no longer legally enforceable.
While parts of the agreement may no longer be operative, it is unclear whether the entire framework has collapsed or whether both sides will renegotiate terms. Trade agreements of this nature often contain flexibility clauses, and both governments may seek to preserve elements that remain mutually beneficial.
Aiman is a PhD candidate in Security and Strategic Analysis at the National University of Malaysia. His research focuses on Malaysia’s space policy, ASEAN regional security, and the strategic implications of emerging technologies. His work explores how Malaysia’s defense policy and strategic culture shape its approach to outer space.
Editorial Deadline 21/03/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)
