Plus Ça Change
Issue 30 — Key Developments Across the Philippines, Singapore, and Vietnam
Editor’s Note
by Karen Ysabelle R. David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk
The more things change, the more they stay the same. As we ring in the new year, the three countries of the Pacific Corridor find themselves facing much of the same old issues.
In the Philippines, Glenn Vincent N. Boquilon writes about the country’s preparations for two upcoming elections. But while the developments surrounding the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao’s first parliamentary elections and the 2028 national elections may be consequential, the political maneuvering and jockeying is nothing new.
In Vietnam, the 14th National Party Congress to be held this January is expected to see the reelection of incumbent General Secretary Tô Lâm. In his article, Sean Vu traces what makes Tô different and what makes his policies distinct.
Finally, in Singapore, Jennifer Tan reports on the rise of scams and online misinformation in the city-state. Media literacy has long been a necessity in our modern age, but AI’s newfound prominence has given a new dimension to an old problem.
The Philippines 🇵🇭
From BARMM to 2028: Philippine Political Maneuvering in 2026
by Glenn Vincent N. Boquilon, in Angeles City
As the Philippines enters 2026, the country’s political landscape is quietly but decisively shifting. While national elections remain two years away, political actors are already laying the groundwork. In particular, two developments are worth watching closely. The primary one is the first parliamentary elections in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) scheduled for March 2026. Alongside this is the early maneuvering for the 2028 national polls.
The BARMM elections mark a historic moment for the region’s autonomous government. More than a routine electoral exercise, the vote will test how local institutions, parties, and coalitions perform under increased public scrutiny. One of the major issues surrounding this election includes the electoral preparedness following multiple postponements. Initially set for May 2025, it was rescheduled for October 2025 after a law postponing it was signed. At present, this was reset by the Supreme Court to no later than March 2026 due to key redistricting rules.
However, things remain complicated as the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has suspended the filing of candidacies this January after the Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA) ended its session without passing the court-mandated districting law, raising concerns that the March 2026 elections could be delayed. Further rescheduling might strain public confidence and prolong the needed consolidation of democratic institutions in the region.
Beyond scheduling concerns, some areas in the region continue to face the issue of clan-based politics or rido, further highlighting their deep-seated local power structures. These dynamics make the electoral process even more challenging and must be carefully approached with inclusive participation and vigilant oversight. Addressing these issues will also be key to a peaceful election in the region.
At the national level, political preparations for 2028 are already underway. While formal campaigns remain distant, parties and political families are quietly positioning themselves. Candidate scouting, alliance-building, and early messaging are becoming more visible, especially at the local level, where influence is often built long before national attention follows. This early activity reflects a familiar pattern in Philippine politics, where momentum is cultivated years in advance rather than during official campaign periods alone.
What sets this cycle apart, however, is the growing use of data and analytics in political strategy. Both national and local groups are increasingly relying on voter data, metrics from digital engagement, and targeted messaging to refine their outreach. Social media trends and demographic analyses are now shaping how candidates present themselves and how coalitions are formed. This shift does not replace traditional political machinery, but it adds a new layer to how influence is built and maintained.
Beyond national borders, these political movements carry broader regional implications. The Philippines is a key player in Southeast Asia, and its internal political dynamics affect regional trade, diplomacy, and investment confidence. The BARMM elections, in particular, offer lessons on subnational governance and autonomy that resonate across ASEAN, where questions of decentralization and political inclusion continue to surface.
As 2026 unfolds, Philippine politics may not yet be in full campaign mode, but the pieces are already moving. The months ahead will reveal how alliances solidify, how technology reshapes political engagement, and how local developments influence national ambitions. For regional stakeholders, paying attention now may offer clearer insights into where Philippine governance is headed long before ballots are cast.
Glenn holds a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from the University of Santo Tomas. His experience spans governance programs, policy development, and political research, having worked with the Ateneo School of Government and WR Numero Research on projects focused on electoral reform, public opinion, and regional development. He also helped coordinate the drafting of the Bangsamoro Local Government Code and supported the Academy of Multiparty Democracy.
Vietnam 🇻🇳
Tô Lâm and the 14th Party Congress
by Sean Huy Vu
Vietnam’s Communist Party will hold its quinquennial Congress from 19 to 25 January 2026, where it will elect members to key Party and State positions to serve for the next five years. These positions include the most senior leadership of Vietnam’s government: the Party General Secretary, the State President, the Prime Minister, the Chairman of the National Assembly, and the Standing Committee of the Party Central Committee. Members will also be elected to the Party’s Secretariat, the Politburo, and the Central Committee as well.
According to Bloomberg News, citing anonymous sources, incumbent General Secretary Tô Lâm will continue to serve his current position and become State President, replacing former General Lương Cường. It would be unusual for a Vietnamese leader to hold both positions concurrently, as the party congress traditionally nominates separate individuals for the roles, except in extraordinary cases. Tô Lâm, for instance, became President in May 2024 while Nguyễn Phú Trọng was still General Secretary. After Nguyễn’s death in July that year, Tô also became General Secretary, later ceding the presidency to Lương in October 2024. Should Tô Lâm assume both positions, it would not only solidify his power, it may reduce the influence of the military, while strengthening the police’s, Tô’s political base.
Tô Lâm, in his brief tenure, has been rather effective at accomplishing some of his policy goals with regard to political streamlining and economic diversification. About 150,000 civil service positions were eliminated and provinces were reorganized last year to reduce bureaucratic inefficiency (although the transition itself has had delays in implementation). Despite predictions by the Asian Development Bank that Vietnam’s quarter three growth in 2025 would only reach 6.7% percent due to US tariffs, the country achieved 8.22% percent growth in the third quarter. This is because of Hanoi’s multiple trade agreements and “strategic partnerships” or “comprehensive strategic partnerships” formed over the years — 14 of which were initiated by Tô Lâm himself. At the East Asia Summit last October, the US backed down to a 19% percent tariff rate on most goods, with some exceptions.
Tô Lâm differs substantially from his predecessor Nguyễn in ideology, as he is far more pragmatic and rational in his strategic calculus. He has openly declared the private sector as critical to the country’s growth, and his industrial policy has supported private firms through strong state-led coordination, consistent and precise sequencing of measures, and subsidies and tax holidays for key stakeholders in certain sectors, such as semiconductors, green technology, and defense technology. The ultimate goal is to upskill the country’s young workforce and help domestic firms climb the value supply chain by competing internationally. Attracting foreign investors — such as multinationals like Samsung, Intel, and NVIDIA — are also meant to upgrade the workforce. Some observers have criticized, however, that Tô Lâm’s policies are only benefiting groups already close to the government, rather than providing support to small and medium-sized businesses.
Despite the absence of a trade deal with the US, Tô Lâm is likely to remain Vietnam’s paramount leader after the upcoming election given his effective leadership of the country and political influence within the party. What is less likely, however, is for him to serve as both President and party chief. The military remains a critical interest group in Vietnam’s government, and not granting a leadership position to it could spell serious political consequences for Tô. However, should he jointly serve both positions, he would be following the precedent set by Xi Jinping and Kim Jong Un.
Sean is a scholar of East Asian history, culture, and international relations, with current research at Georgetown University examining working-class labor and human trafficking in the region. His broader interests include the social psychology of religion and identity politics. Sean previously taught modern Korean history at the University of California, Irvine, where he completed his B.A. in History, and later taught English in Ho Chi Minh City while studying Vietnamese language and culture. His writing has been published by UC Irvine, Johns Hopkins University, and Foreign Analysis.
Singapore 🇸🇬
Navigating Truth in the Modern Digital Age
by Jennifer Hui En Tan, in Singapore
Global connectivity through technological devices has grown rapidly throughout the last few decades. However, so have scam cases and online misinformation through the rapid development of artificial intelligence (AI) and deepfake software, making media literacy more important than ever. In the first half of 2025 alone, Singaporeans reportedly lost SGD 456 million to scams; measures such as the Protection from Online Falsehood and Manipulation Act (POFMA) are thus put in place to protect Singaporeans against misinformation. Media literacy is essential to Singapore’s societal wellbeing and national security, ensuring that citizens are equipped to recognize and navigate digital threats.
The ability to perceive deception and false information online has proven to be more critical now more than ever. Scam cases have cost Singapore SGD 3.4 billion since 2019 and SGD 1.1 billion in 2024 alone. The overall rise and accessibility to AI has shifted the dynamic and forced individuals to be more attentive with the content they see, with three quarters of Singaporeans concerned with the rise of deepfakes used in scams. Beyond scams, the overall rise in AI and deepfakes have also caused a rise in the spread of misinformation. During the 2025 General Elections, experts cautioned Singaporeans against misinformation through foreign interference.
Singapore has identified and is working to target such concerns by encouraging media literacy and preventing cyber threats through a multitude of angles. The Media Literacy Council, supported by the Singapore Infocomm Media Development Authority, develops and supports initiatives under the Digital for Life Movement, a project aiming to expand digital skills and encourage informed digital use. Besides education, Singapore has pushed against scams by implementing stricter laws against scammers. Since 30 December 2025, Singapore has implemented mandatory caning for scammers and given authorities the power to freeze accounts related to such activities. The POFMA, which was passed in 2019, empowers authorities to issue correction directions, remove harmful content, and limit the spread of misleading information that could undermine public trust or social stability. These efforts reflect Singapore’s approach to fostering a safer digital environment for the state.
The rapid rise in misinformation and scams is highly relevant to ASEAN, as misinformation has become a regional challenge which threatens political stability and social trust. For instance, in the Philippines, AI-generated disinformation has intensified political tensions, exemplified by the 15 July 2025 incident where a woman discovered fabricated videos of her deceased brother being circulated to discredit her and advance political agendas. Malaysia faces similar vulnerabilities, with political actors commonly weaponizing disinformation to damage opponents’ reputations. The persistent use of false information for political gain highlights Malaysia’s ongoing struggle with digital manipulation and underscores the broader regional need for stronger media literacy and cross-border cooperation against misinformation.
In sum, the rapid rise of misinformation and scams underscores the urgent need for stronger media literacy efforts in Singapore and across ASEAN. Singapore’s approach illustrates how states can strengthen societal resilience. Yet cases from the Philippines and Malaysia demonstrate that misinformation remains a shared regional challenge, capable of influencing politics, eroding trust, and destabilizing communities. As ASEAN becomes more digitally interconnected, cultivating a well-informed and discerning citizenry is essential to safeguarding national security, preserving social cohesion, and ensuring a safer digital future for the region.
Jennifer is a final-year International Relations student at the Singapore Institute of Management, where she focuses on political engagement, diplomacy, and community governance. She is an active volunteer in her constituency, working closely with residents to understand local concerns, facilitate dialogue, and support community initiatives.
Editorial Deadline 06/01/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)
