New Year Celebrations Begin, Same Old Problems Linger in Mainland Southeast Asia
Issue 44 — Key Developments Across Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand
Editor’s Note
by Nabil Haskanbancha, Editor-in-Chief at TAF
A new year begins across mainland Southeast Asia, but familiar challenges persist. Laos faces the annual return of transboundary haze, with regional agricultural burning once again pushing air quality to hazardous levels and highlighting the limits of national solutions to a cross-border crisis. Meanwhile, in Myanmar, a lawsuit against Telenor over alleged data sharing with the military underscores ongoing concerns over corporate accountability and digital rights following the 2021 coup. In Thailand, a fragile US Iran ceasefire offers only temporary relief, as energy insecurity and reactive policies expose deeper structural vulnerabilities during Songkran.
Lao PDR 🇱🇦
Laos and the Mekong Burning Season. Why Does the Air Pollution Problem Keep Coming Back?
by Thipphavanh Virakhom, in Vientiane
Burn bans return each January. The smoke returns each March. And the cycle begins again, not because no one cares, but because the problem runs deeper than any single policy can reach.
These previous weeks, Vientiane’s air crossed into hazardous territory. But the smoke did not start here. Prevailing westerly winds carry haze from burning fields in Myanmar’s uplands into northern Thailand and Laos. Agricultural fires in Vietnam and Yunnan, China add to the drift. What any one community inhales in March is, in large part, the accumulated output of an entire sub-region. Chiang Mai, just across the Thai border, ranked as the most polluted city in the world on the 1st of April, a reminder that this is a regional emergency that happens to land most visibly in national headlines.
If the smoke crosses every border freely, can any single country’s policies realistically solve this alone? ASEAN has had a legally binding agreement on transboundary haze since 2002, ratified by all ten member states. Yet a critical structural gap remains, the agreement contains no sanction clause for countries that fail to meet their obligations. Cooperation exists – Lao, Thailand and Myanmar are now sharing satellite fire-detection data but it remains early and uneven.
When the same burn ban is issued each January and the smoke returns each March, what does that tell us about the distance between regulation and the institutional muscle required for effective implementation? Laos is not without policy. This dry season brought a strengthened nationwide burn ban, expanded provincial monitoring responsibilities, and a World Bank-backed USD 37.85 million pollution management programme running through 2031. Yet PM 2.5 exceeded safe limits across every province this season. The gap between policy on paper and outcomes on the ground often comes down to enforcement capacity – local authorities in many provinces lack the staff, equipment, and budget to act constantly, producing uneven compliance rather than a national response.
If governments are the main actors driving this change, what obligations come with that role and how do we measure whether those obligations are being met for the communities most affected? Upload farming communities practice slash and burn not out of ignorance, but because it works for their conditions, low cost, no need for external inputs, and adapted to steep terrain with poor soils. Research on agricultural transitions in Laos consistently shows that farmers only shift practices when alternatives earn them at least as much per workday, are reliably marketable, and do not leave them food-insecure during the transition period. It requires not just policy but sustained investment in extension services, accessible markets, land security and time – elements that top-down bans alone cannot provide.
The burning season is not a mystery. Its causes are well documented, its geography mapped from satellite, its health consequences measured. What remains unresolved is the harder work such as aligning policy with enforcement capacity, national rules with regional cooperation, and agricultural change with the real conditions of rural life. None of these are quick fixes. But the smoke returning each year proves that the current approach has not yet closed the distance between intention and outcome, pushing us to seek better alternatives.
Thipphavanh holds a bachelor’s degree in international affairs. She is a governance and development professional specialising in rule of law, access to justice, and gender equality in Lao PDR. Her work focuses on strengthening justice sector institutions, advancing people-centred governance, and promoting gender-responsive systems. With extensive experience in project coordination, monitoring and evaluation, stakeholder engagement, and strategic communications, she has collaborated closely with national institutions and international partners to support inclusive and sustainable development.
Myanmar 🇲🇲
Telenor Faces Lawsuit Over Alleged Data Sharing With Myanmar Military
by Myat Moe Kywe
A Norwegian telecommunications giant, Telenor, is facing a lawsuit filed on April 8 over allegations that it shared customer data with Myanmar’s military following the 2021 coup. The case was brought by a Swedish non-profit, Justice and Accountability Initiative, on behalf of Myanmar citizens who claim their personal data was handed over without consent. The lawsuit is supported by the Centre for Research on Multinational Corporations (SOMO) and the Open Society Justice Initiative (OSJI).
Telenor entered Myanmar’s telecom market in 2014 and quickly became one of the country’s leading providers. However, after the military seized power,, the company announced its withdrawal in March 2022, citing an “extraordinary situation” that made continued operations untenable. In May 2022, Telenor completed the sale of its Myanmar business to Lebanese investment firm M1 Group and majority-owner Shwe Bayin Phyu Group, the military-linked local conglomerate with interests in petroleum, one of the military-linked businesses being listed in Open Sanctions announced by the U.S. Department of Treasury.
According to the lawsuit, between the coup and its exit, Telenor allegedly complied with military requests to provide customer data, including location information. Reuters reported that data linked to at least 1,253 phone numbers may have been shared, with Telenor’s headquarters in Norway advising its local team to comply with junta directives. In the news reported by DW, the company did not deny the allegations but said “Telenor Myanmar had no real options. We could not play Russian roulette with the lives of our employees.”
Civil society activist Aung Thu, who was arrested in September 2021, told Reuters that his data was among those shared. Other reports, including from DW News, suggest that such data may have contributed to arrests, imprisonment of activists, and even the 2022 execution of a prominent political figure, Phyo Zeya Thaw.
The lawsuit demands compensation of €9,000 (about $10,500) for each individual whose data was allegedly shared. Legal counsel Beini Ye from OSJI stated that, “if this lawsuit is successful, this case would be the first to hold a telecoms company to account for not sufficiently protesting user data from access by an authoritarian regime.”
The legal action comes amid growing concerns over digital surveillance in Myanmar. Since the coup, the military government has expanded its control over telecommunications and internet use. Most recently, authorities introduced mandatory registration of mobile devices through the International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) system and the Central Equipment Identity Register (CEIR).
Digital rights advocates warn that such measures could further erode privacy. Thit Nyan, a researcher at the Myanmar Internet Project, cautioned that without proper legal safeguards, systems like CEIR could become powerful tools for surveillance and repression.
Since the military coup in 2021, internet and mobile communications in Myanmar have increasingly been subject to monitoring and censorship, raising ongoing concerns about the safety and rights of users in the country. The outcome of the lawsuit is likely to be closely watched both at home and abroad, as scrutiny grows over accountability and the protection of personal data in Myanmar’s telecom sector.
Myat is a senior undergraduate student majoring in Politics, Philosophy, and Economics. She has interned at The Asia Foundation in Washington, D.C., and she has also worked as a summer research assistant at the Centre for Policy and Innovation (CRPI), gaining experience in research and analysis. Her work focuses on civic engagement, gender, youth leadership, and community development.
Thailand 🇹🇭
The US-Iran Ceasefire: A Fragile Relief for Global Markets, A Permanent ‘War-Tax’ for Thailand
by Paranut Juntree, in Bangkok
To global markets, the April 8 ceasefire between the U.S. and Iran, mediated by Pakistan is a temporary diplomatic and economic victory. However, to the Thai consumer, it is a mirage. While the price of a liter of diesel may eventually tick downward following the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, the price of a plate of Pad Kra Pao and countless other daily essentials may not, and continue to climb.
The damage has already been done. Higher energy and logistics costs are now “baked in” to the economy, as oil serves as the foundation for everything from manufacturing power to product distribution. While the ceasefire has paused the large-scale conflict, it has not halted the permanent upward shift in the cost of living in Thailand, combined with a volatile political climate for an administration already accused of favoring “gray capital” over common citizens.
In Thailand, inflation is projected to rise in Q2 2026, reaching 3.4% as higher costs become a permanent fixture. When oil prices spike, consumer goods also rise. Yet, when a ceasefire may provide a temporary relief, those prices may remain “sticky” as businesses are hesitant to lower costs due to ongoing war-risk surcharges on shipping and the need to recoup losses from the month-long shock.
Furthermore, the ceasefire does nothing to fill the 56.2-billion-baht hole in the Thai Oil Fuel Fund. Even if global crude prices drop, the Thai government must keep domestic prices high to replenish the fund used for previous diesel-price caps. The 6-baht diesel hike implemented on March 26 is not merely a temporary measure, it is a long-term “war-tax” on the Thai public.
The Anutin administration also faces a deepening trust deficit. Early in the conflict, suppliers were suspected of hoarding fuel to wait for price hikes, undermining the 30-baht subsidy. The “missing” 57 million liters of fuel in early April fueled suspicions of middlemen gas-stocking to manipulate the market. This has set in deep-seated outrage, as the public perceives the government as unable or unwilling to control profiteering.
In a move that further fuels a scarcity mindset, the government proposed “wartime rationing,” suggesting petrol stations close from 10 PM to 5 AM. Coming during Songkran, Thailand’s most vital travel season, this policy keeps the public in a state of panic despite the ceasefire news.
The 14-day ceasefire is a fragile relief that fails to address Thailand’s structural vulnerabilities. It is a precarious pause, held together by unagreed terms and shadowed by ongoing regional friction and persistent conflict spillover, which threatens to collapse the truce at any moment. With the ever-present risk of the Strait of Hormuz re-closing, the Thai government must move beyond performative crackdowns on hoarders and develop a robust, transparent energy reserve plan and action steps towards rising inflation. Without a clearer strategy, if the conflict continues, the domestic fallout of the crisis will far outlast its temporary peace.
Paranut has a background in advocacy, with experience in policy research, communications, and civic engagement across both the NGO and government sectors. As Thailand’s Youth Delegate to the United Nations, he represented Thai youth in global dialogues on migration, education, and human rights, championing inclusive policymaking. He holds a degree in political science with a specialization in international relations.
Cambodia 🇰🇭
Cambodia Faces Energy Concerns Amid Middle East War
by Chandara Samban, in Kandal
This week, in our Cambodia coverage, we revisit the March 16 issue by Chandara Samban.
The Middle East conflict, stemming from escalating tensions between Iran and the Israel-US alliance, has entered its third week since late February. The crisis has created widespread instability across the region, with nearly ten countries reportedly targeted by missile and drone attacks. France, Germany, and the United Kingdom have also become involved, further escalating the situation.
Among the most pressing consequences is a growing global energy crisis. The Strait of Hormuz — a critical oil transportation corridor — has been temporarily closed by Iranian forces since the conflict’s opening phase. Countries dependent on oil imports are now facing severe supply disruptions. In Cambodia, citizens have grown increasingly anxious over rising fuel prices, given the country’s limited reserves and uncertain supply outlook.
Oil prices have surged to approximately US$119 per barrel, the highest level since 2022. Cambodians are already feeling the impact, with regular gasoline climbing to around US$1.30 per liter and diesel reaching US$1.54.
Minister of Mines and Energy Keo Rattanak has echoed public concern, warning that Cambodia’s current oil reserves could only last until April without new imports. The ministries of Mines and Energy and Commerce have pledged to coordinate a response in line with the Prime Minister’s directives. As of March 13, around 2,000 gas stations had temporarily closed due to fuel shortages. Authorities have prohibited stations from withholding stock in anticipation of higher prices.
According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), the Strait of Hormuz accounts for nearly 20% of global oil supply — and roughly 90% of oil destined for Asia. Any disruption to this route carries serious consequences for the broader Asian economy, where Cambodia’s dependence on imported fuel leaves it particularly exposed.
In response, some Cambodians have proposed practical alternatives: greater use of public transportation, a shift toward electric vehicles, or simply walking shorter distances where feasible.
Economist Hong Vannak of the Royal Academy of Cambodia told The ASEAN Frontier that while the situation raises legitimate energy security concerns, it is unlikely to trigger a severe economic crisis. “Oil transported through the Strait of Hormuz accounts for around 20% of global supply, which means alternative supply channels may still be available,” he said, adding that OPEC members and other major players would likely seek solutions, with Russian oil a potential option if U.S. sanctions were eased.
Vannak noted that the government has taken steps to monitor and regulate fuel prices, while some private institutions have introduced temporary measures such as remote work policies. He also recommended expanding the use of solar and electric energy — and, looking further ahead, urged the government to attract investors to establish a domestic oil refinery, which would significantly strengthen Cambodia’s long-term energy security.
Chandara is a freelance journalist with a focus on foreign affairs, security issues, and ASEAN affairs. He also serves as a Junior Counterterrorism Intelligence Analyst.
Editorial Deadline 11/04/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)
