Misdiagnosing Terror
Issue 23— Key Developments Across Brunei, Indonesia, and Malaysia
Editor’s Note
by Haniva Sekar Deanty, Lead Editor - Maritime Crescent Desk
Rayhan Prabu in Indonesia looks at the country’s encounter with a school attack shaped by Western far-right ideology underscores how quickly extremist pathways have globalized, outpacing the assumptions of its security apparatus.
Meanwhile across the strait, Muhammad Aiman’s reflection on Malaysia’s struggle with recurring Rohingya boat tragedies shows how humanitarian needs collide with limited national capacity and the absence of regional protection frameworks.
Our Brunei correspondent, Wira Gregory, examines how Brunei’s decision to recognize Chinese aviation certification demonstrates how major-power competition now filters into the technical layers of regulation, industry standards, and connectivity.
New forms of radicalization, entrenched displacement crises, and shifting industrial alignments each demand more coherent, forward-looking policy responses. They also raise a broader question for Southeast Asia: whether governments can modernize their approaches fast enough to meet challenges that no longer fit familiar patterns.
Indonesia 🇮🇩
The Devil You Don’t Know
by Rayhan Prabu Kusumo, in Jakarta
When investigators found a replica AR-15 at the Jakarta State High School 72 mosque bombing site, Indonesia encountered a never-before-seen form of terrorism. The attack injured 96 students and teachers, and was carried out by a student radicalized by Western far-right ideologies. The replica rifle was inscribed with names of notorious far-right terrorists and neo-Nazi symbolisms like “14 Words” and “For Agartha.”
Yet the responses have been alarmingly off-target. President Prabowo proposed banning certain online games, arguing they “condition individuals to become accustomed to violence.” Vice Coordinating Minister of Political and Security Affairs Lodewijk Paulus even dismissed the incident as “not an act of terrorism.” Public discourse further narrowed the cause of bullying, treating it as the sole cause rather than a contributing factor.
Personal grievance and ideological radicalization are not mutually exclusive. The perpetrator may have been bullied, but he chose to express that grievance through far-right symbolism. The inscriptions, white supremacist references, and curated imagery reflect deliberate ideological alignment. Yet no response addresses how a teenager in Jakarta accessed and internalized this content online.
Indonesia must recognize that extremist threats today blend personal grievance with ideological frameworks. These hybrid ideologies intentionally target socially isolated youth who feel alienated from society. Far-right extremism provides a ready-made framework for channeling grievance into violence, with attackers adopting the symbols and targeting patterns of previous terrorists to signal belonging to a global extremist community. Another different yet similar form of extremism, incel extremism, transforms sexual rejection and social ostracism into genocidal misogyny that blames women and society for personal failures. Both thrive in online spaces where lonely teenagers find community, purpose, and justification.
Indonesia is also uniquely vulnerable to these radicalization pipelines. The country faces a youth mental health crisis, with rising rates of anxiety and depression. Bullying, both in-person and online, remains endemic in schools. Economic insecurity compounds these pressures. High youth unemployment, relatively high NEET rate, and premature deindustrialization leave many young Indonesians with limited prospects for meaningful careers or stable futures. These interconnected societal ills create fertile ground for extremist ideologies that promise belonging and purpose.
The government’s response must begin with acknowledgement. Security apparatus and policymakers need to study and understand novel extremist ideologies that are now reaching Indonesian youth. This requires moving beyond comfortable assumptions about what terrorism looks like. Concrete actions must follow: authorities should monitor and restrict access to known extremist forums and imageboards where radicalization occurs. Social media platforms operating in Indonesia must face pressure to improve content moderation of new extremist propaganda. Schools need robust mental health support systems and counselors trained to recognize signs of online radicalization beyond traditional extremism.
This attack will not be an isolated incident if Indonesia continues treating it as an anomaly. The archipelago’s security establishment must evolve beyond its traditional terrorism framework, or risk being blindsided repeatedly by threats it refuses to acknowledge. Indonesia now faces new threats it has never confronted—the question is whether we’ll adapt before the next attack, or after.
Rayhan has a background in government affairs and public policy, with experience across government institutions and advisory firms. His work focuses on the intersection of geopolitics, policy, and risk, with expertise in advocacy, regulatory analysis, and stakeholder engagement. He holds a degree in Government from Universitas Padjadjaran, and has completed an exchange at Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Spain, focusing on global politics and sustainability.
Malaysia 🇲🇾
Dangerous Crossings
by Muhammad Aiman Bin Roszaimi, in Cyberjaya
A boat carrying refugees from Myanmar’s Rakhine State capsized near the Thailand–Malaysia maritime border in November 2025, killing at least eleven people and leaving dozens missing. It was among a rising number of incidents in which vessels overloaded with the persecuted Rohingya minority departed Myanmar or Bangladesh, traversed the Andaman Sea and attempted to land in Malaysia, despite grave risks.
These tragedies highlight a vexing dilemma for Malaysia. On one hand, the country is a habitual destination for Rohingya and other displaced persons, drawn by cultural, religious and linguistic affinities. On the other hand, Malaysia does not recognise refugee status under domestic law, often detains undocumented arrivals and has limited capacity to manage maritime search‐and‐rescue operations and reception. The result: a humanitarian crisis superimposed on a migration management challenge.
The persistence of these dangerous sea‐crossings is no accident. First, underlying push factors remain acute. The Rohingya have faced decades of persecution and live in extremely crowded camps in Bangladesh, many with little prospect of durable resettlement or safe return. Faced with violence, statelessness and economic destitution, some see the risk at sea as less terrible than dying slowly in limbo on land.
Second, pull factors remain potent. Malaysia’s majority‐Muslim population, along with existing diaspora networks make it an appealing destination for Rohingya believing they may have better social reception, informal employment opportunities and community support. Even though safe legal pathways are minimal, the perceived possibility of a new start drives many to gamble everything on a boat voyage.
Third, human trafficking and smuggling networks continue to exploit the refugees’ desperation. The boats involved were likely no exception. These networks charge large sums and take advantage of weak enforcement and open maritime corridors, creating a grim business that keeps the flow alive.
For Malaysia, the continued arrival of refugee boats has multiple implications. There are urgent humanitarian concerns: every capsizing brings loss of life, mass rescue efforts and trauma for survivors and host communities. There are also border management, security and public order implications: undocumented arrivals strain resources, complicate local governance and carry the risk of exploitation. Moreover, Malaysia’s regional reputation and commitment to humanitarian norms come into play especially as a member of ASEAN that expects cooperation on migration and protection standards.
Addressing this problem requires more than reactive rescue operations. Malaysia and its regional partners must invest in upstream solutions: improving conditions for the Rohingya and other refugees in source and transit countries, expanding safe legal pathways, dismantling trafficking networks and improving maritime cooperation. Malaysia might consider refining its national policy to recognise some protection needs, enhance search-and-rescue capacity and work with ASEAN frameworks to share responsibility.
Ultimately, these tragedies stem from unresolved regional displacement, transnational smuggling and a lack of effective protection frameworks. Until the root causes and the risks associated with irregular migration are addressed, the vessels will continue to sail and waters will continue to claim lives.
Aiman is a PhD candidate in Security and Strategic Analysis at the National University of Malaysia. His research focuses on Malaysia’s space policy, ASEAN regional security, and the strategic implications of emerging technologies. His work explores how Malaysia’s defense policy and strategic culture shape its approach to outer space.
Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳
Brunei’s Step Toward Regional Connectivity
by Wira Gregory Ejau, in Bandar Seri Begawan
On 23 October 2025, Brunei’s Department of Civil Aviation (DCA) amended its rules to recognise certification from the Civil Aviation Authority of China (CAAC), allowing Brunei-based airlines to operate Chinese-made aircraft. GallopAir, a recently founded airline start-up, has ordered 15 COMAC C909 regional jets and 15 C919 narrow-body aircraft, marking the first C919 order by a non-Chinese airline.
The regulatory change advances Brunei–China relations by extending cooperation into civil aviation. Aviation is a sector tied to safety regulation, technology standards, and long-term infrastructure commitments. By recognising CAAC certification, Brunei signals confidence in Chinese regulatory capacity. This complements existing bilateral cooperation in energy and infrastructure, adding aviation as a new domain of engagement.
GallopAir’s push to operate COMAC aircraft reflects the role of Chinese financing and investment in enabling Brunei’s aviation ambitions. The arrangement strengthens China’s presence in Brunei’s transport sector and demonstrates Beijing’s ability to leverage state-backed support to embed its industries abroad. GallopAir has stated its ambition to enhance connectivity across the Brunei Darussalam-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA). The C909, with seating capacity suited to regional routes, aligns with this goal. Access to Chinese aircraft and financing provides Brunei with tools to expand air links to secondary cities in the subregion.
For Brunei, this represents diversification of aviation partnerships beyond Airbus and Boeing. For China, it embeds COMAC aircraft in ASEAN’s growth corridors, reinforcing Beijing’s role in regional integration. Other states, such as Cambodia and Laos, had already taken similar steps, operating COMAC aircraft through Chinese partnerships. If more ASEAN regulators follow, COMAC gains a foothold in Southeast Asia that challenges the dominance of Western manufacturers.
Even if sales volumes remain limited, regulatory acceptance alters the competitive landscape. Airbus, Boeing, and Embraer face pressure when Chinese alternatives are present, particularly in markets where financing and delivery timelines are decisive.
Sustained success will depend on investment in maintenance, repair, and overhaul (MRO) capacity and reliable after-sales support. Without this, Brunei risks replicating challenges faced by other carriers that adopted non-Western aircraft.
Nevertheless, Brunei’s acceptance of CAAC certification advances bilateral ties with China. This decision also embeds Chinese aviation standards in ASEAN and supports regional connectivity ambitions. For China, each approval abroad is a diplomatic and industrial gain. For Brunei, it is a calculated step toward diversifying partnerships while positioning itself within ASEAN’s evolving aviation landscape.
Gregory is an MSc candidate in Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He works as a freelance writer specializing in international history, conflict, and counterterrorism, with experience in academia, investigative journalism, and voluntary uniformed service. He currently provides research assistance with the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) under their Southeast Asian Security and Defence Internship Programme and conducts investigations on regional security and transnational crime for a confidential company.
Editorial Deadline 09/11/2025 11:59 PM (UTC +8)
