Editor’s Note
by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk
This week, legitimacy was something several institutions tried to protect or manufacture, with mixed success. In Myanmar, former junta leader and now-President Min Aung Hlaing collected a fourth ASEAN red-carpet welcome in Cambodia, a reminder that recognition from neighboring capitals is not the same as recognition from his own people. In Laos, the Vientiane court handed down life sentences and billions of kip in penalties to former bank officials, an attempt to restore faith in a financial system whose credibility was compromised from the inside. In Cambodia, that same appetite for legitimacy showed up in the Funan Techo Canal's new $1 billion financing deal — proof the project can attract serious capital, even as the risk gets quietly routed through a joint concessionaire rather than the state. And in Thailand, a new deportation regulation dressed up as routine "public order" housekeeping instead strips refugees of appeal rights and edges the country closer to forced returns it has legally promised not to make.
Myanmar 🇲🇲
Myanmar President’s Travels Not For The Country, But For His Own Legitimacy
by Ley Hlaing
Myanmar’s general-turned-president Min Aung Hlaing has been continuously engaging in foreign visits since his presidency started. Having experienced diplomatic isolation and lack of recognition from the rest of the world, these endless travels reveal the notorious truth of the regime’s desperation to revive their role in ASEAN and engage in international relations.
On September 11, 2026, the junta president visited Cambodia in his latest travel and met separately with Head of State Hun Sen and the Head of Government, Hun Manet. This official visit also included a welcoming ceremony with a red-carpet reception and a military guard of honor upon his arrival in Phnom Penh. In the presence of Min Aung Hlaing and Prime Minister Hun Manet, officials from both nations signed four key agreements aimed at boosting cross-border cooperation on protection of investments, avoidance of double taxation, cultural cooperation, and in the information sector. During the trip, the former junta leader strongly emphasized that Myanmar is actively working to strengthen and restore its cooperation within ASEAN. Critics have been warning that this visit, as well as other recent ones, is an attempt to weaken ASEAN’s decision and approach on the Myanmar issues.
Needless to say, the countries officially welcoming Min Aung Hlaing’s visits, such as India, China, Laos, Thailand, Belarus, Russia and most recently Vietnam, are doing so because they prioritize their own benefits over lives of the people of Myanmar, enabling the regime’s survival and undermining the human right abuse across Myanmar. From the beginning of his official visits, many right groups have asked the officials of these countries to arrest Min Aung Hlaing and deliver him to the Internal Criminal Court. Still, no action was taken and his visits actually grew in number.
In this latest trip, Cambodia became the fourth ASEAN country to welcome Myanmar’s President. Cambodia’s role in Myanmar’s issue has been significant as Hun Sen himself served as the rotating Chair of ASEAN in 2022 and visited Nay Pyi Taw in the first foreign official to visit Myanmar after the military coup. Since then, ASEAN’s 11 members started to divide on the Myanmar issue positioning, all while the number of ASEAN countries that officially welcomed the junta leader has increased to four. Still, offshore countries like Malaysia and the Philippines remain consistent on their approach on Myanmar with the five point consensus, showing that Min Aung Hlaing’s diplomatic efforts is mainly working on neighboring countries, which maintain higher interests in stabilizing Myanmar’s situation, no matter the human cost.
However, analysts examined that there might not be any significant changes in ASEAN’s stance on Myanmar until early 2027, when the group’s chairmanship will pass from The Philippines to either Singapore or Thailand, which is actively advocating to fully re-integrate Myanmar into ASEAN. On top of this, there are still other regional giants like India and China that have strong influence on the Myanmar’s domestic affairs.
These countries need Myanmar to be stable not primarily for the people of Myanmar, but for their own benefits and interests. Providing legitimacy to figures like Min Aung Hlaing ultimately deepens fractures within ASEAN, stalling collective efforts toward a peaceful resolution and prioritizing short-term geopolitical interests over regional stability and human rights.
Ley Hlaing is a former Political Science student from the University of Yangon, Myanmar. Currently, he is pursuing his BA at Parami University with a major in Philosophy, Politics and Economics. His academic and professional interests span community development, literature, minority issues, and social impact research. Having held roles as Research Assistant, Student Mentor, and Facilitator for local initiatives, he has constantly supported project management in literature and education programs in Myanmar.
Lao PDR 🇱🇦
Vientiane Court Delivers Severe Penalise in Major Banking Corruption Cases
by Souriya Bounpaseuth, in Vientiane
When corruption reaches the financial system, the consequences can extend well beyond the individuals involved. It can affect public resources, foreign-exchange operations and confidence in institutions entrusted with managing money. That broader question sits behind two corruption and money laundering cases decided by the Vientiane Capital court last week.
A major corruption case involving former banking officials has resulted in life sentences, asset confiscations and billions of kip in financial penalties, following judgments announced by the Vientiane Capital People’s Court on 8 September.
The two cases involved 10 former employees in the banking sector, including five women, and allegations ranging from abuse of official positions and irregular foreign-exchange transactions to bribery and money laundering. Together, the cases involved reported losses of more than LAK 2.29 trillion, equivalent to approximately USD 102.6 million.
The first case centred on two former senior officials of the Bank of Lao PDR, including a former Head of the Monetary Policy Department and a former Head of the Services Department. They were accused of abusing their positions to take foreign currency from central bank reserves and provide unrestricted foreign services.
The court sentenced the defendants to life imprisonment and imposed fines equivalent to one percent of the report damage. One defendant was also ordered to compensate a commercial bank more than LAK 142.71 billion. The court ordered the confiscation of assets, including bank accounts, land and vehicles, to transfer to the state. The second defendant died during the proceedings and therefore did not receive a criminal punishment.
The second case involved eight former bank employees convicted of corruption and money laundering. The allegations included foreign-currnecy transactions conducted outside agreed contract rates, the receipt of bribes, and the conversion of illicit proceeds into assets and bank deposits.
One defendant was convicted after allegedly receiving USD 95,459.97 and THB 1 million through foreign-currency transactions. The defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment and fined one percent of the relevant amount.
Another defendant received a prison sentence in connection with a LAK 180 million bribe from a fuel-import company. Although initially sentenced to seven years, the term was reduced by four years following restitution, resulting in a four-year sentence and a one percent fine.
A further defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment after being convicted of corruption and money laundering involving LAK 24.125 billion obtained through negotiations with foreign-exchange applications.
Other defendants received prison sentences ranging from 16-20 years, with some terms reduced following restitution. Another defendant received a life sentence.
The court also ordered the confiscation of bank accounts, land, vehicles and other assets connected to the cases.
The bigger story is not simply how much money was involved, but how the alleged misconduct was able to take place. The cases put a spotlight on the controls surrounding foreign-exchange operations, the responsibilities of officials entrusted with financial authority, and the mechanisms available to recover assets. In that sense, the court rulings are not only about punishment; they also raise broader questions about the safeguards needed to protect the integrity of the financial system.
Cambodia 🇰🇭
Funan Techo Canal Secures US$1 Billion Financing Deal
by Sokna Thea, in Phnom Penh
Cambodia’s landmark Funan Techo Canal project reached a major financial milestone this week with the signing of an estimated US$1 billion commercial debt facility, revealing a more complex corporate structure behind the project than the usual narrative of direct bilateral state lending.
On September 9 in Xiamen, China Exim Bank formally signed a financing agreement with Funan Techo Coastal-Inland Waterways Co. to fund the Funan Techo Integrated Water Resources Management Project. Instead of being a direct sovereign loan paid to the Cambodian government, the credit facility was issued directly to the joint Cambodian-Chinese project company responsible for delivering the megaproject under a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) and public-private partnership (PPP) model, according to official bulletins from the Agence Kampuchea Presse.
The deal also helps explain the different financing figures reported in recent weeks by international and regional media. Early reports often described Beijing as “footing the entire bill” for the 180-kilometer waterway. However, the financing package is more divided. The new US$1 billion facility is specifically for the main commercial civil works under the BOT concessionaire. Separately, a US$200 million concessional facility arranged in July serves as targeted state-level development financing, according to The Phnom Penh Post.
This layered financing approach shows how China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has developed across Southeast Asia. Instead of relying mainly on large sovereign loans that can create public concerns over debt, Chinese policy lenders are increasingly using special-purpose vehicles (SPVs) and mixed corporate financing. For international observers following Indochina, this distinction is important. Cambodia’s sovereign balance sheet is less directly exposed to default liabilities, while operational risks, toll collection revenues, and long-term control of the asset are placed more directly with the joint concessionaire.
The financing closure comes amid continuing geopolitical concerns within ASEAN. The canal will connect the Bassac River south of Phnom Penh directly to the Gulf of Thailand at Kep, allowing Cambodian cargo to bypass Vietnam’s Mekong Delta ports. Hanoi has repeatedly raised concerns about downstream water flows, salinity intrusion into the agricultural delta, and possible maritime security implications, as reported by the Khmer Times. Phnom Penh maintains that the project is purely economic, aimed at reducing transport costs, improving irrigation, and strengthening Cambodia’s control over its own logistics.
By securing the nearly US$1 billion debt package, Cambodia and its partners have cleared
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one of the most important hurdles facing the canal, demonstrating that the project can attract commercial financing. As construction work accelerates under the BOT framework, the project is becoming a case study in modern infrastructure diplomacy, where commercial concession risks are being managed alongside major regional geopolitical interests.
Sokna has a background in International Affairs and Business & Commercial Law. He’s currently a Senior Project Coordinator at the Ministry of Economy and Finance of Cambodia, working on the Financial Management Information System (FMIS) Project. His professional focus is driven by entrepreneurship, business development, and financial technology, with a particular interest in how private-sector innovation drives Cambodia’s economic growth.
Thailand 🇹🇭
How Thailand’s Deportation Regulation B.E. 2569 Deepens Risks for Refugees
by Satid Sootipunya, in Bangkok
On August 28, 2026, the Prime Minister’s Office Regulation on Deportation B.E. 2569 (2026) officially came into effect. While framed as an administrative update to streamline removals and safeguard public order, the decree creates an alarming structural vulnerability for the tens of thousands of urban refugees and asylum seekers seeking safety across Thailand.
Because Thailand is not a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention, non-citizens, regardless of whether they hold UNHCR documentation or await status determination (asylum-seekers), are legally designated as unauthorized migrants under the Immigration Act, B.E. 2522 (1979). Under Clause 5(1)
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of the new regulation, unlawful entry or staying without authorization serves as an immediate trigger for removal. The regulation concentrates final removal authority directly within the Ministry of Interior without providing standard judicial appeal rights. As a result, human rights NGOs may lack the legal standing to appeal deportation orders for recognized refugees or asylum-seekers in Thailand. Furthermore, courts and prison authorities are mandated to notify the Ministry immediately upon issuing fines or suspended sentences to foreign nationals. For refugees working informally to survive or caught up in routine urban sweeps, minor administrative infractions now directly feed them into a rapid deportation pipeline.
This structural vulnerability is further compounded by the ineffectiveness of domestic protection frameworks. The Royal Thai Government introduced the National Screening Mechanism (NSM), back in 2020, to evaluate claims for “Protected Person” status, conceptually parallel to UNHCR’s Refugee Status Determination (RSD). However, the NSM remains largely ineffective for urban refugees and asylum-seekers in its current stage. Because the mechanism operates under the Immigration Bureau without legal immunity for overstayers, applying for protection creates a dangerous Catch-22: initiating or undergoing NSM screening frequently exposes applicants to arbitrary arrest or requires them to be detained in the Immigration Detention Center (IDC) prior to receiving status determination. Furthermore, the text of the new Deportation Regulation fails to clarify whether individuals holding Protected Person status under the NSM are explicitly exempt from deportation.
The central peril for refugees and asylum-seekers under the new regulation is refoulement, the forced return of individuals to countries where they face persecution, torture, or death. While Clause 8 of the text permits an alternative third-country transfer if return poses a severe risk, the procedural requirements render it nearly impossible. The request must be processed diplomatically within just seven days of the deportation order, require written consent, and be fully funded by the requesting entity. For a refugee or asylum-seeker trapped inside an IDC, organizing international diplomatic intervention within a single week is a near-impossible barrier.
Thailand’s 2023 Act on Prevention and Suppression of Torture and Enforced Disappearance, fulfilling legal duties under the UN Convention Against Torture (UNCAT), explicitly prohibits returning individuals to harm. Yet, the new regulation fails to integrate systematic human-rights risk assessments into its fast-track removal process. Even before the regulation took effect, there were numerous instances of deportations or attempted deportations of individuals at risk of such harm. Without targeted protection screening, the regulation risks turning routine immigration enforcement into a systematic forced returns, exposing vulnerable refugees to catastrophic risk.
To uphold the country’s non-refoulement obligations, the Thai government should establish clear legal mechanisms to safeguard recognized refugees and active asylum-seekers from fast-track deportation. Guaranteeing an automatic stay of removal for individuals registered with UNHCR would ensure domestic enforcement aligns with human rights standards without compromising public safety.
Satid is a multimedia economic journalist and news anchor who covers macroeconomic trends, Thailand’s fiscal policy, and key regional developments for Bangkok Biz. A Journalism graduate from Thammasat University, he has reported on major issues such as the US–China trade tensions, the Myanmar crisis, and global corporate stories, drawing on prior newsroom experience at The Momentum, the Bangkok Post, AFP, and Varasarn Press. His work blends economic analysis, foreign affairs, and digital storytelling, with a strong focus on making complex financial and political topics accessible to Thai audiences.
Editorial Deadline 12/09/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)
