Manila’s Michelin Madness
Issue 27 — Key Developments Across the Philippines, Singapore, and Vietnam
Editor’s Note
by Karen Ysabelle R. David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk
In recent weeks, Manila has been abuzz with the arrival of the Michelin Guide in the country. In awarded restaurants across major cities of the Philippines, crowds of customers await — but will this be enough to solidify the reputation of Filipino cuisine among its Southeast Asian peers?
Elsewhere in the region, Singapore looks toward ASEAN, as increasing multilateral military cooperation between the bloc’s member states presents opportunities for the city-state. In Southeast Asia, where national borders can so often be porous and where multiple threats are transnational, Singapore stands to benefit from these exchanges with its neighbors.
In contrast, Hanoi looks to its bilateral ties, with the General Secretary’s visit to Vientiane earlier this month. But more than a routine interaction between two ASEAN member states, the visit invites a closer look at China’s growing influence in Laos and how this may affect the long-standing relationship between Hanoi and Vientiane.
The Philippines 🇵🇭
Michelin’s Entry Into the Philippines
by Glenn Vincent N. Boquilon, in Angeles City
The Michelin Guide has finally arrived in the Philippines, further cementing the reputation of the country’s rich culinary scene within the region. What initially began as a tire company in France has now revolutionized how food is honored, presented, and consumed. The Michelin Guide seeks to promote exceptional culinary spots to travelers, worthy of a stop, detour, or a specific journey. Contextualizing this within regional development, it strategically positions the Philippines within the highly competitive gastronomic landscape of the ASEAN region. The promotion of culture through gastronomy has always been a significant catalyst for development, and Michelin’s arrival supplements this to a greater extent.
Beyond individual accolades, the Guide’s entry into the Philippine market signals a shift in how the country positions its soft power within Southeast Asia. Food has long operated as an informal bridge between economies, cultures, and investors. The spotlight on these spots creates a better pathway for investments in hospitality, tourism, and even supply chains. Locally, these food hubs are also being recognized by agencies like the Department of Tourism that seek to further draw in tourists.
While the star system is highly anticipated, the French company also presents the Bib Gourmand award to restaurants that equally produce high-quality food, but are more recognizable and at great value. Aside from these, they also award spots with the Green Star for sustainable practices, as well as other special distinctions, such as Michelin-Selected restaurants. A total of 108 establishments received recognition at the awarding of the Michelin guide last 30 October. At the top of the list is fine dining restaurant Helm by Filipino-British chef Joshua Boutwood, with 2 Michelin Stars, an exceptional feat for the Filipino culinary scene.
Almost a month after the awarding, numerous spots have received a staggering amount of support from patrons and fellow food enthusiasts, a practice that is expected to be seen more in the coming months. Morning Sun Eatery, a small, neighborhood spot where home-cooked Filipino meals are served, has reported its highest-ever sales. Regardless of whether it is a fine dining restaurant or just a neighborhood carinderia, the Michelin presence certainly stimulates competition, raises expectations, and forces the industry to rethink what Filipino dining can look like on the world stage.
As the excitement settles, what becomes clear is that Michelin’s arrival is not simply about stars, rankings, or culinary prestige. It marks a moment when the Philippines steps more confidently into the region’s cultural and economic conversation, using food as both narrative and strategy. Whether this momentum leads to sustained investment, stronger culinary ecosystems, or deeper regional recognition will depend on how the industry evolves from here. But for now, the Guide has opened a new chapter, one where Filipino cuisine is not merely tasted, but truly seen.
Glenn holds a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from the University of Santo Tomas. His experience spans governance programs, policy development, and political research, having worked with the Ateneo School of Government and WR Numero Research on projects focused on electoral reform, public opinion, and regional development. He also helped coordinate the drafting of the Bangsamoro Local Government Code and supported the Academy of Multiparty Democracy.
Singapore 🇸🇬
Strengthening ASEAN’s Military Collaboration and Singapore’s Role
by Jennifer Hui En Tan, in Singapore
Multilateral military cooperation amongst ASEAN member states has become an increasingly important pillar of regional security. Through multilateral dialogues, ASEAN states have been collectively moving towards meaningful progress in areas such as humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, cybersecurity, and maritime security. The recent 26th ASEAN Chiefs of Army Multilateral Meeting (ACAMM-26) and the 13th ASEAN Sergeant Majors Annual Meeting (ASMAM-13) are examples of such agreements.
Cyberattacks, climate-driven disasters, and cases of terrorism have increasingly risen over recent years, making military cooperation increasingly important. Modern threats are transnational in nature, making coordinated responses and cooperation vital to reducing the vulnerability of individual states. The joint military mechanism allows states to share intelligence and mobilize rapid assistance during natural disasters such as typhoons, floods, and haze episodes that often affect several ASEAN members simultaneously. Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) efforts can be seen through ASEAN’s response following the March 2025 7.7-magnitude Myanmar earthquake. Singapore deployed an 80-member Operation Lionheart contingent to assist with disaster rescue, as well as three officers from the Singapore Civil Defense Force as part of the ASEAN Emergency Response and Assessment Team (ERAT) and HADR efforts.
Recent military cooperation has been strengthened through multilateral platforms such as ACAMM-26, which focused on the theme ‘Building Regional Cooperation in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR)’. The conference emphasized the need for cooperation in HADR operations, including adopting digital technologies for disaster response, increasing civil-military cooperation, and joint exercises in the near future. By prioritizing HADR, ASEAN militaries are not only preparing for increasingly frequent climate-driven disasters but building trust, transparency, and habits of cooperation which reinforce overall regional stability.
Singapore gains important strategic and operational advantages from ASEAN’s multilateral military cooperation frameworks. On a strategic level, the recent ACAMM-26 held in Singapore allows the state to position itself as a neutral convener whilst enhancing strategic trust with neighboring states. HADR efforts strengthen Singapore’s ability to mitigate risk at home while contributing to broader regional crisis responses, which again reinforces Singapore’s reputation as a neutral party.
Despite Singapore’s size disadvantage, the state maintains advanced military technology, which is supported by its high per capita spending. Singapore spends roughly US$2,000 per capita on defense, far above neighboring states such as Thailand and Malaysia, which each spend under US$100 per capita. This sustained investment has enabled Singapore to build the region’s most technologically advanced force, with capabilities in cyber defense, integrated command systems, and network-centric warfare. According to the Global Fire Index, Singapore’s military is ranked 29th globally on the Military Power Ranking and 4th within ASEAN, reflecting the state’s advanced military technology and position as a highly equipped force within the region.
ASEAN multilateral military cooperation has evolved into a cornerstone of regional security. Natural disasters, cyberattacks, and terrorism have been rising threats in the region, and multilateral meetings such as ACAMM-26 and ASMAM-13 give states a platform to coordinate responses and build trust within ASEAN. Over time, ASEAN has expanded both the scope and frequency of its defense engagements, with member states participating in joint exercises, information sharing arrangements, and capacity-building initiatives. Regular dialogues and working groups have also helped institutionalize cooperation, allowing states to develop common procedures and strengthen communication channels. This gradual deepening of collaboration reflects ASEAN’s broader approach to security, which emphasizes consensus building, preventive diplomacy, and practical cooperation to manage shared challenges.
Jennifer is a final-year International Relations student at the Singapore Institute of Management, where she focuses on political engagement, diplomacy, and community governance. She is an active volunteer in her constituency, working closely with residents to understand local concerns, facilitate dialogue, and support community initiatives.
Vietnam 🇻🇳
Vietnam and Laos Celebrate Five Decades of Unity
by Sean Huy Vu
General Secretary Tô Lâm arrived in Laos on December 2 to celebrate the 50th anniversary of founding of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic. This was not a routine high level visit from a head of government, as Laos and Vietnam are each other’s closest allies in Southeast Asia. Contemporary relations have their origin in the French colonization of Indochina in the late 19th century. Under the leadership of the Viet Minh, Laos and Vietnam successfully resisted French efforts to recolonize the region after World War II.
During the Vietnam War, the Vietnam People’s Army, the Viet Cong, and the Pathet Lao coordinated closely to counter American military intervention, particularly as U.S. bombing campaigns extended into Laos in an effort to disrupt supply routes along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. The Lao People’s Democratic Republic was established in 1975, just months after the Liberation of South Vietnam. Its founding prime minister with Kaysone Phomvihane, a communist leader of mixed Vietnamese and Lao heritage, who played a central role in solidifying the alliance between the two nations
Since the Vietnam War, however, Lao-Viet relations have become more insecure as China has asserted greater influence in mainland Southeast Asia. In the absence of a highly healthy, wealthy, and educated population, Laos has attracted Chinese investment into the country. The most famous example of Sino-Lao economic cooperation is the Vientiane-Boten Railway, which connects the northern border town of Boten to the capital, Vientiane. Costing $7 billion, it is Laos’ most expensive infrastructure project, and is emblematic of the country’s desire to transition from a landlocked to “land-linked” country. Field research by Cheng-Chwee Kuik and Zikri Rosli suggests that the train is well-received in Laos, with many locals describing it as a safer, faster, cost-effective method of transportation. Thanks in part to the railway, official statistics report that 700,000 Chinese tourists visited Laos in 2023.
Kuik and Rosli note, however, that due to the United States’ reluctance to engage with Laos economically due to political corruption and human rights concerns, the Southeast Asian nation lacks the opportunity to pursue economic hedging against China. This has led to growing concerns, especially in Vietnam, that Laos is at risk of becoming overly dependent on its northern neighbor for economic development. More than half of the country’s $14.5 billion public debt (close to 90% of GDP) originates from Chinese loans for mining and infrastructure projects.
Laos’ closer relations with China raise not only economic concerns for the Vietnamese leadership but also security-related ones. Most of the Lao People’s Armed Forces (LPAF) are trained by the Vietnam People’s Army, and the Central Military Commissions of both parties maintain close ties. But the LPAF is increasingly cooperating with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), indicating a shift in Laos’ security alignment.
Thus, Tô Lâm’s visit might be routine for a Vietnamese leader, it occurs amidst a rapidly changing international system. For decades, Vietnam and Laos were allies within a bipolar region dominated by the Communist forces and the United States and its allies. Now, however, as U.S. power declines globally, China has greater opportunity to assert its interests in the region, knowing full well that the U.S. is either unable or unwilling to respond.
Sean is a scholar of East Asian history, culture, and international relations, with current research at Georgetown University examining working-class labor and human trafficking in the region. His broader interests include the social psychology of religion and identity politics. Sean previously taught modern Korean history at the University of California, Irvine, where he completed his B.A. in History, and later taught English in Ho Chi Minh City while studying Vietnamese language and culture. His writing has been published by UC Irvine, Johns Hopkins University, and Foreign Analysis.
Editorial Deadline 09/12/2025 11:59 PM (UTC +8)
