Manila’s Watchdog Under Watch
Issue 21 — Key Developments Across the Philippines, Singapore, and Vietnam
Editor’s Note
by Karen Ysabelle R. David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk
In this week’s issue, a former Philippine Ombudsman’s revelation about a Senator has put the very Office envisioned to lead the crusade against corruption within the government at the center of the country’s latest corruption fiasco. When even the top watchdog cannot be trusted, to whom can the Filipino people turn to for protection?
In Singapore, a watch of a different kind: a recent bill may soon lead to tighter surveillance and penalties against serious crimes. If passed, the bill — which highlights scammers, money mules, and sexual predators — will include caning as a punishment. The question now: once the bill becomes law, will Singaporean authorities be able to monitor scam groups and predators enough for them to face justice?
And in Vietnam, a good month for diplomacy: October has seen the country be highly visible in the international eye. Should it continue its current trajectory, the future seems bright for Vietnam’s place in the world, even amidst global trends and challenges.
The Philippines 🇵🇭
Guarding the Powerful or the People? Villanueva Saga Tests the Ombudsman’s Credibility
by Eduardo G. Fajermo Jr., in Angeles City
In the Philippines, where democracy often teeters between spectacle and substance, the principle of accountability faces a sobering test. A revelation from former Ombudsman Samuel Martires recently resurfaced a controversial chapter involving Senator Joel Villanueva, one many assumed had quietly faded.
The disclosure that a 2016 dismissal order against the Senator had been silently “junked” in 2019 invites deeper scrutiny into the very office entrusted to uphold integrity in public service. In a region like Southeast Asia, where anti-corruption rhetoric often outpaces reform, this saga is more than a personal tale — it’s a question of institutional muscle.
Senator Villanueva once built his political brand on anti-corruption advocacy as a party-list representative of Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption. Yet in 2016, then-Ombudsman Conchita Carpio-Morales found him administratively liable for grave misconduct and serious dishonesty related to the misuse of PHP 10 million from his Priority Development Assistance Fund, funneled through questionable non-governmental organizations. The penalty: dismissal from public service.
Despite the ruling, the Senate refused to act, citing internal procedures. It was a curious impasse that reflected not just legal ambiguity but institutional timidity. For years, the matter lay dormant — until Martires, in an October 2025 interview, said the case was closed under his watch, stating simply that the previous ruling was set aside in 2019. There was no formal press release, no detailed explanation, and no clear resolution made public.
This has sparked fresh concerns. If a binding dismissal order from a constitutionally independent office can be voided without transparency, what does that imply for checks and balances in Philippine governance? The Office of the Ombudsman, established to investigate and prosecute erring officials, is now itself under question.
In Malaysia and Indonesia, high-profile corruption cases — such as Malaysia’s 1MDB scandal or Indonesia’s renewed probes by the Corruption Eradication Commission — have shown that with public pressure and institutional action, oversight mechanisms can gain traction, though not always reach full resolution. These examples suggest that democratic resilience sometimes hinges on the credibility of watchdog bodies.
In contrast, the Philippines presents a more complex case: while institutions like the Ombudsman exist and rulings have been issued — such as the 2016 dismissal order against Senator Joel Villanueva — enforcement often stalls. Legislative bodies have cited internal procedures, while subsequent Ombudsmen have quietly reversed decisions without widespread disclosure. Such developments raise broader regional questions.
Across ASEAN, the existence of oversight bodies on paper does not always translate into accountability in practice. As the legal maxim asks, Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? — who guards the guardians? The Villanueva saga may serve as a cautionary tale of how political convenience can weaken institutional safeguards, leaving the public to wonder whether oversight serves power or the people.
Eduardo is a faculty member at Holy Angel University, where he teaches courses on Philippine history and contemporary global issues. He is currently pursuing a Master’s degree in Political Science at the University of Santo Tomas, with a research focus on disaster governance, environmental politics, and the urban poor in the Philippines.
Singapore 🇸🇬
Tougher Time for Predators and Fraud Rings in Singapore
by Ryan
Singapore has moved to tighten penalties for serious crimes, with a bill introduced on 14 October that would mandate caning for scammers who are members or recruiters of syndicates, and allow judges to cane money mules who supply bank accounts, SIM cards, or Singpass credentials. The proposal sets caning at six to 24 strokes for syndicate actors and up to 12 strokes at the court’s discretion for mules. Authorities also flagged discretionary caning for traditional cheating under Penal Code Section 420.
The same package updates sexual offense laws to reflect digital harms. It raises penalties for sexual grooming and clarifies liability for the large-scale electronic circulation of obscene material. It also makes clear that synthetic images created with artificial intelligence that depict minors or non-consenting adults will be covered.
The moves build on two earlier steps. First, Singapore created a Sentence for Enhanced Public Protection in February 2024 that lets courts detain extremely dangerous violent or sexual offenders for a minimum of five to twenty years, and to continue detention if they still pose a threat. That regime targets a narrow group, but signals longer custodial horizons for the worst crimes. Second, the Protection from Scams Act took effect on 1 July 2025 to give investigators and platforms more tools to disrupt ongoing scams.
Why now? Scam losses remain large even after recent enforcement and platform measures. Local media tallied SGD 456.4 million lost in the first half of 2025, a 12.6% drop from a year earlier, yet still a major drain on households and trust. Policymakers argue that higher physical penalties aim to deter syndicate recruiters who currently view mules as disposable.
Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, Malaysia already authorizes caning for cheating under Section 420 of its Penal Code, with one to ten years of imprisonment and a fine, which means corporal punishment for fraud is not unprecedented in the region. Indonesia punishes fraud largely with shorter prison terms and fines, typically up to four years under the country’s Article 378. The Philippines relies on estafa and the Cybercrime Prevention Act, which raises penalties when fraud is done online, and lawmakers are moving to tighten anti-scam rules further.
The key question is whether tougher punishments will stop the problem at its roots. The bill targets scam groups and online sexual harms. A separate long-term detention tool keeps the most dangerous violent or sexual offenders locked up longer. If Parliament passes the bill, the main test will be enforcement. Authorities need to focus on recruiters, not only low-level mules, and quickly shut down sites and channels that spread or profit from intimate image abuse.
Ryan is a final-year finance student at the Singapore University of Social Sciences (SUSS) with experience across venture capital, venture debt, and business development. He also holds a diploma in Law and Management from Temasek Polytechnic. His interests lie in how emerging technologies and economic trends shape business ecosystems and regional development in Asia.
Vietnam 🇻🇳
Vietnam’s Month of Diplomacy
by Hang Nguyen, in Ho Chi Minh City
October marks a significant milestone in Vietnam’s transformative role in global politics, showcasing its impressive progress in diplomacy and foreign policy, most prominently in the fields of humanitarian development and human rights. Amidst the regional and global landscape of intensifying great power competition, successive climate disasters, and tension in trade arrangements, Vietnam has maintained a strong commitment to international cooperation as a rising actor in shaping multilateralism.
Considering Vietnam’s rejected bid to be admitted to the United Nations (UN) in 1975 — when war-related human rights issues were a major concern raised by some permanent members of the UN Security Council — the country’s transformation over the past five decades has been truly remarkable. On 15 October, Vietnam’s delegation successfully secured re-election to the UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) for the 2026-2028 term, not only recording the highest number of votes, but also being the only country to be re-appointed in the Asia-Pacific region.
Only a week later, the delegation of the National Assembly (NA) of Vietnam’s contribution in the four-day 151st Inter-Parliamentary Union Assembly held in Geneva, Switzerland was highly regarded by international participants and spectators. In concurrence, at the Association of Secretaries General of Parliaments (ASGP), the NA brought home another unprecedented triumph for the nation’s parliamentary diplomacy as Vice Chairwoman Le Thu Ha of the NA Office received the highest number of votes among candidates for the 2025-2028 term. This is the first Vietnamese NA representative to be elected to the ASGP Executive Committee, constituting a milestone in Vietnam’s active legislature in global diplomatic affairs.
Vietnam’s humanitarian diplomacy and efforts in international peace-building, in accordance with the diplomatic principles of diversification and multilateralization, can be observed through such victories. By establishing a more prominent stance in global politics, the national leaders have brought the nation from war recovery and poverty alleviation to developing trade relations and comprehensive strategic partnerships, arguably signifying the success of “bamboo diplomacy.” The approach, first politically articulated in Vietnam during the 2016 29th Diplomatic Conference by General Secretary Nguyễn Phú Trọng, is characterized by flexibility and pragmatism in multilateral engagement.
In some interpretations, “bamboo diplomacy” was scrutinized for being an “unsustainable” façade of “appeasement” to great powers — Beijing and Washington — while neglecting domestic capacity-building. Contradictingly, these observations of international recognition are complemented by 40 formal bilateral partnerships (as of 24 October) — 13 comprehensive strategic partners, 12 strategic partners, and 15 comprehensive partners — as Vietnam integrates itself more intensively and extensively into the global system. The state’s diplomatic model has demonstrated resilience and provides a valuable reference point for other middle powers navigating geopolitical uncertainty.
Regional commitments have likewise remained steadfast. From 25 October to 28 October, Prime Minister Phạm Minh Chính and a high-level delegation’s attendance in the 47th ASEAN Summits and other related high-level summits in Kuala Lumpur will shape Southeast Asia’s future agenda for political, economic, and security cooperation.
The country’s trajectory of foreign policy and diplomacy promises unity amidst the ambiguity of great power politics, maritime disputes, and emerging global trade trends.
Hang is a young researcher with academic experience in Vietnam and the United States. She has previously worked in public relations at the U.S. Consulate General in Ho Chi Minh City and the YSEALI Academy. Her research focuses on ASEAN centrality in the evolving Asia-Pacific landscape, with particular attention to Vietnam’s approach to trade, regional cooperation, and political economy in the face of external power dynamics and global volatility.
Editorial Deadline 28/10/2025 11:59 PM (UTC +8)
