Editor’s Note
by Haniva Sekar Deanty, Lead Editor - Maritime Crescent Desk
Wira Gregory explores Brunei’s evolving approach to non-traditional security through its new counter-narcotics cooperation with Indonesia. Beyond the technical details of information-sharing and enforcement, the agreement reflects ASEAN’s broader security architecture, showing how non-traditional threats are enabling deeper bilateral coordination without triggering sovereignty sensitivities.
Muhammad Aiman looks into the deepening strategic partnership between Malaysia and India, charting its expansion from diplomatic symbolism into defence, industrial and technological collaboration. This cooperation underscores how middle powers are seeking resilience through diversified partnerships, defence industrial capacity and institutionalised cooperation.
Rayhan Prabu assesses Indonesia’s domestic political trajectory ahead of the 2029 presidential election. Elite consolidation, dynastic bargaining and legal vulnerability have narrowed political competition, diverting attention away from economic and governance crises that directly affect ordinary citizens.
Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳
Securing ASEAN's Frontlines
by Wira Gregory Ejau, in Bandar Seri Begawan
On 9 February 2026, Brunei Darussalam and Indonesia signed their first Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on narcotics control, formalising cooperation between Brunei’s Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB) and Indonesia’s National Narcotics Board (BNN). While the agreement centres on information-sharing, prevention education, and rehabilitation, its significance lies in the broader trajectory of Brunei’s foreign and security policy within ASEAN’s evolving security architecture.
Both Brunei and Indonesia occupy critical maritime positions along the South China Sea, a geographical location that has long been exploited by transnational narcotics syndicates. Brunei’s strategic location makes it a potential transit point, even when illicit shipments are not destined for its domestic market. This was underscored in September 2025, when Brunei participated in a major multilateral operation alongside the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, Singapore’s Central Narcotics Bureau, and Australian counterparts, disrupting a global trafficking syndicate. As the U.S. Embassy in Singapore noted, the volume seized surpassed Brunei’s previous record in 2020’s Operation Musang King.
The MoU with Indonesia provides Brunei with an additional diplomatic mechanism to bolster its enforcement toolkit, aligning bilateral cooperation with operational realities. In 2025 alone, the NCB carried out at least six named, major operations: Operation Starburn in December (9 detained), Operation Halloween in November (32 detained), Operation Tokek in June to July (35 detained), Operation Potter in May (5 detained), Operation Ursa Heal 2 in March (20 detained), and Operation Tokan in January (18 detained). These figures, while not exhaustive, illustrate the scale of Brunei’s enforcement activity and the persistence of narcotics proliferation across its borders. Smaller operations, often in cooperation with the Royal Brunei Police Force (RBPF) and other agencies, further underscore the systemic nature of the challenge.
The six major operations conducted by Brunei’s NCB provide a public-facing snapshot of enforcement activity. However, they do not capture the full spectrum of operations carried out across Brunei’s security apparatus. Crucially, these figures exclude other operations undertaken by agencies such as the RBPF and the Royal Customs and Excise Department (RCED), even when conducted in cooperation with the NCB. This distinction matters, as the list of named NCB operations is a rudimentary overlay of publicly available enforcement actions, not a comprehensive account of Brunei’s counter-narcotics landscape.
Indonesia’s involvement adds a tactical dimension that potentially provides Brunei access to operational knowledge and regional intelligence networks. The maritime positioning of both states, with Brunei on the northern edge of Borneo and Indonesia spanning the archipelagic routes, creates a complementary geography for interdiction and interception.
At the ASEAN level, the MoU also reflects the gradual operationalisation of the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC). Non-traditional security threats such as narcotics trafficking offer a domain where sovereignty concerns are less politically sensitive, allowing states to experiment with deeper cooperation. If Brunei and Indonesia can demonstrate tangible outcomes, their partnership could serve as a model for other ASEAN states grappling with similar challenges.
Gregory is an MSc candidate in Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He works as a freelance writer specializing in international history, conflict, and counterterrorism, with experience in academia, investigative journalism, and voluntary uniformed service. He currently provides research assistance with the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) under their Southeast Asian Security and Defence Internship Programme and conducts investigations on regional security and transnational crime for a confidential company.
Malaysia 🇲🇾
From Strategic Partners to Defence Innovators
by Muhammad Aiman Bin Roszaimi, in Cyberjaya
Malaysia and India have reaffirmed their commitments as strategic partners, extending cooperation beyond traditional diplomacy into defence, industrial innovation and economic integration. The deepening relationship was most recently underscored during Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s official visit to Kuala Lumpur in early February 2026, marking his first foreign trip of the year where leaders from both countries pledged to enhance collaboration across multiple sectors.
The bond between Malaysia and India dates back to 1957 when diplomatic ties were first established, and it was elevated to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP) in August 2024. This elevation provided a broader framework for cooperation, recognising the long-standing historical links, shared democratic values and vibrant people-to-people connections between the two nations.
During Modi’s visit, both governments witnessed the exchange of 11 cooperation agreements and memoranda of understanding (MOUs) spanning strategic areas such as semiconductors, disaster management, peacekeeping, and defence. These agreements indicate a shift toward not only expanding bilateral trade, where it reached approximately US$18.6 billion in 2025, but also building deeper industrial and technological linkages that underpin strategic interests for both sides.
Plus, defence cooperation has long been part of the Malaysia–India relationship, including joint military exercises such as Harimau Shakti, which enhances interoperability and mutual understanding between their armed forces. The recent wave of diplomatic engagements seeks to translate these operational interactions into more institutionalised defence industrial collaboration. Under India’s Atmanirbhar Bharat (self-reliant India initiative), the country has cultivated a progressive aerospace and defence manufacturing ecosystem centred on capacity building, technology transfer, and private sector participation, which is a model that could benefit Malaysia’s own defence industrial strategy.
At the diplomatic level, both leaders emphasised strengthening maritime security, intelligence sharing, and counter-terrorism cooperation. India reaffirmed its stance on a robust, unequivocal approach toward countering terrorism and reaffirmed that “no double standards; no compromise” should guide cooperation against cross-border threats.
This expanding Malaysia–India defence and industrial collaboration presents several strategic opportunities. For Malaysia, aligning with India’s growing defence industrial base provides access to emerging technologies, diversified supply chains and capacity building that could enhance its own defence self-sufficiency. For India, Malaysia offers a gateway into ASEAN markets, an investment destination for high-value technology sectors and a partner in shaping a more balanced Indo-Pacific economic architecture.
Yet, challenges remain. Building defence industrial linkages requires navigating complex regulatory environments and fostering trust between the defence sectors of the two countries. Aligning industrial objectives with geopolitical considerations, especially amid shifting geopolitical alignments in the Indo-Pacific will require careful diplomatic balancing.
Aiman is a PhD candidate in Security and Strategic Analysis at the National University of Malaysia. His research focuses on Malaysia’s space policy, ASEAN regional security, and the strategic implications of emerging technologies. His work explores how Malaysia’s defense policy and strategic culture shape its approach to outer space.
Indonesia 🇮🇩
Rearranging the Deck Chairs
by Rayhan Prabu Kusumo, in Jakarta
Indonesia’s next presidential election is three years away. Its ruling coalition is already cracking, not over policy, not over ideology, and certainly not over the welfare of 280 million citizens, but over a single question: who gets to be Prabowo Subianto’s running mate. What remains is a jostling of elites for the seat beside a throne no one dares contest, while the nation they govern slides deeper into crisis.
On one thing, the coalition agrees completely: Prabowo will run again. Every major party in the parliament has since fallen in line. Only PDI-P remains outside, serving as a soft and largely toothless opposition. The Constitutional Court scrapped the presidential threshold in January 2025, which means any party can now nominate a candidate, yet none has volunteered.
The consensus ends at his name. Vice President Gibran Rakabuming, who rode to office on his father Jokowi’s coattails and a controversial court ruling, has spent his first year sidelined, mocked, and partyless. His only institutional backing is the non-parliamentary Indonesian Solidarity Party, chaired by his own brother. Beyond the Jokowi family’s insistence on “Prabowo-Gibran for two terms,” each coalition party has its own designs on the vice presidency. They are united only on Prabowo.
That no one is contesting the presidency tells you everything. Prabowo has consolidated power at a speed Indonesia has not seen since the Suharto era. His approval ratings hover around 80 percent, buoyed by politically potent yet fiscally ruinous programs such as the free school meal program. The opposition, such as it is, offers no alternative.
But the deepest source of his invulnerability is more structural. Indonesia’s political class operates in a state of mutual legal exposure. Nearly every elite figure carries unresolved allegations of one kind or another. Coalition loyalty is maintained not just through patronage but through the unspoken understanding that the legal apparatus can be turned on anyone who steps out of line.
The implications are bleak. If 2029 unfolds as things stand, the world’s third-largest democracy will hold a presidential election that is largely uncontested with no political force that has the will, the independence, or the safety to mount a challenge.
The only contest that exists is over the wrong question entirely: not the economy, not development, not the livelihoods of ordinary Indonesians, but which dynasty or party chair claims the vice presidency. For ordinary Indonesians struggling with stagnant wages, rising prices, and disappearing jobs, the message is unmistakable: your concerns are not on the agenda.
It is a particular kind of indignity for 280 million Indonesians that their political elites, having presided over a collapsing investment climate, a market in freefall, and a governance crisis flagged by every major international institution, are spending their energy on who stands next to the president. The political class would do well to remember that the nation does not pause while they sort out their succession arrangements. The 2029 ticket can wait. The nation cannot.
Rayhan has a background in government affairs and public policy, with experience across government institutions and advisory firms. His work focuses on the intersection of geopolitics, policy, and risk, with expertise in advocacy, regulatory analysis, and stakeholder engagement. He holds a degree in Government from Universitas Padjadjaran, and has completed an exchange at Universitat Pompeu Fabra in Spain, focusing on global politics and sustainability.
Editorial Deadline 07/02/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)
