Editor’s Note
by Siu Tzyy Wei, Lead Editor - Maritime Crescent Desk
Amid a string of resignations and a government clinging on, Indonesian Vice President Gibran Rakabuming Raka has made a shock exit. The Maritime Crescent Desk is tracking how the tremor travels, from Jakarta’s coalition politics to the waters Indonesia shares with its neighbours.
In different waters, Brunei quietly looks for ballast in Doha, where its visit to Qatar points to deeper cooperation in energy, industry and food security. Malaysia, on the other hand, in its digital expansion mission continues to face the task of securing the very foundations of its economic ambitions.
Whether through political manoeuvring, economic partnerships or digital safeguards, the question is increasingly one of what states choose to secure, and at what cost.
Indonesia 🇮🇩
The Beginning of an End?
by Rayhan Prabu Kusumo, in Jakarta
*Note: This article reflects developments and information available at the time of writing.
On the morning of November 10, Vice President Gibran Rakabuming Raka met President Prabowo Subianto for two and a half hours. Afterwards, the palace confirmed that Gibran had told the president he intended to resign. The state secretary said the decision followed recent rulings by the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court, the latest turns in the long fight over whether Gibran’s school diploma is genuine. Prabowo, by the palace’s account, did not refuse. On the record. Gibran is Joko Widodo’s eldest son, and his place on the 2024 ticket was the most visible term of the bargain that made Prabowo president.
He is also the second figure close to Jokowi to fall in a week. On November 3, police arrested General Listyo Sigit Prabowo, the former national police chief and, until the next morning, Prabowo’s chief of staff. He is accused of illegally wiretapping the president, state officials, politicians, journalists and businesspeople. Listyo’s career was defined by Jokowi, who made him national police chief in 2021. Nobody has said whom the wiretaps served, and nothing officially links the two cases. Politically, though, both land at the same door.
Just a day before Gibran’s announcement, the people with the most to lose made their own choice. Three cabinet members from the Indonesian Solidarity Party (PSI), led by Jokowi’s younger son, Kaesang Pangarep, and long seen as the family’s political vehicle, quit the party. Forestry Minister Raja Juli Antoni gave up his post as its secretary-general, and deputy ministers Giring Ganesha and Isyana Bagoes Oka left with him.
All of this is happening to a government already in trouble. The crises this column has described for months have not eased. In SMRC’s latest survey, only 9.8 per cent of respondents said they would vote for Prabowo again. As Gibran sat with the president, students were back on Jakarta’s streets for Heroes’ Day, some of them demanding that he go.
For two years, Indonesia has been governed by an understanding between the two men. Jokowi lent Prabowo his voters, his son and many of his appointees, and Prabowo let that inheritance stand. It held through falling markets, a flailing economy, disasters and protests. But in the space of a week, the appointee who once ran the police has been arrested, the family party’s ministers have walked out of it, and the son is offering to leave.
It is too early to know what this is. It may be a managed separation, with Gibran stepping aside and the two camps settling terms in private, or the start of a longer fight between them, waged through the grassroots, the courts and parliament. At its widest, the Reformasi that Indonesia has held on to since 1998 starts to give way. The result will be formed mostly in rooms the public cannot see. Keep watch.
Rayhan has a background in government affairs and public policy, with experience across government institutions and advisory firms. His work focuses on the intersection of geopolitics, policy, and risk, with expertise in advocacy, regulatory analysis, and stakeholder engagement. He holds a degree in Government from Universitas Padjadjaran, and has completed an exchange at Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Spain, focusing on global politics and sustainability.
Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳
Brunei and Qatar Explore New Areas of Cooperation
by Wira Gregory Ejau, in Bandar Seri Begawan
His Royal Highness Prince Haji Al-Muhtadee Billah, the Crown Prince and Senior Minister at the Prime Minister’s Office, began his first official visit to Doha on 8 November. The visit highlights a relationship between two small energy-producing states that are reassessing how their energy sectors support broader economic and strategic objectives against a backdrop of changing LNG markets, supply-security concerns and efforts to diversify their economies.
Since Brunei and Qatar established diplomatic relations on 2 October 1991, the two countries have signed agreements on economic, trade and technical cooperation, the avoidance of double taxation and air services. They have also signed a 2012 memorandum on education covering scholarships, academic exchanges and joint research, with both sides now looking to develop investment partnerships in renewable energy, petrochemicals and food industries, in line with Qatar National Vision 2030 and Brunei’s Wawasan 2035.
The visit came during a difficult year for Qatar’s energy sector. QatarEnergy’s deliveries to Asia and Europe remain under force majeure until the end of 2026, and the company has responded by widening its sources of supply. In October, it signed long-term agreements to buy 7 million tonnes a year of LNG from the United States, which it says makes it the largest buyer of American LNG.
It is well known that around 80% of Qatar’s LNG is sold to buyers in the Asia-Pacific region, with Brunei located close to many of those buyers, even though its output is small compared with Qatar’s. This year, Brunei LNG signed a supply agreement with a unit of Thailand’s PTT in May and a long-term agreement with Japan’s Japex in September–Japex had earlier bought two spot cargoes at much higher prices to replace supply from the Middle East. As an important part of ASEAN, Brunei can also offer Qatari investors a partner within Southeast Asia for the petrochemical and food industries. Qatar, in turn, can bring capital and industrial scale to Brunei’s economic diversification, along with long experience in LNG and petrochemicals. The two countries’ Air Services Agreement has provided the basis for air links that support tourism and trade between the Gulf and Southeast Asia.
In September, ASEAN and GCC foreign ministers committed to closer cooperation on energy security, including LNG and the diversification of energy supply, noting that ASEAN’s feasibility study for an ASEAN-GCC free trade agreement is due for completion by the end of 2026. Energy and food security are among the priority sectors in their economic work programme, and the third ASEAN-GCC Summit will be held in Saudi Arabia in 2027; Brunei–Qatar projects in these sectors would also contribute to that wider partnership.
For two small states, the main value of the relationship is economic complementarity, with Qatar seeking reliable avenues for investment and commercial engagement in Southeast Asia as Brunei looks towards external capital, expertise and market opportunities to support economic diversification.
Wira holds an MSc in Strategic Studies from the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), with specialised certificates in Terrorism Studies and U.S. Foreign Policy. He works as a freelance writer specialising in history, security and international relations theory, with experience in academia, investigative journalism, and voluntary uniformed service. He currently provides research analysis and consultation on Southeast Asian geopolitics for the Security Observer.
Malaysia 🇲🇾
Behind the Firewall
by Muhammad Aiman Bin Roszaimi, in Cyberjaya
Cybersecurity is no longer simply about protecting computers, preventing data theft or stopping online scams. As Malaysia expands its digital economy, data centres and critical infrastructure, the security of its digital networks is increasingly tied to national security, economic stability and public confidence. Recent developments suggest that Kuala Lumpur is beginning to recognise the scale of this challenge.
Between January and September, the National Cyber Security Agency (NACSA) recorded 5,110 cybersecurity incidents, compared with 5,837 throughout 2025. But these declining figures require careful interpretation. NACSA has emphasised that detected intrusion attempts do not necessarily indicate successful breaches, and that incidents vary considerably in severity. Its priority is identifying threats capable of disrupting essential services.
The concern is therefore what a successful attack could disrupt. The ransomware attack on Malaysia Airports Holdings in March 2025 - which affected Kuala Lumpur International Airport for more than ten hours - illustrates how cyber incidents can extend beyond data theft into the disruption of everyday services. Financial institutions, telecommunications networks, energy infrastructure and government systems present similarly significant vulnerabilities.
The government has responded by strengthening monitoring and coordination. On November 7, the National Security Council (MKN) maintained that Malaysia’s national cyber threat level was moderate and that the situation remained under control. This followed NACSA’s precautionary elevation of the threat level from low to medium earlier in November, alongside closer monitoring of financial institutions and other National Critical Information Infrastructure (NCII) entities.
Recently, Communications Minister Fahmi Fadzil announced that the government is formulating a national strategy to upgrade critical information infrastructure through post-quantum cryptography (PQC). The Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission (MCMC), NACSA, the National Security Council and telecommunications operators are also expected to establish a joint research and development testbed to assess quantum-resistant technologies.
This is a significant development. Future quantum computers could undermine some of the encryption methods currently used to protect sensitive communications and digital transactions. Although practical large-scale quantum attacks remain a future concern, governments cannot afford to wait until the technology becomes operationally threatening. Sensitive information stolen today could potentially be retained and decrypted in the future, a risk commonly described as “harvest now, decrypt later”.
Nevertheless, announcing new strategies and research facilities is only the beginning. Malaysia must ensure that critical infrastructure operators actually adopt stronger security standards, conduct regular vulnerability assessments, develop incident-response capabilities and invest in specialised cybersecurity personnel. Coordination between government agencies and private operators will be particularly important because much of the country’s digital infrastructure is commercially owned and operated.
Ultimately, Malaysia’s cybersecurity challenge is not merely to prevent attacks. It is to ensure that essential services can withstand, respond to and recover from them. As the country is building a more connected digital economy, the question now is whether it can build the security architecture necessary to protect it.
Aiman is a PhD candidate in Security and Strategic Analysis at the National University of Malaysia. His research focuses on Malaysia’s space policy, ASEAN regional security, and the strategic implications of emerging technologies. His work explores how Malaysia’s defense policy and strategic culture shape its approach to outer space.
Editorial Deadline 07/11/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)
