Stepping on the Gas Pedal
Issue 56 — Key Developments Across Brunei, Indonesia, and Malaysia
Editor’s Note
by Siu Tzyy Wei, Lead Editor - Maritime Crescent Desk
This week, the Maritime Crescent finds itself crouched at the starting line of change, ready to accelerate.
In Indonesia, Nadiem Makarim’s sentencing shows what happens when attempts at reform outpaces the laws meant to protect it. Normally seen as the quiet whisper of the region, Brunei recently raised its voice for a regional infrastructure in tackling digital extremism sentiment. In a revisit of Malaysia’s story, new generation of doctors continue running full speed for the lives of their patients amidst a healthcare system long overdue for an upgrade.
This week’s stories move at different speeds but toward the same finish line: a region learning that standing still is no longer an option.
Indonesia 🇮🇩
The Cost of Competence
by Muhammad Rayhansyah Jasin
On June 30, the Jakarta Corruption Criminal Court sentenced Nadiem Anwar Makarim — GoJek founder and Indonesia’s former Minister of Education and Culture (2019–2024) — to 10 years in prison for his alleged corruption in dealing with the Chromebook procurement program for schools that occurred between 2019-2022. The verdict: a fine of Rp1 billion and Rp 809 billions of restitution money, due within a month of the sentencing, or face an additional five years of jail time. The court stated that the Chromebook procurement had been shaped by Google’s influence and ended up profiting Gojek to which Nadiem had claimed no involvement whatsoever. He has vowed to appeal, arguing that the case rests on an investigative error that overlooked how the procurement had actually saved money for the digitalization program. Despite no evidence of money flow towards Nadiem’s personal wealth, the judges reasoned that Nadiem’s decision still resulted in state financial loss and went against the corruption eradication goal. Notably, one of the five presiding judges dissented, stating that Nadiem’s malicious intention was never proven as stated in the public indictment.
Since his September 2025 arrest, Nadiem’s case drew significant public attention; from failed pre-trial appeal to overturn his suspect designation to repeated suspensions of court proceedings, and alleged intimidation tactics after military personnel were dispatched during Nadiem’s indictment session. Two dozen members of academia and anti-corruption NGOs also filed a legal brief by external parties in support of Nadiem, arguing that corruption charges should hinge on proven intent to enrich oneself or associates and not merely on the existence of state losses. Nadiem’s conviction risks criminalizing ordinary policy judgment calls, chilling future bureaucratic reform. Although the court accepted the plea, the verdict’s central reasoning was not that Nadiem made the wrong decision, but rather that the whole decision-making process had violated standard operating procedure and constituted systematic abuse of power.
Foreign investors have watched closely this trial and Nadiem’s verdict could add growing concerns over the fragility of rule-of-law in Southeast Asia’s largest economy. Predictability of doing business in Indonesia has been in limbo as President Prabowo Subianto’s militaristic leadership style chips away at the private sector. As Nadiem’s case became the latest display of prosecution against talented Indonesians that push against bureaucratic traditions, international confidence in Indonesia’s institutional capacity continues to dwindle in the face of authoritarian overreach that seems to conflate unlucky decisions with white collar crime. When that line is blurred, the risk is not just to one former minister or future political appointees, it is to the willingness of any public officials to take real transformative action in reforming bureaucracy. Which standard wins out in a given policy environment may depend less on legal doctrine than political alignments - a new battleground for future decisions.
Rayhan is pursuing an Erasmus Mundus Joint Master’s Degree in Public Policy at Central European University and the Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals. He holds a Bachelor of Social Sciences in International Relations and Political Economy from Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University. His current research focuses on the socio-economic impacts of Indonesia’s nickel mining industry on local communities and national development.
Brunei Darussalam 🇧🇳
Brunei, the SOCTPF, and CT Cooperation
by Wira Gregory Ejau, in Bandar Seri Begawan
On June 23 in Bangkok, Brunei and Thailand co-chaired the fifth Sub-Regional Counter-Terrorism Policy Forum (SOCTPF), bringing together senior officials from the eight countries - Australia, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand to address terrorism and violent extremism, with a specific focus on the digital domain. Brunei’s delegation was led by Acting Permanent Secretary for Security and Law at the Prime Minister’s Office, Awang Zulhusam bin Haji Abdul Samad.
The SOCTPF sits beneath the Sub-Regional Meeting on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Security at the ministerial level, and has operated since 2021 as the senior officials’ mechanism for translating that ministerial mandate into practical sub-regional cooperation. Notably, its membership includes Australia and New Zealand, both Five Eyes partners, participating alongside six Southeast Asian states in a forum that bridges Indo-Pacific CT cooperation across intelligence-sharing traditions and regional security architectures that do not always operate from common assumptions.
The substantive focus of the meeting was the accelerating use of digital infrastructure. Encrypted applications, gaming platforms, AI-generated content, and deepfakes by extremist networks for radicalisation and recruitment were discussed at length. While these are not novel concerns, the forum’s treatment of them has matured to center on building shared analytical tools for measuring and monitoring the conditions where radicalisation occurs online.
The most significant specific outcome is Brunei’s proposal for a Sub-Regional Sentiment Analysis Framework, which is a mechanism designed to operationalise the forum’s existing Glossary of Extremist Content Online into a common reference standard for tracking extremism sentiment across the sub-region’s digital spaces. The prior generation of sub-regional CT work concentrated on intelligence exchange, legal frameworks, and the movement of individuals. What Brunei is proposing is a shared methodological infrastructure of a mechanism for measuring the environment that produces threats. That is a more sophisticated and arguably more durable instrument, and it positions the SOCTPF’s outputs within a broader evidence-based policy framework at a time when the ASEAN Bali Work Plan on radicalisation and violent extremism is due for renewal.
Brunei has no significant domestic terrorism problem, and does not bring to this forum the operational depth of Indonesia who has dismantled major networks and prosecuted hundreds of terrorism cases, or the intelligence weight of the Five Eyes members at the table. Instead, it provides a level of institutional investment and analytical initiative through the Sentiment Analysis Framework. This contribution may yet prove to be technically ambitious, regionally applicable, and developed by a state whose value in the forum is not derived from the scale of the threat it faces at home.
Brunei will host the 6th SOCTPF in Bandar Seri Begawan in 2027, co-chaired with Malaysia, with the framework as its intended key deliverable. Whether the mechanism achieves the sub-regional uptake required to make it operationally meaningful will depend on how consistently the eight member states can align their definitions, data standards, and monitoring practices, but the 2027 forum will be Brunei’s moment to show whether the proposal survives translation from concept into shared regional practice.
Gregory is an MSc candidate in Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. He works as a freelance writer specializing in international history, conflict, and counterterrorism, with experience in academia, investigative journalism, and voluntary uniformed service. He currently provides research assistance with the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) under their Southeast Asian Security and Defence Internship Programme and conducts investigations on regional security and transnational crime for a confidential company.
Malaysia 🇲🇾
Worn to the Bone
by Edrina Lisa Ozaidi, in WP Kuala Lumpur
We have often heard about the bustling, scary scenario in the emergency department of a hospital. Teleseries or medical dramas have taught us one thing — it takes a lot of staff to run a department smoothly. The Malaysian medical sector, however, faces a major crisis of staff retention, especially among junior doctors who battle against job security and burnout.
To understand the severity of the issue, one must understand the progression of problems. Back in 2016, the lack of permanent vacancies prompted the government to introduce the 5-year contract system, where junior doctors will serve 3 years of housemanship plus 2 years of compulsory placement. For those intending to specialise, 2 more years are needed.
This has caused a two-tier workforce, doctors who are already in placement and contract doctors that face a ceiling. While the placement was meant to address oversupply of talent and budgetary constraints, it further caused disparity, significant job insecurity, and career and specialisation pathways among junior doctors.
The suppressed frustration then caused a movement where doctors staged a nationwide strike during the pandemic. Unfortunately, the solution that was prompted by the government was to open more permanent posts and grant Hadiah Latihan Persekutuan (HLP) eligibility to contract officers to mediate the current tension while the systemic flaws are not yet addressed.
By 2025 and the current year, more systemic failures become more noticeable. The government also introduced a shift system intended to replace 24-hour-on-call shifts with 18-hour shifts. However, this integrated on-call hours into the regular work week, causing doctors to lose weekdays on-call allowances, a move that was criticised by the doctors association as a pay cut in disguise.
Recently, the health director-general issued a landmark circular capping house officer hours at 60-62 hours per week and strictly prohibiting 24-hour shifts. The new mandates also mention the implementation of three flexible work shifts (morning, evening, night), without considering the number of housemen available.
The directive stipulates that in the event of a lack of medical officers, the clinical workload for evening and night shifts must be borne entirely by medical officers and specialists to ensure compliance with house officers’ rest periods.
Private doctors’ associations call out that 60 hours remain burdensome compared to the international 40-hour standard (based in UK), while calling for the government to address the systemic failures. Unlike an official cap on trainee doctors’ work hours in Malaysia’s public service, medical officers often work 33 hours on-call shifts.
Recent statistics also reveal more systemic failure, where out of 5,000 housemanship positions offered, only 529 graduates reported for duty. While fewer graduates enter the public system, the burden on existing staff increases. Despite higher on-call allowances (raised by 40% in Budget 2026) and relocation aids, doctors are leaving for the private sector or overseas for better opportunities and pay, and Malaysia needs to step up in its system to ensure the rate of doctors’ retention improves.
Edrina is a communications professional with a background in international relations. She holds a degree from the University of Nottingham Malaysia and has worked across public relations and social media for organizations in the development, education, and corporate sectors. Her work focuses on crafting narratives around regional affairs and strengthening media engagement across Southeast Asia.
Editorial Deadline 04/07/2026 11:59 PM (UTC +8)
