One Year of Silence, No Justice
Issue 26 — Key Developments Across Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand
Editor’s Note
by Nabil Haskanbancha, Editor-in-Chief, TAF
This week’s stories explore challenges facing mainland Southeast Asia, where ambitious goals clash with deep-rooted structural issues. In Laos, the unresolved case of six tourists who died from methanol poisoning in Vang Vieng raises serious concerns about regulatory enforcement and justice. One year later, families continue to seek answers while the implicated hostel prepares to reopen, deepening public frustration.
At COP30, Thailand announced an upgraded climate pledge to cut emissions by 47 percent by 2035. Myanmar presents an urgent humanitarian concern. Economic hardship and conflict have caused a rise in abandoned children, with social services stretched to their limits. In Cambodia, civil society organizations face financial reckoning. As international aid declines, CSOs must transition toward greater independence through innovation, digital efficiency, and clearly defined roles.
Lao PDR 🇱🇦
One Year Later Methanol Deaths in Laos Still Unresolved
by Thongsavanh Souvannasane, in Vientiane
One year after six international tourists died from methanol poisoning in Vang Vieng, Laos, families of the victims say they are still waiting for answers.
In mid-November 2024, the travelers fell critically ill after consuming contaminated alcohol at the Nana Backpackers Hostel, a popular stop in the country’s backpacker circuit.
The fatalities involved young tourists from Australia, Denmark, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Several of them were rushed to hospitals in Thailand for emergency treatment. According to The Guardian, some of the victims were transferred to hospitals in Thailand before succumbing to methanol-induced poisoning. Thai medical authorities cited in regional media confirmed that they later died from methanol-induced organ failure. Their deaths sparked global outrage and raised urgent questions about tourist safety standards in Laos.
Methanol, a colourless, tasteless liquid, is extremely toxic. As little as 60ml can be deadly, less than a triple UK shot of ethanol (regular alcohol). Unlike ethanol, methanol is metabolized by the body into formaldehyde and then formic acid (formate). The body cannot rapidly clear large doses of formate, which accumulates in cells and causes severe tissue injury, organ failure, and death.
Regional health experts from organizations like Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and the Methanol Poisoning Initiative confirm that illicit alcohol containing industrial-grade methanol poses a persistent hazard across Southeast Asia. MSF reports thousands of annual methanol poisoning cases globally, with fatality rates of 20-40% if untreated, and notes Southeast Asia’s high incidence due to unregulated production of bootleg spirits.
Despite early police detentions and government assurances that justice would be pursued, the investigation soon slowed. Thirteen individuals were eventually charged with food safety violations, but families argue these minor charges do not reflect the gravity of a mass poisoning that claimed lives from four different countries. According to statements made by the families, reported by BBC, repeated requests for meetings with Lao authorities and updates on the case have gone unanswered.
The tragedy also revealed deeper regulatory weaknesses in Laos’ tourism hotspots. Vang Vieng district of Vientiane Province has long been associated with nightlife and risky drinking environments, and though authorities have tried to reform the town’s reputation, the incident exposed persistent gaps.
The case’s lack of progress has drawn increasing international scrutiny. Governments in Australia, the UK, and the US updated their travel advisories following the incident, warning visitors about the risks of consuming unregulated alcohol in Laos. Online travel communities now frequently cite the Vang Vieng deaths as a cautionary example, deepening concerns that Laos is struggling to meet basic safety expectations for foreign visitors.
Tensions have risen further as reports surfaced that the implicated hostel intends to reopen. For families still campaigning for accountability, the reopening symbolizes unfinished justice and insufficient government response. Yet for local businesses under economic strain, reopening reflects the difficult balance between tourism revenues and safety obligations.
Methanol poisoning incidents have occurred in Indonesia, Vietnam, and Cambodia in recent years, highlighting a wider pattern of weak alcohol regulation across ASEAN. Laos has pledged to improve food safety and tourism governance under ASEAN frameworks, yet enforcement gaps remain one year after the Vang Vieng deaths. Without transparent procedures and accountability, future tragedies remain likely. As the anniversary passes, the case tests Laos’ ability to protect tourists, deliver justice, and restore trust. For the families, the search for answers continues; for Laos, the question is whether lessons will be learned before another preventable loss occurs.
Thongsavanh is a journalist from Laos with a background in English-language media. He graduated from the Lao-American Institute with a Diploma of the Arts in English and contributes to independent news platforms. His reporting focuses on environmental issues, socio-economic development, and geopolitics.
Myanmar 🇲🇲
Poverty and Conflict Cause a Surge in Abandoned Children in Myanmar
by Pann Ei Thwel, in Mandalay
The rising number of abandoned children, including newborn infants, has become one of Myanmar’s most heartbreaking social issues as the country continues to struggle with prolonged conflict and deepening economic hardship. On November 20, the World’s Children Day, the BBC Burmese documented the growing number of children being abandoned across the country. According to the report, the number of abandoned children aged newborn to one year, has increased from three cases in 2023 to 13 cases in 2025.
Since the 2021 military coup, Myanmar’s political instability and economic mismanagement have repeatedly pushed families into cycles of vulnerability. Today, this crisis has intensified. Charitable organizations operating in Yangon, Sagaing, Mandalay, Mu Se, Taungoo reported an unprecedented rise in infants being given up by parents who can no longer afford to care for them. November marks the month of child rights, yet the hardship facing these children extends far beyond the symbolic recognition of this period.
With food prices skyrocketing and job opportunities shrinking, meeting basic needs has become a daily challenge for millions across the country. The charity organizations reported that the root causes lie in economic crises, marital problems and deaths of the parents. Additionally, continuous bombing and artillery strikes by the military have destroyed homes, displaced families, and created new orphans. As reported, the number of orphans in Shan State has increased from 70 to 100 orphans after the 1027 operation in 2023.
In terms of support systems, the charity organizations themselves are struggling to cope. During the previous NLD government, the Association for the Reduction and Protection of Orphaned Children was established by the Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement, where hundreds of children are taken care of. However, since 2021, the organizations working for orphans have disappeared. With the donor support alone, the current existing centers are operating beyond capacity and are unable to accept any more children unless the infants were completely abandoned on the streets. In some cases, infants are abandoned near the train station, parks and public places, leaving charity organizations with no choice but to care for them in their centers.
As the world reflects on the lives and rights of children everywhere in November, we must not overlook what children in Myanmar endure every single day. Their struggles cannot be addressed only in November—they demand sustained attention and action. Building a strong, safe, and reliable support system for them is essential as the country faces yet another year of uncertainty and conflict.
Pann Ei is an undergraduate student at Parami University, majoring in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics. Following an internship with the CSIS Southeast Asia Program, she developed a strong interest in policy research, with a particular focus on politics and education. She currently works as a research assistant at the Center for Research, Policy and Innovation (CRPI), where she focuses on political institutions and regime types across Southeast Asia.
Thailand 🇹🇭
Ambition vs Accountability: Thailand’s COP30 Climate Commitment and Realities
by Paranut Juntree, in Bangkok
During COP30 in Belém, Brazil, Thailand unveiled its upgraded climate pledge under the third Nationally Determined Contribution Plan (NDC3.0), committing to a 47% reduction from the 2019 baseline by 2035. This is equivalent to the reduction of 152 million tons of carbon dioxide, aligning with the Paris Agreement’s 1.5-degree pathway and accelerating Thailand’s Net-Zero Emissions target to 2050. While this goal appears ambitious on paper, the domestic realities from entrenched energy-sector interests to bureaucratic fragmentation, make the goal far more difficult in practice.
The NDC3.0 is expected to start from January 1, 2031 to December 31, 2035 as an economy-wide GHG emissions reduction target, targeting all emissions and removals across various sectors from energy and industry to agriculture, waste, and land use. The NDC3.0 also demands a financial commitment in energy transition. To support its new pledge, Thailand points to a set of evolving domestic policy frameworks intended to anchor its long-term commitment. Thailand’s climate policy now rests on the BCG economy model and the forthcoming Climate Change Act which would introduce a National Climate Fund and carbon-pricing instruments as the country’s long term climate framework.
Yet despite these emerging frameworks and new climate pledges, Thailand’s climate infrastructure remains beset by longstanding weaknesses. With the current NDC2.0 (2021-2030), experts highlighted that the country was already far from reaching its Long-Term Low Greenhouse Gas Emission Development Strategy (LT-LEDS). This was supported by the fact that the country still has a concerning dependence on fossil fuels and coals, combined with the lack of a comprehensive phase-out strategy. Thailand also has limited performance in renewable energy.
While NDC3.0 significantly raises Thailand’s ambition from the 30%-40% from NDC2.0, analysts caution that the upgrade risks repeating the same structural limitations seen in its predecessor. Analysts caution that the current outdated power development plan (PDP) still lacks clear adaptation indicators with operating assumptions remaining unchanged and heavy dependence and expansion on fossil fuels, contradicting the 1.5-degree pathway and Net Zero 2050.
Moreover, although the NDC3.0 mentions adaptation, it gives no quantitative plans, indicators, MRV frameworks or metrics, unlike other countries in the world and some in ASEAN that integrate clear frameworks in their NDCs. NDC3.0 also makes no reference to loss and damage, an omission that determines the coherence of its climate strategy and could severely weaken Thailand’s basis for securing international climate financing. Given that external finance is already essential for implementing multiple measures outlined in the strategy, its absence could further limit Thailand’s access to critical support due to the lack of justification and transparency.
Above all, the NDC lacks quantified sectoral and methane-specific targets, as well as a clear overall detailed pathway for a just transition. Without addressing these systemic gaps, the higher ambition may remain aspirational rather than actionable. As several ASEAN peers advance clearer sectoral pathways and climate frameworks, Thailand’s upgraded NDC will only translate into real progress if domestic reforms, transparent governance and credible implementation plans catch up with its headline ambition.
Paranut has a background in advocacy, with experience in policy research, communications, and civic engagement across both the NGO and government sectors. As Thailand’s Youth Delegate to the United Nations, he represented Thai youth in global dialogues on migration, education, and human rights, championing inclusive policymaking. He holds a degree in political science with a specialization in international relations.
Cambodia 🇰🇭
The Future of Cambodian Civil Society Organizations (CSOs)
by Sokna Thea, in Phnom Penh
For many years, Cambodian civil society organizations (CSOs) have operated within a comfort zone. Most groups depend on foreign aid to pay staff, run programs, and keep their doors open. But this model is now breaking. Donor funding is shifting to global crises, climate needs, and emergency conflicts. As a result, Cambodian CSOs are among the first to feel the impact of funding cuts.
The CSO mapping study in 2024 highlights shrinking grants, echoing the trends apparent in the CSO Roadmap 2020–2025. Today, the situation becomes clearer that foreign aid will not return to old levels. Many organizations face serious risks: some may be forced to shut down while others may operate within a reduced capacity.
This is not only a Cambodian issue – the same pattern is emerging across ASEAN. Donors are reducing traditional civil society funding. Total official development finance (ODF) to Southeast Asia is projected to fall by over $2 billion by 2026, driven by an expected 20% reduction in bilateral aid. There is also a global push for localization, which means donors want CSOs to be more financially independent and more rooted in the community. At the same time, geopolitical competition makes aid flows unpredictable.
When aid dries up, CSOs should turn into organizations with mixed income sources rather than relying solely on grants. That means exploring social enterprise ideas, membership fees, training services, consultancy work, and community fundraising. While these revenue streams may not replace large donor funding, they can provide a modest safety net. The CSO Roadmap even recommends pooled funds and trust funds for long-term survival.
In addition, CSOs must become more efficient and digitally capable. Many still rely on outdated methods, with staff spending significant time on manual tasks that yield limited output. Today’s donors increasingly expect robust data systems, digital communication tools, and clear performance metrics. A CSO that embraces technology and adopts a lean operational model is far more likely to survive than one still functioning as it did 15 years ago.
CSOs need to strategically select their roles. Not every organization is suited for advocacy, just as not all are equipped for service delivery or community support. The UNAIDS Sustainability Roadmap clearly shows the challenge when donor-funded service delivery faces budget cuts. Cambodia needs a clearer division of roles among CSOs – for example, identifying which groups should partner with the government, which should provide technical services, and which should serve as independent watchdogs.
Fragmentation among CSOs is also one of the sector’s biggest weaknesses. Umbrella groups, shared legal support, shared communication tools, and joint funding proposals can reduce costs and increase bargaining power. The CSO Roadmap suggests the idea of stronger coordination and even a CSO council.
The reduction in aid forces a crucial hard reset rather than an ending. Cambodian CSOs have to embrace this reality by diversifying funding, innovating their approaches, and rebuilding connections with the public to ensure survival. CSOs that instead cling to outdated aid structures will inevitably face a slow decline.
Sokna has a background in International Affairs and Business & Commercial Law. He’s currently a Senior Project Coordinator at the Ministry of Economy and Finance of Cambodia, working on the Financial Management Information System (FMIS) Project. His professional focus is driven by entrepreneurship, business development, and financial technology, with a particular interest in how private-sector innovation drives Cambodia’s economic growth.
Editorial Deadline 28/11/2025 11:59 PM (UTC +8)
