Manila Under Siege
Issue 41 — Key Developments Across the Philippines, Singapore, and Vietnam
Editor’s Note
by Karen Ysabelle R. David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk
Worldwide, the growing global oil crisis continues to dominate headlines. But for the Philippines, amid a dizzying week that has also been rife with espionage concerns and an ongoing maritime dispute in what it calls the West Philippine Sea, the fuel shock is just one of multiple crises laying siege to the country.
Vietnam, too, is facing the twin threats of the oil crisis and rising costs that are quickly becoming familiar the world over. In the face of American unreliability, Hanoi is adopting a dual-track strategy that has seen it engage in a diplomatic flurry of activity.
And for many, Singapore remains a haven, no matter what happens in the rest of the world. With its enduring reputation for economic opportunity and stability, the city-state continues to act as a beacon for foreigners, both in Southeast Asia and beyond.
The Philippines 🇵🇭
The Philippines’ Two-Front Security Squeeze
by Eduardo G. Fajermo Jr., in Angeles City
A fuel surge, driven by widening international conflict, is not just hitting Filipino wallets. It is also tightening the operating space for a country that must patrol contested waters while shoring up vulnerabilities at home. This week’s headlines show the Philippines confronting a two-front challenge at once: alleged foreign-linked information leaks inside government networks and rising maritime pressure in the West Philippine Sea (WPS).
The “inside” front: Recruitment, proxies, and near real-time leaks
A report this month detailed how a Filipino civilian admitted to transmitting sensitive information to a foreign handler, including operational details on missions in the WPS. According to the civilian’s account, access was gained by compromising the device of a friend in the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), and communications evolved from messaging apps to a method concealed inside a “Tetris” gaming application.
The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) has framed this as part of what it calls a “growing global intelligence trend,” describing recruitment methods that target young professionals online and seek operational advantage by learning adversaries’ plans and capabilities. The National Security Council, for its part, has tried to calibrate public alarm, acknowledging that some leaked information was sensitive but saying it did not pose a “serious threat” to national security, while emphasizing the need for vigilance among government employees facing suspicious “job offers.”
Security now is not only about ships and aircraft. It is also about people, access, and routine practices. The state can invest in radars and patrol assets, but still lose the advantage if mission schedules, vessel deployment details, or personnel data leak through informal channels.
The “waters” front: Flares over Mischief Reef and intensified presence
While agencies move to seal internal vulnerabilities, events at sea are simultaneously raising the temperature. On 20 March, Chinese forces were reported to have fired flares near a PCG aircraft during a maritime domain awareness flight over the Kalayaan Island Group, with the plane operating near Mischief Reef (Panganiban Reef). The same report noted additional monitoring of Chinese maritime militia vessels near Escoda Shoal and the continuing strategic weight of Philippine-held outposts such as Pag-asa Island. There were also reported PCG concerns about Chinese “clearing operations” at Bajo de Masinloc (Scarborough Shoal), which the Coast Guard said were meant to intimidate Filipino fishermen and reinforce Beijing’s presence.
Fuel shock meets security operations
The fuel crisis is now spilling into government decisions and military routines. The AFP has publicly said it is implementing energy conservation measures to address rising prices, while stressing that essential security operations will continue, including activities tied to the WPS. That constraint shows why today’s security environment is not only a sovereignty issue. It is also a logistics issue.
Even as fuel costs rise, joint exercises and alliance operations are expanding. Around 1,000 Japanese troops are expected to participate in this year’s Balikatan exercises, part of deepening security ties amid regional uncertainty.
Why ASEAN should pay attention
The Philippines’ two-front squeeze should be read as a warning for the rest of ASEAN: in contested environments, external pressure often arrives through both the sea lane and the inbox. The outcome will depend not only on diplomatic statements, but on whether states can harden internal protocols, protect sensitive operations, and sustain patrols even when global fuel markets turn security into an expensive discipline.
Eduardo is a faculty member at Holy Angel University, where he teaches courses on Philippine history and contemporary global issues. He is currently pursuing a Master’s degree in Political Science at the University of Santo Tomas, with a research focus on disaster governance, environmental politics, and the urban poor in the Philippines.
Vietnam 🇻🇳
The Scramble for Energy Diplomacy and Security
by Hang Nguyen, in Ho Chi Minh City
The convergence of 2025 trade war tariffs and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz amid ongoing Middle Eastern conflicts reveals the United States’ continued capacity to shape global economic outcomes, despite an increasingly inward-looking and state-centric policy orientation. The Strait of Hormuz carries on average 20% of global crude oil trade, with 90% of shipments heading for Asia. For Southeast Asia’s rapidly expanding digital and industrial frontier sectors, the insufficient domestic resources and limited extraction capacity leaves the region structurally vulnerable to disruptions at vital chokepoints.
The diminishing supply of oil and the accompanying exponential surge in costs imposes a financial strain on businesses and consumers navigating the risk of inflation and necessities like daily transport. The collapse of shipping traffic in the Strait of Hormuz signals the accelerating shift toward multi-vector energy diplomacy, revealing how middle powers — such as Vietnam — adapt. As confidence in America’s sphere of influence erodes proportionally to the Trump’s administration’s volatile and conflict-prone foreign policy, Hanoi has adopted a dual-track strategy in response that combines external energy diplomacy with internal market stabilization.
On the diplomatic front, Hanoi political leaders have responded proactively by engaging in diplomatic phone calls with global world leaders, sending official letters, and meeting with foreign ambassadors in Vietnam. On 17 March, Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh received a diplomatic visit from the Ambassador of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to Vietnam, Mr. Bader Abdullah Almatroosh, subsequent to a diplomatic phone call with the UAE President. The Prime Minister reiterated the bilateral Comprehensive Partnership and Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) to discuss the securitization of a stable supply of crude oil and natural gas imports, upgrading to a Strategic Comprehensive Partnership, accelerating Vietnam–Gulf Cooperation Council Free Trade Agreement (FTA) negotiations, and investment cooperation. Earlier, on 16 March, Prime Minister Pham Minh held a phone call with Angolan President João Manuel Gonçalves Lourenço to request for additional supplies of oil and gas, grounded in over 50 years of diplomatic relations and partnership. Hanoi also voiced the need to accelerate the implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on oil and gas cooperation.
On the domestic front, Hanoi prepares to impose countermeasures to combat against the implications of the prolonged closure of the vital oil waterway. In approximately three weeks post the initial missile strike in the Middle East, oil and petroleum prices have experienced a 27–40% fluctuating increase, directly hurting the pockets of everyday consumers. On 18 March, the Hanoi Department of Construction issued Document No. 5556/SXD-KTXD to contain the impact of oil price fluctuations on critical infrastructure and construction projects through measures and guidelines. While this exemplifies administrative actions to deter or minimize negative impact, Vietnam’s positionality cannot endure long-term repercussions of the Middle Eastern war. The current crisis underscores the urgency of accelerating structural reforms in the domestic energy sector, including investment in renewable energy, enhancement of refining capacity, and reduction of fossil fuel dependency. Without such long-term adjustments, external diversification risks becoming a reactive rather than transformative strategy.
Hang is a young researcher with academic experience in Vietnam and the United States. She has previously worked in public relations at the U.S. Consulate General in Ho Chi Minh City and the YSEALI Academy. Her research focuses on ASEAN centrality in the evolving Asia-Pacific landscape, with particular attention to Vietnam’s approach to trade, regional cooperation, and political economy in the face of external power dynamics and global volatility.
Singapore 🇸🇬
Why Singapore Feels Like Home for Some Foreigners
by Ryan
In a recent Straits Times article, Korea-born finance executive Andrew Lim described how Singapore became more than just another overseas posting. Having previously lived in Hong Kong, Beijing, and Dubai, he said what stood out was not only Singapore’s role as a business hub, but also the warmth of daily life: lunches at hawker centers, festive gatherings with colleagues, and a workplace culture that felt open and community-oriented. After relocating in 2019, he eventually felt ready to bring his wife to Singapore and plan for the long term. His story helps explain why, for many foreigners, Singapore is not just a place to work, but a place to build a life.
Singapore’s appeal is not difficult to understand. It offers what many global cities struggle to balance: economic opportunity, personal safety, political stability, and everyday efficiency. Official figures show that Singapore had 6.11 million people as of end-June 2025, including 1.91 million non-residents, while the Ministry of Manpower reported a total foreign workforce of 1.64 million at the end of 2025. This reflects how deeply foreign talent is woven into the country’s economy. For many professionals, Singapore is attractive because it is orderly, well-connected, and internationally minded, all while remaining close to the rest of Asia. The quality of infrastructure, ease of commuting, and sense of security all strengthen its appeal, especially for those considering more than a short-term posting.
There is also a softer reason some foreigners stay: Singapore can be relatively easy to settle into. Andrew’s experience suggests that belonging is often built through small, repeated social moments, rather than dramatic gestures. In a multicultural society where English is widely spoken and social norms are easier for newcomers to navigate, foreigners may find it simpler to adjust than in places where language or cultural barriers are more rigid. For those raising families, Singapore’s emphasis on safety, order, and social cohesion can make it feel like a practical long-term base rather than a temporary expatriate stop.
Yet Singapore is not somewhere everyone chooses to remain. The same city that attracts global talent can also wear people down. Cost is one of the clearest reasons. Although the property market cooled somewhat at the end of 2025, private residential rents still rose 1.9% across the year, while 3.3% private home prices has increased. For foreigners without access to subsidized public housing, rent can be one of the biggest pressures on daily life. Over time, even a strong salary may not fully offset the cost of housing, schooling, childcare, and other essentials, particularly for expatriates with families.
Work status also shapes whether someone stays or leaves. Singapore remains open to foreign professionals, but access is selective. Employment Pass candidates must meet salary thresholds and, in most cases, pass the COMPASS points framework. These rules are meant to ensure foreign professionals complement the local workforce, but they also make Singapore a harder place to remain in if one’s job situation changes. For some, that uncertainty, combined with demanding work culture, limited space, and distance from home, makes leaving the more sensible choice.
A broader ASEAN lens helps put Singapore’s appeal into perspective. Andrew’s decision to build a future here reflects a wider regional pattern. Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand remain major destinations for foreigners, while countries such as Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar are still more commonly seen as labor-sending economies. Some foreigners may choose Malaysia or Thailand over Singapore for lifestyle reasons, longer-term residency options, or retirement planning. Even so, for many people across ASEAN seeking work, stability, and upward mobility, Singapore continues to exert the strongest pull.
Ryan is a final-year finance student at the Singapore University of Social Sciences (SUSS) with experience across venture capital, venture debt, and business development. He also holds a diploma in Law and Management from Temasek Polytechnic. His interests lie in how emerging technologies and economic trends shape business ecosystems and regional development in Asia.
Editorial Deadline 24/03/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)
