Old Ghosts and New Hopes
Issue 23 — Key Developments Across Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand
Editor’s Note
by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk
Like pistons in the same engine, Mekong countries often move in opposite directions — some rising with new energy, others weighed down by resurfacing old problems. This week, that rhythm was on full display. In Cambodia, the long-frozen gears of diplomacy began to turn again as Phnom Penh and Washington rekindled defense and development cooperation after years of mutual suspicion — a cautious sign that old ghosts of mistrust might finally give way to pragmatic engagement. Meanwhile, Laos faces the darker side of extraction and dependency, with illegal gold and rare earth mining threatening fragile ecosystems and exposing the limits of state control. In Thailand, bureaucratic confusion is stalling the momentum of the newly introduced refugee work permit, dimming the initial optimism that came with the policy announcement. But while optimism is fading out in Thailand, it reignites across the border in Myanmar, where ordinary citizens are reclaiming their agency through a nationwide boycott of the junta’s latest propaganda film — a quiet, collective defiance that shows that the region’s spirit for change still runs strong beneath the surface.
Cambodia 🇰🇭
Cambodia-US Ties On The Rise After Years of Silence
by Chandara Samban, in Kandal
After nearly a decade of near silence, Cambodia and the United States are expected to strengthen bilateral ties by the end of 2025 under Donald Trump’s second administration and the Hun Manet government. Relations have shown signs of improvement since Washington intervened to mediate in the Cambodia-Thailand border dispute. On October 26, during a ceremony in Kuala Lumpur where Trump witnessed the Cambodia-Thailand joint peace declaration, both sides announced plans for new cooperation in trade and defense.
One of the darkest chapters in Cambodia–U.S. relations dates back to the 1970s, when the US dropped nearly half a million tons of bombs on Cambodia during the Vietnam War, an operation approved under the Nixon administration at the advice of National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger. The devastation from those bombings continues to haunt Cambodia today, particularly through the lingering threat of unexploded ordnance. Many Cambodian intellectuals still raise this as a painful reminder of past U.S. involvement.
Another major rift occurred in 2017, when Cambodia’s Supreme Court dissolved the main opposition party, the Cambodia National Rescue Party (CNRP), and charged its former leader, Kem Sokha, with conspiring to overthrow the government. The accusation was based on a video in which Kem Sokha mentioned receiving advice from U.S. experts — a statement Phnom Penh viewed as evidence of foreign interference. Former Prime Minister Hun Sen publicly demanded an explanation from Washington at the time.
After that, Cambodia–U.S. relations weakened considerably, with limited engagement in the following years. Meanwhile, Cambodia moved closer to Beijing, joining initiatives such as the “Ironclad Friends” and “Diamond Hexagon” frameworks in 2023.
By late 2025, however, signs of a diplomatic u-turn began to emerge. Washington has shown renewed interest in Cambodia, marked by increased exchanges between senior officials of both countries. In November, Deputy Prime Minister Sun Chanthol visited the US to attract investment, while U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Michael George DeSombre visited Phnom Penh to meet with Hun Manet and other officials. Both sides reaffirmed their commitment to strengthen cooperation, especially in the economic sector, culminating in the signing of the Cambodia–U.S. Agreement on Reciprocal Tariffs (ART) in Kuala Lumpur.
Under the agreement, Cambodia commits to eliminating tariffs on U.S. goods — including food, agricultural, and industrial products. The White House issued a statement titled “Unlocking New Opportunities with Cambodia”, announcing the removal of the U.S. arms embargo on Cambodia. Both nations also agreed to restart the Angkor Sentinel joint military exercises, which had been suspended since 2017, alongside expanded cooperation in economic and security fields.
Pen Bona, spokesperson for the Cambodian government, told TAF that Cambodia–U.S. relations have recently gained new prominence, particularly after the U.S. intervention in the Cambodia–Thailand border issue. He emphasized, however, that relations between the two countries have never been “bad” but just less active at times, and that differing perspectives on certain issues are normal in international relations.
Experts note that Cambodia’s growing engagement with both Washington and Beijing reflects the broader dynamics of US–China competition in Asia. As a close “Ironclad friend” of China, Cambodia faces increasing pressure to balance relations between the two major powers. Many analysts believe this balancing act — or “hedging” — is an essential strategy for smaller states in a volatile geopolitical environment.
Geopolitical analyst Seng Vanly told TAF that renewed trade cooperation and joint military exercises between Phnom Penh and Washington are “a clear and positive signal” for both sides, serving as a test for deeper collaboration in 2026 and beyond. Addressing concerns that Cambodia is “playing both sides,” he said, “It’s a common small-state strategy — hedging to preserve autonomy — which is not only acceptable but necessary in today’s uncertain world. The real danger comes when a country aligns too closely with just one power.”
Similarly, EAT Sophea, Permanent Secretary of State at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, reaffirmed that Cambodia, guided by a foreign policy based on neutrality, independence, and non-alignment, is open to cooperation with all countries without exclusivity, noting that strong bilateral relations require mutual effort — not just Cambodia’s alone.
Ultimately, Seng Vanly noted that Cambodia’s foreign policy should continue to serve its national interests through positive engagement with all partners — whether the US, China, or others. While China remains Cambodia’s largest investor and partner in infrastructure and trade, he suggested that the US can play a more significant role in defense, security, political openness, and civil society.
Chandara is a freelance journalist with a focus on foreign affairs, security issues, and ASEAN affairs. He also serves as a Junior Counterterrorism Intelligence Analyst.
Lao PDR 🇱🇦
Laos Confronts Illegal Gold and Rare Earth Mining
by Thongsavanh Souvannasane, in Vientiane
Unregulated rare earth and gold mining operations across northern Laos are threatening ecosystems and community livelihoods, with contamination spreading into watersheds that feed the Mekong River, a lifeline flowing through five ASEAN countries.
Recent research from Mongabay traced the opening of 27 rare earth mines across Laos since 2022, with 15 located in the Mekong River Basin. These include operations along the Nam Khan River in Luang Prabang, a UNESCO World Heritage city, and the Nam Ngiep River. Many mines operate within protected areas. While rare earth extraction remains officially illegal nationwide, local authorities frequently grant informal approvals, allowing operations to continue with minimal oversight.
Chemical contamination from rare earth mining has already devastated river communities. In 2024, elevated cyanide and acidity levels in rivers across Houaphanh and Luang Prabang provinces caused massive fish die-offs affecting dozens of villages. In July, the Mekong River Commission reported elevated arsenic levels in the Mekong River, possibly linked to mining runoff from Myanmar spreading into northern Thailand and Laos, underscoring the cross-border dangers of unregulated extraction.
Gold mining adds another layer of pressure.
In Xieng Khouang Province, unregulated operations caused four deaths following a landslide. In Oudomxay Province, villagers reported severely degraded water quality along the Phark River. Responding to mounting concerns, authorities in Houaphanh’s Xiengkhor district issued a permanent ban on all gold mining permits in June 2025.
Despite national efforts to curb the crisis, enforcement remains problematic. In March 2025, Prime Minister Sonexay Siphandone ordered a nationwide halt to all alluvial gold mining permits, banning new concessions and related activities.
Yet illegal operations persist across multiple provinces, revealing a critical ‘gap’ between policy and on-the-ground control.
My own 2024 field survey in Muen district, Vientiane Province, found that concessions granted to Chinese firms for gold mining inside watershed forests had severely affected local residents. Rivers in the area are now muddy and contaminated, fish have disappeared, and villagers rely on alternative water sources. Many villagers said they dared not complain due to “fear of reprisals,” resigning themselves to the pollution silently.
Without stronger oversight and enforcement, Laos’ rivers will continue bearing the brunt of mining expansion. Sediment, heavy metals, and toxic chemicals threaten not only human health and fisheries but also the biodiversity and livelihoods of millions living downstream throughout the Mekong Basin.
As Laos pursues sustainable development within the Mekong Framework Cooperation, the twin challenges of rare earth and gold mining present an urgent test: Can economic growth coexist with protecting the rivers that sustain the nation?
The answer will determine not just Laos’ environmental future, but also the wellbeing of an entire region that depends on the Mekong’s health.
Thongsavanh is a journalist from Laos with a background in English-language media. He graduated from the Lao-American Institute with a Diploma of the Arts in English and contributes to independent news platforms. His reporting focuses on environmental issues, socio-economic development, and geopolitics.
Thailand 🇹🇭
Thailand’s Refugee Work Permits Facing Tests in Implementation
by Paranut Juntree, in Bangkok
As US aid cuts strain Thailand’s refugee camps, the government’s new work permit for Myanmar refugees in camps marks a shift from relief to self-reliance. The rollout that began in October 2025 shows both promise and tension as slow registration, bureaucratic confusion, and public unease emerge. Still, it is Thailand’s boldest attempt yet to move refugees “from aid to agency,” testing whether economic pragmatism can coexist with humanitarian responsibility.
US and international funding reductions, including USAID’s global downsizing under Executive Order 14169, have severely impacted Thailand’s refugee-camp system. For over four decades, over 100,000 Myanmar refugees, mostly from ethnic minorities, have lived in nine camps along the border, unable to return home due to the ongoing conflict in Myanmar.
With budgets shrinking, the UNHCR and NGO partners within the Committee for Coordination of Services to Displaced Persons in Thailand (CCSDPT) have reduced food, education, and health services, leading Human Rights Watch to warn that refugees in Thai camps would face grave risks. In this context, aid dependency had become unsustainable for both refugees and Thailand.
In August 2025, amidst the humanitarian pressures, Thailand approved a policy allowing registered Myanmar refugees in camps to apply for one-year renewable work permits, with the implementation scheduled for October 1, 2025, coordinated by the Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of Interior. Tammi Sharpe, UNHCR Representative in Thailand, added that “refugees will now be able to support themselves and their families, stimulate local economies through increased consumption, and promote job creation.”
However, one month into the permit’s introduction, the progress is slow. Many refugees struggle with complex documentation and travel restrictions. Many remain wary due to unclear regulations and poor communication between agencies. Moreover, progress is slowed by the implementation being done “learning as they go” and confusion among employers on the new policy. This comes with inconsistent interpretations of the new procedures and no clear standard operating framework, leading many to suggest a “One Stop Service” to clear the confusion. This bureaucratic and policy confusion is evident as some camps may have their own procedural rules while others do not. At the moment, Mae La camp in Tak is the only pilot for One Stop Service.
The success of the policy hinges on balancing economic pragmatism with social acceptance. Although Thailand faces an ageing population and a labour gap worsened by the exodus of Cambodian migrant workers amidst the 2025 Thai-Cambodian conflict, many remain skeptical about migrant workers. Public concerns and nationalist sentiments have fuelled fears that refugees will take Thai jobs or drain public resources. In reality, most refugees would fill 3D jobs (Dirty, Dangerous, and Difficult) that Thais would usually avoid, and only 40,000 Myanmar refugees are eligible to work, just 0.01% of the 40-million labour force nationwide. This underscores the need for inclusion narratives among the public to accompany the policy. Without them, social resistance driven by misconceptions could undermine the policy’s success, despite positive economic outcomes. Chawaratt Chawanrangkul, the co-founder of Thailand Migration Reform, stated that the right to work affirms human dignity and marks the first step towards a stable life for refugees.
Thailand’s refugee right-to-work policy can only succeed if it is backed by clear, consistent regulations and paired with broader co-existence measures, particularly access to education and legal pathways for their families. Beyond the camps, urban refugees must also not be forgotten. Extending the right to work to them would complete Thailand’s shift from short-term aid to lasting inclusion, highlighting Thailand’s aim to not only economic but also humanitarian excellence.
Paranut has a background in advocacy, with experience in policy research, communications, and civic engagement across both the NGO and government sectors. As Thailand’s Youth Delegate to the United Nations, he represented Thai youth in global dialogues on migration, education, and human rights, championing inclusive policymaking. He holds a degree in political science with a specialization in international relations.
Myanmar 🇲🇲
Myanmar Civilians Launch Boycott Against Junta’s Propaganda Film
by Pann Ei Thwel, in Mandalay
Myanmar’s military junta is using the film industry to spread propaganda about the upcoming election. A short film named ‘Khit Thamine Ko Done Saing Myi Thu Myar’ (Those Who Will Derange the History of the Era) was released on October 28, starring famous actors Nay Toe, Myint Myat, Chue Lay, and many more. The release prompted anger among the public, resulting in harsh social backlash and calls to boycott the movie and its actors.
Historically, the Burmese military has used creative arts as a tool to influence public opinion, portraying the Tatmadaw (the military) as the country’s protector. In particular, the new movie is intended to persuade the public to vote for junta-related parties in the upcoming election. In the short film, the civil war is portrayed as a false impression that only exists on social media, and that the on-ground situation is actually peaceful. The film also portrays the upcoming election as the only way out, and urges civilians to vote for the running parties. Furthermore, the youths participating in the revolution are referred to as those who cause the violence inside the country, attempting to ruin the election.
All this false information in the movie prompted anger among the public, who have been bearing the brunt of the conflict every single day. Urban revolution forces —Yangon Army (YA), Dark Shadow, Operation Flame(OF), Mother Son Yangon Force, Broken System — urge the public to boycott and carry out social punishment by not supporting these people’s businesses, not using the products they advertise, unfollowing them on social media accounts, and not liking nor commenting on their posts. The impact of social punishment has been so remarkable that some of the boycotted actors’ collaborators were forced to apologize to the public, and the actors themselves are trying to convince the public that they were forced to make that film.
U Aye Kywel, Director General of the Information and Public Relations Department under the Military Council said that all famous actors and artists must participate in speaking out election campaign messages, and threatened that serious punishment would follow if they refused to act. Director Mike Te, supporting actor Kyaw Win Htut, and comedian Ohn Dai were arrested on October 29 for criticizing the military’s election propaganda film on social media. One of the famous actresses, Pway Pyaw, was also arrested on November 7, after she ignored the order from the military to support the election. According to Irrawaddy news, 88 civilians have been arrested for criticizing the election under the new Election Protection Law. Actors and artists are now under pressure from the military to support the election.
Amid tightening control, Myanmar’s civilians have shown that the junta’s grip over society is far from absolute. The nationwide boycott of the propaganda film not only discredits the regime’s attempt to manipulate public opinion but also reveals the strength of a society through unity, creativity, and collective action.
Pann Ei is an undergraduate student at Parami University, majoring in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics. Following an internship with the CSIS Southeast Asia Program, she developed a strong interest in policy research, with a particular focus on politics and education. She currently works as a research assistant at the Center for Research, Policy and Innovation (CRPI), where she focuses on political institutions and regime types across Southeast Asia.
Editorial Deadline 7/11/2025 11:59 PM (UTC +8)
