Sleeping With One Eye Open
Issue 40 — Key Developments Across Brunei, Indonesia, and Malaysia
Editor’s Note
by Haniva Sekar Deanty, Lead Editor - Maritime Crescent Desk
On this week’s issue of the Maritime Crescent, Indonesia’s move to Siaga 1 projects urgency, however, Hree P. Samudra questions whether the country’s defence architecture can actually withstand sustained external pressure.
Edrina, in Malaysia, assesses the country’s contribution may pivot to energy security in a moment of geopolitical strain, but sometimes even resilience has its limits.
Meanwhile in Brunei, Syimah Johari reflects on the small state’s water infrastructure, where recurring disruptions reveal more than isolated technical failures.
Systems are often only predictable when pushed beyond routine. Indonesia, Malaysia, and Brunei are all operating in that in-between space. Not quite a crisis, but it is not stability either. It is one thing to speak of readiness. It is another to sustain it. In moments like these, you do not get to rest easy.
Indonesia 🇮🇩
A Middle Power Without the Architecture
by Hree Putri Samudra, in Jakarta
On March 1, Indonesia’s military commander issued Siaga 1, the highest peacetime alert level, in response to the widening Middle East war. The signal was meant to project resolve. But it inadvertently surfaced a harder question, one Jakarta has been avoiding for years. If a serious geopolitical shock hits, is Indonesia’s defense infrastructure actually capable of absorbing it? The honest answer, based on the military’s own disclosures, is probably not.
Indonesia sits astride four of the most consequential maritime chokepoints on earth. The Straits of Malacca, Sunda, Lombok, and Makassar together carry roughly a quarter of global seaborne trade. In any major disruption, whether a Hormuz closure, a Taiwan contingency, or sustained conflict radiating from the Persian Gulf, these waterways become strategic pressure points. Indonesia does not simply border them. It bears responsibility for their security. Yet the gap between that obligation and the capacity to meet it is striking.
In April 2025, Navy Chief of Staff Admiral Muhammad Ali told parliament that only about 60% of warships were operationally ready, meanwhile maritime patrol aircraft readiness stood at just 23.7%, leaving most grounded. The navy also carries roughly $191 million in unpaid fuel bills to Pertamina, undermining its ability to sustain patrols and enforce sovereignty. More alarming, Admiral Ali acknowledged that the navy lacks meaningful underwater surveillance—no seabed sensor or hydroacoustic monitoring—leaving Indonesia with limited ability to detect submarines transiting its archipelagic sea lanes under UNCLOS. Plans for a SOSUS-like network remain largely conceptual, with timelines stretching to 2044.
This has practical implications. The Australian Strategic Policy Institute argues that in a Taiwan contingency, Indonesia’s neutrality would depend entirely on persistent surveillance, the ability to detect and attribute military activity moving through its waters. Without that, neutrality becomes “declaratory rather than operational”, as gaps from short patrol cycles and intermittent coverage can be exploited.
Meanwhile, the broader modernization picture offers little comfort. The Minimum Essential Force targets expired in 2024 with the fleet still below planned strength. The navy’s expansion to five fleet commands will stretch an already thin force thinner. A recent War on the Rocks analysis warned that Indonesia “risks creating an increasingly modern fleet whose true potential remains unproven and strategic value remains underexploited”.
None of this, however, is irreversible as the corrective path is identifiable. Three shifts would fundamentally change the picture. First, Indonesia should accelerate undersea domain awareness through partnerships like the Quad’s support offer rather than waiting for a 2044 indigenous solution. Second, Jakarta needs to resolve the structural funding mismatch between the navy’s geographic mandate and its operational budget. Third, maritime patrol aircraft recapitalization should be treated not as a procurement wish list but as a national security emergency.
Indonesia’s political class speaks of sovereignty and strategic autonomy as though the words themselves were load-bearing. They are not. What bears the load is the capacity to surveil, to sustain, and to enforce. On each count, the gap between Indonesia’s ambition and its operational reality remains wide. Strategic environments do not wait for procurement cycles to finish.
Hree serves as Project Associate for Asia and the Pacific at the Global Network of Women Peacebuilders (GNWP), where she leads multi-country initiatives integrating Women, Peace and Security (WPS), and Youth, Peace and Security (YPS) frameworks into security policies across ASEAN and South Asia. She is also a Non-Resident Fellow at the University of Glasgow’s Atomic Anxiety in the New Nuclear Age program. Previously, she served as Chair of the Humanitarian Disarmament and Inclusive Governance Working Group at the British American Security Information Council (BASIC), advocating for more accountable and inclusive nuclear policy frameworks.
Malaysia 🇲🇾
Navigating the Fuel and Uncertainties from the Middle East Crisis
by Edrina Lisa Ozaidi, in WP Kuala Lumpur
When the United States and Israel launched coordinated strikes on Iran on February 28, the first casualty was not a military target; it was the Strait of Hormuz. Iran’s subsequent closure of the strait on March 2 effectively shut the throat through which a fifth of the world’s oil and liquefied natural gas normally flows. Panic buying erupted across the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam almost immediately. Malaysia, however, occupied an unusual position.
Unlike most of its ASEAN neighbours, Malaysia is a net oil and gas exporter. The country’s electricity grid draws 40 to 45 percent of its energy needs from natural gas, most of it sourced domestically from Kerteh and the Malaysia - Thailand Joint Development Area; supply chains that do not pass through the Strait of Hormuz. This structural insulation explains why Deputy Prime Minister Fadillah Yusof could state, on March 15, that domestic gas and power supplies remain stable and sufficient despite the ongoing West Asian conflict.
Yet stability today does not mean immunity tomorrow. The government has acknowledged that petroleum product supplies are sufficient until at least May 2026, and the Automatic Fuel Adjustment rate is projected to stay in rebate mode until April. But PETRA has also warned that if tensions persist and global fuel prices continue to climb, that position may change in subsequent months. Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim has been candid that existing fuel subsidies can be maintained for “one or two months”, framing the current calm as a bridge, not a destination.
The deeper tension is one of weaponised interdependence. A country that is a net exporter can still be economically damaged by a conflict it did not start and cannot end. Higher oil prices may boost Petronas revenues, but they also raise production costs for Malaysia’s export markets in the US, Europe, and China which then soften external demand for electronics and manufactured goods. War-risk insurance premiums and surging tanker charter rates compound the friction across a trade-dependent economy that exceeded RM3 trillion in total trade in 2025.
The crisis has, perhaps usefully, accelerated a conversation Malaysia was already having with itself. Economy Minister Akmal Nasrullah has pointed to the National Energy Transition Roadmap, targeting net-zero by 2050 as the structural answer. Domestically generated solar and hydropower are immune to Strait of Hormuz closures and geopolitical pressure by definition. Every unit of renewable capacity built is, in effect, a hedge against the next crisis in West Asia.
For now, Malaysia manages from a position of relative strength. The harder question where the upcoming National Economic Action Council meeting will begin to address is whether this moment of managed stability becomes the catalyst for the deeper structural shifts the country needs. In an era where energy is increasingly wielded as leverage, self-sufficiency may be the most durable foreign policy Malaysia can pursue.
Edrina is a communications professional with a background in international relations. She holds a degree from the University of Nottingham Malaysia and has worked across public relations and social media for organizations in the development, education, and corporate sectors. Her work focuses on crafting narratives around regional affairs and strengthening media engagement across Southeast Asia.
Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳
Brunei’s Water Infrastructure Under Strain
by Syimah Johari, in Bandar Seri Begawan
Brunei has recently faced recurring water supply disruptions. Earlier this year alone, there were two to three water disruptions caused by damages to mainline piping. One severe incident occurred when the main pipes in Kampong Batang Mitus burst following a landslide. The Public Works Department (JKR) announced urgent pipe repairs, resulting in water outages lasting several days. During this time, residents were forced to seek alternatives to access water, with some temporarily checking into hotels in unaffected areas while others moved in with relatives. Hospitals, schools and businesses activated their contingency plans.
On 6 March, JKR reported that pipe repairs along the Muara-Tutong highway would also disrupt nearby water supplies. While such announcements are often framed as routine infrastructure updates, the frequency of these incidents raises a broader question: why do these disruptions escalate so quickly, and how can water infrastructure be made more resilient?
The country’s main water supply relies on major transmission pipelines that carry water from treatment plants to large populations. These infrastructures are particularly vulnerable to environmental conditions such as weather and terrain. During the northeast monsoon, periods of intense rainfall increase the risk of flooding and landslides. When pipelines are damaged, the impact can extend across districts due to the centralised nature of the system.
In response to such incidents, authorities typically issue public notifications and deploy repair teams to restore damaged infrastructure. However, adverse weather can complicate repairs and delay the restoration of supply. As part of contingency plans, JKR has mobilised water deliveries to critical facilities and deployed blue water tanks at several locations for public access. While these emergency measures provided short-term relief, they are often limited in scale and cannot fully substitute a continuous piped water supply. Some areas continue to experience recovery periods even after repairs, highlighting the structural vulnerabilities of the system.
These disruptions are not new to the country. Many of Brunei’s water infrastructure systems date back to the 1980s and 1990s, and incidents of theft involving wiring, cables, and pumps further exacerbate the problem. In response, the country has focused on strengthening monitoring and improving maintenance of water infrastructure.
Following the recent Legislative Council Meeting held on 14 March, it was also announced that under the 12th National Development Plan, there are plans to upgrade aging water infrastructure and improve facilities to support both households and future industrial development. Such investments are expected to strengthen the long-term resilience of Brunei’s water supply system.
Even with these investments, the recent disruptions show how deeply water access affects everyday life. For many residents, outages are not just a temporary inconvenience but the need to rearrange daily routines, seek alternative places to stay, or search for available water supplies. As infrastructure continues to age and weather conditions become more unpredictable, building a more resilient system will be increasingly important. Ensuring a stable or reliable water supply will not only support households and businesses, but also provide communities with the certainty that essential services can continue without prolonged disruption.
Syimah is a graduate of King’s College London with a BA in International Relations. With a strong focus on diplomacy, regional cooperation, and development policy, she is passionate about contributing to meaningful change through public service. Currently, she is involved in poverty alleviation work through a local NGO.
Editorial Deadline 14/03/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)
