Shifting Tides in a Polarized World
Issue 15 — Key Developments Across Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Thailand
Editor’s Note
by Mattia Peroni, Lead Editor - Mekong Belt Desk
This week’s issue of the Mekong Belt explores the collision of external pressures with fragile domestic foundations, and the different ways in which countries respond. In Laos, the U.S. reinstated visa restrictions have cut off educational lifelines, threatening to produce a “lost generation” without international exposure. But when one door closes, Laos is betting that new ones can be forced open elsewhere, choosing to lean deeper into alternative frameworks such as the SCO and BRICS rather than seeking reconciliation with Washington. Thailand, by contrast, is scrambling not to pivot, but to preserve, as new U.S. anti-transshipment rules bring not just tighter controls but mountains of paperwork that could negatively impact the export sector. Moving away from geoeconomic dilemmas, Cambodia’s suicide crisis exposes a fragile mental health system, with the WHO urging stigma reduction and stronger support as the government struggles to build capacity. And in Myanmar, regional crackdowns and U.S. sanctions against scam centers bring momentary relief, but the problem remains vast — a drop of water in an ocean of exploitation.
Lao PDR 🇱🇦
Strained Ties and Strategic Ambitions in Laos’ Global Positioning
by Thongsavanh Souvannasane, in Vientiane
The reinstatement of the United States’ visa restrictions in June under Trump 2.0 has placed Laos at a pivotal diplomatic moment, forcing rapid adjustments to its international strategy while imposing significant domestic costs.
The suspension of tourist, student, vocational, and exchange visas has effectively severed critical educational pathways for Lao youth. Programs including Global Undergraduate Exchange Program (Global UGRAD), Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative (YSEALI), and Fulbright, which previously provided thousands of students with international exposure and leadership training, have been indefinitely halted.
This educational disruption threatens to constrain Laos’ human capital development at a crucial stage of its economic transition.
But the consequences extend beyond education.
Deportations of Lao nationals have intensified, placing strain on families already facing uncertainty. Meanwhile, new 40% tariffs on Lao goods have compounded trade difficulties, prompting Lao Post to suspend U.S. shipments, a decision that has disrupted both commercial operations and personal connections. Small and medium enterprises report mounting operational challenges as traditional trade channels face unprecedented barriers from both regulatory restrictions and increased costs.
In response to these pressures, however, Laos has accelerated its diplomatic diversification rather than pursuing reconciliation with Washington. The country’s designation as the 15th Dialogue Partner of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in early September signals a decisive shift toward security and economic cooperation frameworks outside Western influence.
Concurrent expressions of interest in BRICS membership further underscore Vientiane’s commitment to multipolarity over traditional Western alignment.
Regional comparisons highlight Laos’ distinct trajectory.
Myanmar, also subject to visa restrictions and sanctions, has sought closer alignment with Washington as the ruling junta pursues external legitimacy. Laos, by contrast, has sought greater engagement with alternative international institutions, reflecting a different set of priorities. For Vientiane, the focus is less on political recognition and more on securing economic and diplomatic resilience through broader international platforms.
Additionally, Laos’ geographic position along China’s Belt and Road Initiative provides it with viable alternatives that Myanmar’s isolated junta lacks, making institutional diversification a more feasible strategy for Vientiane than for Naypyidaw.
Looking ahead, the suspension of international study and training opportunities poses the gravest long-term risk, potentially creating a “lost generation” of Lao professionals lacking international experience and networks, narrowing the country’s human capital base.
Diplomatically, diminished ties with the U.S. could also reduce opportunities for cooperation in areas such as education, governance, and human rights.
Nevertheless, engagement with the SCO and potential BRICS membership may offer Laos compensatory benefits. These platforms could provide alternative sources of development financing, technology transfer, and security cooperation, though they also introduce new dependencies and strategic considerations.
Laos thus stands at a critical diplomatic juncture.
U.S. visa restrictions and related measures have imposed social, economic, and educational costs, while simultaneously accelerating the country’s pivot toward new international alliances. The choices made today will determine whether Laos emerges as a resilient middle power or becomes overly dependent on alternative patron states.
Thongsavanh is a journalist from Laos with a background in English-language media. He graduated from the Lao-American Institute with a Diploma of the Arts in English and contributes to independent news platforms. His reporting focuses on environmental issues, socio-economic development, and geopolitics.
Thailand 🇹🇭
Trade Avalanche and Thailand’s Challenge to Meet New US Demands
by Paranut Juntree, in Bangkok
Thailand is scrambling to set up a special task force to brace for a flood of export paperwork after Washington tightened trade rules to block Chinese goods from slipping into US markets through third countries, a practice known as transshipment.
Roughly USD 55 billion worth of Thai exports to the United States is at stake, one of the lifelines for the country’s already fragile economy. Yet this isn’t just a story about red tape. It reflects a much broader geopolitical moment, where Thailand and ASEAN must navigate the fault lines of the US-China rivalry while safeguarding their position in global trade.
On August 1, the Trump administration issued revised and lower tariff rates for many countries, including ASEAN economies. Although Thailand is currently subject to a reduced 19% tariff rate, down from the original 36% imposed by the United States, the country now faces another complex challenge as Washington tightens trade regulations with the revised reciprocal tariff rates executive order. ASEAN economies, including Thailand, have been singled out over alleged roles in concealing and rerouting Chinese goods, a practice the US labels as transshipment.
Countries found exporting illegally rerouted goods to conceal their origin will face an additional 40% duty. This prompted Thailand to establish a task force to manage the certificate of origin requirements expected under the new US trade rules. In 2024, the Kingdom exported goods worth USD 55 billion to the United States, accounting for about 18% of its total exports, now at risk under Washington’s new rules. The number of certificates of origin for exports to the US could surge from a baseline of 70,000 per year to several million annually. This shift risks delays and could further strain Thailand’s already fragile economy.
This marks part of a wider US strategy to decouple from China’s supply chains, using stricter documentation to track where goods originate. For Thailand, the risk is significant. Its export industries, such as electronics, auto parts, and textiles, are already deeply tied to Chinese inputs, making compliance more difficult.
Yet Thailand is not alone.
Vietnam and Malaysia face similar scrutiny, underscoring how US trade enforcement is reshaping supply chains across ASEAN. However, at its core, this is not only a compliance challenge but a geopolitical balancing act for many ASEAN countries, increasingly caught in the middle of the US-China rivalry.
While China is the region’s largest source of imports and supply chain inputs, the US remains one of its most important export markets and a key security partner for many countries, including Thailand. This dual dependency means ASEAN cannot afford to alienate either side, reinforcing the need for an ever-more careful hedging strategy that positions the region as a vital bridge between the world’s two largest economies.
ASEAN countries need to strengthen coordination on trade rules and compliance systems and invest in supply chain transparency tools to reassure Washington while keeping Chinese investment flowing. More importantly, ASEAN must push for a more collective voice in global trade negotiations, positioning itself not as a transshipment loophole but as a legitimate production hub, turning vulnerability into leverage. For Thailand, this is not just a test of compliance with new trade rules, but of its ability to prove itself as a trusted trade partner in a polarized global economy.
Paranut has a background in advocacy, with experience in policy research, communications, and civic engagement across both the NGO and government sectors. As Thailand’s Youth Delegate to the United Nations, he represented Thai youth in global dialogues on migration, education, and human rights, championing inclusive policymaking. He holds a degree in political science with a specialization in international relations.
Cambodia 🇰🇭
Cambodia Faces Growing Mental Health Crisis Amid WHO Warning
by Malai Yatt, in Phnom Penh
The World Health Organization (WHO) has urged countries to address the rise in suicides through stigma reduction measures and improved mental health support. Just in 2024, Cambodia reported 212 suicides, highlighting the need for more psychologists, school counsellors, and national policies aligned with WHO guidance.
In its most recent statement, the WHO issued an urgent plea to reframe the public conversation around suicide, which claims more than 720,000 lives worldwide each year. The agency stressed the importance of “challenging harmful myths” and “reducing stigma,” arguing that fostering compassionate dialogue is a key step in addressing the global mental health crisis.
In Cambodia, the Department of Mental Health and Substance Abuse reported that of the 212 suicides this year, 168 were men (79%) and 44 were women (21%). Nearly 40% of cases occurred in Phnom Penh, followed by Kandal (8%), Battambang (7%), Siem Reap (6%), Svay Rieng (5%), Kampong Chhnang and Kampong Speu (3% each), Kampong Cham (2%), and 17% across other provinces. While most incidents were cases of bridge-jumping (34 cases in Phnom Penh and 14 in surrounding provinces), other methods included hanging, pesticide ingestion, overdoses, and jumping from buildings.
To address the crisis, the WHO has outlined key prevention measures: restricting access to means such as pesticides, firearms, and certain medicines; promoting responsible media reporting; teaching adolescents social and emotional skills; and ensuring early detection, treatment, and follow-up for those at risk.
Marking World Suicide Prevention Day on September 10, WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus emphasized that every lost life deeply affects families, friends, and communities. He urged moving from stigma to empathy, creating safe spaces for people to seek help, and called on governments to prioritise mental health care and invest in policies that provide accessible support for all.
Cambodia’s response reflects both progress and remaining gaps. The Ministry of Health has launched a Mental Health Strategic Plan (2023–2032) to strengthen nationwide mental well-being. Aligned with the government’s Pentagonal Strategy, the UN Sustainable Development Goals, and WHO’s regional frameworks, the plan focuses on building a resilient system, expanding the mental health workforce, improving care quality, and advancing universal coverage.
Yet experts warn that capacity remains limited. Cambodia faces a growing mental health crisis, with calls for more psychologists and school-based counselling to reduce suicide rates. For instance, Cambodian Psychological Association president Hoeur Sethul highlighted the lack of formal recognition for psychologists and the shortage of training opportunities. Many graduates are forced into unrelated fields, he said, before urging the government to expand specialized courses, deploy school counsellors nationwide, and foster closer collaboration between doctors and mental health professionals.
WHO’s call is clear: tackling suicide requires openness, empathy, and systemic support. With rising cases, Cambodia must expand training, school counselling, and community support. Ultimately, aligning Cambodia’s Mental Health Strategic Plan with WHO guidance will be key to saving lives and improving well-being.
Malai is a reporter at Kiripost, where she has worked for over two years, driven by a strong commitment to amplifying the voices of underserved communities. Her reporting focuses on economic and foreign affairs.
Myanmar 🇲🇲
Raids, Repatriation, and the Resilience of Scam Centers
by Pann Ei Thwel, in Mandalay
With the increasing number of scam centers in Myanmar, much effort is needed to halt their operations. Last week, the U.S. Department of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued a statement, sanctioning 19 individuals and companies related to the multibillion-dollar scam network across Myanmar and Cambodia. The sanction applied to target areas in Shwe Kokko, an area under the control of the Karen National Army (KNA), which has reciprocal relations with the Burmese military.
Scamming starts with fake job advertisements targeted at young people from poor countries looking for jobs to support their families. Against a backdrop of inflation and rising living costs in Myanmar, the promise of well-paid work appears to offer a path out of poverty, but a trap lies behind the surface. The victims are not limited to Myanmar citizens, as the scheme lures in all young people from across the region looking for a way out from their difficult situations, be it political instability or poverty.
People who escaped from scam centers describe harrowing experiences of trafficking and abuse. One survivor recalled being promised a high-paying tech job in Bangkok, only to find himself trafficked to KK Park, one of the notorious scam centers in Myawaddy, Myanmar. Another witness mentioned that once he got into the center, he was given detailed instructions on how to manipulate victims to gain their trust and later scam millions of dollars from them. Failure to meet targets brings brutal punishments—beatings, confinement in freezing rooms, and food deprivation. In extreme cases, survivors reported lasting injuries and even the loss of body parts.
To counter the widespread scamming, the Thai government carried out crackdowns on scam centers this year. Thousands of trafficked workers were saved and placed into Thai custody, with some repatriated with their government's agreement. While the crackdown is a step in the right direction, these efforts are still just a drop of water in the ocean, as the UN estimates that more than 120,000 people remain trapped in scam centers.
However, what the data seems to ignore is that while many endure horrific abuse, some voluntarily choose to work in these centers, judging the conditions preferable to the poverty and insecurity outside. The torture awaiting in these centers is indifferent to what locals in Myanmar have to go through in their day-to-day life, making the choice to work in these centers reasonable for some.
In this context, sanctions and crackdowns may temporarily disrupt operations, but lasting change will require addressing the root causes that sustain the industry: poverty, lack of opportunity, and the absence of the rule of law. Without confronting these underlying issues, the cycle of trafficking and exploitation is likely to persist.
Pann Ei is an undergraduate student at Parami University, majoring in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics. Following an internship with the CSIS Southeast Asia Program, she developed a strong interest in policy research, with a particular focus on politics and education. She currently works as a research assistant at the Center for Research, Policy and Innovation (CRPI), where she focuses on political institutions and regime types across Southeast Asia.
Editorial Deadline 12/09/2025 11:59 PM (UTC +8)
