No Shelter From a Distant War
Issue 40 — Key Developments Across Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand
Editor’s Note
by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk
A conflict centered thousands of miles away — in the volatile triangle between Iran, Israel, and their respective allies — is making itself felt in Cambodian gas stations, Thai cargo routes, and ASEAN meeting rooms. As its consequences suddenly become a real concern for ordinary people in Southeast Asia, this week’s issue of the Mekong Belt captures a region increasingly caught between internal and external pressures.
In Cambodia, citizens and government alike are grappling with the immediacy of dwindling fuel reserves and rising costs, with no domestic production to fall back on. In Bangkok, Thailand has pushed ASEAN to respond as a bloc — an effort as much about demonstrating regional cohesion as solving an energy equation that has no easy answers.
Internally, the pressures are no less urgent. In Vientiane, a city trying to relaunch a public transit system that failed once already, the margin for error has never felt thinner. And in Myanmar, the junta is using the cover of taxation to roll out a sweeping phone registration system — another step in its quiet construction of a total surveillance state, tightening its grip on its own people even as the region around it burns.
Cambodia 🇰🇭
Cambodia Faces Energy Concerns Amid Middle East War
by Chandara Samban, in Kandal
The Middle East conflict, stemming from escalating tensions between Iran and the Israel-US alliance, has entered its third week since late February. The crisis has created widespread instability across the region, with nearly ten countries reportedly targeted by missile and drone attacks. France, Germany, and the United Kingdom have also become involved, further escalating the situation.
Among the most pressing consequences is a growing global energy crisis. The Strait of Hormuz — a critical oil transportation corridor — has been temporarily closed by Iranian forces since the conflict’s opening phase. Countries dependent on oil imports are now facing severe supply disruptions. In Cambodia, citizens have grown increasingly anxious over rising fuel prices, given the country’s limited reserves and uncertain supply outlook.
Oil prices have surged to approximately US$119 per barrel, the highest level since 2022. Cambodians are already feeling the impact, with regular gasoline climbing to around US$1.30 per liter and diesel reaching US$1.54.
Minister of Mines and Energy Keo Rattanak has echoed public concern, warning that Cambodia’s current oil reserves could only last until April without new imports. The ministries of Mines and Energy and Commerce have pledged to coordinate a response in line with the Prime Minister’s directives. As of March 13, around 2,000 gas stations had temporarily closed due to fuel shortages. Authorities have prohibited stations from withholding stock in anticipation of higher prices.
According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), the Strait of Hormuz accounts for nearly 20% of global oil supply — and roughly 90% of oil destined for Asia. Any disruption to this route carries serious consequences for the broader Asian economy, where Cambodia’s dependence on imported fuel leaves it particularly exposed.
In response, some Cambodians have proposed practical alternatives: greater use of public transportation, a shift toward electric vehicles, or simply walking shorter distances where feasible.
Economist Hong Vannak of the Royal Academy of Cambodia told The ASEAN Frontier that while the situation raises legitimate energy security concerns, it is unlikely to trigger a severe economic crisis. “Oil transported through the Strait of Hormuz accounts for around 20% of global supply, which means alternative supply channels may still be available,” he said, adding that OPEC members and other major players would likely seek solutions, with Russian oil a potential option if U.S. sanctions were eased.
Vannak noted that the government has taken steps to monitor and regulate fuel prices, while some private institutions have introduced temporary measures such as remote work policies. He also recommended expanding the use of solar and electric energy — and, looking further ahead, urged the government to attract investors to establish a domestic oil refinery, which would significantly strengthen Cambodia’s long-term energy security.
Chandara is a freelance journalist with a focus on foreign affairs, security issues, and ASEAN affairs. He also serves as a Junior Counterterrorism Intelligence Analyst.
Thailand 🇹🇭
ASEAN Foreign Ministers Hold Special Meeting to Address Middle East Crisis
by Natamon Aumphin, in Bangkok
On March 13, 2026, ASEAN foreign ministers convened a special online meeting to address the escalating situation in the Middle East. Initiated by Thailand, the meeting was called by Foreign Minister Sihasak Phuangketkeow to push for de-escalation and to coordinate a regional response to the resulting energy crisis.
The meeting came just two days after a Thai cargo ship, the Mayuree Naree, was attacked by Iranian forces while passing through the Strait of Hormuz. Twenty crew members were successfully evacuated by Oman, while three remain awaiting rescue. Sihasak invited the Iranian ambassador to explain the incident and commended Oman for its swift response. Nevertheless, he stressed that ASEAN must address the situation collectively.
As a tightly integrated regional supply chain, the bloc has been directly affected by the attack — most acutely through surging oil and energy prices. Some member states have already implemented preliminary measures, such as mandating work-from-home arrangements for government staff to conserve energy. However, ministers acknowledged that longer-term strategies are urgently needed.
While ASEAN lacks the leverage to directly influence the conflict, Sihasak emphasized that a unified call for peace and dialogue remains essential to demonstrating regional resilience. On immediate humanitarian priorities, he praised Singapore for offering seats on evacuation flights to ASEAN nationals stranded in the Middle East.
Discussions also touched on the possibility of oil-sharing arrangements among member states — an unprecedented proposal that Sihasak acknowledged would be difficult to implement, given that only a few ASEAN members produce oil, largely for domestic consumption. Despite the obstacles, he affirmed that the bloc must explore every available option to ease the burden on its members.
The meeting further advanced the ASEAN Power Grid initiative, which aims to connect regional electricity networks as a structural solution for long-term energy resilience. Though still in development, the initiative has gained new urgency in light of the current crisis.
With supply chains under pressure and fuel prices rising across the region, this meeting signals that ASEAN is determined to respond as a bloc — even where its direct influence remains limited.
Natamon has served as a rapporteur at the Institute of Security and International Studies (ISIS Thailand). She has also worked as a research assistant on diplomatic issues in Southeast Asia. Her work focuses on how domestic politics shape foreign policy in the region. She holds a degree in international relations and has experience in policy analysis, event reporting, and regional research.
Myanmar 🇲🇲
Myanmar Junta's Phone Registration System Raises Surveillance Fears
by Mozart
Myanmar’s military junta has launched a compulsory phone registration system requiring users to register their devices in the Central Equipment Identity Register (CEIR) by submitting their handset’s International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) number. The move has raised serious concerns about the junta’s expanding digital surveillance capabilities.
Announced on March 5, 2026, and coming into force on April 1, the system mandates that every active phone be registered to verify it has “paid tax.” Failure to comply will result in loss of network access and fines for reinstatement. The junta’s Ministry of Information claims the measure aims to prevent stolen, counterfeit, or non-compliant devices from operating on mobile networks, citing Section 389 of the 2008 Constitution: the citizen’s duty to pay taxes as prescribed by law.
However, observers believe the real reason behind the measure goes far beyond taxation.
IT specialists warn that the system’s real purpose is to tighten surveillance over resistance forces and activists. Once a device is entered into the CEIR portal, its IMEI data is automatically collected. Should a handset be flagged for links to resistance activity, authorities can block both the SIM card and the IMEI number, rendering the entire device permanently unusable.
The threat is compounded by Myanmar’s existing SIM card registration system, which already requires users to submit their national identity card number and name. Combined with CEIR, the two systems would give the junta an unprecedented tool to map users’ movements and activity — even with location services disabled — while also identifying the specific device model being used. Analysts warn that arresting a single member of a resistance network could expose the contacts and movements of an entire group.
The comparison with other countries that operate CEIR systems — including the United Kingdom, India, and Pakistan — is telling. Those countries use CEIR primarily to make lost or stolen phones trackable globally. Myanmar’s system, by contrast, is linked to SIM-based identity registration and is not connected to any international CEIR protocol, making its surveillance intent difficult to disguise.
This is not the junta’s first move in this direction. Since the 2021 coup, military authorities have used telecom registration data to track and arrest targeted activists, and have introduced laws restricting VPN usage. In recent months, the junta has also expanded identity cross-checks against criminal records at checkpoints, hotels, and ticketing counters — with significant assistance from China. The new CEIR system, analysts note, would likely be impossible to implement without Chinese technical support, further highlighting the junta’s deepening reliance on Beijing.
With mandatory registration framed as a tax obligation, Myanmar’s junta is quietly assembling the infrastructure of a total surveillance state — one phone registration at a time.
Mozart is a research assistant at Mosaic Myanmar and is currently pursuing a Bachelor of Arts in Liberal Arts and Sciences at Parami University. His academic and professional interests span community development, minority issues, and social impact research. He has held roles including service-learning intern, student mentor, and operations coordinator for local initiatives, supporting project management, monitoring and evaluation, and education programs in Myanmar.
Lao PDR 🇱🇦
Vientiane’s BRT Gets a Second Chance, But Has Anything Really Changed?
by Thongsavanh Souvannasane, in Vientiane
The capital’s troubled Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) system relaunches with free rides and fresh promises. Skeptics are asking whether fixes go deep enough.
Vientiane’s BRT system returned to the streets on 10 March, offering free rides as it begins a two-month trial running until 9 May. For a project that collapsed within weeks of its first launch, the fanfare was notably muted, and the questions notably loud.
The relaunch, confirmed by the Vientiane Capital Public Works and Transport Department, connects Dongdok at the National University of Laos to Talat Sao (Morning Market) across 19 stations. Buses will run daily from 6:00 AM to 10:00 PM, with peak-hour frequency of every six to seven minutes. Normal fares kick in from 10 May.
On paper, it is a reasonable service. In practice, Vientiane has been here before.
The BRT’s first launch in November 2025 unraveled within weeks. Curb-separated bus lanes proved dangerous on the capital’s narrow roads, inexperienced drivers struggled in mixed traffic, and dispatch systems failed during rush hours. Authorities suspended operations in December and ordered a full redesign, a damaging concession for a USD 100 million project backed by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), European Investment Bank, and other international donors.
The most visible fix this time is the replacement of physical curbs with painted lane markings. All non-BRT vehicles are now banned from the corridor between 6:00 AM and 10:00 PM, with fines for violations and full repair liability for anyone damaging BRT infrastructure.
The rules are firmer. But rules were not what broke the first trial.
The operational questions remain stubbornly open. Have drivers received meaningful additional training, or were staffing issues simply left unaddressed? Is the dispatch system that buckled under rush-hour load actually fixed, or patched? Authorities have offered detailed schedules and enforcement provisions while staying largely silent on what specifically went wrong internally and what was done to correct it.
The stakes are too high for vagueness. In January 206, the ADB warned that extended delays risked pulling donor funding entirely.
Officials are projecting confidence, pointing to the planned extension connecting the BRT to the Laos-China Railway station as evidence of the system’s long-term ambitions. But ambition was never the problem. Execution was.
Vientiane’s residents, who welcomed the BRT’s first launch with genuine optimism, are being asked to believe in it again. Free rides will help. But trust, once lost to a bus that couldn’t navigate its own lane, is considerably harder to win back.
Thongsavanh is a journalist from Laos with a background in English-language media. He graduated from the Lao-American Institute with a Diploma of the Arts in English and contributes to independent news platforms. His reporting focuses on environmental issues, socio-economic development, and geopolitics.
Editorial Deadline 14/03/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)
