Singapore’s Identity Crisis
Issue 25 — Key Developments Across the Philippines, Singapore, and Vietnam
Editor’s Note
by Karen Ysabelle R. David, Lead Editor - Pacific Corridor Desk
Singapore: a beacon of wealth and stability in an otherwise tumultuous region. But in the final part of her series focusing on Singapore’s “we-first” society, Nurul Aini exposes the underlying identity crisis the city-state still grapples with, sixty years after gaining its independence. In such a multicultural society, the debate around identity politics continues to rage on with no end in sight.
Meanwhile, Tri Vo writes about the recently concluded trade talks between the United States and Vietnam earlier this month. The talks, however, have repercussions for more than just Hanoi: in negotiating to achieve their own goals, will Vietnam inadvertently disadvantage other ASEAN member states, and in so doing, damage ASEAN unity itself?
Over in the Philippines, Arianne De Guzman reflects on the Miss Universe 2025 pageant. In a country widely viewed as a global beauty pageant powerhouse, the journey of this year’s Miss Universe Philippines is worth knowing, not only for what it reveals about the Filipino psyche, but also as a symbol of hope against adversity.
Singapore 🇸🇬
We-First Society (III): What are “We”? Contesting Identity Politics in Singapore
by Nurul Aini, in Singapore
In Prime Minister Lawrence Wong’s emphasis of the “we” before “me,” we question the extent of truly living up to the spirit of “we” when geopolitical and international events can send shockwaves through Singapore’s multicultural society.
In a Ministerial Statement released by the Coordinating Minister for National Security and Minister of Home Affairs K. Shanmugam on 14 October 2025, he affirmed that religion and politics should not mix in Singapore. He cited several historical and recent cases of foreign interference, such as the attempt of some members of the Parti Islam Se-Malaysia to influence the votes of the Malay/Muslim community during the 2025 elections. The statement also affirms that, although there are certain aspects of racial relations that are still a work in progress, Singapore’s non-majoritarian approach ensures that no one race can claim superiority on the basis of language, culture, or religion. In other parts of the statement, Shanmugam rejected the use of unhealthy identity politics while highlighting the opposition parties’ use of it.
In response to the statement made in Parliament, several opposition parties have stepped forward to question its nuances. The Workers’ Party, having been at the center of the critique of identity politics due to the case of the preacher Noor Deros, agreed that religion and politics should not mix in Singapore. However, they defended the timing of their response, arguing that an immediate response to Deros’ statement would only have elevated attention towards him during the heat of the elections.
Meanwhile, Dr. Chee Soon Juan, the Secretary-General of the Singapore Democratic Party (SDP) took to Instagram to refute the People’s Action Party’s (PAP) statement, on the basis that the government’s approach thus far has been playing on identity politics, citing examples such as the CMIO (Chinese, Malay, Indian, Others) categorization in identity cards and the Group Representative Constituency system, explaining that these reveal the irony in the PAP’s stance and only accentuate racial division. This is in light of Shanmugam’s spotlighting Damanhuri Abbas, an SDP member, who made a statement the PAP regarded as accusations against Malay PAP MPs and as advocating for more racial separation.
On the ground, existential questions on identity have emerged. Ilyas Sholihyn, the Editor-in-Chief of RICE Media, uses the word “penat” (tired), to characterize the many times that racial minorities have been placed in the spotlight — time and time again, it seems, racial minorities have to prove themselves as rational and loyal citizens to the country. He argues that this is particularly the case for the Malay/Muslim community, and that this spotlighting erodes the trust that the community is capable of standing firm against foreign interference. Ilyas suggests that there needs to be a clearer definition of what identity politics means within Singapore’s local politics.
Singapore’s more communitarian approach, where social order and social cohesion are valued, may hinder individuals from expressing complex emotions with regard to social and global issues that may affect our intersecting identities.
Undeniably, the nation is remarkably forward-looking in many of its policies. But it must presently confront the reality of its identity crisis.
Aini is currently pursuing a master’s degree in English literature at Nanyang Technological University. She has experience working in youth groups, contributing to the planning and management of outreach activities.
Vietnam 🇻🇳
Can US Tariffs Present a Stress Test for ASEAN Unity?
by Tri Vo, in Ho Chi Minh City
Across the meeting rooms of Washington, D.C., Vietnamese negotiators are walking a geo-economic high-wire that will have great significance for their country. The talks, whose fifth round ran from 12 to 14 November, were part of a series of deliberations to finalize a “balanced and fair” trade agreement with the US; yet, behind the hifalutin diplomatic language lies a set of stark differences between both sides that intimate the hard-edged nature of so high-stakes an event. The US is leveraging a punishing 20% “reciprocal tariff” to address a substantial US$111 billion trade deficit with Vietnam, a figure recorded in the first 10 months of 2025 alone. For Hanoi, the outcomes of such negotiations are nothing if not existential, as they will determine how well the country’s vital sectors — such as the electronics and textile sectors, the backbone of its economic growth engine — can weather the current tempest to continue buttressing its economic aspirations now and into the future.
The core of the negotiation is a painful trade-off. The US is wielding the 20% tariff as a “stick,” which was already negotiated down from an even more onerous rate of 46% announced in April 2025. Yet, the only “carrot” is the chance for specific Vietnamese exports to be granted a 0% rate by being listed under “Annex III” of a recent US Executive Order. In exchange, Vietnam must provide “preferential market access for substantially all U.S. industrial and agricultural exports” and dismantle its own non-tariff barriers, such as those protecting its indigenous, fledgling auto industry.
So high a price is something that Hanoi has proved willing to shoulder, given its ambitions for a lofty 10% GDP growth rate in 2026, a part of the grand strategy to transform Vietnam into a high-income economy by 2045. Without access to the US market, Vietnam’s largest export destination, it is doubtful whether Hanoi’s economic aspirations can be realized.
However, the implications of the US protectionist posture extend far beyond Vietnam. The US is not just negotiating with the country alone; it is establishing a blueprint for a new, much more commercially restrictive era of trade relations with all of ASEAN. This coercive, strictly bilateral framework, forcing individual nations to negotiate against a baseline of punitive tariffs, is already being applied to ASEAN member states, such as Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines.
This strategy effectively fragments the regional bloc, compelling ASEAN members into a near-zero-sum dynamic in which they must compete against one another for US market access. As Hanoi’s negotiators fight to shore up their trade position vis-à-vis the US, the rest of ASEAN is watching, not without some consternation and perturbation, as the gains of Hanoi can present potential losses to other states, given Washington’s constricted trade prospects during the second Trump administration. Consequently, this trajectory will prove perilous to ASEAN’s unity at a time of great global upheaval, when such a factor has assumed even greater significance than ever before. As such, in the pursuit of economic security in a region whose growth depends on external trade in an increasingly hostile commercial environment, regional unity might take a back seat to the future benefit of no one.
Tri has experience in management consulting and strategy, having worked with institutions such as the UNDP, The Asia Group, and ARC Group. He has provided strategic, legal, and operational insights to clients in sectors including manufacturing, energy, and technology. He holds both academic and professional experience related to Southeast and East Asia, with a focus on regional development and policy.
The Philippines 🇵🇭
How Miss Universe Philippines Ahtisa Manalo Built Symbolic Capital
by Arianne De Guzman, in Bulacan
On 21 November 2025, Ahtisa Manalo concluded her Miss Universe journey as the 3rd Runner-up – the first time that the country has reached the Top 5 since Miss Universe Philippines 2021, Beatrice Luigi Gomez. After the competition, she shared a video on Instagram with the caption, “Capping off my pageant journey with a quick look-back from where it all began.”
In the Philippines, the fascination with beauty pageants stems not just from entertainment preferences, but from deep historical, social, and cultural factors. Pageants function as social rituals that can promise visibility, recognition, and communal pride. As Gender Studies scholar J. Pilapil Jacobo notes, during American colonial rule, Filipinos were stripped of their own indigenous standards of body, character, and aesthetics, and beauty pageants have since allowed them to reclaim value, dignity, and recognition.
Today, the country has the most extensive grassroots-to-international pipeline — from competition in barangays to internationally recognized pageants, Filipinos at home and abroad have long celebrated pageants as integral cultural activities. Ranked as one of the poorest countries in the Southeast Asia region, the country commemorates victories in pageants that are rarely claimed in the political or economic arena, with beauty queens serving as a beacon of hope through their advocacies and capacity to raise social awareness.
Ahtisa Manalo’s own trajectory emerges from this ecosystem. Born into a low-income household, she began competing in pageants at the age of 10. In 2008, she won the title of Little Miss Enverga, which granted her an entire school year free of tuition fees. With the help of pageantry, Ahtisa was able to obtain a degree in accountancy, support her siblings’ education, and run two Australia-based cafes at the age of 20, as well as other food businesses based in the Philippines.
In a culture that prizes family loyalty and collective responsibility, Manalo’s lived experiences – her struggles, resilience, and motivation – exemplify cultural capital, which in turn form the symbolic value of her narrative. Her victory not only serves as a hope for many Filipinos but also enhances the Philippines’ global reputation, contributing to the nation’s social prestige. She strengthened this further through her engagement with Alon Akademie, a non-governmental organization that empowers children from disadvantaged communities through entrepreneurship. During the “Beyond the Crown” segment of the Miss Universe competition, she foregrounded the needs of around 2.1 million Filipino out-of-school youth, linking her story to a national issue.
Essayist and columnist Danton Relato observes that Manalo effectively converted her personal struggles into a form of cultural recognition by grounding her journey into clear advocacy and data-driven messaging. Her approach deeply resonated with Filipinos, allowing her pageant journey to function as symbolic capital that amplifies not only her individual ambition, but also the advocacy she promotes.
Ultimately, Ahtisa Manalo’s symbolic capital is not merely transactional, but relational. Personal hardship turned into shared visibility, not by simply being beautiful, but by presenting a culturally grounded story – and through that, she has acquired a rare form of social prestige that transcends the Miss Universe 2025 title.
Arianne has worked in legal research at the Philippines Department of Justice and in policy research at De La Salle University’s Jesse M. Robredo Institute of Governance, supporting projects on systemic reform. She holds a degree in Political Science from Colegio de San Juan de Letran and is pursuing a master’s in Sociology at the University of the Philippines Diliman. She is also involved in youth development and grassroots advocacy through the Rotaract Club of Santa Maria.
Editorial Deadline 25/11/2025 11:59 PM (UTC +8)
