Editor’s Note
by Siu Tzyy Wei, Lead Editor - Maritime Crescent Desk
Across the Maritime Crescent, governance has always been recorded - on palm leaves, in policy briefs, in ministerial mandates. The lontar manuscripts of the Malay Archipelago were never meant to be permanent - they were inscribed on material that requires tending, reading and renewal to survive.
This week, the stories ask of the aforementioned three qualities of sustainability. Brunei, a small state continues to deliberate where it fits within its relationship with BRICS. Malaysia’s haze response, still underwhelming, pleads for a framework that has yet to be held to account. In Indonesia, a ministerial exit raises questions on how power moves in the archipelago.
The walls stand. The question is how long before delayed maintenance becomes too late.
Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳
As BRICS Expands, Where Does Brunei Fit?
by Syimah Johari, in Bandar Seri Begawan
Following the recent BRICS summit in New Delhi where leaders discussed reform of global governance, trade, development, energy, technology and the broader role of the Global South, the grouping continues to expand its engagement beyond its membership. With several Southeast Asian countries now participating as members or partners, geopolitical and economic dynamics in the region are evolving. Where, then, does a small ASEAN state fit within an increasingly diversified diplomatic landscape?
Several ASEAN countries are already engaging with BRICS in different capacities. Indonesia is a member, while Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam are among the grouping partner’s countries. Their participation provides additional channels for engagement with BRICS members and broader discussions on issues affecting the Global South. For Brunei, this creates both opportunities and deliberations. Although Brunei may not need to join BRICS to benefit from its expanding networks, it will need to monitor how the grouping affects ASEAN cohesion, regional economic competition and the balance of relations among China, Russia, India and other major powers.
The implications are particularly relevant to Brunei’s trade and energy interests. BRICS gather large markets and major economies, including energy producers. For Brunei, greater engagement among neighbouring ASEAN economies with BRICS could create avenues to diversify exports, attract investment and develop cooperation in energy, food security, technology and infrastructure. At the same time, closer economic ties with individual BRICS members would require careful management to avoid excessive dependence on any one market or partner.
Diplomatically, Brunei’s existing relationships with China and India, alongside its wider ties with other BRICS members, can give the sultanate room to engage through bilateral relationships and ASEAN-led platforms. For a small state, this flexibility can be valuable. Brunei can continue to engage in areas such as development, maritime cooperation and global governance while keeping ASEAN at the centre of its regional diplomacy. Rather than viewing BRICS as a choice between alignment and distance, Brunei could approach its growing presence in Southeast Asia as another avenue for dialogue and cooperation.
As BRICS cultivates a stronger presence in Southeast Asia, it is becoming part of the diplomatic and economic landscape surrounding Brunei. For Brunei, the question may not be whether to align itself closer to BRICS, but more about how to do so while keeping ASEAN at the centre of its regional outlook. For a small state like Brunei, maintaining that flexibility could allow it to build new economic and diplomatic partnerships without narrowing the relationships it already has.
Syimah is a graduate of King’s College London with a BA in International Relations. With a strong focus on diplomacy, regional cooperation, and development policy, she is passionate about contributing to meaningful change through public service. Currently, she is involved in poverty alleviation work through a local NGO.
Malaysia 🇲🇾
Time’s Ticking
by Edrina Lisa Ozaidi, in WP Kuala Lumpur
Malaysia’s air quality continues to worsen, pushing Air Pollutant Index (API) readings into alarming rates. Yet again, the country finds itself stuck in a frustrating cycle. Fueled by El Niño, the current haze emergency has laid bare deep institutional fatigue.
As public health warnings continue to roll out, a hard look at the current administrative responses reveals a troubled reality; the state mechanisms are sluggish, reactive and disconnected from the much needed proactive agility. Is the current administration doing enough for the haze emergency compared to the past?
Currently, Malaysia’s tactics against the seasonal haze rely on both domestic containment strategies and regional diplomacy. The Department of Environment (DOE) constantly tracks real-time data through the Air Pollutant Index Management System (APIMS), which local authorities and state disaster committees use to coordinate emergency actions when the readings spike and, of course, provide open-source data for the public.
State governments have deployed targeted solutions like localised cloud-seeding operations to induce rainfall over heavily polluted pockets, alongside clamping down on domestic open burning permits. Healthwise, the Ministry of Health (MOH) issued continuous advisories and public messaging through various media networks. However, despite decades of experience with transboundary haze, the crisis continues to recur with punishing intensity.
Malaysia remains structurally hamstrung by its reliance on regional frameworks like the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution. Because enforcement depends on neighbouring political will and complex corporate concessions, diplomatic protocols lag in stopping fires at the sources, thus creating a transboundary deadlock.
The Human Rights Commission of Malaysia (SUHAKAM) has repeatedly pointed out that Malaysia lacks a dedicated Clean Air Act. Without a solid legal framework, domestic standards and broader public-interest litigation rights, environmental enforcement often defaults to fragmented local bylaws rather than a national mandate.
Public frustration also continues to build on the Ministry of Health (MOH) and the Ministry of Education (MOE). During past episodes, state distribution of genuine N95 masks to vulnerable communities were with far greater urgency. In contrast, recent policy responses have been lackluster, seen in the sharp incline of asthma and upper respiratory tract infections (URTI). For low-income families, advocating to wear appropriate masks without subsidised distribution amounts to an empty mandate.
Under standard guidelines, school closure are triggered only when the API threshold crosses critical limits, leaving students and teachers to endure the bad air condition long before administrative takeover. The pivot to home-based learning only arrived after public outcry and even then, initiatives or help for working parents were not established. Despite experience, better policies for working parents during school closure are an afterthought.
The recurring haze is no longer a surprise weather anomaly. Malaysia needs to move past its slow reactions and expedite the process of delivering a solid framework that holds its stakeholders rightfully and fully accountable.
Edrina is a communications professional with a background in international relations. She holds a degree from the University of Nottingham Malaysia and has worked across public relations and social media for organizations in the development, education, and corporate sectors. Her work focuses on crafting narratives around regional affairs and strengthening media engagement across Southeast Asia.
Indonesia 🇮🇩
No Surprise Here
by Gemala Asyura, in Pekanbaru
One would usually postpone answering a phone call during an important meeting, but Purbaya was told to pick up his phone right away. He stepped away to answer it, only to find out that he had been effectively and immediately terminated from his role. He never returned to the meeting. Within hours, the position was handed over to his deputy, Suahasil Nazara. Purbaya’s removal also followed the abrupt resignation of Bank Indonesia Governor Perry Warjiyo weeks earlier, intensifying scrutiny of Indonesia’s economic leadership.
President Prabowo Subianto appointed Purbaya Yudhi Sadewa as finance minister in September last year, replacing Sri Mulyani Indrawati amid the 2025 protests. Two top officials leaving so close together suggests something more - perhaps real instability at the top of Indonesia’s economic leadership. So what actually triggered it? All signs point to one thing, a reshuffle of officials at Customs and Tax, just four days before he was fired. Purbaya himself said the firing was “partly” about an internal staff reshuffle at the ministry. He insists he didn’t disagree with Prabowo on policy, just with some other officials.
On September 10, Purbaya rotated around 350 to 400 officials across the Finance Ministry. Most of them worked at two agencies, The Directorate General of Taxes and the Directorate General of Customs and Excise (Bea Cukai). While Purbaya has been shaking up Bea Cukai in recent months, investors like Fitch and Moody’s have cut Indonesia’s credit outlook. Moreover, the rupiah hit historic lows under Purbaya. So the firing may have been about both internal friction and market pressure at the same time.
In early 2026, Prabowo wanted to disband Bea Cukai entirely and outsource its functions to the Swiss surveillance firm Société Générale de Surveillance (SGS), a system Indonesia had used decades earlier during the New Order era. So why did Purbaya’s September reshuffle draw the President’s attention quickly?
One possible explanation is that it touched people closer to Prabowo himself. Customs Director General Djaka Budhi Utama wasn’t just any official. According to The Star, citing Reuters, he got handpicked directly by Prabowo, and was a former member of Prabowo’s special forces team. When Purbaya rotated officials under Djaka without his agreement, it may have read less as routine institutional cleanup and more as a move affecting figures within the President’s own network.
In hindsight, Purbaya is the eighth minister replaced across six separate waves of reshuffles within Prabowo’s Kabinet Merah Putih (Red and White Cabinet) in just 23 months. That’s an average of one reshuffle wave roughly every four months since Prabowo took office, making cabinet turnover a defining feature of his presidency rather than a rare event.
This also raises the question of whether Prabowo is relying too heavily on his power to reshuffle the cabinet. The President has the prerogative right, but using it eight times in under two years without clear proof of improvement makes it fair to ask whether this power is being used to fix real problems, or just to keep control over people close to him.
Gemala holds a degree in International Relations, with a focus on contemporary global issues. In addition to her years of undergraduate study, she has hands-on experience in early childhood education, having worked in both teaching and teaching assistant roles. She now pursues journalism as a practical extension of her academic background, with a focus and scope centered on ASEAN regional dynamics and social issues.
Editorial Deadline 19/09/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)
