Parliament Dissolved, Laws Left Hanging
Issue 32 — Key Developments Across Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand
Editor’s Note
by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk
Three weeks into 2026, the political chaos that characterized the Mekong Belt’s end of 2025 continues to unravel. In Thailand, landmark legislation collapsed with the Parliament: as the Clean Air Act is suspended under Section 147 of the Constitution, the “right to breathe” turns into a political test of whether change can survive procedural continuity. Similarly, political turmoil continues to spread in Myanmar, where the elections keep unfolding despite armed resistance. However, as civil participation is mainly driven by the junta’s coercive measures, the election is unlikely to be a truthful reflection of the will of the people, but rather the result of a forced choice between compliance and punishment. Meanwhile, in Cambodia, banks and microfinance institutions have cancelled and restructured debts for soldiers, refugees, and migrant workers affected by recent border clashes. The measures provide much-needed breathing room for families in crisis, but also highlight how emergency relief continues to stand in for longer-term fixes to household debt and economic vulnerability. And in Laos, authorities have ended search efforts for four people lost in a deadly sinkhole linked to potash mining, leaving families without closure. The decision has cast a harsh light on the human cost of development plans that move forward despite repeated warnings, and on how long communities are expected to live with risk in the name of growth.
Thailand 🇹🇭
New Year, Same Air
by Paranut Juntree, in Bangkok
Thailand enters 2026 choking under “red zone” smog, yet key climate legislation that could address the air crisis collapsed following the dissolution of Parliament in December 2025. The Clean Air Act—designed to establish a legal “right to breathe” and introduce structural measures targeting major polluters—is now stalled, with no certainty of revival. Alongside it, the Pollutant Release and Transfer Register (PRTR) Act and the Climate Change Act are also in limbo, leaving Thailand to confront hazardous PM2.5 levels without a clear legal framework as the country heads toward the February 8 general election.
The dissolution of Parliament rendered the Clean Air Act one of the most high-profile casualties, despite the bill having passed its first reading with near-unanimous support. Under Section 147 of the 2017 Constitution, all bills under parliamentary consideration automatically lapse once the House is dissolved. While this effectively halted legislative progress, it did not permanently kill the bills.
Under the same constitutional provision, lapsed legislation can be revived—but only within a strict 60-day window. Once a new Cabinet is formed after the February election, it must formally request the resumption of these bills within 60 days of the first parliamentary session. If this deadline is missed, the Clean Air Act, PRTR Act, and Climate Change Act would have to restart the entire legislative process from the beginning, a delay that could take years. If revived in time, the Clean Air Act would resume at the Senate committee stage, while the PRTR Act would return to its second parliamentary reading.
Beyond the Clean Air Act, the PRTR Act is widely viewed as essential to any serious effort to combat air pollution. The bill would require factories to publicly disclose their emissions of hazardous substances. Without such reporting, enforcement of clean air standards lacks a reliable data backbone. In effect, the Clean Air Act without the PRTR is a law without instruments.
Despite the legislative setback, momentum among civil society, health advocates, and environmental groups has not entirely dissipated. The Second Thailand National PM2.5 Forum, scheduled for January 20–21, 2026, will bring together more than 100 partner organizations. Organizers aim to use the platform to pressure candidates from major political parties to publicly commit to reviving the stalled bills within the 60-day post-election window.
As the February 8 election approaches, the fate of these climate laws will largely depend on the composition of the next governing coalition. Progressive parties have signaled support for reviving the legislation, framing clean air as a public health and environmental justice issue and backing emissions disclosure and the Polluter Pays Principle. By contrast, a conservative, pro-business coalition may dilute or sideline the bills, reflecting long-standing resistance from industrial lobbies that have previously slowed progress on environmental regulation.
Thailand’s air pollution crisis is no longer merely a seasonal or meteorological phenomenon. It has become a test of the state’s ability to uphold the right to health and a clean environment. As PM2.5 levels rise, the right to breathe has moved beyond draft legislation to an urgent political choice. For Thai voters, the February election may determine whether the country finally adopts a durable, rules-based system—or continues fighting invisible toxins without lasting protection.
Paranut has a background in advocacy, with experience in policy research, communications, and civic engagement across both the NGO and government sectors. As Thailand’s Youth Delegate to the United Nations, he represented Thai youth in global dialogues on migration, education, and human rights, championing inclusive policymaking. He holds a degree in political science with a specialization in international relations.
Myanmar 🇲🇲
A Vote Cast in Fear
by Pann Ei Thwel, in Mandalay
In Myanmar’s sham election, many citizens are casting ballots not out of hope for change, but out of fear and basic survival amid ongoing civil war and repression. The second phase of the election took place on January 11, intensifying an already dire situation, while the third phase is scheduled for January 25. Compared with the first phase, the second round brought heavier pressure on the public as fighting escalated, with both the military and opposition forces continuing to bomb each other’s positions.
Under normal circumstances, elections give citizens the choice to participate freely. In Myanmar, however, refusing to vote comes with severe consequences. The military has used threats and punishment as tools for force participation. Civilians from Minhla town reported that authorities pressured people to vote by threatening fines or imprisonment for those who refuse. For young people, not voting can lead to forced conscription into the military. As the voting period nears its end, pressure has grown in areas where pollings are conducted.
Just before the second phase, the general administration office under military control in Htantabin village, Bago Region, was bombed during a meeting of top officials about conducting the election. A deputy district administrator was killed and an election committee member was injured. Such attacks, along with continued clashes between both sides, have made many citizens reluctant to approach polling stations at all.
In the midst of civil war and repression, voting in Myanmar has shifted from an act of civic participation into a tool of coercion. Rather than reflecting the will of the people, the junta’s election forces citizens to choose between compliance and punishment, reinforcing why this election should be dismissed by the international community.
Pann Ei is an undergraduate student at Parami University, majoring in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics. Following an internship with the CSIS Southeast Asia Program, she developed a strong interest in policy research, with a particular focus on politics and education. She currently works as a research assistant at the Center for Research, Policy and Innovation (CRPI), where she focuses on political institutions and regime types across Southeast Asia.
Cambodia 🇰🇭
Cambodian Banks Resolve $12 Million Debt Crisis for Frontline Military Families
by Malai Yatt, in Phnom Penh
Following recent border tensions with Thailand, Cambodia’s financial authorities and banking sector have rolled out emergency debt relief measures, providing more than $12 million in loan forgiveness and restructuring roughly $500 million in outstanding loans to support soldiers, refugees, and migrant workers.
The two rounds of fighting along the Cambodia–Thailand border between December 7 and 27 displaced more than 600,000 people across seven Cambodian border provinces, disrupting livelihoods and threatening local economic stability. As communities grappled with evacuation and income losses, concerns over mounting household debt quickly emerged as a parallel crisis.
In response to a surge in requests for assistance, the National Bank of Cambodia (NBC) acknowledged that commercial banks and microfinance institutions were struggling to process relief fast enough. The central bank intervened to ensure liquidity and prevent frontline workers and affected households from facing cash shortages while relief mechanisms were implemented.
Despite these measures, some cases of delayed or incomplete relief persisted. Several frontline soldiers reportedly continued to face repayment pressures from local financial institutions. Addressing these concerns, Sok Chan, Head of Financial Inclusion and Public Relations at the Association of Banks in Cambodia (ABC), told local media that individual cases had been reviewed and resolved. He added that the ABC has urged all banks to “fully and efficiently implement the NBC’s announcement.”
Kaing Tongngy, Communications Head of the Cambodia Microfinance Association (CMA), said the immediate priority for both public and private financial institutions was delivering direct relief to those most affected by the conflict. Under the current framework, soldiers or co-borrowers impacted by the fighting are eligible for loan cancellations of up to 80 million riel (approximately 19.900 USD). Soldiers who sustained permanent disabilities can receive debt forgiveness of up to 10 million riel (about $2.495 USD).
“For soldiers who sacrifice their lives on the frontlines, their families are generally exempted from repaying outstanding debts,” Tongngy said, adding that while relief for other affected individuals may face administrative delays, institutions are working to accelerate the process.
According to recent CMA data, more than $12 million in loan principal and interest has already been forgiven or reduced. This includes nearly $1 million in debt relief for soldiers killed or injured in the line of duty and their families, as well as over $10.6 million in waived interest payments for refugee households.
Beyond outright cancellations, approximately $500 million in existing loans have been restructured to ease repayment terms for migrant workers and other vulnerable borrowers, providing temporary financial breathing room as communities recover.
In conclusion, while Cambodia is under economic challenge caused by the recent war, these measures should ensure that frontline families and workers receive critical financial protection while the nation recovers from the pain.
Malai is a reporter at Kiripost, where she has worked for over two years, driven by a strong commitment to amplifying the voices of underserved communities. Her reporting focuses on economic and foreign affairs.
Lao PDR 🇱🇦
Laos Abandons Search for Four Victims as Potash Ambitions Face Reckoning
by Thongsavanh Souvannasane, in Vientiane
Fourteen days after four people vanished into a collapsing sinkhole, Lao authorities abandoned recovery efforts on 16 January, leaving the victims permanently entombed in a stark testament to the human cost of the nation’s ambitious potash development strategy.
The Ministry of Industry and Commerce said rescue teams could not safely access the site in Thongmang village, Xaythany district, due to the sinkhole’s depth and instability. The collapse occurred on January 2, yet residents were not evacuated until after the disaster, prompting scrutiny of whether authorities acted too late, and whether oversight failed.
The incident represents the fifth sinkhole in Thongmang since May 2025, compelling authorities to belatedly evacuate 38 households from designated high-risk zones. A sixth sinkhole occurred on January 11 at the precise location of the initial collapse nine months prior.
Why did it take multiple sinkholes and four deaths before comprehensive evacuations were ordered?
The tragedy unfolded despite a National Assembly-approved moratorium on potash mining in Vientiane Capital, imposed on 1 July 2025, implemented the same day following a 1 June land collapse that damaged residential properties and farmland. Nevertheless, sinkholes continued manifesting throughout the latter half of 2025, raising doubts on whether mining activities continued illegally after the moratorium, and whether authorities failed to uphold their own emergency orders.
The crisis extends beyond the capital.
In Khammouane province, two large sinkholes, one measuring 20 meters wide and 10 meters deep, opened in Pak Peng village, Thakhaek district, in December 2024. Authorities linked the collapses to excavation by a Chinese-owned potash company, yet only ordered localized suspensions while allowing operations elsewhere in the concession, despite the interconnected nature of underground tunnel systems.
Why was a partial suspension deemed sufficient when the interconnected underground tunnel network suggested systemic instability?
These incidents fundamentally challenge Laos’ strategic objective to leverage an estimated 133.62 billion tons of potassium chloride reserves to become the world’s third-largest potash producer after Russia and Canada. The Lao government has previously acknowledged that many mining operations suffer from serious shortcomings, including a lack of qualified technical experts, with nearly half of companies failing to meet industry standards.
But at what cost? How many more lives must be lost before the government reassesses whether these ambitions are geologically feasible or ethically justifiable?
Laos’s economic pressures complicate the picture. With a debt-to-GDP ratio of 88% in 2025, much of it owed to China, critics question whether financial dependence undermines the government’s ability to hold foreign-owned mining firms accountable.
Authorities extended condolences to the bereaved families and provided financial assistance for funeral arrangements, though no remains have been recovered. Is financial compensation adequate when the government’s regulatory failures may have contributed to preventable deaths?
Mounting evidence of subsurface instability is prompting the Lao government to question the geological and economic soundness of its potash ambitions, and to reflect on whether economic goals should outweigh human safety.
Thongsavanh is a journalist from Laos with a background in English-language media. He graduated from the Lao-American Institute with a Diploma of the Arts in English and contributes to independent news platforms. His reporting focuses on environmental issues, socio-economic development, and geopolitics.
Editorial Deadline 16/01/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)
